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Recruitmentand Integration: Germanic Soldiers in The RECRUITMENT AND INTEGRATION: GERMANIC SOLDIERS IN THE ROMAN ARMY OF THE FOURTH CENTURY A.D. _______________________________________ _______________________________________ By Justin R. Ja mes, PhD June 2021 © Copyright by Justin R. James 2021 All Rights Reserved Please visit Schola Eclectica at www.schola-eclectica.com for more articles, presentations, and videos. ii Table of Contents _______________________________________ Abstract ........................................................................................... 1 Recruitment and Integration: Germanic Soldiers in the the Roman Army of the Fourth Century A.D. ................................................... 2 Works Cited .................................................................................. 27 iii iv Abstract The Roman Empire recruited many Germanic soldiers in the third to fifth centuries A.D. Recruitment escalated in the fourth century A.D., especially in the reigns of Constantine and Theodosius. This phenomenon raises questions: Why did the recruitment of Germanic soldiers escalate? Did Germanic soldiers create military inefficiency? I argue that Germani, whether as conscripts or volunteers, provided necessary and dependable soldiers until the empire ceased to integrate them. Although Roman citizens had become reluctant to serve by the fourth century A.D., the Germanic peoples could provide many recruits to swell imperial forces. The incessant civil wars were also a factor, which exacerbated recruitment problems. The Germani came from warrior societies and therefore were eager to enlist in the imperial army, which remained a prestigious institution for most of the fourth century A.D. The Roman policy of receptio successfully integrated these recruits for most of the century. Receptio created a cultural amalgamation in the army, but did not transform it into a force of barbarian mercenaries. The empire recruited Germani on its terms until the Adrianople disaster, which began a decline in Roman supremacy. Recruitment and Integration: Germanic Soldiers in the the Roman Army of the Fourth Century A.D. The Romans used non-citizen soldiers from the republic onward; barbarization must be seen in this context. 1 Peregrini (foreigners) served in the Roman army from at least the end of the Romano-Latin War (340-338 B.C.), i.e. in units distinct from citizen legions.2 This was a hallmark of Roman statecraft, to employ vanquished adversaries as valuable allies. As the empire expanded so did its recruiting grounds. Barbarian mercenaries soon began fighting beside Rome’s legions and allies. Long before the recruitment problems of the fourth century A.D., barbarian peoples such as the Germani3 had warred for and against the empire with equal ferocity.4 Julius Caesar recruited Germani east of the Rhine River during his conquest of Gaul.5 Goldsworthy writes, “From the 1 Heather addresses the theory of Germanic manpower contributing to the fall of the western empire (Heather 2010, 74-75). Ferrill defines barbarization as “…the use of Germans on such a large scale that the army became German rather than the Germans becoming Roman soldiers…,” with the result being a decrease in military efficiency (Ferrill 1986, 84-85). 2 Friell notes that the Romans accepted that this strategy would alter the ethnic character of their state (Friell 1994, 91). 3 Germanic seems the best adjective, and Germani the best noun. “Germanic peoples” is inconvenient, “Germans” is anachronistic, and “barbarians” is vague. “Germani” however does not refer to a nation but a group of peoples from Germania and adjacent territories with a shared culture and similar languages. Wolfram notes that the term “Germani” originated from the Gauls and the Romans adopted it; therefore, only a Germanic person on Roman soil would actually refer to himself as a Germanus (Wolfram 1990, 4). 4 In Germania, Tacitus describes a battle between two tribes and hopes that the Germans continue to slaughter each other because it is good for Rome (Tacitus 1970, 33). 5 Caesar 2006, 7.13, 8.13. Caesar’s Germanic cavalry performed excellently in the Gallic War. In another passage, he praises the warlike virtues of the Germani over the Gauls (Caesar 2006, 6.24). 2 very beginning [Gallic War 58-50 B.C.], the Germans were a valuable source of military manpower as well as a threat.”6 In republican and early imperial times, the Romans tapped into the warlike traditions of barbarians only to supplement the legions. Barbarians, such as the Germani, provided fierce warriors who expanded the fighting capabilities of the legions with their specific skills.7 The British Empire had a similar recruitment strategy: the British recruited from warrior cultures within and without the empire, including Scottish Highlanders and Nepalese Gurkhas.8 The policy was sound and posed no threat to either empire. Augustus incorporated the mercenaries of the republic into well-defined units called auxilia (auxiliaries).9 These units were peregrini and specialized, e.g. Syrian archers or Germanic cavalrymen.10 Heather writes, “From the time of Augustus, at least half of the total army – all its auxiliary formations – was always composed of non-Romans, a substantial number of whom were recruited from the Germanic world.”11Although the Roman army became a melting pot, especially after the constitutio Antoniniana,12 it maintained its Roman character in organization and training.13 Nevertheless, when citizen volunteers began to 6 Goldsworthy 2009, 105. 7 Delbrück 1980, 254; Ward-Perkins 2005, 38. 8 Friell 1994, 92; Ward-Perkins 2005, 38. 9 Campbell notes that most auxiliaries were volunteers, but not all (Campbell 2003, 225). 10 The northern barbarians were excellent horsemen, e.g. the Germanic Batavi of the lower Rhine (Drinkwater 2003, 235). The tribe revolted (69-70 A.D.) under prince Julius Civilis, but were treated leniently after surrender, probably because Rome still valued their manpower. 11 Heather 2010, 74-75. 12 Antonine Constitution=the enfranchisement of all imperial subjects, with a few exceptions. 13 Delbrück 1980, 248. Regarding auxilia, their ethnic origins eventually eroded as the army recruited manpower from other provinces to replenish their ranks (Campbell 2003, 225). 3 disappear in the fourth century A.D., the barbarian element became even more essential.14 Roman citizens were normally reluctant to serve in fourth century A.D.15Ammianus refers to this occasionally, e.g. he contrasts Italians to robust Gauls who do not cut their thumbs off to avoid service.16 Matters worsened, especially after the Adrianople disaster. The Theodosian Code ordered murci to be burned to death, corrupt masters fined, new recruits to be branded, and deserters sent to the mines.17Conquest and civil war transferred from the Mediterranean Basin to the frontiers in imperial times, and it seems that inhabitants of the former adjusted to peaceful urban life. According to Shaw, “The shift was usually marked by an increasing reluctance to serve on the part of the ordinary citizens of the conquering state, and an increasing professionalization of military service and drawing of recruits from 14 Cameron notes that barbarians were crucial from the late fourth century A.D. (Cameron 2012, 53). If barbarians constituted half the early imperial army then perhaps they were already more than a supplement. Nevertheless, the citizen legions were the core of the republican and early and middle imperial armies; the history of the Roman army is one of steady but gradual change. 15 Population decline in the western empire is uncertain, which would contribute to a manpower shortage, but the army only absorbed around one percent of the population (James 2009, 161; Mackay 2004, 331; Shaw 1999, 135). The eastern empire did not have a shortage however, and yet Constantius II still requested Germanic troops from Julian (360 A.D.)(Marcellinus 1986, 20.4.2). Furthermore, even by the fifth century A.D. the urbanized provincial populations greatly outnumbered the invading Germanic peoples (Maas 2010, 345). 16 Marcellinus 1986, 15.12.3, 19.11.7, 31.41-6. The self-mutilators are called murci, and apparently were not found in Gaul. He seems to be describing the Romanized Celtic population, which provides evidence that at least some Roman citizens were not averse to military service (Marcellinus 15.12.3). Nevertheless, it is clear that the empire, and especially the late empire, had greater difficulty recovering from defeats than the republic (Friell 1994, 211). 17 James 2009, 162; Theodosian Code 7.13.5, 10.22.4, 17.18.1. 4 the war zones of the state.”18 Roman authorities eventually had to resort to compulsion; thenceforth, the imperial army ceased to be a volunteer force clearly defined into citizen legions and foreign auxilia. The Romans used conscription to replenish the ranks but it was ultimately insufficient. Diocletian or Constantine required that veterans’ sons enlist, which was reinforced by Theodosius.19Annual conscription may have been instituted by Diocletian and required landowners to provide recruits.20 The army would naturally target the landowners more than the cities because their manpower was already inured to hardship.21 Some landowners were wealthier than others; only large ones had to provide a recruit annually while smaller ones combined resources and rotated the duty.22 The system was abused. Property owners were the local authorities in the countryside and were indisposed to surrender their fittest men. Press-gangs rounded up unwilling recruits or passed off unsuitable ones with bribes.23 Delbrück writes, “Levied or impressed soldiers are only competent in very well-disciplined troop units with strong cadres…Only if the men 18 Shaw notes that other powers experienced this, and that Roman citizens had ceased to be militarized by the imperial period (Shaw 1999, 138). 19 Ferrill 1986, 43; Theodosian Code 7.1.5. Delbrück notes the changed political and social conditions of the fourth century A.D.: urban populations had assigned duties and the landowners had moved from the city to the country, making them the local authorities there Delbrück 1980, 228. 20 Shaw 1999, 389. Manpower constituted a portion of capital and was therefore taxable.
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