TO TRANSFORM A CULTURE: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE U.S. ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAM, 1970–1985 JAMES MICHAEL YOUNG A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Ph.D. in Leadership and Change Program of Antioch University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy June, 2014 This is to certify that the Dissertation entitled: TO TRANSFORM A CULTURE: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE U.S. ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAM, 1970–1985 prepared by James Michael Young Is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Leadership and Change. Approved by: Carolyn B. Kenny, PhD, Chair date Alan E. Guskin, PhD, Committee Member date Jerome V. Martin, PhD, Committee Member date Brian M. Linn, PhD, External Reader date Copyright 2014 James Michael Young All rights reserved Acknowledgments As anyone who has ever written a dissertation can attest, such a project involves the generous assistance of many contributors. Above all, I could not have accomplished this work without the love and care I received from my wife, Geli. As a former executive editor, her advice and assistance were truly invaluable. Likewise, I am indebted to my son, Adrian Young, a PhD candidate at Princeton University, for his wisdom and guidance. A very special thanks also goes to my dearest friend, Major General Denny Laich, who joined me twice a week for breakfast over many years. Together we explored a number of the topics covered in this narrative. I am eternally grateful to the Army OE community for trusting me with their stories and experiences. Thanks largely to the leadership of Ms. Lynn Herrick, the “matriarch” of the Army OE program, this community has maintained close friendships across four decades. As the humanists they are, they invited me into their extended family and provided me with an enormous quantity of primary source documents. Their stories deserve the attention of a full-length book. Sadly, the confines of a doctoral dissertation precluded me from portraying their experiences. On the west coast, Lynn introduced me to some of the finest human beings I have ever met: Dr. Jerry Eppler (the “soul” of Army OE), Dr. Mel Spehn, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Goodfellow, Lieutenant Colonel Ron Sheffield, Lieutenant Colonel Lee Edwards, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Looram, Lieutenant Colonel Roy Avant, and on the east coast, Ms. Kay Powers and Brigadier General Mick Zais. Lieutenant Colonel Dick Powell and Brigadier General John Johns, as well as Lynn, were a historian’s dream come true. As pack rats, they provided me a treasure trove of primary source documents that proved indispensable in this project. Lynn and her close colleagues also facilitated contact for me i with many former OESOs. I truly appreciated their eagerness to share their experiences with me through correspondence: Colonel John Alexander, Colonel John Williams, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Byard, Colonel Richard Scherberger, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel William Chadwick, Lieutenant Colonel Carol Johnson, Lieutenant Colonel Mitch Kotula, Lieutenant Colonel Brian Ludera, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Perrault, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Richardson, and Lieutenant Colonel Al Wilgus. Lieutenant General Walt Ulmer, Jr. graciously granted me several hours of his time and provided enormous insight in the “client” side of this story. When I told him that his OESOs loved working for him because of his strong support, he replied, “well, why wouldn’t I use them as I would any other weapons system?” General Ulmer also provided me invaluable insight into Colonel Mike Malone (his best friend) and Malone’s collection of writings.1 I am very thankful to Mr. Scott Gower, archivist of Special Collections, National Defense University, for providing me extensive access to the papers of General Bernard Rogers. My hope is that these papers will soon be declassified so that other historians may have access to these remarkable documents. The archivists at the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, were likewise very accommodating in providing me access to Army War College resources. Finally, a special thank you to Colonel Tony Nadal, the “father” of Army OE. As great as your leadership was in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, it was even greater in your efforts to promote OE. You showed us all the enormous difference one person can make in changing an organization. 1. Posted to my web site that is dedicated to the OE program: www.armyoe.com. ii Last but certainly not least is a strong thank you to my dissertation committee. My chair (and fellow humanist) Dr. Carolyn Kenny, Antioch University; Professor emeritus Dr. Alan Guskin, Antioch University; Dr. Jerry Martin, Chief Historian, Strategic Command; and Dr. Brian Macalister Linn, the Ralph R. Thomas Professor in Liberal Arts, Texas A&M University. Please know that I sincerely appreciate your tolerance of a very long dissertation. And thank you for helping me to become a better historian. It is impossible to dedicate this work to any one single individual because, as I reach the age of sixty, I see that it is the culmination of a lifetime of education and experiences. In the process of researching and writing this story, my mind often focused on so many people who have had a transformational impact on my life. So, I would like to dedicate this work: To Dr. Allan R. Millett, and Dr. Williamson Murray—my teachers, my mentors, and my friends—who gave a young ex-infantryman and mediocre undergraduate student the opportunity of a lifetime to join the best graduate program in military history in the nation. To Colonel Steve Knudsen, my boss in the 82nd Airborne Division and 5th Special Forces Group, and Lieutenant Colonel Rob Soeldner, my boss in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Boeselager), the only two transformational leaders I had as commanders during my thirty years in uniform. Thank you for always listening and for giving me the freedom to speak my mind. To Dr. Peggy Arnott, psychologist extraordinaire, of the Chalmers P. Wylie VA Center in Columbus, Ohio. Thank you for guiding me back. To the soldiers of the 384th Military Police Battalion for their professionalism in carrying out a difficult mission at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and especially for making me a better commander and a better human being. iii And to the thousands of soldiers who gave their lives, portions of their bodies, and their minds to the conflict in Afghanistan and in the unjust war in Iraq. Thank you truly for your sacrifices. Most of you deserved better leaders than the ones you had. iv Abstract In the early 1970s, following a decade of social upheaval in the US and a traumatizing military defeat in Vietnam, a group of progressive army officers, armed with recent graduate degrees in the social and behavioral sciences, created a grass roots movement that soon led to the implementation of the largest organizational development program ever conducted. Wartime atrocities and chronic careerism in the Army officer corps, along with President Richard Nixon’s promise to create an All- Volunteer Force (AVF), opened up a window of opportunity for these progressives to promote transformational leadership theories grounded in humanistic psychology. In institutionalizing OD across the Army, these officers attempted to transform the leadership culture throughout the institution. However, various strategies employed to effect cultural change met with strong resistance from an officer corps that rejected the strong humanistic elements that characterized OD in the 1970s. Although institutionalization progressed with strong support from Army Chief of Staff (CSA) General Bernard Rogers, the program proved unsustainable once he vacated his position. By 1980, conservative views of leadership permeated the Army’s school system and its leadership doctrine. Concurrently, OD evolved in its theoretical application and shifted its emphasis from humanistic psychology to open systems. At that point, the Army OE Program was relegated to a far less priority and essentially became a process improvement mechanism. By 1985, a new CSA terminated the program. This is a history of the Army OE Program and the efforts of the progressive officers who implemented it. The electronic version of this Dissertation is at OhioLink ETD Center, www.ohiolink.edu/etd v Table of Contents Preface ............................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter I: The Need for Better Leaders: Vietnam and the Specter of an All-Volunteer Army .................................................. 74 Chapter II: Presenting and Testing New Concepts: The Early Initiatives of Army OE ............................................................................ 158 Chapter III: Growing Pains and Turf Wars: The Weyand Years ................................................................................................. 239 Chapter IV: The Institutionalization of OE: The Rogers Years .................................................................................................. 310 Chapter V: Conclusion: Lost Victories ......................................................................... 381 Glossary ...................................................................................................................... 414 Appendix ..................................................................................................................... 419 Appendix A: US Army Doctrinal Definitions of Leadership .........................................