Persian Cluster Forecast

PERSIAN CLUSTER FORECAST

Justin D. Long, ed. — Edition 1.1 — February 2013 Mission to Unreached Peoples

http://www.justinlong.org l http://www.mup.org

Persia Cluster 1 Terms of Use

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2 Persia Cluster ERRATA HISTORY 2/1/13 1.0 Initial release. 2/1913 1.1 Minor spelling and grammatical fixes, addition of misplaced Kermanshah provinces in the district survey, and additions to 19a on the current status of Bible translation in Iran.

Persia Cluster 3 To learn more about joining a Strategy Team and engaging least-reached people groups, visit www.mup.org, call Pete at 469-814-8222, or email [email protected] www.facebook.com/UPGnow | www.twitter.com/UPGnow

4 Persia Cluster The Persian Cluster Forecast Was Also Sponsored In Part By donors like you.

Thank You to our Interviewees

including Iran Alive Ministries 214-932-0995, www.iranaliveministries.org

and the many others not named for security reasons.

To learn more about joining a Strategy Team and engaging least-reached people groups, visit www.mup.org, call Pete at 469-814-8222, or email [email protected] www.facebook.com/UPGnow | www.twitter.com/UPGnow

Persia Cluster 5 INTRODUCTION

There are multiple purposes for this document. First and foremost is to provide a deep and regularly-updated review of the “Persian Cluster” (defined as Farsi- speakers in Iran, and their diaspora). This is intended as a tool for intercession, inspiration and strategic planning. Second, it is hoped this document will be a useful introduction to the Persian Cluster for potential missionary candidates and short-term workers. This will be, therefore, a summary, but also link you to many additional resources which will provide you with further and deeper insights. Finally, my goal is to provide something of a “reality check” and a “forecast” for the likely future of the Persian cluster and in particular the Persian church. Iran will not change overnight, and the future of the church in Iran is still small and restricted for the future--unless something is changed. Fortunately many are working on this. The measure of the success of this document will be if it inspires more to join them.

METHODOLOGY

This document works to achieve its goals by making valuable forecasts: projec- tions candidates and agencies can use for long-term strategic planning. Obvious- ly, no forecast can be absolutely error-free. However, I have sought to separate “signal” (trend) from “noise” (random data). Underlying this forecast are both statistical data (in the form of demographic data from the UN, church growth data from various on-the-ground networks as well as religious databases, and other similar collections), historical patterns, and expert opinion from workers with long-term histories on the field. (Each interviewee has, on average, at least 10 to 15 years of experience in direct field work amongst Iranians, and for this report more than a few had many decades. I was privileged to listen to their stories and their passion for bringing the Gospel to Iran.) The specific forecasts (numbered, in this document) are my own responsibil- ity. I have made them as specific and testable as possible so we can see which ones I have gotten “right” and which I have gotten “wrong,” and the underlying forecast model can be improved in future editions. Meanwhile, in the individual forecasts I have labored to give specific estimates of how probable a forecast is. Some are “almost certain” (better than 90%), and others are less so (perhaps over 60% or 75%). The percentages in most cases are based on underlying statistics using a Bayesian approach.

6 Persia Cluster Overarching Forecasts for 2015-2025

1. Iran’s population is growing slowly, and will likely begin to decline after 2040. Slowing growth reflects changing cultural norms and pessimism about future possibilities in Iran.

2. Iran is urbanizing, with vast numbers leaving the poverty of the rural regions to seek a better life in the cities. Tehran in particular is a magnet.

3. Iran has had a notably “young” population, but slowing population growth will cause the average age to rise.

4. The economy is disintegrating, leading to anger, hopelessness and despair on the part of millions of people. Iran is experiencing a “brain drain” as many of the frustrated and discontent, having no hope for a better future in their lifetime, are leaving the country.

5. Iran is in the midst of a cultural “unraveling”—a period of severe cultural debate (although much of this is being suppressed ruthlessly). We estimate this will last until somewhere around 2030, at which point the nation will enter a crisis.

6. Potential Sparks and wildcards: • An almost certain earthquake (fault lines cover 90% of Iran) • A lack of self-sufficiency in food, and bread price spikes • The impact of shrinking oil revenues on the government’s budget • Societal breakdown, especially due to divorce, drugs and prostitution • The influence of women and the boiling point of their education • Illegal technologies that connect Iranians to the world and shape views

7. Many are discontent with the government, but the chance for liberalization is low. The government controls the political process as well as military and paramilitary forces which it uses to suppress dissent.

8. Iran will be Islamic for the immediate future. However, the church has endured since ancient times, and won’t be eradicated any time soon.

9. Much modern church growth is fueled by disgust with Islam, but the impact of long-term evangelistic efforts, media, and the boldness of believers should not be underestimated.

10. The church is growing in size, strength and maturity—but it will still be small and fragile for the next decade and beyond.

Persia Cluster 7 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. The population will decline. 2. The population will urbanize. 3. The average age will rise. 4. Many will leave the country, frustrated and discontent. 5. A major, disastrous earthquake is highly probable in the near future. 6. Food prices will continue to spike. 7. Shrinking oil revenues will impact governmental budgets. 8. Iran is in the midst of a cultural unraveling through 2030. 9. Iran has veered back and forth between its Persian and Islamic identity. 10. Iranian society is breaking down due to pervasive structures of sin. 11. The women’s rights movement remains a minority, albeit a vocal one. 12. The education of women is likely to be a boiling point. 13. The economy is disintegrating. 14. There is widespread discontent with the government. 15. Open, large-scale warfare between Iran and its neighbors is unlikely. 16. Technology is illegal in many forms, but many continue to seek it out. 17. Iran is, and will be, largely Islamic for the immediate future. 18. The church has endured and will not be eradicated any time soon. 19. Modern church growth is fueled by disgust with Islam, and evangelism. 20. The church is growing in size, strength and maturity. 21. The church will be small and fragile for the next decade and beyond.

8 Persia Cluster DEMOGRAPHICS

Population growth is slowing, and the population as a whole will most 1 likely decline. If the current trend continues in the long term, Iran could fall to around 60 million by 2100. The prospects of reversing this are low, despite the desires of the Iranian government. a) The population is presently growing, but the rate of growth peaked in 1980 and has been falling ever since. It is currently 1.2% and falling, with a fertility rate averaging 1.6 children per woman (well below the roughly 2.1 average needed to avoid population decline). As a result, the total population is expected to peak at 85 million around 2040 and then begin to decline. It may drop as far 62 million by 2100 (the low variant of the estimates projects 31 million). b) The reasons for this decline had historical beginnings but now are rooted in widespread cultural norms and dissatisfaction with the economic and political situation in Iran. After the 1979 revolution, the government urged Iranians to have big families. The economy, however, did not grow as fast, and the rapidly growing population became impoverished, leading to frustration and discontent. The government found it expedient to reverse its position. In the 1990s it began providing a population family planning scheme, promoting the idea of small families. This was very successful and accelerated a rapid drop in fertility. c) Families are having fewer children. The percentage of families with 5 or more children fell from 47% in 1967 to 30% in 2000, by which time a third of women had only 1 or 2 children. The idea of having fewer children has become a cultural norm, especially among younger, urbanized children: fertility is higher in rural regions (2.4) than in urban ones (1.9). d) Women are getting married later. The percentage of 15-to-19-year-old women who were never married increased from 54% in 1976 to 84% in 2000. There were also increases in the percentage of 20-to-34-year-olds who have never married. Because of this trend, the mean age at first marriage climbed from 14.5 in 1970 to around 20 and 21, reducing the window of childbearing years. e) Many are never marrying at all. Fewer men feel they can support a family, so do not marry. Moreover, women are seeking out their own education and careers, and preferring to remain single as long as possible. Extramarital sex is becoming more common (despite the threat of clerics that such actions “cause more earthquakes in Iran,” see Telegraph, http://goo.gl/4gF6). Men and women in this situation generally use measures to prevent pregnancy; thus, singlehood affects the birth rate. e) The government is urging Iranians to have larger families. This will likely have limited success, for a variety of reasons that will be discussed in this Forecast: dissatisfaction with the government, disgust with Islam, a desire to be more Westernized, and the expense of having a family.

Persia Cluster 9 Read more Mostaghim, Ramin and Alexandra Sandels. “Iran urges young couples to have more babies.” Los Angeles Times, 7 February 2013, http://goo.gl/QxdTp. No more free vasectomies, tubal ligations; teens urged to marry, have babies. “Iran’s leader introduces plan to encourage population growth by paying families.” New York Times, 27 July 2010: http://nyti.ms/UhUTvf. Parents would be expected to match the government’s payments, until the child is 18. Khalaj, Monavar. “Iranians resist call to boost population.” FT.com, 23 July 2012: http://on.ft.com/UmFNzl. “Iran gives up birth control program to boost population.” Al Arabiya, 3 August 2012: http://bit.ly/VxVrLN. “Recent changes and the future of fertility in Iran.” Mohammad Jalal Abbasi- Shavazi. UN.

Vast numbers are leaving the rural areas to seek more opportunities 2 and a better life in the cities. The pace of urbanization is very rapid, and although it has been slowed slightly in recent years, it will most likely continue for the foreseeable future. a) Iran has been growing steadily more urban since 1950. It crossed the 50% threshold in 1980 and today is close to 70%. The rate of urbanization has slowed a little (with the slowing of population growth overall), but at 1.25% p.a. still outpaces the rural growth rate of 0.57%. By 2050, Iran will be more than 80% urbanized with a total urban population of some 66 million. b) Over half of urbanites live in the smaller cities. Iran has seven megacities (Ahwaz, Qom, Shiraz, Tabriz, Isfahan, Karaj and Masshad) and the super- city of Tehran (estimated in 2012 at over 10 million). There are about 70 cities with populations greater than 100,000 and less than a million. c) Rapid urbanization is feeding discontent. There are more jobseekers than opportunities, which has fed rising frustrations. At the same time, cities increase connectedness by shrinking distance and providing communications technologies (fueling political unrest), and provide more opportunities for those with idle hands to get into trouble. d) Rapid urbanization is also feeding secularization and the growth of Chris- tianity. The urban environment tends to be far more liberal than the rural areas (as will be discussed later). Most of Iran’s Christians are in the cities, where it is easier to be anonymous. As people move to the cities, they move away from Islam, and many of these move toward Christianity.

The average age of the Persian population will increase, slowly. The 3 rapid population growth of the past gave Iran a very young population: over a fifth under the age of 15, and nearly two-thirds are under the age of thirty. The falling population growth rate will introduce some aging into Iran, so this demographic pattern will change slowly over the next generation. a) Half the population (those under the age of 34, 44%) have never known any life but that under the Islamic Revolution. They feel stifled under the reli-

10 Persia Cluster Map 1. Population Density, 2004. Regions (especially Tehran) are more populous now than in the chart on the map below, but the relative densities remain the same.

Tehran. Skyline of a city of 10 million people, largest in Iran.

Persia Cluster 11 Map 2. Linguistic Concentrations.

12 Persia Cluster gious restrictions, are angry at their rulers, and militantly insist Islam has been betrayed. b) The vast majority of the youth have no interest in Islam and work to get around its restrictions. “Hidden friendships” between men and women are common. Contact with the wider world through illicit technologies (satellite and Internet) is pursued. The young are resourceful and have learned to do what they wish “behind closed doors.” c) Although the young are disgusted with the government, they are also cyni- cal about any possibility of change. They resist speaking up, freely, for fear of government monitoring. They are largely staying away from the elections—and many are seeking visas to leave Iran behind.

Read more De Luce, Dan. “Iran’s youth face growing disillusionment.” Mail & Guardian, 26 February 2004: http://goo.gl/HmFRA. Hosseinian, Zahra and Hashem Kalantari. “Key constitutencies disillusioned as Iran votes.” Reuters, 1 Mar 2012: http://goo.gl/kMPSN. Varzi, Roxanne. Warring souls: youth, media and martyrdom in post-revolution Iran. Duke University Press (2006). Review at http://goo.gl/F8eQD.

The “brain drain” from Iran will continue, as many of the frustrated 4 and discontent don’t believe change is possible and choose instead to leave. Emigration is not easy, but will not slow in the short-term. Most of those who are leaving represent the best-educated and most-secularized, and this will impact Iran significantly in the future. Meanwhile, Iran is also a prime destination for Afghani and Iraqi refugees. a) Iran’s location makes it a geographic and cultural “bridge” between the Mediterranean and Asia. Many have tried to conquer it, and as a result emigration in the form of flight from war is a key part of its history. How- ever, in addition, in the period of 1950-1979, oil revenues enabled middle- and-upper class families to travel abroad and send their children to other countries for higher education. During this period, under the Shah, there were few limitations on where they might go. It was common, for example, to see Iranians fly to Paris for a long weekend. b) In the years immediately preceding the Revolution, over 100,000 Iranian students were studying abroad. After the Revolution, many did not return to Iran, and many of their relatives opted to join them. In addition, mem- bers of religious minorities, socialist and liberal elements (particularly those with daughters), and large numbers of professionals, entrepreneurs and academics all chose to leave. Over half of Iran’s professors and a third of its doctors left in the first few years. c) In the 1990s, another wave of emigration emerged, as highly skilled and educated individuals as well as working-class labor migrants and economic refugees fled the country. Only a quarter of youth who graduate from Iran’s colleges can be employed in Iran’s tightly state-controlled economy.

Persia Cluster 13 Frustrated, they are opting to leave. Emigration rates have particularly increased since the 2009 presidential election. Tens of thousands of emigrants leave Iran every year. e) The Iranian diaspora is large and growing, presently estimated at about 4 million. Many are in the United States (over half in Los Angeles and San Jose, and another 20% in New York and Washington, DC), Canada, West- ern Europe, Turkey, the Gulf States and Southeast Asia. Estimates of the Iranian-American community (including the US-born children of foreign- born Iranians) ranges from 0.3 million (Census Bureau) up to a range of 0.7 million to 1.2 million. f) Even more desire to leave, but actually emigrating is an enormously difficult enterprise, and requires a certain amount of desperation. The Iranian government makes it difficult to emigrate. Those who cannot legally leave have instead opted to flee over the porous borders between Iran and other nations. Large numbers have migrated into Turkey and registered as refugees with the United Nations in that country (many becoming Christians in the process). g) Not every country is willing to accept Iranians. Those with ties to the ad- ministration, the Revolutionary Guards, or the Basij paramilitary groups are generally not welcomed. Those who do claim to have become Christians are rigorously interviewed for many hours on their faith. h) Those who do move abroad are often afflicted with homesickness and culture shock, and rarely feel they completely connect with their new society. However, at the same time, the overwhelming percentage of those who leave Iran never return.

Read more “The vicious circle of Iranian emigration.” PBS.org, 22 April 2011: http://goo.gl/ Fcyrq. Akcapar, Sebnem Koser. “Conversion as a migration strategy in a transit country: Iranian Shiites becoming Christians in Turkey.” Institute for the Study of International Migration 40:4 (Winter 2006), p. 817-853: http://www.academia. edu/426636/Conversion_in_a_Transit_Country_Iranian_Shiites_are_Becom- ing_Christians_in_Turkey Farshid Motahari. “Next stop, Canada: in new wave of emigration from Iran.” Immigration Canada, 21 March 2011: http://goo.gl/w5FFO. Over 250,000 Iranians have emigrated to Canada. Hakimzadeh, Shirin and David Dixon. “Spotlight on the Iranian foreign born.” Migration Information Source, June 2006: http://www.migrationinformation. org/USFocus/display.cfm?ID=404. Hakimzadeh, Shirin. “Iran: a vast diaspora abroad and millions of refugees at home.” Migration Information Source, Sep 2006: http://goo.gl/z1bQe. In- cludes emigration statistics by decade to largest destinations, from 1960-2005. “Turkey: change from an emigration to an immigration and now to a transit mi-

14 Persia Cluster gration country.” Hamburg Institute of International Economics: http://www. hwwi.org/uploads/tx_wilpubdb/HWWI_Policy_Paper_3-16_01.pdf.

GEOGRAPHY

Iran will almost certainly endure a major earthquake somewhere in 5 the not-too-distant future. Major earthquake fault lines cross the country and cover at least 90% of its land. Earthquakes are frequent: small earthquakes (under magnitude 3) occur nearly every day; larger earthquakes (of magnitude 5 or greater) occur typically once per year. Since 1900, over 120,000 have been killed as a result. Since 2000, there have been 11 earthquakes, all but two having magnitudes greater than 6.0. Iran has been fortunate as it has been more than a decade since a greater-than-7.0 magnitude earthquake; during the 1900s, these kinds of earthquakes occurred at least once per decade.

Map 2. Seismic Hazard Map. From Global Seismic Hazard Assessment Program.

Persia Cluster 15 RESOURCES

Food prices will continue to spike. Iran is almost, but not quite, self-suf- 6 ficient in food, and bad harvests can lead to rapidly rising bread prices and political instability. These increases are politically sensitive, as they can cause significant waves of unrest. a) Much of Iran receives too little rainfall to be agriculturally productive. The center, south and southeast receive less than 250 mm per year, and are considered dry. Most of the agricultural land is thus in the north and east, near the Caspian Sea. In other areas, farming depends on irrigation from underground channels. b) Agriculture employs about a third of Iran’s people and accounts for a tenth of its national economy. The staple crop is wheat, which makes up half of Iran’s production; wheat, rice and barley together account for two-thirds. c) Iran is usually in the top 15 nations worldwide as a producer of wheat, harvesting between 10 and 15 million metric tons each year. However, it needs about 14 million metric tons for its people, and more for animals. A bad year will see Iran importing. d) Bread prices are politically sensitive. Sudden spikes can can cause significant unrest, as bread is a staple food for many homes.

Read also “Iran quietly makes massive wheat buy on global markets.” Reuters, 27 Sep 2012, http://reut.rs/VOJZbs. “Iran buying wheat, fearing more curbs.” Wall Street Journal, 27 March 2012, http://on.wsj.com/VGzOZB. “Wheat crisis in Iran.” En.trend.az, 4 October 2012, http://en.trend.az/regions/ iran/2072695.html.

Shrinking oil revenues will present a significant challenge for the gov- 7 ernment, and could impact the economy enough to bring governmental change. Iran has some of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves, but production is declining and revenues have been severely impacted by sanctions. a) Iran has the world’s fourth largest proven oil reserves (137 billion barrels, 9% of the world’s total), and is OPEC’s second largest oil producer and third largest oil exporter. In addition, it is the world’s fourth largest producer and third largest consumer of natural gas. Oil and natural gas powered the Iranian economy to great heights and continues to sustain the government today. b) However, Iran’s capacity to produce oil is declining. Production peaked at 6 million barrels/day in 1977; since 1979, war, investment sanctions, and a high rate of decline in the fields has prevented Iran from reaching similar levels. It is presently estimated to be producing about 2.6 million barrels daily, losing about a half million barrels of crude production capacity each year due to declines in the mature oil fields. Iran needs to invest in equip- 16 Persia Cluster ment and infrastructure upgrades to halt these declines, but international sanctions have prevented it from doing so. c) Iran primarily exports to China, Japan, India, Italy and South Korea. These nations together make up three-quarters of Iran’s exports. Iran is China’s second biggest supplier (after Saudi Arabia). d) Iranian belligerance and nuclear ambitions have led to numerous Ameri- can and European sanctions against it. They bar many kinds of exports to Iran, investments in its oil industry (or anything related), imports of its oil products, business dealings with the Republican Guards, banking and insurance transactions, and shipping. These have caused Iran’s share of global oil exports to decline, reduced its access to infrastructure technologies for its oil and energy sectors, and reduced its oil income. The result has been a drastic decline in the value of the Iranian rial and a battering of the economy. Iran has threatened to halt all oil exports to the West, but this has had little result. e) Sanctions have unfortunately led to increased smuggling. Only those with strong connections to the Tehran government, however, can achieve this. The net effect has been to increase the power of the government within Iran.

Read also “Iran boasts of long-term oil potential: 140 years.” UPI, 22 January 2013: http:// goo.gl/z9Pum. “Iran oil revenues down 40 percent.” Associated Press, 7 January 2013: http:// apne.ws/UDBp0x. “Iran’s warning to oil market fails to send prices higher.” New York Times, 23 Oc- tober 2012: http://goo.gl/5TNCr. “Iran’s ace (or deuce): it’s oil reserves.” New York Times, 6 March 2010: http:// goo.gl/FI226.

HISTORY A generational view of history is useful in understanding where a culture has been and where it is going. The research of Strauss & Howe (“The Fourth Turning” being perhaps one of the best known, see http://www.fourthturning. com for a broad overview) argues every culture goes through four generational “Turnings”—prophet, nomad, hero and artist. These cycles are caused by the ways the previous generation raised their young, and the interaction of the generations. The response of these broad generational archetypes to crisis events likewise sends cultures through four “Turnings”: from High to Awakening to Un- raveling to Crisis, and then back to High again.

Iran is in the midst of a cultural unraveling which we estimate will last 8 until around 2030. During this period there will be a high potential for unrest as well as governmental oppression and restrictions. a) Iran (as Persia) has an ancient history, going back in time as far as the

Persia Cluster 17 Elamite kingdoms that originated around 2700 BC. We do not have the space or the need in this Forecast to cover the whole of this history, but it should be kept in view as extremely important to Persians. Cyrus and Zo- roastrianism in particular have had significant influence over who Persians see themselves to be. The Safavid Empire (1502-1736) was the greatest empire since Islam conquered Persia. It reached its high point under Shah Abbas I (1587-1629), who defeated the Uzbeks, Ottomans and Europeans to centralize power, expanded trade links with England and the Dutch, and promoted tourism and architecture. After his death, the empire slowly disintegrated under the lavish lifestyle of its rulers, until it was overthrown by Nader Shah in 1736. Nader Shah ruled from 1736 to his assassination in 1779, after which Iran fell into civil war. Out of this came the Qajar dynasty in 1794, which lasted until 1925. The occupation of Persia during World War I was the final blow to the dynasty. b) 1925-1941 Crisis. Reza Khan, a military commander, staged a coup d’etat in 1921, and became the ruler of Iran, proclaimed as Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1925. Most Crises periods are defined by increasing authoritarianism and governmental control, and his was no different. He emphasized Iran’s Per- sian heritage, pushing Islam into the background and introducing reforms to secularize and modernize the country. He required men to wear Western clothing, mosques to use chairs, women to stop wearing the hijab, and men and women to be allowed to congregate. During roughly the same period, Turkey was also introducing many of the same reforms. The key difference: while Turkey enabled reforms, Iran required them. To enforce these, he rapidly moved to state control of all government functions. Censorship and propaganda were widely used under his leadership. He ruled for 16 years, but became committed to Germany in World War II and, with the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, was forced to abdicate. e) 1941-1963 Corrupted High. Reza Shah’s son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahla- vi, came to power, and largely continued the direction his father had taken. High periods typically begin when a Crisis abates and a nation begins building its infrastructure. Initially, he allowed parliament significant authority, but this government became very unstable. After a 1951 crisis involving foreign intelligence agencies and attempted coups, he, like his father, centralized power and rapidly moved from a monarchy to a dictatorship. He controlled virtually all governmental opera- tions through the Senate, his family, and the secret police (SAVAK). The economic crisis of the late 1950s led to a series of modernizing reforms known as the White Revolution. The reforms did not improve general economic conditions, and the general populace continued to be discontented with the perceived moral decline in Iran’s Westernization. An Islamic fundamentalist movement began to emerge. f) 1963-1989 Awakening. In the 1960s and 70s, internal security became increasingly active, trying to clamp down on unrest. In this, they were

18 Persia Cluster unsuccessful. The writings of Khomeini and others spread Islamic funda- mentalism rapidly across the nation, filling the vacuum of discontent. The clergy became more and more vocal. In response, Khomeini and others were exiled, and the Iranian government began spending more money on its military. Finally, in 1978, major demonstrates and strikes paralyzed the country, and in 1979 the Shah left for exile and Khomeini returned to Tehran. The Islamic Republic was approved overwhelmingly through a national referendum. Khomeini served as Supreme Leader, the economy was nationalized, protests from secularists were suppressed, and populist policies were promised. (During this period, Iranian students seized the US embassy and took 52 hostages, holding them 444 days. This takeover was popular and is still celebrated today.) In 1980, the Iran-Iraq war began and continued through 1988. Finally, on his deathbed in 1989, Khomeini tapped Khameini to be his successor, and there was a quick transition after his death on June 3. g) 1989-2015? Unraveling. In the period since Khameini’s rise to power, Iran has been in the midst of a “culture war.” The theocratic government has suppressed the populace and not delivered on its promises. (For a full dis- cussion of this, see Governance.) Most Iranians are discontented with their leadership and the direction of the nation, but there is no consensus agree- ment on a new direction. h) 2015?-2035? Crisis. Sometime in the not too distant future, if this pattern holds true, it is likely Iran will enter amother moment of crisis. The discus- sion under Governance suggests Iran will likely endure at least one more Supreme Leader’s rule, since the vested interests currently in power are too strong to be overcome by the general populace. Any revolt (successful or otherwise) is very likely to be extremely violent.

Read more Axworthy, Michael. Iran: empire of the mind: a history from Zoroaster to the present day. Alavi, Nasrin. We are Iran: the Persian blogs. Brooklyn: Soft Skull Press, 2005. This collection illustrates daily life in Iran: drugs, prostitution, alienation, petty repression, hatred for the curret regime, despair about the future. Buchan, James. Days of God: the revolution in Iran and its consequences. Viking, 2012. Kurzman, Charles. The unthinkable revolution in Iran. Harvard University Press, 2004. Molavi, Afshin. The soul of Iran: a nation’s journey to freedom. W. W. Norton, 2005.

CULTURE

Between Reza Shah and Khomeini, Iran has veered back and forth 9 between the twin poles of its Persian and Islamic identity. Today, many seem to feel the extreme emphasis on Islam within Iran has been at the expense of a glorious Persian heritage. This cultural debate will continue to

Persia Cluster 19 shape the direction of Islam’s future.

Read more Garthwaite, Gene. The Persians. Blackwell Publishing, 2005. Loveday, Helen. Iran-Persia: Ancient and modern. W. W. Norton, 2005. Price, Massoume. Iran’s diverse peoples: a reference sourcebook. ABC-CLIO, 2005. Shows Iran remains a Persian empire, in which Persians dominate many groups.

Iranian society is breaking down due in part to pervasive structures 10 of sin. Although many of these are not immediately obvious the casual observer, they are powerful forces that affect cultural, religious and governmental decisions. a) Divorce is widespread. In 2010, nation wide, one in 7 marriages ended in divorce; in Tehran, it was one in every four. Women now have more rights to divorce due to abuse, while men have always had a unilteral right to divorce for any reason. The spread of divorce has impacted the birth rate. The government has initiated programs to try to stem the divorce rate. b) Iran is a drug-manufacturer, smuggler and trafficker, and suffers one of the worst addiction rates in the world. It lies directly in the path of the world’s largest flow of heroin, originating in Afghanistan and Pakistan and aimed at European markets. Some of the heroin is seized, and some drug traffick- ers are captured (and often hung) by Iran’s anti-narcotics division. Howev- er, many of the smuggling routes are protected by the Quds Force, an elite member of the Revolutionary Guards. In addition, Iran drug-makers are dominant players in methamphetamine.What isn’t seized heads to Europe via the Balkans. Hundreds of millions of dollars are involved in the trade between Iran’s east and west borders, and thousands of Iranian border guards have been killed over three decades. There are estimates of 3 million Iranian drug addicts, many millions more with “a problem,” and 130,000 new addicts each year. c) Prostitution has become far more common, especially in the cities. Avail- able figures suggest prostitution is worst in Tehran (est. 84,000 women, 250 brothels) and the province of Khorasan Razavi. Unconfirmed studies suggest the average age girls start in prostitution is 12 to 18. A majority of the prostitutes are estimated to be young married girls; there are many stories of girls forced on the streets to help support the drug habits of their husbands. Cyberprostitution is also growing. d) Another common form of prostitution is the short-term marriage contract, which is allowed in certain Shi’a schools of shari’a. Such a marriage is established by a fixed contract and can last anywhere from one hour to several years; the woman receives compensation afterward. Read more “Iran drug trafficking: a ton of narcotics confiscated every day.” Huffington Post, 13 January 2013: http://goo.gl/3iRHZ.

20 Persia Cluster Baghernejad, Mehdi. “Iran worries about soaring divorce rate.” Payvand.com, 18 April 2010: http://goo.gl/N4pw3. Erdbrink, Thomas. “The West’s stalwart ally in the war on drugs: Iran (Yes, that Iran).” New York Times, 11 October 2012: http://goo.gl/fGRRa Parvin, Parto and Arash Ahmadi. “Iran sets sights on tackling prostitution.” BBC, 26 July 2012: http://goo.gl/0mCvf. Tomlinson, Hugh. “Revolutionary Guard ‘running Iran drug trade.’” The Austra- lian, 18 November 2011: http://goo.gl/gX3rN. Warrick, Joby. “In Iran, drug trafficking soars as sanctions take bigger bite.” Washington Post, 1 November 2012: http://goo.gl/5HUlB. “Drugs and prostitution ‘soar’ in Iran.” BBC, 6 July 2000: http://goo.gl/JMRa4. References an internal report in Iran with horrifying numbers. Bozorgmehr, Kayvan. “Drop in prostitution age in Iran.” Roozonline.com, 15 June 2011: http://goo.gl/XbWDW. Fard, Camella. “Unveiled threats.” The Village Voice, 27 March 2001: http:// goo.gl/ccQwL. A revealing look at the use of sigheh, or temporary marriage, among Muslim clerics in Qom. Fathi, Nazila. “To regulate prostitution, Iran ponders brothels.” New York Times, 28 August 2002: http://goo.gl/t5fLE. Schubert, Zach. “Iran’s dark secret: child prostitution and sex slaves.” Huffington Post, 19 August 2009: http://goo.gl/jyjQU. “Iran permits brothels through temporary marriages.” Albawaba.com, 7 June 2010: http://goo.gl/Pw6TF.

The movement for women’s rights will remain a minority, but will be 11 very vocal, and educated women will grow in influence.Women had gained many rights under the Shah, then lost them under the Revolution. Their situation has marginally improved over the past few decades, but they are still second class citizens in many respects. Many do not wish to remain so. a) Under the Pahlavi regime, women were granted rights and shoved into public view. They had the right to vote, to enter the work force, and to enter Parliament. They were given a limited and restricted right to divorce their husbands (although husbands had far greater rights to divorce their wives). Polygamy was made somewhat more difficult. b) After the Revolution, many of these rights were taken away. Laws passed after 1979 enabled men to take up to four wives, and to gain custody of the children automatically should any of their wives divorce them. The mini- mum age of marriage had been raised to 18 under the Pahlavi regime, but was again reduced to 9. Women who had positions of power before the Revolution (in Parliament, and as judges) lost them. c) Societal trends have led to an increase in the number of single women in the cities, although no one has exact numbers. It has been fueled in part by the number of women entering universities as well as by the growing number of divorcees. Attitudes toward single women are also changing, driven by satellite television and the Internet, which have exposed many Iranians to the lives women lead elsewhere (especially in the West).

Persia Cluster 21 d) Increasing levels of education and awareness of women’s lives in the world have made women dissatisfied with marital options at home. College-educated women are finding it difficult to find men they feel are their equals. e) The government will try to put women back in a box, but will fail. The growing prominence of women in society has disturbed the government, especially their active involvement in the 2009 protests. The response has been to introduce bans (such as in Education) that will restrict the role of women in society and encourage marriage. This will not succeed.

Read more “Ahmadinejad calls on Iran’s universities not to segret sexes.” AhramOnline.com, 6 July 2011: http://goo.gl/cBGKV. “Women’s rights under Iran’s revolution.” BBC, 12 February 2009: http://goo. gl/Wkcmq. Erdbrink, Thomas. “Single women gaining limited acceptance in Iran.” New York Times, 12 June 2012: http://goo.gl/NruFW. Fathi, Nazila. “Starting at home, Iran’s women fight for rights.” New York Times, 12 February 2009: http://goo.gl/FiucB Kar, Mehrangiz. “Women, the victims of the Iranian revolution.” Gozaar.org, 5 March 2010: http://goo.gl/12fd6

The education of women is a likely boiling point in the future of Iran. 12 More women than men are seeking out a college education, but the government seems to fear the long-term trend of college-educated single women with different values than the Revolution. a) Women have been successfully seeking out an education. Iran was one of the first Middle Eastern countries to permit women in universities and has made significant efforts since 1979 to encourage girls to enroll. Over two- thirds of university students are women, up from a third in 1982. b) Universities are seen as centers of liberal leanings. In the 1980s, they were one of the few places men and women could mix freely. However, stricter measures have been slowly introduced, and this accelerated after the 2009 elections and the subsequent protests, as conservative politicians increased their control on the country. Khameini called for the “Islamization” of the universities, criticizing subjects deemed as too Western. c) With the new academic year in 2012, many limits on women were introduced. More than 30 universities introduced bans on female students from almost 80 different courses. Activists allege it is an attempt by the government to restrict female access to education in order to limit their activities in society. The government responded that 90% of university courses were still open to both men and women.

Read more Sahraei, Fariba. “Iranian university bans on women causes consternation.” BBC, 21 September 2012: http://goo.gl/08gJv “Male-order education: Iran bars women from 77 university courses.” RT.com, 21 22 Persia Cluster August 2012: http://goo.gl/0cTGU

ECONOMY

The economy is disintegrating, leading to anger, hopelessness, and 13 despair on the part of millions of people—especially the young. These emotions have and will continue to translate into protests. a) The development of the economy was very recent and very rapid. It was once largely agricultural, but between 1954 and 1960 it grew rapidly with expanding oil revenues and international aid and investment. In the 1970s, the Shah’s government labored to industrialize and modernize it. In the years prior to the 1979 revolution, with rising discontent and uncertainty, significant capital flight (as people got out while they could) slowed the economy. After 1979, many industries were nationalized, and this was fur- thered after the Iran-Iraq war. b) 80% of the economy is under direct governmental control. Although it says it intends to privatize nationalized industries, it has not. Close to half of this is under the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, an institution set up shortly after the revolution to defend the country’s Islamic system. Its engineering wing is involved in numerous construction projects, and it controls most of the bonyads (religious foundations) which in turn control about 20% of the economy. The Guards report directly to the Supreme Leader, with no parliamentary oversight. c) There are many seemingly intractable problems, including high inflation (estimated at 15 to 20% yearly), declining living standards (average income of $500/month), unemployment (recently estimated at 28%), and low oil prices (generally, Iran needs prices over $90/barrel to balance its budgets). d) Corruption is rampant. What is not controlled by the government is generally under the merchants of Iran’s bazaars. They are a powerful lobby, having financially supported the Revolution. Corruption is widespread in both the government and the bazaars. The Guards, for example, are known to be involved in smuggling; bribery is rampant; and among the merchants, many have benefited from links to the government, “creative accounting” and “crony capitalism.” The elite few are very wealthy, but most business owners are very poor, and many believe there is no way to change this system in the near future. e) International sanctions have further battered the economy. Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons has led to American and European sanctions, which have had a deep impact. It has gotten bad enough in recent years that merchants have joined strikes and political protests which had to be dispersed by the police and the basij. Many merchants have privately acknowledged the economy is very bad, although they insist they will continue to support the government.

Persia Cluster 23 f) Jobs for Christians are few and far between. The situation of Muslim-background believers who become Christians (“apostates”) is especially precari- ous. With the economy dominated by the government, the Guards and the religious foundations, converts to Christianity run the risk of losing their jobs. (Assyrian and Armenian Christians are not faced with the same degree of risk but still have to deal with prejudice.) g) Despite this bleak outlook, the trappings of materialism can still be widely seen on the streets of Tehran. There is and has been a growing gap between a wealthy minority and a vast, poor majority, and much of the gasp has been fueled by corruption. Elite Iranians are affluent enough to travel abroad and buy cars and other imported goods.

Read more “Iran: Awakening Dissent,” a video report from France24.com, 18 Jan 2013: http://goo.gl/3P7cZ. Tait, Robert. “Iran’s food costs soar and unemployment spirals as nuclear sanctions begin to bite.” The Telegraph, 1 July 2012: http://bit.ly/ZgQrhN. Kanovsky, Eliyahu. “Iran’s economic morass: mismanagement and decline under the Islamic republic.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy: http://goo.gl/ BttCw. ___. “Profile: Iran’s revolutionary guards.” BBC, 18 October 2009: http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7064353.stm. Murphy, Kim. “Iran’s $12-billion enforcers.” LA Times, 26 August 2007: http:// articles.latimes.com/2007/aug/26/world/fg-guards26. On the Guards. Moaveni, Azadeh. “Iran’s rich revolutionary guard.” TIME, 5 September 2007: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1659039,00.html.

GOVERNANCE

There is widespread discontent with the government, but the chance 14 for political liberalization remains low for the foreseeable future, as is the chance of any sort of revolution or significant change.There have been some political protests (notably the Green Movement) but none successfully brought about any liberalization. a) Iran will certainly have new leadership, and soon, but it is unlikely this will lead to new openness. Ahmadinejad cannot stand for reelection as President, so a new President will be elected in 2013. The most powerful post is Supreme Leader, with the President being the second highest state authority. The current Leader, Khamenei, is in his 70s, and some think he is ill. The Leader is responsible for virtually every decision made, either immediately or through control of the decision-makers. His successor is the single most important factor in liberalization. The Supreme Leader is technically elected (a position which, once reached, is held for life), but in reality since the electors are largely determined by the Supreme Leader, the post is determined more by competition

24 Persia Cluster between the various political factions. These were kept in check during Khomeini’s rule due to his stature. Khameini at first worked with the factions, but with time he increasingly developed a militarized authoritarian form of rule, excluding the factions and causing discontent among them. While many if not most accept the idea of a Supreme Leader, some think the Leader’s authority should be both viewed as divinely ordained and popularly mandated–that the Leader should be accountable to the people and their representatives. This view would moderate the Leader’s power—but it is unlikely it will be influential. Khameini’s power network was developed by providing ongoing political and financial benefits. It includes governmental function- aries, the Revolutionary Guards, the paramilitary Basij forces, the Friday prayer leaders, key parliamentary leaders, and the religious foundations (bonyads). The Guards and the bonyads between them control close to 30% of Iran’s economy, and state control of various enterprises (including oil) represents another 50%. (Less than 20% of Iran’s economy is privatized.) This personal network is considered to be the “principal decisionmakers in Iranian politics” and have a vested interest in continuing the status quo. The jockeying of all these factors could lead to these scenarios: Status quo (50% chance). Khameini eventually picks his successor, who is rubber-stamped by the electoral process. This is the scenario Khameini and those closest to him strive for. The current power of Khameini’s network seem to Iran watchers to make this the most likely scenario. It would not lead to any significant liberalization, and in fact a harsh crackdown could come during the transition. Absolutist (30% chance). A leader who furthers the power of certain vested interests and becomes a quasi-dictator. This would likely lead to changes in the constitution and a considerable hardening of the environment, and protests would undoubtedly result. This is the second most likely scenario, and it, too, would not lead to any liberalization. Democratic (15% chance). A reformist more accountable to the elected institutions. This would not be a democracy in the Western since, but rather a liberalized version of the existing system. This would involve a degradation of the power presently held by Khameini’s network. It would also likely require changes to the constitution. Given the power of the vested interests in Iran, this scenario seems less likely. Leadership Council (4% chance). The role of the Supreme Leader is re- placed with a leadership group. This possibility has been discussed but has never been seriously possible. Since such a council would drastically reduce the power of the Revolutionary Guards and other elites, this seems the least likely scenario of all. b) A more drastic form of revolution—the replacement of the current government with one completely different, hopefully providing more freedom— seem very low (1%). This would require a change in the political powers and players within Iran. One method might be a popular political upris- ing, but another form would be a military coup. Uprisings have brought governments to their knees through political votes and economic strikes.

Persia Cluster 25 In Iran, however, a revolt would be very difficult to carry off, as the Green Movement demonstrated. Iran’s economy is centrally controlled by the government and its institutions. An economic strike would have very little impact. Protests can be met as they were with the Green Movement: by arrests, militia attacks, and the like. Popular revolts were successful in the past: the most obvious is 1979, against the Shah’s regime. However, the economy was not centralized (as it is now). The current governmental system does not have the same vulner- abilities. Thus the odds of a successful revolution are low: probably less than 1% in the next generation of change. c) The long-term outlook for Iran: a brittle, cracking government. Iranians are extremely discontented and disgusted with the authorities. The weight of the military (particularly the Revolutionary Guards and the basij) keep the populace in line—for now. This is a very similar situation to China, twenty years ago: Beijing ruthlessly crushed the Tiananmen Square protests, but eventually demographic and economic change brought about new openness. China is not a democracy yet, and can be very cold and ruthless—but it is different today. Twenty years from now, Iran could be a very different situation as well. It will see the rise of a new group of leaders: some in the Guards, some among the more liberal Islamic clerics and parliamentary leaders. They will face the same enormous levels of discontent, but they may choose different solu- tions. If they fail to do so, unrest will very likely emerge again.

Read more Takeyh, Ray. Hidden Iran: paradox and power in the Islamic Republic. Times Books, 2010.

Open, large-scale warfare between Iran and any of its neighbors in the 15 next decade is unlikely. Ahmadinejad’s caustic statements are largely posturing, and the US would prefer to avoid an open military confrontation as the costs are high and the risks are great. a) The Iran-Iraq war has been the only extended confrontation with Iran since the Revolution, and it proved very costly on both sides. Iran and Israel have the two most powerful militaries in the Middle East. Iran has over a half million active personnel (between the army and the Republican Guards) as well as over 2.5 million reservists. The basij paramilitaries are estimated at over 10 million, with 3 million combat-trained. The West looks at war with Iran as a very risky endeavor, and would prefer to avoid it. A much more likely scenario is limited “shadow wars” and precision military strikes, but the more public these are, the more dangerous the results. b) An Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities could inflame the region. The West (and especially Israel) do not wish to see a nuclear-armed Iran, and Is- rael insists it would attack Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities if it believed Iran were close to a nuclear weapon. Tehran says it would respond to such an act with force, attacking Israeli and American targets in the region. That

26 Persia Cluster would certainly lead to a wider Middle East conflict. c) Cyberwarfare from Iran (and against it) will certainly increase, attempt- ing to prevent Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon. The cost of open war against Iran is great; cyberwarfare against its nuclear facilities is consider- ably cheaper and less risky. Several cyber attacks have been launched by the United States against Iranian nuclear, military and political targets, believing that these attacks are a “last ditch effort” to avoid a conventional military attack. In turn, Iran is allegedly the source of a series of cyberattacks against the Saudi oil industry and American banking institutions, and is ramping up its own cyberwarfare capabilities. d) The possibility of targeted assassinations cannot be ignored. There have been assassinations of nuclear scientists (which various governments deny having any hand in). The Iranian government has likewise been known to attempt assassinations on government officials. e) Clandestine Iranian support for certain regimes in the Middle East is certain to continue. Iranian arms have made their way into the Horn of Africa, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. These and other efforts will continue if only because they are income-generators for smugglers. f) The general population admires the West (and particularly America), and are not interested in a war. Although the government regularly criticizes America (“The Great Satan”), Iran-watchers note the average Iranian in general is very friendly toward the United States. It is the preferred destination for refugee Iranians who want to take advantage of economic oppor- tunity. The Iran-Iraq war cost the country greatly. Engaging in another war with any neighbors would likely be too much for the people to endure.

Read more Fung, Brian. “Why has Iran slowed its nuclear program—on purpose?” Atlantic, 29 January 2013: http://goo.gl/4DS8R “Israel ‘postpones’ nuclear Iran red line by ‘8 to 10 months.’” RT.com, 31 October 2012: http://goo.gl/2DKCv. Shanker, Thom and David Sanger. “U.S. suspects Iran was behind a wave of cyberattacks.” New York Times, 13 October 2012: http://goo.gl/cqCJs. Sanger, David. “Obama order sped up wave of cyberattacks against Iran.” New York Times, 1 June 2012: http://goo.gl/4SfG5. Warrick, Joby. “U.S. officials among the targets of Iran-linked assassination plots.” Washington Post, 27 May 2012: http://goo.gl/gVA3e. Gjelten, Tom. “Could Iran wage a cyberwar on the U.S.?” NPR, 26 April 2012: http://goo.gl/jIWlV. Goodman, J. David. “Iran arrests 15 people accused in assassination plot.” New York Times, 18 April 2012: http://goo.gl/jKS3b. Mitnick, Josh. “Was Israel behind Iran nuclear scientist’s assassination?” Christian Science Monitor, 12 January 2012: http://goo.gl/8CCsH.

Persia Cluster 27 TECHNOLOGY

Technology is illegal in many forms, but many will continue to seek 16 it out, and it will shape the connectedness of youth and Iran’s future. The government attempts to control forms of communication, but the youth are constantly seeking out and finding new ways to avoid censorship and monitoring. This technological game of cat-and-mouse is one of the major factors keeping Iranians connected to the wider world (as well as boiling the simmering pot of discontent, especially among the young). a) Mobile phones are widely used but monitored. Youth will go to practically any cost to obtain them and use them daily for communication. However, they are almost completely in the control of the government. Prior to the Green Movement, instant messaging, texting and social media (such as Twitter and Facebook) were not monitored. Now, all instant messaging and texting from phones goes through centralized computer systems, and are recorded and constantly scanned. The Bluetooth workaround has been around for a few years now. Bluetooth is a spectrum that facilitates wireless communication between electronic devices (such as phones) over short distances (like buses). Because the networks don’t go over cellular or wifi, they are not monitored. During the Green Movement revolts, Bluetooth was used to share protest videos; later, many of the videos widely shared via Bluetooth networks in Iran were uploaded to Youtube. The government is demanding these technologies be removed from phones imported into Iran. b) Theoretically, all television broadcasting in Iran is to be under state control: there are eight national channels and 30 provincial ones. Satellite dishes are pro- hibited but common, and proliferating rapidly: various estimates suggest that nationally, between a quarter and half of Iranians have a satellite dish. Usage in the cities is higher than in the rural regions: around two-thirds of most cities and probably three-quarters of those in Tehran have one. How- ever, even in rural regions, satellite dish usage is becoming very common. Satellite TV ministries note an increasing number of calls are coming from small villages and towns that are not on most maps, and satellite dishes are reportedly even used by nomadic tribes. There are over 120 Persian-language satellite television channels aimed at Iran from the diaspora (more, it is claimed, than any other language in the world). There are occasionally “dish raids,” but the dishes can quickly be repurchased from the black market. “That’s the only fun we have here. There’s nothing worth watching on [state television],” said one woman to a reporter. “They can come and take my dish away. I will get a new one.” c) The Internet is widely available but somewhat limited in usefulness. Most people now use home connections, as Internet cafes are under orders to register users and record what sites they visit, maintaining the records for months. Internet users within Iran struggle to find avenues to access websites. Proxy servers and VPNs are all in use, but the government’s frequent interference with them is problematic. Further, the government often reduces the speed 28 Persia Cluster of the Internet in Tehran to very low levels (although high speed access is available in other cities). Online courses in Internet security are offered. Despite all of the problems, the Internet continues to be a lifeline of information for the Iranian people, and many thousands use it to access political information, news, and to ask questions about Christianity.

Read more “Iran’s war on satellite dishes: ‘we just buy new ones the next day.’” France24. com, 20 December 2012, http://goo.gl/a4Ff5. “Satellite wars: why Iran keeps jamming.” PBS, 20 Nov 2012: http://goo.gl/ pTDFp. York, Jillian. “Is Iran’s halal internet possible?” Al Jazeera, 2 October 2012: http:// goo.gl/DV3fH. Ball, James. “Iran preparing internal version of Internet.” Washington Post, 19 Sep- tember 2012: http://goo.gl/mISYB. “Iranian cyber-struggles.” Middle East Research and Information Project, 3 May 2012: http://goo.gl/UFx3J. “Nothing comes between Iranians and their satellite dishes—not even the police.” RFERL.org, 13 March 2012: http://goo.gl/6NaIX. “Bluetoothing Iran’s revolution.” MarkFollman.com, 26 January 2010: http://goo. gl/nbURd. “Iranian mobile phones use Bluetooth scatternet to share videos.” German Journal, 26 February 2008: video, http://goo.gl/KxpE9.

RELIGION

Iran has been, is, and highly likely to be largely Islamic—at least in 17 name—for the immediate future. Church growth is rapid but still too slow to change this anytime in this generation. The growth of agnosti- cism and nominal Islam is, for the moment, a stronger trendline. a) Iran has been Islamic for centuries, and is presently more than 98% Muslim by most estimates. It will take a very long time to change this, because the change rate will have to exceed the demographic birth rate. Since the birth rate is crashing, change has become more likely. a) Many Iranians—especially the young—have functionally left Islam. Urban, educated Iranians in particular are likely to abandon the practice of Islam: they cease to pray, to keep the fast, to journey to Mecca, and ulti- mately to believe in Islam at all. Iran-observers report a growing number of mosques are largely empty of worshippers, even at Friday prayer, and an increasing number of Iranians are even becoming militantly opposed to Islam, calling for its overthrow in Iran. b) Diaspora Iranians in particular are more likely to be agnostic. MIT’s 2005 Iranian-American Community Survey showed that 33% of Iranian Muslims in exile self-identified as agnostic, and 9% as atheist. Of the 49% that indicated they were Muslims, half indicated they did not practice Islam. Persia Cluster 29 b) Many who come to want nothing to do with Islam eventually decide they have to have a religion of some sort, and eventually end up seeking Christ.

Read also Tavernise, Sabrina. “Violence leaves young Iraqis doubting clerics.” New York Times, 4 March 2008: http://goo.gl/Vq5jd. Pocha, Jehangir. “Iran’s other religion.” Boston Review: http://bostonreview.net/ BR28.3/pocha.html. “Drugs and prositution soar in Iran.” BBC News, 6 July 2000: http://goo.gl/ JMRa4. “75% of country’s 60 million (in 2000) and 86% of its students do not say their daily prayers.” Harbin, Julie Poucher. “Kadivar: secularization of the Islamic republic of Iran unstopable.” Duke Today, 18 April 2012: http://goo.gl/BYM7q.

The church of Iran has endured since ancient times, and won’t be erad- 18 icated any time soon. Although decimated after the coming of Islam, small numbers of Orthodox Christians endured for centuries. The church began blossoming again in the 19th century, thanks to evangelical missions. a) Christianity in Iran dates back to the time of Acts. Iranian bishops attended international conferences, and Persian Christians were among the first to take the gospel east toward China. With the coming of Islam in the 7th century, Christians became second-class citizens, and their number began to shrink. Today, they make up a small minority among Persians. b) The total number of believers is uncertain. Operation World estimates it at about 0.4 million, with the number of Muslim-background believers at somewhat over 100,000. Other Iran watchers make estimates up to and over a million. Iranians are certainly at present one of the most responsive Mus- lim peoples: the church is growing very rapidly. At the same time, many believers are fleeing persecution. Inside Iran, it appears to this editor that the total number of believers is likely below 1 million; but there are a large number of diaspora believers. c) Inside Iran, a large percentage of the Christian community has historically been Orthodox, mostly Armenians and Assyrians. These are not technically part of the Persian cluster. They are a cultural and linguistic “island” with an ancient heritage. Many if not most are nominal Christians, although there has been some significant work in the recent past to revitalize the faith and practice of this community. However, their numbers are shrinking, due largely to emigration.

Much of the modern church growth is fueled by widespread disgust 19 with Islam, but long-term evangelistic efforts, media and the boldness of believers should not be underestimated. a) “We thank God for Khomeini.” The iron fist of Islamic theocracy has led to frustration, disgust and the abandonment of Islam. That was not happening (or likely to happen) under the Shah, when there was much materialistic freedom but individual families kept people firmly in Islam. 30 Persia Cluster b) Christian respect for Persian history and culture has some effect. The anger many Persians feel toward Islam is coupled with a sense of the loss of their ancient culture. As one example, today little is taught in schools about Per- sian history before the Revolution. Islamic worship is in Arabic, not Persian. The Bible, on the other hand, often talks about Persia with respect; Cyrus (a Persian hero) is God’s “anointed one” in the Scriptures. Further, the Bible has been translated into Persian, and the use of Persian in teaching and worship makes Christianity more accessible (and appreciated) by Iranians. c) Decades of work is bearing fruit. People who heard the Gospel through long years of faithful preaching in villages prior to the Revolution are now turning to Christ. The Assemblies of God and Presbyterian churches in particular were involved in this. Bibles handed out then and left forgotten on shelves are now being taken down and read. The labors of these faithful men and women are seeing their reward. d) The impact of Persian-language media aimed at Iran over the past decade has been enormous. Satellite television, radio broadcasts, and Internet ministries have brought awareness of Christianity to millions. People can access these resources in the privacy of their own home, with little chance of being caught. Tens of thousands have responded overtly. Perhaps hundreds of thousands have accepted Christ but have not publicly contacted a broad- caster out of fear. Many have been secret believers for decades, getting their teaching in this way. Moreover, these evangelistic broadcasts have influ- enced the opinion of the general populace, imparting a more positive view of Christianity. e) Over a million Scriptures in Iran are having an impact. Over half a million new Testaments have already been placed, with a goal of 1 million total by the end of 2013. A Persian translation was completed around 1900. The United Bible Society translated the New Testament and published it in 1974. They additionally translated and published the Old Testament in 2007 (The complete Bible called “Good News for the New Generation”). The “Tafseer- ee” Farsi Bible was translated and published in 1994 under the sponsorship of the Living Bible. Elam Ministries has finished a translation of the New Testament and is working on a translation of the Old Testament. f) Martyrdoms have impressed people. Of particular note was the martyrdom of Bishop Haik Hovsepian and Mehdi Dibaj in the mid-1990s. Dibaj, who had been a Christian for 30 years, was imprisoned and sentenced to death. Bishop Hovsepian of the Assemblies of God in Iran led an international campaign on his behalf, and Dibaj was eventually released—only to be shortly afterward abducted and killed. Bishop Hovsepian, too, was mur- dered. Their funerals were attended by thousands of Muslim-background believers, despite the significant risk in doing so. Persecution, arrest, and martyrdom have continued to show the hard side of Islam, and made even more people interested in what Christianity has to offer.

Persia Cluster 31 The church is growing and will grow stronger. It has endured much 20 over the past several decades, and has grown in numbers and quality in spite of it. a) The church is larger. The increased numbers and the rapid growth rate are together increasing the confidence of believers. b) The church is bolder. Most if not all who decide upon Christianity have already counted the costs, and there appears to be very little defection. Some are likewise increasingly bold in witnessing, particularly to their house- holds and extended families.

The church will be small and fragile for the next decade and beyond. 21 While it is has seen many remarkable things happen, there are many dangers that surround it, and any single congregation stands a high risk of being raided, shut down, arrested, imprisoned or worse. a) Boldness is growing but fear remains pervasive and dampens growth in numbers. Many come to Christ in secret and remain so, listening to satellite television and radio broadcasts to nurture their faith in the safety of their own homes. They might never know their next door neighbor is likewise a secret believer, and never experiencing community and the growth in spiritual maturity that comes from living in fellowship with other believers. b) Governmental surveillance is widespread, and persecution is harsh. After his re-election as President, Ahmadenijad declared his intent to crack down on Christianity. Since 2009, persecution has particularly intensified, with numerous arrests and imprisonments. These rob the church of what spiritual leadership it has, and spreads fear that prevents evangelism and discipleship. c) Leaders are needed: spiritual immaturity is widespread. Secret believers receive all of their teaching, encouragement and worship from television, but never have the chance to practice it with other believers. There have little chance to live out their faith, model it for others, and serve each other. As new believers with little discipleship, they are very susceptible to false teachings transmitted by cults, some also by television and the Internet.

Bibliography

In addition to the books listed in the sections above, the following are also recommended. The Iran Primer. Brings together 50 top experts (Western and Iranian) to offer a comprehensive, concise overview of specific topics within Iran (62 subjects in 10 categories). Online at http://iranprimer.usip.org/ as well as in book form. Adeney, Miriam. Kingdom without Borders: the untold story of global Christianity. IVP Books (2009). Includes a chapter on Iran. Bradley, Mark. Iran and Christianity: historical identity and present relevance. Con- tinuum International Publishing Group (2008).

32 Persia Cluster Name Pop Notes Alborz 2.4 North-central. Old Tehran province. Alborz mountain foothills. Ardabil 1.2 NW. Borders Azerbaijan. Cold, mountainous. Tourism. P=Azeri. Bushehr 1.0 SW. On P. Gulf. Seaports, navy, gas field. Foreign workers. C Mahall & Bakh 0.9 W. P=Luri, Bakhtiari. Agriculture. East Azerbaijan 3.7 NW. Borders Azerbaijan. Archaic. Industry, mining, tourism. Esfahan 4.9 Center. 83% urban, 88% literate. Tourism. P=Bakhtiari, Luri, Qashqai. Fars 4.6 S. “Cultural Capital.” 61% urban. P=Persian,Qashqai,Luri. Agriculture. Gilan 2.5 Caspian Sea. Wet. P=Gilaki,Kurds. Tourism (2mln p.a.), cultural sites. Golestan 1.8 North-central. P=Turkmen, other minorities Hamadan 1.8 NW. P=Azeri,Luri,Laki,Kurdish. Historic sites (Tomb of Esther, more) Hormozgan 1.6 On P. Gulf. Mountains, hot. Agriculture (limes, dates), fish, tourism. Ilam 0.6 W. Mountains. P=Kurds,Lurs,Laki. Heavy damage Iran-Iraq war, poor. Kerman 2.9 SE. 52% urban. Mountains, desert. Fossils. Disasters. Auto industry. Kermanshah 1.9 W. Iran-Iraq war damage. Paleolithic caves, carpets, tourism. N Khorasan 0.9 NE. P=Kurds, Turkmen. Tourism. R Khorasan 6.0 NE. Many cultural sites. S Khorasan 0.7 SE. P=Persians,Pashto,Baluch,Arab. Pilgrimage site, tourism. Khuzestan 4.5 SW. On Iraq, P Gulf. P=Luri,Bakhtiari,Khuzi. Agriculture, shipping, oil. Kohgiluyeh & BA 0.7 SW. P=Luri. Mountainous. Kordestan 1.5 W. P=Kurds. 52% urban. Agriculture, livestock. Cultural sites. Lorestan 1.8 W. P=Luri. Mountainous. Nomadic herders. Markazi 1.4 W. Ancient ruins. Railroad, industry. Mazandaran 3.1 N. On Caspian. Dense pop, resources. Tourism, science, agriculture. Qazvin 1.2 NW. Mountains. P=Kurds, Luri, others. Historic sites. Qom 2.0 Tourist sites, historic mosques, churches. Agriculture. Semnan 0.6 N. 50% urban. Mountains. Cultural sites, tourism, orbital launch site. Sistan & Baluch 2.5 SE. On Pakistan, Persian Gulf. Dry. P=Baloch. Desolate, poor. Tehran 12.2 N. Central. 29% of GDP. 86% urban. Industry, mosques, churches. West Azerbaijan 3.1 Far NW. P=Azeri,Kurd,Armenian,Assyrians. Christians. Yazd 1.1 Central. 75% urban. Zoroastrians. Cultural heritage sites. Desert. Zanjan 1.0 NW. Mostly rural. Agriculture, handicrafts, carpets. caves.

Persia Cluster 33 The Provincial Forecast: The potental for Gospel expansion in each province An experimental table to forecast the regions where a planted church would be most likely to endure.

Province Pop Den $ Urb L D U G E F A P rC rQ rN Alborz 2.4 471 1.2 75.0 -2 1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Ardabil 1.2 70 1.0 35.0 -4 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Kermanshah 1.9 78 0.9 50.0 -3 0 1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Bushehr 1.0 45 3.6 50.0 -2 -1 1 1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 C Mahall & Bakh 0.9 55 0.8 35.0 -4 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 E Azerbaijan 3.7 82 1.2 50.0 -2 0 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Esfahan 4.9 46 1.5 75.0 -3 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Fars 4.6 37 1.2 50.0 -3 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Gilan 2.5 177 1.1 35.0 -3 1 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Golestan 1.8 87 0.9 35.0 -3 0 0 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Hamadan 1.8 91 1.0 35.0 -4 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Hormozgan 1.6 22 1.3 35.0 -5 -1 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Ilam 0.6 28 1.1 50.0 -4 -1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Kohgiluyeh & BA 0.7 42 6.2 35.0 -3 -1 0 1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Kordestan 1.5 51 0.8 50.0 -3 0 1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Kerman 2.9 16 1.0 50.0 -4 -1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 S Khorasan 0.7 7 3.7 50.0 -2 -1 1 1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 N Khorasan 0.9 31 2.8 50.0 -2 -1 1 1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 R Khorasan 6.0 50 0.4 50.0 -3 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Khuzestan 4.5 71 3.6 50.0 0 0 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Lorestan 1.8 62 0.9 50.0 -3 0 1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Markazi 1.4 49 1.9 50.0 -3 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Mazandaran 3.1 129 1.4 35.0 -3 1 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Qom 2.0 174 0.6 90.0 -2 1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Qazvin 1.2 77 1.4 50.0 -2 0 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Sistan & Baluch 2.5 14 0.5 35.0 -4 -1 0 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Semnan 0.6 6 1.4 75.0 -3 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Tehran 12.2 890 2.5 90.0 3 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 0 0 3 W Azerbaijan 3.1 82 0.8 50.0 -3 0 1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Yazd 1.1 8 1.3 75.0 -4 -1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 Zanjan 1.0 47 0.0 35.0 -4 -1 0 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3

Column headings: Province: the name of the province. Pop: the population, as of 2010. Den: population density, measured in people per square kilometer. $: GDP per capita as of 2010. Urb: the percentage of the population that is urbanized. These four factors are extremely rough order-of-magnitude estimates, based on available data from a variety of academic and governmental sources. L=Lean Scale. For the individual factors, see next page.

34 Persia Cluster The Provincial Forecast is an effort to identify which provinces lean toward openness or conser- vativism. Theoretically, churches planted in more open provinces should have a stronger chance of enduring and building influence in the society, while churches planted in conservative areas have less of a chance of growing.

Lean Scale: -4 and beyond, strongly conservative; -3 to -1, lean conservative; 0, neutral; +1 to +3, lean open; +4 and beyond, strongly open.

The Forecast “Lean” Scale is built on 9 separate factors as described below.

D=Density. Greater population densities tend toward liberality. It is often easier for a small church to get “lost” within a larger population, and operate “under the radar.” Smaller communi- ties over larger areas (less dense) are more apt to be conservative and aware of small churches in their midst. +1 for densities greater than 100/sq. km., and -1 for densities under 50/sq. km.

U=Urbanization. Larger cities attract migrants, intellectuals, liberals, foreign workers, larger companies, and so on. They tend to be centers where religious choice, experimentation, seeking, and openness to new ideas are more prevalent. In any culture, churches tend to get planted in more connected cities before migrating into rural areas. This is measured roughly by the percentage of the population in each province which is found in the provincial capital. +1 for concentrations exceeding 50%, -1 for those under 25%.

G=GNP per capita. Regions that have more wealth per person are less dependent on social networks for survival, and better able to consider alternative views. +1 for per capita GNP greater than $2,000; -1 for per capita GNP of under $1,000.

E=Education. Centers of education also tend to be centers of openness (although this is not always the case). +1 for provinces that have more than one university.

F=Foreigners. Foreigners bring with them foreign culture and ideas. +1 for those that welcome marked tourism, retirees, foreign stgudents, workers, etc. Although Iranians are friendly toward tourists who come, the provinces are scored -1 because of the difficulty of entry. Tehran is the excep- tion.

A=Alcohol. The church clearly doesn’t endorse drunkenness, but the broad availability of alcohol (licenses, bars, clubs, restaurants, nightlife) are indicators of a more open and less conservative attitude. (This can in some instances work against the church, obviously; secularization isn’t necessarily desirable.) +1 for the broad availability of alcohol; -1 for provinces with an anti- alcohol stance. Although there is a significant underground “party network,” alcohol remains largely unavailable, so all provinces are scored -1.

P=Persecution. -1 for provinces in which known instances of significant persecution have occurred (mob violence, arrests, vandalism, killings). rC, rQ, rN: the presence of Christians, non-religious, and non-Christian religions. To score a 1, at least 25% of the population must be in the specific category for the province.In Iran, no province is more than 25% Christian or non-Religious, so every province scores a “3” (over 90%) in the non- Christian Religion category.

Persia Cluster 35 Alborz 2.4 North, in mountain foothills. P=Persians, Lurs, Azerbaijani, Kurds. Karaj 1.7 Seat of Karaj, 4th largest city. Education, tourism. Chemicals, fertilizer. Nazarabad 0.1 Rural district. Savojbolagh 0.2 Hashtgerd. Archaeology. Industry, farming, research centers. Taleqan <50k Small, rural district with a mild climate.

Ardebil 1.2 NW, on border of Azerbaijan. Cold, mountainous. Tourism. Ardebil 0.5 Ardabil, historic city. P=Azeri. Classic silk, carpet trade. World Heritage City. Bilehsavar 50k Border crossing city. Germi 0.1 Historic town. Much farming. P=Azeri. Khalkhal 0.1 Rural district. Kowsar 25k Mountains. Much farming, tourist destinations. Meshkinshahr 0.1 Historic city. Mountainous. Springs, Azerbaijani rugs. Namin 50k Very rural district. Neer 25k Very rural district. Parsabad 0.1 Rural district: 50% urban.

Bushehir 1.0 SW, on Persian Gulf. Seaports, navy, gas fields. Many foreign workers. Asaluyeh 50k Far southeast of province, small rural district. Bushehr 0.2 Province capital. Historic region, vast plain, important seaport. Dashtestan 0.2 50% rural. Explosive population growth, much farming (grain, dates). Dashti 0.1 60% rural. Farming, oil, natural gas, honey, tourist attractions. Dayyer 50k Arid. Natural gas, some farming and fishing. Rural. Deylam 50k Far northwest of province, small rural district. Genaveh 0.1 Northwest. Jam 50k Southeast, rural. Petrochemical industries. Kangan 0.1 Southeast, 70% rural. Tangestan 75k P=Tangesier. Famous military heroes, and dates.

C Mahall 0.9 West. Luri, Bakhtiari. Agriculture. Ardal 75k Center. Boroojen 0.1 High altitude, cold. Junction city for nation, strong industrial center. Farsan 0.1 Rural. Koohrang 50k Very rural. Lordegan 0.2 Ancient Elamite sites. Forests, rice fields, animal husbandry. Bakhtiari. Shahr-e Kord 0.3 High elevation, rural. Third largest city in Iran. P=Bakhtiari, Qashqai.

E Azerbaijan 3.7 Border of Azerbaijan. Ancient history. Industry, mining, tourism. Ahar 0.1 NE. Famous for rugs. Ajabshir 75k 75% rural. Azarshahr 0.1 66% rural. P=Azerbaijani. City of Azarshahr is historic Tufarqan. Bonab 0.1 Lakeside. Turkish speakers. 3 universities. Bostanabad 0.1 Historic sites, tourism destinations. Charoimaq 50k 90% rural. Heris 75k Some cities, but very rural. Weaving center (Heris rugs). Hashtrud 75k Very rural. Jolfa 50k Northern border town. Important shipping point, universities. Farming. Kalibar 75k Protected forests, ancient fortresses. Very rural. Marand 0.2 Northwest. 50% rural. Pre-Islamic historic city. Maragheh 0.2 South-central. P=Azerbaijani. Orthodox church, universities, ancient city. Miyaneh 0.2 Ancient (Media Empire). Farming. Malekan 0.1 South. Very rural: farming, fruit. Osku 0.1 Very rural. Historic villages, tourist destination.

36 Persia Cluster Sarab 0.1 East. Famous for rugs. Universities, technical colleges. Shabestar 0.1 West. Railway, university. Mosques, shrines, churches. Tabriz 1.5 Center. Heavily urban in Tabriz city. Rich history, culture. Earthquakes. Varzaqan 50k Copper mine (3% of world reserves), gold. Farming. Earthquakes.

Esfahan 4.9 Center of nation. 83% urban, 88% literate. Tourism. Many tribes. Aran & Bidgol 50k Desert. Rural. Oil, carpets, some tourism. Ardestan 50k Historic (Sassanian Empire). Orchards. 50% rural. Borkhar & M 0.1 60% rural. Chadegan 50k Very rural. On Zayandeh River. Farming. Dehaqan 50k 50% rural. Some livestock and orchards. Faridan 0.1 75% rural. Fereydunsh. 50k Zagros Mountains. P=Georgians. 50% rural. Falavarjan 0.2 Rural. Historic sites, famous mausoleums. Golpayegan 75k 50% rural. River irrigation for farming. Rugs. Isfahan 1.6 Metro area, 3.4m. Famous historic city, major industrial capital. Kashan 0.4 Very urban. Textiles, carpets, silks, some tourism. Khansar 25k Mountains. Historic sites, flower gardens, rugs, tourism. Khomeynish. 0.3 Urbanized. Universities. Lanjan 0.2 On Zayandeh River. Steel mill, farming. Rural. Mobarakeh 0.1 50% rural. Najafabad 0.2 25% rural. Important regional agricultural markets. Natanz 10k Mountains. Fruit orchards, shrines, nuclear uranium enrichment facility. Nayin 50k 50% rural. Historic sites, rugs. Semirom 25k Rural. Shahin Shahir 0.2 Zagros Mountains. Lightly urban. Many refugees. Baha’i, Christians. Shahreza 0.1 Urbanized. Tourism (caravanserai). Tiran & Karvan 75k Very rural.

Fars S. “Cultural Capital.” 61% urban. P=Persian,Qashqai,Luri. Agriculture. Abadeh 0.1 50% rural. High elevation. Woodwork, fruit, rugs, historic sites. Arsanjan 50k 75% rural. 5,400 ft. Bovanat 50k 75% rural. 9,400 ft. Darab 0.2 Hundreds of rural villages. Fertile region: fruit, tobacco, salt mines. Eqlid 0.1 50% rural. Mountains, desert. Farming, fruit. Estahban 75k 50% rural. Fertile land: grain, fruits, saffron, figs. Historic (Cyrus the Great). Farashband 40k 75% rural. Fasa 0.2 50% urban. Universities. Firozabad 0.1 50% urban. Historic sites. Gerash 50k 50% urban. Large numbers of seasonal migrants. Jahrom 0.2 50% urban. Much agriculture. Several universities. Kazerun 0.3 60% rural. Agriculture, science, historic sites. Khorrambid 50k 50% rural. Lamard 75k 50% rural. Many natural gas deposits, industrial factories. Larestan 0.2 Very rural. P=Lari. World Heritage Sites. Marvdasht 0.3 Ancient city (Persepolis). Factories, universities, agricultural center. Mamasany 0.1 50% rural. Many tribes (Mamasani, Luri, Baluch). Mohr 50k Very rural. Rich gas deposits, refineries. Neyriz 0.1 50% rural. Famous mosque. Qirokarzin 50k Very rural. 1972 earthquake devastated area. Sepidan 0.1 Very rural. Earthquakes. Shiraz 1.6 Very urbanized ancient city of Shiraz, powerful economic center of South. Zarrindasht 75k Very rural.

Persia Cluster 37 Gilan 2.5 Caspian Sea. Wet. P=Gilaki,Kurds. Tourism (2mln p.a.), cultural sites. Astaneh 0.1 50% urban. Peanuts, rice, silk. Astara 0.1 Borders Azerbaijan. Important trade route. Very urbanized. Bandar-e-A 0.1 Urbanized. Harbor town, much rain. Caviar. Fuman 0.1 60% rural. Lahijan 0.1 50% rural. P=Gilaki, others. Tea, tourism, universities. Langrud 0.1 50% rural. Ports, tourism. Masal 50k Very rural. Rasht 1.0 Largest on Caspian Sea, much tourism/industry, trade gateway to Europe. Rudbar 0.1 Very rural, cold. Olive groves. Rudsar 50k Rural. Agriculture, much fishing. Caviar. Rezvanshahr 75k Very rural. Shaft 75k Very rural. Rice, fishing, livestock. Sume’eh Sara Very rural. Tavalesh 0.1 Mountainous, rural, isolated. Many historic sites.

Golestan 1.8 North-central. P=Turkmen, other minorities Aliabad 0.1 50% rural. Alborz Mountains, waterfalls. Aq Qala 0.1 Very rural. Azadshahr 0.1 60% rural. Bandar-e-G 50k 75% rural. Port, refinery factories. Gonbad-e Q 0.3 50% urban. P=Turkmen. Historic sites, universities. Gorgan 0.4 50% urban. Airport, universities. Famous for carpets. P=Turkmen. Kalaleh 0.1 60% rural. Mountains. Animal husbandry. Kordkuy 75k 70% rural. Alborz mountains, historic sites, tourism. Minudasht 0.1 70% rural. Ramyan 0.1 Very rural. P=Qizilbash. Torkaman 0.1 60% rural. Seaport. Agirculture, fishing, tourism. Caviar, cotton.

Hamadan 1.8 NW. P=Azeri,Luri,Laki,Kurdish. Historic sites (Tomb of Esther, more). Asadabad 0.1 50% rural. Numerous minorities. Several historic sites. Rugs. Bahar 0.1 Very rural. Farming (potatoes, watermelon). Famenin 50k Very rural. Hamadan 0.7 Urban. One of oldest cities in world (Ezra 6:2, Ectaban). Tourism. Kabudarahang 0.1 Very rural. Malayer 0.3 Mostly urban. Rugs, parks. Nahavand 50k Historic city, possibly founded by Darius I. Razan 0.1 90% rural. Tuyserkan 0.1 Zagros Mountains. Walnuts.

Hormozgan 1.6 On P. Gulf. Mountains, hot. Agriculture (limes, dates), fish, tourism. Abumusa 10k Island. Fishing, oil exports. Bandar-e-A. 0.5 Heavily urban. Shipping port, strategic Iranian Navy base. Bandar-e-Len. 0.1 Rural. Coastal city. Regional trade center. P=Arabs, Persians. Bashagard 50k Very rural. Bastak 75k Ancient cities, today very rural. Hajiabad 75k Very rural. Citrus products. Jask 50k Very rural. Port city, Naval base, airport. Khamir 50k Very rural. Minab 0.3 Moderately rural. Fishing (shrimp), agriculture. Famous bazaar. Parsian 50k Gavbandi. Rural. Qeshm 0.1 Very rural. Fishing. Rudan 0.1 60% rural.

38 Persia Cluster Ilam 0.6 W. Mountains. P=Kurds,Lurs,Laki. Heavy damage in Iran-Iraq war. Abdanan 50k P=Kurds, Lak, Luri. Many rivers. Zagros Mountains. Tourism, military bases. Darrehshahr 50k P=Kurds, Lak, Luri. Historic sites, archaeological digs, agriculture. Dehloran 75k Border city. Very rural. Eyvan 50k 50% rural. P=Kurds. Ilam 0.2 Iraq border, Kabir Kuh mountains. P=Kurds. Universities. Malekshahi 50k Very rural. Mehran 25k 2 hours from Baghdad. War devastation, refugees. Tourism, pilgrims today. Shirvan & Ch 75k Very rural.

Kerman 2.9 SE. 52% urban. Mountains, desert. Fossils. Disasters. Auto industry. Anbarabad 0.1 Rural. Agriculture near capital city, but mostly desert. Baft 0.1 Rural. Desert, with some agriculture. Bam 0.1 Rural. Desert, protected parks, some agriculture. Bardsir 0.1 Rural. Desert. Fahraj 50k 80% rural. Jiroft 0.2 On a fertile plain in a mountainous area, with rivers. Hot. Kahnuj 75k 60% rural. Mehroyeh Wildlife Refuge. Kerman 0.7 Province capital. Urbanized, large city. Important cultural center of Iran. Kuhbonan 25k Very rural. Manujan 75k Mostly rural. Qaleh Ganj 75k Mostly rural. Rabar 50k Mostly rural. Rafsanjan 0.2 Mostly urban. Pistachios, rugs, copper mines, universities. Ravar 50k Mostly rural. Deserts. Carpet weaving. Roudbar Jon. 0.1 Very rural. Shahr-e-Babak 0.1 Ancient city. Mostly rural. Copper mines. Sirjan 0.2 Urbanized. Depression between mountains: copper, coal, iron, stone, gold. Zarand 0.1 Rural. Earthquake 2005.

Kermanshah 0.8 W. War damage, paleolithic caves, carpets, tourism. P=Kurds. Dalahu 50k Created 2004. Rural. 2 cities. Eslamabad-e 0.1 Very rural. 2 small cities. Gilan-e 75k Rural. P=Kurdish. Cultural center, rice farming. Harsin 0.1 Elevation 1mi. Population in townships. Some tourist sites. Javanrud 75k In small towns. P=Kurds. Some tourism. Kangavar 0.1 In town of Kangavar. Archaeological sites (Media Empire). Kermanshah 1.0 Capital. Zagros Mountains. Ancient history, tourist sites. P=Kurdish. Paveh 50k Mountains, caves. Rural. Zoroastrianism. P=Kurds. Qasr-e Shirin 25k Rural, 2 small towns. P=Kurds. Much agriculture. Ravansar 50k Shaho Mountain. Springs, caves, tourism. P=Kurds. Sahneh 75k Rural. Half in Sahneh city. Salas-e Bab. 50k Rural, 2 very small towns. Sarpol-e Zah. 0.1 Rural. Half in Sarpol-e Zahab city. P=Kurds. Sonqor 0.1 Mountains. Moderately urban. P=Kurds, Azerbaijanis. Historic sites.

S. Khorasan 0.7 SE. P=Persians, Pashto, Baluch, Arab. Pilgrimage site, tourism. Birjand 0.2 Urban, growing. Afghani trade (opium), saffron, barberry, rugs. Universities. Boshruyeh New district. Very rural. Historic sites. Darmian 50k Border with Afghanistan. Very rural. Ferdows 50k New district. Rural. Saffron, pomegranates. Nehbandan 50k SE. Very rural. Qaem 0.1 Ghayen. Rural. Trade center, saffron, carpets.

Persia Cluster 39 Sarayan 25k Very rural. Sarbisheh 50k Very rural.

R. Khorasan 6.0 NE. Agriculture, holy city of Mashhad, millions of religious pilgrims. Bajestan 25k Urbanizing. Saffron, pomegranates. Bardeskan 75k Rural. Saffrons, pistachios, figs. University. Chenaran 0.1 Mostly rural. Agricultural center, with many farms. Darrehgaz 75k Bordering Turkmenistan. Ancient sites. Very rural. Fariman 0.1 Very rural. Firuzeh 50k Takht-e Jolgeh. Formed 2006. Very rural. Gonabad 75k Very rural. Saffron. World heritage site. Jowayin 50k Very rural. Joghatai 50k Very rural. Kalat 50k Very rural. P=Khorasani Turk, Kurdish. Kashmar 0.1 Urbanized. Raisins, grapes, saffron, rugs. Universities. Khaf 0.1 Rural. Bordering Afghanistan. Khalilabad 50k Very rural. Mahvelat 50k Very rural. Mashhad 2.8 Historic. 2nd largest holy city in world: Shi’a shrines, 20m pilgrims p.a. Neyshabur 0.4 Large cities but mostly rural. Agricultural. Earthquakes. Historic sites. Quchan 0.2 Borders Turkmenistan. Rural. Earthquakes. P=Kurds, Turks. Rashtkhar 50k Very rural. Sabzevar 0.3 Urbanized. Agricultural trade center, processing, airports, universities. Sarakhs 0.1 Ancient city split between Iran and Turkmenistan. Mostly rural. Taybad 0.1 Borders Afghanistan. Rural. Torg-o-Sh. 50k Very rural. Torbat-e-Hey. 0.2 Mostly rural. Saffron. Sufi tombs. Torbat-e-Jam 0.2 Rural. Ancient cities, monuments, tombs. Cultural center, some tourism.

Khuzestan 4.5 SW. On Iraq, P Gulf. P=Luri, Bakhtiari, Khuzi. Agriculture, shipping, oil. Abadan 0.2 Urbanized. Devastated in Iran-Iraq war. Port, schools, refineries, airport. Ahvaz 1.5 Urbanized, provincial capital. Oil. Universities, commerce, industry. Andika 50k Very rural. Andimeshk 0.1 Urbanized, historic. Military depots, airports. Behbahan 0.2 Mostly rural. P=Luri. Baha’is. Historic ruins. Baghemalek 0.1 Rural. Mahshahr 0.2 Important seaport. Gas, exports, refineries, universities. Dasht-e-Azad. 0.1 Rural. Dezful 0.4 Urbanized. Famous ancient bridge, archaeology sites. Cotton, sugarcane. Gotvand 75k Rural. Haftgol 25k Rural. Hendijan 50k Historic site. Hoveyzeh 50k Rural. Oil, agriculture. Devastated in Iran-Iraq war. Izeh 0.2 P=Bakhtiari. Rural. Agriculture (rice), mines. Khorramshahr 0.1 Urbanized. Seaport. Rebuilt from war. Oil production, shipping, university. Lali 25k Rural. M. Soleyman 0.1 In Zagros Mountains. Urbanized. P=Bakhtiari. Oil. Omidiyeh 0.1 Urbanized. Ramhormoz 0.1 Ancient Samangan. Mostly rural. P=Luri. Ramshir 50k Formed 2005. Rural. Shadegan 0.1 Rural. Shush 0.2 Ancient Susa. Mostly rural. Shushtar 0.2 Ancient Elamite city with Roman water system. World Heritage Site.

40 Persia Cluster Kohgiluyeh 0.7 SW. Zagros Mountains. P=Luri. Boyer Ahmad 0.2 Urbanized. Industry, refineries. P=Luri. Dena 50k Very rural. National Heritage sites. Gachsaran 0.1 Urbanized. Many natural gas deposits. P=Luri, Qashqai. Kohgiluyeh 0.2 Very rural. Baneh <50k Very rural.

Kordestan 1.5 W. P=Kurds. 52% urban. Agriculture, livestock. Cultural sites. Bijar 0.1 High elevation. Rural. P=Kurds. Carpets, rugs. Dehgolan 50k 50% rural. Formed 2007. Divandarreh 0.1 Mountainous. Rural. P=Kurds. Kamyaran 0.1 Much urbanization. P=Kurds. Marivan 0.1 Urbanized. Border city (Iraq). Shopping, tourism center. Qorveh 0.1 Rural. P=Kurds, Azeri. Sanandaj 0.4 Urbanized, large city. Industrial and agricultural processing center. Saqqez 0.2 5,000 feet. Moderately rural. Historic sites. Sarvabad 50k Very rural.

Lorestan W. Mountainous. Nomadic herders. P=Luri. Aligudarz 0.1 Mountains. P=Bakhtiari. Urbanized. Azna 75k Zagros Mountains. Urbanized. P=Kurdish refugees. Borujerd 0.3 Urbanized. Industrial, cultural center. Historic city. Dalfan 0.1 6,500 feet. Rural. P=Laki. Dorud 0.1 Urbanized. Dowreh 50k Formed 2007. Very rural. Khorramabad 0.4 Very urbanized. P=Lur, Laki. Tourist sites, agricultural center. Kuhdasht 0.2 Zagros Mountains. Very rural. Poldokhtar 75k Very rural. World Heritage Site. Selseleh 75k Very rural.

Markazi 1.4 W. Ancient ruins. Railroad, industry. Arak 0.5 Very urbanized. Heavy industry, universities, some agriculture. Ashtiyan 25k Agriculture, carpets, historic sites. Delijan 50k Urbanized. Industry, carpets. Caves. Khomeyn 0.1 Mostly urban. Fertile agriculture. Birthplace of Khomeini. Komeijan 50k Very rural, small towns. Khondub 50k Very rural. Mahalat 50k Urbanized. Zoroastrianism, flowers. Saveh 0.2 Ancient city (Medes), historic sites, wheat, cotton, fruits, some industry. Shazand 0.1 Very rural. Tafresh 25k Urbanized. Zoroastrianism. Universities. Much emigration. Zarandiyeh 50k Very rural.

Mazanderan 3.1 N. On Caspian. Dense pop, resources. Tourism, science, agriculture. Amol 0.3 Ancient city. Mostly urban. Tourist attractions, summer homes. Babol 0.5 Major commercial center of northern Iran. Orange farms, historic ruins. Babolsar 0.1 Once important seaport, since surpassed. University. Behshahr 0.1 Mostly urban. Industrial factories, historic ruins, some tourism. Chalus 0.1 Mostly urban. Fishing. Juybar 75k Very rural. Mahmudabad 0.1 Very rural. Neka 0.1 Urbanized industrial center. Huge power plant. Noshahr 0.1 Rural. Much domestic tourism. Airport, university.

Persia Cluster 41 Nur 0.1 Very rural. Birthplace of Baha’i founder. Qaemshahr 0.3 Very urbanized. Rapid growth caused infrastructure challenges. Ramsar 75k Urbanized. P=Gilaki. Radiation due to local geology. Savadkuh 0.4 Very urbanized. Food production, some industry. Sari 75k Very rural. In mountain ranges. Farming. Tonekabon 0.2 Urbanized. Agriculture (oranges, kiwi, rice, tea).

Qom 2.0 Tourist sites, historic mosques, churches. Agriculture. Qom 1.0 Enormously important holy city, center of Shi’a scholarship, pilgrims.

Qazvin 1.2 NW. Mountains. P=Kurds, Luri, others. Historic sites. Abyek 0.1 Rural. Cement factory. Alborz 0.2 Rural. Boyinzahra 0.2 Very rural. Pistachios, tourism, university. Earthquakes. Qazvin 0.1 Historic (Persian Empire). Cultural center. P=Tati. Textiles, university. Takestan 0.2 Very rural. Vineyards. P=Tati.

Sistan & Bal. 2.5 SE. On Pakistan, P Gulf. Dry. P=Baloch. Desolate, poor. Chahbahar 0.2 Mostly rural. P=Baluchi, Turks. Some immigration. Free Trade Zone. Dalgan 50k Very rural. Hirmand 75k Formed 2007. Very rural. Iranshahr 0.2 Old Balochistan capital. P=Baluch (100%). Khash 0.1 5,000 feet. P=Baluch (100%). Konarak 75k Rural. P=Baluch. Military airbase. Mehrestan 50k Very rural. Nikshahr 0.2 Very rural. Saravan 0.2 Very rural. P=Baluch. Insurgency. Sarbaz 0.1 Very rural. P=Baluch. Sib o Soran 75k Very rural. Zabol 0.2 Mostly urban. Numerous tribes. University, airport. Zahedan 0.6 Borders Pakistan, Afghanistan. P=Baluch. University. Zehak 75k Rural. P=Baluch.

Semnan 0.6 N. 50% urban. Mountains. Cultural sites, tourism, orbital launch site. Damghan 0.1 Ancient city, ruins (mosques, forts). Tourism, university. Garmsar 75k Rural. Dozens of tribes. Universities. Mehdishahr 50k Rural. Semnan 0.1 Political, cultural center of province. Flowers, rugs. Shahrud 0.2 Urabnized. Iranian Space launch facility. Historic sites.

Tehran 12.2 Capital. 29% of GDP, 86% urban. Industry, mosques, churches. Damavand 25k Volcano, thermal springs. Urbanized. Historic sites. Eslamshahr 0.5 Heavily urban. Handicrafts. Firuzkuh 50k Mountains. Very rural. Historic sites, tourism. Malard 0.3 Heavily urbanized. Pakdasht 0.2 Very urban. Pishua 75k Urban. Historic tombs and shrines. Qods 0.2 Formed 2007. Heavily urbanized. Rey 0.3 Tehran MSA. Heavily industrialized. Shrines, pilgrimage site. Robatkarim 0.6 Very rural. 3 cities. Shahriyar 0.5 More rural. Shemiranat 25k Alborz Mountains. Parks, embassies, summer homes, tourism. Tehran 7.8 Capital. Largest in Iran, world class city (one of the top 10 in the world).

42 Persia Cluster Varamin 0.5 Urbanized. Heavy industry, universities.

W. Azerbaijan 3.1 Bukan 0.3 Rural. P=Kurds. Much farming. Chaldoran 50k Rural. Some tourism (historic temples). Chaypareh 50k Very rural. Khoy 0.3 Mostly rural. Fruit, grain, timber. P=Azeri. Mahabad 0.2 Mostly rural. P=Kurds. Miyandoab 0.2 Rural. Fertile agriculture, sugar factories. Maku 0.1 Rural, 2 cities. Large free trade zone on border of Turkey, Azerbaijan. Naqadeh 0.1 Very rural. Oshnaviyeh 75k Rural. Near Turkey. P=Kurds. Wheat, fruits. Piranshahr 0.1 Urbanized. Granite production. Sardasht 0.1 Rural. Chemical weapon attack in ‘80s Iran-Iraq war. P=Kurdish. Shahindezh 0.1 Rural. P=Azeri Turks, Kurds, Chahardoli. Salmas 50k Rural. Ancient church (tourism). Borders Azerbaijan. Showt 50k Very rural. Takab 0.1 Rural. P=Azeri Turks, Kurds. Agriculture, carpets. Urmia 0.9 P=Azeri, Kurd, Assyrian, Armenian. Fruit, tobacco. Christian history.

Yazd 1.1 C. Desert. 75% urban. Zoroastrians. Cultural heritage sites. Abarkuh 50k 5,000 feet. Rural. Ardakan 75k Rural. Zoroastrian center, pilgrimage site. Bafq 25k Urbanized in small towns. Khatam 25k Rural. Meybod 25k Rural. Mehriz 75k Desert. Ancient city, tourism. Sadugh 25k Rural. Taft 50k Very rural. Tabas 75k Rural. Famous gardens and shrines. Earthquakes. Yazd 0.5 Ancient city (Medes). Very urban population center. Handicrafts, silks.

Zanjan 1.0 NW. Mostly rural. Agriculture, handicrafts, carpets. Caves. Abhar 0.1 Urbanized. Science center, many universities. Ijerod 50k Very rural. Khodabandeh 0.2 Very rural. Khorramdar. 75k Rural, 1 city. Mahneshan 50k Very rural. Tarom 50k Very rural. Zanjan 0.5 Provincial center. P=Azeri. Handicrafts, carpets.

Persia Cluster 43