sign in sign up
<<
Home , Rashi

CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD APOSTATES IN TOSAFIST LITERATURE, LATE TWELFTH–EARLY THIRTEENTH CENTURIES

Ephraim Kanarfogel

I

More than a half century ago, Katz published a pioneering study on the theme of “Yisra’el she-hata’, ’af ‘al pi she-hata’, Yisra’el hu’ (a , even though he has sinned, remains a Jew).” According to Katz, this talmudic principle, as it was interpreted and applied by Rashi, became the dominant policy with respect to the status of the apostate in medieval Ashkenazic society. Those who succumbed under duress and were forcibly converted to Christianity during times of persecu- tion, as well as those who had willfully abandoned , could return (or revert) to the Jewish community at any time. Moreover, a returning apostate could once again participate in prayer services (and in other aspects of religious and communal life) without any additional requirements or representations, other than a renewed commitment to be a loyal and law-abiding member of the Jewish religious community. Indeed, Katz asserts that Rashi’s underlying intent was to delineate that conversion to Christianity via the baptismal font did not diminish in any way the apostate’s ability to return, swiftly and completely, to full participation in Jewish life.1 As a corollary of this approach, during the time that an apostate was living (religiously and socially) outside of the Jewish community (as a Christian), the members in good standing of the Jewish community ought not consider him (or relate to him) in either personal or eco- nomic matters as a non-Jew (although there were limitations placed on certain forms of fraternization, such as partaking of the food of an apostate). Thus, for example, the apostate’s betrothal of a Jewish woman (presuming her acceptance or acquiescence) was considered to be binding, just as it was prohibited for a Jew to lend money to an

1 Jacob Katz, “ ’Af ‘al pi she-hata’, Yisra’el hu’,” Tarbiz 27 (1958): 203–17 [= idem, Halakhah ve- (Jerusalem, 1986), 255–269]. 298 ephraim kanarfogel apostate (or to borrow from him) at any rate of interest. At the same time, once an apostate made the decision to return to the practice of Judaism and to the Jewish community, other were permitted immediately to “consume his bread and to drink his wine”; there was no need for a waiting or probation period in order to establish that his return had been undertaken with full intention and in “good faith.”2 These interwoven policies, according to Katz, were accepted by almost all of the leading Tosafists and rabbinic authorities in northern and during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, with limited exceptions.3 For example, in Rashi’s day (and even beforehand), there were Ashkenazic rabbinic authorities who maintained that a who had reverted to Judaism could not pronounce the priestly blessing upon his return. This was to be understood, however, as a particular stringency associated with the precept of birkat Kohanim, rather than as an evaluation of the overall status of the Kohen as a Jew.4 To be sure, Katz made note of less than a handful of rabbinic texts from the thirteenth century that referred to an existing practice which required the reverting apostate to undergo ritual immersion. Based on their (small) number and muted tone, however, Katz judged these texts to be a reflection of a popular societal practice that was in vogue, rather than of a considered rabbinic requirement. Indeed, this is also how Yosef Yerushalmi (writing a decade or so after Katz) understood the direct reports that the inquisitor Bernard Gui received in during the early fourteenth century (which also may have included Jews who lived at some point in Germany) about the vigorous prepara- tions and immersions that apostates who wished to return to the Jew- ish community had to undergo. In the absence of any hard evidence for such a requirement in medieval codes or other halakhic texts, these were popular procedures that allowed members of the Jewish commu- nity to “un-baptize” those Jews who had been led astray. They did not necessarily have the approbation or the input of the rabbinic leader- ship, although Yerushalmi notes that this type of procedure was to be

2 See, e.g., Teshuvot Rashi, ed. I. Elfenbein (New York, 1943), nos. 168, 171, 174, 175. 3 See also Jacob Katz, Beyn Yehudim le-goyim (Jerusalem, 1961), 79 [= idem, Exclu- siveness and Tolerance (New York, 1961), 71–72]. 4 See , Hakhmey ’ ha- (Jerusalem, 1981), 122–126, 155 (n. 181), 224–225; and idem, Hakhmey Tzarefat ha-rishonim (Jerusalem, 1995), 152–153; and cf. Teshuvot Rashi, no. 170.