A Case Study in Afghanistan

Multi-purpose AFGHANISTAN Cash and Sectoral CASE Outcomes STUDY

May 2018 Sara Pavanello Acronyms

CVWG Cash and Vouchers Working Group

ERM Emergency Response Mechanism

LAS Land Allocation Scheme

MEB Minimum Expenditure Basket

PDM Post Distribution Monitoring

SMEB Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket

Layout & Design: BakOS DESIGN Table of Contents

Executive Summary...... 2 Key Findings: Sectors ...... 3

Introduction...... 5 Limitations...... 5

Multipurpose cash in Afghanistan...... 6 Overview of the UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation Cash Grant...... 6 Other multipurpose cash programmes in Afghanistan...... 7 Value of the UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation Cash Grant...... 8 Monitoring of the Repatriation Cash Grant ...... 9

Multipurpose cash and protection...... 11

Multipurpose cash and sectoral outcomes: key findings...... 14 Food Security...... 14 Livelihoods ...... 15 Shelter...... 17 Energy and the Environment...... 20 WASH...... 21 Health...... 22 Education...... 22 Complementarity with other programmes...... 23

Conclusions...... 25

References...... 26

Annex 1: Overview of the cost of basic commodities for 2016 ...... 27

Annex 2: List of key informants and FGDs conducted in Afghanistan...... 28

1 © UNHCR/Sebastian Rich

Executive Summary

The repatriation cash grant has helped Afghan search of jobs. Systematic engagement, support returnees from Pakistan to meet a number of and coaching of potential returnees could be basic needs upon return. The cash grant is used provided in the country of asylum to capture for transportation costs, to buy food and address existing skills and explore promising livelihoods important shelter needs, thus contributing to opportunities in return areas. Providing part of the aspects of reintegration. At the same time, poor cash grant as start-up capital (for some) could also security of tenure and quality of shelter point to the be explored as a more effective way to ensure challenges of ensuring quality of shelter outcomes livelihood outcomes. with the cash grant only, in the notable absence of technical and legal support, including provision of The findings also show the limits of the repatriation legal assistance, and advice on Housing Land and cash grant in addressing systemic barriers of Property (HLP) rights and property law. access to education, including entrenched gender- based norms that prevent girls’ enrolment in Only a small minority of male returnees were schools and a cumbersome and expensive process found to have used the repatriation cash grant as that makes recognition of school certificates difficult a springboard for livelihood investments. The lack to attain. Cash alone has not helped beneficiaries of jobs was reported by virtually all interviewees to safely return to non-conflict affected areas; as a major challenge, also driving further migration many have become IDPs in a matter of weeks or of young males back to Pakistan and elsewhere in months following return and in the process have

2 Key Findings: Sectors

Food security been exposed to significant protection threats and sustained additional costs (e.g. transport, Returnee monitoring reports indicate that the bulk food, shelter), some of which have been covered of the repatriation cash grant is spent on food, but with the grant. More substantial investments in no additional information is provided on related communication campaigns in the country of asylum food security gains. is one step that could be explored to minimize return to conflict-affected areas. Livelihoods

Developing a theory of change, unpacking The repatriation cash grant has catalyzed and clearly stating programme objectives, and investments in livelihoods for a very small minority. determining the value of the repatriation cash Scarce and poorly paid livelihood opportunities grant on the basis of MEB or SMEB calculations in are prompting further migration of male youth coordination with other cash initiatives and actors to Pakistan. Despite recent focus by UNHCR on in the country are all critical steps to improve the livelihood activities as a way to mitigate protection quality of monitoring, effectively measure progress risks, and on strengthening linkages between towards more clearly defined objectives, and humanitarian and development programming ensure transparency and communication to other through partnerships, very limited support to stakeholders. livelihood activities was found in the areas visited.

3 MULTI-PURPOSE CASH AND SECTORAL OUTCOMES

Systematic engagement, support and coaching health needs. Mechanisms to identify vulnerable of potential returnees could start in Pakistan returnees, including those with serious medical to capture existing skills and discuss potential conditions, are in place but some may be falling investments in small enterprises or livelihoods through the cracks; the difficulties associated with activities upon return, as informed by socio- tracking returnees and the pattern of secondary economic profiling and market analysis (in displacement may be among the reasons. development). Providing part of the cash grant as start-up capital (for some) could also be explored Education as a more effective way to ensure livelihood outcomes. Distance to public school and entrenched gender norms were found to be key barriers of access Shelter to education that the repatriation cash grant has been unable to redress. The inclusion of The repatriation cash grant has made important returnee children in the education system was also contributions to shelter needs, enabling returnee hampered by a lengthy and expensive process that beneficiaries to rent a home upon return, buy made recognition of school certificates extremely land, and/or construct houses. That said, weak difficult to attain. There may be a stronger role for security of tenure and poor quality of shelter UNHCR in collaboration with other actors such as indicate the difficulties of ensuring quality of shelter UNICEF to advocate with the Ministry of Education outcomes with multipurpose cash only, without to develop a simplified process and potentially complementary legal, technical or in-kind support. redress supply-side barriers of access to education.

Assistance and advice in legal matters, on HLP rights, property law, land tenure and occupancy certificates, and advocacy are all of critical importance to support returnees to make informed decisions when investing the repatriation cash grant in land or housing.

Energy and the Environment

Part of the repatriation cash grant has been used by beneficiaries who returned during winter months in 2016 to buy fuel for heating and warm clothes.

WASH

A small part of the repatriation cash grant has been used in some returnee households to address the specific hygiene needs of women and girls. Some females however reported asking their husbands to buy sanitary pads on their behalf, but they refused, considering purchases of Menstrual Hygiene supplies as superfluous expenses.

Health

Health was not a widespread expenditure among returnees interviewed; only a very small number reported having used the bulk of cash to address

4 Introduction

As ample evidence of the past ten years Limitations demonstrates, cash is an important part of the humanitarian toolbox that can allow people The case study in Afghanistan was faced with two to meet their basic needs effectively and with main limitations. Security concerns restricted field dignity. Little evidence however exists on how visits to specific locations in the outskirts of Kabul far multipurpose cash contributes to sectoral and Mazar-i-Sharif (Mazar), Balkh Province, that outcomes in health, WASH, shelter, food security were deemed safe for the research to take place. and nutrition, education, livelihoods, energy and Also, UNHCR Sub Office staff in Mazar were unable environment programming, and how sectoral to locate returnees from Iran1 or other countries. As interventions should include multipurpose cash a result, FGD participants only comprised Afghan along with accompanying support activities to best returnee beneficiaries of the UNHCR repatriation reach intended sectoral outcomes that contribute cash grant who returned from Pakistan in 2016 to protection. and 2017. Therefore, this review acknowledges that FGD findings presented here relate only to a This case study in Afghanistan is part of a review specific sub-group of beneficiaries of the UNHCR commissioned by UNHCR to investigate the repatriation cash grant. The findings are not contribution of multipurpose cash assistance representative of the whole returnee beneficiary in meeting sectoral outcomes, the activities population and are not generalizable to other and interventions that can best complement returnee groups (e.g. documented returnees who multipurpose cash in different sectors, and related returned before 2016, returnees from Iran and other challenges, gaps and opportunities. This case countries, and undocumented returnees). study focuses on the Voluntary Repatriation Cash Grant delivered by UNHCR to eligible documented returnees to provide the means to meet basic needs in the first phase upon return.

This case study relied on a mainly qualitative methodology and collected primary and secondary data through key informant interviews with UNHCR Afghanistan and other organizations such as UN agencies, INGOs and national NGOs. In addition, returnee monitoring data provided by UNHCR on the cash programme under analysis and other relevant studies were used, as well as Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with beneficiaries of multipurpose cash assistance. More details on the methodology are found in the main review, and participants of key informant interviews and FGDs conducted in Afghanistan can be found in Annex 3.

1 The number of returnees from Iran and other countries is very low. Most of those returning from Iran are individual students who return for a short period of time to obtain necessary documentation and return back to Iran to continue their education.

5 © UNHCR/Sebastian Rich

Multipurpose cash in Afghanistan

Overview of the UNHCR Voluntary as “a protection tool that provides the means to Repatriation Cash Grant meet basic needs in the first phase upon return and the freedom of choice to determine a family’s The Voluntary Repatriation Cash Grant (repatriation priorities. Furthermore, it gives direction to future cash grant) has been delivered by UNHCR since re-integration prospects”. 2002 to support Afghan refugees in Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Russia, India The one-off repatriation cash grant is delivered and other countries2 to address their immediate to eligible documented returnees3 at one of the needs for food, shelter and other necessities four UNHCR encashment centres located in upon return to Afghanistan. UNHCR Afghanistan Kabul (Kabul city), Nangarhar (Samarkhail area (2017a: 10) defines the repatriation cash grant in Jalalabad city), Kandahar (Kandahar city) and

2 Returnees from India, Russia and other far off countries are provided with an air ticket, support with border formalities, and pre-departure food allowances (Altai Consulting, 2009). 3 For returnees from Pakistan and Iran: registered Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan holding a Proof of Registration (PoR) card issued by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) with an expiry date of 31 December 2015; Afghan refugees residing in Iran holding a valid Amayesh Cards issued by the Government of Iran (UNHCR Afghanistan, 2017).

6 Herat (Herat city) in Afghanistan. After arrival at reliance opportunities, and uncertainty regarding the encashment centre, the repatriation cash renewal of Proof of Registration cards. Other grant is disbursed as cash in hand to the head of confluent factors included the introduction of a the household in USD, through a Money Service border management regime affecting the traditional Provider (MSP) using the hawala system (UNHCR irregular cross-border movements of Afghans, and Afghanistan, 2017). A range of complementary a campaign by the Government of Afghanistan to services and awareness-raising activities are encourage all refugees to return. The number of provided free of charge to returnees at encashment returnees from Pakistan spiked during the second centres by UNHCR and other actors, including half of 2016 to nearly 370,000 (363,227), compared basic health care, polio and measles vaccinations to nearly 7,000 in the second half of 2017 (UNHCR for children (Ministry of Public Health supported by Afghanistan, 2016b). WHO and UNICEF), mine-risk briefings (Coordinated by UNMAS, carried-out by Danish Demining Group/ DDG), a ‘back to school’ campaign (UNICEF/Ministry Other multipurpose cash of Education), and identification of Persons with programmes in Afghanistan Specific Needs (PSNs) (UNHCR Afghanistan, 2017a). The 2018–2021 Humanitarian Response Plan for At the time of writing, in March 2018, the cash Afghanistan includes a section on multipurpose grant value was set at an average of 200 USD cash assistance, as part of operational response per person. As indicated by UNHCR respondents, plans. This reflects the growing use of multipurpose according to the Voluntary Repatriation Forms cash by different humanitarian actors in the country database, the average Afghan returnee family is as a key response modality “to help shock-affected six individuals and as such the total grant value people [mainly IDPs] meet their basic needs in a a household typically receives is around 1,200 manner that upholds their dignity” (HRP, 2018: 40). USD. The cash grant is calculated to account for The main coordination mechanism is the Cash and two main components: transport, of an average of Voucher Working Group (CVWG), co-chaired by the 50 USD per person,4 and an initial reintegration Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and World Food component of 150 USD per person to address Programme Council (WFP) and of which UNHCR is immediate needs. part.

As explained by UNHCR staff, the value of the Since 2011, European Civil Protection and cash grant has been gradually increased over Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) has been the years to adjust to changes in commodity funding a rapid-response mechanism implemented prices and inflation rates, on the basis of in-house by seven INGOs5 to meet the emergency food, market assessments. At the end of June 2016 shelter/NFIs, protection and WASH needs of until 03 April 2017, the cash grant was doubled internally displaced persons (IDPs) affected by from an average of 200 to 400 USD per person. conflict or natural disasters across Afghanistan This coincided with the deterioration of bilateral (CaLP, 2017). The multipurpose cash transfer is relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan in distributed to targeted IDP households in two 2016 and the consequent reduced protection instalments across consecutive months and environment for all Afghans, including registered its value has not been fixed across Emergency refugees in several areas of Pakistan. Escalating Response Mechanism (ERM) partners (HRP, 2017). protection threats at the time included decreased However, ERM partners in coordination with acceptance by hosting communities, police the CVWG and on the basis of existing cluster harassment and arbitrary detentions, loss of self- standards (e.g. food, NFI) have recently developed

4 The exact value of the transportation component depends on the travel distance from returnees’ place of residence in the country of asylum and place of origin in Afghanistan. 5 NRC, DRC, PIN, ACF, Solidarities International, DACAAR and ACTED.

7 MULTI-PURPOSE CASH AND SECTORAL OUTCOMES

a Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB), needs (and exactly which basic needs) and to which is expected to provide guidance in the give “direction to future re-integration prospects” determination of the cash value. The total SMEB (Ibid.). In turn it would help clearly spell out which is 30,000 AFN (435 USD) and split across two outcomes in each sector might be possible to monthly instalments: 18,000 AFN (260 USD) during achieve. Some of the questions at the heart of this the first month and 12,000 AFN (175 USD) during exercise are: the second month. • What does “re-integration” in the context of Afghanistan mean? IOM supports undocumented returnees6 from Pakistan and Iran with cash assistance aiming at • What are the key aspects, components and meeting cross-sectoral needs. The cash transfer underlying assumptions of re-integration? is also a one-off unrestricted lump sum, calculated and delivered per household to the household • Which specific basic needs are expected to be head at four border crossings, and consisting of met with the cash grant? two components: a transportation component of an average of 25–50 USD per individual (depending In the absence of such theory of change, on final destination in Afghanistan) and 100 USD understanding how the repatriation cash grant is per household for non-food items. In addition, meeting outcomes across different sectors, which is complementary services are provided at the the purpose of this review, is clearly difficult. centres, including meals, overnight accommodation, special transportation for persons with specific The articulation of a theory of change would also needs, provision of medical services and TB serve as the basis for explicitly linking the objective screening. of meeting basic needs with a cash value, which is currently missing. The value of any cash transfer – whether multipurpose, cash for sector-specific Value of the UNHCR Voluntary interventions, conditional, etc. – should be tied Repatriation Cash Grant to the objectives of the programme. For a cash programme that seeks to address basic needs, The majority of UNHCR staff interviewed stressed such as the repatriation grant, the value should be that the objective of the repatriation cash grant is determined on the basis of how much a household to meet immediate, basic needs of returnees upon requires in order to meet a set of basic needs. The return and not to support sustainable reintegration MEB or SMEB serves exactly this scope (CaLP, (see also Altai Consulting, 2009). 2015).

To be able to effectively measure results against Key informant interviews with UNHCR staff the set objective of the programme, critical terms indicated that the cash grant value has been such as “protection tool”, “future re-integration determined on the basis of two market prospects”, “basic needs” as per the definition of assessments conducted in 2012 and 2016. An the repatriation cash grant, would greatly benefit examination of the findings of these assessments from being unpacked, defined and clarified to shows the inclusion of the results of in-house plainly state what the repatriation cash grant is market surveys focused on food and non-food aiming to achieve in this context. Developing commodity prices (broken down by costs/ a theory of change that sets out the strategy categories), including transportation costs, and underpinning the repatriation cash grant seems of secondary macroeconomic data such as GDP to be particularly useful. This exercise can help growth and inflation rate. (UNHCR Afghanistan, UNHCR to lay out thinking and assumptions on 2012 and 2016). However, the breakdown of costs how the cash grant is expected to meet basic of food and non-food items (see Annex 2 below)

6 Returnees are considered undocumented if they did not hold valid refugee or other residence documents in the country of asylum.

8 does not include services (e.g. health or education) strategy for its future adaptations as discussed or communication (e.g. telephone) or other costs above, would greatly benefit from collaboration and that are typically included in multisectoral market coordination with these actors and IOM. assessments and used to develop the MEB or SMEB (see CaLP 2015). There is therefore no explicit correlation between the findings of the Monitoring of the in-house market survey and the determination of Repatriation Cash Grant the value of the repatriation cash grant. Indeed, the development of a MEB following the in-market The repatriation cash grant is monitored through survey seems to be the missing link here. returnee monitoring exercises organized in two phases. The first consists of face-to-face More explicitly linking programme objectives interviews conducted with returnees at Voluntary with the cash value through the development of Repatriation Centres in the country of asylum and a MEB would also go a long way to improving at encashment centres upon arrival. The second transparency in this context. The doubling of the part consists of telephone call surveys conducted transfer to an average of 400 USD per individual in with returnees, one to three months after return, the second half of 2016 was explained by UNHCR to explore cash expenditures and people’s staff (and available documents) as seeking to situation upon return in relation to aspects such as address the initial multiple reintegration challenges, access to basic services, livelihood opportunities identified in 2015 during the returnee monitoring, and relationship with the community (UNHCR including accessing basic services, securing land Afghanistan, 2015 and 2017a). In July 2017, UNHCR tenure, adequate shelter and job opportunities contracted a research organization (Orange Door linked to limited absorption capacity in return Research & VIAMO) to carry out the second phase areas (UNHCR Afghanistan, 2016a). Discussions of monitoring with returnees, and included IDPs with a range of non-UNHCR respondents however and the general population in the phone surveys revealed a general lack of understanding on how (UNHCR, Orange Door and VIAMO, 2017). UNHCR was calculating the repatriation cash grant value and the rationale behind adjustments over The second part of monitoring exercises was of the years – in 2016 particularly, when doubling particular interest for this review since it captures the amount took place in concomitance with the cash expenditures and aspects of integration. deteriorating protection environment in Pakistan A key finding in this regard is that there is no and other factors. A number of respondents were consistency across returnee monitoring reports under the impression that rather than being based on data collected and presentation of findings. on specific calculations, again like the MEB, the Also, cash expenditure categories that are largely repatriation cash value was driven by funding unrelated are often grouped together, and analysis availability and broad political considerations (see of expenditures and outcomes in particular is also HRW, 2017). limited. For example, UNHCR Afghanistan (2017a: 10) presents findings on employment of returnees, Lastly, since the start of the cash component of the but no analysis is actually provided on investments repatriation programme in early 2000, there have that returnees have made in livelihood activities or been significant changes in the cash landscape, assets using the repatriation grant as a springboard. and in line with global trends, multipurpose cash- The report simply mentions that “20% said they based responses have been scaled up. ERM used the money to build shelter, pay off debts partners have recently developed a SMEB to and invest in livelihoods”. Another report does guide calculations of multipurpose cash assistance include “investments in sustainable livelihoods” as to IDPs under the CVWG umbrella, ensuring a cash expenditure, but this is only captured in one the method is aligned with a number of Cluster graph without further details or analysis (UNHCR Standards (e.g. food, shelter and NFI). UNHCR Afghanistan, 2016b). provided inputs into this exercise. The redefinition of the repatriation cash grant value and a clear

9 MULTI-PURPOSE CASH AND SECTORAL OUTCOMES

While attention is increasingly being paid to a In addition, an Inter-Agency Information Centre comparative analysis of different population (Inter-Agency Information Centre) was being groups – returnees, IDPs and host populations, established at the time of writing as a joint initiative as described above – the monitoring of grant supported by UNHCR and WFP and implemented expenditure and sectoral outcomes needs stronger by the United Nations Office for Project Services focus to enhance understanding on the use (UNOPS). The Inter-Agency Information Centre is of repatriation cash and its actual contribution a toll-free humanitarian helpline aiming to provide to different aspects of returnees’ lives. The two-way communication between agencies and development of a theory of change and articulation beneficiaries / host communities. As the Inter- of clearer objectives of what the repatriation Agency Information Centre is expected to provide cash grant intends to achieve in this context are a platform for agencies to carry out rapid surveys important first steps. or awareness campaigns by placing calls to beneficiaries, several UNHCR staff felt that once When discussing monitoring, UNHCR staff operative it could be used to improve reach out frequently highlighted the difficulties in tracing to returnees, following SIM card distributions as returnees scattered across the country, particularly above. in urban/peri-urban areas and regions outside of government control; several staff estimated At the same time however, the limits of relying the capacity to trace only around half of them. on phone surveys as the predominant mode IOM reported similar challenges in tracking of contacting returnees need to be better undocumented returnees. One reason was linked acknowledged and addressed. Experience to returnees’ lack of access to SIM cards upon elsewhere has shown the shortcomings of similar arrival in Afghanistan, since the main established modalities, which unlike verbal and face-to-face modality to reach out to returnees is through phone mechanisms, such as meetings with individuals, calls. are found to be poorly understood, not trusted and not preferred by beneficiaries. Investing in UNHCR staff pointed to two main steps that complementing ongoing phone surveys with have been taken in this regard. Up to recently, face-to-face FGDs and home visits in areas where the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) required a this is feasible, for example with returnees who national identification card, or tazkira, for returnees return as a group and settle together in an area to be able to obtain a SIM card. Having lived for (as the communities visited for this review), would years or decades in exile however, not all returnees contribute to strengthening the evidence base. possess one. Sustained advocacy by UNHCR since 2016 has resulted in an agreement with the GoA where returnees can obtain a SIM card using the Voluntary Repatriation Form instead of the tazkira. Starting from March 2018, UNHCR will facilitate the distribution of SIM cards to returnees at encashment centres, which include 2 USD monthly credit for a period of 3 months to better ensure that SIM cards remain active.7

7 As explained by a UNHCR staff member, SIM cards will be distributed by telecom companies and UNHCR will only facilitate office space at the encashment centers. UNHCR will provide 2 USD per SIM card to encourage returnees to maintain SIM cards active, so that they can be used for monitoring purposes.

10 Multipurpose cash and protection

One protection aspect explored in returnee household, typically the husband, and the amount monitoring reports is intra-community relations and (around 1,200 USD per household) is quite high, attitudes towards returnees. The findings point to particularly in the context of Afghanistan. generally positive attitudes towards returnees who are largely welcomed by host communities (UNHCR In terms of the cash amount, PDM reports and Afghanistan, 2015 and 2016b). UNHCR, Orange key informant interviews with UNHCR staff do Door and VIAMO (2017) also found a more positive not point to specific protection risks. One female view of returnees (47%) than IDPs (31%) among host returnee in Kabul stated that her husband was communities. tricked by people to make an investment with some of the repatriation grant and lost the money; she In some FGDs, returnees’ relationships with had no further knowledge on this matter. Except local communities were investigated. In line with for this case, no one else reported similar issues monitoring data, the findings point to harmonious during FGDs. This however seems to be an aspect relationships between returnees and other that warrants more attention in monitoring and community members and no one reported intra- evaluation. community tensions in the areas visited as a result of the repatriation cash grant. Returnees As discussed in the Shelter section, many returnees often referred to neighbours as sympathetic and interviewed reported buying parcels of land with showing understanding of their displacement the repatriation cash grant. These decisions experiences. In Noor Khoda for example female were found to be overwhelmingly in the hands returnees of Pashtun ethnicity described the of husbands and only in Kabul did some female good relationship they have developed with returnees state that they had been consulted; their Hazara female neighbours, their welcoming some added that their husbands had taken them attitudes when they first returned and settled in to see the plot of land before finalizing purchase. the neighbourhood, and how they were “good When asked, some females added that even if the friends” today. Relationships and interactions with cash had been delivered to them they would have host community members were significantly more handed it over to their husbands, as they would not pronounced among returnees who lived in peri- know how to manage such a large sum. Limited urban neighbourhoods together with other urban decision-making power of women in this context residents, such as Noor Khoda and Dashti Noor in emerged also during discussions related to rent. Mazar. By contrast, in areas such as Kabul PD21, In Noor Khooda female returnees said they did not Cheil Dokhtaran and Qalan Bafan, which were fully know why they returned to Mazar as this had been inhabited by hundreds or thousands of returnees decided by their husbands; nor did they know the clustered together, there were limited mentions monthly rent costs covered with the repatriation of interactions with other community members, grant. Indeed, this finding indicates that cash alone particularly among women who were more likely to can hardly change entrenched power dynamics and remain at home than men. gender based norms.

In addition, discussions with male and female The 2015 return monitoring report also discusses returnees also focused on gaining insights on intra- perceptions of security and finds that returnees household decision-making processes around cash “felt free” in Afghanistan and no longer feared expenditures and on protection risks that may have arrest or harassment as they did in exile by virtue arisen from the sudden acquisition of a large sum of their nationality (UNHCR Afghanistan, 2015). This of cash. As indicated above, at encashment centres strongly resonates with the findings of this review. the repatriation grant is delivered to the head of In FGDs, all returnees stated that they felt safe and

11 MULTI-PURPOSE CASH AND SECTORAL OUTCOMES

secure in Kabul and Mazar, and juxtaposed their along with food and other necessities, at 150 USD lives in Pakistan: increasing harassment by police, per month. The double costs of transport (from requests for bribes, arrests, and unwelcoming the encashment centre to the village and then attitudes of the general population were all to Mazar) were reported at around 200 USD per commonly described. Feelings of belonging and family.9 Similar costs were mentioned by returnees homecoming were frequently mentioned. interviewed in Cheil Dokhtaran.

It is important to note that returnees interviewed This pattern of return and displacement has been felt safe and secure in Kabul and Mazar where the focus of several recent studies and was already they were residing at the time of FGDs conducted recognized in 2015 by UNHCR Afghanistan (2015: for this study. Not all however had returned from 12) as “secondary displacement of returnees in Pakistan directly to the neighbourhoods of Kabul conflict affected areas”. The same terminology or Mazar. In several locations returnees explained has been used in a 2016 policy brief issued by that after they collected the repatriation cash grant the World Bank and UNHCR (2016: 2), where the at encashment centres they went to villages in their “progressive increase in secondary displacement rural areas of origin with the intention of settling, among returnees” was noted. More recently, but they fled one to three months after because of Samuel Hall et al. (2018: 16) defined those cases rampant insecurity, clashes among warring parties, as “returnee-IDPs” and found that 72% of the total and coercion and extortionary practices by Anti- study sample had been displaced twice and 27% Government Elements (Anti-Government Elements). displaced three times (see also Oxfam, 2018).

For example, returnees in Qalan Bafan, Mazar, The growing evidence of returnees becoming explained that they had previously returned to internally displaced soon after return is a sad their village of origin in a rural area in the Sholgara reflection of the pervasive insecurity that continues district, in the southern part of the Balkh Province. to grip the country. Particularly in 2016, return Soon they started to receive regular visits, often was for many an escape and avoidance response at night, by “the Taliban”.8 As recounted by a male to escalating protection threats in Pakistan. But returnee: for many, return to unsafe areas of origin has essentially meant continued exposure to protection “ threats, albeit of a different nature (conflict and The Taliban would come at night and tell us that we insecurity) and by different perpetrators (e.g. Anti- should join the jihad and fight against the government. Government Elementss). In this context, the limits We were not interested and we tried to negotiate of cash in contributing to protection outcomes are with them; we explained that we had just returned evident; while the grant may have other protection and that we wanted to buy a home, settle down dividends – starting with food security and shelter, and work. But they would not leave us alone. They at least immediately upon return – the repatriation started to demand cooked meals every night, which cash grant alone is not helping returnees to avoid they would take back to their base. We decided to risks and ensure a safe return in non-conflict leave after two months and we came to Mazar”. affected areas.

Complementarity with other programmes There were also costs involved in this process, some of them covered with the repatriation grant. The first part of returnee monitoring conducted In Qalan Bafan returnees estimated the costs of at the encashment centre seeks to capture “the renting houses in the village in Sholgara district, level of information returnees had to make an

8 Threats that returnees are exposed to in this area were also mentioned during key informant interviews. 9 Including transport for family members and the many household items (blankets, mattresses, cooking utensils, etc.) that they had brought with them from Pakistan.

12 informed decision, push/pull factors and problems return to unsafe areas, since having “adequate faced during the repatriation process” (UNHCR information” to make informed decisions, as Afghanistan, 2015). Monitoring findings suggest indicated in returnee monitoring, says little about that the great majority10 claim to have sufficient the sources and information returnees actually refer information to make an informed decision prior to to. return (Ibid.). Ongoing, sustained advocacy, particularly in During FGDs, both male and female returnees Pakistan, to improve the protection space of frequently indicated that their expectations refugees in countries of asylum is of paramount in relation to life in Afghanistan upon return importance. The findings also point to the need had not been met. Many appeared to conflate to invest more substantially in communication information provided by UNHCR (e.g. at Voluntary campaigns in the country of asylum to ensure that Repatriation Centres in Pakistan and at encashment potential returnees receive accurate and timely centres) and the GoA. Mention was often made security information. Some respondents suggested of messages broadcasted on radio depicting a that returnees should be provided transport to safe buoyant economic situation in Afghanistan and areas in-kind, rather than left to meet transport the widespread availability of land for returnees. costs through the repatriation grant. Clearly such Most likely they referred to the “Khpal Watan, Gul a shift, whether at all feasible, would need to be Watan” (My country, my beautiful country) campaign premised on a robust analysis of many aspects, launched by the GoA in July 2016 in Pakistan to including the capacity of areas to where transport is encourage Afghans to return home, and to the Land provided to absorb returnees. Allocation Scheme (LAS) (see Shelter section). In light of their current situation, and mainly in relation to lack of livelihood opportunities, many were visibly disappointed and often spoke of “failed promises”.

FGD participants were asked why they had decided to return to their (often unsafe) areas of origin. However, no one recalled having received information about either the general security situation or conflict and insecurity hotspots in Afghanistan. Some returnees were under the impression they could settle in rural areas of origin (where costs of living were thought to be cheap), buy land and work in the agricultural sector, making the decision without, it seemed, much consideration of whether this was actually viable. Among 2016 returnees, a large number appeared to have returned in haste with limited time to prepare; this could also have been a contributing factor for selecting their areas of origin as the first choice of return, where they had familial and kinship ties.

The findings point to the need to deepen understanding of the reasons underpinning

10 The UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation to Afghanistan (2015) report states, “Over 96% of the interviewed returnees from Pakistan and Iran said that they had received adequate information to make an informed decision to return” (UNHCR Afghanistan, 2015).

13 © UNHCR/Sebastian Rich

Multipurpose cash and sectoral outcomes: key findings

Food Security grant within the first month, and 88% of families spending the money within three months. Returnee Food security sector outcomes and the monitoring from 2017 suggests similar spending contribution of cash timeframes, with 97% of returnees interviewed spending the money over one to two months, UNHCR staff stated that the bulk of the repatriation and all within three months (UNHCR Afghanistan, cash grant is spent on food and transportation, 2017a). and this is confirmed by available monitoring and evaluation evidence. According to UNHCR, During FGDs conducted for this review, it was Orange Door and VIAMO (October 2017), the most difficult to gain an accurate understanding of what common use of the repatriation grant is food (65%), proportion of the grant returnees had used for followed by rent/shelter (38%) and transportation food, and also to understand outcomes, since many (31%). No additional information is provided on simply stated that they bought food for the family. In associated food security gains, however. A survey part this was because many struggled to remember of returnee households in the 2009 evaluation of the amount. Several respondents, both males and the repatriation cash grant also found the majority females, also mentioned they had savings that (94%) having spent the grant primarily on food and they took with them from Pakistan. For those, the transportation, and around a third to rehabilitate cash grant was often pooled along with household houses (Altai Consulting, 2009). The evaluation savings and used to purchase food and address was concerned with the short-term nature of the other needs during the first months of return. repatriation grant, since it was typically spent quickly, with over half the families spending their

14 Livelihoods Examples included buying a vending cart and the initial stock of fruits and vegetables for a total of Livelihood sector outcomes and the 150 USD, renting a small grocery shop for 30 USD contribution of cash a month, and covering rent costs for the first three months with the repatriation grant. There is limited available data in returnee monitoring reports about use of the repatriation An accurate explanation as to why this group cash grant to support livelihood opportunities upon was able to make livelihood investments with return. UNHCR Afghanistan (2016b) finds that only the cash grant is difficult and many contributing 15% of returnees surveyed made investments in factors could be at play. The fact that this group “sustainable livelihoods”. By contrast, the 2009 of returnees all reported having received a cash evaluation of the repatriation cash grant found that grant of 400 USD per person, may have meant the majority, over 75%, were able to use part of the that they simply had more cash available to invest cash grant to start small businesses, from as little as than their counterparts who received 200 USD. $20 to as much as $1,400 (Altai Consulting, 2009). Another explanation could be linked to the fact that The same evaluation however already observed far they all reported having returned from Pakistan lower “levels of entrepreneurship” in the returnees’ directly to Mazar and therefore had not ‘wasted’ sample (2007 and 2008 returnees) compared to the repatriation grant in double transportation other that of the 2005 evaluation (Altai Consulting, 2005, costs as a result of displacement as discussed in Altai Consulting, 2009). One possible explanation above. suggested was the worsening macro-economic context: “opportunities to create new businesses A recurring theme of FGDs in all locations was the were higher in the initial years of development, lack of job opportunities and the lower wages in since the country was missing mostly everything, Afghanistan in comparison to Pakistan. Virtually including many small shops and services. Seven all male returnees said they had been working in years later, it has become more difficult to Pakistan and in a wide variety of casual jobs, such identify niches and create new businesses” (Altai as in grocery stores, selling fruits and vegetables, or Consulting, 2009: 23). as construction labourers, and the great majority of female returnees reported home-based economic The worsening economy in a context of escalating activities in Pakistan, including wool yarn spinning, conflict and chronic political impasse (Samuel Hall kilim rug weaving, embroidery and clothes-making. et al., 2018; Afghanistan, 2016b), as well as the influx of nearly 370,000 returnees from Pakistan Scarce and poorly paid livelihood opportunities in 2016 alone, are among the contributing factors were often indicated as having prompted further of an increasingly contracted labour market. migration. In FGDs both in Kabul and Mazar, Thus for the thousands of Afghan refugees who returnees explained that several male youth, returned in 2016, finding a job or setting up a married and unmarried, in their community had small business through the cash grant appears decided to return to Pakistan soon after return more challenging than it was a few years ago. because of extremely limited job opportunities. The upcoming evaluation of the repatriation cash One male returnee in Kabul estimated that around grant commissioned by UNHCR at the end of 2017 60% of male youth had returned to Pakistan. may usefully shed light on this trend and allow Other FGD participants added that they had male comparisons of different returnee cohorts surveyed relatives who were currently in Pakistan but “were since 2005. trying to go to Iran and even Europe”. In parallel, the great majority of returnees stated that they The findings of FGDs likewise indicate that the were receiving regular remittances from relatives repatriation cash grant has catalyzed livelihoods abroad, including males that had returned to investments for a very small minority. Only in Noor Pakistan. This phenomenon is also captured in the Khoda area, Mazar, were investments in economic returnee monitoring report of November 2017. Due activities reported, by a handful of male returnees. to lack of livelihood opportunities, 8% of the sample

15 MULTI-PURPOSE CASH AND SECTORAL OUTCOMES

surveyed confirmed that a family member either left (Ibid.). A key focus of Community-based Protection for another location within the country or moved Measures is strengthening the linkages between back to the country of asylum (UNHCR Afghanistan, humanitarian and development actors, including 2017a). the private sector. Efforts are being stepped up to consolidate and strengthen a range of Complementarity with other programmes partnerships with UNDP, ILO, FAO and others under a Partnership Strategy, which was in development Lack of economic opportunity was widely at the time of writing. recognized by respondents as a major obstacle of reintegration. As explained by a number of The focus on livelihoods activities as a way to UNHCR staff, the geographical targeting of the mitigate protection risks and on strengthening Reintegration Programme has long been focused humanitarian-development linkages is no doubt on areas of high return and displacement. Until positive and much needed. Indeed, a key finding 2016 the main analytical base underpinning in the areas visited was the very limited support targeting, and assistance was the UNHCR to livelihood activities, by UNHCR or other actors. Comprehensive Needs Assessment Survey. In The only area where beneficiaries mentioned 2017, UNHCR Afghanistan began replacing this with having received livelihoods support was in PD21 socio-economic profiling and market analysis to in Kabul. One UNHCR staff member explained identify the livelihood zones and markets in areas of that 30 small enterprises were established for high return and displacement. Profiling and analysis female returnees and 20 for males, focusing were still ongoing at the time of writing. on skills such as tailoring, grocery shopping, butchery, shoes shop, welding, wool spinning, This new approach has stemmed from the soap making etc. Beneficiaries were also provided realization that livelihood activities had been business development training and cash as start- largely designed to address the short-term needs up capital. During FGD discussions in PD21, two of returnees and IDPs, with limited attention women mentioned having received training for to community dynamics and sustainability of wool spinning but complained of the difficulties interventions. Also, vocational trainings were largely they faced in selling their product. The challenge built around traditional activities and informal in linking beneficiaries to the market was also sectors, rather than informed by a sound market recognized by UNHCR staff. Limited funding analysis (UNHCR Afghanistan, 2017c). available to support livelihood interventions in the highly constrained labour market was also an issue. Together with returnee monitoring, the findings are expected to provide the basis for Community- The study sample was no doubt too small to based Protection Measures (Community-based capture other areas where UNHCR has provided Protection Measuress). As explained by one staff livelihood support. Even so, it is clear there are member, the idea is to ensure that livelihoods huge challenges in reaching returnees and activities mitigate protection risks at individual supporting them with sustainable livelihood and community levels while at the same time opportunities. As outlined above, UNHCR “fostering linkages with development partners is currently only able to track around 50% for a continuum to long-term development and of returnees, particularly when hundreds of sustainability” (UNHCR Afghanistan, 2017d: 1). households – such as in PD21 or Qalan Bafan – Community-based Protection Measures activities settle in one area. include Asset-Based Community Development to increase communities’ access to services and A more comprehensive and integrated approach productive assets, enhancing peaceful co-existence to livelihood support complemented with the and self-reliance; and Employability, Employment establishment of strategic partnerships as and Entrepreneurship which seeks to promote self- described above seems to be a positive step reliance through small business development and forward. In addition, systematic engagement, job placement in partnership with the private sector support and coaching of potential returnees could

16 start in Pakistan to capture existing skills and repatriation grant, others reported having been discuss potential investments in small enterprises unable to do so (in some cases because of lack of or livelihoods activities upon return, according livelihood opportunities), and this was source of to socio-economic profiling and market analysis. worry. Provision of part of the cash grant as start-up capital could also be explored as a more effective way to The majority of those who invested in land – in ensure livelihood outcomes. Kabul PD21 and Mazar, in Cheil Dokhtaran and Qalan Bafan – did so a few months after receipt of the repatriation cash grant and after having been Shelter displaced from their areas of origin where they first returned. While many had pooled the cash transfer Shelter sector outcomes and the with other cash resources, such as savings and/ contribution of cash or remittances, to cover the cost of land, some stated that they purposefully set aside or saved the According to UNHCR monitoring reports, a repatriation grant to buy land. One female in Kabul relatively small part of the repatriation cash grant recalled that her husband had decided to invest is spent on shelter. In 2016, 12% of the grant the cash grant in land when they first heard about it was spent on rental accommodation and 11% in Pakistan in 2016, and that “400 USD per person on “sustainable shelter construction” (UNHCR offered a once in a life opportunity to return and Afghanistan 2016b). Figures from 2017 suggest that buy land”. She explained that all expenses incurred 6% of returnees built shelter with the cash grant since return, including first returning to Kunduz and and 1% bought a plot of land (UNHCR Afghanistan, then fleeing to Kabul, had all been covered through 2017a). UNHCR, Orange Door and VIAMO (2017) family savings “without touching the cash grant”. research shows shelter as the third largest expenditure among returnees and IDPs surveyed, However, lacking the financial means to construct a following food and transport, though with land house, many returnees were still living in temporary (presumably purchase of land) the seventh out of shelters, such as tents, erected on their land plots. nine expenditures. During FGDs with males in Kabul, one community leader, also a returnee, estimated that around half However, FGDs with male and female returnees of returnee households in the area were living in in the locations visited for this review, in Kabul tents, and up to 75% in Cheil Dokhtaran. and Mazar, indicated that for many shelter was a pronounced cash expenditure, which they covered Size of land parcels purchased ranged between all or in part with the repatriation cash grant, to buy 100 and 300 m2. In Kabul PD21 the price of land a piece of land, construct a home or rent a house. was indicated at around 12 USD11 per m2, in Cheil Dokhtaran at around 14 USD per m2 and in Qalan A minority of returnees explained that while still Bafan at around 12 USD per m2, and was attained in Pakistan they bought the parcels of land where through the government’s Land Allocation Scheme they were currently living in Kabul or Mazar (usually (LAS).12 male family members travelled from Pakistan to Afghanistan to carry out the transaction). Purchases The repatriation cash grant was also found as were reported as having been made either with having been used to cover rental costs upon own savings or through money borrowed from return, again either in full or in part for those relatives. While some said that they had settled who had household savings. For example, a few their debts immediately upon receipt of the male respondents in Kabul explained that they

11 Different FGD participants mentioned prices with slight variations, so the land prices reported here are not necessarily an accurate reflection of the exact price per m2 paid by returnees. 12 In 2005, Presidential Decree 104 established the Land Allocation Scheme (LAS) for the distribution of uncultivated government land to eligible landless returnees and IDPs (UNAMA, 2015).

rented houses or rooms in the vicinity of PD21 (for multipurpose cash only, without complementary approximately 70 USD a month) while their home legal, technical or in-kind support. construction was underway. In Mazar – Dashti Shor and Noor Khoda – the cash grant had helped In Cheil Dokhtaran in Mazar, returnees explained returnees cover initial rent costs of the houses that land parcels had been bought from one where they were still living at the time of field individual, who they described as “a rich man that visits for this review. Rent prices were indicated buys and sells land”, through an arrangement at around 30–50 USD per month, plus utility bills. regulated by a private contract, where returnees In Noor Khoda, where all returnees interviewed covered the initial deposit using the repatriation had benefited from the cash value of 400 USD per cash grant. Land plots were reported as having individual, some stated that the cash grant was been sub-divided among 20–30 households, which used to cover up to six months of rent. Among were all part of the same contractual arrangement. returnees that had been displaced, some used the The remainder of the cost of land was being paid cash grant for 1–3 months to rent homes before in monthly instalments of approximately 130 USD fleeing (others stayed with relatives for free). (higher than the average monthly rent in the area, at around 70 USD). Returnees explained that they Investments in land were overwhelmingly perceived expected to receive the land title once all returnee by beneficiaries as positive, fulfilling decades- long families who were part of the agreement completed dreams of owning land in their home country. FGD their payments. Many were finding settling their findings indicate that for some, the repatriation cash monthly instalments challenging and payments in grant has made an important contribution to shelter arrears were reported as common. At the time of needs, enabling beneficiaries to rent a home upon fieldwork no one had completed payment and no return and/or to buy land, and for some to construct one had received a land title. houses. However, a number of issues related to security of tenure and quality of shelter also An in-depth examination of land purchase emerged during FGDs, pointing to the challenges arrangements and titling in Cheil Dokhtaran of ensuring quality of shelter outcomes with was beyond the scope of this review. But these

18 dynamics are a reason for concern. For some time managed to construct houses move during the now, media, government and international agency winter season to Jalalabad where the weather is reports have extensively documented patterns milder to save money on heating and look for jobs. of illegally obtained state land in Afghanistan Returnees who are still in tents move temporarily (UNAMA, 2015; Samuel Hall et al., 201813). The lack into their homes for free, in exchange for “looking of an overarching and integrated national policy on after their houses”. As findings show, however, this state land distribution, and material deficiencies in support mechanism might help some but certainly the land distribution legal framework and regulatory not all who continue to live in precarious conditions, scheme are among the drivers underpinning land since returnees who have managed to finalize grabbing, land usurpation and corruption in the construction appeared to be a minority and most country (UNAMA, 2015). Indeed, the problems likely not all of them will relocate to Jalalabad for associated with land, security of tenure and the winter. corruption were frequently highlighted by key informants. Against this background, there are Complementarity with other programmes concerns that without the necessary legal support, land investments made through the repatriation As acknowledged by many respondents, cash grant might put returnees in a risky and landlessness is a major obstacle to returnees’ uncertain position, opening the door for a variety of adequate access to shelter, and land and claims and troubling disputes over land ownership property issues are key drivers of conflict and and establishment of informal settlements. internal displacement and continue to challenge sustainability of return, reintegration and The quality of land purchased in Qalan Bafan reconciliation (UNHCR Afghanistan, 2015; UNHCR, was a problem. The area was a rather isolated Orange Door and VIAMO, 2017; Altai Consulting, plateau, located at around 30 km from Mazar city 2009; HLP, 2017; Oxfam, 2018). The technical centre and quite far from the main paved road. As complexities and political sensitivities surrounding noted above, land plots had been purchased by land in this context were frequently indicated by returnees after being displaced and through the UNHCR and other humanitarian actors as requiring government’s LAS, also with the support of UNHCR long-term comprehensive solutions that pay and NRC. Several key informants confirmed that attention to returnees, IDPs, and host communities, one of the challenges of the LAS in providing a developed through joined-up collaboration. A sustainable shelter solution to returnees is the number of initiatives were found in this regard. quality of allocated land, which is often situated in remote areas, with limited access to basic services The Housing Land and Property Task Force chaired and livelihood opportunities (HLP, 2017). This is one by UN-Habitat together with UNHCR and NRC, reason why many returnees do not take advantage focuses on facilitating a systematic approach to of this scheme and decide to settle in the outskirts housing, land and property rights protection of of cities and towns instead. displaced populations and other persons at risk, including returnees. In light of the implementation The quality of shelter is also a concern in relation to challenges surrounding the LAS, a key strategic those who have bought parcels of land but, lacking priority is to work with the GoA to establish more the financial means to construct houses (or finalize effective land allocation procedures. Among these construction), continue to live in tents erected on is the development of technical procedures that their land plots. During the harsh winter season in focus on the identification of suitable land for both Mazar and Kabul, lack of permanent shelter allocation – for example with ease of access to puts these families in a highly vulnerable position. basic services and access roads, not mined, and One interesting community-support mechanism with good soil quality for housing construction. was found in Kabul. Some returnees who have (HLP, 2017).

13 https://bit.ly/2MEXpsY

19 MULTI-PURPOSE CASH AND SECTORAL OUTCOMES

As explained by key informants, to further support This initiative is an interesting example of how, this strategic priority, UN HABITAT was about through collaboration, the cash repatriation grant to launch the Sustainable Human Settlements can be complemented with other shelter support, in Urban Areas to Support Reintegration in both legal support and shelter construction. In light Afghanistan (SHURA), again in collaboration with of findings so far, assistance and advice in legal UNHCR. This new initiative seeks to identify land to matters, on HLP rights, property law, land tenure returnees and IDPs in urban areas in proximity to and occupancy certificates, and advocacy are all livelihood opportunities and services for eventual of critical importance to support returnees to make allocation by the GoA. This work also builds on informed decisions when investing the repatriation the technical support that UN HABITAT has been cash grant in land. Lastly, it is important to providing to the GoA on the issuance of occupancy acknowledge that in Qalan Bafan, while immediate certificates to gradually upgrade the land and shelter needs have been addressed, long-term property rights of urban households and improve reintegration opportunities for returnees appear to security of tenure.14 As indicated by a key informant, be challenged by the poor quality of land allocated the new SHURA programme has been conceived under the LAS and limited access to basic services as a precursor to the establishment of a “pro-poor and livelihood opportunities in the area. housing scheme in urban areas of the country”, precisely in light of population movement trends that see IDPs and returnees increasingly taking up Energy and the Environment residence in the towns and cities of Afghanistan. Sectoral outcomes and multipurpose The above are some of the high level inter-agency cash contribution efforts taking place in the country. They reflect growing understanding of the importance of a Returnee monitoring reports do not show cash concerted effort to tackle the needs of IDPs and grant expenditures on energy needs. Fuel for returnees. On the ground however, this review household heating was however widely reported, found limited, ad hoc attention on how to best both in FGDs and key informants interviews, as a support the contribution the repatriation grant was substantial seasonal cash expenditure for returnees making to shelter needs. and other population groups in the many high- altitude areas of Afghanistan where winter is harsh. An exception was found in Qalan Bafan. There the UNHCR Sub-Office in Mazar had worked jointly with Indeed, as fieldwork for this study took place the Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance during the month of February, and therefore during (ICLA) team of the Norwegian Refugee Council the cold winter season, heating was frequently (NRC) to support a group of returnees who had indicated as a priority by returnees interviewed. A been displaced from their area of origin in the variety of heating methods were commonly used, Sholgara district (referred to above). Agencies including a traditional domestic heating system, worked together to support returnees to access in Dari called sandali,15 gas portable heaters, and land in Qalan Bafan under the LAS, for example by wood or charcoal burning stoves. During FGDs providing assistance to processing the application some estimated the cost of heating in winter at and collating required documents, as well as approximately 100 USD per month per household. putting pressure on the GoA and municipality In both Kabul and Mazar, several FGD participants to speed up the process. Subsequently, NRC also mentioned that they were burning plastic items implemented a shelter project in the area to and trash, usually collected by children in nearby construct the houses where returnees who were dumping sites, as they were unable to regularly interviewed for this study were still living. afford fuel materials.

14 https://bit.ly/2M7TfbM 15 This heating method consists of a low table or pyramidal wooden structure with a clay container of charcoal underneath – typically what is left of firewood used for cooking – and covered by a blanket.

20 Among 2016 returnees, many appeared to have of IDPs report that they have the same access to returned in haste with limited time to prepare, water as the host community. arriving in the second part of the year at the onset or during winter. There were indications that part of In peri-urban areas in Mazar, such as Noor Khoda the repatriation cash grant had been used to buy and Dashti Shoor, bimonthly water and electricity fuel for heating purposes and to buy winter jackets bills were indicated by male respondents as and warm clothes for family members.16 Some amounting to approximately 20–30 USD and were mentioned that in areas where they had been living covered initially with the repatriation cash grant, in Pakistan, such as Quetta, the weather was hot in part or fully (depending on household savings), all year round and they did not own warm winter together with rent costs. However in locations clothes, and that the repatriation cash grant had such as Kabul and Cheil Dokhtaran, houses were enabled them to cover those needs. not connected to the electricity grid and residents accessed free water for domestic use through a Complementarity with other programmes local water pump.

Since 2015 UNHCR has been providing Some male and female returnees also recalled hav- winterization support in the form of a one-off ing used part of the repatriation cash grant to meet unconditional cash grant using a vulnerability-based basic household hygiene needs, such as soap and approach to targeting. Areas hosting large numbers shampoo. FGDs with female participants indicated of IDPs or recent returnees, particularly where that, for a minority, a small part of the cash transfer other actors are not present or cannot sufficiently was used to address the specific hygiene needs cover existing needs, are prioritized and 10% of of women and girls. Some female respondents ex- vulnerable host community members in the area plained that in rural Afghanistan women typically are also targeted. Standard Operating Procedures use a menstrual cloth pad, which they wash and dry (SOPs) developed by UNHCR Afghanistan17 are out of sight for reuse. In Pakistan however they had aligned with the Shelter Cluster standards. In late become accustomed to disposable sanitary pads, 2017 UNHCR distributed unconditional cash winter which were considered a more practical solution assistance of 200 USD to targeted households to menstrual hygiene management than reusable (UNHCR Afghanistan, 2017e). Findings from post- clothes. In Pakistan they were regularly buying san- distribution monitoring of this winterization cash itary pads themselves from the local market, since assistance were not available at the time of writing. the market was very close to their houses, and they were working and had money available to cover such costs. WASH Upon return to Afghanistan and receipt of the cash WASH sector outcomes and the grant, some asked their husbands to buy sanitary contribution of cash pads (1 USD for 24 pieces) on their behalf because they did not know their way around the area and Returnee monitoring reports do not capture the cash grant was in their husbands’ hands. whether returnees have used any of the Some husbands refused as they considered such repatriation cash grant to cover WASH needs. items as superfluous expenses. In Qalan Bafan UNHCR Afghanistan (2015) only captures access however, some females reportedly succeeded in to drinking water in the areas of return, finding that convincing their husbands: “the cash grant was for the great majority of returnees were able to access each member of the family and so it was also for safe potable water. According to UNHCR, Orange us. It was our right to ask and use some of it for our Door and VIAMO (2017), 64% of returnees and 56% needs”.

16 FGD participants struggled to recall exact cash expenditures for these items. 17 First developed in 2016 and revised in September 2017

21 MULTI-PURPOSE CASH AND SECTORAL OUTCOMES

Health reflecting the huge variation of health expenditure on the ground. This could be something useful to Health sector outcomes and the reflect upon as part of the development of the MEB contribution of cash or SMEB.

Returnee monitoring reports do not capture Complementarity with other programmes whether returnees have used any of the repatriation cash grant to cover health needs. As a number of UNHCR staff explained, there UNHCR Afghanistan (2015) only captures access are mechanisms in place to identify vulnerable to health services (in the areas of return), and returnees, both at encashment centres (through finds that access for returnees is similar to the interviews) as well as through the ongoing general population: the majority of returnees use protection monitoring UNHCR carries out in public health facilities and only 20% private health the country to identify violations of rights and facilities. The quality and quantity of medicine protection risks for people of concern. Persons with available in health centres, and the lack of female Specific Needs identified at encashment centres personnel or equipment, were indicated as barriers are referred for follow up and potential assistance of access. UNHCR, Orange Door and VIAMO in the locations of (intended) return. As the example (2017) find that 65% of returnees and 51% of IDPs above indicates however, some returnees may be are unable to access healthcare, but no further falling through the cracks. It was beyond the scope elaboration is provided on barriers of access for of this review to understand why, but the difficulties either. associated with tracking returnees and the pattern of secondary displacement may be among the FGD findings do not point to health being a reasons. widespread expenditure among returnees interviewed. Only a very small number reported having used the bulk of cash to address health Education needs. For example, one male returnee in Dashti Shor, Mazar, stated that the bulk of the repatriation Education sector outcomes and the cash grant had been used to cover health costs contribution of cash for one disabled child and for childbirth delivery complications. His particularly dire situation was As with WASH and health, returnee monitoring confirmed by other participants during the FGD reports do not capture whether returnees have who stressed that he was struggling to make ends used any of the repatriation cash grant to cover meet and was living in a small rented room together education-related costs. UNHCR Afghanistan (2015) with his five children and wife. only captures returnee access to education and notes that primary and secondary education is free In line with health seeking behaviours noted for all Afghan citizens. However, rates of enrolment during discussions with returnees for this review, among returnees are low and there are disparities a health expert respondent stated that among the between boys and girls. Research by UNHCR, Afghan population, including returnees and IDPs, Orange Door and VIAMO (2017) also finds low household health expenditures are either very low rates of enrolment and gender disparities among or very high. Either households do not use any cash returnee children: only 49% of boys and a mere for health (and these are the majority, as cash is not 27% of girls are in school. typically used for minor illnesses), or a lot of cash is used where there is a serious health problem FGDs with returnees pointed to distance to public that requires expensive treatment. In turn, the 60 school and entrenched gender norms as barriers USD per household per month allocated for health of access to education. In Kabul and in Cheil expenditures in the SMEB calculation (developed Dokhtaran, Mazar, children (boys and girls) were not under the CWG, as noted above), was described enrolled in school. Distance to the nearest public by the same respondent as largely artificial and not schools, located approximately 30–40 minutes’

22 walk away, was unanimously reported as the main for around 2 USD per child and stationary. They reason. However, distance did not seem to be the estimated that the monthly school cost per child, only reason for girls not being in school. In both including food, is approximately 12 USD, which they Dashti Shor and Noor Khoda areas returnees said covered with the repatriation grant. Review findings that a public school was located very close to confirm that that cash alone is simply unable to their houses, but in both locations only boys were redress patterns of inequalities, in this case gender- enrolled. When asked, some returnees in Cheil based inequalities. Dokhtaran stated that even if there was a public school nearby they would not enrol their daughters. They added that when they lived in refugee camps Complementarity with in Pakistan, primary education and learning classes other programmes for adults were offered free of charge; even then, only boys and men attended. Information about the importance of education is provided at encashment centres through During an FGD in Noor Khoda, some females said the provision of leaflets and brief discussions they intended to convince their husbands to enrol with parents and children, as part of the “back daughters in school, as families of other ethnicities to school” campaign. However not all FGD in the area were doing. As one young woman participants remembered having been provided explained: with education-related information, and as the findings above demonstrate, the service has done “ little to redress barriers of access to education. I will speak to my husband and make sure This is not surprising, since redressing gender- that my daughters are enrolled in school. based norms and practices requires tackling values, They also have the right to a better future. norms and social institutions that maintain and Why do our girls have to continue to be kept reinforce inequalities – something that one-off in the dark and our boys in the light? messages can hardly achieve. In Noor Khoda for example, male beneficiaries remembered seeing leaflets distributed at the encashment centre and Interestingly, the same respondents also described recalled that UNHCR staff had talked to them about the good relationship and friendship they had the importance of sending both boys and girls to developed with their Hazara neighbours (as school. One male beneficiary candidly stated that discussed above). This may be an indication that to be polite he nodded and “accepted”, but already returnee integration among other ethnic groups knew he would not send his daughters to school is engendering positive changes around gender upon return in Mazar. norms and expectations, in contrast with returnees who cluster in areas predominantly inhabited by Some key informants mentioned that returnee other returnees. This is an issue that could be inclusion in the education system in Afghanistan further investigated. was being hampered by a lengthy bureaucratic process which requires school certificates to be Only in Noor Khoda was part of the cash reported stamped at the Afghan Embassy/Consulate in the as having been used by returnee households country of asylum, as well as at the Ministry of to send boys to primary school. Beneficiaries Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education at indicated that when they returned in November provincial level upon return to Afghanistan. It is 2016 there were only two months left to the end not difficult to see how many may be faced with of the academic year, and therefore they waited enormous challenges when it comes to recognition until March 201718 to enrol boys. Textbooks were of school certificates upon return. For example, the provided by the school, but they bought uniforms thousands who returned rather suddenly in 2016

18 The academic year in Afghanistan consists of two semesters and runs from March to January.

would have hardly had the time to start this process in Pakistan; many returnees may be simply unaware of this requirement and/or may not have the financial means to pay for this process, including travel to the consulates in countries of origin and provincial capitals in Afghanistan (UNHCR Afghanistan, 2015).

There may be a stronger role for UNHCR in collaboration with other actors, such as UNICEF, to advocate to and support the Ministry of Education to develop a simplified process. Successful advocacy UNHCR has carried out to waive the tazikra requirement for acquiring a SIM card should serve as encouragement for advocacy work in this context, to redress supply-side barriers of access to education.

24 Conclusions

The repatriation cash grant has helped Afghan Developing a theory of change, unpacking returnees to meet a number of basic needs across and clearly stating programme objectives, and several sectors. Shelter needs were found to be determining the value of the repatriation cash prioritized by many, with the cash grant having grant on the basis of MEB or SMEB calculations in been used to buy land or rent or construct homes, coordination with other cash initiatives and actors therefore positively contributing to a key aspect in the country are all critical steps to improve the of reintegration. At the same time, issues related quality of monitoring, effectively measure progress to security of tenure and quality of shelter have towards more clearly defined objectives, as well as pointed to the challenges of ensuring quality of ensuring transparency and communication to other shelter outcomes with multipurpose cash only, in stakeholders. the notable absence of technical and legal support, including provision of legal assistance, and advice on HLP rights and property law.

Only a small minority of male returnees were found to have used the repatriation cash grant as a springboard for livelihood investments, and the lack of jobs was reported virtually by all as a major challenge, also driving further migration of young males in search of jobs. Systematic engagement, support and coaching of potential returnees could be provided in Pakistan to capture existing skills and explore livelihood opportunities and investments, as informed by socio-economic profiling and market analysis in return regions. Providing part of the cash grant as start-up capital (for some) could also be explored as a more effective way to ensure livelihood outcomes.

The findings also show the limits of multipurpose cash assistance in addressing systemic barriers of access to education. These include national policies that complicate the integration of returnees into the national education system, and for girls specifically, entrenched gender-based norms, which are also manifest in relation to women and intra-household decision making power around cash expenditure. Cash alone was not helping returnees avoid risks and achieve safe return to non-conflict affected areas, and several returnees interviewed had become IDPs in a matter of weeks or months following return. A regional approach to increase investment in communication campaigns in the country of asylum is one step suggested, but there is a need to more thoroughly understand how to tackle this pattern.

25 MULTI-PURPOSE CASH AND SECTORAL OUTCOMES

UNHCR Afghanistan References UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation Update for the month of November 2017. Altai Consulting UNHCR https://bit.ly/2JZNg8h UNHCR’s Voluntary Repatriation Program: UNHCR Afghanistan Evaluation of the Impact of the Cash Grant, 2009. Community Protection Measures Fact Sheet. Altai Consulting December 2017. Integration of Returnees in the Afghan Labor UNHCR Afghanistan Market. An Empirical Study. October 2006. Reintegration (Livelihoods) Programme: Strategic CaLP Approach and Objectives, 2017, Unpublished. The Afghanistan Emergency Response Mechanism UNHCR Afghanistan (ERM). Case Study Findings.Housing, Land and Afghanistan: community protection Property Task Force (HLP), 2017, Fact Sheet measures fact sheet, 2017. Afghanistan. UNHCR Afghanistan Human Rights Watch (HRW) Country-Level Standard Operating Procedures Pakistan Coercion, UN Complicity: the mass forced (SOPs) for Cash-Based Interventions For return of Afghan Refugees, 2017. Winterization assistance, Afghanistan, 2017. Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) UNHCR Afghanistan HRP Afghanistan (January 2018 – December 2021), Repatriation of Afghan Refugees from Pakistan: 2017. Supplementary Appeal, September – December Oxfam 2016. Returning to Fragility: Exploring the link between UNHCR Afghanistan conflict and returnees in Afghanistan. Oxfam Returns to Afghanistan. A Challenging Year. Research Report, January 2018. Afghanistan: Assisted Return, 2016. Shelter Cluster UNHCR Afghanistan Afghanistan North Flood Response Evaluation Voluntary Repatriation to Afghanistan: 2015 Key Assessment, April 2017. Findings of UNHCR Return Monitoring, Shelter Cluster 01 January – 31 December 2015. Badakhshan Earthquake Response Evaluation UNHCR Afghanistan Assessment, December 2016. A collaborative approach towards Sustainable Samuel Hall, NRC and IDMC Reintegration of Afghan Returnees in Afghanistan, Challenges to IDPs’ Protection in Afghanistan. September 2013. A report commissioned by NRC and IDMC and UNHCR Afghanistan funded by the European Union and the Norwegian Proposal for increasing Cash Grants for the UNHCR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018. Afghanistan Return Program, 2012. UNAMA UNHCR, Orange Door Research and VIAMO The Stolen Lands of Afghanistan and its People. Returnee and IDP Monitoring Report Second The State Land Distribution System Part 2 of a 3 Monthly Report – October 2017. Report produced Part Series. UNAMA Rule of Law Unit Civil Affairs for UNHCR. Unit, March 2015. World Bank and UNHCR UNHCR Afghanistan Fragility and population movement in Afghanistan, Country-Level Standard Operating Procedures 2016. (SOPs) for Cash-Based Interventions Payment of Voluntary Repatriation Grant, Afghanistan, 2017.

26 Annex 1: Overview of the cost of basic commodities for 2016

Price in 2014 Price in 2015 Price in 2016 Difference between No . Item Unit USD Afs .* USD Afs . USD Afs . 2016 and 2015 A B C D E F G (E–C) H (G/C) I . Basic Food Stuff – Price in USD 1 Flour Kg $ 0.51 27.8 $ 0.45 28.2 $ 0.43 29.2 $ (0.03) –6% 2 Rice Kg $ 1.12 61.4 $ 1.01 62.9 $ 0.97 66.4 $ (0.04) –4% 3 OIl Kg $ 1.33 73.0 $ 1.29 80.1 $ 1.17 80.4 $ (0.12) –9% 4 Tea Kg $ 3.93 216.1 $ 3.87 240.2 $ 3.76 257.6 $ (0.11) –3% 5 Sugar Kg $ 0.76 41.8 $ 0.74 46.0 $ 0.72 49.2 $ (0.02) –3% 6 Salt Kg $ 0.28 15.2 $ 0.27 16.8 $ 0.28 19.1 $ 0.01 3% 7 Beans Kg $ 1.30 71.5 $ 1.17 72.8 $ 1.12 76.8 $ (0.05) –5% Food (Normal Price/ 8 Portion $ 2.78 152.7 $ 2.87 178.1 $ 3.03 207.6 $ 0.16 5% portion) Average I –3% II . Non-Food Items – Price in USD 1 Petrol Lit $ 0.99 54.7 $ 0.83 51.2 $ 0.61 41.5 $ (0.22) –27% 2 Diesel Lit $ 0.87 47.6 $ 0.74 46.2 $ 0.53 36.3 $ (0.21) –29% 3 Gas Kg $ 1.21 66.4 $ 0.99 61.7 $ 0.63 43.4 $ (0.36) –36% 4 Fire Wood 560 kg $125.08 6,879.1 $111.31 6,901.0 $ 99.39 6,807.9 $(11.92) –11% 5 Match boxes Box $ 0.45 24.6 $ 0.44 27.5 $ 0.45 30.5 $ 0.00 0% 6 Jerry Can Piece $ 2.43 133.9 $ 2.26 140.2 $ 2.30 157.8 $ 0.04 2% 7 Soap Bath Piece $ 0.53 29.1 $ 0.53 33.0 $ 0.49 33.9 $ (0.04) –7% 8 Soap Laundry Piece $ 0.32 17.5 $ 0.32 19.8 $ 0.29 19.5 $ (0.03) –11% 9 Kettle/tea pot Piece $ 6.76 371.6 $ 6.59 408.6 $ 6.15 421.3 $ (0.44) –7% 10 Pressure Cooker Piece $ 15.45 849.6 $ 14.85 920.7 $ 13.74 941.1 $ (1.11) –7% 11 Blanket Piece $ 25.34 1,393.7 $ 24.50 1,518.9 $ 23.15 1,585.8 $ (1.35) –6% 12 Tarpaulin (Chaines) Piece $ 9.67 531.9 $ 9.65 598.5 $ 9.76 668.6 $ 0.11 1% 13 Gas Bottle Piece $ 12.92 710.6 $ 12.45 772.1 $ 12.22 837.3 $ (0.23) –2% 14 Mattress Piece $ 22.41 1,232.3 $ 22.67 1,405.5 $ 19.38 1,327.5 $ (3.29) –15% 15 Bag Cloth Hygiene kit Piece $ 5.41 297.8 $ 5.28 327.6 $ 5.21 356.6 $ (0.08) –1% Average II –10% III . Others – Price in USD 1 Taxi Fare Km $ 0.97 53.2 $ 0.76 47.4 $ 0.79 54.0 $ 0.02 3% 2 Buss Fare Stop $ 0.22 12.3 $ 0.20 12.3 $ 0.22 15.3 $ 0.02 12% 3 Standard Hotel Room Room $ 39.60 2,178.1 $ 37.70 2,337.4 $ 34.39 2,355.7 $ (3.31) –9% 4 House Rent Room $108.46 5,965.2 $ 97.93 6,071.7 $ 96.23 6,591.6 $ (1.70) –2% 5 Minimum labour cost Daily $ 5.69 313.2 $ 5.21 323.1 $ 5.18 355.2 $ (0.03) 0% 6 Food for livestock 1MT $109.97 6,048.1 $107.41 6,659.7 $108.24 7,414.2 $ 0.82 1% Average III 1% Overall Average (I, II, III) –4%

27 MULTI-PURPOSE CASH AND SECTORAL OUTCOMES

Annex 2: List of key informants and FGDs conducted in Afghanistan

Organization Name and surname Title UNHCR Sergio Molinari CBI Officer UNHCR Aneeta Ghotge Senior Protection Officer UNHCR Mohammed Haroon Assistant Repatriation Officer UNHCR Stephen Gherman Protection Cluster Coordinator UNHCR Anna Law CWG Coordinator and NRC Cash Advisor UNHCR Martha Kow-Donkor NFI/Shelter Cluster Coordinator UNHCR Nanduri Sateesh Senior Livelihoods Officer/Senior Programme Officer DRC Gul Rahman ERM Manager DRC Naser Shawkat Haider Emergency Coordinator WFP Amarullah Hasid Head of VAM WFP Mohammed Sheikh Programme Policy Officer WFP Saddiq Amin Emergency Programme officer WFP Saleem Hakimzada Programme assistant CBT FAO Ulfatullah Malangyar Food Security Cluster Coordinator OCHA Toma Dursina Humanitarian Officer ECHO Marco Menestrina Humanitarian Adviser IOM Haruka Ueda Shelter and Cash Based Initiatives Officer Afghanistan Holding Group Abuzar Royesh Senior Research Associate and Evaluation Manager of UNHCR Independent Evaluation of the Repatriation Cash Grant United States Department of Said Ebad Hashemi Refugee Affairs Specialist State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) UN HABITAT David Dominic Maliro Chief Technical Adviser – Program Manager (SHURA) People In Need (Mazar) Ahmad Zahir Samim Emergency Response Mechanism Team Leader NRC (Mazar) Patoney Frogh Emergency Coordinator Programme

FGDs with documented returnee beneficiaries of the UNHCR cash grant

Total number of FGD participants Fieldwork sites in Kabul and Mazar FGDs 2 Females, married with children Kabul, PD21 2 Males, married with children Kabul PD21 2 Females, married with children Mazar, Cheil Dokhtaran (Dehdadi district) 2 Males, married with children Mazar, Cheil Dokhtaran (Dehdadi district) 1 Males, married with children Mazar, Qaleen Bafan (Nahr e Shahi district) 1 Females, married with children Mazar, Qaleen Bafan (Nahr e Shahi district) 1 Males, married with children Mazar, Dashti Shor (PD8) 1 Females, married with children Mazar, Dashti Shor (PD8) 1 Males, married with children Mazar, Noor Khoda (PD8) 1 Females, married with children Mazar, Noor Khoda (PD8) 14