USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Issue No. 903, 3 May 2011

Articles & Other Documents:

'Iran Self-Sufficient in Nuclear Fuel Cycle' Al Qaeda No.2 Zawahri most Likely to Succeed Bin Laden 10 Nations Urge New Push for Non-Proliferation Pak Had No Knowledge of US Operation against US Asked to Ratify Nuclear-Free Pacific Osama: FO

Secrets of India‘s Nuke Stocks Out Critics Have Intelligence Services in their Sights

Moscow Keeps Tactical Nuclear Weapons Cuts Issue NASR and Pakistan‘s Nuclear Deterrence – Analysis Low-Key - Russian Senator The Security Implications of Bin Laden's Death Russian, U.S. Military Officials Discuss European Missile Defense in Brussels LUGAR: Next Threat? Counterstrikes with Nukes, Bioweapons Statement on Nuclear Free Zones in Asia and Africa South Asia: Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Strategic US, Romania Announce Plan for Missile Defense Site Risk – Analysis

In Pakistan, an Embarrassed Silence on Killing of Bin Can Plan B Work? Laden AFTER BIN LADEN Dead: Osama's Killing Inside Pakistan Major Embarrassment for Army

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at http://cpc.au.af.mil/ for in-depth information and specific points of contact. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

Press TV – Iran 'Iran Self-Sufficient in Nuclear Fuel Cycle' Sunday, May 01, 2011 Iran has reached self-sufficiency in the nuclear fuel cycle and the production of radioisotopes used in medical treatments, says Deputy Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Mohammad Qannadi. ―Despite the West's sanctions on Iran, Iranian youth and scientists have managed to obtain advanced nuclear technologies...‖ IRNA quoted Qannadi as saying on Sunday. The AEOI official added that Iranian experts have also succeeded in making Iran self-sufficient in the field of producing radioisotopes used in medical treatments and made it unnecessary to import the products by utilizing the available facilities of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Qannadi expressed hope that Iran will also produce industrial isotopes in the next several years, saying there will be no need to import those products to Iran either. In June 2010, the United Nations' Security Council (UNSC) imposed a fourth round of sanctions against Iran, over allegations that the country is pursuing a military nuclear program. Shortly after the UN sanctions, the United States and the European Union imposed unilateral sanctions on Iran's financial and energy sectors, encouraging other countries to abandon investment in the Iranian market. However, Iran rejects the allegations, saying as a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency and a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it has the right to use peaceful nuclear technology. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/177622.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Mainichi Daily News – Japan May 1, 2011 10 Nations Urge New Push for Non-Proliferation BERLIN (AP) -- Japan, Canada, Australia, Germany and six other nations have urged other countries in the international community to renew efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear material. The goal of their initiative is to "work toward achieving nuclear disarmament and a strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime," the foreign ministers of the 10 countries said in a joint statement Saturday. The group said it is urgent to reduce the "danger to humanity posed by the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons" and to achieve tangible results on the path toward a world free of nuclear weapons. The production of fissile material for nuclear weapons should be banned internationally "to curb the risk of future nuclear arms races and reduce the danger of non-state actors getting such material into their hands," the ministers said. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle also told journalists in Berlin that the group agrees that the international treaty banning nuclear tests should be swiftly adopted by all countries. In addition, nuclear weapon states should show greater transparency regarding their arsenal, he said. Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd lamented that one year after the latest review of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, "we have seen very little practical work done." The treaty, which came into force in 1970, is one of the international community's main set of rules regarding nuclear disarmament and the prevention of proliferation. There are 190 states who are party to the treaty, but four nations that are known or believed to possess nuclear weapons -- India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel -- have not endorsed it. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, or CTBT, in turn, has been ratified by 153 nations, but it has not yet taken effect because several key countries -- those listed above and others -- refuse to sign and ratify the treaty. "We call on all states which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT," the ministers in Berlin said. "We believe that an effective end to nuclear testing will enhance and not weaken our national as well as global security and would significantly bolster the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime," the statement added. Finally, the ministers' group stressed the important role played by the U.N.'s nuclear agency, the IAEA, in verifying countries' compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, which should be further strengthened. Japan's foreign minister said he had briefed the group on the progress made in securing the crippled Fukushima Dai- Chi nuclear facility. "In the area of nuclear power, a consensus has been reached to further strengthen safety measures," Takeaki Matsumoto said through a translator. Germany hosted the disarmament talks that were also attended by the foreign ministers from Chile, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United Arab Emirates, Poland and Turkey. Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa stressed the importance of the group of 10 nations stretching across continents and political blocks, saying their joint effort reflects "the importance of this issue that has a direct impact of the future of humanity." The group's next meeting is planned on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly meeting in September. (Mainichi Japan) May 1, 2011 http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/international/news/20110501p2g00m0in050000c.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Sky News – Australia US Asked to Ratify Nuclear-Free Pacific Tuesday May 3, 2011 United States President Barack Obama has called on the US Senate to agree to a nuclear weapons-free zone in the South Pacific. The US is the only nuclear weapons state to have not ratified the Treaty of Rarotonga protocols, because it has until now refused to accept the 'no-nukes' policy promoted by New Zealand. The treaty was signed by eight countries in 1985, after the South Pacific Forum (SPF) supported New Zealand's proposal to create a nuclear weapons-free zone in the region. But though the US signed the protocols in 1996, it has so far refused to ratify them because it refuses to accept any limitation on the right of passage of US nuclear-powered vessels or naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons in the region. Today the US Embassy announced that President Obama had sent the protocols for the South Pacific treaty, and a similar one in Africa, to the US Senate 'for its advice and consent' to ratification. 'The protocols to the treaties, once ratified, will extend the policy of the United States not to use or threaten use of nuclear weapons against regional zone parties that are members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in good standing with their non-proliferation obligations,' the embassy said. The South Pacific was once a major testing ground for nuclear weapons. The US carried out 106 atmospheric and underwater tests, including 24 atmospheric nuclear tests on Australia's Christmas Island, before 1963. The US and UK stopped all testing in the South Pacific after they signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, but France established its own nuclear test site at Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia and conducted a total of 193 tests in the region between 1966 and 1996. In protest against a French decision to ignore an International Court of Justice ruling that it cease testing, New Zealand's third Labour government, led by Norman Kirk, sent two navy frigates, HMNZS Canterbury and Otago, into the test area, carrying Fraser Colman, the minister of immigration and mines. In 1974, the French moved the tests underground. On July 10, 1985, French agents bombed Greenpeace's Rainbow Warrior protest vessel in Auckland, killing Dutch photographer Fernando Pereira. The Rainbow Warrior bombing increased international outrage against nuclear testing in the region and the South Pacific forum negotiated a final treaty text relatively quickly. The Treaty of Rarotonga came into force on December 11, 1986, after eight countries (New Zealand, Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu and Samoa) ratified it. It prohibits the possession or testing of nuclear explosive devices even for peaceful purposes. http://www.skynews.com.au/politics/article.aspx?id=608256&vId= (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Tehelka – India April 30, 2011 Secrets of India’s Nuke Stocks Out Washington report bares India’s nuke holdings, says it is far behind China By Iftikhar Gilani, New Delhi A Washington study on nuclear material security says India is almost at par with Pakistan in terms of nuclear arsenal, but is far behind China, having only a third of the nuclear warheads China has. The report says India is one of the few countries that produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium. It says India‘s nuclear weapon arsenal is based on plutonium while the production of HEU is chiefly intended to fuel a fleet of three to five nuclear submarines. The study basically shows the progress made in reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism since the US-sponsored Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in April last year. It is meant as a status update, halfway to the next summit in 2012. "Pakistan is thought to possess an arsenal of 90-110 nuclear weapons. This number reflects a significant recent increase, as Pakistan is believed to have doubled its nuclear arsenal over several years. Virtually all of its fissile material stockpiles are designated for military use; Islamabad does not have a civilian plutonium programme and its civilian stocks of HEU are estimated at 17 kilos," the report noted. India's nuclear weapon arsenal is estimated to be roughly 80-100 warheads, based on plutonium. It is estimated that 0.5 tons of India‘s plutonium stockpile are weapons-grade, while the remaining 3.5 tons are reactor-grade. China has some 240 nuclear warheads. In terms of fissile material holding, India tops in plutonium in the region, possessing 4 plus/minus 0.65 tonnes as compared to China's 1.8 plus/minus 0.5 tonnes and Pakistan's 100 kilos. India has much lesser HEU, 1.3 plus/minus 0.5 tonnes compared to China's 16 plus/minus 4 tonnes and Pakistan's 2.6 plus/minus 1 tonne. The report refers to China signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the US in January to set up a nuclear centre of excellence and India signing a similar MoU in November last to establish a Nuclear Energy Centre with a nuclear security component in Gurgaon. Estimating that China has some 240 nuclear warheads, the report says ―little is officially known about the status of China‘s nuclear weapons and fissile material stockpiles, which Beijing has never disclosed‖. It, however, noted that China is thought to have stopped producing fissile material for weapons around 1990, but without a formal declaration to date. Pointing out that Beijing's stocks of fissile materials are entirely devoted to military activities, the report says ―this may change in the coming years if China goes ahead with plans to develop a commercial-scale reprocessing plant‖. The report points out that the biggest threat of nuclear material theft comes from Russia, which has the world's largest stockpile of nuclear weapons—770 plus/minus 120 tonnes of HEU and 175.7 tonnes of plutonium—stored in the largest number of buildings and bunkers. An estimated 11,000 nuclear warheads and hundreds of buildings containing nuclear material mean that Russia is central to a broader nuclear security agenda, the report noted. The second largest stockpile is with the US—614 tonnes of HEU, 91.9 tonnes of plutonium and 5,113 nuclear weapons deployed and reserved plus several thousand waiting to be dismantled. The report says the majority of the US fissile material stockpile is designated for military purposes. The US uses 260 tonnes uranium for weapons and reserves 230 tonnes as fuel for naval reactors. While 38.3 tonnes of plutonium is either in weapons or weapons laboratories and the rest has been declared as ‗excess‘ to be disposed off. The nuclear status of some other countries is: UK: 225 nuclear heads, 21.2 tonnes HEU and 92.9 tonnes plutonium; France: 300 nuke heads, 30.9 plus/minus 6 tonnes HEU and 91.9 plus/minus 15 tonnes plutonium; Germany: non- nuke state but with 920 kg HEU and 9.5 tonnes plutonium, 7.5 tonnes of which is stored outside the country; Japan: no nuclear arms, 2,000 kg HEU and 46.1 tonnes of plutonium, 36.1 tonnes of which is stored outside the country. Israel is believed to possess some 80 nuclear weapons, 0.3 tonnes HEU and 0.8 tonnes plutonium. The report notes that these estimates are highly uncertain as the Israel government ―maintains extreme secrecy over every aspect of its nuclear development, from its still-unacknowledged nuclear arsenal to its fissile material stockpiles to its nuclear security arrangements‖. There is no official word on the nuke stockpile in Iran and Iraq. The UAE, , , Jordan, Morocco and Malaysia are believed to have no nuclear material. Iftikhar Gilani is a Special Correspondent with Tehelka.com. http://www.tehelka.com/story_main49.asp?filename=Ws300411DEFENCEII.asp (Return to Articles and Documents List)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency Moscow Keeps Tactical Nuclear Weapons Cuts Issue Low-Key - Russian Senator 30 April 2011 Russia considers the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, which has been actively promoted by the United States, a low-key issue, senior Russian senator Mikhail Margelov said after talks with top U.S. officials in Washington. "Russia's reaction on the prospects for talks on tactical nuclear weapons is, charitably speaking, restrained and cautious," Margelov, who heads the foreign relations committee of the Russian parliament's upper house, said. When ratifying the new strategic arms reduction treaty with Moscow in December 2010, the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution obligating the government to start bilateral talks on cutting the TNW stockpiles - landmines, artillery shells and short-range missiles. Washington says Moscow has a larger number of these systems. President Barack Obama said in a message to the Senate in February his country expects to hold talks with Russia on TNW within a year after the New START arms reduction deal came into force on February 5. Gottemoeller said last week the U.S. Administration was working intensively to secure an agreement with Russia on the reduction of TNW. Moscow has said it is too early to discuss limiting TNW with the United States because Russia needs to see the way the U.S. fulfills its commitments under the New START. Margelov said it was unlikely that there were "even two people who would zealously support the abandonment of tactical nuclear weapons" among the members of the Federation Council's foreign relations or defense and security committees. During his visit to Washington, Margelov met with Ellen Tauscher, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, Rose Gottemoeller, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, as well as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow and Michael McFaul, senior director of Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council. U.S. officials expect Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama to address the issue during their meeting at the G8 summit in Deauville in late May, the Russian senator said. WASHINGTON, April 30 (RIA Novosti) http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110430/163787812.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency Russian, U.S. Military Officials Discuss European Missile Defense in Brussels 2 May 2011 High-ranking Russian and U.S. military officials are meeting at the NATO headquarters in Brussels on Monday to discuss the possibilities for Russian-U.S. cooperation in the creation of the European missile defense network, Russia's envoy to NATO Dmitry Rogozin said. The Russian delegation is headed by Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov, and the U.S. negotiators by James Miller, the principal deputy undersecretary of defense, and Patrick O'Reilly, the head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, Rogozin said. Russia and NATO agreed to cooperate on the so-called Euro missile shield during the Russia-NATO Council summit in Lisbon in November 2010. NATO insists there should be two independent systems that exchange information, while Russia favors a joint system with full-scale interoperability. In late April, Commander of Russian Space Forces Lt. Gen. Oleg Ostapenko outlined Russia's proposals for the future European missile defense network. He said it would be logical and efficient to create a network of "sector" defenses where each member state or group of states would assume responsibility for intercepting and destroying ballistic missiles over assigned territory. Russia is ready to provide a "missile shield" over Eastern Europe, the Black Sea, the Barents Sea and the Baltic Sea, he said, adding that a decision to deploy missile defenses must be coordinated by a joint command center on the basis of information provided by a joint data processing center. Ostapenko also stressed that Russia had no plans to place interceptor missiles outside its territory. Russia has retained staunch opposition to the planned deployment of U.S. missile defense systems near its borders, claiming they would be a security threat. NATO and the United States insist that the shield would defend NATO members against missiles from North Korea and Iran and would not be directed at Russia. BRUSSELS, May 2 (RIA Novosti) http://en.rian.ru/world/20110502/163823201.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The White House Office of the Press Secretary May 2, 2011 Statement on Nuclear Free Zones in Asia and Africa Today the President submitted the Protocols to the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty and the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. This step advances the President‘s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and to the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. Regional nuclear weapon free zone agreements reinforce both the commitment of nations not to pursue nuclear weapons and the nearly 65-year record of their non-use. The protocols to the treaties, once ratified, will extend the policy of the United States not to use or threaten use of nuclear weapons against regional zone parties that are members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in good standing with their non-proliferation obligations. As a next step, the United States will engage parties to the two other regional agreements in force, in Southeast Asia and Central Asia, so that we can sign the protocols to those treaties as soon as possible. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/statement-nuclear-free-zones-asia-and-africa (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Miami Herald Tuesday, May 3, 2011 US, Romania Announce Plan for Missile Defense Site By ALISON MUTLER, BUCHAREST, Romania -- Romania's president said Tuesday his country will host missile interceptors as part of a planned U.S. shield over Europe. Traian Basescu announced that Bucharest had agreed to build the interceptor site at the Deveselu former air base near the Bulgarian border, in a remote agricultural region. Romania already had agreed to host the interceptors, but the location had not been decided. The president, a staunch ally of the U.S., said it would give Romania "the highest security level in its history." Basescu earlier met with U.S. undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher and she traveled to the site, some 125 miles (200 kilometers) southwest of Bucharest. An average of 200 troops will be based at the site, which can host a maximum of 500, Basescu said. The base, which will remain under Romanian command, is a few kilometers (miles) outside Deveselu, a town of about 3,000. He said the site was approved late Monday by the country's Supreme Defense Council. Local officials were informed and gave their agreement, he said. Basescu said the remote base was chosen because it fulfilled all of the 120 requirements needed to guarantee the full security of the system. The Romanian site is part two of a four-part plan that the Obama administration outlined in 2009, when it shelved a Bush administration plan to use long-range interceptors based in Poland to counter a threat from Iran and North Korea. That plan was opposed by Russia, which worried that the system could target Russian warheads or undermine the Kremlin's deterrence strategy. The Obama administration has said its plan - designed to counter the threat of short-to-medium range missiles - would be more effective and able to counter a threat from Iran earlier. But critics have said that the new plan caved in to Russian demands and have doubted whether the administration could build an effective shield in the timetable promised. There was no immediate reaction from Moscow to the announcement in Bucharest. The Czech republic is also negotiating a plan with the United States to place a warning center to gather and analyze information from satellite sensors "to detect missiles aiming at NATO territory," Prime Minister Petr Necas said last year. Defense Ministry spokesman Jan Pejsek said Tuesday the negotiations with the U.S. have not been completed yet and it's not clear when that could happen. The U.S. administration's plan calls for placing land- and sea-based radars and interceptors in several European locations over the next decade and upgrading them over time. As the first part of the plan, the United States in March deployed to the Mediterranean the USS Monterey, a ship equipped to detect and shoot down missiles. Each phase of the four-part plan calls for a more sophisticated and capable interceptor, culminating at the end of the decade with the deployment in Poland of more advanced interceptors that still are in development. Basescu also said that the country's top defense body had approved a U.S. request to use an airport near the Black Sea air base of Mihail Kogalniceanu in eastern Romania for the transiting of troops and equipment to Iraq and and from Iraq to Europe. Romania has about 1,700 troops serving in Afghanistan. Associated Press writers Alina Wolfe-Murray in Bucharest and Desmond Butler in Washington contributed to this report. http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/05/03/2198262/us-romania-announce-missile-defense.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Star – Malaysia Monday May 2, 2011 In Pakistan, an Embarrassed Silence on Killing of Bin Laden By Chris Allbritton and Rebecca Conway ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Pakistan faced enormous embarrassment on Monday after Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Special Forces, raising questions over whether its military and intelligence were too incompetent to catch him themselves or knew all along where he was hiding. The killing of the world's most-wanted man in a house just a few hundred metres from Pakistan's version of the West Point military academy will only fuel suspicions that the country has been playing a double-game over Islamist militants and al Qaeda. Analysts say it would be a stretch to believe Pakistan's spy agency did not know bin Laden was living in a town just a couple of hours up the road from Islamabad: if it did know, the country was essentially caught red-handed shielding him from capture. "There will be a lot of tension between Washington and Islamabad because bin Laden seems to have been living here close to Islamabad," said Imtiaz Gul, a Pakistani security analyst. "This is a serious blow to the credibility of Pakistan." SNARED BEHIND PAKISTAN'S BACK Washington has in the past accused Pakistan of maintaining ties to militants targeting U.S. troops in neighbouring Afghanistan. Relations soured further in recent months over U.S. drone attacks and CIA activities in the country that have fuelled anti-American sentiment. For years, however, Pakistan had maintained it did not know bin Laden's whereabouts, vowing that if Washington had actionable intelligence, its military and security agencies would act on it. In October 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton voiced dismay that bin Laden and other prominent militants had not yet been caught and suggested Pakistani complicity, telling newspaper editors in Lahore she found it "hard to believe that nobody in your government knows where they are and couldn't get them if they really wanted to". Neither Pakistan's spy agency, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), nor its military spokesmen returned repeated calls for comment on Monday. Adding to the silence, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani have said nothing publicly about the operation. Bin Laden was killed in a dramatic night-time raid by U.S. helicopters on his hideout in Abbottabad, home to Pakistan's main military academy. U.S. President Barack Obama, speaking in a hastily announced late-night news conference, said cooperation from Pakistan had helped lead U.S. forces to bin Laden. But American and Pakistani sources familiar with details of the operation said U.S. forces had snared bin Laden virtually behind Pakistan's back. That the mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States was not hiding in mountains along the border but in relative comfort in a town hosting the main military school and home to scores of officers will bolster those who have long argued that Pakistan has been playing a duplicitous hand. "The evidence suggests it was done totally by the Americans, and the Pakistan military, they have been informed at the 11th hour," said Hassan Askari Rizvi, an independent political analyst. "There is distrust between the two intelligence agencies and ... this is very similar to what the Americans did when they fired missiles on Osama's training camps in August 1998." At that time, the United States gave Islamabad just 90 minutes' notice that it would retaliate for two embassy bombings in Africa because it was worried Pakistan would tip off the Afghan Taliban, who in turn could have warned bin Laden. "This operation was conducted by the U.S. forces in accordance with the U.S. policy of hunting down Osama wherever he was supposed to be," said Wajid Shamsul Hasan, Pakistan High Commissioner to Britain, speaking to Sky News. "They successfully eliminated him and subsequently they informed the president of Pakistan this morning of the event." BACKLASH POSSIBLE IN PAKISTAN Just how much the Pakistani military knew of the raid on bin Laden's mansion hideout is not clear. For one thing, analysts say, it would have been difficult for the U.S. Special Forces to act without some logistical military assistance on the ground. It is also possible that Pakistan allowed the operation to go ahead as part of a deal with Washington on its stake in the endgame in Afghanistan, where U.S. troops are due to start withdrawing in July after nearly 10 years of war. But the government and security agencies had one strong reason for staying silent and letting Washington take the credit for the raid: fear of a public backlash for working so closely with the United States to nab a man who has in the past been popular in Pakistan. Hours after the assault, about 200 Islamists held a rally in the city of Quetta in the southwestern province of Baluchistan to condemn the killing of bin Laden. The protesters, from a small Islamist party, chanted "down with America," and "Long live Osama bin Laden". "He was a great holy warrior," said Mufti Kifayatullah, a lawmaker from Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, a hardline Islamic group, said while speaking in the provincial assembly in Peshawar. "Osama was the name of an ideology and an ideology does not die with the death of a person. Today was the blackest day in the history of Pakistan." Popular news anchors with alleged ties to the spy agencies referred on air to bin Laden as a "shaheed", or martyr. And Imran Khan, the cricketer-turned-populist-politician, said Washington should immediately end the war in Afghanistan because Pakistan would pay the price for bin Laden's death. "There will be a backlash from supporters of Osama bin Laden, who will think Pakistan has a role in it, and secondly there will be a pressure from America because of the very fact that he (Laden) was found in Pakistan," he told Geo TV. Additional reporting by Myra MacDonald in London, Augustine Anthony, Zeeshan Haider and Kamran Haider in Islamabad, Gul Yousufzai in Quetta and Faris Ali in Peshawar; Editing by John Chalmers. http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/5/2/worldupdates/2011-05- 02T201257Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC_0_-567150-1&sec=Worldupdates (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Economic Times – India Osama Bin Laden Dead: Osama's Killing Inside Pakistan Major Embarrassment for Army May 2, 2011 Press Trust of India (PTI) ISLAMABAD/NEW YORK: In a major embarrassment for Pakistan's powerful army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani , al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden was killed just yards from a military compound that he visited last month where he had famously claimed that his forces had broken the "terrorist backbone". "The terrorist backbone has been broken and Inshaallah we will soon prevail," Kayani said in his address at a passing out parade at the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul on April 23 in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Incidentally, Osama was today killed in a highly secured compound just 800 yards away from the academy by the US special forces' personnel. Kayani's comments had come days after Admiral Mike Mullen, America's top military official, warned that the ISI's longstanding links with the Haqqani militant network are at the core of Pakistan's strained and problematic relations with the United States. Bin Laden was shot dead in a pre-dawn helicopter-borne razor-sharp operation today in a house just yards from the military academy in Abbottabad town, raising questions whether spy agency ISI knew his whereabouts. The dreaded terror threat was found living in a fortress-like two-storey house, almost next door to Pakistan's Kakul Military Academy, which is home to army's three regiments and far away from remote mountain caves where most intelligence estimates put him in recent years. US authorities had been keeping a watch over the compound since August. ISI's possible knowledge of bin Laden's whereabouts was also raised by a leading US daily. "The killing of Osama bin Laden deep inside Pakistan in an American operation, almost in plain sight in a medium- sized city that hosts numerous Pakistani forces, seems certain to further inflame tensions between the United States and Pakistan and raise significant questions about whether elements of the Pakistani spy agency knew the whereabouts of the leader of Al Qaeda," said. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/osama-bil-laden-dead-osamas-killing-inside-pakistan- major-embarrassment-for-army/articleshow/8145582.cms (Return to Articles and Documents List)

International Business Times Al Qaeda No.2 Zawahri most Likely to Succeed Bin Laden May 2, 2011 Egyptian-born doctor and surgeon Ayman al-Zawahri is al Qaeda's second-in-command expected to succeed Osama bin Laden following his killing in a firefight with U.S.forces in Pakistan. Zawahri has been the brains behind bin Laden and his al Qaeda network, and at times its most public face, repeatedly denouncing the United States and its allies in video messages. In the latest monitored by the SITE Intelligence Group last month, he urged Muslims to fight NATO and American forces in Libya. "I want to direct the attention of our Muslim brothers in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and the rest of the Muslim countries, that if the Americans and the NATO forces enter Libya then their neighbours in Egypt and Tunisia and Algeria and the rest of the Muslim countries should rise up and fight both the mercenaries of Gaddafi and the rest of NATO," Zawahri said. Born into an upper-class family of scholars and doctors in an upscale neighbourhood, the cerebral Egyptian in his late-50s is second after bin Laden on the FBI "most wanted terrorists" list. Both bin laden and Zawahiri eluded capture when U.S.-led forces toppled Afghanistan's Taliban government in late 2001 after al Qaeda's Sept. 11 attacks on U.S. cities. But on Sunday bin Laden was killed in a firefight with U.S. forces and his body was recovered, U.S. President Barack Obama said. There was no word on Zawahri. Bespectacled, with grey hair and a grey beard, Zawahri won prominence in Nov. 2008, when he attacked then U.S. President-elect Obama as a "house Negro," a racially-charged term used by 1960s black American Muslim leader Malcolm X to describe black slaves loyal to white masters. In a subsequent video, in Sept. 2009, Zawahri returned to the attack on Obama, saying he was no different from his predecessor George W. Bush. "America has come with a new deceptive face ... It plants the same dagger as Bush and his predecessors did. Obama has resorted to the policies of his predecessors in lying and selling illusions," said Zawahri, clad in white robe and turban. Like bin Laden, Zawahri has long been thought to be hiding along the rugged Afghan-Pakistan border. The last video of Zawahri and bin Laden together was broadcast by al Jazeera on Sept. 10, 2003. It showed them walking in mountains, calling for jihad and praising the Sept. 11 hijackers. "BRAIN TO THE BODY" Analysts have described Zawahri as al Qaeda's chief organiser and bin Laden's closest mentor. "Ayman is for bin Laden like the brain to the body," said Montasser al-Zayat, a lawyer in Cairo who once represented Zawahri. In a video after the Sept. 11 attacks, Zawahri called them a "great victory" achieved "thanks to God". He has not always been so ebullient. As U.S.-led forces drove out the Taliban in 2001, Afghan sources described him flying into a fury at the nonchalance of Taliban fighters playing badminton behind the front lines while U.S. bombs rained from the skies. Zawahri and bin Laden met in the mid-1980s when both were in the Pakistani city of Peshawar to support guerrillas fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, and worked closely thereafter. But the alliance was not Zawahri's first foray into militancy. Born in 1951, he was the son of a pharmacology professor and grandson of the grand imam of Al Azhar, one of the most important mosques in the Muslim world. He graduated from Egypt's most prestigious medical school in 1974 and did a second degree in surgery. By then he was involved with the Muslim Brotherhood, a non-violent group seeking the creation of a single Islamic state. When the militant Egyptian Islamic Jihad was founded in 1973, he joined. When members posed as soldiers and assassinated President Anwar Sadat in 1981, he was among 301 people arrested He went on trial but was cleared. He did, though, spend three years in jail for having an unlicensed pistol. On his release, Zawahri made his way to Pakistan where he worked with the Red Crescent treating fighters wounded in the Afghan war. Taking over the leadership of Jihad in Egypt in 1993, he was a key figure in a campaign in the mid-1990s to set up a purist Islamic state there, in which more than 1,200 Egyptians died. In 1999, an Egyptian military court sentenced Zawahri to death in absentia. He has also been indicted in connection with the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Days after those bombings, he telephoned a Pakistani reporter, denying responsibility, but urging Muslims to "continue their jihad against the Americans and Jews". An hour later, U.S. cruise missiles hit al Qaeda's Afghan training camps. Both bin Laden and Zawahri escaped injury. Zawahri's wife, Azza, and three daughters were reported killed in a bombing strike on the Afghan city of Kandahar, the stronghold of the Taliban, in early December 2001. Zawahri has appeared regularly in a series of video or audio messages since then, criticising the U.S. war in Iraq, praising the Taliban and the suicide bombers who attack London in 2005 and urging Muslims to help victims of an earthquake in Pakistan. He has occasionally shown he is aware of criticisms by Muslims who dislike the group's indiscriminate violence. "SEIZE A STATE" In a 2005 letter to Iraq al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Zawahri suggested it was time to end beheadings of captives and start acting as more of a political leader in anticipation of the eventual U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. In 2008, Zawahri held an unprecedented question and answer session online with al Qaeda sympathisers who repeatedly questioned him over the group's killings of civilians in Iraq. Zawahri in his responses denied killing innocents, and said that if any died in attacks it was through error or necessity, for example if they were being used as human shields Zawahri has repeatedly called for al Qaeda to seize control of a state, a goal the group has never come close to despite its alliance with Afghanistan's late 1990s Taliban rulers. "Confronting the enemies of Islam and waging a jihad against them require a Muslim authority, established on Muslim territory that raises the banner of jihad and rallies Muslims around it," he wrote in a 2001 essay, Knights Under The Prophet's Banner. "If we do not achieve this goal, our actions will be nothing more than small scale harassment." http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/140123/20110502/al-qaeda-no-2-zawahri-most-likely-to-succeed-bin-laden.htm (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The International News – Pakistan Pak Had No Knowledge of US Operation against Osama: FO Tuesday, May 3, 2011 By Reuters ISLAMABAD: Pakistan on Tuesday denied any prior knowledge of the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden, but said it had been sharing information about the targeted compound with the CIA since 2009. The al Qaeda leader was shot dead by U.S. Special Forces in an attack on a sprawling compound in Abbottabad early on Monday. "Neither any base nor facility inside Pakistan was used by the U.S. forces, nor the Pakistan Army provided any operational or logistic assistance to these operations conducted by the U.S. forces," the foreign ministry said in a lengthy statement. While Islamabad hailed the killing of bin Laden as an important milestone in the fight against terrorism, the statement said Pakistan had expressed "deep concerns" that the operation was carried out without informing it in advance. "This event of unauthorised unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule," the ministry said. According to the statement, U.S. helicopters entered Pakistani airspace by making use of "blind spots" in the radar coverage caused by the hilly terrain surrounding Abbottabad. The foreign ministry said the Pakistani air force scrambled its jets within minutes of being informed of the U.S. operation but there was no engagement with the U.S. forces as they had already left Pakistani airspace. It said Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) spy agency had been sharing information about the compound with the CIA and other friendly intelligence agencies since 2009 and had continued to do so until mid-April. "It is important to highlight that taking advantage of much superior and technological assets, CIA exploited the intelligence leads given by us to identify and reach Osama bin Laden." http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=15085 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Vancouver Sun – Canada Critics Have Intelligence Services in their Sights By Tom Whitehead and Damien McElroy, Daily Telegraph May 3, 2011 The role of Pakistani intelligence services was under intense scrutiny Monday night as experts suggested it was impossible for the country not to have known about Osama bin Laden's hiding place. The world's most wanted man was discovered in a hideout just a few hundred metres from the Pakistan Military Academy, which has been described as Pakistan's "West Point." Abbottabad, a city of one million about 60 km from Islamabad, is home to thousands of soldiers and is under government control. The Pakistani intelligence agencies are normally very adept at sniffing out the presence of foreigners, especially in towns with a heavy military presence. And yet bin Laden had been able to live in the area's largest building, which was "custom built," and with "extraordinary" security for six years without raising any apparent suspicion. Originally secluded along a dirt track, other properties had been allowed to build up around it, providing urban camouflage, and expensive cars were regularly seen driving in and out. It is not the first time the city has been linked to al-Qaida. Earlier this year a senior Indonesian militant, Umar Patek, was arrested there. He had been protected by an al-Qaida operative, a clerk who worked undercover at a post office. The revelations reignited concerns that some factions in Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency may have been helping to shelter the terrorist. The fact that the U.S. did not forewarn the Pakistan authorities in advance of Sunday's raid signalled a lack of trust. Pakistan was only informed of the U.S. operation after it scrambled jets in response to the helicopter attack at the compound. Government and security experts in the U.S. and other western countries said serious questions must now be asked of Pakistan. Pakistan's high commissioner in London, Wajid Shamsul Hasan, admitted that bin Laden may have chosen the city as a "safe haven" but insisted that Islamabad had no idea of his whereabouts until the U.S. operation. U.S. officials expressed increulity that the Pakistani secuity services had failed to ask questions about the one-acre compound, which was eight times the size of any other building nearby and had walls up to five metres high topped with barbed wire. John Brennan, the chief U.S. counter-terrorism adviser, said it was "inconceivable" that he had not received support in the six years he had been at the compound. He said: "People are referring to it [the compound] as hiding in plain sight. We are looking at how he was able to hide there for so long." Richard Ottaway, chairman of Britain's Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), said: "Unfortunately, I am not sure that the government of Pakistan speaks for the whole of Pakistan. It is a divided country with lots of tribal loyalties, and there are clearly internal divisions within Pakistan's security services." Hasan dismissed the suggestion that there was a lack of trust between U.S. and Pakistani security agencies. "The fact that bin Laden has been found in a huge complex in the middle of a military garrison town -rather than in some remote rural area -leads you to wonder how on earth he has been able to live in this place," said Mike Gapes, a former head of the FAC. Nigel Inkster, a former assistant chief of Britain's MI6 security agency, said: "There are questions, obviously, that arise out of this as to whether elements in the Pakistani intelligence community probably judged that it might be better to keep Osama bin Laden safe rather than risk the opprobrium that might attach to being in some way responsible for his death or capture." A former British special forces officer who has worked in Pakistan said that country's military needs sustained terrorism to keep western funding flowing. "We face a kind of Hobson's choice where the military have wanted the insurgency to continue because if the problem goes away so does the funding from America and others, including the U.K.," he said. Khalid Mahmood, chair of Pakistan's parliamentary allparty group on tackling terrorism, said: "If he had been in the mountains of Peshawar, that might have been acceptable, but in a key town in Pakistan, I am amazed that that has been allowed to happen. How is it that they have never found him there?" http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Critics+have+intelligence+services+their+sights/4716659/story.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Eurasia Review – OPINION/Analysis NASR and Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence – Analysis May 2, 2011 By Rabia Akhtar Pakistan has developed a Short Range Surface to Surface Multi Tube Ballistic Missile Hatf IX (NASR) successfully tested on April 19, 2011. NASR, has ―a range of 60 km, carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes.‖ According to the Director General Strategic Plans Division, Lieutenant General (Retired) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai ―the test was a very important milestone in consolidating Pakistan‘s strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum.‖ Besides having a robust ballistic and cruise missile capability, Pakistan now possesses short range ballistic missile capability. How does this translate to Pakistan‘s nuclear deterrence? Does this mean an upgrade of Pakistan‘s credible minimum nuclear deterrence? Or does this mean diluting Pakistan‘s deterrence? Let us analyze these questions in the backdrop of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) and their relationship to nuclear deterrence. TNWs signify a country‘s ambitions to either use these weapons in a preemptive attack on enemy or for battlefield use. But even if a country wants to maintain its defensive deterrence doctrine, TNWs will add to deterrence value if backed by a credible resolve to use only in case its nuclear thresholds are challenged. Pakistan then for example does not need to alter its CMD doctrine because its nuclear thresholds are ambiguous enough for deterrence to operate at both conventional and nuclear levels. Although TNWs have been de-emphasized given their ability to render military operations impossible because of possible contamination, but they possess immense power of de- escalation which can be played to raise the costs of war to induce peace. For Pakistan, the strategic landscape has changed with the introduction of Indian Cold Start doctrine and since conventional warfare between the two armies is not a win-win situation therefore introduction of TNWs at this stage has the potential to enhance existing deterrence without diluting its essence. This signifies that if India pursues its Cold Start doctrine of ‗hot pursuit‘ through conducting ‗surgical strikes‘ inside Pakistan it should do so with full knowledge of Pakistan‘s response options. If India thought that it could limit Pakistani response to Pakistani territory and win the war without crossing the nuclear threshold through Cold Start offensive, then it should think twice now. While we know that rationality is the outcome of deterrence we must remember that ‗irrationality‘ is the twin pillar of deterrence. In fact it is the foundation on which the entire rationale of deterrence stands. It is the thin line that separates a madman from a rational man. It is the threat of sanity button backfiring which actually preserves the sanity on both sides. NASR provides Pakistan the value-added for deterrence which is best described by borrowing Thomas Schelling‘s terminology ―rationality of irrationality.‖ NASR is a continuation of the uncertainty in the mind of enemy about the exact nature of Pakistan‘s response coupled with an ambiguous No No First Use (NNFU) posture which makes Pakistan‘s deterrence effective. Moreover, a weapon that is small and usable possesses more deterrent value than a weapon which is big and has strategic value. After all deterrence is no good if the capability and the will to use the weapon is not exhibited. Pakistan is doing both to preserve strategic balance which keeps shifting in favor of India given doctrine like the Cold Start and the possibility of India renewing nuclear testing. There is no doubt that South Asia today stands on the slippery slope of deterrence to actual use. Pakistan‘s nuclear deterrence rests on clarity of its threat, the credibility of its response, the restraint that it suggests and the rationality it expects from its enemy. The response choices Pakistan has opted for limits the choices available for India. There is however no unilateral outcome of the nuclear game. Even though both Pakistan and India think they are playing rationally, both will end up worse in case deterrence fails with or without TNWs. For the critics of NASR and Pakistan‘s dynamic nuclear posturing, attention should be focused on reducing the circumstances under which Pakistan will have to contemplate use of tactical nukes rather than criticizing the tools it might deploy to deal with those circumstances. In the interest to preserve regional and international security it is paramount that India should be asked to restrain its conventional and nuclear ambitions both of which directly impinge on Pakistan‘s national security. Author is a PhD candidate in Security Studies Department, Kansas State University, USA. http://www.eurasiareview.com/nasr-and-pakistans-nuclear-deterrence-analysis-02052011/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) OPINION/Analysis The Security Implications of Bin Laden's Death By Mr. Riad Kahwaji, CEO, INEGMA, & Dr. Theodore Karasik, Director R&D, INEGMA May 02, 2011 The announcement of the death of Al-Qaeda spiritual leader Osama Bin Laden on May 2, 2011 by U.S. Special Operations forces is a major moral victory for the United States and her allies fighting against terrorism. A momentary expression of relief is reasonable and a chapter closed. However a new chapter is opening that raises many questions about the near future in terms of al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization and the impact on the Middle East and the Gulf States in particular. Al-Qaeda‘s decentralized organization emerged in the mid-2000s with the emergence of three main franchise operations: al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers (Iraq). These groups operate on their own with what appears to be very little guidance from Bin Laden or his close associates in Pakistan (known as al-Qaeda Central). The strategy featured a ―transference policy‖ where the franchises developed unique ways to target Western assets through innovative ways by looking for key legal and security loopholes (the 2011 cargo explosives episode comes to mind). The decentralization was also a boost to recruitment efforts for local affiliates who were able to bring in volunteers that fell outside of Western counterterrorism operations. Significantly there is the question of the role Bin Laden played recently in al-Qaeda management from Al-Qaeda Central. Some argued that the al-Qaeda leader was under so much pressure from foreign intelligence services who were hunting for him that Bin Laden was unable to communicate and was hiding ―in a cave.‖ Others asserted that Bin Laden still delivered messages to his operators not only in Pakistan but also to al-Qaeda franchises when necessary regarding finances, operations, and recruitment. The fact that Bin Laden was killed along with two couriers testifies to his means of communications. Who are the possible successors in the wake of Bin Laden‘s death? First and foremost is Ayman Zawahiri, the Egyptian confidant of the now deceased al-Qaeda leader. While Bin Laden was a charismatic leader providing ideological justification for al-Qaeda‘s program, Zawahiri is a strategist and organizer. In the 2001 booklet, ―Knights Under the Prophet's Banner,‖ Zawahiri developed a long-term strategy for the violent Salafist jihadi movement — to inflict ―as many casualties as possible‖ on the Americans, while trying to establish control in ―a nation‖ as a base "to launch the battle to restore the holy caliphate" of Islamic rule across the Muslim world. More telling, however, is that perhaps al-Qaeda may turn to someone unknown in order to safeguard the organization from their leadership from being decapitated. Omar bin Laden, Osama‘s son, commented that the next generation is more vicious and seeks more violence to achieve their goals. Who these individuals are remains to be seen and may possibly be an individual that is more mysterious than public. Or, al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula may take the helm of the organization because they have leadership, ideology, training, and media capabilities. Anwar al- Awlaki is the key al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula leader who can fill Osama Bin Laden‘s position as a spiritual leader and a driving force to organize, train, and recruit new violent jihadis and take up where Bin Laden left off. Al- Awlaki is one of the few al-Qaeda leaders who possess Bin Laden‘s ability to unite individuals in violent jihad through his dynamic charisma and his ability to speak. Al-Awlaki is also a driver to building a powerful support base among Yemeni tribes, even marrying into local tribes, which complicates the situation in today‘s Yemen under revolt. Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, the leader of AQIM is also a possible leader. Besides attacks on Algerian targets and spreading chaos across North Africa chiefly in and running smuggling operations throughout Western Africa, AQIM issued a statement on February 24, 2011 calling all Muslims to support the revolt against Gaddafi in order to install an Islamic regime thereby echoing Zawahiri. The regional implications of Bin Laden‘s death are multifold. First and foremost is that the group will launch attacks on American and or Western interests in the Middle East. It is rumored that al-Qaeda had in place plans to launch retribution operations in the event of Bin Laden‘s demise; ever since . Now that this fact is a reality, those plans may be dusted off and implemented. And they can take a number of forms; from a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) to a Mumbai style attack. There are other variants including attacks on American businesses or tourists. Violent Jihadist chat rooms are today alive with the threat of vengeance for Bin Laden‘s death and the possibility of lone-wolf operations cannot be ruled out. These threats are not only present in the Middle East but also on the Arabian Peninsula. A second implication to watch out for is the impact on the so-called Arab Spring – which refers to a series of public revolts across the Arab world. While al-Qaeda‘s narrative has been sidelined most of the year, there are comments by al-Qaeda leaders regarding the revolts particularly in Egypt and Libya. In April 2011, al-Zawahiri celebrated the overthrow of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Al-Zawahiri called upon Muslims to fight both ―the mercenaries of Qaddafi and the rest of NATO‖ should NATO intervene in Libya. If al-Qaeda tries to slip into and manipulate the revolt this could have dramatic consequences within and surrounding key countries in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Particularly worrying is how Yemeni President Saleh will react. Saleh will likely use Bin Laden‘s death as an excuse to stay in power longer because he will likely argue that he needs to remain in charge to help squash any attempts by al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula from gaining more ground and expanding operations. The main lessons learned from the events of May 2, 2011::  Al-Qaeda leaders are very elusive and could be living in safe areas hundreds of miles from the warfront, as was with the case of Bin Laden who was killed in a recently-built compound just 50 kilometers from the Pakistani capital Islamabad.  Nothing is as effective as intelligence-style operations in the war on terrorism. Keeping just very few people aware of the operation was a key for its success. As the newly appointed director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), General David Patraeus, the war on terrorism will be fought by intelligence officers.  The Pakistanis had an important role to play diplomatically and in intelligence-sharing. Despite the Pakistani denial of knowledge about the operation, it would be hard to believe that in a very militarized country like Pakistan which is always on alert for possible military threats from India, its radars failed to see the U.S. helicopters flying in and out of the country ferrying the commandos to a compound 50 kilometers away from the capital. It could be that only a limited number of well-trusted Pakistani officials were aware of this operation in order to ensure the safe-passage of the U.S. commandos unit in and out of the country.  Killing Bin Laden in the heart of Pakistan proved the level of cooperation Al-Qaeda and Taliban have with elements of the Pakistani security and intelligence agencies. This will place Pakistani military and security forces under further international pressure to do more in combating terrorism.  The war on terror is open-ended and without limits on place and time. It took ten years to get Bin Laden and would likely take more than that to get his colleagues in terror. It will not be long before the world realizes that Al-Qaeda terror did not end with the death of Bin Laden. Al-Qaeda is now a decentralized organization united by a radical ideology. Hence this movement will die when no more people support or uphold this ideology. Maybe the Arab Spring, which is helping Arab citizens regain their long-lost dignity - with the collapse of dictatorships and rise of free and democratic governments – will help eradicate Al- Qaeda‘s radical ideology that used to find sympathy and support within oppressed societies. If so, the death of Bin Laden combined with the successful transition of the Arab Spring might be the beginning of the end for Al-Qaeda. But for now, the war on terror is still on and it could be some time before it is over. http://www.inegma.com/?navigation=reports (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Washington Times OPINION LUGAR: Next Threat? Counterstrikes with Nukes, Bioweapons WMDs al Qaeda’s leader’s top priority By Sen. Richard G. Lugar, the Washington Times Monday, May 2, 2011 The attack on Osama bin Laden is a magnificent triumph for American intelligence and for the men and women of our military who planned and carried out this daring operation. It is a testament to the persistence and training of our forces and demonstrates to the world that the arm of American justice is long. This is a victory not only for the United States, but for all those who have been victims of al Qaeda's terror over the years. This terrorism has claimed the lives of far more Muslims than Americans around the world. Our war is not against Islam; it is against a tiny faction of murderous extremists. This important achievement is not the end of the war. We must remain vigilant and continue to press to eliminate al Qaeda cells. Bin Laden was a major inspiration for the hatred of Americans, but that venom is still held by others. Everyone in al Qaeda personally swore allegiance to him, so this is a major blow to al Qaeda. I am hopeful there may be upheavals in the organization we can exploit. We also must be alert for a counterattack or revenge operation. Al Qaeda has decentralized over the years and has spawned independent terrorist cells with no direct operational links to the organization itself. There is a risk that some bin Laden-inspired group may try to lash out in dramatic fashion. The most dramatic, of course, would be the detonation of a nuclear device or some other weapon of mass destruction. More than 10 years ago, bin Laden declared, "Acquiring nuclear and chemical weapons is a religious duty." Our top military leaders have said that the biggest threat to U.S. security, both short-term and long-term, would be the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon. So far, experts believe al Qaeda has been unsuccessful in its efforts to acquire nuclear material or a working nuclear device, and its few crude attempts at using chemical or biological agents have been ineffectual. That does not mean we should let down our guard. The United States should continue with the Nunn-Lugar program, which conducts an ongoing effort to eliminate nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in Russia, the other former Soviet states and other countries where they are discovered. In recent years, for instance, Nunn-Lugar helped eliminate a Soviet-era chemical-weapons cache discovered in Albania, and after Libya's Col. Moammar Gadhafi agreed to give up his incipient nuclear-weapons program in 2004, an analogous operation helped secure the nuclear material and safely transport it to the United States, out of harm's way. We also should step up our efforts to contain and control biological weapons and dangerous pathogens, particularly in Africa. That's because Africa has a unique combination of naturally occurring dangerous diseases, poorly secured laboratories and research centers where those pathogens are collected for public health study, and simmering Islamist terrorist activity that thrives in the region's many poorly governed spaces. If misused, this material can be turned against targets anywhere in the world, converted into horrible weapons much more easily than nuclear material. Few terrorists may have the technical expertise of bioweaponeers in the old Soviet Union, but even crude methods can produce terror and chaos with random outbreaks of deadly diseases. Our nation's capital already has been the target of one bioweapons attack. The anthrax spores mailed in late 2001 to Washington's Hart Senate Office Building and elsewhere killed five people, infected 17 others and disrupted the Capitol complex for three months. I have highlighted the bioterrorism threat from Africa and worked to increase cooperation between our experts and the African countries. Important steps already have been made by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the U.S. Army Medical Research Units, which have established good working relationships in a number of countries. The next key step is to address the security problems at the laboratories through the Nunn-Lugar program. Our military and intelligence personnel deserve high praise for killing bin Laden, but the fact that it took nearly 10 years illustrates the difficulty in containing and capturing individual terrorists. That makes it all the more important that we do everything we can to deprive terrorists of access to deadly materials that could be used to carry out a devastating attack in the United States. Sen. Richard G. Lugar is the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/may/2/next-threat-counterstrikes-with-nukes-bioweapons/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) – Singapore OPINION/Analysis South Asia: Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Risk – Analysis May 3, 2011 Synopsis: Pakistan‘s testing of a tactical ballistic missile lowers the nuclear threshold in the antagonistic India-Pakistan relationship. A symmetrical response from India will aggravate the situation rather than enhance its security. By Rajesh Basrur Commentary: ON 19 APRIL 2011, Pakistan successfully tested the Nasr (Hatf-IX) short-range ballistic missile. With a range of 60 km, the missile is a tactical weapon designed for ―warfighting‖ or battlefield use. This development threatens to destabilise the strategic relationship between India and Pakistan. Though both countries conducted low-yield tests appropriate for tactical weapons in 1998, neither showed interest in tactical weapons at the time. Indian strategic experts, some of whom have already advocated the development of tactical weapons as part of a ―flexible response‖ strategy, will inevitably press for a symmetrical capability. That is not a good idea. Intents and Outcomes The testing of the Nasr represents one more step in an on-going action-reaction process that is built on the tussle over Kashmir. Sheltered by nuclear deterrence, Pakistan has been able to pressurise India by backing groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba that have carried out violent attacks against Indian targets. Hamstrung by the risk of escalation involved in a conventional military response, India in turn has tried to carve out strategic space for a suitable riposte. Threats to launch limited strikes or to go to war came to a head following a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. But the military mobilisation that followed under Operation Parakram was slow and cumbersome, brought a like response from Pakistani forces, and ultimately failed to stop the flow of terrorists from across the border. The Indian Army then began developing the so-called ―Cold Start‖ strategy, which envisages rapid forward movement of compact, highly mobile forces to occupy small slices of enemy territory to obtain a bargaining advantage. Pakistan‘s response has been to threaten tactical nuclear attacks against Indian forces. In theory, the use of tactical nuclear weapons is designed to minimise the scope for escalation to a larger war involving a major nuclear exchange. But rational intent does not necessarily produce rational outcomes. Lower Nuclear Threshold The advent of tactical nuclear weapons to South Asia lowers the nuclear threshold in the event fighting breaks out. Though nuclear weapons are generally considered ―unusable‖ because of their horrific effects, small weapons designed for battlefield use are inherently more usable than big ones because their destructive capacities are relatively limited and because they target military assets rather than population centres. In addition, tactical weapons are less amenable to centralised command and control – the decision to use them has to be delegated early to obviate the risk of communication failure in the midst of combat. Local commanders may be tempted to resort to tactical nuclear weapons in adverse situations where they come to believe they have to ―use them or lose them‖. Avoiding escalation is difficult because the mere presence of nuclear weapons complicates decision-making enormously. In the India-Pakistan context, the distinction between tactical and strategic weapons is blurred by the short distances involved. The Nasr may be designed for use against military targets, but Amritsar, with a population of over a million, is only 28 km from the Pakistan border and falls well within its range. From the Indian perspective, it has to be assumed that the city would be vulnerable to a nuclear attack in the event fighting breaks out. This will compel India to place its nuclear weapons on high alert if conflict breaks out. Moreover, once fighting has begun, Indian conventional attacks against Pakistan‘s conventional targets may inadvertently threaten or destroy its nuclear assets, including command and control systems, thereby triggering a nuclear response. All of this applies even if India does not respond to the Nasr by producing and deploying its own tactical weapons. If it does develop its own tactical weapons, the risks will be multiplied. Finally, once the critical nuclear threshold has been crossed, there is every possibility that escalation will be hard to stop in the heat and confusion of conflict. We must bear in mind that war involving nuclear weapons has never been fought and that if it is, it is likely to involve a succession of events on scales of time and destruction that are unprecedented and qualitatively different from human experience thus far. Nuclear Self-deterrence It could be argued that the Pakistani threat to initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons will be self-deterred. After all, the nuclear detonations that occur – even if limited – will be either within Pakistan‘s territory or so close to it that the fallout will likely affect its own population. This again assumes a logical, rational process and does not account for non-rational outcomes that inevitably accompany the fog of war, when information and control are limited and human responses under pressure are unpredictable. Conceivably, localised combat can be contained over a considerable period of time in a nuclearised environment. In 1969, Soviet and Chinese forces engaged in limited fighting for several months even as their nuclear forces remained poised for use. The Kargil conflict in 1999 was even less portentous in this respect as combat was restricted to a relatively small area along the Line of Control that divides the two armies. Nonetheless, the emerging strategic landscape must give us pause; it blurs the boundaries between nuclear and conventional weapons and shifts the centre of gravity of decision-making from the central to the local. It may still be possible to avoid escalation, but one can hardly wager the lives of millions on it. The Larger Issue The larger issue is about India‘s appropriate response to Pakistan‘s irredentism. Clearly, military responses are burdened by excessive risk. India needs neither tactical nuclear weapons nor Cold Start-type offensive strategies. It makes more sense to sustain the dialogue currently under way and, for what it is worth, try and engage the Pakistani military, which remains the ultimate arbiter of the country‘s politics. After all, the military was on board the impending Manmohan-Musharraf breakthrough of 2007 before the Pakistani President‘s plummeting political fortunes brought the process to an abrupt halt. Failing this, India needs to continue to strengthen its domestic defences, which were sorely exposed by the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and persist with negotiations. Confidence building measures to deploy ballistic and cruise missiles away from the border must be given priority. Rajesh Basrur is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, where he coordinates the South Asia Program. http://www.eurasiareview.com/south-asia-tactical-nuclear-weapons-and-strategic-risk-analysis-03052011/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The News International – Pakistan OPINION Can Plan B Work? By Dr Maleeha Lodhi Tuesday, May 03, 2011 The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK. Faced with a stalemate in negotiations for a treaty banning the production of bomb making nuclear material, Western nations led by the United States are now contemplating taking these talks outside the Conference on Disarmament (CD). This would be a risky course to take and with little guarantee of success. The United Nation‘s CD in Geneva is the world‘s sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and it is in this 65-nation forum where discussions on major treaties including the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty were successfully concluded. The latest indication of such a move has come from a well-informed New York Times editorial titled ‗Time for Plan B‘. The 21 April editorial lamented that the effort to negotiate a Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT) in the CD was getting nowhere due to Pakistan‘s opposition and urged the need for ‗a new approach‘. It pointed to discussions the Obama Administration had started with Britain, France and others on negotiating a ban outside the CD. Citing the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the 1997 Landmine Treaty as precedents to take talks out of the conference, it endorsed following a similar course for a fissile material ban. This is not the first signpost to consideration of such plans. In her speech to the CD in late February, US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton warned that if the deadlock continued ―then the US is determined to pursue other options‖. This was followed by the UN Secretary General‘s statement that any negotiations outside the UN would undermine the CD and its objectives. But that doesn‘t rule out such actions in the future. Modest efforts to test the ground in this regard have been taken by Ban ki Moon himself. Last year he convened a high level meeting on the FMCT in New York to mobilise a consensus outside the CD. This did not make much headway. Then in February this year Australia and Japan convened an ‗Experts Side Event on FMCT Definitions‘ in Geneva to initiate informal discussions on aspects of the treaty. China and several other countries stayed away on the grounds that the event lacked wider, more relevant participation. Pakistan did not participate and criticised the event as an initiative to ―undermine the CD‖, while other countries including India and Iran made it clear they regarded the proceedings as non-binding and as neither a negotiation nor a pre-negotiation. The outcome of these decidedly more modest efforts says something about the viability of a Plan B on the FMCT. Whether the thinly veiled threats to take negotiations ‗elsewhere‘ is a way to intensify pressure on Pakistan and try to isolate it or an alternative path that is being explored, it represents a deeply flawed approach that will be counter- functional to Washington‘s own objectives. This is so for many reasons. First, the so-called precedent of negotiations on Cluster Munitions, Landmines or an Arms Trade Treaty – concluded outside the UN – is misleading, even spurious. These negotiations entailed groups of like-minded nations coming together to curb the kind of armaments that most countries can easily manufacture. So assembling the largest number of countries made sense even if the US, Russia and China are still not a party to these agreements. The aim of the FMCT is to end fissile material production by the nuclear weapon states. The treaty would be meaningful only if all eight nuclear weapon powers (P5 plus the three non-NPT countries) are a part of it. Nations that have signed on to the NPT are already committed to the FMCT in practical terms. But if Pakistan or any of the other non-NPT nuclear states stay out of negotiations the very objective of an FMCT is defeated. This is also because the US, France, Britain and Russia have already suspended fissile material production while China has an undeclared moratorium. Without Pakistan, India and Israel may also stay away from any parallel process. This will increase the likelihood of China and Russia also keeping out and if Iran and North Korea don‘t join either, the negotiations will turn out to be worthless. Shifting negotiations to another venue would also set a precedent for taking other CD core agenda items outside the UN. Apart from the FMCT, the CD‘s present agenda includes a Nuclear Disarmament Convention, Negative Security Assurances for non-nuclear states and Prevention of an Arm Race in Outer Space. The US and its allies are blocking serious talks on all three issues in the CD. Threats to bypass the CD on the FMCT can also lead to efforts by other nations to take any of these core agenda items to parallel forums. Moreover any attempt to transfer the FMCT negotiations to another forum would leave the UN‘s disarmament machinery permanently damaged, quite apart from denuding that effort of the legitimacy and credibility that only a UN process confers. Behind the rhetoric of pursuing ‗other options‘ lurk many uncertainties. The US and its allies cannot be sure they will be able to control the proceedings in a parallel process that will not have the consensus rule to protect their interests. Open-ended discussions in an alternative venue might become difficult to manage. Nor is there, as yet, any clarity or agreement on what mechanism would be a viable alternative to the CD. For these reasons, efforts to find ‗other options‘ have fizzled out before. The answer to the present impasse in the CD is not to circumvent the established and legitimate multilateral disarmament process but insure that the FMCT negotiations take into account the security concerns of all states and not just the priorities of the powerful few. The problem does not lie in the CD‘s rule of consensus that is being singled out for criticism by some Western nations. It lies squarely in the ongoing effort to push through a proposed treaty that undermines the security of a member state – Pakistan. Whether negotiations proceed inside the CD or outside, in its present form the FMCT is unacceptable to Pakistan, which will continue to press its objections against what it sees as a discriminatory instrument. Since talks on the FMCT resumed in 2009, Pakistan‘s envoy to the UN in Geneva, Zamir Akram, has vigorously articulated the country‘s reservations about a treaty that aims only at prohibiting future fissile material production. Without the treaty taking into account the asymmetry in existing fissile material stocks the imbalance between Pakistan and India would be frozen, leaving Pakistan at a permanent strategic disadvantage. As currently envisaged the FMCT obliges Pakistan to accept a limit on its deterrent capability, which does not apply to India because of the preferential treatment it has received. As a series of meetings of Pakistan‘s National Command Authority have signalled, the West‘s nuclear exceptionalism for India and the special treatment it has been accorded by the Nuclear Supplies Group will further accentuate the asymmetry in fissile material stockpiles to the detriment of Pakistan‘s security interests. With India having been provided the means to escape the ban on additions to fissile material stocks – by the assured supply of civilian nuclear fuel that frees up its domestic production to be diverted for weapons use – the treaty as currently configured would place Pakistan at an enduring strategic disadvantage. Unless Pakistan‘s legitimate security concerns are addressed and a level nuclear playing field created any expectation that Islamabad will yield to pressure or efforts at diplomatic isolation will not materialise. Countries sign up to international agreements when their fundamental interests are accommodated and treaties accord non- discriminatory treatment to its signatories. This is the ineluctable principle that forms the basis of all arms control or disarmament instruments and that guides the negotiating behaviour of states, big or small, strong or vulnerable. Pakistan is likely to agree only to a treaty predicated on the principle of equal and undiminished security of all states. http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=44824&Cat=9&dt=5/3/2011 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Foreign Policy Research Institute – Philadelphia, PA OPINION/Analysis May 2011 AFTER BIN LADEN By Barak Mendelsohn Barak Mendelsohn is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Haverford College. Osama bin Laden‘s death is a devastating blow to al-Qaeda, but it is not the end of jihadi terrorism. While it is demoralizing for the whole jihadi camp, it will not eliminate the motivation to attack the U.S. and is likely to trigger revenge attacks. But from strategic point of view the death of bin Laden could mark a critical junction in the process of demilitarizing the war on terrorism and the beginning of the end for U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda will survive bin Laden‘s death. Al-Qaeda and jihadism will continue not merely because bin Laden‘s legacy will keep feeding jihadi terrorism, but because the jihadis‘ radical interpretation of Islam still resonates with some Muslims. But bin Laden‘s importance for al-Qaeda and the adverse effects his death will have on the group, cannot be overstated. His unique centrality is unlikely to be replicated by any of his potential successors. Although his operational role greatly diminished since 9/11, bin Laden was the embodiment of al-Qaeda. He devised the group‘s strategy, and was a strong symbol of resistance. Beyond successful tactical measures to preserve the group and American strategic missteps, it was the power of bin Laden‘s charisma that allowed al-Qaeda to survive tremendous losses after 9/11 and become a brand name that attracted individuals and other jihadi groups. Paradoxically, bin Laden was simultaneously the power behind al-Qaeda‘s ascendance and a major cause for its decline. During the 1990s, at a time when jihadis‘ confrontations with the ‗close enemy‘ regimes in Egypt and Algeria failed, bin Laden offered an alternative course of action. By attacking the U.S., he triggered a momentous set of events, and positioned himself and al-Qaeda at the forefront of the jihadi camp. But bin Laden was also an inept strategist. His strategy was based on extremely unrealistic expectations that the U.S. will quickly crumble, and that the Muslim masses will hurry to join al-Qaeda‘s ranks. Bin Laden‘s fantasy plan, which promised to solve the problems of the umma, cost the lives of many innocent people as he encouraged numerous young Muslims to engage in an orgy of violence, often massacring co-religionists in the name of God. But bin Laden‘s strategy did not bring the anticipated fruits and failed to recreate a Caliphate or bring down even one single Arab ruler. Instead, in his last days alive, the Muslim youth bin Laden was counting on were demonstrating throughout the Middle East, calling for democratic reforms which he saw as signs of infidelity. His silence since the Arab Spring started was deafening. Bin Laden‘s leadership style magnified al-Qaeda problems. Bin Laden was a benign authoritarian: while maintaining an above the fray image, and a holy-like demeanor, bin Laden mastered the skills to quietly suppress internal opposition. He kept the organization relatively cohesive even as its operation became increasingly diffused in response to the heavy international pressure. After 9/11 bin Laden even succeeded in bringing critics such as abu Musab al-Suri to close ranks behind him. However, his strategy pushed al-Qaeda over the brink and its grave mistakes (primarily the killing of Muslim civilians) slowly fractured bin Laden‘s image. People who once were close associates started criticizing him publicly. And yet bin Laden maintained his unique position inside the jihadi universe and far beyond. Others may prove to be better strategists but no individual, including his lieutenant al-Zawahiri, possesses similar aura of invincibility and appeal among Muslims. Whoever succeeds bin Laden will find that for his sympathizers throughout the world bin Laden the leader can only be replaced by bin Laden the myth and the symbol. Terrorism will endure but strategic objectives will become even harder to achieve. His successor will have to struggle with difficult problems bin Laden managed to postpone due to his stature and allure. Prominent among these issues will be how to maintain al-Qaeda‘s anti-American and anti-Western narrative. Revenge may prove a useful way to motivate al-Qaeda members and sympathizers to continue bin Laden‘s plans and attack the U.S. and its allies, but without a compelling strategic vision that will tie such attacks to strategic change, the appeal of such a campaign will be short lived. The need to preserve the broader al-Qaeda network will confound the challenges of bin Laden‘s replacement. Franchises that swore allegiance to bin Laden himself may not accept the authority of his successor. Even if they chose to remain part of al-Qaeda outwardly, the inclination of most franchises to focus on local conflicts is likely to increase, though Western targets in the franchises‘ theater of responsibility will probably retain their preferred status. At the same time, the leadership of al-Qaeda‘s branch in the Arabian Peninsula, which in the past couple of years, eclipsed the central organization, may even present a direct challenge to the leadership in South Asia in the post-bin Laden era. Combining the operational opportunity due to the unrest in Yemen, presence near the birthplace of Islam, and an intimate relationship with the dead leader, the leaders of this branch could vie for leadership of the jihadi movement. As events in the Middle East highlight the weakness of its ‗far enemy‘ strategy, al-Qaeda will be pressed to produce a much more compelling reaction than its spokesmen, al-Zawahiri, abu Yahya al-Libi and Atiyatallah, have offered so far. The new al-Qaeda leader will not have the privileges bin Laden enjoyed and he will face much more pointed critique if he does not provide a strategic direction for the group. With regimes collapsing throughout the Middle East, even the greatest supporters of al-Qaeda will feel inclined to focus on events back home and abandon global jihad. Examples from Libya and Egypt suggest that some jihadis may even abandon local jihads altogether and seek reintegration into their societies. As a result, al-Qaeda may end up largely irrelevant to setting the future of the Middle East. Moreover, it could end up increasingly dependent on Western recruits -- many of whom are ignorant about Islam -- for continuing its anti-Western agenda. Such developments, albeit still gravely threatening to Western countries, will push al-Qaeda further away from its Islamic roots and from the areas it is mostly concerned with, the states of the Middle East. While the strategic threat from al-Qaeda will probably decline, the motivation for revenge attacks by groups and individuals in the West will be at its highest level. Lone terrorists and ―homegrown‖ cells in particular will seek to avenge bin Laden, and they will be even less discriminate in their killings. In addition, al-Qaeda affiliates throughout the Middle East will want to demonstrate their sympathy by carrying out attacks in memory of bin Laden. Pakistan will probably suffer (as always) the greatest carnage as multiple local jihadi groups will seek to take revenge against the Pakistani state and its citizens. Over the long run, the prospects of ending U.S. intervention in Afghanistan have increased considerably. Bin Laden‘s death provides the U.S. an opportunity to declare victory and start withdrawing from the country. The Afghan Taliban, on the other hand, will find that bin Laden‘s death released them from a great liability and could make it easier for them to severe their links with al-Qaeda; after all the Taliban have much greater interest in regaining control over Afghanistan than waging a global jihad. If both sides will take advantage of the opportunity to wind down the war in Afghanistan, bin Laden‘s death will mark a stepping stone in demilitarizing the global war on terrorism and toward dealing with terrorism through intelligence and police work. http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201105.fpri.binladen.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)