Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 A publication of MAF Biosecurity Authority

Avian influenza: p6 Also in this issue New biosecurity system taking shape A New Zealand FMD vaccine bank Ants targeted

Enhancing sea container risk management security Simplifying risk assessment of air passengers Container inspection training pays off Southern saltmarsh mosquito Plant pest surveillance Timely interception of Gypsy moth How to contact us: Everyone listed at the end of an article as a contact point, unless otherwise indicated, is part of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Contents Biosecurity Authority. All MAF staff can be contacted by email. The standard format for all addresses is [email protected] For example Michelle Threadgold would be 3 New biosecurity system taking shape [email protected] 4Work proceeds creating new biosecurity system PO Box 2526, Wellington New Zealand 5 Stakeholder participation in biosecurity Biosecurity People: Biosecurity Coordination team: Mike O’Hara and (+64) 4 474 4100 (switchboard) Tane Woodley most staff have direct dial lines which are listed where available 6Avian influenza – the risk to New Zealand (+64) 4 474 4133 9 Developing a New Zealand FMD vaccine bank • Animal Biosecurity Group 10 Ants targeted by intensified surveillance (+64) 4 470 2730 Biosecurity People: Animal Biosecurity: Fiona Stuart • Biosecurity Coordination Group Biodiversity focus for seminar – Policy Team 11 Electronic solutions to enhance sea container risk management – Indigenous Flora & Fauna Team – Contracts Management Team Biosecurity People: Border Management group: Grant Knight – International Team 12 Simplifying biosecurity risk assessment of air passengers (+64) 9 368 5148 13 NZ–US bilateral discussions 2004 • Director Border Management Container inspection training pays quick dividends • Border Management Group, 14 Saltmarsh mosquito: update Auckland 15 Options for stepping up surveillance for exotic plant pests (+64) 4 474 2738 • Border Management Group, 16 Sweetcorn investigation of interest to Australian authorities Wellington Biosecurity People: Plants Biosecurity team: Christina Cundari Vieglais (+64) 4 498 9888 17 Timely interception prevents Gypsy moth outbreak in South Island • Group Director and Director, Biosecurity People: Forest Biosecurity group: Barry Wards Business Support, Biosecurity The last Peltoschema Authority • Director, Animal Biosecurity 18 Trans-Tasman animal welfare group meets • Director, Plants Biosecurity Cruelty to animals clue for social agencies • Director, Forest Biosecurity • Director, Biosecurity Coordination • Animal Welfare Group (+64) 4 474 4257 • Plants Biosecurity Group 19 Draft import health standards for consultation – Animals (+64) 4 470 2741 Amended import health standards for consultation – Animals • Forest Biosecurity Group New and amended import health standards issued – Animals ASB Bank House, 20 Guide for Approval of Semen Storage Centres Exporting Ruminant 101 The Terrace, Wellington Semen from NZ Biosecurity is published 6-weekly by MAF Import health standards for re-evaluation Biosecurity Authority. It covers biosecurity Import health standards revoked and animal health, animal welfare, plant Codes of ethical conduct – approvals, notifications and revocations since the health and forest health issues. It is of special last issue of Biosecurity interest to all those with a stake in New 21 Introductory period for grain operational standard ends Zealand’s agriculture, horticulture, forestry, 23 Draft code of welfare for zoos animal welfare and environment. Enquiries about specific articles: Refer to contact listed at the end of the relevant article. General enquiries (eg, circulation requests or 22 New organism records: 15/12/03 – 13/02/04 information about MAF's biosecurity work): Biosecurity Magazine 24 Codes of Welfare – Animal Welfare Act Update MAF Biosecurity Authority PO Box 2526, Wellington Phone: 04 474 4100 Cover: High bird densities, as found in Asian markets, may promote genetic reassortment among avian influenza viruses. Feature p6. Fax: 04 498 9888 Email: [email protected] Editorial enquiries: Editor: Phil Stewart Phone: 04 384 4688 Email: [email protected] ISSN 1174 – 4618 www.maf.govt.nz/biosecurity New biosecurity system taking shape

By Murray Sherwin, MAF structure they’re currently located. Director-General, MAF and how it MAF Quarantine Service to should be set up In August last year the Cabinet adopted remain separate in terms of line the Biosecurity Strategy and The MAF Quarantine Service will not management determined that the broad strategy and become part of a MAF Biosecurity and reports. recommendations of the Biosecurity Group, but will report directly to myself Council would be developed and The decisions in a separate management group. This refined. Much of the “big picture” made fall decision may be revisited in a couple of design work for the management into two years as new structures and processes structure of the new system was distinct areas: strategic function and settle down. However, there will be very completed in the lead up to Christmas, high-level structure. close attention to ensuring close and I was left with a number of options Biosecurity Strategy Group interaction and collaboration between the Biosecurity Group and MQS at to consider. In terms of strategic function, there will all levels. At the beginning of February 2004 staff be a Biosecurity Strategy Group in the key government agencies reporting directly to the Director- Further decisions to come responsible for managing New Zealand’s General and the Biosecurity Chief And I still need to do further consulting biosecurity effort were given an outline Executives’ Forum. The establishment of and evaluation regarding the of the decisions I have made, and this group is an important outcome of management of MAF’s laboratories and informed of those yet to be made. the Biosecurity Strategy. the Verification Agency. I expect to be making a decision on these two areas in In this editorial, I would like to explain The CEOs of other biosecurity agencies weeks rather than months. the decisions made so far, and discuss put high store on this group bringing the decisions that are still to be made. integrated, holistic thinking to decision- As you can see, there are some making and prioritisation in biosecurity. significant changes in the wind and a As Director-General of MAF, I now have For an initial period of 18 months to great deal of work to come to get it all responsibility, under the Biosecurity two years, these CEOs wish to see the in place. We may be the Ministry of Strategy, for the overall leadership of the group standing outside the regular MAF Agriculture and Forestry, but our whole of the biosecurity system, not just structure – giving it visibility and a responsibilities now spread well beyond the biosecurity concerns relating to the sense of independence from the enhancing the primary industries. primary production system, as has perceived primary sector/economic MAF is now a very important previously been the case. Bearing this in interests of MAF. mind, it’s clear that the decisions to be contributor to both the economic and made were enormously significant ones, High-level structure environmental (marine and land-based) requiring consideration of how the Looking at the high-level structure, this well-being of New Zealand. We are a function will fit into the wider is to be based on ‘points of intervention’ direct contributor to public health

“There are some significant changes in the wind and a great deal of work to come to get it all in place” organisation of MAF, and our – that means management around pre- outcomes, and we are an important deployment of resources. The decisions border, border, surveillance, response agency promoting and facilitating required careful thought about the and pest management. the economic and cultural interests shape and function of MAF needed to of Maori. We have a big agenda I believe this will very effectively drive meet all its objectives, as well as ahead and I look forward to updating ‘whole-of-system’ thinking into our the kind of culture or ‘personality’ of you on developments in future issues processes. It’s more likely to be the organisation. of Biosecurity. understood by our stakeholders and will The options developed by Deputy lead to the use of standard models for • On pages 4-5 of this issue, Director-General Larry Fergusson and particular interventions across the Biosecurity Strategic Unit Director, his team focused on a couple of key whole of the system. The plan is for Geoff Hicks, brings more detail on structural options – in particular MAF’s Animal Welfare and stakeholder participation, and the relating to the location of the Investigations/Compliance functions to workplan ahead for the development biosecurity function within the overall remain within the groups in which of our biosecurity system.

Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 3 Work proceeds creating new biosecurity system The Biosecurity Strategy Implementation Team and the Geoff says another key project on this year’s agenda will define Biosecurity Strategic Unit have merged their workplans and the boundaries of the system and its service-delivery roles. have a full year ahead bringing to life recommendations of “The Government agreed that MAF will have overall the Biosecurity Strategy. A number of projects have been responsibility for biosecurity, including the pest management prioritised and the 2004 work programme formulated. function,” he says. “That means that the roles and Leadership structure a priority responsibilities of all agencies with biosecurity functions need Highest priority goes to projects that have a direct bearing to be revisited. This project will look at who should do what on the design of the new biosecurity organisation. Firstly and agree on the systems and arrangements needed to make there is the task of designing the leadership structure for the it work.” new system. Fresh identity to emerge “We’ll be considering the functions and activities of the A branding exercise will be undertaken to describe the look Governance and Leadership (Strategic) Unit, assessing the staff and feel of the new biosecurity structure. “Everyone’s expecting needed, estimating budgets and examining the links with some newness and freshness, and so a branding project will set MAF’s Policy and Regulatory groups, the Quarantine Service, out to create an appropriate identity for the organisation,” says laboratories and other biosecurity agencies,” Strategic Unit Geoff. “It is vital that the public see a strong alignment Director Geoff Hicks explains. “This work is urgent as it will between all elements of the biosecurity system, expressed in inform the final size and shape of the new biosecurity system.” one clearly recognised brand.” A full design is expected by the end of March 2004. A human resources project is setting out to prepare current MAF staff for the transition. HR expertise is being Regulatory and service delivery functions sought to manage the change process, advise on organisational The design of the regulatory and service delivery functions is design issues and on the practicalities of staff retention another high priority. Significant work has already been and recruitment during what is an intense period of undertaken towards this, but Geoff Hicks says this project will organisational change. formalise activities and create a vital connection to other projects on the workplan. Included is a look at The development of a system-wide risk management and decision-making framework is expected to be completed • internal structure towards June. “This integrated framework, accounting for • management span of control economic, environmental and social/cultural interests, • functional links between parts of the new organisation will need to be simple yet robust to ensure consistency and transparency in risk management decisions,” • integration of system-wide risk management functions Geoff Hicks explains. • cultural values. A definition of system-wide outcomes has been developed and “It’s a big task,” Geoff admits, “but it’s important to recognise drafts are currently under consultation with concerned that MAF’s existing Biosecurity Authority has much work to departments and stakeholders. Further work on outputs, do to ‘morph’ itself into the new biosecurity organisation and activities and performance measures is continuing and will take on what is expected of it from the Strategy.” inform the final organisational design. The teams are putting a lot of thought into the relationship of Finalising the 2004/05 budget package and a review the new organisation with its supporting bodies and of funding are the two final high priority projects on the stakeholders. A project is considering the establishment of work programme. some mechanisms to ensure the delivery of a holistic, inclusive approach to biosecurity. The first key steps have been taken – Geoff says that throughout the year, work will continue on the creation of the Ministerial Committee for Biosecurity, the other slightly lower priority projects including a review of the Chief Executives’ Forum and the Strategic Unit. This project many recent reports on biosecurity, and a look at information will establish further supporting bodies, such as a central management systems for the new organisation.

and regional government forum and possibly an industry Geoff Hicks, Director, Biosecurity Strategic Unit, forum, to allow for good stakeholder participation in the phone 04 471 5524, biosecurity process. [email protected]

4 Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 Stakeholder participation in biosecurity The Biosecurity Strategy for New performance and relationships with • the Strategic Unit will also consider Zealand proposed a number of M¯aori. A Ministerial Committee for the case for a single industry forum, institutional mechanisms to support the Biosecurity has also been convened to reporting to the Chief Executives’ expansion of MAF’s biosecurity oversee the biosecurity system. Forum, to advise on strategic direction setting at the boundaries of mandate and to help ensure delivery of The work programme for the Strategic central government and industry ‘whole of system’ biosecurity. Unit over the next few months includes responsibility. Of these, the biosecurity Chief establishing the other supporting bodies This will involve developing terms of Executives’ Forum and Strategic Unit identified in the strategy for stakeholder reference – specifying role, scope of were established immediately following participation in biosecurity: activity, governance, membership and the release of the Strategy in August •reconstituting the Biosecurity operation – and securing appointments 2003. The Chief Executives’ Forum, Council as a ministerial advisory to each body. The Strategic Unit will comprising the chief executives of MAF group, to provide independent approach stakeholder organisations in (chair), the Department of advice to the Minister for April with an invitation to suggest Conservation, Ministry of Fisheries, Biosecurity on the performance of names of suitable people for Ministry of Health and Te Puni K¯okiri, the biosecurity system; and appointment to these bodies. is tasked with developing the strategic • establishing a central-regional direction for biosecurity and Michael Chapman, government forum, reporting to the monitoring the performance of the Biosecurity Strategic Unit, Chief Executives’ Forum, to involve biosecurity system. phone 04 471 6717, regional councils in strategic [email protected] The Strategic Unit advises the chief direction setting in relation to Geoff Hicks, executive of MAF and the Chief decisions at the boundaries of Director, Biosecurity Strategic Unit, Executives’ Forum on direction setting, central and regional government phone 04 471 5524, priorities, capabilities, system responsibility; [email protected]

Biosecurity Coordination team Project Office. During this time, he enhanced his project management skills with involvement in international Mike O’Hara joined MAF Biosecurity benchmarking of project management methods and approaches Coordination, Contracts Management and led the development of ACC’s current project reporting and team, as Programme Manager project management methods and practice. (New Organisms) in January 2004.

Mike completed his PhD in Microbiology Biosecurity Coordination team at Massey University in 1989, studying Tane Woodley has just joined MAF genetic variation in the clover symbiont Biosecurity as part of the Contracts Rhizobium. He spent the next ten years Management team, in Biosecurity in veterinary vaccine research and Coordination. He is working in the new development in New Zealand and the United States. role of Systems Planner (New Organisms). This position was created to He was biological project leader in the original transfer of develop and implement a coordinated technology from the UK to New Zealand and left (what was doctrine dealing with new organisms, then) Mallinckrodt Veterinary as Research and Development with a particular emphasis on logistics Manager in 1995. After a stint in California as Good and pre-planning. Manufacturing Practice Projects Director at a small biotechnology firm, Mike returned to New Zealand to work Prior to joining MAF, Tane worked at Telstraclear in its for CSL. In these roles he interacted with many regulatory Wellington office. Before this, he was an officer in the Regular authorities and much of the relevant legislation as a Force of the New Zealand Army. He served for 11 years, mainly ‘user’, which gives him a pragmatist’s perspective on his in the logistics field. new role. He continues to serve with the Wellington unit of the Mike also spent three and a half years at ACC, running the ACC Territorial Force.

Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 5 Avian influenza – the risk to New Zealand The current avian influenza pandemic in Asia has raised many questions – not only about the nature of the disease, but also about the potential risks to and from wild and domestic birds in New Zealand.

The biology of the virus that causes the disease in birds is the key to understanding the subject. There are safeguards in place to protect New Zealand from exotic disease such as highly pathogenic avian influenza, but awareness and vigilance are important to ensure this protection is maintained. What is it? Avian influenza is a viral disease of poultry caused by RNA viruses of the family orthomyxoviridae. There are three main groups of influenza viruses: type A, B & C. Avian variants of influenza virus are classified as type A. that inter-species mixing (e.g. quail, virus and also laboratory tests Influenza B & C viruses are generally geese, ducks, chickens) and high i.e. in vivo (experimental challenge restricted to humans. population densities, such as occurs in tests) and in vitro (cell culture) bird markets in China and other pathogenicity attributes. Influenza A viruses are widespread in Asian countries, may promote genetic birds and mammals although most All of the reported outbreaks of HPAI in reassortment amongst the viruses avian and other non-human variants do chickens have been caused by viruses of circulating in the different species not infect humans. Very few of the many the H5 or H7 subtypes with HA cleavage of bird. thousands of variants of avian influenza sites that contain multiple basic amino virus recognised have been found to Genes exchanged acids. This feature relates to the ability cause significant disease in birds. between viruses of host proteases to cleave the HA in to Influenza A viruses are frequently The subtype of the virus responsible for two components (HA1 and HA2) to isolated from a wide range of birds, the current pan-Asian influenza facilitate infection of a wide range of cell including healthy waterfowl outbreak is an H5N1 virus. There are types. Such ‘highly pathogenic’ influenza (especially ducks) and some sea birds 15 heamagglutination (H) and nine (HPAI) viruses are therefore able to (i.e. shearwaters, terns, gulls) and neuraminidase (N) types and these cause systemic disease in chickens shorebirds (i.e. knots, ruddy antigens are coded for by specific genes. (Gallus sp.) while less pathogenic forms turnstones). The number and range of These surface antigens are used to type are only able to establish replication in these non-pathogenic viruses isolated the viruses into antigenic subtypes. the gut or respiratory tract. However, varies from year to year and is higher in Small changes in the expression of other subtypes of influenza virus, such juvenile birds. these surface structures results in as H9N2, have caused high mortality antigenic ‘drift’. and morbidity in chickens and turkeys The epidemiology of influenza A viruses even though they do not fulfil the is complex. There have been occasional Antigenic ‘shift’ results in more definition for HPAI. reports of deaths attributed to avian significant changes in the virus and are influenza viruses in terns, passerines (i.e. due to genetic reassortment whereby The disease – diagnosis not starlings, sparrows), birds of prey and in genes are exchanged between viruses. always clear cut captive psittaciforms in quarantine, but The term ‘highly pathogenic avian The clinical signs seen in avian influenza in most cases underlying factors such as influenza’ (HPAI) is reserved for viruses vary, and diagnosis is not simple. concurrent disease and physiological that fit the definition outlined in the Respiratory signs may predominate but stress contributed to the death of the diagnostic manual prepared by the often there is general malaise and birds. It is still not known why some world organization for animal health, diarrhoea. In some cases there may be variants of avian influenza become the Office International des Epizooties neurological signs but sudden death virulent under certain circumstances (OIE). This definition is based on may be the only sign. It is likely that the while others do not, but it is thought antigenic characterisation of the clinical presentation depends on the age

6 Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 and immune status of the infected host rapidly. Control strategies generally rely further characterised. The H5N2 as well as species, population dynamics, on depopulation and disposal of all sick subtypes did not fit the OIE criteria as the presence of concurrent disease and and in-contact birds, followed by being highly pathogenic as they did not the type and dose of the virus to which decontamination and a rest period possess multiple basic amino acids at the host is exposed. before restocking. the HA cleavage site.

Newcastle disease and other systemic There is good evidence to suggest that Other studies have also reported the infections may appear clinically similar the H5N1 virus in the current Asian isolation of avian influenza viruses from and can also cause high mortality. pandemic, was circulating in China and mallard ducks in New Zealand (Austin Respiratory diseases such as other parts of Asia for many months & Hinshaw, 1984) and more surveillance mycoplasmosis or pasteurellosis may before it was reported and this, in part, work, sampling a wider range of avian also complicate the diagnosis of avian is why it has become so widespread. species, is planned. Although the influenza. Mortality and morbidity rates Vaccination has been considered but is influenza viruses isolated were not HPAI are variable but devastating losses may controversial because inappropriate it is important to note that it is not occur over time as the virus replicates in selection and use of vaccine may mask possible to predict which H5 or H7 (or the gut and is rapidly spread from bird infection and facilitate further spread. other) subtypes can become virulent in to bird directly via faeces and also There are a range of vaccines, including different bird species. The way to respiratory secretions or via fomites recombinant vaccines, available but minimise any risk to, or from, poultry is (inanimate disease vectors). recommendations for the use of these to minimise contact between poultry remain controversial. and game birds and other species such To demonstrate that avian influenza as wild ducks, waders or sea birds. viruses have been the primary cause of Have avian influenza viruses been found in This should be part of any avian death requires the virus to be isolated biosecurity plan. and characterised. In addition there New Zealand wildlife? would need to be evidence that any In New Zealand there have been several The risks to, or from, pathology attributed to influenza viruses studies to assess the prevalence of avian poultry and wild birds isolated was sufficient to cause death. influenza and paramyxoviruses in Inter-species transmission of avian mallard ducks (Anas platyrhynchos). In influenza viruses has been recorded on a Prevention and control one of the larger studies Stanislawek et number of occasions. The H5N1 Hong Because there are many subtypes of al., (2002) isolated 33 viruses from 321 Kong strain was transmitted from virus and these are constantly changing, cloacal and tracheal swabs collected chickens to people in 1997 and on other the epidemiology of avian influenza is from ducks trapped in various sites occasions subtype H9N2 viruses have complex. The virus survives well in the around the country. also been transmitted from chickens to environment, especially in waterways people, although in both situations There were six influenza viruses isolated and in cool damp areas. It is destroyed human-to-human spread did not (two H5N2 and 4 H4N6 subtype by ultraviolet light. become significant. viruses). Serological samples were also Because influenza A viruses have a lipid assessed and the result indicated that There are also reports of transmission of envelope, most disinfectants and mallard ducks were frequently exposed avian influenza viruses between ducks, detergents are effective against them and to influenza and paramyxoviruses. The quails and geese (H5N1, H9N2 & H6N1 this allows good control should an ducks sampled were apparently healthy subtypes) with reassortment to outbreak be reported and confined and the influenza viruses isolated were virulence of H5N1 subtypes and subsequent transmission of such viruses to humans (Shortridge et al., 2003). And there are reports of transmission of H7N7 subtypes from seals to humans; therefore there is potential for inter- species transmission, especially where virus replication is rapid and large amounts of virus are produced. The mechanism by which influenza viruses can adapt to the host cell receptors of another species is not fully understood, but there is current concern that the Asian H5N1 avian influenza virus may enter humans and reassort with the current Fujian H3N2 human

Continued on page 8

Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 7 Continued from page 7 permits and Import Health Standards samples for avian influenza and (IHS) require compliance with strict other avian diseases, should disease influenza virus to create a new human requirements to ensure that poultry investigation be required. pandemic strain. Much of the products pose no disease risk to current disease control effort in Asia is It is also advisable to encourage poultry New Zealand. directed at preventing this, with a keepers to keep their birds separated collaborative effort from national and Migratory birds from wild birds. A number of diseases can cause high mortality in birds and international veterinary and public There is some suggestion that migratory the isolation of avian influenza viruses health organisations. birds may carry H5N1 from Asia to New may not indicate that this agent is Zealand but the species that migrate to There is good evidence that avian responsible for deaths. For this reason, a New Zealand along the Asia-Pacific influenza viruses can adapt to the host full investigation is required to assess the flyways at this time of the year are not receptor of the pig trachea and that cause of death and the virulence currently thought to pose any direct these viruses can then more readily potential of any influenza viruses threat to poultry, people or other infect human cells. Although this has identified. been well demonstrated in vitro, the role species. MAF and DoC are currently of the pig in the field transmission of collating information about the species, References avian influenza viruses to humans is not numbers, flyways, stopovers and Alexander, D.J. (2000) A review of avian really known. destinations of all migratory species that influenza in different bird species. come to New Zealand as well as Veterinary Microbiology. 74: 3-13. Risk to native species low assessing the movements of waders and Austin, F.J., Hinshaw, V.S (1984) The Any avian species could potentially other species within the country. isolation of influenza A viruses and become infected with avian influenza paramyxoviruses from feral ducks in All available biological information is viruses because these viruses do survive New Zealand. Aust. J.Exp. Biol. Med. included in risk analysis, surveillance Sci. 62, (Pt.3), 355-360. in the environment, especially in ponds and incursion response activities. and waterways. It is also likely that they Shortridge, K.F., Peiris, J.S.M., Guan, Y (2003) The next influenza pandemic: are endemic in a range of wild species, The New Zealand public can assist with lessons from Hong Kong. Journal of but due to the population dynamics and surveillance by reporting any suspicious Applied Microbiology. 94: 70S-79S. behaviour of many native species in mortalities in migratory and other Stanislawek, W.L., Wilks, C.R., Meers, J., wild birds. New Zealand, the risk of exposure to Horner, G.W., Alexander, D.J., HPAI, should it occur in poultry, is low. Raising awareness Manvell, R.J., Kattenbelt, J.A., Gould, A.R. (2002) Avian It is not possible to predict the A collaborative approach is required to paramyxoviruses and influenza pathogenicity of avian influenza viruses protect the biosecurity status of New viruses isolated from mallard ducks in different avian species but no deaths Zealand and everyone has an important (Anas platyrhynchos) in New Zealand. due to influenza viruses have been role to play. Arch. Virol. 142: 1287-1302. reported in this country to date. Should it occur here, highly pathogenic Useful websites Managing the risk to avian influenza would cause devastating FAO – Avian Influenza Disease Card: New Zealand losses in poultry in New Zealand and www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/en/ may also pose a threat to indigenous How do we prevent the entry of exotic, health/diseases-cards/avian.html species and the public. It is appropriate highly pathogenic avian influenza virus and important to be vigilant and to be OIE –Avian Influenza: into New Zealand? prepared for the possibility of the www.oie.int/eng/info/en_avinf.htm Potential routes of entry include illegal disease entering New Zealand. imports of unprocessed poultry World Health Organisation – Avian Animal health professionals and advisers products or the movement of Influenza Fact Sheet: can help by raising public awareness contaminated carriers (i.e. avian faecal www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_ about the disease. They can do this material on packaging, clothing, influenza best by: equipment etc) from infected areas. MAF Biosecurity Authority MAF Quarantine Service staff inspect •becoming informed about the www.maf.govt.nz/avian-influenza passengers and luggage, consignments of disease and its differential diagnoses cargo and imported commodities to •becoming familiar with the diagnosis Ministry of Health ensure that the risk of introducing of disease in birds so that they can www.moh.govt.nz/birdflu exotic pathogens such as the current give informed advice to clients with subtype H5N1 into New Zealand Dr Susan Cork, birds and to wildlife conservancies; National Adviser, is minimised. and Risk Analysis, There is little risk of entry through legal •keeping in regular contact with MAF phone 04 470 2784, importation of poultry products and Biosecurity with regard to fax 04 474 4133 related commodities because current recommendations for submission of [email protected]

8 Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 Developing a New Zealand FMD vaccine bank Because an international arrangement disposition of FMD vaccinates, it is protection. Currently vaccine for nine to source FMD vaccine is ending, essential that any emergency vaccine is strains is considered the minimum to New Zealand is looking to make its registered in New Zealand. ensure adequate protection for New Zealand. own arrangements for reliable supplies Although antigens from the current IVB of vaccine. will probably be incorporated into a New Zealand investigating Essential component of new IVB model, the nature of that own arrangements contingency planning potential model is currently unknown as Australia weighed the alternatives and Vaccination is an essential component of member countries have not agreed decided to enter a commercial contract any national contingency plan for an about a future vaccine bank independently in April 2003. New outbreak of foot and mouth disease arrangement with a commercial Zealand is also investigating private (FMD). It can effectively contain FMD supplier. New Zealand’s likely arrangements with a commercial until adequate resources are available to requirements could be met by a vaccine manufacturer to ensure an depopulate and dispose of high volumes contingency supply arrangement for initial supply of emergency FMD of carcasses, and is an approach 500,000 doses – the minimum volume vaccine from 1 July 2004. New Zealand favoured by environmentalists and generally available commercially. would purchase antigen for important animal welfare advocates in Europe Access to vaccine bank vital strains of FMD virus currently circulating in the world, focusing on who experienced the carnage of the International experts have advised that if those in South East Asia. The 2001 outbreaks. the option to vaccinate for FMD is commercial manufacturer would agree The option to employ emergency included in national contingency plans to hold vaccine antigen frozen in liquid vaccination as an adjunct to eradication for FMD, the only guarantee that nitrogen, guarantee quality and break in the event of an outbreak of FMD in supplies of vaccine will be available routine commercial production to New Zealand is long standing. New when required is to be a member of an formulate emergency vaccine for New Zealand, the UK, Australia, Ireland, antigen or vaccine bank. Most FMD-free Zealand for immediate delivery. There is Finland, Sweden, Norway and Malta are countries store only vaccine antigen no ready off-the-shelf supply of FMD members of the International Vaccine concentrate (antigen), as formulated vaccine and the establishment of a Bank (IVB). The IVB was established in vaccine has a limited shelf life. The contract with a commercial FMD 1985 to hold a range of FMD antigens North American FMD Vaccine Bank manufacturer will ensure that New that can be rapidly formulated into (Canada, United States and Mexico) has Zealand has immediate access to an FMD vaccine for any contributing existed since 1982 and the European FMD vaccine that reflects the current member. The members have drawing Union FMD Vaccine Bank since 1993. circulating strains representing the rights in proportion to their Individual EU countries including greatest threat to New Zealand. contribution to capital and maintenance Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany costs. New Zealand contributes 15.73%, and the Netherlands hold additional Constant threat allowing 300,000 doses to be drawn. The independent FMD vaccine reserves. FMD is a low probability but high IVB is co-located with the Institute for Outside the EU, Bulgaria, Croatia, the consequence risk for New Zealand. Animal Health, the world reference Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Israel, Recent experiences in Taiwan 1997 (free laboratory for FMD in Pirbright, UK. Romania, Russia and Slovenia hold since 1929), South Africa 2000 (free vaccine banks. International Vaccine Bank since 1956 in domestic livestock), South to be terminated Multiple strains required Korea 2000 (free since 1934), Japan 2000 for full protection (free since 1908) and the UK 2001 (free The IVB will terminate on 30 June 2004 since 1967) are reminders that the threat There are seven serotypes of FMD virus since it is no longer able to deliver FMD from FMD is constant. vaccine of the quality that members now (O, A, C, ASIA1, SAT1, SAT2 and SAT3), require. Manufacturing facilities meet with little or no cross protection. Some, Dorothy Geale DVM PhD Bsc (Hons), Exotic Disease Response neither European nor New Zealand such as serotype A which is prevalent in Programme Coordinator, South America, have several standards for licensing of veterinary Surveillance and Response, pharmaceuticals. With the changing antigenically unique strains requiring Animal Biosecurity, international perspective on the multiple type A vaccine strains to ensure [email protected]

Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 9 Ants targeted by intensified surveillance

The introduction of a new ‘See, Although it is not clear how the ants may have entered the Contain, Report’ brochure is country, sea containers are a known pathway for unwanted part of MAF’s ongoing national pests. Since 1 January 2004, six-sided inspection of all sea invasive ant programme. containers has been in place, with further checks at MAF- approved transitional facilities during unloading. Additional The programme was initiated in checks have been put in place since the red imported fire 2001 to assist in the early ant find. detection of exotic invasive ants. For three years MAF has focused The red imported fire ant is one of the ant species featured in surveillance and monitoring on the brochure, which includes information to help people high-risk locations such as recognise, identify and report exotic invasive ant species. The international ports, transitional brochure will be distributed in high risk areas and contains facilities, container yards and characteristic descriptions of seven exotic ant species. some nurseries. Invasive ants have the potential to significantly affect New This intensified surveillance has Zealand’s native insect, bird, reptile, and plant life, in turn resulted in the recent discovery upsetting the natural ecology of the environment. Despite New of approximately 200 red Zealand’s stringent biosecurity controls, the importation of imported fire ants at the Port of ants is difficult to control due to their size and ability to stow Napier. The ants were found in away on pretty much anything. If we are not cautious, they can attractant bait traps set in high risk areas and an exotic pest easily become established in New Zealand. response was immediately implemented. Early detection is the key to eradication and this brochure is a valuable tool in the protection of New Zealand against exotic invasive ants.

Amelia Pascoe, Programme Coordinator, Exotic Animal Response, phone 04 470 2785, fax 04 474 4133, [email protected] Animal Biosecurity Fiona Stuart has recently joined MAF Biodiversity focus for seminar Animal Biosecurity as Programme Biosecurity and how it fits in with efforts to safeguard New Development Manager. Fiona Zealand’s biodiversity is the theme of the New Zealand graduated in Veterinary Medicine Biosecurity Institute’s national education and training seminar from the Royal Veterinary College, (NETS) to be held in Rotorua from 21-23 July 2004. London University in 1978. She also has an MSc in Medical With speakers ranging from those involved in international Microbiology (1984). issues, such as the Invasive Species Specialist Group and the Australian Quarantine Inspection Services, to scientists from Fiona joins MAF after an interesting research institutes and field staff working at the coalface, this and varied career. She started as a promises to be a challenging and interesting three days. resident small animal surgeon at the Royal Veterinary College and then had a short stint in practice. In 1979, Fiona joined A feature this year will be the inclusion of speakers from some what was the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food (MAFF) high-profile environmental groups, sharing insights into the Central Veterinary Laboratory in the UK, where she worked on achievements they have made in talks that are open to the research and diagnosis of livestock diseases, principally public. This session has been a great success in the past, and bovine tuberculosis (Tb), brucellosis and anthrax. is part of the NZBI’s outreach programme to raise public awareness of biosecurity issues. Fiona lived in Zimbabwe from 1989 to 1999, doing a variety of different jobs including research into skin disease in NZBI membership is open to all those who work with, or are farmed crocodiles, field work on diagnosis of anthrax in interested in, biosecurity issues. Non-members are also hippos, locums in small animal practice, breeding horses, welcome to attend NETS2004. running a smallholding and selling retirement homes. Information contact: In 1999, she returned to the UK to set up and manage the Carolyn Lewis, NZ Biosecurity Institute, bovine Tb research programme for the Department of NETS 2004 Organising Committee Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA). She was also Registration details and a draft programme will be involved in managing the animal welfare, veterinary medicines available soon at: and endemic diseases research programmes. www.biosecurity.org.nz

10 Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 Electronic solutions to enhance sea container risk management

MAF and the New Zealand Customs Service are developing a “We welcome MAF’s use of our system, and will assist our system that will electronically assess biosecurity risk and colleagues at the border as much as we are able,” he says. provide clearance for imported sea containers. “This project addresses a number of expectations from the Government, including the biosecurity strategy, closer integration between border agencies, the development of e- commerce capability and reduced compliance costs for industry,” explains Carolyn Whyte, MAF’s National Adviser, Border Risk Management. The project is still in the early stages and MAF and Customs will be engaging with industry groups such as port companies, “The project is part of an increased focus on the risk shipping companies, importers, transporters and freight management of the sea container pathway. The aim is to forwarders over the coming months. provide a single electronic facility for industry to lodge required information with government agencies. This will One of the first steps was an inter-agency workshop held in increase efficiency and hopefully reduce compliance costs.” early February to scope the project and develop timelines. Some decisions have already been made: MAF will begin using Customs Information Systems Manager Peter Rosewarne says Customs’ CusMod system to risk assess incoming sea Customs is pleased to help MAF achieve this aim. containers. The electronic data about each sea container will then be exported to MAF’s QuanCargo program, replacing the interim manual data entry process for sea containers that was implemented on 1 January 2004. “Incorporating biosecurity container risk profiling into Border Management Group Customs’ CusMod, with subsequent export of relevant information to QuanCargo for biosecurity clearance, is the Dr Grant Knight has recently joined most cost-efficient and industry-friendly means of developing the MAF Biosecurity Authority, these capabilities,” Carolyn says. Border Management Group based at Ballantyne House, Auckland, as part “Customs already receives electronic information about sea of a two-person Container Risk containers from importers and brokers, and has the capability Profiling Team. to electronically select specific types of containers requiring certain actions. MAF Quarantine Service staff will then inspect Grant graduated from the University high risk containers and issue electronic container biosecurity of Canterbury as a zoologist with a directions and clearances through the QuanCargo program.” marine biology specialty and then was employed by the University of As a final step, the accredited persons responsible for checking Auckland Medical School, becoming a Senior Research low-risk containers at approved transitional facilities will also Fellow in the Department of Surgery, running the analytical be able to electronically lodge the results of their checks, and chemistry laboratory and jointly coordinating clinical trials. receive final container clearances. This involved all aspects of project management, volunteer “The project is multidisciplinary, involving staff from recruitment, data collection and dissemination of results. regulatory, operations, information management, applications This later led to liver transplant research, pharmaceutical development, communications and legal groups of both MAF development, and, latterly, contract work looking at efficient and Customs,” Carolyn adds. waste disposal and resource recovery. “The project forms the first stage of a closer integration of The combination of ecology, biochemistry, project information management between the two agencies.” coordination and data analysis will be put to good use in formulating an efficient and workable profiling strategy to Full live implementation is scheduled for the end of June 2004. beat the exotic hitch-hikers on, and in, shipping containers. Dr Carolyn Whyte, Grant Knight, National Adviser, Technical Adviser, Border Risk Management, Container Profiling, Border Management Group, Border Management Group, 027 270 4957, phone 09 368 5145, fax 09 368 5148, fax 09 368 5148, [email protected] [email protected]

Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 11 Simplifying biosecurity risk assessment of air passengers Managing biosecurity risk from incoming passengers is expensive. In New Zealand the annual cost is more than $18 million. In many countries the sheer numbers involved present almost insurmountable logistical challenges. X-ray screening of passengers’ bags at their point of departure – rather than at arrival in New Zealand – could help meet such challenges. MAF Biosecurity is working with representatives of other border agencies, airport authorities, airlines X-ray screening of incoming passengers’ baggage at their point of departure could help streamline passenger processing at the New Zealand border. and technology suppliers in the International Air Transport Association technological perspective, the concept dog screening, and random search (IATA) Simplifying Passenger Travel was feasible. Significant international regime for deterrent purposes. interest has been generated, including Group (SPTG) to develop innovative Implementation would also involve x- from countries with very significant global solutions to cost effectively ray screening of hand baggage at the passenger flows. manage risks associated with departure airport for biosecurity risk air travellers. The proposal is linked to a number of goods. This would probably be Much work has been done in the other initiatives, including installation of undertaken at the aviation security immigration and customs environments hold stow baggage screening at airports, point. In some cases, restricting the sale to risk-assess passengers prior to their automated kiosk check-in, touch screen of certain products in departure areas arrival at their destination airport, declarations, smart cards, Advance may be required. using advance passenger information. Passenger Information (API) and Benefits for passengers In many countries, passengers are Passenger Name and Record (PNR) Once operational, the concept will result already risk-assessed as they are checked data, transfer, data mining, and in significant facilitation benefits for in and non-acceptable passengers are automated x-ray image recognition, and passengers, lower airport infrastructure denied boarding. radio frequency identification tags. costs and greater passenger processing From a biosecurity perspective, Touch-screen efficiency. By facilitating people who do advance passenger information alone biosecurity declaration not pose a biosecurity risk, it encourages is insufficient to enable effective When introduced, the system will, from passengers not to carry risk goods. risk assessment. a biosecurity perspective, involve a There will always be a need for skilled passenger making a touch screen Remote biosecurity screening biosecurity staff at airports, along with biosecurity declaration at check-in. The Neil Hyde, Director Border detector dogs and inspection declaration information will be bundled Management, who represents MAF on technologies. The new process focuses electronically with the x-ray images of IATA SPTIG, and System Engineering on the use of these specialist resources the checked baggage and the API and Technical Assistance (SETA), developed on the passengers who pose the real risk. PNR data collected at their check-in a concept that involves remote In New Zealand, less than 3 percent of process. X-ray images will be remotely biosecurity screening of x-ray images of passengers carry risk goods requiring scanned along with the electronic bags captured during security screening seizure, and only one third have been declaration and API and PNR data, and at the departure airport. This replaces x- not declared. The concept is now being a decision made as to whether ray screening of the bags on arrival. widened to assess the potential benefits biosecurity processing on arrival is for risk assessment of mail prior to its This concept was tested in conjunction necessary. Undertaking biosecurity risk arrival in the destination country. with Australian Quarantine and assessment before passengers arrive at Inspection Service (AQIS) and MAF their destination airport, will result in Neil H Hyde, Quarantine Service (MQS) in late 2003, up to 75 percent of passengers not Director Border Management, MAF Biosecurity Authority, involving seventy Sydney to Auckland requiring any biosecurity processing on [email protected] flights. This trial proved that, from a arrival, apart from a “free flow” detector

12 Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 NZ–US bilateral discussions 2004

The annual New Zealand-United States bilateral quarantine USDA officials hear about insect pest monitoring discussions were held in Wellington and Kerikeri in January procedures from Amanda 2004. The meeting was attended by representatives from the Little in a citrus orchard at Kerikeri. L to R: Andrew United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Harty (KeriFresh), Mike Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Phytosanitary Guidicipietro (USDA), Cathleen Enright (USDA), Issues Management, and from MAF Plants Biosecurity Karen Ackerman (USDA), Authority. The USDA team was led by Cathleen A. Enright, Amanda Little (KeriFresh). Assistant Deputy Administrator and the MAF team by table grapes, grain, papaya, citrus and stonefruit from the Richard J Ivess, Director Plants Biosecurity. United States. In addition, the meeting discussed joint strategies to promote changes in Japanese quarantine systems, Discussions held on the first day in Wellington continued the in particular for the import of apples and cherries, and to next day in Kerikeri, where the visitors were able to see New reduce unjustified on-arrival fumigation. Zealand citrus export production and packhouse systems at first hand. Bob Macfarlane, National Adviser, Plant Exports, [email protected] Topics discussed included the exports of citrus, persimmon, Veronica Herrera, Manager, Plant Imports Team, capsicum and pitaya to the United States, and the import of [email protected] Container inspection training pays quick dividends The implementation of the new over a number of trees. They are exterior of containers on a ship in standard for sea containers is aggressive and will attack intruders. Auckland recently found giant African progressing smoothly. Newly trained They swarm when provoked and snails trying to slither their way into staff are already spotting pests which give a painful bite. New Zealand. may have previously gone unnoticed. • Carpenter ants – these can nest and If the snails – which eat more than 500 Around 5,000 facilities are registered cause serious damage to houses and species of plant and are one of the most with MAF to unpack containers and buildings, telephone poles, or in invasive snail species in the world – 11,000 people are requesting other wood or wood products. became established, they could seriously accreditation to check containers. • Crazy ants – this is one of the damage New Zealand’s vegetation. world’s worst invasive ant species. February saw the roll-out of the online The 21 snails, which can also carry a They can completely change training for accredited persons to carry form of meningitis that can be passed to community structure and species out biosecurity checks on low-risk humans, are believed to have hitched a composition if infestations are large imported sea containers. Within the first ride from the tiny French Pacific islands enough. They also protect week over 800 people had successfully of Wallis and Futuna. honeydew-secreting bugs from carried out the course. This is on top of predators, allowing these insects to The intercepted snails ranged from 2- the 5000 people who have been trained thrive and hence have detrimental 6cm, but can grow up to 20cm and can in classroom-based courses to date. effects on plant life. They are also weigh around 1kg. They are prolific Having so many people trained in highly predatory on other insects. breeders. Each contains female and male biosecurity awareness will bolster MAF’s Giant African snails intercepted reproductive organs and in a typical year biosecurity inspections as an accredited an adult will lay about 1200 eggs. Stevedores (who have been trained as person will provide an extra set of eyes accredited persons) checking the The snails can live as long as nine years and strengthen the biosecurity system. and cold weather is no problem – they MAF continues to inspect ‘high-risk’ can hibernate and survive in even containers and biosecurity risk cargo. snowy climates. They are originally from Serious ant pests spotted an area south of the Sahara in East But recent interceptions show that low Africa, but are now found in parts of the risk does not equate with no risk. Pacific, where they were taken as a Recently trained and accredited people source of food, and in Asia. have already found and notified a range Ken Glassey, of serious ant pests on low-risk Programme Coordinator containers. For example: (Border Management), The sharp-eyed stevedores who spotted these phone 04 498 9610, Giant African snails on a container in • Green tree ants – these can form Auckland recently had been given biosecurity 025 249 2318, large colonies with nests spreading awareness training. [email protected]

Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 13 Saltmarsh mosquito: update In December, the Associate Minister Eradication programme: New discovery: for Biosecurity, Hon Marian Hobbs, Napier, Mahia Whangaparaoa Peninsula announced the eradication of The eradication programmes in Napier On 27 January 2004, following high Ochlerotatus camptorhynchus, and Mahia have been completed and the rainfall a few days earlier, routine commonly known as southern local public health service is undertaking surveillance in the Whangaparaoa saltmarsh mosquito (SSM) from Napier routine monitoring of potential habitat Peninsula found a number of mosquito and Mahia. as part of its ongoing saltmarsh larvae. Seventeen third instar larvae While this is a significant achievement surveillance. There have been no further from one site next to Shakespear for New Zealand biosecurity, the finds in these areas. Regional Park were identified on Minister cautioned that it was too early Eradication programme: 28 January 2004 as SSM. This site had to be too confident. Tairawhiti, Porangahau been previously identified as high risk. Approval for eradication plan The eradication plan for the remaining Delimiting was instituted on 28 January 2004 over the Whangaparaoa Peninsula The government had approved a $30 Hawke’s Bay site (Porangahau) and and other potential habitat nearby, from million programme to eradicate SSM Tairawhiti (on the East Coast) is being Long Bay to Puhoi. To date, infestations around the Kaipara Harbour. This was implemented. Applications of have been found at two sites within two in addition to $10.5 million programme S-methoprene to sites in Porangahau hundred metres of the index site, i.e. in for the eradication of SSM in Napier, and Tairawhiti were completed in April the one location. However, a number of Tairawhiti, Mahia and Porangahau. 2003 and June 2003 respectively, and surveillance is continuing. sites were identified as potential habitat Health consequences of SSM but were dry at the time of the initial The last adult trapped in Porangahau Southern saltmarsh mosquito is a survey. Following recent heavy rain in was in June 2002 and the last larva was known vector for the debilitating Ross the area, this potential habitat has been detected in August 2002. If no further River Virus, which causes epidemic inundated and surveillance was larvae or adults are detected, eradication polyarthritis (inflammation of the repeated. While there were no further will be completed in September 2004. joints). Symptoms can be wide ranging, positive sites found, surveillance is The last mosquito was detected in from pain and tenderness in the muscles continuing at the time of this report. Tairawhiti in September 2002. If no and joints to flu-like symptoms of chills further adults or larvae are found, On 28 January 2004, the Associate and fevers. Most people fully recover eradication will be completed in Minister for Biosecurity agreed that within a month. October 2004. actions taken in an attempt to eradicate SSM from the Whangaparaoa area are to No locally acquired cases of Ross River Eradication programme: Kaipara Virus disease have been reported; be exempted from the provisions of Part however, people carrying Ross River The Kaipara (including Mangawhai and III of the Resource Management Act Virus will regularly be present in New Whitford) eradication programme is 1993 as permitted by section 7A of the Zealand (e.g. people returning from being fully implemented. Permanent Biosecurity Act 1993. Treatment of Australian states where Ross River Virus sentinel surveillance sampling sites have 20 hectares of coastal margin in the is endemic). Ross River Virus disease can been established at 31 locations Shakespear Regional Park was only be transmitted by mosquitoes – it including Mangawhai and Whitford, and undertaken on the afternoon of 28 cannot spread from person to person. sites are visited twice weekly and January 2004 to ensure the larvae in the However, possums and horses could act sampled for adults and larvae. Sites have index location were not able to mature. as ‘bridge hosts’ for the disease. Being an been selected to represent known positive areas; intermittently positive It is likely that the infestation occurred aggressive day-biting species, SSM also from a mosquito blown or transported has a high nuisance value. areas and known negative sites and reports include community reports of by mechanical transport east from the unusual biting activity. southern Kaipara to Whangaparaoa. At this stage the implications of this finding The last mosquito detected at are unclear and will depend on the Mangawhai was in December 2002. results of delimiting and adult trapping If no further mosquitoes are found, in the area. Once these results are eradication will be completed in available, Health officials will consider December 2004. The last adult mosquito the implications of this discovery and detected in Whitford was in April 2002 options for action. and the last larva in November 2002. Sally Gilbert, Chief Technical If no further adults or larvae are found, Officer (Health), Ministry of Health, Southern saltmarsh mosquito: an aggressive eradication in Whitford will be ph 04 495 4345, fax 04 495 4401, species that attacks by day. completed in November 2004. [email protected]

14 Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 Options for stepping up surveillance for exotic plant pests

Active surveillance for exotic plant pests is the key to early detection and the best possible chance for successful eradication. It can also act as an additional ‘backstop’ to pre- border measures preventing pests from entering New Zealand. $million Most exotic pests associated with plants are detected as a result of submission of samples and reports by the general public and the scientific community to MAF’s National Plant Pest Reference

Laboratory (NPPRL). This is passive Fruit fly SBWMV Plum pox surveillance, and MAF is considering Karnal bunt Pipfruit fungiCitrus canker Kanzawa mite Asparagus rust potential improvements to this system. ellow peach moth Pierce’s + GWSS Y MAF currently operates several active Figure 1. Estimated cost of active surveillance for high impact pests. surveillance programmes directed * given 5% incidence on any site visited. against specific plant pests in agriculture site was only visited once – unlike fruit surveillance programmes. Potential for and forestry: fruit fly, gypsy moth and fly surveillance where sites are visited active surveillance can be significantly wood boring and bark beetle. Directed every fortnight during spring, summer enhanced through the involvement of surveillance for forestry pests is also set and autumn. affected parties (e.g. industry). Coupled up around transitional facilities, ports with this, there is also potential to and small forest blocks. Estimated costs exploit existing crop management Collectively, these programmes cost the Estimated annual surveillance costs practices and identify opportunities to tax-payer $1.75 million per annum. The ranged from $197,865 for three fungi conduct surveillance, thus significantly fruit fly programme accounts for 57 of pipfruit sampled at 95% probability reducing costs. percent of this, and the gypsy moth a of detection* to $3.8 million for plum This information was presented in further 17 percent. pox potyvirus at a 99% probability greater detail at the New Zealand Plant of detection*. Wider range of pests considered Protection Society conference in for active surveillance MAF also included soil-borne wheat Christchurch, 12-14 August 2003 in two These programmes are being used as mosaic virus, which was in fact detected papers presented by members of MAF benchmarks in considering the potential in New Zealand at the end of 2003 Biosecurity Authority and the MAF for applying active surveillance to other through general surveillance. A NPPRL. They can be downloaded from: pests. MAF is considering improvements programme for this disease based on www.hortnet.co.nz/publications/nzpps/ to surveillance, and this includes the taking leaf samples for diagnostic testing proceedings/03/03-005.pdf possibility of implementing specific from areas of fields showing symptoms www.hortnet.co.nz/publications/nzpps/ programmes targeting a wider range of was estimated to cost $2.9 million at proceedings/03/03-010.pdf exotic pests. These would involve the 99% probability (Figure 1). When input of, and possible investment from, random sampling was considered Joanne Wilson, Adviser, external parties. As a precursor to without searching for symptoms to Plant Pest Management, MAF Biosecurity Authority, considering active surveillance, the MAF bias in favour of detection, the cost at phone 04 470 2796, 99% probability was estimated at NPPRL has studied the range of fax 04 474 4257, different exotic plant pests to estimate $22.5 million. [email protected] costs of annual surveillance. In this These costs do not include backyard Barney Stephenson, study, a variety of different horticultural surveillance in high-risk urban areas National Adviser, and arable pests (insects, fungi, bacteria, such as Auckland. Plant Pest Surveillance viruses) were selected so that a range of and Response, hosts, life cycles and biological features Given these costs and the number of MAF Biosecurity Authority, could be represented. The surveillance potential target organisms, it would be phone 04 474 4102, plans that were developed were based on unreasonable to expect a single fax 04 474 4257, annual field surveys. In these plans, each institution to fund and deliver such [email protected]

Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 15 Sweetcorn investigation of interest to Australian authorities MAF Biosecurity Authority National Accord.The report also covered MAF’s Included were papers on the capacity for Adviser Dr Barney Stephenson attended simulation exercises for fruit fly and Australian agriculture to respond to a meeting of the Australian Plant apple brown rot and industry exotic pest incursions and a draft of Health Committee (PHC) in Brisbane in surveillance initiatives in the past year. PLANTPLAN, a national plant industry December 2003. Before the 2-day This formed part of a session which plan for incursion management. meeting, MAF was invited to attend a discussed incursions and management Data presented at the RIFA meeting half-day review meeting on the red of significant pests. showed that the programme has imported fire ant (RIFA) eradication New Zealand’s experience with GM been very successful in reducing programme in Brisbane. sweetcorn was of special interest, as populations of these ants to very PHC meets annually and includes Australia has not experienced an low levels, and eradication was representatives from the Australian equivalent situation. Other discussions considered achievable. Government Department of Agriculture, covered plans for incursion Barney says involvement with the Fisheries and Forestry, the eight state management, establishing pest-free PHC will potentially provide and territory departments and the areas, interstate quarantine and public significant opportunities for future Commonwealth Science and Research awareness programmes. co-operation, particularly in Organisation. The committee assists Plant Health Australia, a public information exchange, application of with overall coordination and policy company responsible for developing science and in sharing diagnostic development for endemic and exotic national plant health policy in Australia, capacity and other specialist resources. pest administration across Australia. also contributed to the meeting. Of Barney Stephenson, Barney presented New Zealand’s interest to MAF Biosecurity was their National Adviser, country report, which included progress in developing an Australian Plant Pest Surveillance and Response, information on MAF’s GM sweetcorn plant pest diagnostic network and a MAF Biosecurity Authority, investigation in May 2003, an illegal laboratory accreditation scheme, and the phone 04 474 4102, plant importation, significant plant pest cost-sharing agreement with industry fax 04 474 4257, incursions and the National Pest Plant which was close to being signed. [email protected]

inheritance of phytochrome-mediated photoperiodicity in strawberry as part of a USDA effort to develop daylength- insensitive, disease resistant cultivars bred for continuous fruit production. This project gave Christina first-hand experience Plants Biosecurity team with MAF’s quarantine procedures, as she successfully Christina Cundari Vieglais moved to imported 16 genotypes of strawberry tissue cultures upon her Wellington on the day the GMO arrival to New Zealand, after completing a phytosanitary moratorium was lifted and joined certification through USDA APHIS in Beltsville, Maryland. Plants Biosecurity as National Adviser Since meeting her Australian husband, David, at Kennedy for New Organisms. In addition to Space Center in 1993, where they worked together on a global contributing to the regulation of new climate change project under NASA’s Ecological and organisms under the HSNO Act and Environmental Programmes, the Vieglaises have gradually been assisting Plants Pest Management with moving westward. From Florida, they moved to the University of management of exotic plant pest Kansas in Lawrence, where David developed The Species incursions, Christina will coordinate enforcement activities for Analyst, a biodiversity informatics network providing standards the field testing, conditional release, and unauthorised release and software tools for improving access to worldwide of genetically modified organisms. Christina has a PhD and biodiversity data. Christina worked at Midwest Research MSc from the University of New Hampshire in Plant Biology, Institute in Kansas City, developing methods for the rapid specialising in plant breeding and genetics, and BSc degrees in identification and characterisation of low-abundance transgenic Biochemistry and Agronomy from Virginia Tech, Virginia. and other novel organisms. With the expansion of The Species Christina wasn’t born in New Zealand, but travelled here as Analyst, Christina and David have travelled extensively, but soon as possible, 15 years ago as a student recipient of a their numerous visits back to New Zealand to visit family and Fulbright Grant in plant genetics. In Palmerston North at friends have often been the highlight of their travels. They are DSIR’s Climate Lab (now HortResearch’s New Zealand avid gardeners, hikers, bikers, and sailors, so they are happy to Controlled Environment Lab), Christina characterised the be finally living in New Zealand.

16 Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 Timely interception prevents Gypsy moth outbreak in South Island

Quick work by a Christchurch trainee Peter Thomson says it’s impossible to vehicle inspector has prevented a underestimate the significance of potentially devastating South Island this find. incursion of the Gypsy moth. “Gypsy moth is one of this country’s The living larvae and egg mass – a most-feared moth pests. We are in the significant biosecurity risk – was middle of a campaign to eradicate it attached to the wheel of a Japanese following the discovery of a single male moth in Hamilton last year. It’s suited to import vehicle. The car had been Well spotted! Innocuous to the untrained eye, imported directly from Yokohama to this egg and larvae mass could have spawned cool climates and is a voracious a devastating biosecurity incursion of consumer of conifers. Its impact on Lyttelton inside a container which held Gypsy moth. five vehicles. South Island forests could have been hidden on the inside of the left rear tyre devastating,” he says. Vehicle inspector Elizabeth Nosegaard wall. The entire mass was transferred to was only in her second week of training a secure bag and transported to the Director of Border Management, when she made the find during a MAF Quarantine Service in Neil Hyde, says the interception is a routine inspection. The search was Christchurch for overnight fumigation. good example of how the new carried out within minutes of the inspection system for sea containers The cars and container were container being emptied at a vehicle is working. immediately sprayed, and then agent’s premises in Christchurch late last everything that originally came from the “We rely on people working at the front month. The car was hoisted up and container was gathered up and returned line to be vigilant and alert to potential checked underneath with handheld to the container where it was fumigated. biosecurity risks.” spotlights. Quarantine Officer John www.maf.govt.nz/gypsy-moth Hinton says the eggs and larvae were MAF’s Director of Forest Biosecurity

The last Peltoschema Not every eradication programme Forest Biosecurity group MAF Forest Biosecurity undertakes receives dramatic press or polarises Barry Wards has recently joined the public opinion. Sometime between Forest Biosecurity group in the newly 2001 and 2003 the last individual of created position of National Adviser, Sent packing: Peltoschema suturalis disappeared from Forest New Organisms. Barry’s Peltoschema suturalis is New Zealand as quietly and responsibilities include the management now officially eradicated but site surveillance unobtrusively as it had arrived. This of issues associated with new organisms will continue. small leaf beetle on Acacia species was (including GMOs), containment found in Hataitai, Wellington in 2000 during routine MAF facilities, conditional and field release, high-risk site surveillance. The response used two ground- particularly as they relate to forests, based spray programmes (at initial detection and a year later) and the technical and operational standards associated complemented by frequent site inspections by Vigil over the with these. Barry previously worked as a scientist with AgResearch, at the Wallaceville Animal Research Centre in last three years. The last individual was found in late 2001. Upper Hutt, developing improved vaccines for Mycobacterium Peltoschema is not considered a serious pest in its native bovis, the causative agent of bovine tuberculosis. He also Australia, but detection of the beetle at a low population level managed PC3 containment facilities and assisted with the occurring on a restricted range of hosts meant that the management and maintenance of the small animal eradication attempt was both feasible and appropriate. Since biocontainment facility which housed kiwis and New Zealand Peltoschema has not been detected for over two years, this bats during the testing of rabbit calicivirus (RCD) prior to its insect is now considered eradicated. The host Acacia species unauthorised release in the South Island in 1997. will continue to be inspected as part of general surveillance at Barry has a strong interest in forests and the New Zealand this site. environment and has been chair of the Upper Hutt branch of Davor Bejakovich, Forest and Bird for the past decade. He is looking forward to National Manager, Forest Pest Surveillance and Response, applying his knowledge to protect New Zealand’s biosecurity. phone 03 325 7132, [email protected]

Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 17 Trans-Tasman animal welfare group meets Snags with the uneven implementation since the late 1980s and shares a number • the welfare of genetically modified of Australia’s proposed national of common technical areas and general and cloned animals ban on the docking of dogs’ tails was policy issues, including the development •vertebrate pest control of codes of welfare. one of the issues discussed on a busy •a proposed co-operative research agenda of the recent meeting As well as the implementation of the centre for animal welfare research. of the trans-Tasman Animal Welfare tail docking ban, other issues on the The recent Keniry review on the live Working Group. agenda included: export of animals, following the last The first biannual meeting for 2004 took • the Keniry review on the live export year’s Cormo Express incident, was place in Hobart on 11 and 12 February. of animals (see below) discussed at length. One The group comprises representatives of recommendation of the review was that • the National Animal Welfare Strategy all Australian states and territories, the the trans-Tasman group will have a • national collection of statistics of Federal Government, the major role in the development of a animals used in research, testing and Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial national standard for livestock exports. teaching Research Organisation (CSIRO) and New Zealand’s experiences of the recent New Zealand. • the OIE animal welfare strategic development of the code of welfare for initiative and global conference The group provides advice on welfare pigs were shared as the group is about to •model codes of practice: emu, issues of national significance, identifies embark on an Australian code. The next camels, deer, cattle, pigs, destruction areas for research and develops national meeting will be held in June 2004. of feral animals, land transport of animal welfare standards through model poultry, sheep, goats and cattle Wayne Ricketts, codes of welfare. Members meet face to Programme Manager face twice a year, and by teleconference •religious slaughter Animal Welfare, four times during the year. •veterinary biologicals testing phone 04 474 4276, fax 04 498 9888, • fish welfare New Zealand has participated in the [email protected] working group and its predecessors •layer hen research Cruelty to animals clue for social agencies

First Strike, an American campaign reduce adult crime than criminal First Strike New Zealand logo adapted with kind that aims to raise society’s awareness sanctions applied later in life permission of First Strike of the links between animal cruelty •childhood behaviour is more Scotland, Scottish SPCA and printed courtesy of and adult violence, has been important than teenage behaviour in First Strike New Zealand established in New Zealand predicting future violence. campaign organisers. (Biosecurity 41, February 2003). In 1997, as a result of the American An umbrella group comprising The following is adapted from an research, the Humane Society of the representatives from Child, Youth and article by Catriona MacLennan1, an United States created the First Strike Family Services (CYFS), the Royal New Auckland barrister and member of the campaign. The campaign involves co- Zealand Society for the Prevention of New Zealand First Strike umbrella operation and reciprocal reporting Cruelty to Animals (SPCA), Plunket, group. The article explains the basis of between child protection, domestic the Police, Women’s Refuge, local the campaign and recent steps taken violence and animal welfare groups in councils, the New Zealand Veterinary to implement it. the United States. The object of Association and animal management A strong correlation between youthful coordinating the agencies’ efforts is to services was formed in Auckland in abuse of animals and adult violence has better protect victims of violence, deal November 2002, to explore how the been established by more than 25 years with offenders and prevent future organisations can co-operate. of research in the United States. Studies violence through early identification of CYFS and the SPCA are working on a have demonstrated that violent people with violent tendencies. protocol for co-operation and reciprocal offenders frequently have childhood and The American First Strike campaign reporting of abuse. adolescent histories of serious and also operates in Scotland. New Zealand repeated animal cruelty. Research also has now been authorised to develop its Moves are also underway to provide indicates that: own version to encourage inter-agency temporary shelters for the animals of • early intervention is more likely to co-operation. domestic violence victims. Women may

1 New Zealand Herald, 25 February 2003 continued on page 19

18 Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 embryos to transmit bluetongue and about the effectiveness of standard embryo washing methods. The standard requires donor buffalo to be resident in a bluetongue-free area for at least 100 days prior to, and during, collection of the embryos as specified Draft import health standards for by OIE Code, ‘Article 2.1.9.14 for in vivo derived embryos of consultation – Animals ruminants other than bovine’ from infected countries. Your comments on this draft import health standard The following draft import health standards (IHSs) have been are welcome and should be received in writing by developed by MAF Biosecurity Authority and are available for Friday 2 April 2004. Comments for both import health standards public consultation. should be addressed to: Submissions are subject to release under the Official Jennie Brunton, International Animal Trade, Animal Biosecurity Information Act (OIA). If any information in your submission is MAF Biosecurity Authority, PO Box 2526, Wellington commercially sensitive or if you do not wish it to be released to fax 04 474 4227, [email protected] other interested parties, please state this clearly with relevant www.maf.govt.nz/biosecurity/consultation.htm#draft-ihs reasoning for assessment in the event of an OIA request. A copy of the background paper is also available on request. Malayan Sun Bears (Helarctos malayanus) from Australia This is a new standard for the importation of Malayan Sun Amended import health standards Bears into New Zealand zoological facilities from Australia. for consultation – Animals It is restricted to sun bears born and raised in Australian zoos. Scoured wool from all countries Your comments on this draft import health standard are Scoured and carded wool all countries welcome and should be received in writing by Unprocessed fibre all countries Friday 26 March 2004. These standards have been amended to include yak fibre. Bovine and buffalo (Bubalus bubalis) embryos from Australia This addition is based on a background paper, which is The import health standard for bovine embryos from Australia available on request. Your comments on these draft import has been revised to include buffalo (Bubalus bubalis). There is health standards are welcome and should be received in writing a lack of specific information about the ability of buffalo by Friday 16 April 2004 addressed to: Paul Berentson, International Animal Trade, Animal Biosecurity MAF Biosecurity Authority, PO Box 2526, Wellington continued from page 18 fax 04 474 4227, [email protected] Photo courtesy of the Delta Society www.deltasociety.org and First Strike www.maf.govt.nz/biosecurity/consultation.htm#draft-ihs New Zealand campaign organisers.

often be reluctant to go to refuges New and amended import health standards because they fear what will happen issued – Animals to pets that are left behind. The following import health standards (IHSs) have been issued CYFS Otara office supervisor Briar by the Director, Animal Biosecurity and are available for use: Humphrey is urging training for Bovine embryos from Canada and the United States frontline social work staff and The standard has been amended to remove the following animal welfare inspectors, and clauses regarding freedom from bovine spongiform inclusion of information about the encephalopathy (BSE): treatment of animals in the social work risk assessment carried ‘The donor animals must have been resident only in countries out by social workers. that are officially free of bovine spongiform encephalopathy’. While most of these moves have so far taken place in Both Canada and the United States are officially free from BSE. Auckland, campaign coordinators are keen to see the Bovine embryos may still be imported from the United States programme extended throughout New Zealand. and Canada as BSE is not transmitted in embryos. For more information about the First Strike campaign in This standard is now dated 26 January 2004 and replaces that New Zealand, contact: dated 8 January 2004. First Strike Campaign Coordinator, School of Natural Sciences, Bovine products from the United States UNITEC, Private Bag, Auckland, phone 09 815 4321 extn 7875, The following standards have been amended so that the clause fax 09 815 3010. relating to BSE is only relevant to bovine products:

Joanna Tuckwell, • Dried bovine/porcine blood for human consumption from Policy Adviser Animal Welfare, Canada and the United States phone 04 474 4296, fax 04 498 9888, • Spray-dried bovine and porcine blood products for further [email protected] processing into animal food from the United States

Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 19 • Sausage casings for human consumption from Canada and The consultation notice appeared in Biosecurity 48, the United States 15 December 2003. The standards are now dated 12 January 2004 and replace those dated 12 March 2001 (EDIBLOIC.NAM & FOBLOIC.USA) Import health standards for re-evaluation and 22 May 2001(MEACASIC.ALL). During 2004 the MAF Biosecurity Authority proposes to review Inedible tallow from the United States the following import health standards: The clause requiring BSE freedom has been removed as this • Camelids from the UK standard already has a statement about level of impurities • Camelids from the United States including protein. The new standard replaces that dated 22 These standards will be amended to be consistent with the new May 2001. standard for camelids from Australia. Shelf-stable pet foods containing bovine ingredients from • Cervine germplasm from Ireland specified countries The United States has been added to the specified countries Import health standards revoked list. The new standard replaces that dated 26 August 2003. Cattle from the United States dated 19 August 2002 Shelf-stable pet foods containing animal products Llamas and alpacas from the United States dated 4 September Under the Eligibility section, the United States has been added 2002 to the notes (NB1-5) indicating that specific standards should be used for certain products including: Cooked pet foods, These import health standards are to be withdrawn following Cooked pet food ingredients containing animal products, Dry the detection of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in dog and cat pet foods, Dried pelleted pet foods for pets other the United States. than cats and dogs. The new standard replaces that dated 26 August 2003. Codes of ethical conduct – approvals, Specified products for human consumption containing dairy notifications and revocations since the products, eggs or meat last issue of Biosecurity Pre-cooked heat-and-eat meals containing animal products All organisations involved in the use of live animals for for human consumption from Canada, European Community research, testing or teaching are required to adhere to an and the United States approved code of ethical conduct. Canada and the United States have been added to the clauses Codes of ethical conduct approved advising that importation of commercial consignments of beef • AgResearch Ltd (expiry 31 December 2008) products are subject to approval from the New Zealand Food • Ambreed New Zealand Ltd (Expiry 31 December 2008) Safety Authority (NZFSA). An additional clause states that all • Ancare New Zealand Ltd (expiry 31 December 2008) edible animal products must also comply with the Food Act • Auckland Zoological Park (expiry 31 December 2008) 1981. Importers are advised to check with NZFSA prior to • Bay of Plenty Polytechnic (expiry 31 December 2008) importation for details of the restrictions. • HyClone New Zealand (expiry 31 December 2008) The standards are dated 11 February 2004 and replace those • Landcare Research New Zealand Ltd (expiry 31 December dated 20 August 2003 (EDIPROIC.ALL) and 1 November 2001 2008) (HEAMEAIC.ALL). •Massey University (expiry 31 December 2008) Kerry Mulqueen, National Adviser, • Schering-Plough Animal Health Ltd (expiry 31 December Animals Imports and Exports, Animal Biosecurity, 2008). phone 04 498 9625, fax 04 474 4132, [email protected] Transfers of codes of ethical conduct approved: Nil

www.maf.govt.nz/animal-imports Amendments to codes of ethical conduct approved: Nil Notifications to MAF of minor amendments to codes of Guide for Approval of Semen Storage ethical conduct Centres Exporting Ruminant Semen from NZ • PharmVet Solutions This document sets out the guidelines for official veterinarians Notifications to MAF of arrangements to use an existing code when inspecting and approving semen storage centres that of ethical conduct propose to re-export imported ruminant semen or semen that • Abacus Biotech Ltd (to use AgResearch Ltd’s code and has been collected and processed at a MAF approved ruminant Invermay AEC) (renewal – code expired) semen collection centre. • AgriQuality NZ Ltd (to use AgResearch Ltd’s code and Ruakura AEC) (renewal – code expired) The Guide can be found on the MAF website: • AgVax Developments Ltd (to use AgResearch Ltd’s code and www.maf.govt.nz/animal-exports Wallaceville AEC) (renewal – code expired)

20 Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 • Animal Health Centre (to use AgResearch Ltd’s code and Approvals by the Director-General of MAF for the use of non- Ruakura AEC) (renewal – code expired) human hominids: Nil • Central Southland Veterinary Services Ltd (to use Approvals by the Minister of Agriculture of research or AgResearch Ltd’s code and Invermay AEC) (renewal – code testing in the national interest: Nil expired) Linda Carsons, Senior Policy Adviser, Animal Welfare, • Dairy Production Systems Ltd (to use AgResearch Ltd’s code phone 04 470 2746, fax 04 498 9888, and Ruakura AEC) (renewal – code expired) [email protected] • Dexcel Ltd (to use AgResearch Ltd’s code and Ruakura Introductory period for grain operational AEC) (renewal – code expired) standard ends • Duirs New Zealand Ltd (to use AgResearch Ltd’s code and Ruakura AEC) (renewal – code expired) On 25 August 2003 MAF Operational Standard MAF • Fort Dodge New Zealand Ltd (to use PharmVet Solutions’ Operational Standard PIT-GFP-ISR – Grain for Processing, code) Import System Requirements was approved to hold operational •Horticulture & Food Research Institute of New Zealand Ltd requirements for the management of grain before and after (to use AgResearch Ltd’s code and animal ethics importation into New Zealand. committees) (renewal – code expired) This standard is available on the MAF website at: • InterAg (to use AgResearch Ltd’s code and Ruakura AEC) www.maf.govt.nz/biosecurity/imports/plants/standards/ (renewal – code expired) pit-gfp-isr.pdf • Kotare Bioethics Ltd (to use AgResearch Ltd’s code and Grasslands AEC) (renewal – code expired) Importers of the main types of grains (barley, maize/sweet corn, • Livestock Improvement Corporation Ltd (to use AgResearch oats, sorghum, and wheat) may only bring viable grain into New Ltd’s code and Ruakura AEC) (renewal – code expired) Zealand if they provide a written grain importation system (GIS) • New Zealand Institute for Crop & Food Research Ltd (to use that MAF approves. Under this system of importation, grain may AgResearch Ltd’s code and Grasslands AEC) only enter New Zealand if mandatory requirements are met that • New Zealand Leather & Shoe Research Association (Inc) (to are specified in the operational standard. use AgResearch Ltd’s code and Grasslands AEC) Examples of mandatory operational requirements • On-Farm Research Ltd (to use AgResearch Ltd’s code and Transport operators who are approved by MAF may only transport Grasslands AEC) (renewal – code expired) imported grains from the point of arrival (entry port). • Parnell Laboratories New Zealand Ltd (to use AgResearch Additionally, the grain may only be transported to MAF-approved Ltd’s code and Ruakura AEC) (renewal – code expired) transitional facilities for processing (milling) or for treatment to • PPL Therapeutics (New Zealand) Ltd (to use AgResearch ensure that the grains (and any contaminants) are not viable Ltd’s code and Ruakura AEC) (renewal – code expired) (cannot be grown as seed for sowing). Once milling or approved • Suta Export Ltd (to use AgResearch Ltd’s code and Ruakura AEC) (renewal – code expired) treatments occur, the material is not regarded as being a biosecurity risk. •Virionyx Corporation Ltd (to use HyClone New Zealand’s code) (renewal – code expired) From 25 August 2003, MAF provided importers with a 6-month •Wanganui Veterinary Services Ltd (to use AgResearch Ltd’s introductory period so that GISs could be provided to MAF for code and Grasslands AEC) (renewal – code expired) approval and importers could align their businesses with the • Xcluder Pest Proof Fencing Company Ltd operational standard. The period ended on 25 February 2004 (to use AgResearch Ltd’s code and Ruakura AEC) but PIT-GFP-ISR provides a temporary import option for current (renewal – code expired) import permit holders. Under this option, importation may Codes of ethical conduct revoked or expired or continue for 3 months under strict compliance agreement arrangements terminated conditions and total MAF supervision. However, all new • Agri-Feeds Ltd importers must provide a GIS for approval before importation is • Diverse Animal Holdings allowed and an import permit is provided by MAF. Phytosanitary • Elanco Animal Health requirements for grains and seeds for consumption and • Fort Dodge New Zealand Ltd processing must also be met and these requirements are found •Impian Technologies Ltd in the complementary phytosanitary standard: • New Zealand Trade and Enterprise www.maf.govt.nz/biosecurity/imports/plants/standards/ • Novartis New Zealand Ltd (with AgResearch Ltd) pit-gfp-phr.pdf •PA Biologicals New Zealand Dave Nendick, National Adviser – Grain for Processing, • Slacek, Dr Brigitte Plants Biosecurity, MAF Biosecurity Authority, •Tompkins, Dr Daniel PO Box 2526, Wellington, •Woodland Goats Ltd ph 04 474 4200, fax 04 474 4257, [email protected] Updates continued on page 23

Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 21 New organism records: 15/12/03 – 13/02/04

Biosecurity is about managing risks – protecting the New Zealand environment and economy from exotic pests and diseases. MAF Biosecurity Authority devotes much of its time to ensuring that new organism records come to its attention, to follow up as appropriate. The tables below list new organisms that have become established, new hosts for existing pests and extension to distribution for existing pests. The information was collated by MAF Forest Biosecurity and MAF Plants Biosecurity during 15/12/03 – 13/02/04, and held in the Plant Pest Information Network (PPIN) database. Wherever possible, common names have been included.

PLANTS BIOSECURITY RECORDS 15/12/2003 – 13/02/2004 Validated new to New Zealand reports Organism Host Location Submitted by Comment Ramularia armoraciae Barbarea verna Auckland National Plant Pest A leaf spot fungus detected in a public park. DoC has been informed of (no common name) (winter cress) Reference Laboratory this detection. (NPPRL) Cercospora erysimi Erysimum sp. Auckland NPPRL This leaf spot fungus was detected by chance in a public park. DoC has (no common name) (wallflower) been informed of the detection. Naohidemyces vaccinii Vaccinium ashei cv. Waikato NPPRL Blueberry rust has been found extensively in the Waikato. Rust fungi are (Hemlock – Blueberry Woodard (blueberry, readily distributed on wind currents. DoC has been informed of this Rust) rabbit eye blueberry) detection. New host reports Organism Host Location Submitted by Comment Cercospora apii Fuchsia procumbens Auckland NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include several weed species, corn marigold, blue (cercospora leaf spot) (climbing fuchsia; statice, strawberry blite, annual chrysanthemum and Bells of Ireland. creeping fuchsia) Deutzia crenata (Deutzia) Gaura lindheimeri (butterly plant) Pseudocercospora oleariae Olearia furfuracea Auckland NPPRL No other hosts recorded in PPIN. (no common name) (no common name) Phytophthora cryptogea Verbena sp. Central Otago NPPRL This fungus has a wide host range. (phytophthora root rot) (verbena) Fusarium sporotrichioides Verbena sp. Central Otago NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include banana and Douglas fir. (no common name) (verbena) Gibberella avenacea Verbena sp. Central Otago NPPRL This fungus has a very wide host range. (foot rot, root rot) (verbena) Phoma sp. Verbena sp. Central Otago NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include tare, pear, kiwifruit, date plum, wheat, (phoma leaf spot, (verbena) rhododendron, nectarine, onion, capsicum, asparagus, blueberry, olive, phoma rot) Kalgan boronia, soft tree fern, maize, Phoenix palm, Dracaena sp., yucca, and kawakawa. Pleospora tarda Verbena sp. Central Otago NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include tomato, tare, parsley, oriental lily, cabbage, (sooty mould) (verbena) passionfruit, feijoa, asparagus, nectarine, statice, peony, chicory, Paterson’s curse, Daphne, olive, spinach and custard apple. Erwinia herbicola Daucus carota ssp. Central Otago NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include grape, passionfruit, kiwifruit, feijoa, avocado, (bacterial rot, sativus apricot and pumpkin. bacterial soft rot) (carrot) Alternaria dianthicola Dianthus zeyheri Auckland NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include gypsophila and carnation. (alternaria leaf spot) (Dianthus) Botryotinia fuckeliana Dianthus zeyheri Auckland NPPRL This fungus has a very wide host range. (botrytis blight, grey (Dianthus) mould, stem blight) Fusarium anthophilum Parajubaea cocoides Auckland Forest Research Other PPIN hosts include canna lily. (fusarium) (Andean coconut) Naohidemyces vaccinii Vaccinium corymbosum Waikato NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include rabbit eye blueberry. (Hemlock – Blueberry (blueberry, highbush Rust) blueberry) Pseudocercospora Glechoma hederacea Auckland NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include basil. ocimicola (ground ivy) (Pseudocercospora leaf spot) Nectria radicicola Ribes nigrum Dunedin NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include kiwifruit, capsicum, rose, olive, (cylindrocarpon root rot) (black currant) chrysanthemum, cabbage tree, cymbidium orchid, carrot, yam, persimmon, strawberry, tomato, apple, banana, narcissus, peony rose, avocado, Prunus spp., potato, wheat, blueberry, grape, arum and calla lily. Platypus apicalis Diospyros kaki Auckland NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include river peppermint, shining gum, Spanish oak, (pinhole borer) (persimmon) English oak and Eucalyptus sp.

22 Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 PLANTS BIOSECURITY RECORDS CONTINUED 15/12/03 – 13/02/04 Extension to distribution reports Organism Host Location Submitted by Comment Pseudocercospora oleariae Olearia furfuracea Auckland National Plant Pest No other distributions recorded in PPIN. (no common name) (no common name) Reference Laboratory (NPPRL) Fusarium sporotrichioides Verbena sp. Central Otago NPPRL Other PPIN distributions include Northland and North Canterbury. (no common name) (verbena) Epyaxa rosearia Inanimate host Nelson NPPRL Other PPIN distributions include Waikato. (common looper) (packaging)

Fusarium anthophilum Parajubaea cocoides Auckland Forest Research Other PPIN distributions include Northland. (fusarium) (Andean coconut) Mycosphaerella ribis Ribes nigrum Dunedin NPPRL Other PPIN distributions include North Canterbury. (septoria leaf spot) (black currant)

Plants records: George Gill, Technical Adviser, Pest Management, MAF Plants Biosecurity, phone 04 470 2742, fax 04 474 4257, [email protected]

FOREST BIOSECURITY RECORDS 15/12/2003 – 13/02/2004 Validated new to New Zealand reports Organism Host Location Submitted by Comment Nambouria xanthops Eucalyptus cephalocarpa Auckland Forest Research Other PPIN hosts include blue gum, ribbon gum, southern mahogany, (no common name) (eucalypt) candle-bark gum, and Camden woolly-butt. Saissetia oleae Asclepias physocarpa Auckland Forest Research Other PPIN hosts include squash, sweet orange, navel orange, mandarin, (black scale, olive scale) (swan plant) lemon, Meyer lemon, tangelo, grape, kiwifruit, Litchi, nashi, pear, Cymbidium sp., Rosa sp. and heather.

Saissetia coffeae Casimiroa edulis Bay of Plenty Forest Research Other PPIN hosts include quince, nectarine, Japanese plum, avocado, (hemispherical scale) (white sapote) feijoa, sweet orange, navel orange, mandarin, lemon, Meyer lemon, tangelo, grape, kiwifruit, yew and capsicum. Dicarpella dryina Quercus robur Auckland National Plant Pest No other hosts recorded in PPIN. (no common name) (English oak, truffle oak) Reference Library (NPPRL) Oemona hirta Syringa vulgaris Hawke’s Bay Forest Research This insect has a wide host range. (lemon tree borer) (lilac) Extension to distribution reports Organism Host Location Submitted by Comment Holocola sp. cf. triangulana Acacia longifolia Hawke’s Bay Forest Research Other PPIN distributions include Auckland, Bay of Plenty, Gisborne, (pink blackwood leaftyer, (Sydney golden wattle) Wanganui, Waikato and Nelson. pink wattle gouger) Nematus oligospilus Salix babylonica Kaikoura Forest Research Other PPIN distributions include Auckland, Gisborne, Waikato, Mid (willow sawfly?) (weeping willow) Canterbury, Dunedin, Marlborough and Buller.

Salix fragilis Marlborough (crack willow) Sounds Uromycladium alpinum Acacia mearnsii Marlborough Forest Research Other PPIN distributions include Hawke’s Bay and Rangitikei. (acacia rust) (black wattle) Sounds Stegommata sulfuratella Banksia integrifolia Marlborough Forest Research Other PPIN distributions include Coromandel, Bay of Plenty, Wellington, (banksia leaf miner) (coastal banksia) Sounds Hawke’s Bay, Gisborne, Marlborough, Nelson, Northland, Taupo, Taranaki and Wanganui.

Forest records: Peter Thomson, Director MAF Forest Biosecurity, phone 04 498 9639, fax 04 498 9888, [email protected]

ANIMALS BIOSECURITY RECORDS 15/12/2003 – 13/02/2004 Validated new to New Zealand reports: No new to New Zealand records reported for this period Animals records: Amelia Pascoe, Programme Coordinator, Exotic Animal response, Animal Biosecurity, ph 04 470 2785, fax 04 474 4133, [email protected]

25 February 2004. The draft code is available on the MAF website: www.maf.govt.nz/animal-welfare Draft code of welfare for zoos It may also be inspected at MAF, ASB Bank House, The National Animal Welfare Advisory Committee (NAWAC) 101-103 The Terrace, Wellington. wishes to advise that a code of welfare for zoos has been The closing date for submissions is 8 April 2004. Submissions drafted to replace the Code of Recommendations for the on the draft code can be made in writing to NAWAC at: Welfare of Exhibit Animals and Information for Animal Exhibit Animal Welfare Group, Operators, which was deemed as a code of welfare under the MAF Biosecurity Authority Animal Welfare Act 1999. MAF, PO Box 2526, Wellington The draft code was released for public consultation on [email protected]

Biosecurity Issue 50 • 15 March 2004 23 CODES OF WELFARE – Animal Welfare Act Update The table below is a quick guide as to the status of the various codes of welfare as they are developed under the Animal Welfare Act 1999. Code Status Broiler Code Final code issued by Minister of Agriculture on 26 June 2003 Pig Code Final code presented to Minister of Agriculture on 25 November 2003 Rodeo Code Final code issued by Minister of Agriculture on 4 December 2003 Layer Hen Code Final code presented to Minister of Agriculture end of March 2004 Zoo Code Pre-notification consultation closed on 12 December 2003. Final code to be presented to Minister of Agriculture mid 2004 Circus Code Public consultation completed on 14 November 2003. Final code to be presented to Minister of Agriculture early–mid 2004 Commercial Slaughter Code Public consultation completed. Final Code to be presented to Minister of Agriculture mid 2004 Wayne Ricketts, Programme Manager Animal Welfare, phone 04 474 4276, fax 04 498 9888, [email protected]

Exotic disease and pest emergency hotline: 0800 809 966 Animal welfare complaint hotline: 0800 327 027 www.maf.govt.nz/biosecurity