Recruitmentand Integration: Germanic Soldiers in The

Home , Batavi (Germanic tribe), Batavi (military unit), Bauto, Comitatenses, Cornuti, Foederati

RECRUITMENT AND INTEGRATION: GERMANIC SOLDIERS IN THE ROMAN ARMY OF THE FOURTH CENTURY A.D.

______

Justin R. Ja mes, PhD

June 2021

Please visit Schola Eclectica at www.schola-eclectica.com for more articles, presentations, and videos.

Table of Contents

______

Abstract ...... 1 Recruitment and Integration: Germanic Soldiers in the the Roman Army of the Fourth Century A.D...... 2 Works Cited ...... 27

iii

Abstract

The Roman Empire recruited many Germanic soldiers in the third to fifth centuries A.D. Recruitment escalated in the fourth century A.D., especially in the reigns of Constantine and Theodosius. This phenomenon raises questions: Why did the recruitment of Germanic soldiers escalate? Did Germanic soldiers create military inefficiency? I argue that Germani, whether as conscripts or volunteers, provided necessary and dependable soldiers until the empire ceased to integrate them. Although Roman citizens had become reluctant to serve by the fourth century A.D., the Germanic peoples could provide many recruits to swell imperial forces. The incessant civil wars were also a factor, which exacerbated recruitment problems. The Germani came from warrior societies and therefore were eager to enlist in the imperial army, which remained a prestigious institution for most of the fourth century A.D. The Roman policy of receptio successfully integrated these recruits for most of the century. Receptio created a cultural amalgamation in the army, but did not transform it into a force of barbarian mercenaries. The empire recruited Germani on its terms until the Adrianople disaster, which began a decline in Roman supremacy.

Recruitment and Integration: Germanic Soldiers in the the Roman Army of the Fourth Century A.D.

The Romans used non-citizen soldiers from the republic onward; barbarization must be seen in this context. 1 Peregrini (foreigners) served in the Roman army from at least the end of the Romano-Latin War (340-338 B.C.), i.e. in units distinct from citizen legions.2 This was a hallmark of Roman statecraft, to employ vanquished adversaries as valuable allies. As the empire expanded so did its recruiting grounds. Barbarian mercenaries soon began fighting beside Rome’s legions and allies. Long before the recruitment problems of the fourth century A.D., barbarian peoples such as the Germani3 had warred for and against the empire with equal ferocity.4 Julius Caesar recruited Germani east of the Rhine River during his conquest of Gaul.5 Goldsworthy writes, “From the

1 Heather addresses the theory of Germanic manpower contributing to the fall of the western empire (Heather 2010, 74-75). Ferrill defines barbarization as “…the use of Germans on such a large scale that the army became German rather than the Germans becoming Roman soldiers…,” with the result being a decrease in military efficiency (Ferrill 1986, 84-85). 2 Friell notes that the Romans accepted that this strategy would alter the ethnic character of their state (Friell 1994, 91). 3 Germanic seems the best adjective, and Germani the best noun. “Germanic peoples” is inconvenient, “Germans” is anachronistic, and “barbarians” is vague. “Germani” however does not refer to a nation but a group of peoples from Germania and adjacent territories with a shared culture and similar languages. Wolfram notes that the term “Germani” originated from the Gauls and the Romans adopted it; therefore, only a Germanic person on Roman soil would actually refer to himself as a Germanus (Wolfram 1990, 4). 4 In Germania, Tacitus describes a battle between two tribes and hopes that the Germans continue to slaughter each other because it is good for Rome (Tacitus 1970, 33). 5 Caesar 2006, 7.13, 8.13. Caesar’s Germanic cavalry performed excellently in the Gallic War. In another passage, he praises the warlike virtues of the Germani over the Gauls (Caesar 2006, 6.24). 2

very beginning [Gallic War 58-50 B.C.], the Germans were a valuable source of military manpower as well as a threat.”6 In republican and early imperial times, the Romans tapped into the warlike traditions of barbarians only to supplement the legions. Barbarians, such as the Germani, provided fierce warriors who expanded the fighting capabilities of the legions with their specific skills.7 The British Empire had a similar recruitment strategy: the British recruited from warrior cultures within and without the empire, including Scottish Highlanders and Nepalese Gurkhas.8 The policy was sound and posed no threat to either empire. Augustus incorporated the mercenaries of the republic into well-defined units called auxilia (auxiliaries).9 These units were peregrini and specialized, e.g. Syrian archers or Germanic cavalrymen.10 Heather writes, “From the time of Augustus, at least half of the total army – all its auxiliary formations – was always composed of non-Romans, a substantial number of whom were recruited from the Germanic world.”11Although the Roman army became a melting pot, especially after the constitutio Antoniniana,12 it maintained its Roman character in organization and training.13 Nevertheless, when citizen volunteers began to

6 Goldsworthy 2009, 105. 7 Delbrück 1980, 254; Ward-Perkins 2005, 38. 8 Friell 1994, 92; Ward-Perkins 2005, 38. 9 Campbell notes that most auxiliaries were volunteers, but not all (Campbell 2003, 225). 10 The northern barbarians were excellent horsemen, e.g. the Germanic Batavi of the lower Rhine (Drinkwater 2003, 235). The tribe revolted (69-70 A.D.) under prince Julius Civilis, but were treated leniently after surrender, probably because Rome still valued their manpower. 11 Heather 2010, 74-75. 12 Antonine Constitution=the enfranchisement of all imperial subjects, with a few exceptions. 13 Delbrück 1980, 248. Regarding auxilia, their ethnic origins eventually eroded as the army recruited manpower from other provinces to replenish their ranks (Campbell 2003, 225). 3

disappear in the fourth century A.D., the barbarian element became even more essential.14 Roman citizens were normally reluctant to serve in fourth century A.D.15Ammianus refers to this occasionally, e.g. he contrasts Italians to robust Gauls who do not cut their thumbs off to avoid service.16 Matters worsened, especially after the Adrianople disaster. The Theodosian Code ordered murci to be burned to death, corrupt masters fined, new recruits to be branded, and deserters sent to the mines.17Conquest and civil war transferred from the Mediterranean Basin to the frontiers in imperial times, and it seems that inhabitants of the former adjusted to peaceful urban life. According to Shaw, “The shift was usually marked by an increasing reluctance to serve on the part of the ordinary citizens of the conquering state, and an increasing professionalization of military service and drawing of recruits from

14 Cameron notes that barbarians were crucial from the late fourth century A.D. (Cameron 2012, 53). If barbarians constituted half the early imperial army then perhaps they were already more than a supplement. Nevertheless, the citizen legions were the core of the republican and early and middle imperial armies; the history of the Roman army is one of steady but gradual change. 15 Population decline in the western empire is uncertain, which would contribute to a manpower shortage, but the army only absorbed around one percent of the population (James 2009, 161; Mackay 2004, 331; Shaw 1999, 135). The eastern empire did not have a shortage however, and yet Constantius II still requested Germanic troops from Julian (360 A.D.)(Marcellinus 1986, 20.4.2). Furthermore, even by the fifth century A.D. the urbanized provincial populations greatly outnumbered the invading Germanic peoples (Maas 2010, 345). 16 Marcellinus 1986, 15.12.3, 19.11.7, 31.41-6. The self-mutilators are called murci, and apparently were not found in Gaul. He seems to be describing the Romanized Celtic population, which provides evidence that at least some Roman citizens were not averse to military service (Marcellinus 15.12.3). Nevertheless, it is clear that the empire, and especially the late empire, had greater difficulty recovering from defeats than the republic (Friell 1994, 211). 17 James 2009, 162; Theodosian Code 7.13.5, 10.22.4, 17.18.1. 4

the war zones of the state.”18 Roman authorities eventually had to resort to compulsion; thenceforth, the imperial army ceased to be a volunteer force clearly defined into citizen legions and foreign auxilia. The Romans used conscription to replenish the ranks but it was ultimately insufficient. Diocletian or Constantine required that veterans’ sons enlist, which was reinforced by Theodosius.19Annual conscription may have been instituted by Diocletian and required landowners to provide recruits.20 The army would naturally target the landowners more than the cities because their manpower was already inured to hardship.21 Some landowners were wealthier than others; only large ones had to provide a recruit annually while smaller ones combined resources and rotated the duty.22 The system was abused. Property owners were the local authorities in the countryside and were indisposed to surrender their fittest men. Press-gangs rounded up unwilling recruits or passed off unsuitable ones with bribes.23 Delbrück writes, “Levied or impressed soldiers are only competent in very well-disciplined troop units with strong cadres…Only if the men

18 Shaw notes that other powers experienced this, and that Roman citizens had ceased to be militarized by the imperial period (Shaw 1999, 138). 19 Ferrill 1986, 43; Theodosian Code 7.1.5. Delbrück notes the changed political and social conditions of the fourth century A.D.: urban populations had assigned duties and the landowners had moved from the city to the country, making them the local authorities there Delbrück 1980, 228. 20 Shaw 1999, 389. Manpower constituted a portion of capital and was therefore taxable. 21 Vegetius writes, “On this subject I think that it could never have been doubted that the rural populace is better suited for arms…for whom wielding iron, digging a fosse and carrying a burden is what they are used to from the country” (Maas 2010, 95; Vegetius 1.3). Goffart adds that the army refined their search still further, to the remotest and least cultivated regions rather than the plantations (Goffart 2006, 190). 22 Ferrill 1986, 43; Lenksi 1999, 389. The smaller landowners formed groups called consortia, which operated press-gangs. 23 Macdowall 1994, 51. 5

came of their own will with a good attitude and the animal instincts for the warrior’s life could they be employed as usable troops.”24 Old recruiting grounds may have dried up, but the frontier regions could still supply such men. The recruitment of Germani was economically convenient for the government and the landowners. Estates were larger in the late empire, especially in the west, which allowed landowners to obstruct recruiting.25 Although unwilling to release their labor, the landowners were willing to give money in lieu of troops. Ammianus mentions this with Constantius’s settlement of the Limigantes (359 A.D.), and later when the Goths petitioned Valens (376 A.D.).26 The emperors gave up and did what was easy.27 The Persians may have been a factor as well, since so many units were sent east to fight them.28 Germani were plentiful, semi-trained, and eager to enlist, since they were coming from warrior societies.29 Julian’s special operations across the Rhine River (357 A.D.) reveal significant settlement along to the frontier, which would

24 Delbrück 1980, 229. Liebeschuetz notes that impressed soldiers won the battle of Trafalgar, but it was difficult to amass large armies by impressments (Liebeschuetz 1990, 20). 25 Liebeschuetz 1990, 20f. 26 Ammianus is critical of the policy because it backfires (Marcellinus 1986, 19.11.7; 31.4.1-6). Nevertheless, it was convenient since both landowners and tenants seemed to have no patriotism. 27 Liebeschuetz 1990, 21; Shaw 1999, 135, 138. 28 Burns,Rome and the Barbarians 100 B.C.-A.D. 400 2003, 286; Geary 1999, 115. 29 Ward-Perkins 2005, 38. Wolfram writes, “Peace was the exception; it had to be fixed by treaty. The enemy was not only the tribe living on the other side of a broad border zone. The enemy could be much closer, as close as the neighboring village, the next clan, or the other king group of the same tribe” (Wolfram 1990, 8). The empire was not another tribe however, since it fought wars different in kind and scale. If a tribe did border the empire, as argued above, service rather than raid provided the safest outlet for the “pathos of heroism,” as described by Wolfram (Wolfram 1990, ibid.). 6

facilitate recruitment.30 Ward-Perkins writes, “Within reach of the Rhine and Danube frontiers lived tens of thousands of men who had been brought up to think of war as a glorious and manly pursuit, and who had the physique and basic training to put these ideals into practice.”31 It was cheaper for the empire to employ these warriors rather than have them menacing the frontier.32 The Roman Empire was still a formidable opponent in the fourth century A.D., even during civil strife. Serving the empire was much safer for the Germani, who constituted tribes rather than a nation.33 Accordingly, they could not defend themselves against the empire’s depredations with a unified front, much less conduct long-term, strategic conquests, at least not in the fourth century A.D.34 Friell writes, “First, the Germanic nations were not the myriad hordes of legend, swamping the empire like human waves.”35 But even if they were hordes, the late imperial army still had significant advantages over them. Ward-Perkins lists several, including extensive roads, powerful fortifications, sophisticated logistics, standardized equipment, and excellent discipline and

30 Imperial forces plundered farmsteads and Roman-style houses for ten miles until they reached wilderness, which was occupied by Alamanni in ambush (Marcellinus 1986, 17.1.8). 31 Ward-Perkins 2005, 49. 32 Cameron 2012, 54. This was a rationale provided by Constantius concerning the Alamanni, “…we shall secure without bloodshed the abatement of those fits of ferocity which have often proved destructive to our provinces…” (Marcellinus 1986, 14.10.14). 33 For example, according to James “…for if it is true that the Franks were a recognized group of smaller tribes, it is equally true that at no time before the sixth century did they form a political unit” (James, The Franks 1988, 38). 34 Goffart 2006, 32f. 35 Friell notes that warrior societies put a significant percentage of males into the field, but precise numbers are difficult to determine for Germani (Friell 1994, 86). 7

training.36 Another advantage seems to be luck, since major barbarian problems rarely coincided with a Persian war, except the Gothic migration of 376 A.D.37 Ammianus presents Roman frontier policy as essentially defensive, with imperial armies occasionally mounting punitive expeditions.38 Roman raids appear far more destructive than the wrongs they were avenging though, with whole villages razed, livestock captured, and people enslaved.39 Indeed, the Romans stereotyped barbarians as wretched opponents deserving to be crushed.40 Julian deemed the Goths as unworthy foes, and Ammianus considered the Quadi as nothing to be feared, at least in his day.41 Despite their victory at Adrianople, the Goths still failed to decisively defeat the empire because of their lack of siegecraft.42 The Romans could not dismiss the Germani, as they had annihilated Roman armies in the past. Nevertheless, it was normally more convenient for Germani to fight for rather than against the empire, and moreover there were positive reasons in doing this. Service was the easiest way to access benefits from

36 Ward-Perkins 2005, 34. Rome may not have had the massive numbers of republican times, but its military system was more professional than neighboring powers. 37 Burns, Rome and the Barbarians 100 B.C.-A.D. 400 2003, 328. 38 Seager 1999, 604. 39 Geary 1999, 114. 40 Ammianus consistently portrays haughty barbarians stunned by the power of the imperial army, but quite humbled in defeat (Seager 1999, 605). 41 Whittaker, “Barbarian” 1999, 334. For Goths, “He [Julian] replied that he was looking for a worthier foe; the Goths could be dealt with adequately by the slave-traders of Galatia…” (Marcellinus 1986, 22.7.8). For Quadi, “They are a people who nowadays inspire little fear, but were formerly immensely warlike and powerful” (Marcellinus 1986, 29.6.1). 42 According to Ammianus, “Fritigern realized that it was pointless for men without experience of siege-works to fight at such a disadvantage. He suggested that the siege should be abandoned and a sufficient force left behind to contain the enemy. He had no quarrel, he said, with stone walls…” (Marcellinus 1986, 31.6.4). 8

the empire, at least until the late fourth century A.D. Germani occasionally raided the empire for plunder. The Romans remembered injuries though, and their devastating responses would normally negate the raid’s value. Geary writes, “Until the last quarter of the 4th century, barbarians had found direct assaults on imperial armies less effective than service to them. Barbarian military successes against the empire tended to result from Roman disputes and weaknesses.”43 Most Germani willingly entered the empire, but as recruits rather than raiders.44 The Romans in turn offered enticements, including promotions, salaries, and higher living standards; this was feasible since Germani were not prejudiced against Romans or their way of life.45 Emperors could also give gifts, which bestowed material wealth and most importantly honor; essentially the patron-client system in action.46 Theodosius honored some barbarians with gifts upon his accession, since they had become clients.47 While Theodosius was ill, Gratian successfully pursued the same policy in the west.48 Indeed, the cessation of tribute might induce a barbarian leader to raid the empire to restore status.49 Heather argues that these gifts might be equivalent to modern “foreign aid,” since the Romans gave them from a position of strength, e.g. Julian’s payments to the Alamanni

43 Geary recognizes, as Wolframs does above, that most Germanic warfare against other Germani, rather than against the empire (Geary 1999, 113). 44 Goldsworthy 2009, 273. 45 James, Europe's Barbarians AD 200-600 2009, 162; Ward-Perkins 2005, 23. 46 Burns provides references for this policy, which acted as an extension of the ancient Roman patron-client system (Burns, Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, ca. 375-425 A.D. 1994, 65); (Burns, Rome and the Barbarians 100 B.C.-A.D. 400 2003, 324, 341). Gifts could be many things, e.g. coins, military equipment, or clothing, which chieftains in turn could distribute to their own people; therefore, just as in Rome, the patron-client system reinforced a hierarchical society. 47 Maas 2010, 348; Zosimus 1967, 4.56. 48 Jordanes 1966, 27.141. 49 Burns, Rome and the Barbarians 100 B.C.-A.D. 400 2003, 287. 9

even after the battle of Strasbourg (357 A.D.).50 In any case, service in the Roman army was an honor itself, since it was still a highly prestigious institution in the fourth century A.D.51 Among the Germani, warfare was ritualistic and waged for booty and honor; serving a Roman emperor was no different in principle than serving a tribal chieftain, and the benefits were quite lucrative.52 Troublesome landowners and a de-militarized citizenry were big enough problems for recruitment, but recurrent civil strife was also significant in causing the escalation of Germanic soldiers. After the overthrow of the Severan Dynasty (235 A.D.), every Roman generation until the fall of the western empire suffered a civil war.53 Roman generals and their frontier armies caused these wars, which operated in the hinterland far from the civilian elites.54 Constantius II campaigned against the Alamanni (354 A.D.) but concluded peace quickly; the army was relieved because he seemed to have better luck in civil wars.55 Imperial propaganda often depicted Roman armies triumphing over foreigners but civil wars were the biggest threat. Shaw writes, “These internal wars also exacted a much greater toll on its [the Roman state’s] resources and its leaders—only one of the fourteen emperors who died violently during this period did so in battle against the

50 Heather 2010, 84. 51Friell 1994, 83. 52 Goldsworthy notes that individual warriors and chieftains, with some retainers, enlisted in the Roman army (Goldsworthy 2009, 108). For the former, it was like serving a chieftain. 53 Goldsworthy 2009, 83f. 54 Burns notes that the Roman army unsurprisingly had little sympathy for the elites in the Mediterranean core of the empire, who had gradually been disassociated from them (Burns, Rome and the Barbarians 100 B.C.-A.D. 400 2003, 295f.). Gallienus supposedly banned senators from military offices, but this had become the trend regardless (Goldsworthy 2009, 145). The army was managed by professional officers in Constantine’s reign, with distinct career paths for the military and civilian elites (Ferrill 1986, 47). 55 Marcellinus 1986, 14.10.16. 10

external enemies of the empire—than did the barbarian incursions which they did so much to encourage.”56 Germani were disunited into tribes, and the Persians did not have the resources to overrun the empire either, only civil wars were consistent in frequency and cost. Regarding manpower, these wars wasted valuable professional soldiers and disrupted normal recruitment.57Recruiting Germanic soldiers was a way to rectify these losses. Germanic soldiers were already necessary by the fourth century A.D. but civil wars further increased their importance. Roman civil wars were contested by equally matched forces in equipment, organization, and training; imperial armies thus lost the advantages that they had in foreign wars. Amassing superior numbers could better the odds however, and the Germani provided the perfect means.58 Indeed, it was easier to make peace with foreign barbarians than fellow Romans.59 For example, Constantine raised a massive army of almost 100,000 to confront Maxentius (312 A.D.); the number may be exaggerated, but Zosimus confirms that it consisted of many northern barbarians.60 Constantine also created the central reserve army known as the comitatus, later divided into comitatenses, which served directly under the emperors, included many Germani, and acted as rapid strike

56 Shaw 1999, 148. 57 Goldsworthy 2009, 119. 58 Goldsworthy 2009, ibid.; Shaw 1999, 134. Shaw cites Delbrück’s thesis, “The balance of the evidence supports Hans Delbrück’s thesis that for this type of premodern warfare it was the mobilization of manpower that mattered n the long run”(Shaw 1999, ibid.). There are a few exceptions but the state with the largest reservoir of manpower, provided it could mobilize effectively, normally had the best chance of winning, e.g. the Punic Wars. Rome always seemed to have this advantage until the late empire. 59 Ward-Perkins 2005, 52. 60 Zosimus 1967, 2.15. 11

forces.61 He may have designed their flexibility to quickly confront internal threats rather than foreign ones, since they were more dangerous.62 Roman emperors also used Germani indirectly by inciting them to raids. The evidence is uncertain according to Ammianus, but Constantius II may have ordered the Alamannic king Vadomar to attack Julian in Gaul (361 A.D.).63 Roman emperors and usurpers criticized each other for recruiting Germani. For example, Magnus Maximus (r. 383-388 A.D.) complained that Valentinian had incited raids led by the Germanic Bauto, even though his own barbarian allies had been threatening Italy in turn.64 Despite the message of imperial propaganda, the Germani were more useful alive than dead; the same was not true for rivals. The escalation of Germanic soldiers in the late Roman army was inevitable. Around twenty-five percent of the army was foreign by the fourth century A.D., with most recruits coming from the Danubian and Rhenish frontiers.65 Recruitment problems made these soldiers essential for imperial defense. This was not the whole story however, as the Roman Empire managed this escalation reasonably well. The Romans integrated Germani into the army until misfortune exposed the policy’s limitations, i.e. the events surrounding the Adrianople disaster, which began a decline in Roman supremacy. Until then however, Roman supremacy forced Germani to integrate. Having discussed the reasons for the escalation of Germanic soldiers, it is time to discuss the

61 Crump 1973, 99f.; Ferrill 1986, 46f. Ferrill notes that system of flexible comitatenses and static limitanei has been traditionally interpreted as defense in depth, i.e. defending the provinces against foreign incursions (Ferrill 1986, 45). 62 Shaw 1999, 149. Zosimus criticizes Constantine for relocating units away from the frontier, but in blaming the policy for letting in the barbarians he might be missing the real reason, i.e. Roman strife (Maas 2010, 79f.; Zosimus 2.34). 63 Marcellinus 1986, 21.3. 64 Ambrose 2005, 24.4-8; Shaw 1999, 150. 65 Maas 2010, 97. Suitable recruiting areas also existed in the east, e.g. Armenia and the Caucausus (ibid). Europe also provided valuable non-Germani troops, such as the Alans, Huns, and Sarmatians. 12

mechanisms for their integration and their success in producing dependable soldiers. Many barbarians migrated into the empire in the fourth century A.D., but at the empire’s discretion. The Romans supervised immigration by a process called receptio (the act of receiving). This was the legal way to become an imperial subject and was granted to all incomers, including foreign levies, prisoners of war, and volunteers.66 The medallion from Lyons shows the policy’s significance, which depicts barbarians crossing the Rhine into Roman protection.67 Receptio was essentially a continuation of the patron-client system, but with foreigners who then gained Rome’s direct protection.68 There are many examples of Germani and other barbarians that were accepted into the empire through receptio, with the stipulation that they become farmers and/or soldiers. The Quadi sought pardon from Valentinian in 375 A.D. as clients, and promised to provide levies in return.69 A panegyric praises Constantius I for turning Frankish prisoners of war into loyal farmers and soldiers of the empire.70 Julian commanded Germani who had entered the empire voluntarily, since Rome promised not to dispatch them too far from their European homes.71 Constantine rescued Sarmatian clients from the Goths in

66 Burns, Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, ca. 375-425 A.D. 1994, 12. This policy was not new but did increase dramatically in the fourth century A.D.; Marcus Aurelius (r. 161-180 A.D.) had settled defeated barbarians in the empire (Heichelheim 2003, 455). 67 Burns, Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, ca. 375-425 A.D. 1994, 13f.; Whittaker, “Barbarian Settlements” 1999, 335. 68 Burns, Rome and the Barbarians 100 B.C.-A.D. 400 2003, 340f. 69 Marcellinus 1986, 30.6.1. 70 “Constantine’s ‘pagan vision’: The anonymous panegyric on Constantine (310), Pan. Lat. VII(6)” 1996, 7(6).5-6. 71 Constantius II requested the Germanic Herulian and Batavian units, and some other men, for use against the Persians in 360 A.D (Marcellinus 1986, 20.4.2). 13

334 A.D., and then distributed them in Italy and throughout the Balkans.72 Regardless of tribal ethnicity or circumstances of migration, the Romans carefully processed immigrants through most of the fourth century A.D. by receptio. Receptio was useful for restricting and assimilating Germanic soldiers. Friell writes, “Provided it [receptio] was on Roman terms…it offered a simple means of recultivating deserted lands, securing a source of recruits for the army, and creating a safety-valve for the pressures of the tribes beyond the frontiers.”73 Germani may have been valuable but the empire determined when, where, and how they served; in other words, barbarians did not overrun the frontier and swarm the ranks of the imperial army. Advisors persuaded Valens to permit the Tervingi, but he rejected the request of the Greuthungi as not in the empire’s interests.74 Aside from Julian’s volunteers, many Germani had to serve far from their homes. For example, Theodosius interchanged seasoned Egyptians with newly raised Gothic troops.75 Another tactic was accepting immigrants in small groups, as James argues “…to avoid barbarians forming factions within the army, and to promote barbarian identification with the Roman cause.”76 Constantius I blockaded some Germani that tried to cross the Rhine, and then forced their surrender, received a portion selected by lottery, and returned the rest to Germania.77 The Tetrarchy fought numerous wars against the Germani, including the Carpi and their Gothic allies; Galerius seems to have weakened the Carpi by accepting

72 “The origin of Constantine: The Anonymous Valesianus pars prior (Origo Constantini)” 1996, 6.32. 73 Friell 1994, 14. 74 Marcellinus 1986, 31.4.1-11. 75 Burns, Rome and the Barbarians 100 B.C.-A.D. 400 2003, 304; Burns, Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, ca. 375-425 A.D. 1994, 59; Zosimus 1967, 4.30-31. 76 James, Europe's Barbarians AD 200-600 2009, 162. 77 “Constantine’s ‘pagan vision’: The anonymous panegyric on Constantine (310), Pan. Lat. VII(6)” 1996, 7(6).6. 14

only a portion and settling them in groups along the Danube.78 Such small groups of barbarians could be immediately dispersed throughout the Roman army or relocated to plantations as coloni.79 The coloni were tenants, tied to the land, but could leave their homes to join the army at least until the fifth century A.D.80 The Romans controlled barbarian immigration for much of the fourth century A.D. through the various mechanisms accompanying receptio, which only failed under extraordinary circumstances. A facet of receptio was deditio (submission). Some Germanic soldiers had been dediticii (prisoners of war), a legal rather than military category.81 These soldiers could be distributed throughout the regular army, in either the comitatenses or limitanei, although this was not possible in earlier times.82 Not all Germanic immigrants were dediticii, so the Romans used symbolic surrender to enforce their supremacy. This was deditio, which entailed submission, disarmament, and an oath to be imperial subjects.83 Examples of dediticii include the Carpian bodyguards of Maximinus Daia (r. 308-313 A.D.), the six hundred Franks captured by Julian on the Meuse River (357 A.D.), and the Goths surrendered to Constantine for peace (332 A.D.).84 Gratian

78 Burns, Rome and the Barbarians 100 B.C.-A.D. 400 2003, 301. 79 Sozomen reports that the Germanic Sciri were defeated and sold as slaves to plantations in Asia Minor, since the governors feared rebellion if they remained intact; Sozomen himself saw some laboring in Bithynia (James, Europe's Barbarians AD 200-600 2009, 163; Sozomen 1845, 9.5). 80 Wolfram 1990, 59. 81 Dediticii could not be citizens or write wills, in accordance with the constitutio Antoniniana (Burns, Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, ca. 375-425 A.D. 1994, 12; Whittaker, “Barbarian Settlements” 1999, 335). 82 James, Europe's Barbarians AD 200-600 2009, 164; Liebeschuetz 1990, 14. 83 Goldsworthy 2009, 251f.; Wolfram 1990, 81f. 84 “The origin of Constantine: The Anonymous Valesianus pars prior (Origo Constantini)” 1996, 21; Marcellinus 1986, 17.2; Speidel 1996, 166). Julian sent recruits to Constantius II, including Gentiles and Scutarii, who were probably 15

received recruits from the Lentienses, a tribe of Alamanni, who only submitted after an inconclusive campaign; Gratian returned the rest to their homes. Whittaker writes, “The conflicting images [receptio and deditio] are captured on the obelisk of Theodosius at Constantinople, depicting both the submission of kneeling barbarians and long-haired barbarian soldiers standing at the emperor’s side.”85 Receptio was useful but sometimes miscarried. Ammianus seems a critic, and provides two examples of when it backfired. Constantius II’s repeated efforts to settle the Limigantes failed, but in this instance the empire decisively crushed the rebels.86 Advisors persuaded Valens to receive the Goths (Tervingi) that petitioned him in 376 A.D. Ammianus writes, “With these high hopes various officials were sent to transport this wild host, and the greatest care was taken to ensure that, even if he were suffering from mortal illness, none of those destined to overthrow the Roman empire should be left behind.”87 Ammianus observes however that their numbers were extraordinary and corrupt officials exacerbated the crisis.88 Furthermore, there was no deditio, since the Romans had neither defeated nor disarmed the Tervingi before they crossed the Danube.89 The Goths had arrived suddenly because of the Huns, and therefore the traditional mechanisms of receptio could not be implemented.90 Ultimately, the result was disaster, due in part however to poor generalship at the battle of Adrianople (378 A.D.). not volunteers; Julian had volunteers, as noted above, who had refused to march beyond the Alps (Marcellinus 1986, 20.8.13). 85 Whittaker, Barbarian 1999, 334. 86 Marcellinus 1986, 17.13, 19.11.7. 87 Marcellinus 1986, 31.4.5. 88 Marcellinus 1986, 31.4.10; Seager 1999, 601. 89 Goldsworthy 2009, 251. Fritigern agreed to convert to Christianity however, which was another mechanism of receptio(Sozomen 1845, 6.37). 90 Burns, Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, ca. 375-425 A.D. 1994, 24. 16

The Romans controlled Germanic immigration for most of the fourth century A.D., which created a “cultural amalgam.”91 Modern archaeologists have found similar artifacts and settlements on both sides of the empire’s boundaries; this reflects change rather than subversion.92 Germanic settlement and extensive commerce produced this amalgam, which we can overlook with classical authors’ preoccupation with war.93 The Romans had ruled a cosmopolitan state since the early republic, as Friell writes “To ask how far and how quickly they [Germanic soldiers] became “Romanized” is too simple a question, for Romanitas meant different things and the Germanic tribes were in any case not a uniform society.”94 Having dwelt in the empire for generations however, and fought for it, we can expect that Germanic settlers eventually identified with Rome’s cause. For example, there was a competent and loyal Roman general named Silvanus who, according to Ammianus, was manipulated into rebellion by court intrigue.95 Nevertheless, Silvanus attempted to return to his Frankish kinsmen, but another officer warned him that they would only kill or ransom him.96 As James notes, Romanized Franks probably viewed their counterparts across the frontier as

91 Burns, Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, ca. 375-425 A.D. 1994, 42. Zosimus criticizes Constantine’s decision to create an elastic defensive, which he claims opened the empire to barbarian invasion (Zosimus 1967, 2.34). Regardless of its efficacy, it may have depopulated the frontier regions and thus facilitated Germanic settlement (Mackay 2004, 312). 92 Maas 2010, 98f. Heichelheim argues that the Roman literary elite are largely responsible for the distinction between Roman and “barbarian” cultures, which had already interacted for centuries by the fourth century A.D. (Heichelheim 2003, 454). 93 Goffart 2006, 17. 94 Friell 1994, 99. 95 Marcellinus 1986, 15.5. 96 Marcellinus 1986, ibid. 17

barbarians, and vice versa as Romans.97Zosimus provides a description of the Gothic Fravitta, a successful and well assimilated general: “…a barbarian by race but in other respects (not only by disposition but also by deliberate choice and religious practice) a Greek.”98 Germanic immigration changed the nature of the frontier but also the army, since many had been primarily received into the empire for military service. Germanic soldiers brought some of their customs into the imperial army but changed it only superficially. The Romans adopted trousers from the northern barbarians, which was not unique since most “Roman” military equipment had foreign origins.99 The intimidating barditus (war-cry) was used at the battle of Strasbourg (357 A.D.) by the cornuti and bracchiati, and later at the battle of Ad Salices (377 A.D.) by Romans more generally.100 Julian’s troops raised him up on their shields in the Germanic fashion to proclaim him emperor.101 The late imperial army may have looked and sounded different from the legions of Augustus, but it was still essentially Roman. Valentinian raised a large army of Germani and Romans in 367-369 A.D., enlisted them together in the legions, and so thoroughly drilled them that the barbarians beyond the Rhine did not dare raid the provinces for nine years.102 Valens dispatched general Vadumarius, formerly a

97 James, The Franks 1988, 44. The same could be said for the other Germani, but it was probably a precarious situation for those recently accepted into the empire (Geary 1999, 115). 98 Zosimus 1967, 4.20. 99 This is true even for early republican armies, which used Celtic and Greek helmets, Celtic mail cuirasses, Spanish swords and daggers, and central Italian javelins and shields. Roman tactics were also foreign, i.e. Greek for the phalanx, and Samnite or central Italian for the legions’ maniples. 100Marcellinus 1986, 16.12.43; 31.7.11. 101 Delbrück 1980, 250; Marcellinus 1986, 20.4.17. 102 Maas 2010, 98f.; Zosimus 1967, 4.12. Burns estimates that it took no longer than three years to properly integrate barbarian troops, at least militarily (Burns, 18

prince of the Alamanni, to besiege some rebels in Nicaea; Vadumarius’ training in the Roman army must have been beneficial since barbarians were normally poor in siegecraft.103 Ammianus mentions the barditus in the two battles above, but the Roman army is still described as disciplined and cautious, in contrast to the ferocious Alamanni.104 The many Germanic soldiers changed the army, but it seems only superficially until the fifth century A.D.105 The mechanisms of receptio integrated Germani into regular units. The regular army, as opposed to irregular mercenaries, was divided into comitatenses, the higher status regional armies under the emperors, and limitanei, the lower status border troops under duces.106 A useful catalogue is the Notitia Dignitatum, which contains civil and military offices, insignia, and unit emblems; it lists barbarian names for numerous units.107 Germanic recruits were dispersed throughout both divisions of the regular army, which facilitated assimilation.108 The Romans did not relegate Germani to average units though, but also enrolled them in the elite units and then probably gave them citizenship.109

Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, ca. 375-425 A.D. 1994, 102). 103 Burns, Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, ca. 375-425 A.D. 1994, 5; Marcellinus 1986, 26.8. 104 Marcellinus 1986, 16.12.41-48. 105 Friell 1994, 82. 106 Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army 2003, 202f. 107 James, Europe's Barbarians AD 200-600 2009, 164; Lenski 1999, 612. 108 Burns, Rome and the Barbarians 100 B.C.-A.D. 400 2003, 322. Burns notes that Rome did not have sufficient manpower to keep foreign mercenaries intact in specialized units except for some exceptions, but had to enroll them in formerly citizen units (Burns, Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, ca. 375-425 A.D. 1994, xiv). Goldsworthy notes however that there were units called numeri, which were recruited as ethnic units but eventually became submerged into the regular army (Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army 2003, 204). 109 Goffart 2006, 190; Heichelheim 2003, 455. 19

Germanic recruits were of high quality, as the sources repeatedly attest, and so the empire wanted to use them effectively.110 Constantine replaced the Praetorian Guard with elite cavalry units called scholae palatinae (imperial followers), whose recruits were mostly Germanic.111 Cavalry became a prestigious arm in the late imperial army, since it saw much action in conventional and special operations.112 Speidel argues that Constantine’s predecessors in the west, Maximian and Constantius I, were responsible for new elite infantry called auxilia palatina; foreign infantry had yet to serve as elite guards.113 The cornuti (he-goats) were a unit of auxilia palatina that significantly contributed to Constantine’s victory at Milvian Bridge (312 A.D.).114 According to Alföldi, the Arch of Constantine attests their importance by depicting their horned shield emblem, which may be a Roman adaptation of a type of Germanic helmet.115 The cornuti and bracchiati were skilled units by Julian’s reign, and may have been paired to “uphold morale through rivalry,” as Speidel terms it; the Frankish Batavians and Alamannic Regii may be another example of this.116 The laeti (prosperous men) were special colonies that proved effective in integrating Germani. The laeti consisted of

110 Maurice praises “light-haired races” for their boldness, courage, and refusal to retreat (Maas 2010, 104; Maurice 11.3). Vegetius praises the northerners for their fitness and readiness for battle (Maas 2010, 95f.; Vegetius 1.2-4). Ammianus relates the Roman army’s orderly retreat from Persia, which eventually came to the Tigris while it was flooding. Some northern barbarians, who had been trained for such things since boyhood, swam across the river, secured the bank, and wiped out the Persian guards (Marcellinus 1986, 25.6.13). 111 Ferrill 1986, 49. 112 Burns, Rome and the Barbarians 100 B.C.-A.D. 400 2003, 313. 113 Speidel 1996, 167. 114 Alföldi 1959, 174, 178. 115 Alföldi 1959, 174, 177. 116 Marcellinus 1986, 16.12.43; Speidel 1996, 166f. The bracchiati derived their name from non-Roman armbands, and the cornuti from their helmets (Alföldi 1959, 175f.) 20

Germanic prisoners of war, many of them Franks, and were settled along the Gallic frontier and in Italy.117 These settlements were created during the tetrarchy, probably by Constantius I, on public land called terra laetica; by contrast, coloni were settled on private land.118Thus, the government could supervise laeti directly without interference from landowners. Their officers were called praefecti laetorum (captains of prosperous men), and were presumably responsible for levying soldiers from them.119 The laeti supplied regular units that are listed in the Notitia Dignitatum, and therefore could be sent abroad.120 For example, Constantius II dispatched general Gomoarius with laeti to oppose Julian at the Succi Pass.121 The laeti seem to have assimilated swiftly, probably because the Romans received them under deditio and governed them closely; there is little trace of them in the archaeological record.122 There was a general and usurper named Magnentius who may have been descended from laetic settlers.123Nevertheless, his rebellion reveals no barbarian separatism, and there are many other examples of Germanic officers who were loyal to the state. There were many officers of Germanic descent in the late Roman army, but little evidence that they favored the interests of barbarians over Rome. Ammianus attests their preponderance over “Roman” officers by relating the betrayal and mass murder of

117 Friell 1994, 98. 118 “Constantine’s ‘pagan vision’: The anonymous panegyric on Constantine (310), Pan. Lat. VII(6)” 1996, (7)6.9; James, Europe's Barbarians AD 200-600 2009, 163; James, The Franks 1988, 40). 119 Friell notes importantly that the laeti could not have been militia, since civilians were not armed in the late empire (Friell 1994, 98.) 120 Burns, Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, ca. 375-425 A.D. 1994, 42; James, The Franks 1988, 39). The list for Gaul has sixteen such units (Whittaker, “Barbarian Settlements” 1999, 335). 121 Marcellinus 1986, 21.13. 122 Stickler 2007, 500. 123 James, The Franks 1988, 41. 21

Gothic garrisons: “…he [Julius] sent secret orders to those in charge of the Goths who had been transferred earlier to Asia, and dispersed in various cities and fortresses. These commanders were all Romans, an unusual thing at the present time.”124 The third and fourth centuries A.D. saw much civil strife, and it was impossible for Germanic officers, given the role of the army, not to be drawn into it.125 There was Magnentius, a usurper, and also Silvanus, although he was a victim of Rome’s corrupt politics. There was also the Frankish general Arbogastes, who proclaimed the non- Germanic Eugenius as emperor in the west, and fought for him against Theodosius at the Frigid River (394 A.D.). James notes however that “It would be very easy to put together quite a long list of disloyal Romans in the army – the number of successful or abortive usurpations in the later Roman Empire is considerable – and therefore the evidence might well suggest that barbarians were more loyal than Romans.”126 It is impartial to blame Germanic officers for political instability when those paying them had repeatedly sacrificed the empire’s welfare for their own interests. This was the environment for foreigners undergoing assimilation, and therefore it is unsurprising that they would participate in Roman strife. Many “Germanic” officers were Romans, including Magnentius and Silvanus, and there is little evidence that they supported the interests of former tribes and kinsmen, even though they participated in the recurrent strife of the late empire. Some officers had formerly been tribal aristocrats, who entered the imperial army as trained warriors with authority and prestige.127

124 Marcellinus 1986, 31.16.8. 125 Friell 1994, 83. 126 James, Europe's Barbarians AD 200-600 2009, 168. 127 Friell 1994, 99; Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army 2003, 221. Heichelheim notes that Germanic noblemen already came from societies that pursued vendettas, which Roman strife could only exacerabate, especially in the fifth century A.D.(Heichelheim 2003, 490). 22

Other officers were born in the empire and had never seen Germanic lands except on campaign. Regardless of upbringing however, Germanic officers served dutifully against other barbarians, even their former tribes.128 There was a Gothic nobleman named Modares who trounced some Goths in Thrace for the Roman cause (379 A.D.).129 Fravitta killed his fellow Goth Eriulphus when the latter contemplated breaking his oath to the empire (382 A.D.).130Arbogastes campaigned against Franks in Roman service, defeated them, and was even put in charge of receiving them into the empire (392 A.D.).131 Mallobaudes is an example of a Roman officer who maintained his links with his old tribe, but the Romans would not have viewed his behavior as disloyal.132 He first served Rome as a tribune, and later, as both a count of guard troops and a Frankish king, assisted the empire against the Lentienses (378 A.D.).133 Products of Rome’s successful integration policies were still around in the early fifth century A.D., although the system had started to break down. The great general Stilicho, whose ethnicity was Vandal, had grown up a Roman citizen and remained loyal to the empire.134 There are cases of disloyalty, but they seem exceptional. For example, Constantius II was campaigning against the Alamanni in 354 A.D. and almost found a suitable ford to surprise the barbarians, but some of his Germanic officers gave the plan away; Ammianus repeats this incident, but seems to dismiss it as rumor.135 Germanic soldiers

128 Friell 1994, 83. 129 Modares’s campaign occurred in Theodosius’s reign, and thus after Adrianople (Zosimus 1967, 4.25). His service reveals that the empire was still attractive option (Friell 1994, 31). 130 Zosimus 1967, 4.56. 131 Burns, Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, ca. 375-425 A.D. 1994, 103. 132 Burns, Rome and the Barbarians 100 B.C.-A.D. 400 2003, 339. 133 Marcellinus 1986, 14.11, 31.10. 134 Geary 1999, 119; Wolfram 1990, 89, 100f. 135 Marcellinus 1986, 14.10.7-8. 23

were sometimes disloyal to the empire, but the same is also true for Romans descended from many generations of citizens. For most of the fourth century A.D., the Romans used integrated rather than hired Germani to rectify recruitment problems. The foederati were mercenaries recruited by foedus (treaty) from barbarians outside the empire.136 They were irregulars and probably levied for single campaigns, which is probably why they are not listed in the Notitia Dignitatum.137 Constantine campaigned against Sarmatians and Tervingian Goths in 332 A.D. and made a treaty that stipulated supplying troops, which were later supplied on three occasions.138 Constantius II campaigned on the Danube in 358 A.D. against the Limigantes, and seems to have used foederati from Sarmatians and Taifali; these irregulars knew the terrain better and were used to hunt down the fleeing rebels.139 Using foederati by these methods posed no threat to the empire, but this changed with Theodosius’s treaty of 382 with the Goths. Nevertheless, the circumstances of 382 were ultimately due to Valens, as Wolfram writes, “…so the event played out like an ancient tragedy: the messenger came to warn the hero of his doom, but the hero, blinded by hubris, would not and could not listen.”140 Ammianus describes the defeat at Adrianople

136 Procopius, a Roman author in the sixth century A.D., claims that foederati were treaties with free barbarians in the empire (Maas 2010, 98; Procopius 3.11.1-5). By “earlier times” he must be referring to Theodosius’s treaty in 382, but would be anachronistic for even earlier times when the Romans had made treaties with clearly defeated barbarians (Heather, Goths and Romans 332-489 1991, 111). 137 James, Europe's Barbarians AD 200-600 2009, 165; Liebeschuetz 1990, 34. 138 Heather, Empires and Barbarians 2010, 61; Heather, Goths and Romans 332-489 1991, 109. Heather notes that the pro-Gothic Jordanes exaggerates the importance of the Goths in Constantine’s reign, and also glosses over hostilities towards the Christian emperor, as they had supplied troops to Licinius as well (“The origin of Constantine: The Anonymous Valesianus pars prior (Origo Constantini)” 1996, 5.27; Heather, Goths and Romans 332-489 1991, 108f.). 139 Marcellinus 1986, 17.13. 140 Wolfram 1990, 85. 24

(378 A.D.) as only comparable to Cannae (216 B.C.), but given the severe recruitment problems of the fourth century A.D. it may have been worse in the long-term.141 Indeed, the Romans even had to resort to the rarely used practice of enlisting slave soldiers.142 Under these circumstances, Theodosius had to raise a new army and defeat the Goths. Valens’s disaster at Adrianople forced Theodosius to defeat the Goths with very limited manpower, which he accomplished by an unprecedented use of receptio, i.e. settling barbarians in the empire and recruiting them as foederati. The Goths, even after their great victory, could not defeat the empire outright, for it still had walled cities, great resources, and strong leadership from Theodosius. On the other hand, Theodosius had scraped together a new army and could not risk losing it.143 Theodosius could not and did not want to destroy the Goths, who would still provide experienced soldiers if compelled to terms.144 Although this is what happened in 382 A.D., it was not from same position of might as when Constantine conquered the Goths in 332 A.D. Theodosius settled the Goths in Lower Moesia and Thrace, seemingly under deditio, but semi-autonomously under their own leaders and with their Gothic identity intact; Wolfram refers to their settlements as “states within the state.”145 Burns argues that the experiment was in the vein of receptio, and did not lead to an immediate breakdown in order.146 This seems correct but eventually disorder happened, as Ferrill states, “It is true that the

141 Marcellinus 1986, 31.13. 142 Maas 2010; Theodosian Code 7.13.16. 143 Friell 1994, 29f.; Ferrill 1986, 65f. 144 Friell 1994, ibid.; Orosius 1964, 7.34. 145 Heather, Goths and Romans 332-489 1991, 158,164; Wolfram 1990, 88. 146 Burns, Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, ca. 375-425 A.D. 1994, xixff., 108. 25

barbarians who settled in the Empire under Theodosius eventually played an important role in the fall of Rome.”147 In hindsight, Theodosius’s experiment was a costly precedent, as the Goths were recruited, fought loyally, but never integrated. Theodosius was a great statesman and did what was practical in 382 A.D. Furthermore, his policy worked in the short- term. Theodosius confronted the usurper Eugenius at the battle of Frigid River (394 A.D.), and won decisively with his new army bolstered by loyal Gothic foederati. Orosius even describes it as a double victory, “…a civil war was extinguished by the blood of two men, not to mention those ten thousand Goths sent ahead by Theodosius whom Arbogastes is reported to have destroyed completely. To have lost these was surely a gain and their defeat a victory.”148 Theodosius’s successors however, Arcadius and Honorius, were not skilled enough to manage this complicated relationship with the Goths and cope with the empire’s civil wars.149 As the fifth century A.D. progressed, the Romans ceased to effectively control and integrate Germanic immigrants. The Romans were skilled soldiers and statesmen, and had centuries of experience to deal with the recruitment problems of the fourth century A.D. The empire did not resolve these problems directly however, i.e. by land distributions to recreate the militarized citizenry of the Republic. Instead, they escalated the recruitment of barbarians, mostly Germani. The principle was receptio, and the mechanisms were controlled immigration and integration. The history of Germanic soldiers in the imperial army attests to Rome’s successful solution to its recruitment problems.

147 Ferrill 1986, 76. 148 Orosius 1964, 7.35. 149 Ferrill 1986, 86; Friell 1994, 161. Wolfram notes that Alaric the Goth, who sacked Rome in 410 A.D., was a Roman general like Stilicho, but unlike his counterpart he did not identify with the Roman cause (Wolfram 1990, 92, 100f.). Therefore, Alaric contrasts Mallobaudes above, who successfully managed his dual role as Roman officer and barbarian king. 26

Furthermore, it merely constitutes a chapter in Rome’s long history as a melting pot. Nevertheless, because these problems were dealt with indirectly, circumstance intervened in the late fourth century A.D. to ruin the experiment. The arrival of the Huns surprised both the Goths and the Romans. Moreover, to compound the crisis, Valens rushed into battle at Adrianople, even though Gratian was coming with reinforcements. The disaster of Adrianople illustrates the importance of chance and personality in history, as well as long-term phenomena. The breakdown in military order was not immediate, but eventually in the fifth century A.D. Germanic soldiers ceased to see the advantages of being Roman. Works Cited

Alföldi, A., and M. Ross. "Cornuti: A Teutonic Contingent in the Service of Constantine the Great and Its Decisive Role in the Battle at the Milvian Bridge. With a Discussion of Bronze Statuettes of Constantine the Great." Dumbarton Oaks Papers 13 (1959): 169+171-183.

Ambrose. Ambrose of Milan Political Letters and Speeches. Translated by J. Liebeschuetz. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005.

Burns, T. Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome A Study of Roman Military Policy and the Barbarians, ca. 375-425 A.D. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. —. Rome and the Barbarians 100 B.C.-A.D. 400. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003.

Caesar, J. The Gallic War. Translated by H. Edwards. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.

Cameron, A. "The empire and the barbarians." In The Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity AD 395-700, 39-57. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Campbell, J. "Auxilia." In Oxford Classical Dictionary, edited by S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth, 224-225. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

"Constantine’s ‘pagan vision’: The anonymous panegyric on Constantine (310), Pan. Lat. VII(6) ." In From Constantine to Julian: Pagan and Byzantine Views A Source History, edited by S. Lieu and D. Montserrat, translated by Vermes M., 63-96. New York: Routledge, 1996.

Crump, G. "Ammianus and the Late Roman Army." Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 22, no. 1 (1973): 91-103.

Delbrück, H. The Barbarian Invasions. Translated by W. Renfroe. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980.

Drinkwater, J. "Batavi." In Oxford Classical Dictionary, edited by S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth, 235. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Ferrill, A. The Fall of the Roman Empire The Military Explanation. London: Thames and Hudson, 1986.

Friell, G. and S. Williams. Theodosius The Empire at Bay. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.

Geary, P. "Barbarians and Ethnicity." In Late Antiquity A Guide to the Postclassical World, edited by G. Bowersock, O. Grabar and P. Brown, 107- 129. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999.

Goffart, W. Barbarian Tides The Migration and the Later Roman Empire. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.

Goldsworthy, A. How Rome Fell. U.S.: Yale University Press, 2009. —. The Complete Roman Army. London: Thames and Hudson, 2003.

Heather, P. Empires and Barbarians. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. —. Goths and Romans 332-489. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.

Heichelheim, F., Ward, A., and C. Yeo. A History of the Roman People. 4th. U.S.: Prentice Hall, 2003.

James, E. Europe's Barbarians AD 200-600. United Kingdom: Pearson Education Limited, 2009. —. The Franks. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988.

Jordanes. The Gothic History of Jordanes. Translated by C. Mierow. New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1966.

Lenksi, N. "Conscription." In Late Antiquity A Guide to the Postclassical World, edited by Bowerstock G., P. Brown and O. Grabar, 389. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999.

Lenski, N. "Notitiae." In Late Antiquity A Guide to the Postclassical World, edited by G. Bowerstock, P. Brown and O. Grabar O., 612. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999.

Liebeschuetz, J. Barbarians and Bishops. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

Maas, M. Readings in Late Antiquity. 2nd. New York: Routledge, 2010.

Macdowall, S. Late Roman Infantryman 236-565 AD. London: Osprey, 1994.

Mackay, C. Ancient Rome A Military and Political History. U.S.: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Marcellinus, A. The Later Roman Empire (A.D. 354-378). Translated by Hamilton. W. New York: Penguin Books, 1986.

Orosius, P. The Seven Books of History Against the Pagans. Translated by R. Deferrari. Washington, D.C., 1964.

Seager, R. "Roman Policy on the Rhine and the Danube in Ammianus." The Classical Quarterly 49, no. 2 (1999): 579-605.

Shaw, B. "War and Violence." In Late Antiquity A Guide to the Postclassical World, edited by G. Bowersock, O. Grabar and P. Brown, 130-169. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999.

Sozomen. The Ecclesiastical History of Sozomen, Comprising a History of the Church, From A.D. 324 to A.D. 440. Translated by E. Walford. London: Henry G. Bohn, York Street, Convent Garden, 1845.

Speidel, M. "Raising New Units for the Late Roman Army: "Auxilia Palatina"." Dumbarton Oaks Papers 50 (1996): 163-170. 29

Stickler, T. "The Foederati." In A Companion to the Roman Army, edited by P. Erdkamp, 495-514. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007.

Tacitus, P. Agricola Germania Dialogus. Translated by M. Hutton. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.

"The origin of Constantine: The Anonymous Valesianus pars prior (Origo Constantini)." In From Constantine to Julian: Pagan and Byzantine Views A Source History, edited by S. Lieu and D. Montserrat, translated by J. Stevenson, 39-62. New York: Routledge, 1996.

Ward-Perkins, B. The Fall of Rome. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Whittaker, C. "Barbarian." In Late Antiquity A Guide to the Postclassical World, edited by G. Bowerstock, P. Brown and O. Grabar, 334. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999.

Whittaker, C. "Barbarian Settlements." In Late Antiquity A Guide to the Postclassical World, by G. Bowerstock, P. Brown and O. Grabar, 335-336. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999.

Wolfram, H. The Roman Empire and Its Germanic Peoples. Translated by T. Dunlap. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990.

Zosimus. Zosimus Historia Nova The Decline of Rome. Translated by J. Buchanan and H. Davis. San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1967.