APPENDIX 2

Bacillus anthracis consumption of undercooked meat from those animals Disease Agent: • Occupational risk for farmers, veterinarians, tannery and wool workers, and laboratory personnel • anthracis • A threat as a bioterrorist weapon for susceptible Disease Agent Characteristics: populations

• Gram-positive, rod-shaped, aerobic, nonmotile, Vector and Reservoir Involved: -forming, facultatively intracellular bacterium • None • Order: ; Family: • Size: 3.5 mm ¥ 1-1.2 mm Blood Phase: • Nucleic acid: Approximately 5200 kb of DNA • Symptomatic bacteremia and toxemia are common in systemic from gastrointestinal and inha- Disease Name: lational . Bacteremia is detectable in fulmi- • Anthrax nant cases of cutaneous anthrax. • Bacteremia in asymptomatic individuals has not been Priority Level: described. • Scientific/Epidemiologic evidence regarding blood Survival/Persistence in Blood Products: safety: Theoretical • Public perception and/or regulatory concern regard- • Unknown ing blood safety: Very low Transmission by Blood Transfusion: • Public concern regarding disease agent: High • Theoretical; experimental transmission through Background: blood has been demonstrated in animal models. • In 1876, Bacillus anthracis was the first microorgan- Cases/Frequency in Population: ism identified as the cause of a specific disease by • Uncommon in the US: seven cases of cutaneous . During the same year, he was growing anthrax reported to CDC (1980-2000) and an outbreak B. anthracis in his laboratory and within the decade, of bioterrorism-related anthrax with 22 confirmed developed a viable vaccine for use in or suspected cases (2001). One case of inhalation livestock. Effective animal and human vaccines were anthrax was found in a man who made traditional developed in the 1930s and 1960s, respectively. African animal drums (2006). • In 1954, it was recognized that B. anthracis produces • Anthrax can be found globally in temperate zones but toxins, the main reason the host feels sick or dies. it is more often a risk in countries with less standard- • Classified among the highest priority for bioterrorism ized and less effective health programs. Areas at high agents by the CDC (Category A) risk are Central and South America, Southern and Common Human Exposure Routes: Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle East. • Cutaneous anthrax results from the introduction of the spore through a cut or abrasion on the skin. This is Incubation Period: the most common manifestation of naturally occur- • Cutaneous anthrax: usually 5-7 days (range: 1-12 ring infections. days) • Inhalation anthrax develops after anthrax • Inhalation anthrax: usually 1-7 days (in some cases up enter the lungs and germinate. to 42 days) • Gastrointestinal anthrax develops following the con- • Gastrointestinal anthrax: usually 1-6 days sumption of undercooked infected meat. Likelihood of Clinical Disease: Likelihood of Secondary Transmission: • Very high • Extremely low. Few reports of suspected person-to- • Presence of antibodies to B. anthracis without previ- person transmission, all of which have been limited ous clinical disease has been reported. to the cutaneous form of the disease Primary Disease Symptoms: At-Risk Populations: • Cutaneous anthrax: Small painless (often pruritic) • Those performing certain activities, such as papule that quickly enlarges and develops a central butchering or slaughter of infected animals, or the vesicle or bulla that later forms a black scab usually

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with extensive surrounding swelling. Regional lym- • Under circumstances of a bioterrorism threat, phadenopathy and lymphangitis are often present. the need for and potential effectiveness of specific Systemic symptoms, including fever, malaise, and donor screening questions would need to be headache, also may occur. addressed. • Inhalation anthrax: Early symptoms are nonspecific Laboratory Test(s) Available: with myalgia, fever, and malaise. Two to three days later, respiratory symptoms develop (severe dyspnea • No FDA-licensed blood donor screening test exists. and hypoxemia). Shock may occur in the second • Primary approach is direct culture of clinical phase. Hematogenous spread can result in lesions in specimens other organ systems. • An FDA-licensed immunochromatographic diagnos- • Gastrointestinal anthrax: Includes two clinical forms, tic test is available for testing of nonhemolytic Bacil- oropharyngeal and intestinal. The oropharyngeal lus isolates cultured on sheep blood plates. This form consists of edematous lesions in the orophar- can be used for the presumptive identification of ynx, which progress to pseudomembranous necrotic B. anthracis isolates. ulcers. Cervical lymphadenopathy, , and • Other tests include susceptibility to gamma phage fever may be present. In the intestinal form, symp- lysis, real-time PCR assay, a direct fluorescent assay, toms may include fever, nausea and vomiting, anor- and time-resolved fluorescent assay for detection of exia, abdominal pain and tenderness, and progress to B. anthracis-specific antigens. hematemesis and bloody diarrhea. Hemorrhagic ascites may be present. The disease may progress Currently Recommended Donor Deferral Period: to toxemia, cyanosis, shock, and death. Mild cases of • The FDA recommends: gastrointestinal anthrax may present as gastroenteri- ᭺ Current confirmed medical diagnosis of anthrax tis with diarrhea as the only symptom. of any form: Defer until a full course of an appro- Severity of Clinical Disease: priate treatment is completed and the condition is resolved. • Cutaneous anthrax: Severe if not treated with ᭺ Proven bacterial colonization in a well person: Defer until a full course of prophylaxis with an • Inhalation and gastrointestinal anthrax: Severe appropriate is completed. Mortality: ᭺ Presence of a skin lesion suspected to be anthrax: Defer until either the lesion is later shown not to < • Cutaneous anthrax: Mortality rate is 1% with anti- be a result of anthrax or the lesion is confirmed as biotic therapy. Without appropriate therapy, it can be cutaneous anthrax and the person completes a as high as 20% full course of an appropriate treatment and the • Inhalation anthrax: Usually fatal (85% or higher). If condition is resolved. treated early in the course of disease, the mortality rate is lower. During 2001 bioterrorism event, 55% Impact on Blood Availability: responded to antibiotic treatment. • Agent-specific screening question(s): Not applicable; • Gastrointestinal anthrax: Fatality rate is unknown but in response to a bioterrorism threat, impact of a local is estimated to range from 25-60%. deferral would be significant. Chronic Carriage: • Laboratory test(s) available: Not applicable

• None Impact on Blood Safety:

Treatment Available/Efficacious: • Agent-specific screening question(s): Not applicable; • Sensitive to a wide range of antibiotics. Ciprofloxacin, unknown impact in response to a bioterrorism threat , and are FDA approved for the • Laboratory test(s) available: Not applicable treatment of anthrax in adults and children. Leukoreduction Efficacy:

Agent-Specific Screening Question(s): • Unknown • No specific question is in use. Reduction Efficacy for Plasma Derivatives: • Not indicated because of a low incidence of disease, and it is unlikely that persons with symptomatic B. • Specific data indicate that the multiple steps in the anthracis would pass the donor screening fractionation process are robust and capable of inac- questionnaire and physical exam. tivating and/or removing at concentrations • No sensitive or specific question is feasible. that may be present in plasma.

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Other Prevention Measures: 7. Food and Drug Administration. Guidance for industry: recommendations for assessment of donor • None suitability and blood and blood product safety in cases of possible exposure to anthrax. 2002. [cited Suggested Reading: 2009 June]. Available from: http://www.fda.gov/ 1. Beatty ME, Ashford DA, Griffin PM, Tauxe RV, Sobel J. BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceCompliance Gastrointestinal anthrax: review of the literature. Arch RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/Blood/ Intern Med 2003;163:2527-31. ucm076711.htm 2. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 8. Jernigan DB, Raghunathan PL, Bell BP, Brechner R, Summary of notifiable diseases—, 2003. Bresnitz EA, Butler JC, Cetron M, Cohen M, Doyle T, Morb Mortal Wkly Rep MMWR 2005;52:1. Fischer M, Greene C, Griffith KS, Guarner J, Hadler JL, 3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Inhala- Hayslett JA, Meyer R, Petersen LR, Phillips M, Pinner tion anthrax associated with dried animal hides— R, Popovic T, Quinn CP, Reefhuis J, Reissman D, Pennsylvania and New York City, 2006. Morb Mortal Rosenstein N, Gerberding JL, et al. National Anthrax Wkly Rep MMWR 2006;55;280-2. Epidemiologic Investigation Team, Investigation of 4. Christie AB. Anthrax. In: Christie AB. Infectious bioterrorism-related anthrax, United States, 2001: diseases: epidemiology and clinical practice. 3rd epidemiologic findings. Emerg Infect Dis 2002;8: ed. New York: Churchill Livingstone; 1980. p. 703- 1019-28. 21. 9. Olson, K. Aum Shinrikyo: Once and future threat? 5. Demirdag K, Ozden M, Saral Y, Kalkan A, Kilic SS, Emerg Infect Dis 1999;5:513. Ozdarendeli A. Cutaneous anthrax in adults: a review 10. Siristhana T, Brown AE. Anthrax of the gastrointestinal of 25 cases in the eastern Anatolian region of Turkey. tract. Emerging Infectious Diseases 2002;8:649-51. Infection 2003;31:327-30. 6. Dixon TC, Meselson M, Guillemin J, Hanna PC. Anthrax. N Engl J Med 1999;341:815-26.

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