PERSIAN CLUSTER FORECAST Justin D. Long, ed. — Edition 1.1 — February 2013 Mission to Unreached Peoples http://www.justinlong.org l http://www.mup.org Persia Cluster 1 Terms of Use It is not easy, in this day and age, to “control” the circulation of a digital document. So, I will not endeavor to try. Here is the “honor” system for this forecast document. If you bought or sponsored this research, please feel free to pass a copy on to someone else who will make good use of it. If you have received a copy, but you haven’t bought it yet, then please read it and use it. If you want to pass it on, or you find it useful enough to want to support it, then please visit http://www.justinlong.org/persia to purchase your copy. If you find this report useful, please take a moment to email [email protected] and give us a brief report that we can pass on to our sponsors —it will make their day! 2 Persia Cluster ERRATA HISTORY 2/1/13 1.0 Initial release. 2/1913 1.1 Minor spelling and grammatical fixes, addition of misplaced Kermanshah provinces in the district survey, and additions to 19a on the current status of Bible translation in Iran. Persia Cluster 3 To learn more about joining a Strategy Team and engaging least-reached people groups, visit www.mup.org, call Pete at 469-814-8222, or email [email protected] www.facebook.com/UPGnow | www.twitter.com/UPGnow 4 Persia Cluster The Persian Cluster Forecast Was Also Sponsored In Part By donors like you. Thank You to our Interviewees including Iran Alive Ministries 214-932-0995, www.iranaliveministries.org and the many others not named for security reasons. To learn more about joining a Strategy Team and engaging least-reached people groups, visit www.mup.org, call Pete at 469-814-8222, or email [email protected] www.facebook.com/UPGnow | www.twitter.com/UPGnow Persia Cluster 5 INTRODUCTION There are multiple purposes for this document. First and foremost is to provide a deep and regularly-updated review of the “Persian Cluster” (defined as Farsi- speakers in Iran, and their diaspora). This is intended as a tool for intercession, inspiration and strategic planning. Second, it is hoped this document will be a useful introduction to the Persian Cluster for potential missionary candidates and short-term workers. This will be, therefore, a summary, but also link you to many additional resources which will provide you with further and deeper insights. Finally, my goal is to provide something of a “reality check” and a “forecast” for the likely future of the Persian cluster and in particular the Persian church. Iran will not change overnight, and the future of the church in Iran is still small and restricted for the future--unless something is changed. Fortunately many are working on this. The measure of the success of this document will be if it inspires more to join them. METHODOLOGY This document works to achieve its goals by making valuable forecasts: projec- tions candidates and agencies can use for long-term strategic planning. Obvious- ly, no forecast can be absolutely error-free. However, I have sought to separate “signal” (trend) from “noise” (random data). Underlying this forecast are both statistical data (in the form of demographic data from the UN, church growth data from various on-the-ground networks as well as religious databases, and other similar collections), historical patterns, and expert opinion from workers with long-term histories on the field. (Each interviewee has, on average, at least 10 to 15 years of experience in direct field work amongst Iranians, and for this re- port more than a few had many decades. I was privileged to listen to their stories and their passion for bringing the Gospel to Iran.) The specific forecasts (numbered, in this document) are my own responsibil- ity. I have made them as specific and testable as possible so we can see which ones I have gotten “right” and which I have gotten “wrong,” and the underlying forecast model can be improved in future editions. Meanwhile, in the individual forecasts I have labored to give specific estimates of how probable a forecast is. Some are “almost certain” (better than 90%), and others are less so (perhaps over 60% or 75%). The percentages in most cases are based on underlying statistics using a Bayesian approach. 6 Persia Cluster Overarching Forecasts for 2015-2025 1. Iran’s population is growing slowly, and will likely begin to decline after 2040. Slowing growth reflects changing cultural norms and pessimism about future possibilities in Iran. 2. Iran is urbanizing, with vast numbers leaving the poverty of the rural regions to seek a better life in the cities. Tehran in particular is a magnet. 3. Iran has had a notably “young” population, but slowing population growth will cause the average age to rise. 4. The economy is disintegrating, leading to anger, hopelessness and despair on the part of millions of people. Iran is experiencing a “brain drain” as many of the frustrated and discontent, having no hope for a better future in their lifetime, are leaving the country. 5. Iran is in the midst of a cultural “unraveling”—a period of severe cultural de- bate (although much of this is being suppressed ruthlessly). We estimate this will last until somewhere around 2030, at which point the nation will enter a crisis. 6. Potential Sparks and wildcards: • An almost certain earthquake (fault lines cover 90% of Iran) • A lack of self-sufficiency in food, and bread price spikes • The impact of shrinking oil revenues on the government’s budget • Societal breakdown, especially due to divorce, drugs and prostitution • The influence of women and the boiling point of their education • Illegal technologies that connect Iranians to the world and shape views 7. Many are discontent with the government, but the chance for liberalization is low. The government controls the political process as well as military and para- military forces which it uses to suppress dissent. 8. Iran will be Islamic for the immediate future. However, the church has en- dured since ancient times, and won’t be eradicated any time soon. 9. Much modern church growth is fueled by disgust with Islam, but the impact of long-term evangelistic efforts, media, and the boldness of believers should not be underestimated. 10. The church is growing in size, strength and maturity—but it will still be small and fragile for the next decade and beyond. Persia Cluster 7 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. The population will decline. 2. The population will urbanize. 3. The average age will rise. 4. Many will leave the country, frustrated and discontent. 5. A major, disastrous earthquake is highly probable in the near future. 6. Food prices will continue to spike. 7. Shrinking oil revenues will impact governmental budgets. 8. Iran is in the midst of a cultural unraveling through 2030. 9. Iran has veered back and forth between its Persian and Islamic identity. 10. Iranian society is breaking down due to pervasive structures of sin. 11. The women’s rights movement remains a minority, albeit a vocal one. 12. The education of women is likely to be a boiling point. 13. The economy is disintegrating. 14. There is widespread discontent with the government. 15. Open, large-scale warfare between Iran and its neighbors is unlikely. 16. Technology is illegal in many forms, but many continue to seek it out. 17. Iran is, and will be, largely Islamic for the immediate future. 18. The church has endured and will not be eradicated any time soon. 19. Modern church growth is fueled by disgust with Islam, and evangelism. 20. The church is growing in size, strength and maturity. 21. The church will be small and fragile for the next decade and beyond. 8 Persia Cluster DEMOGRAPHICS Population growth is slowing, and the population as a whole will most 1 likely decline. If the current trend continues in the long term, Iran could fall to around 60 million by 2100. The prospects of reversing this are low, despite the desires of the Iranian government. a) The population is presently growing, but the rate of growth peaked in 1980 and has been falling ever since. It is currently 1.2% and falling, with a fertil- ity rate averaging 1.6 children per woman (well below the roughly 2.1 aver- age needed to avoid population decline). As a result, the total population is expected to peak at 85 million around 2040 and then begin to decline. It may drop as far 62 million by 2100 (the low variant of the estimates projects 31 million). b) The reasons for this decline had historical beginnings but now are rooted in widespread cultural norms and dissatisfaction with the economic and political situation in Iran. After the 1979 revolution, the government urged Iranians to have big families. The economy, however, did not grow as fast, and the rapidly growing population became impoverished, leading to frustration and discontent. The government found it expedient to reverse its position. In the 1990s it began providing a population family planning scheme, promoting the idea of small families. This was very successful and accelerated a rapid drop in fertility. c) Families are having fewer children. The percentage of families with 5 or more children fell from 47% in 1967 to 30% in 2000, by which time a third of women had only 1 or 2 children. The idea of having fewer children has become a cultural norm, especially among younger, urbanized children: fertility is higher in rural regions (2.4) than in urban ones (1.9).