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The AKP's Authoritarian, Islamist Populism: Carving out a New Turkey

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The AKP's Authoritarian, Islamist Populism: Carving out a New Turkey ECPS Party Profile Series #4 February 2021 AUTHOR: Ihsan Yilmaz The AKP’s Authoritarian, Islamist Populism: Carving out a New Turkey www.populismstudies.org The AKP’s Authoritarian, Islamist Populism: Carving out a New Turkey BY IHSAN YILMAZ ABSTRACT The global tide of populism will leave a profound mark on Turkey. The ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) success during the past two decades, has hinged on Islamist authoritarian populism and been driven by its long-time leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. “New Turkey” is now a reality. The AKP has been successful at dismantling the Kemalist ideals – ironically, perhaps, by using similarly repressing techniques, such as cracking down on civil liberties and democratic rights. IHSAN YILMAZ is Research Professor and Chair of Islamic Studies and Inter- cultural Dialogue at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globali- sation (ADI), Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia. ECPS Leader Profile Series offer analyses of political leaders and promi- nent public figures with populist tendencies. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed by the author are only attributable him and not to any institution with which they are associated. The profile available for free downloading from the ECPS website (www. populismstudies.org) ©ECPS 2021 ECPS | 155 Wetstraat, Rue de la loi, 1040 Brussels, Belgium | Tel: (+32) 246 583 18 | www.populismstudies.org Table of contents 1. THE SURVIVAL OF ISLAMIC PARTIES IN TURKEY ��������������������������������������4 2. TIP OF THE ICEBERG: TWO SIDES OF THE AKP ���������������������������������������� 6 3. THE AKP AND ITS ‘NEW TURKEY’ ������������������������������������������������������������������� 13 4. THE AKP’S FUTURE . .15 CONCLUSION . .16 REFERENCES . .17 Late Islamist populist politician Necmettin Erbakan. the last remnant of the “caliphate” – the The Survival of new Republic isolated a large number of conservative citizens. The focus on nation- Islamic Parties in alism also isolated a significant number of non-Sunni Muslims, non-Muslims, and Turkey non-Turks. The Republic of Turkey was born in The leaders of the Justice and Devel- the aftermath of the fall of the Ottoman opment Party (AKP) initially positioned Empire, a symbol of power in the Muslim itself as a populist party that voiced the world for over six centuries. The decay and anxieties and grievances of the populace eventual collapse of the Ottomans follow- by not only representing the conservative ing the First World War left the former factions but also a number of individuals/ Ottoman populace facing an identity cri- groups who felt rejected by Kemalist prin- sis. With the monarchy disbanded, Turkey ciples. embarked on a transformative journey –a new republic under the leadership of Mus- Yet, during its two decades in power, the tafa Kemal Ataturk, who is credited with AKP has increasingly identified with the moulding the country in his image. The “black Turks,” those who felt excluded by “Kemalist” ideology hinges on six pillars: the politics of the “white Turks.” However, republicanism, nationalism, statism, pop- this has merely isolated the “white Turks.” ulism, laicism, and reformism, all standing Power, in contemporary Turkey, now rests in sharp contrast with traditional Ottoman with religiously “pure” Sunni-Turks pre- Muslim culture (Los Angeles Times, 1991). dominantly from Anatolia. This populace embraces their “glorious” Ottoman past For approximately eight decades, Ke- and seeks vengeance for decades of being malism prevailed as the state’s main nar- wronged by Western powers and the rative, with its intense focus on a homo- “white Turks,” who are held up as repre- geneous nation rooted in Turkish identity sentatives of Western ideals. These “black and disassociated from its Ottoman past. Turks” – deeply religious, predominantly However, since the core of Ottoman rule Anatolian Sunni Muslims – are “the peo- was religion – the Ottoman Empire was ple.” 4 The AKP has been successful at ma- noeuvring its way into power by tapping into the population’s latent anxiety, para- noia, resentment, a sense of victimhood. ,, The party has further divided Turkey between “the people” and “the other.” Increasingly, it uses the same tactics to Traditionally, the highly defend its autocratic tendencies (Yilmaz secularized military had & Bashirov, 2018). The AKP’s populism has kept major Islamist parties gradually eroded Kemalist nationalism, birthing a new institutionalized narra- at bay, while the majori- tive for Turkish citizenry – a “New Turkey” ty of the public had been (Yilmaz, Caman & Bashirov, 2020). The AKP “secularized” by the ide- has constructed this counter ideology using autocratic populism legitimized by als of Kemalism. Yet, eight Islamist nationalism (Yilmaz & Bashirov, decades of crafting a new 2018). identity amongst a highly diverse and somewhat reli- The AKP is the first successful mod- ern Islamist party to complete its term gious populace had created in power, in Turkey. Formed in 2001, the fissures in the society. party comes from a line of members who have either been directly involved with or influenced by a series of right-wing ideol- ogies, primarily from Necmettin Erbakan ist ideology. The disbanded members of and his political parties. Erbakan’s Milli the FP formed two separate parties – the Gorus (National View) had, since the 1970s, AKP and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi – given a generation of Turkish politicians SP) (Koni, Rosli, & Zin, 2015). a right-wing, pan-Islamic inspiration and direction. Milli Gorus focused on calling Traditionally, the highly secularized Muslims to save Islam from becoming military had kept major Islamist parties at lost in Western values, thus calling Mus- bay, while the majority of the public had lim “brothers” to unite in their efforts been “secularized” by the ideals of Kemal- against the quote “Zionist” lobby. Erbakan, ism. Yet, eight decades of crafting a new throughout his life, was a vocal critic of identity amongst a highly diverse and the West and “Zionists.” He was known for somewhat religious populace had created his anti-Zionist, anti-Semitic statements: fissures in the society. Not only did Sunni Muslim factions feel marginalized, but so “All Infidel nations are one Zionist enti- too did Kurds (15-20 percent of the coun- ty”; “Jews want to rule from Morocco to try’s population) and Alevi (10-15 percent Indonesia”; “The Zionists worked for 5,767 of the population). These groups were years to build a world order in which all institutionally discriminated against or money and power depend on Jews”; “The denied recognition, all in an effort to form US dollar is Zionist money”; “The Jewish a singular Turkish identity. This would be ‘bacteria’ must be diagnosed for a cure an ideal citizen, the secularized Sunni Turk to be found”; “Zionists initiated the Cru- (Yilmaz, Barton & Barry, 2017). sades”; “Jews founded Protestantism and the Capitalist order”; “Bush attacked Iraq Widespread discrimination created to build Greater Israel, so Jesus can return” resentment against the Kemalist govern- (Vielhaber, 2012). ments. The AKP found an opportunity in this growing discontentment. It emerged Founding members of the AKP, includ- as a “Muslim Democrat” party that would ing Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul represent the discontented Sunni conser- and Bulent Arinc, were raised on such vatives and historically marginalized eth- rhetoric. They would eventually belong to nic and religious factions. In 2001, the AKP the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi – FP). The broke away from the Milli Gorus doctrine FP was banned for violations against the and positioned itself as a centre-right par- constitution, which protected the Kemal- ty. It was for the people and an answer to 5 the rifts within society. AKP evolved into a populist authoritarian party. While the AKP took a more reformist agenda with younger leaders from the In 2007, to secure a second term in former party, SP was led by Erbakan and office, the AKP showed an early sign of its a group of older Sunni Muslim men who populism. Under Kemalist principles, to stood by their hard-line views rooted in modernize and secularize society, women Milli Gorus. The AKP craftily separated were barred from wearing a headscarf in itself as a reformed religiously “moderate” public offices and educational institutions. democratic party that offered an alter- The AKP predominantly represented Mus- native to the status quo – the promise of lims; the potential first lady wore a head- liberalized Islamic democracy. One of Er- scarf. This was a point of contention –a dogan’s statement shows how he viewed clash of two ideologies, between the Ke- the new party: “We don’t need bearded malists and the AKP. As the AKP sought to men who are good Koran reciters; we reverse this ban, they were met by harsh need people who do their job properly” criticism from the military, a digital cam- (Genc, 2019). paign called “a digital coup”, and massive “Republican Rallies” in major cities calling The February 28, 1997, came down hard out the increasing role of Islam in the sup- on Islamists and other non-Kemalist par- posedly secular fabric of Turkish society. ties. The AKP’s earliest version used this oppression to position itself as a better al- terative compared to the “secular elite” led by the military establishment. It became the voice of “the people”: Erdogan prom- ,, ised the party was dedicated to the wel- fare of the people rather than any ideolo- gy or personal agendas. “A cadre will run In a bid to stop the AKP, a the party,” he said, “and decisions won’t be trial was launched by the taken under the shadow of one leader…” military to keep the party in His role was that of an “orchestra chief,” check. The trial did not lead in his own words. The “age of me-centred to the AKP being banned, politics is over,” he insisted (Genc, 2019). but severely limited the The AKP cautiously stepped into the corri- dors of power in 2002, winning 34.28 per- party’s funding.
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