BernardS. Bachrach 3 ·

The imperial roots of Merovingian military organization

Since the mid-nineteenth centurY e.trlv either of late antique or of early medieval milit­ mcdiev thJ� ::lc� tion orr he citie..., of the Lucr Ronun empire inro Ba.;:·hrach 1994b, I')')� h. had brought with thl·m from the Cn:-n,m 'han..knnr centers of milira0· strength whKh \Verne! 198+ Durliat forests. These h.uhari.ms. ,,·ho \\·ere g.nho:-r<;:·d had f(mr imerre!ared military functions: 1. sup­ l')')O; Coff.m I')Sl'l: into embarrassingly sm,1ll .lrmed �roups 'C�.J..:h ply depors; 2. control points at key land .md H.h:hr:�ch 1994h. I')barbarians. ing .1 v.:.�r number of the cities and lesser habi­ lines fin: m.Ijor dcrnenr'. lr is clear, however. that roda�· the hiswrin­ tation cenrers of the empire was carried our Howe\'n. it would �l·cn1 ' reasonable to su�gc�t that graphical construct 'Dark Ages' is dead. The with great vigor. : These efforts in military con­ Luuv>ak \ poinr fivc i.e. successor swtes of the empire are seen accur.ne­ struction ·were continued through the greater conservation of the ly as Romano-German polities.' Those who parr of the fourth cenrury.1' The walls existed a..., �uength of mobile t(Jru·'· would still conjure up carl�· medieYal sratclc.... s a major factor nor only in evef)'day life bur rbe�· can rea,onahly be ,uh­ polities·· as analogues of America's non-lircr,ue also played a significant role in fmure mil iran· <;umcd under poim fi1ur. strategy and tactics.1·' Indeed, Isidore of Se\'ille. �� e.g.lsaac; 1990; \X'hin.Ik�·r 'Red Indians' or sub-Sahara's warrior nomJ.ds,' 1<)8'). have seriously misunderswod the earl�· :\Iiddle \'vTiting during the early seventh century called II. \\'heeler 1')')_'1. Ages in general, and carl�· medieval mihJI")' attention to the crucial role of such fortifica­ 12. Lurt>�·ak 19;6:n6-r')O; organization, strategy and tactics in particular.'' tions in his Etymologies, when he '\\Tote: "A city Bachrach 1995b. In militaf)' terms it ha..., long been demon­ is made by its walls".1' 11. Johnson 1983; Peuikovirs 1971; Buder 1959; Grenier strated that the institutions that were de\'eloped The vast material changes in the milirar:-· 1934; Bruhl 1975, 1990: during the later Roman empire provide rhe topography of the empire brought about by the Blanchet 1907; Fhrier proper background for the study of mosr of fortification of the urbes and lesser fortifica­ 19 -:-3; Huhen 1959. Western Europe and especially Gaul during the tions, led, as rhe imperial government intended, Bradbury 1992. Bachrach <.:arly Middle Ages.- Neither rhe primitiYe� so to the dominance of siege warfare.'" The build­ 19'))b. 1). xv,ii.L artfully constructed by T acirus in his Gennania ing of the walls was intended, in large parr, to 16. Bradbury 1992; Harri�on; nor the legions so carefully described by Caesar thwart the effons of the so-called 'barbarians' Bachrach 1994a. in his Opera are of importance to the study from beyond the frontiers in their efforts to loot

25 and ravage the cities of the empire. In this con­ role throughout the Middle Ages and even text Ammianus Marcellinus tells his readers beyond.24 The prizes of diplomacy and by that the Visigorhic ruler Fritigern, "[S]eeing extension of war were viable civitates with their that his men, who were ignorant of the manner highly developed economic resources of a rural in which to conduct a siege and were experi­ nature as well as their fortified urbes. encing serious casualties," warned "be at peace These cities also served as the administrative with the walls. ... ". 17 capital, religious center, and focus for commer­ As imperial military commentators saw the cial activity within each administrative region. matrer, learning how to deal with fortifications Campaign strategy, and to a lesser extent battle was the shze qua non for being civilized in mil­ ucrics, recognized the primary importance of iwry terms.1·' The younger Merobaudes, a keeping the desrrunion of both people and Romano-frankish genc::wl and author, observed resources to a minimum and of avoiding that the 'Teurons whom Caesar had fought unnecessary damage when possible. Massacred had only a crude command of warf�ne and were t�umers and artisans, burned buildings, dcvas­ inexperienced in irs developed an." How ever. tAlans, Saxons, and Romt' in the tdlowing manner: "\\'c decr(.:c... T.�ibk Thc�c forces were organized in a bt.:\vil­ rhat all arc to know ... that no Rom;m cirizen or dering congeries of insrirurional structures from member of a guild is ro be compelled to do military colonies of \'arious sons to urban gar­ [expeditionary] military service. Indeed, he is ri�ons. general le·ies and select levies. 2- required ro do armed service only on the walls Procopius, \Hiring toward the mid-sixth cen­ and at the gates [for rhe defense of rhe city] rury, describes in considerable detail the fare of whenever the necessity arises. The regulations one group, perhaps limitanei, that had been made by the Illustrious Prefect n� the Ciry are serving in Armorica and subsequently was to be obeyed hy alL ":-1 amalgamated into Clovis's armies.co Procopius Siege warfare, which is manpower intensive, writes: "[T]he�· handed themselves over along required large numbers of militia troops to with their military standards and the lands that defend the wall. However, even greater num­ they had been guarding for the Romans for a bers of effectives were needed to invest the long rime to rhe Arborychoi [Armoricans] and empire's new fortress cities when they fell into to the Germans [Merovingian Franks]." These enemy hands.:': Finally, as noted above, the so­ Roman soldiers, Procopius continues, "handed called barbarians, who came to attack or to set­ down to their offspring all of their fathers' cus­ de in the empire, were required to learn the toms .... and this people held them in rever- • ''"! sophisticated techniques and discipline, from ence ...even up to my time. - logistics to the building and operation of The Roman legacy, physical, institutional machines, that undergirded siege warfare.23 and human, that the leaders in Merovingian The focus of war in Merovingian Gaul was Gaul, who made military policy or grand strate­ upon gaining control of and holding the civi­ gic decisions, inherited, they modified over tates with their fortified urbes. The civitates were time in response ro their perception of contem­ the fundamental units of political, military, porary conditions. 50 Nevertheless, throughout economic, and religious organization during the Merovingian era and, indeed, for a very the Roman empire and cominued to play this long rime thereafter the walls that had been r I I built following the crash of the third century when your enemy is ensconced in this excep­ not only survived throughout the Middle Ages. tionally strong place?"' Aridius then goes on to Indeed, the walls continued more often than observe: "You depopulate the fields [of their not and in more places than in fewer to be animals], consume the meadows, hack down maintained in defensible condition.31 the vines, fell the olive trees, and all the fruits of Thus in Gaul, some eighry per cent of the this region you completely destroy." Neverthe­ one hundred and fifteen urbes that are listed in less you still "do not prevail against your en­

the Notitia Galliarum were drastically reduced emy." -'6

in size and became the beneficiaries of massive Gregory then depicts Aridius suggesting a pre­ "\valls which averaged ten meters in height and sumably more a([racrive and obviously more tra­ fOur meters in thickness at the base. These for­ ditional option to Clovis. Thus, rather than con­ tifications were generally suengthened with tinuing to impose such destruction on the coun­ equally massive rowers, that on average were tryside, Clovis is advised that he should send a placed at nventy-five meter intervals along the delegation to King Gondobad and offer terms by walls, and by elaborate fortifications ro protect which the Burgundian ruler will agree to pay "a the gates. This entire complex was usual!�· fur­ yearly tribute to you so that he may save the ther reinforced with an internal citadel, i.e. the region." Then Aridius explains, "You will be the

mx or pMetorium. FinJ.lly, in order ro enhance lord [and] the tribute will be paid in perpetu­ rhe defenses, it \\·as not uncommon ro have um.'' Gregory then explains that Clovis accepted 1 ·'· 3k. XXXI, ch. 6. p.-1r.l 4· ditches dug around the walls which were then the principles embodied in this advice.,- 11\ B:�chrach I99Jh. 19. Lint's 144-15J. fil!t:d wid1 \\'J.ter by haYins nearby streJ.m� or \Vhen Clovis's sons, grandsons, and great :co. BKhr.-�ch I')')P rivers din·rted. < grandsons fought their exhausting civil wars, :r. �o1·. Val. V.2. In this context. Gregory ofTours's descrip­ the urbes remained rhe tOcus of their military __ Bachrach and ,\ris I')')O: tion, in his Histm')'. of the fOrtress to\nl of activit)', horh strategically and tactically.'' For 13achrach 1')')4·'- example, :c;;. Bachr.lch !')')_)h: B:.tchr.Kh Dijon is \\·orth quoting: "It is a tOrrified place prior to rhe beginning of rhe cam­ '99-i-J wid1 very strong walls built in rhe middle of a paigning �cason of 584, Gregory of Tours 24. Bachrach 1995b. plain .... Four gates f:Ke the four corners of the recounts in his History that King Chilperic of :'.). !bJJ. earth and thirty d1ree-to\\·ers guard the [circuit] Neusrria obtained intelligence that his brother, 2.6. Goffan I<;S8. walls. These rowers an: huilr of squared stones King Guntram of Burgundy, and his nephew, r. B::tchrach 1')"'2 ro a ·Q K;Khrach 19-oh. 19-::'. height of nvenry teet and J.hon� rhese are Childebt.'rt II of Amrrasia, had formed an _\nrlcnon I')')): cf. !'ol_1·. cour.<.cs of .small srones. The total heiglu of rhe alliance. lnformarion on this pact wa� followed 29. 196;:2.64ff: cf. ldominate was intended to attack him. Indeed, any Aus­ 1959- v.rarfare both at the strategic and ar the tactical trasian invasion of Spain very likel y would have u. Ibid. and Petrikovirs 1')71: level. Thus, the centrality of siege warfare to pass through Neusrrian territory. Conse­ Butler 1959: Gn:·•ier 1914: "\vhich focussed upon dl't tabes of Gaul during quently, Chilperic sent messeti:gers to sound rhe Blancher I')OJ: the early Middle Ages is massively document­ alarm to his generals and to the counts in each 33- Bk. l!I, (h. I'). ed.'" For example, Clovis ·s conquest, during the of the cities of his regnum. He ordered these 54- Bachrach 1972: Bradbury 1')')2. later fifth and early sixth centuries, of what is officers to repair the walls of the cities and to .H- Bachra,h 1972:1-17. now the greater parr of France, was based upon bring their troops and resources within the 36. Bk. Il, ch. 32. the abiliry of his armies to capture great fortress defenses in order to withstand a siege. Chilper­ _:p. Bk. II, ch. 32. N.b. rhi� cities such as Verdun, Paris, Avignon, Albi, ic, himself, mustered an army and kept it the conver�atton may never have taken place and it i-" Rodez, Clermont, Bordeaux. Toulouse, and field under his direct command.1'' unlikely that even if it had Angouleme.-1; Despite the meager description of these taken place that Gregory The siege, or, at least, d1e threat of a siege, events provided by Gregory, it is clear that recorded it verbatim. dominated warfare, but like war, in general, Chilperic was employing a defense in depth However, it is important intelligent commanders undertook such opera­ strategy. His well defended cities- not only did that Gregory wants ro con­ vey to his readers that Clo­ tions only when diplomacy failed. Gregory of he order the walls to be repaired but the gen­ vis accepted the validity of Tours makes an effort to illustrate this by show­ erals and counts were instructed to bring their such diplomatic and strate­ ing how a Gallo-Roman magnate named Arid­ field forces within the fortifications- were to be gic thinking and that it ius explained rhe relation between diplomacy used as strategic 'hardpoims' which the enemy was "Roman" thinking as and war to Clovis while the Merovingian ruler could nor easily overwhelm. Chilpcric, himself, personified by Aridius. 3lj. Bachrach 1972:18-73; already was besieging the massive fortress ciry of stayed in the field with an army that could be Bachrach 1994C:II9-148. Avignon. Thus Aridius begins by asking rhetor­ brought up quickly against any force that was 39- Bk. VI, ch. 41. ically: "Why do you keep this army in the field besieging one of his ci(ies. ShouJd an enemy force refuse to raise its obligation was nor confined to the Merovin­ siege, the fortified hardpoinr served as the gian kingdoms bur was ubiguitous in Rome's potential anvil in Chilperic's strategy and his successor stares. For example, the Anglo-Saxon fidd army as the hammer. According to such a analogue to the Merovingian local militia was plan any besieging force would be caught the great jjrd.4' between the two and seriously discomforted. In Civilians of sufficient means, regardless of addition, because field forces had been brought their ethnic backgrounds, had military obliga­ into the cites and could reinforce the urban tions that went well beyond participation in the militia forces on the walls, the fortifications local defense, i.e. they were called upon for would be very difficult ro capture by storm. expeditionary serYice."r' These men were Fina!ly, these regular troops could sortie from required nor only to provide for their arms, rhe det"t-nses and in coordination with Chilper­ armor. and transport bur also to sustain their ic's army catch the besieging army in a pincer food costs for three months and clothing costs movement with the immense tactical advamage for six months of campaigning each year.'- This such a deployment enjoyed. aspecr of a wealth-based military obligation There is a clear indication rhar a defense in w.ts, like the general levy, a ubiquirous feature depth straret,•y \V;ls put in place. This is proYid­ of military organization in Rome's successor ed by rhe recognition, reported by Gregory in stares. For example, the Anglo-Saxon analogue the HiJtOJy, that both Chilperic and his com­ "·as the ..select Jj·rd'._, manders understood that rheir unprotected from a numerical perspecrive, the milita­ assets in the countryside would be at risk �md rized ciYilian popularion throughour Gaul pro­ like!!· \\'ould be seriously dJ.nuged invading \·idcd rhe oYcrwhelming majority of rhe armed army. Thus, rhc king guaranteed to his officers forces t()r local dett-nse and also the rank and rhar whatever assets that might be lost would be file of rhe armies rhar carried our major offen­ replaced to their profit. The recognition that .\i\·e operations \\·hich were aimed ;H permanenr unprotected and unprotectabk as�cts are w be conque�r. Hm,·eyer. these parr-rime militia

�acritlced in the short rerm i� a key aspect of a unir:. \H·Jc- �ignitlcand:· strengthened both tOr defeme in-depth srratet.'!'···" local ddense and while on e>.:peditio hy rhe The importance of the great t()ftres� cities addition of units of prot"t.-ssional rroops. These remained a significant strategic and tactical Lmer t{)rces \Wre organized in a vast variety of constant when eHecrivc control of rhc govern­ \\"<1:·\. Firs{ and tOremo�r among the profc.ssion­ mcm p;1sscd from the ,�v1erovingian roi.flillltliW ,d .1.o!Jier.s were rhe armed tOilowers who served to rhe Carolingian mayors of rhe palace and in the king's household. i.e. the analogue of the other great regional magn;ue Cm1ilics. Thus, f(n emJK'for-s prae.i(ll/,de.i. Orhcr members of the example. Charles Marrel be.\ieged Avibnon rm··,d anm· were escablished with their families twice and Narbonne once all in 737· '1 In in military colonies or as garrisons in local Aquitaine, rhe independent dukes, Eudo and strongholds, and sometimes even on lands of Waiofar, based their entire strateg)' upon con­ their own.-·· rr�<�l of the great fortress cities of rhe·region. Other imporranr men in society, lay and Waiofar's ulrimate failure ro defend rhese derical alike, commonly supported a military againsr Charles Martel's son, Peppin, in fact, household in accord with whar, as seen above, sounded the death knell of Aguiranian inde­ was the imperial tradition. The importance of pendence> the armed following was well undersrood in the The militarization of the popubtion, that Roman empire and flourished in Rome's suc­ had been accelerated by the building of fortress cessor stares. For example. the great Byzantine cities, thoroughly informed Merovingian mil­ general Belisarius, a contemporary of Clovis's irary organization. In Gaul each able bodied sons, is reported by a contemporary on his staff male, whether free or unfree, was required to to have had 7 ,ooo effectives in his military provide service in the locally based militia for household. Most of the members of such a the defense of the region in which he lived. GefolgJChafi, like the praeJenta!es of the em­ These men played the primary role in defend­ peror, served in rhe household of the man who ing the walls of the city in which they livedY In supporred rhem. '0 During the period of transi­ addition, those men, who lived in or near one tion from direct imperial rule to the derivative or another of the many orher fortificarions that consrirutions of Rome's successor states in the dotted rhe countryside, were trained to defend West, rhe episcopate gradually became one of the walls of these castra, castella, or lesser the dominant elements in local government.'1 strongholds."'4 This aspect of a general military Thus, important ecclesiastics played a key role

28 in the military organization of Merovingian region and commanded by Ullo, the count of Gaul. Usually each bishop supported a military Bourges. In the ensuing battle, the Berichon component in his jdmilia or household. They forces were defeated and retreated to Bourges in also had the responsibility for seeing ro it that order to prepare the defense of the city against their dependents, both free and unfree, per­ the forthcoming siege. A contemporary reports formed service in the general levy.'' that the forces in the battle at Chiteaumeillam Towards the latter part of the nimh century suffered combined casualties in the 7 ,ooo Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims, who is to be range.5� considered one of rhe most ferocious defender Continuity between the later Roman empire of church rights during the early Middle Ages, and the Merovingian kingdoms can also be attempted ro codify the long-standing military identified in regard to the campaign srrateg�" obligations that were owed to rhe stare by rhe and tactics used by the commanders of field church. Thus. he made it clear rhar according armies. For example, the Gallo-Roman general, ro cusrom a full rwo-fifrhs, i.e. forry per cent, of Mummolus (d. 586), is consistently depicted by episcopal income as well as of rhe income that Gregory of Tours in his HiJtory as employing was collected by other religious inSiirurions ·was trickery and surprise, avoiding potentially risky to be made available to the government for the encounters, choosing the battlefield when he

defense of the res publim.' decided to fight, preparing fortifications care­ The requirement that the walls of the great fully, looking after his logistic needs, .slaughter­ fOrtress cirie� and of the lesser population cen­ ing fOragers in surprise raids, fOrcing rhc enem�· ters be manned in warrimt.: undoubtedly pla�·ed to surrender irs plunder. and concentrating a crucial role in accelerating the milirariz.;,Hion overwhelming fOrce before going imo battle.. · · of the civilian population. Indeed. proper In short, despite Gregory's defecrin' and hostile

d(:'fcnse required rbr one man ddL·nd approx­ descriptions of military operations, in general.

imardy f(>ur leer of wall..' Thus. for example. and Mummolus' military activities, in panicu­ .jO. F\k. \'L ..:h.. p.. 41. S:khr:1ch I\J-O�l the 2.900 meter circuit w.1lb of Bourgcs'· br,'·" it is evident that he very 3.blc officer. 4:'.. Ehchrach 19:-+ required a ddCnse f(>rce of something in excess Arguably he was the best military comnunder 4>- Bachrach 1•r2 of 2,350 local militia men. C:onn�rsely. an produced in Mero\'ingian G;wl and it is clear 44· B;Jchrach I')')_l

:')}U:)il·)c). four to one numcricd adYantagt: o\·cr the gcrius's Dt n' !vfilitan�'' 4-. HachrKh J')-oa: cf. defenders."" Thus, for example, if Bourges were \1\illcr .. :dc:nem 1')6:;: to be defended simply b�- irs local militia. as To conclude: the construction of nu�-�iYc \X.-cidemann I')Sc. estimated above, ;m attacking force in the order f(>rrress cites and lesser forrificarion during the Yoi.Jl:.:>.-y-281. of magnitudl' of JO,ooo d"tecciws would be later Roman empire thorough!�· altered the mil­ 48. Hollisrcr 1•)62.. 49· B2chrach 199)b. required in order to create a credible thre;n to itary topography of Gaul and conditioned so. Ibid.. onC cerning rhc rok storm the walls. These calculations remained grand strategy, campaign strategy, tactic�. and of these GefO�t,>• h�,f�oJi n valid throughout the early ;'v1iddle Ages becau�t' combat techniques for a millennium and more. what ha� come to ht· char· the milirary technology rlur was Jsailahle to Sieges came to dominate warfare and the popt;- - ac!eriLed as '"fCw.b!i�m" �et· to e fOni­ Re;•nolds who;e now pro· those who defended the walls and those on !arion was militarized both to defend th vidc:s the ba�is f(H further the offensive ostensibly remained constant until fied population cc::nters and to provide the rink di.;;cu�sion of this subject. the period following the first Crusade in nor and file for local defense forces and for expedi­ 51. Hcinzclmann 1976. 1')�8. later..'· tionary armies. The so-called 'barbarians· were \l Bachrach J9')_lb Large military t()rces were reqUJred ro invest Romanizcd culmrally not only as ;1 result of liY­ 'i."i· Hincmar r8�9:35: l'.'clson the 1')86:124- large and prosperom fonress cities such as ing within rhe physical environmellt of )4 .. Bachrach and Ari; I')')O. Bourges. Then:fore, it was necessary tOr large empire but through conversion to Christianity, )\.Claude 1')6o: Briihl 1')7S· forces to be mobilized if sieges were to be raised learning Latin, having their laws redrawn under 1 '}')0. or otherwise th\'.'arted by the defenders who the influence of Roman law, and, in general, 56 Bachrach and Ari� 1990. sought to engage the invaders in the field.. For preserving to the best of their ability the insti­ );. Bradbury 1')')2: Rogers 583 1992: Bachrach 1994c example, in the summer of an army of tutions that they found in Gaul. sfL Bachrach 1994C:79-So, 161- between Is,ooo-zo,ooo effecrives, led by Duke In order to function militarily within the 167. Desiderius and Duke Bladast, advanced on empire the newcomers had to learn the full ''J. Bk. IV, 45 chs. 42, 44. ; hk. Bourges from the south with the aim of laying range of skills that had informed warfare in !arc Vi, 26: hk_ Vll, ch<>. 10, the city under siege. This invasion force was antiquity .. These extended from the construc­ 34-37 - confronted at Chiteaumeillam, on the Berry tion of siege engines to the provision of logistic (io. Goffan 1988:16L 1Xo, 217, 2!'). frontier, by a force of some Is,ooo troops com­ support for the large armies that were needed to 61. Bachrach 1995a. posed of the augmented general levy of the be.<>iege massive fortress cities. 'Where possible, existing imperial military personal were and was strengthen at the scolae which flour­ 62. Ibid. absorbed into the armed forces of the Merovin­ ished in the Merovingian royal courts.62 I aver 63. Bachrach 1972. gian kingdom and these men were encouraged more strongly today than I did almost a quarter

w maintain their training. The tradition of century ago when I wrote: "The Merovingian learning about warfare from experienced com­ military recalls Romania rather than Genna­

manders, from books, as well as from on the job nia.""3 experience continued in the Roman manner

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