BernardS. Bachrach 3 · The imperial roots of Merovingian military organization Since the mid-nineteenth centurY e.trlv either of late antique or of early medieval milit­ mcdiev<Il miliurv hisron· has heen reduced ro a ary organization <Ind warfare:' rather simple formula. Prior ro the \fiddle .-\�es In rhis context, it is important ro emphasize warfare in \\-/cstnn Europe \\·a� dornin.Jt�.:..: b�· four closdy reb red milit�lry devdopmems rh.u the high\�· trained and \\·dl oq;..mi1ed in;�:.:�:ry took place during the later empire. Followins legions of the Ronun empire. Then for �c·. cr.1l the crash of the third century. the imperial gm·­ hundred year\, the barb:mans, who <.:ithc .lrc ernment decided to pur:;ue a grand srr;negy dur 1 [)tlhrilck 198�: Oman credired or bbmed f(H destroying the Rc•!!un we have come to characr<.:rizc a\ 'defemc in •·F+ Lot 194(,· empin· and cre:Hing thL· so-c.llled Thrk .-\:::c< . deprh·. This required the radical transf(mll.l­ \\"t:rf1<:r 198+ Dudi.H I')\10: (;oft"art 1980: fought according to the 1ribal cu�torn":> thJ� ::lc� tion orr he citie..., of the Lucr Ronun empire inro Ba.;:·hrach 1994b, I')')� h. had brought with thl·m from the Cn:-n,m 'han..knnr centers of milira0· strength whKh \Verne! 198+ Durliat forests. These h.uhari.ms. ,,·ho \\·ere g.nho:-r<;:·d had f(mr imerre!ared military functions: 1. sup­ l')')O; Coff.m I')Sl'l: into embarrassingly sm,1ll .lrmed �roups 'C�.J..:h ply depors; 2. control points at key land .md H.h:hr:�ch 1994h. I')<J�h. imagination has lwcn CXf1L'lldnl rn·1:�� lO w�ll<.:r r<HHcs; ). coordination of rear are�l �CCtlr­ \llliT,l\" !•):;';. 1<)88 -\ucr P))l. explain hm\· the} m.ln,lgcll w L.Oih.jll<.- ;::1c ir�· :llld inrclligcnu:; and 4· sclf..cont:und i.cysct l')-'): hcc�an I<)<);. Roman empir<.:) put�HiH·Iy I(Hlgln t.'ach mh.:: in strongholds with mobile field tOrces.·'The quib­ 6. Bachrach 1994b. an ongoing search for greater and �rcncr bling criticisms"' that have follnw<.:d in the wake H.J.chr.Kh 1972: Br,Jdbur;· amounts of plunder and dw 'irrational' f1LJ:--,uir of Lurrwak 's magisterial rhe ....is now han· hccn :992: Andenon 199� of glory. \VarCtre, a.\ commonly undersWt1� in dismantled eHCcrively.:· 8 B.Khrach I');-oh. IT�: ;..1urra;· i<)S8; .A.nckr�nn Western civilization on the ba�is of a Crc..:o­ In order to implemem this strategy of l')')j. Roman model, is belieYed osremibl�· to �J.,·c defense in depth a ma...,si\'c program of fonif:·­ '). Lunwak 1')76:!)::'.-I_:q.. out­ ceased ro exi\t amon1;'1hesc barbarians. ing .1 v.:.�r number of the cities and lesser habi­ lines fin: m.Ijor dcrnenr'. lr is clear, however. that roda�· the hiswrin­ tation cenrers of the empire was carried our Howe\'n. it would �l·cn1 ' reasonable to su�gc�t that graphical construct 'Dark Ages' is dead. The with great vigor. : These efforts in military con­ Luuv>ak\ poinr fivc i.e. successor swtes of the empire are seen accur.ne­ struction ·were continued through the greater conservation of the ly as Romano-German polities.' Those who parr of the fourth cenrury.1' The walls existed a..., �uength of mobile t(Jru·'· would still conjure up carl�· medieYal sratclc.... s a major factor nor only in evef)'day life bur rbe�· can rea,onahly be ,uh­ polities·· as analogues of America's non-lircr,ue also played a significant role in fmure mil iran· <;umcd under poim fi1ur. strategy and tactics.1·' Indeed, Isidore of Se\'ille. �� e.g.lsaac; 1990; \X'hin.Ik�·r 'Red Indians' or sub-Sahara's warrior nomJ.ds,' 1<)8'). have seriously misunderswod the earl�· :\Iiddle \'vTiting during the early seventh century called II. \\'heeler 1')')_'1. Ages in general, and carl�· medieval mihJI")' attention to the crucial role of such fortifica­ 12. Lurt>�·ak 19;6:n6-r')O; organization, strategy and tactics in particular.'' tions in his Etymologies, when he '\\Tote: "A city Bachrach 1995b. In militaf)' terms it ha..., long been demon­ is made by its walls".1' 11. Johnson 1983; Peuikovirs 1971; Buder 1959; Grenier strated that the institutions that were de\'eloped The vast material changes in the milirar:-· 1934; Bruhl 1975, 1990: during the later Roman empire provide rhe topography of the empire brought about by the Blanchet 1907; Fhrier proper background for the study of mosr of fortification of the urbes and lesser fortifica­ 19 -:-3; Huhen 1959. Western Europe and especially Gaul during the tions, led, as rhe imperial government intended, Bradbury 1992. Bachrach <.:arly Middle Ages.- Neither rhe primitiYe� so to the dominance of siege warfare.'" The build­ 19'))b. 1). xv,ii.L artfully constructed by T acirus in his Gennania ing of the walls was intended, in large parr, to 16. Bradbury 1992; Harri�on; nor the legions so carefully described by Caesar thwart the effons of the so-called 'barbarians' Bachrach 1994a. in his Opera are of importance to the study from beyond the frontiers in their efforts to loot 25 and ravage the cities of the empire. In this con­ role throughout the Middle Ages and even text Ammianus Marcellinus tells his readers beyond.24 The prizes of diplomacy and by that the Visigorhic ruler Fritigern, "[S]eeing extension of war were viable civitates with their that his men, who were ignorant of the manner highly developed economic resources of a rural in which to conduct a siege and were experi­ nature as well as their fortified urbes. encing serious casualties," warned "be at peace These cities also served as the administrative with the walls. ... ". 17 capital, religious center, and focus for commer­ As imperial military commentators saw the cial activity within each administrative region. matrer, learning how to deal with fortifications Campaign strategy, and to a lesser extent battle was the shze qua non for being civilized in mil­ ucrics, recognized the primary importance of iwry terms.1·' The younger Merobaudes, a keeping the desrrunion of both people and Romano-frankish genc::wl and author, observed resources to a minimum and of avoiding that the 'Teurons whom Caesar had fought unnecessary damage when possible. Massacred had only a crude command of warf�ne and were t�umers and artisans, burned buildings, dcvas­ inexperienced in irs developed an." How ever. t<ued vine�·ards. broken canals, and destroyed the newcomers learned "the mature skills of the bridges merely undermined the value of victory an of warfare" after their settlcmem within the as raxes \muld fill in arrears and productivity empire. This education consisted, in large pare would slump.:' The unjustified emphasis on of learning how to defend and build great stone military destruction and disasrer in Merovin­ fortitlcuions. 1'' gian Gaul found in rhe 1-fistor)' of Gregory of Contemporary with imperial measures to Tours. our mosr important and inAuenrial foni�· the cities of the empire w�l.\ the accder­ �ourcc. is due w the bishop's ovef\vhelming au.:d militarization of the civilian population bias against secular society, in generaL and mil­ throughout the Roman world.c'' This process itary matters in particular:'" was driven, in pan, by the need to have militia In Gaul. the ?\1erovingian rulers, wirh the ff.1rces available ro man the walls of the newlv help of their Calla-Roman advisers, mainrained fortified cenrers of population. Thus, for ex­ when pm�ihle the milirary srrucrures that rhey ample, d1e legislation establishing urb:1n militia had acquired from rhe larer Roman empire. forces was :llready very well in train by 440 Thus. the military forces of Clm·is and his suc­ when rhe Emperor Valentinian Ill clarified the cessor:. were dr,m·n from a vast variety of ethnic exisring �iwarion with regard ro m�nrns ;lt groups. e.g. Gallo-Romans, Alans, Saxons, and Romt' in the tdlowing manner: "\\'c decr(.:c... T.�ibk Thc�c forces were organized in a bt.:\vil­ rhat all arc to know ... that no Rom;m cirizen or dering congeries of insrirurional structures from member of a guild is ro be compelled to do military colonies of \'arious sons to urban gar­ [expeditionary] military service. Indeed, he is ri�ons. general le·ies and select levies. 2- required ro do armed service only on the walls Procopius, \Hiring toward the mid-sixth cen­ and at the gates [for rhe defense of rhe city] rury, describes in considerable detail the fare of whenever the necessity arises. The regulations one group, perhaps limitanei, that had been made by the Illustrious Prefect n� the Ciry are serving in Armorica and subsequently was to be obeyed hy alL ":-1 amalgamated into Clovis's armies.co Procopius Siege warfare, which is manpower intensive, writes: "[T]he�· handed themselves over along required large numbers of militia troops to with their military standards and the lands that defend the wall. However, even greater num­ they had been guarding for the Romans for a bers of effectives were needed to invest the long rime to rhe Arborychoi [Armoricans] and empire's new fortress cities when they fell into to the Germans [Merovingian Franks]." These enemy hands.:': Finally, as noted above, the so­ Roman soldiers, Procopius continues, "handed called barbarians, who came to attack or to set­ down to their offspring all of their fathers' cus­ de in the empire, were required to learn the toms .... and this people held them in rever- • ''"! sophisticated techniques and discipline, from ence ...even up to my time.