Does Al-Qaeda Matter for Africa? How Affiliation with Al-Qaeda Influences the Behavior of African Sunni Extremist Groups
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
DOES AL-QAEDA MATTER FOR AFRICA? HOW AFFILIATION WITH AL-QAEDA INFLUENCES THE BEHAVIOR OF AFRICAN SUNNI EXTREMIST GROUPS A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies By Hailey A. Hoffman, B.A. Washington, DC April 12, 2010 Copyright 2010 by Hailey A. Hoffman All Rights Reserved ii DOES AL-QAEDA MATTER FOR AFRICA? HOW AFFILIATION WITH AL-QAEDA INFLUENCES THE BEHAVIOR OF AFRICAN SUNNI EXTREMIST GROUPS Hailey A. Hoffman, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Justine A. Rosenthal, Ph.D. ABSTRACT This paper seeks to investigate the frequently alleged trend that al-Qaeda is growing and becoming more dangerous in Africa. The study uses data from 2004 to 2009 provided by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) on attacks and targeting by African jihadist groups to compare the behavioral trends of those that have joined al- Qaeda and those that have not. The data are interpreted to assess to what extent joining al-Qaeda seems to bring about behavioral changes in African Sunni terrorist organizations. The study finds that membership in the al-Qaeda organization correlates to drastic increases in activity levels and harm caused to victims in Africa. It also finds that groups that join al-Qaeda tend to increase their targeting of Western symbols and assets, although only moderately. From the insights gained through this analysis, the paper offers policy recommendations for the U.S. government. iii This thesis is dedicated to the brilliant students of the Georgetown University Security Studies Program (SSP) Class of 2010 for their counsel and support throughout the course of this project. Many thanks also to the University of Southern California International Relations Program, whose Michael L. Sullivan scholarship helped to make my studies possible. With gratitude, HAILEY A. HOFFMAN iv TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction, Background, and Literature ................................................... 1 1.1 The Hype about al-Qaeda in Africa ............................................................. 1 1.2 Historical Background: How al-Qaeda Evolved in Africa ............................ 7 1.3 African al-Qaeda in the Context of the Global Jihad ................................. 13 1.4 Contribution to Existing Literature ........................................................... 19 2. Terms and Hypotheses ................................................................................. 21 2.1 Definition of Terms .................................................................................. 21 2.2 Hypotheses ............................................................................................... 22 2.3 Justification of Hypotheses ....................................................................... 23 3. Methodology and Data ................................................................................. 25 3.1 Data Sources and Classifications .............................................................. 25 3.2 Means of Organizing and Interpreting Data .............................................. 27 4. Findings ........................................................................................................ 29 4.1 Findings ................................................................................................... 29 4.2 Alternative Explanations ........................................................................... 41 4.3 Limitations of the Available Data ............................................................. 41 5. Policy Recommendations ............................................................................. 44 5.1 Recommendations of Policy Actions for the U.S. Government ................. 44 6. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 50 6.1 Areas for Future Study.............................................................................. 50 6.2 Concluding Remarks ................................................................................ 50 7. Bibliography ................................................................................................. 52 7.1 Primary Data Sources ............................................................................... 52 7.2 Secondary Sources.................................................................................... 52 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Map: Al-Qaeda‘s Key Areas of Operation ............................................. 5 Figure 2. Table: Classification of Groups: Joined vs. Not Joined ........................ 27 Figure 3. Chart: Total Attacks: Joined vs. Not Joined ......................................... 30 Figure 4. Chart: Attacks by Non-al-Qaeda Sunni Groups in Africa .................... 31 Figure 5. Table: Before and After: Quarterly Attacks Committed ....................... 32 Figure 6. Chart: Victims Affected by al-Qaeda Joined Groups ........................... 34 Figure 7. Table: Before and After: Quarterly Victims Affected .......................... 35 Figure 8. Table: Before and After: Efficiency Per Attack ................................... 36 Figure 9. Chart: Victims Affected: Non-al-Qaeda Sunni Groups ........................ 37 Figure 10. Attacks on Western Targets by al-Qaeda Joined Groups .................... 39 vi 1. Introduction, Background, and Literature 1.1 The Hype about al-Qaeda in Africa Despite the well-documented fact that al-Qaeda has been operating in Africa for decades, its seemingly growing presence there has generated a great deal of anxious dialogue in recent years. Indeed, the United States government, other governments around the globe, elite academic institutions, and news media venues have all addressed both al-Qaeda‘s observed expansion on the African continent since 9/11 and its enormous potential for future growth in the region. Many prominent scholars and officials have claimed that Africa‘s al-Qaeda problem is worsening. For instance, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, General William E. Ward, Commander of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), told lawmakers: ―Al-Qaeda increased its influence dramatically across north and east Africa over the past three years with the growth of East Africa Al-Qaeda, al Shabaab, and Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).‖1 This sentiment is not uncommon. Military and intelligence leaders frequently express a fear that Africa‘s vast, weakly-governed spaces and underemployed young male Muslim populations could make much of the continent highly vulnerable to the influence of al- Qaeda. Some analysts believe that the geographic and governance attributes of the region have made it both attractive to jihadists and difficult for African and Western 1 William E. Ward. Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 17, 2009. Available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/March/Ward%2003-17-09.pdf (Accessed February 22, 2010). 1 governments to monitor and address.2 For example, for the Sahel region south of the Maghreb, scholars assess that it could fall prey to al-Qaeda because it is: ―…home to some of the poorest people, institutions are brittle, and the United States has a low profile. The Sahara plays an overriding role, not least because of the southern drift of the Algerian radical Islamist movement and the growing interest of the Wahhabist al Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Berbers movement.‖3 Sparsely populated and lawless regions of Africa, while lacking in the kind of basic infrastructure a modern terrorist organization would want to exploit for high-yield operations, could offer jihadist militants safe haven. Since 9/11, scholars have repeatedly asserted that the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the Maghreb, and other portions of the continent could provide for terrorists and criminals alike many ―convenient bases from where to regroup.‖4 Terrorism expert Bruce Reidel sees North and Central Africa as a sort of ―lawless bazaar‖ where the local governments‘ ―lack of sovereign control and general debility‖ has allowed al-Qaeda to thrive, although he also argues that so far, the group has ―used the region less to foment terrorism than to protect and expand its finances.‖5 Whether exploited for operational or financial ends, the region could pose a serious threat to both local and Western governments. 2 Some argue that ―the weakness of Sahelian states and the ineffective control of their territory have played a major role in the development of the current situation‖ regarding al-Qaeda activities in the region. See: Dario Cristiani and Riccardo Fabiani. ―AQIM Funds Terrorist Operations with Thriving Sahel-Based Kidnapping Industry.‖ Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 4, January 28, 2010. Available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35963&tx_ttnews[backPid]=13&cHa sh=7bda57e997 (Accessed March 13, 2010). 3Patrick M. Cronin, Ed., Global Strategic Assessment 2009: America’s Security Role in a Changing World. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, 2009, p. 307. Available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/19-GSA2009_Chpt%2014.pdf (Accessed February 24, 2010) 4 Rita Abrahamsen. ―A Breeding Ground for Terrorists? Africa & Britain's 'War on Terrorism'.‖ Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 31, No. 102, Agendas, Past & Future (December 2004), pp. 677-684 5 Bruce Reidel. ―Al