BRIEF POLICY

A CHANCE TO REFORM: HOW THE EU CAN SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN MOROCCO Susi Dennison, Nicu Popescu and José Ignacio Torreblanca

There may not have been a revolution in the Kingdom of SUMMARY While Morocco is usually seen as more stable, Morocco, but it has not been left untouched by the “Arab more advanced and more democratic than Spring”. Like many of its neighbours, Morocco has seen many other countries in North Africa, it too the growth of a protest movement demanding dignity, has potential for unrest. Although there is democracy and an end to corruption. Since 20 February no immediate prospect of a revolution as in 2011 – the date that gave the alliance of students, left- Egypt or Tunisia, Moroccans are increasingly frustrated with the country’s veneer of wing activists and non-parliamentary Islamists leading the democracy. They are now demanding protests its name – demonstrations have taken place in more limits on royal power and an end to several Moroccan cities. The demand for social and political corruption and clientelism. In short, they change is likely to continue to grow louder still as the internet, want a king who, as a slogan of the 20th YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and even rap music spread the February protest movement puts it, “reigns, but does not govern”. This situation presents demonstrators’ message to a much wider audience. the EU with a different kind of challenge than those it faces in Egypt or Tunisia. This brief is based on a research visit by the authors to Rabat in April to meet with representatives of the Moroccan With its European outlook and its close government and members of political parties; members of economic and commercial ties with EU states, the 20th February movement; journalists, academics and Morocco highly values its privileged status within the EU’s southern neighbourhood. civil society; and representatives of key European embassies This brief, based on a research visit by the and the European Union (EU) delegation. The Rabat that the authors to Rabat in April, argues that the EU authors saw does not have the feel of a city on the tipping point should now use the considerable leverage it of political reform on a radical scale: the protest movement has to put greater pressure on Morocco to has not yet gathered the momentum of its counterparts in create real democracy. The EU should put its Egypt and Tunisia. In particular, few people in Morocco weight behind a more inclusive constitutional commission, engage with youth movements, want to overthrow the monarchy: rather, there is a growing including Islamists, and offer better trade domestic call for it to reform. Around the country, protesters terms. It is in the EU’s interest to push for are demanding more limits on royal power and an end to political reform now rather than react to a corruption and clientelism. In short, they want a king who, as Syrian-style crackdown and instability in a a slogan of the 20th February movement puts it, “reigns, but few months’ time. does not govern”. 2 ECFR/33 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu A CHANCE TO REFORM: HOW THE EU CAN SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN MOROCCO Potential for unrest 1  This situation presents a different kind of challenge to to challenge of kind different a presents situation This Tunisia that there is “no guarantee” that the “Arab spring” spring” “Arab the that guarantee” “no is there that Tunisia The Moroccan foreign minister wrote in relation to Egypt and Though the protest movement is growing, it does not seem not does it growing, is movementprotest the Though If the EU made clear that the future of Morocco’sadvancedoffuture the thatclear made EU the If It is widely accepted that the revolutions in the Middle EastMiddlerevolutions thetheacceptedwidely inthat is It acceptedsofar, theMoroccan government would listen. Itis values highlyMorocco states, EU with tiescommercial and domesticthe ofsupport InternationalMorocco.in pressure are not fulfilled, the protest movement surges in anger and anger in surgesmovement protest thefulfilled, not are and North Africa in 2011 have been sparked by four factors:foursparkedbybeen have 2011 AfricainNorth and announced a consultation on the constitution in order to be constitutionconsultationannouncedtoorderthe a inon authoritarian monarchy with the potential for gradual gradual for potential the with monarchy authoritarian a free-trade agreement with the US. But while the middle middle the while But US. the with agreement free-trade a became it 2004, in EU; the withAgreement Association an anequally likely scenario. game: following the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, he counts. With its European outlook and its close economic economic close its and outlook European its With counts. do not seem inclined to make meaningful changes to the the to changes meaningful make to inclined seem not do democratic institutions. For now, the king is playing a tactical potential. this realise to place in all yet not are pieces chess the However, democracy. constitutional towards evolution onto a real road to reform. In particular, Europe’s voice voice Europe’s particular, In reform. to road real a onto cooperationinthe “war onterror”. In2000, Morocco signed on strong diplomatic links, trade ties and, more recently, recently, more and, ties trade links, diplomatic strong on not a state in post-revolutionary transition, but rather an an rather but transition, post-revolutionary in state a not relationship with the EU and the United States, based based States, United the and EU the with relationship will lead to an “Arab summer” and that a “sobering winter” is months’ time if the king’s promises of constitutionalpromisesking’softhe reform if months’ time make him concede significant powers by creatinggenuinelysignificantconcedebypowers him make than react to a Syrian-style crackdown and instability in a few has it as rights human of areas limited on steps baby than the king cracks down violently. the EU than those it faces in Egypt or Tunisia. Morocco is is Morocco Tunisia. or Egypt in faces it those than EU the than many other countries in North Africa, it too is vulnerable the third state in the region, after Jordan and Israel, to signIsrael,region, toJordanafterandthe in state third the in the EU’s interest to push for political reform now rather now reform political for push to interest EU’s the in stridestowardslargedemocracy,dependedstatusonrather its privileged status within the EU’s southern neighbourhood. in each of these four areas. democratic more and advanced more stable, more as seen shore up the monarchy’s legitimacy. But he and his entourage seenrespondingas thetodemands protestersof andthus to strong enough to threaten King Mohammed VI sufficiently to protest movement could tip the balance, and push Moroccopushbalance,and the protest movementtip could unequal economic development; demography; a lack of of lack a politicalusuallycorruption.freedom;andMoroccoisWhile demography; development; economic unequal power balance in Morocco in the near future. Since independence in 1956, Morocco has enjoyed a close close a enjoyed has Morocco 1956, in independence Since le-printemps-arabe-n-est-pas-nouveau_1501170_3232.html. March 2011,available at http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/03/31/au-maroc- Taib FassiFihri,“AuMaroc,‘leprintempsarabe’ n’estpasnouveau”, 1 But the same could also be said of Le Monde , 31 4  3 2  Literacy rate Figure 1 In addition,In Morocco muchhasapoorer ratingnumber aon UNDPHuman Poverty Index, and has an illiteracy rate of 45 Libya and Egypt, independence brought to power Marxists or and public services to prove his legitimacy to rule. devolution the in resulted decolonisation because Morocco arelower than those of Sudan, Haiti and Rwanda, though its GDPpercapita istwotofour times larger. Morocco’s per capita GDP is around half that of Tunisia’s. of that half around is GDP capita per Morocco’s equalityand wealth redistribution. None ofthis happened in especially,post-independenceof politics.Tunisia, In Algeria, of power to an absolute monarch. As a result, there was no was thereresult, a As monarch.absolute an to power of ofdevelopment indicators. Morocco is96th out of120 inthe or Tunisia’s 23 percent.Tunisia’s23 or class and the elites have benefited from Morocco’s increasing nationalists who may not have promotedpoliticalhavepluralismnot nationalists may who immediate incentive to create a well-functioning economy economy well-functioning a create to incentive immediate and, government and governance poor of result a also is it internationaltrade, the average Moroccan citizen’s quality of partlybeattributed todisappointing economic performance: percent, compared to Egypt’s 34 percent, Algeria’s 24 percent life hasn’t improved much. but promoted social mobility, popular education, gender gender education, popular mobility, social promoted but Source: United Nations Development Program Report, 2009  Morocco technical-paper_02.pdf. the Crossroads”),availableathttp://www.iai.it/pdf/mediterraneo/MedPro/MedPro- MEDPRO TechnicalReportNo.2/April2011, p.5(hereafterColombo,“Moroccoat Crossroads: Seizingthewindowofopportunity forsustainabledevelopment”, UNDP HumanDevelopmentIndicators.SeeSilviaColombo,“Moroccoatthe library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html. library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html andhttps://www.cia.gov/ Tunisia’s was$9,500.SeeCIAWorldFactbook,availableathttps://www.cia.gov/ According toCIAdata,Morocco’sestimatedpercapitaGDPin2010was$4,900; country/enpi_nip_morocco_en.pdf,. National IndicativeProgramme, p.7,availableathttp://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/ See EuropeanNeighbourhoodandPartnership Instrument,Morocco,2007-2010 the EU,almost1.5millionchildrenofcompulsory schoolage(6-15)arenotinschool. percent inruralareas(46formenand 74.5percentforwomen).Accordingto available athttp://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. Illiteracycanrisetoasmuch60.5 Figures onlevelsofliteracyfromUnitedNations DevelopmentProgrammeStatistics, 55.6

Algeria 75.4 3 In fact, Morocco’s levels of literacyMorocco’soflevelsfact, In Tunisia 77.7 Libya 86.8 4 This lagcan only Egypt 66.4 2

The Moroccan population is as young as in the other countries are de facto limitations on freedom of expression, particularly in the region, with one-third of the population between 15 when media outlets and civil society organisations cross the and 29 years old and higher levels of youth unemployment line of criticising the monarchy too closely. than in Tunisia or Egypt.5 According to a government report published in 2006, Morocco needed to double the number of new jobs it created each year from 200,000 to 400,000 Figure 3 in order to deal with the country’s deficit in terms of human Morocco’s rising corruption perception development.6 With almost three times as many people entering the job market each year as there are jobs created, 2010 85 the pressures for emigration are huge: one in four graduates 89 does not have a job.7 Youth emigration, and the resulting 2009 remittances, have become a permanent reality of Moroccan 2008 80 society over the past three decades, with large Moroccan communities in Spain and France, in particular. 2007 72

2006 79

Figure 2 2005 78 Population under the age of 25 2004 77

2003 70

2002 52

Source: Transparency International, 2010 52.3 Morocco’s Rising Corruption Perception 47.7 47.5 47.4 42.1 There is also widespread corruption: Morocco placed 85th in the Transparency International Corruption Index for 2010 – well below Tunisia and Jordan.8 To make matters worse, Mohammed VI has, like ousted presidents Zine al-Abidine Morocco Algeria Tunisia Libya Egypt Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, amassed an incredible fortune. In fact, the 47-year-old king, who acceded to the throne pledging to be the “king of the poor”, is now Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010 the seventh richest monarch in the world, with a personal fortune estimated to be around $2.5 billion – bigger than that of the emirs of oil-rich Kuwait or Qatar.9 But while he Since King Mohammed VI came to the throne in 1999, there has invested in infrastructure projects such as tramlines in has been some progress in terms of particular human rights. Rabat and Casablanca and a high-speed rail link, 80 percent For example, in 2004 a new family code granted women of Moroccans struggle to survive. This puts Morocco in 119th greater marriage and child custody rights, and from 2004 to position in the “Struggling Index” – three places below Egypt 2006 an Equity and Reconciliation Commission investigated before the revolution.10 human rights abuses since independence (under the reign of Hassan II, from 1961 to 1999, thousands of his political opponents were disappeared, tortured and killed). But Morocco’s privileged status although this commission has done important work in terms of investigation and reparation, those responsible for abuses From across the Mediterranean, the EU has chosen to focus have not been prosecuted. Moreover, although arbitrary on the positive developments under Mohammed VI, such as arrest and torture are less frequent than they used to be, they the Equity and Reconciliation Commission, and the veneer still take place, particularly on charges of terrorism and in of democracy in the country. Political parties from left and relation to the Western Sahara territory disputed between right regularly rotate in power following elections that, by Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. There the standards of the region, are relatively free (though not necessarily fair). Morocco also has a civil society and an urban

5 According to the International Labour Organization, youth unemployment in Morocco (ages 15-34) is at 82 percent. See Institute of International Finance, 2011, “From Tunis 8 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, available at http:// to Cairo: An Altered Political Landscape”, February 1, 2011, table 2, p.3. www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results. 6 See “50 Years of Human Development & Prospects for 2025”, (an in-depth 9 Tatiana Serafin, “The World’s Richest Royals”,Forbes , 17 June 2009, available at government-commissioned report to assess Morocco’s needs 50 years after http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/17/monarchs-wealth-scandal-business-billionaires- independence) available at http://www.rdh50.ma/fr/index.asp. richest-royals.html. 7 Lise Storm, Democratization in Morocco: The political elite and struggles for power in 10 Gallup Global Wellbeing Survey, Gallup World Poll, 2005-2009, available at http://www. the post-independence state (Routledge, 2007). geographic.org/country_ranks/global_wellbeing_index_2010_country_ranks.html. 3 4 ECFR/33 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu A CHANCE TO REFORM: HOW THE EU CAN SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN MOROCCO Western Sahara that left the state coffers empty. 12  11 European Neighbourhood Policy and has cultivated it as a as it cultivated has and Policy Neighbourhood European EU. Thirdly, and perhaps most crucially of all, this special special this all, of crucially most perhaps and Thirdly, EU. in state other any than more Commission, European These benefits of closer ties with the EU have enabled the the enabled have EU the with ties closer of benefits These Tunisia under Ben Ali and the more problematic and less EU- This endorsement by the EU is crucial to Morocco for for Morocco to crucial is EU the by endorsement This In light of these surface-level efforts by the monarchy to to monarchy the by efforts surface-level these of light In Moroccan elite to hold their country up as a model for the for model a as up country their hold to elite Moroccan appetite for reform. In many ways, the country has turned has country the ways, many In reform. for appetite around 59 percent of Morocco’s imports were from the EU. and (albeit limited) democracy. Morocco has also been helped by the fact that its performance army, including plots to assassinate Hassan II, and a war in the dependentLibya and Algeria, Morocco had a milder political characterisedpoliticalrepressionfiercedissidentsofbyand only state in the region that was able to offer both stability both offer to able was that region the in state only its of that by relief into thrown was reform political on the recognise to willingIslamists those space,public the of region, contributing to the legitimacy of the regime. neighbourhood,and cooperating with the EU and the US on greater a and pluralism political apparent more regime, relationship is also the foundation for trade. In 2009, 62 62 2009, In trade. for foundation the also is relationship the from aid development in million €205 received authoritarian more the to Compared states. neighbouring ersn pors twrs mr sal scey hn the than society stable more a towards progress represent middleclasseducatedthatis Europhile. and Withimportant monarchy’sreligiousclaimto leadership havebeenlegalised, the EU awarded Morocco “advanced status” within the the within status” “advanced Morocco awarded EU the the closure of the border with Algeria. thus attained a kind of privileged position, perceived as the asperceived position,privileged of kind a attainedthus the first North African country to hold a summit with the the with summit a hold to country African North first the greater of prestige the provides it Secondly, region. the its back on the rest of North Africa, an attitude symbolised by several reasons. Firstly, it is lucrative – in 2009, Morocco Morocco 2009, in – lucrative is it Firstly, reasons. several the byattempts d’étatcoups failed of series a unrest,social socialisedintobe started to thushaveparliament and in sit keypartner. By taking limited steps which satisfied the EU’s key issues such as migration and counter-terrorism, Morocco limits and exceptions in areas such as media freedom,mediabasicexceptionsaslimitssuchareasand in present Morocco as being on a path towards democracy, democracy, towards path a on being as Morocco present percent of Morocco’s total exports went to the EU, and and EU, the to went exports total Morocco’s of percent political engagement – in March 2010, Morocco became became Morocco 2010, March in – engagement political was which VI, Mohammed to prior erapost-independence parliamentarypolitics.developmentsThese undoubtedly do freedebate. are – demonstration and association as such – freedoms broadly respected. The internet in particular allows for relatively box-ticking approach to promoting political reform in the the in reform political promoting to approach box-ticking

See, for example, http://www.reforme.ma/en for a lively debate on constitutional reform. docs/2006/september/tradoc_113421.pdf. March 2011,basedon IMF 2009data,availableathttp://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ “Morocco’s TradewithMainPartners2009”, EuropeanCommission,DGTrade,11 11 Whilesome Islamist groups havebeenkept out 12

Allthese aspects theofEU-Morocco relationship a addtoup 13 14  9.3 percent of the Moroccan population are emigrants, andemigrants, are population Moroccan the of percent 9.3 EUwithlimited a window toencourage Morocco toturn this Europe and sees its future as being closely tied to it. As a Europeanresult, than North African. Morocco, like Tunisia, looks to and – prestige significant quite enjoy to continues Europe Tunisiaand Egypt’s revolutions might deprive Morocco ofits Thus, although Morocco no longer aspires to EU membership, Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. The Moroccan are ongoing. a genuine effort at deeper political opening. providesThisdeep.theMorocco’sskingoing only efforts as Morocco’sinward remittance flows amounted to $6.2 billion immigrants money the because least not – accessible and in communities significant also are there and Spain, and MoroccoMoroccanrelationship.millionpeopleoftwo Over accepted, and considered legitimate yardsticks with which which with yardsticks legitimate considered and accepted, governmentisvery keen tokeep legal migration routes open generally, parts of which see themselves as more southern southern more as themselves see which of parts generally, cooperated with the European Commission and member member and Commission European the with cooperated currently sensitive to pressure from the outside. Added to this, certain level of potential for the EU to insist on political reform descent currently live in Western Europe, mainly in France in mainlyEurope,Western in livecurrentlydescent cooperation on immigration is another centrepiece of the EU- on a readmission agreement began in September 2000 andSeptember 2000readmissionin agreement begana on of “Europeanisation” as a powerful tool to trigger domestic trigger to tool powerful a “Europeanisation”as of with the bitter memories of the rejection of its application to with particularly close ties among the country’s middle and middlecountry’s the among tiesparticularly closewith reform among the political elites. EU standards are widely are standards EU elites. political the among reform reform and compensate for the lack of domestic will for deep many of the elites’ minds, the EU still plays an important role, join the then-European Communities in 1987 still present in there is now a palpable fear in Rabat about the possibility that therefore leverage – among the Moroccan populationMoroccanmore the among – leveragetherefore to assess the depth and adequacy of political, economic or or economic political, of adequacy and depth the assess to in Morocco, should it choose to. In this sense, Morocco is Morocco sense, this In to. choose it should Morocco, in showing greater promise of genuine reform, exposing exposing reform, genuine of promise greater showing in 2009 (Morocco’s GDP is around $154 billion). states in trying to prevent inflows of illegal migration, bothmigration, illegal of inflowsprevent to trying in states social reform. send back is important to the Moroccan economy. In fact, fact, In economy. Moroccan the to important is back send privileged status and divert funding towards the countries the towards funding divert and status privileged protect this mobility, the Moroccan government has therefore political classes. Many political and civil-society actors think from Morocco and from other parts of Africa. NegotiationsAfrica. of parts other from and Morocco from fear to good use and earn its right to advanced status through  Ebook.pdf. available athttp://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011- Migration andRemittancesFactBook2011 , SecondEdition,TheWorldBank, http://en.rsf.org/morocco-royal-pardon-for-internet-user-19-03-2008,25900.html. years of jail for creating spoof Facebook profile for prince”, 19 March 2008, available at Reporters Without Borders, “Royal pardon for Internet user, condemned to three 13 In order to Figure 4 Beneath the veneer of reform Democracy index

In January 2008, a 26-year-old computer technician called Fouad Mourtada created a fake Facebook profile of Prince Moulay Rachid of Morocco. He was quickly arrested and, a month later, sentenced to three years in prison for infringing the law on the sacrality of the royal house, which is guaranteed 3.79 3.44 by Article 23 of the constitution. Mourtada was released 43 days 3.07 later on a royal pardon in response to international outrage at 2.79 the sentence.14 However, the case showed that, in Morocco, the monarchy is untouchable. For years, discussing or questioning 1.94 the affairs of the king in the media has been an absolute taboo. Those who dared touch the king could be exiled, imprisoned or fined at best.15 In recent years, several independent journalists have been imprisoned, forced into exile or severely fined.16 In 2010, two newspapers that did criticise the king were fined and Morocco Algeria Tunisia Libya Egypt closed down. Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010 Despite the Moroccan government’s efforts to present itself to the outside world as reformist, the political system – which is centred on the king – is far from the constitutional monarchy Admittedly, the Moroccan system is clearly more diffuse and that it claims to be. The king has strong executive powers open than the consolidated single-party rule of Ben Ali in and dominates political life: he names the prime minister Tunisia or Mubarak in Egypt. But while it has allowed the and the cabinet and can dismiss either at any time; can population to let off political steam, it has also discredited dissolve parliament; can pass decrees or veto laws approved political parties, which have been co-opted by the system by parliament; heads the armed forces and presides over the through perks and posts, and by the right of judicial Supreme Council of the Judiciary which appoints all judges. immunity granted to members of parliament. Moroccans feel Morocco does have a limited multi-party system; holds that they vote for alternative parties but do not get alternative regular elections which are relatively free; has alternating governments. As a result, there is now increasing apathy, governments; and the parties that win the most votes at the low election turnout and anti-makhzen (establishment) election are invited to head the government. But while elections frustration. As one interlocutor put it, “our parties pursue lead to changes of government, the winning parties do not posts, not power, since only one person – the king – has power really govern. They run the administration, but ministers have in this country”. To many Moroccans, the country seems to be much less power than the king’s counsellors. In short, political ruled by a shadow government of the king’s advisors rather parties are in government but not in power. than by ministers.

As an institution, the monarchy remains genuinely popular. The royal house is over 300 years old and claims to descend from the Prophet Muhammad, and the king is “Amir Al- Muminin” – Commander of the Faithful. Mohammed VI also remains popular. The king has announced a series of high- profile investments that project an image of economic and social progress such as a 23 percent increase in education spending since 2008 to meet UN Millennium Development Goals, and the Tangier port, which is estimated to be one of top three in the entire region by 2015.17 A member of the governing Istiklal party says: “His Majesty initiates and launches all the big projects, such as motorways or high- speed rail. He always brings the good news. But while the king is given credit for achievements, failures are blamed on the government. That’s a problem.”

15 See, for example, Human Rights Watch Annual Report 2003, available at http://www. hrw.org/legacy/wr2k3/. 16 See Reporters Without Borders, “Advances and reverses for press freedom during King Mohammed’s first decade”, 22 July 2009, available at http://en.rsf.org/ morocco-advances-and-reverses-for-press-22-07-2009,33950.html. 17 See Colombo, “Morocco at the Crossroads”, p.3, 6. 5 6 ECFR/33 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu A CHANCE TO REFORM: HOW THE EU CAN SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN MOROCCO At the same time, however, the king has supported supported has king the however, time, same the At 20 20 19  18  Percentage of population online Figure 5 Justice and Development, an Islamist party that is shunned by 2002 to 8 million in 2008), developing free trade with the EU (the number of tourists in Morocco rose from 2.2 millionin 2.2fromMorocco rose tourists in numberof (the In additionbeing“commanderfaithful”de thetheIntoand of Islamist – groups. Abdelillah Benkirane, leader of the Party of Morocco’s political system might have been more pluralist pluralist more been have might system political Morocco’s and expanding rights for women. forrights expanding and extended and consolidated skilfully has VI Mohammed a large swathe of businesses with an estimated value of €6 of value estimated an with businesses of swathe large a allother political actors, says that “we are against the system and the United States. Middle East. double legitimacy: it constantlyalternateslegitimacy:showingbetweendoubleit conservative religious policies, which has allowed him to to him allowed has which policies, religious conservative within Morocco. He has led the modernisation of Morocco, of modernisation the led has He Morocco. within retain the support of more traditional Islamic – and even even and – Islamic traditional more of support the retain withinMorocco, but also, importantly, the support of the EU model of convergence of economic power, cronyism and rent- than Tunisia’s or Egypt’s, it nevertheless reproduces the the reproduces nevertheless it Egypt’s, or Tunisia’s than the most important business actors in the country, controlling its modern face and then its Islamic face”. support of the urban middle classes and the political elites political the and classes middle urban the of support seeking around the palace that is so common elsewhere in the his political power by appealing to different constituencies different to appealing by power political his processing, mining and distribution businesses.distribution and mining processing, for exampleforincreasingby country’s the opennesstourists to facto head of government, the king and his entourage are also billion. be preserved”.be Thecrown has,localaas journalist putsit, “a but not the king. His role as commander of the faithful should Source: World Bank, 2008 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%   No. 5,April2011,pp.54-59. For adetailedaccountoftheking’sbusinesses, seetheMoroccanjournal statistics/visitors-to-morocco-over-time.html. Tourism figuresfromRiadReviews,http://www.riadreviews.com/resources/tourism- 2011, availableathttp://www.almaghariba.com/news/307-rachidniniarrested. Abdellatif Serroukh,“RachidNiniArrested… Again”,Almaghariba.com,29April guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/239525. reveals UScable”, stakes.html; “USembassycables:Moroccan businessman revealsroyalcorruption, news/2011-04-22/morocco-king-s-investment-fund-to-give-up-major-company- Stakes”, Bloomberg,22April2011,availableathttp://www.bloomberg.com/ See AidaAlami,“MoroccoKing’sInvestment FundtoGiveUpMajorCompany Morocco

19 These include banking, real estate, insurance,estate,banking,includefoodrealThese The Guardian,6December2010,availableathttp://www. Algeria Tunisia 18 This has guaranteedthe has This Libya 20 Although Kantara, Egypt AlgeriaYemen,andmovementathis isrealthat hatenohas The protest movement and the 23  22 20th February movement. “We want a monarchy like in in like monarchy a want “We movement. February 20th (“get out”) has no one in Morocco to attach itself to. The The to. itself attach to Morocco in one no has out”) (“get policemen to roses handingexample, for – Europe Eastern February movement, which is made up of student activists, student of up made is which movement, February The demand for political reform in Morocco is led by the 20th Islamist movement Jama’at al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice (Justice wal-Ihsan al-Adl Jama’at movement Islamist In an official statement, an appeals court in Casablanca Casablanca in court appeals an statement, official an In Holland.askingarereforms,wefornowFor ousting the not question the from awaystaying are they now, forHowever, government’s response aboutthe power and role ofthe king has begun. Newspapers Moroccan people. The leaders of the movement argue that argue movement the of leaders The people. Moroccan aroundslogansdemocracy,theof dignity justiceandthefor the loyaltyto showdonationsorganising blood to massand and Spirituality). Inspired by revolutions in neighbouring neighbouring in revolutions by Inspired Spirituality). and advisers should be as involved in business as they are. This are. they asbusiness in involved as be shouldadvisers an outspokenan criticcorruptionofadvocate angreater and of country – to mobilise people. Though they come from diverse demonstrationson 20 February and 20 March even resorted and networks activist internet, the used has it countries, criticism is not without its risks: on 29 April, Rachid Nini, Nini, Rachid April, 29 on risks: its without not is criticism of theofking.” Unlike itscounterparts Egypt,in Tunisia, Libya, existing the by represented feel not do “We throne. the on remains king the if possible is reform sufficient whether of ontoprotest banners, theyarenotreally wellenough known written which were deemed “harshly critical of governmental meaningful concessions. than whom it is against: the now-familiar cry of “dégage” “dégage” of cry now-familiar the against: is it whom than make to beginsgovernment the until themsustain will this to recyclingto anti-Mubarak andBenAlibanners forwanta of large the in protestors Some resentment. much incite to themore radical parts ofthe left, and the non-parliamentary the editor of the Casablanca-based newspaper newspaper Casablanca-based the of editor the innovative forms of protests reminiscent of revolutions in in revolutions of reminiscent protests of forms innovative still do not venture into discussing specific business ventures, institutions”. security and national were based to on a threat number of a articles posing that Nini included had charges the that said king himself retains broad popular support, and although although and support, popular broad retains himself king political parties”, said Nizar Bennamate, a member of the the of member a Bennamate, Nizar said parties”, political united are protesters the spectrum, political the of parts photos of some of his close advisors have found their way way their found have advisors close his of some of photos political freedom, was arrested. His trial began on 2 May. May. 2 on began trial His arrested. was freedom, political Since the toppling of Ben Ali in Tunisia, a cautious debate cautious a Tunisia, in Ali Ben of toppling the Since figures to rally around. It has a clearer idea of what it is for is it what of cleareridea a has around.Itrally figuresto better unifying call. but they do question whether the king, his family and his his and family his king, the whether question do they but  Marruecos/indulta/148/presos/conciencia/elpepuint/20110414elpepuint_8/Tes. País, 14April2011,availableathttp://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/rey/ Ignacio Cembrero,“ElreydeMarruecosindulta a148presosdeconciencia”, com/2011/03/09/king-mohamed-vi-speech-3911-full-text-feb20-khitab/. For thefulltextofspeech,seehttp://moroccansforchange.wordpress. 21

Al Massae Al El , The protests have forced Morocco’s elites to make limited In particular, if the 20th February movement feels that the concessions. In a speech on 9 March, the king called for goodwill that it showed towards the process of constitutional “new, comprehensive reforms . . . as part of the continuing reform has been betrayed, far greater numbers might come interaction with all of the nation’s stakeholders”.22 On 14 out onto the streets. In the absence of timely international April, he pardoned 148 prisoners of conscience and reduced pressure to push the Moroccan government towards a more the sentences of another 42 – a measure for which Moroccan progressive response, a crackdown could also be possible human rights groups had long called.23 He also set up a in response. As the ongoing trial of Rachid Nini shows, the committee to consult widely and review the constitution, regime is prepared to accept the protest movement while it which will report in June 2011. However, there is some does not appear threatening. While it feels it is able to control scepticism about this committee, whose members have been how far and how fast reform moves, there are limits to what directly appointed, thus sidelining parliament, and which will it will accept. If the EU does not engage now to underline the have limited time and will be able to deal with a limited range need to make progress towards genuine democracy, it could of issues. After taking submissions, it will draft proposals face a far more difficult decision of when and how to respond that will be put to a referendum, in which the people will be to a crackdown – as it currently faces in Libya and Syria. expected to vote in line with the king. To the 20th February movement, the process appears to represent yet another attempt to co-opt the main parties, undermine the demands The EU: divided, indifferent and short-termist of the opposition, delegitimise street protests and change as little as possible in the functioning of the political system. As outlined above, the EU and its member states have not only political and commercial influence in Morocco, but also The announcement of the process of constitutional reform significant soft-power potential. But this soft power is there does seem to have bought the monarchy some time. For because of what Europe is, not because of what the European now, the 20th February movement is keeping the pot of Union does. Like elsewhere in North Africa to date, the EU has unrest simmering rather than increasing the pressure. failed to use its leverage and presence in Morocco to promote However, the government is attempting to placate the protest better governance and democracy. In fact, the west’s anti- movement with the same recipe that has worked in their terrorist agenda that followed 9/11 relieved many of the more relations with the EU: an appearance of major concessions, cooperative regimes of the pressure they had been under to with little substance: in a meeting in the justice ministry in democratise.25 Morocco was rated “partly free” by Freedom early April, officials brushed aside the deafening noise from House in 2010, but was on a downward trend because of the a demonstration outside the building as “business as usual” increasing concentration of power in the hands of the king for Morocco, which has always known strikes and public and his elites. meetings. This approach appears to ignore the fact that there are significant changes underway in Moroccan political society Overall, the EU has generally failed to engage with the forces that are moving the situation beyond “business as usual”. most likely to challenge the Moroccan government – the For example, the leadership of two of the key establishment youth and the Islamists. Even though they are relevant forces parties – the Justice and Development Party (PJD) and for political development in Morocco and are keen to speak to the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) – are under member states in the hope of making their views heard, most strong pressure from their ranks to join the 20th February EU embassies are not in contact with them. The two member movement.24 The “defection” of these two parties from the states that matter most in Morocco are Spain and France, monarchy’s camp would have wide-reaching consequences. which are the main sources of investment, trade, and tourism, and which have the biggest Moroccan communities abroad. The coming months will be the test of whether the speed and However, because of their close economic and strategic ties to extent of the elite concessions are sufficient to satisfy the Morocco, France and Spain are also the strongest advocates demands of the protest movement, which has now seen in within the EU for greater and unconditional EU assistance to neighbouring countries how quickly change can come. But the Morocco regardless of its human rights record. opposition to the monarchy does not at the moment seem strong enough, without international support, to force the king to The Moroccan monarchy has played its cards skilfully in these accept far-reaching reform. If the committee on constitutional relationships, building up confidence with France and Spain, reform comes back in June with very limited proposals, and including through efforts to manage illegal immigration no real attempt to create genuine democratic institutions (both from Morocco and from sub-Saharan Africa) and (for example, a parliament with real legislative powers and a being particularly tough on Islamic terrorism movements judiciary that is not appointed by a council chaired by the king), at home through controversial anti-terror laws. (However, the situation in Morocco could become more volatile.

25 Abdallah Saaf, director of the Centre d’Etudes et des Recherches en Sciences Sociales, writes: “While the EU is admired for enjoying all the things which the people in the region want (democracy, prosperity, the rule of law, social justice, secularity, etc.), 24 Three MPs, Mustafa Ramid, Lahbib Chobani and Abdelali Hamieddine, resigned from its commitment to promote those values in the region is formal, incoherent, and the PJD’s executive committee following the decision by the party’s secretary general, dominated by double standards. Whenever there is a need to prioritise, the EU prefers Abdelillah Benkirane, not to publicly endorse the protests of the 20th February to choose short-term stability and security over democracy”. (Authors’ translation.) movement. See Kantara, No. 5, April 2011, p. 36. See Kantara, 2011, No.5, p.10.. 7 8 ECFR/33 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu A CHANCE TO REFORM: HOW THE EU CAN SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN MOROCCO Asthe ex-colonial power, officially, close diplomatic, cultural France and Spain, because other member states have happily The divided, indifferent and short-term approach that that approach short-term and indifferent divided, The aa. h Mrca cmuiy n rne ersns a represents France in community Moroccan The Rabat. However,wouldunfairguiltdoortheittheallbeoflayat to But at least as strong are the business links between the the between links business the are strong as least at But andlinguistic ties govern therelationship between Paris and UN the stop to Rabat helped also have supportFrench and as the ports of Ceuta and Melilla (which are on Moroccan Moroccan on are (which Melilla and Ceuta of ports the as turbulentcarefullyamanage to able been also Moroccohas a is reform political for need the on government Moroccan now centres, call as such functions, many and Morocco granted a mandate to monitor human rights. outsourced there. As a result, acting as a challenge to the the to challenge a as acting result, a As there. outsourced either in terms of a brokering of common positions (member closelyuntil thisyear. Rabat,In there veryislittle sense that collective support of political reform in Morocco. This lack of outsourced EU policy to them. Less interested member states fact, In people. Sahrawi the with public Spanish the of of Morocco’s cooperation on migration and trade, Madrid Madrid trade, and migration on cooperation Morocco’s of of whose voice matters. otherwell informed but do not really coordinate) or in terms relationship with Spain that includes sensitive issues such such issues sensitive includes that Spain with relationship a and partnership firm a for need the with Morocco, with appointmenthisrespondingRachida(whowasin Datiof to with its close neighbour because of the importanceSpainneighbourthecloseto because itsofwith no longer unconditional: the EU has some ground to make to ground some has EU unconditional:the longer no – EU the with interacts government their or they that way very developmentspolitical following or Rabat to reporters being (MINURSO) Sahara Western in mission monitoring member states have taken in Morocco means that the EU’s the that meansMorocco in taken have statesmember this complex challenge, as illustrated by the Marrakech Marrakech the by illustrated as challenge, complex with this cope to struggling still is government Moroccan the territorybut under Spanish sovereignty) and the sympathies in operating companies French many with countries, two theend of2010 has brought, orwill bring, any change tothe Europeanthebirththeof External ActionService (EEAS) at to do so, were also guilty by virtue of having failed to push for indulge Morocco’s occupation and annexation of the Western stable business environment playing the trump card. government.firsthis ministerin a Moroccanasorigin) of is significant social force, which, at least in part, Nicolas Sarkozy institutions. interest in Morocco among northern member states extended such as Germany and the UK, who have the clout within the EU soft power with those forces that oppose the governmentis the opposethat forces those with power soft each keep to delegationappear EU the andembassies state has become one of Rabat’s main advocates within the EU EU the within advocates main Rabat’s of one become has long way down France’s list of priorities in its relationship its in priorities of list France’s down way long Sahara territory, as well as its reluctance to hold a free and free a hold reluctanceto its as well territory,as Sahara fair referendum, as UN resolutions repeatedly demand. US demand.repeatedly resolutions UN as referendum,fair to willing been have Madrid and Paris services, these for bombing on 28 April, in which 16 people died.) In return return In died.) people 16 which in April, 28 on bombing because of its need to maintain friendly bilateral relations relations bilateral friendly maintain to need its of because beyondgovernments, mediaorganisationsfewwith sending African region, this protectionist attitude is also further further also is attitude protectionist this region, African With its huge market just on the other side of the Mediterranean, Percentage of trade with EU 27 Figure 6 26  France and Spain want to offer is mainly aid rather than trade Thisis short sighted. Ironically, given that southern member an export market for agricultural products decreases the the decreases products agricultural for market export an actor. To achieve sustainable economic growth and job job and growth economic sustainable achieve To actor. although the EU and its member states – especially those those especially – states member its and EU the although Morocco feel a certain bitterness that their cause was ignored contributing in the longer term to migratory pressures on on pressures migratory to term longer the in contributing creationthat could support human development inMorocco over the longer term, countries like Morocco and Tunisia Tunisia and Morocco like countries term, longer the over needtradeopportunities morethananything else.Yet,what would compete with what they themselves produce. member states do not compete with Morocco in exports exports in Morocco with compete not do states member mostopposed tosubstantial trade liberalisation inthe goods the EU. The diminished possibility for access to the EU as EU the to access for possibility diminished The EU. the the EU has considerable influence as a powerful economic powerful a as influence considerable has EU the that matter most, such as olive oil or tomatoes, since this this since tomatoes, or oil olive as such most, matter that the huge prosperityhugethebetweensouthernnorthern gapthe and in agricultural goods. agricultural in that are constitutionalarethat power,itsoftmonarchies havestill – southern neighbourhood and is at least partly responsible for North the from immigration by affected most are states shores of the Mediterraneanthefurtherincentivefuelling shoresofthe– is beginning to fray around the edges. have very good political relations with North Africa and are andAfricapoliticalNorth relationsgoodwith very have potential for economic growth (and job creation) in the the in creation) job (and growth economic for potential pushing for more EU financial aid to the region. But they are like speaking to China or Cuba”. This reinforces the idea that, is democracy about diplomats French to “speaking that us up. Civil-society organisations pushing for political reform in Spring of 2011 in Tunisia and Egypt showed that it might might it that showed Egypt and Tunisia in 2011 of Spring foryoung unemployed people to leave the country. Northern be worth backing. A 20th February movement activist told activist movement February 20th A backing. worth be Arab the until it support to power the had who those by Source: European Commission, DG Trade, 2010 Morocco Algeria Deficits inMorocco Carl Dawson,EUIntegrationwithNorthAfrica:TradeNegotiations andDemocracy Tunisia Egypt Libya

(Tauris,2009). 26 The southern member states might states member southern The 31.2% 51% 60% 63.9% 70% and could therefore be more supportive of Morocco’s trade Africa. Thus the link between security, democracy and human interests than the southern states. However, to date, they development was broken in the minds of policymakers.31 have not chosen to push very strongly for greater market Now, Morocco and the EU have an opportunity to get it right access in EU policy towards North Africa. and to restore this link.

While the corridors in Brussels buzz with talk of the need for For the EU, the stakes are clear: if Morocco becomes less a greater democratic push in the neighbourhood, the need stable, this will impact directly on EU member states – for greater conditionality and a “more help for more reforms” whether in the form of increased illegal immigration, energy- approach in the future, things look very different on both supply disruptions or political pressure from Moroccan the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean.27 diaspora communities within Europe. Concern about these There is little trace in the southern EU member states of a potential implications among European governments should shift towards greater conditionality. In fact, in response to not be allowed to lead to short-term policies, but rather the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, a number of southern an implementation of “more for more” in return for real member states, led by France and Spain, requested a shift progress against the international standards of democracy in EU aid funding from the east to the south, irrespective of and human rights. For too long, the EU has rewarded the state of democracy there.28 As a southern EU diplomat in Morocco very richly, for progress on limited areas of human Rabat said: “If we did not impose conditionality on Morocco rights that was actually very thin, because it was at least doing before, how can we do it now that things are moving in the better than its neighbours and acting as a relatively reliable right direction?” security partner in the region. The competition for status as the “most committed to the path of democracy” has become So, despite many public statements by EU leaders – from much fiercer in North Africa in 2011, and the EU should work northern states, southern states and the EU institutions – with this by rewarding genuine progress against international expressing aspiration to bring about a sea change in policy standards, not accepting rhetoric about reform from regimes towards North Africa, the EU remains a long way from who intend to do no such thing. being able to make a political offer that is genuinely new – not least because of the different interests driving member In the case of Morocco, given the EU’s potential to influence, states’ bilateral relations. Rather than pretending that these and the growing political voice of the protest movement in bilateral relationships do not exist, member states should Morocco, a consistent approach of this sort could be the agree on a common set of principles to guide their relations, critical factor in moving it, without revolution, from being a which should include supporting long-term stability and the stable authoritarian monarchy with a veneer of liberalisation political reform necessary to achieve this. to a stable state that is genuinely on a gradual path to democracy. A democratic Morocco would help to shore up the spread of political reform in the North African region Securing the democracy dividend and provide an example of a reformed monarchy to Jordan in Morocco 29 and elsewhere, and there is no reason to believe that it would be less open to cooperation with the EU given Europe’s soft In the 2003, the EU declared that: “The best protection power and the advantages of market access that Europe has for our security is a world of well-governed democratic to offer Morocco. However, the longer the EU stands back states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and from supporting change in Morocco, the harder it will be to political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, make up ground with the emerging reform movement. establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order”.30 Pushing for democratic reform With this statement, the EU acknowledged that achieving its own security required investing in democracy, open The period between now and the constitutional commission’s economies and inclusive societies in its neighbourhood. But report in June will be a testing one for Morocco. The the EU has completely failed to do that in Morocco – or, for government will have to maintain a delicate balance that matter, anywhere elsewhere in the Middle East and North to convince the protest movement that it is genuinely contemplating change while working out just how much ground it is willing to give. Online and in the streets, the debate on the constitution is heating up, and it will be 27 On the Brussels approach see, for example, “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”, European Commission crucial for the stability of the country that the constitutional High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, commission’s proposals do not underestimate the growing Joint Communication, 8 March 2011, available at http://ec.europa.eu/ commission_2010-2014/fule/docs/news/joint_communication-a_partnership_for_ desire for political reform that instils genuine powers in a democracy_and_shared_prosperity_with_south_med_en.pdf. 28 See, for example, “Action de l’Union européenne en direction du voisinage Sud”, legitimate parliamentary system. French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 14 February 2011, available at http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/11-02-17_Non-papier_Action_de_l_ Union_europeenne_en_direction_du_voisinage_Sud.pdf. 29 The authors are grateful to Gonzalo Escribano for this concept. See Gonzalo Escribano, “Political and economic change in the Arab World: implication for Spain”, Elcano Royal Institute for International Affairs Bulletin, No. 85, no. 2001, pp-4-11. 30 “A secure Europe in a better world – a European Security Strategy”, Council of the 31 The authors are grateful to Ana Palacio for this point. See Ana Palacio, “Upheaval in European Union, 12 December 2003, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ the Arab World: A (close) Call for the European Union”, Europe’s World, Spring 2011 uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. edition. 9 10 ECFR/33 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu A CHANCE TO REFORM: HOW THE EU CAN SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN MOROCCO As Morocco engages in its constitutional reform process, it process, reform constitutional its in engages Morocco As Engaging with the protest movement 32  EU could go further and make cooperation with the Venice the cooperationwith make and further go could EU To achieve a meaningful conditionality in its relationship with The EU could offer Morocco the support of the European European the of support the Morocco offer could EU The The EU and its member states should also use this immediate Programme, by identifying and getting to know leaders of the and Shared Prosperity” with its southern neighbourhood. bilateralrelations,theirguideprinciples to of set common a bilateral important that pretending than rather Morocco, fake to attempt further a than rather – media free and activist movement in Morocco and facilitating exchange with about Morocco. The EU could set up an exchange programme, Commission’s proposal for a new “Partnership for Democracy Commission a pre-requisite for participation in the European body advisory Europe’s of Venice Council (the the Law through Commission), Democracy for Commission young political leaders in Europe, particularly those from from those particularly Europe, in leaders political young corruption and freedom of the press are therefore critical. The ensure to elaborated are constitution the on consultation judiciary executive, parliament, – institutions democratic diasporaMuslimcommunitiesandcrucial play rolesin who on constitutional matters. This would ensure that the the that ensure would This matters. constitutional on recommendations from the initial, domestic phase of of phase domestic initial, the from recommendations recommendationsfor reform. They should make it clear that whichshouldinclude supporting long-term stability theand have Spain memberstatesshouldexist, and agreeEUnotMorocco, with do France that those as such relationships, will be conditional on its democratic progress. modelled on the US International Leadership Visitors Visitors Leadership International US the on modelled the impact on the daily life of Moroccan citizens; fighting fighting citizens; Moroccan of life daily the on impact the A constructed.are institutions democraticaccountable that they expect the proposals to lead to independent, accountable the democratic process in Europe. inclusive constitutional commission with far-reaching far-reaching with commission constitutional inclusive more a behind weight their put should states member its a give to is king the for temptation the While 2003. in back outlined it vision the on deliver to EU the for time is including the Islamists. Simple things such as the visible visible the as such things Simple Islamists. the including semblance of reform without genuine change, the EU and and EU the change, genuine without reform of semblance key focus of this support for political reform should be on on be should reform political for support this of focus key political reform necessary to achieve this. EU the with relationship Morocco’s that and liberalisation, leave a strong impression that Europe has not forgotten forgotten not has Europe that impression strong a leave demonstrations at observers as staff embassy of presence Morocco, in movements youth the with engage to period partnership_for_democracy_and_shared_prosperity_with_south_med_en.pdf.. ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/fule/docs/news/joint_communication-a_ Affairs andSecurityPolicy,JointCommunication, 8March2011,availableathttp:// Mediterranean”, EuropeanCommissionHigh RepresentativeoftheUnionforForeign “A PartnershipforDemocracyandSharedProsperity withtheSouthern 32

As in Tunisia, it will be important as part of a wider European Asymmetric Trade Preferences were previously offered to the 33 34  Helping improve socio-economic performance European markets for agricultural goods that Morocco has Morocco that goods agricultural for markets European Finally, and particularly in the wake of the Marrakech Marrakech the of wake the in particularly and Finally, Exchange programmes should therefore be complemented by EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme, giving The European Commission put forward a new agriculture agriculture new a forward put Commission European The In the longer term, support for the process of political reform But it is time for the EU to move on and offer the most reformist and fisheries agreement in December 2010 which is currently a strong focus on rural and female schooling and literacyschoolinginfemale andand rural on focus strong a also means more structural support to deal with the longer- the with deal to supportstructuralmore means also GSP or the Free Trade Agreement with Morocco.AgreementUnilateralTradewithFree the or GSP corporate social responsibility programmes. couldencouragedalsobe participateto exchanges,in toand development spending and European volunteer programmes exchangesbetween thetwocontinents. However, theincase contribution to prosperity in North Africa to encourage student democracy in the southern neighbourhood as well as a step a as wellsouthernneighbourhood theas democracyin helped andMoldova, andBalkans Western the ofcountries offer professional training in Morocco as part of international Morocco,of poorquality education ofcritical a isissue all at offer the same to countries that make most advances towards itssouthernof neighbours Asymmetric TradePreferences in with US development efforts. European business associations with a voluntary contribution to local developmentprojects,localvoluntarycontribution to a with number of European leaders have been advocating. this agreement will contribute towards the integration of of integration the towards contribute will agreement this this industry to Morocco, European tour operators could could operators tour European Morocco, to industry this term causes of unrest.causesMoroccotermofcurrently participates the in towardslonger-termthe ambitionfree-tradea of areathata those trade products which are insufficiently covered through in, Morocco’s tourist industry. Given the importance of of importance the Given industry. tourist Morocco’s in, initiative. support the branding of Morocco as responsible tourism, tourism, responsible as Morocco of branding the support it preferential trade tariffs for products it exports to the EU. such as Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) and other other and (VSO) Overseas Service Voluntary as such products,animportant step towards less restricted access to production and distribution of EU and Moroccan agricultural programmesfor school leavers ongap years, incoordination training. professional and university to primary from levels this with ahead move should EU The for. calling been long being debated by the European Parliament. If ratified, ratified, If Parliament. European the by debated being be given to rebuilding the security of, and confidence confidence and of, security the rebuilding to given be should support high-profile April, of end the at bombing boosttradethesewithin theEUcountries. timeistoNowit  the EUmarket. countries andterritoriesintheformofreduced tariffsfortheirgoodswhenentering which theEUprovidespreferentialaccessto theEUmarketto176developing The EU’sGeneralisedSystemofPreferences (GSP)isatradearrangementthrough Rettman, “UKchampions owndiplomacyoverEU‘actionservice’”, and services,aswelltheimprovementofconditions forinvestment.”SeeAndrew trade areaandeventuallyacustomsunion,progressively coveringgoods,agriculture offer [ArabSpringcountries]broadanddeep economicintegration,leadingtoafree- For example,BritishforeignsecretaryWilliam Haguehassaidthat“theEUshould May 2011,availableat http://euobserver.com/24/32271. EU Observer 34 , 5 33 especially literacy projects, being suggested to those considering travel there in 2011.

Surrounded by the excitement and promise of change of the Arab Spring, Morocco is a state with a fighting chance to achieve a gradual transition to democracy. But, to do this, it needs international pressure on the monarchy to reform, and international support to the civil society pushing for this reform. If the EU chooses to support this path to reform, it could restore the broken link between security and democracy in its policy towards the neighbourhood. This could be done at relatively low cost to Europe, and with clear benefits for both sides.

11 12 ECFR/33 May 2011 www.ecfr.eu A CHANCE TO REFORM: HOW THE EU CAN SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN MOROCCO About the authors the About Anthony Dworkin) of José Ignacio Torreblanca Russian power in the troubled neighbourhood Wilson, 2009) and and 2009) Wilson, Juan March Institute for Advanced Studies in Madrid, he he Madrid, in Studies Advanced for Institute March Juan 2008, he has also been a regular columnist for iu Popescu Nicu EUforeign policy, as well as on Spanish foreign policy. Since (with Mark Leonard, 2007). ECFR include International, carrying out advocacy and policy analysis analysis policy and advocacy out carrying International, UK position for ECOFIN, contributed to the Social Europe Social the to contributed ECOFIN, for position UK for a post-Western world Relations. A professor of political science at UNED University Susi Dennison Susi advisor to the prime minister of Moldova. His publications for 2004 the to run-up the in policy migration on advised and coordinatedthesheTreasury, where UK the atworked also and the rule of law. Previously she worked for Amnesty Amnesty for worked she Previously law. of rule the and Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, and he was he andBrussels, in StudiesPolicyEuropean for Centre EU’s the in Specialising Relations. Foreign on Council eastern neighbourhood and Russia, he holds a doctorate in doctorate a holds he Russia, andneighbourhood eastern of the Madrid Office at the European Council on Foreign Foreign on Council European the at Office Madrid the of on human rights protection and promotion in the EU’s EU’s the in promotion and protection rights human on democracy,rightsForeignRelations,humanworkingon on wave of accession to the EU. She is the co-author (with (with co-author the is She EU. the to accession of wave Europe, of Future the on Convention the of group working has She Americas. the and Asia Africa, with relationship including institutional reforms, eastern enlargement and and enlargement eastern reforms, institutional including in Madrid, a former Fulbright Scholar and Fellow of the the of Fellow and Scholar Fulbright former a Madrid, in in Budapest. From 2005–7 he was research fellow at the the at fellow research was he 2005–7 From Budapest. in international relations from the Central European University has published extensively on the politics of EU integration, EU of politics the on extensively published has previously a visiting fellow at the EU Institute for Security for Institute EU the at fellow visiting a previously Studies in Paris. Throughout 2010 he was senior foreign policy The Limits of enlargement-lite: European and is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European European the at Fellow Policy Senior a is is a Policy Fellow at the European Council Council European the at Fellow Policy a is A Power Audit of EU-Russia relations relations EU-Russia of Audit Power A Towards an EU human rights strategy (2010). is a Senior Policy Fellow and Head (with Andrew El País . Acknowledgements Jamai and Jordi Vaquer for their time and their insightful insightful their and time their for Vaquer Jordi and Jamai Foundation kindly hosted many of our research meetings, meetings, research our of many hosted kindly Foundation The authors would like to thank Gonzalo Escribano, Aboubakr Hamid Bellahcene, who offered importantofferedresearchsupportBellahcene,Hamidwho and Daniel Korski, and to Hans Kundnani for his excellent his for Kundnani Hans to and Korski, Daniel and translation.and JudahgratefulBenareWithinECFR,towe us offering in helpful very was Embassy Spanish the and grateful to both organisations. We would also like to thank to like also would We organisations. both to grateful editing. Our council member Emma Bonino also provided provided also Bonino Emma member council Our editing. very are we – meetings up setting in support and contacts important comments, for which we would like to thank her. inputs on this brief. In Rabat, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Stiftung Ebert Friedrich the Rabat, In brief. this on inputs Also available from ECFR What does Russia think? Turning Presence into Power: edited by Ivan Krastev, Mark Lessons from the Eastern New World Order: The Balance Leonard and Andrew Wilson, Neighbourhood of Soft Power and the Rise of September 2009 (ECFR/16) Nicu Popescu and Andrew Herbivorous Powers Wilson, May 2011 (ECFR/31) Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, Supporting Moldova’s October 2007 (ECFR/01) Democratic Transition Egypt’s Hybrid Revolution: Nicu Popescu, October 2009 a Bolder EU Approach A Power Audit of EU-Russia (ECFR/17) Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Korski Relations and Nick Witney, May 2011 Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, Can the EU rebuild failing (ECFR/32) November 2007 (ECFR/02) states? A review of Europe’s Civilian Capacities Poland’s second return to Daniel Korski and Richard Europe? Gowan, October 2009 (ECFR/18) Paweł Swieboda, December 2007 (ECFR/03) Towards a Post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU- Afghanistan: Europe’s forgotten US Relations war Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney, Daniel Korski, January 2008 October 2009 (ECFR/19) (ECFR/04) Dealing with Yanukovych’s Meeting Medvedev: The Politics Ukraine of the Putin Succession Andrew Wilson, March 2010 Andrew Wilson, February 2008 (ECFR/20) (ECFR/05) Beyond Wait-and-See: The Re-energising Europe’s Security Way Forward for and Defence Policy EU Balkan Policy Nick Witney, July 2008 (ECFR/06) Heather Grabbe, Gerald Knaus and Daniel Korski, May 2010 Can the EU win the Peace in (ECFR/21) Georgia? Nicu Popescu, Mark Leonard and A Global China Policy Andrew Wilson, August 2008 François Godement, June 2010 (ECFR/07) (ECFR/22)

A Global Force for Human Towards an EU Human Rights Rights? An Audit of European Strategy for a Post-Western Power at the UN World Richard Gowan and Franziska Susi Dennison and Anthony Brantner, September 2008 Dworkin, September 2010 (ECFR/08) (ECFR/23)

Beyond Dependence: How to The EU and Human Rights at deal with Russian Gas the UN: 2010 Review Pierre Noel, November 2008 Richard Gowan and Franziska (ECFR/09) Brantner, September 2010 (ECFR/24) Re-wiring the US-EU relationship The Spectre of a Multipolar Daniel Korski, Ulrike Guerot and Europe Mark Leonard, December 2008 Ivan Krastev & Mark Leonard (ECFR/10) with Dimitar Bechev, Jana Kobzova & Andrew Wilson, Shaping Europe’s Afghan Surge October 2010 (ECFR/25) Daniel Korski, March 2009 (ECFR/11) Beyond Maastricht: a New Deal for the Eurozone A Power Audit of EU-China Thomas Klau and François Relations Godement, December 2010 John Fox and Francois (ECFR/26) Godement, April 2009 (ECFR/12) The EU and Belarus after Beyond the “War on the Election Terror”: Towards a New Balázs Jarábik, Jana Kobzova Transatlantic Framework for and Andrew Wilson, January Counterterrorism 2011 (ECFR/27) Anthony Dworkin, May 2009 (ECFR/13) After the Revolution: Europe and the Transition in Tunisia The Limits of Enlargement-lite: Susi Dennison, Anthony European and Russian Power in Dworkin, Nicu Popescu and Nick the Troubled Neighbourhood Witney, March 2011 (ECFR/28) Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson, European Foreign Policy June 2009 (ECFR/14) Scorecard 2010 March 2011 (ECFR/29) The EU and human rights at the UN: 2009 annual review The New German Question: Richard Gowan and Franziska How Europe can get the Brantner, September 2009 Germany it needs (ECFR/15) Ulrike Guérot and Mark Leonard, April 2011 (ECFR/30)

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Our Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome and Sofia. In the future ECFR, uniquely among European think-tanks, has offices in A physical presence in the main EU member states. European Council on Foreign Relations ECFR has brought together a (ECFR) is the GmbH Roland BergerStrategyConsultants Chairman, Founder andHonorary Roland Berger (Germany) former PrimeMinister Governor, NationalBankofPoland; Marek Belka (Poland) Deputy Director, ElPaís Lluís Bassets (Spain) MP; formerForeignMinister Dora Bakoyannis (Greece) President oftheEuropeanConvention Former PrimeMinisterandvice Giuliano Amato (Italy) President Management Initiative;former Chairman oftheBoard,Crisis Martti Ahtisaari (Finland) Party spokesperson fortheSocialDemocratic Committeeandforeignpolicy Affairs Deputy ChairmanoftheForeign Urban Ahlin (Sweden) and ChairmanofBavarianNordicA/S President andCEO,A.J.AamundA/S Asger Aamund (Denmark) countries. candidate and states member EU the from figures cultural and activists leaders, business intellectuals, public ministers, and parliamentarians former and current commissioners, European presidents, ministers, prime former are Relations Foreign on Council European the of members Among Journalist Director ofMelakInvestments/ Ipek Cem Taha (Turkey) California Catalunya andUniversityofSouthern Professor, UniversitatOberta de Manuel Castells (Spain) Cooperation Minister forInternationalDevelopment Gunilla Carlsson (Sweden) former PrimeMinister President oftheEuropeanParliament; Jerzy Buzek (Poland) and CentralEurope Chairman of the Institute for the Danube Erhrad Busek (Austria) Writer andacademic Ian Buruma (The Netherlands) Minister (Taoiseach) Ambassador totheUSA;formerPrime Former EuropeanCommission John Bruton (Ireland) Commissioner Vice PresidentoftheSenate;formerEU Emma Bonino (Italy) President ofVenture EquityBulgariaLtd Founder, CommunitasFoundationand Svetoslav Bojilov (Bulgaria) Lewiatan Confederation ofPrivateEmployers- Economist. PresidentofthePolish Henryka Bochniarz (Poland) Foreign Minister Carl Bildt (Sweden) Council; formerPrimeMinister Chairman, PrimeMinister’s Economic Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland) Politica Internazionale) President, ISPI(IstitutopergliStudidi Boris Bianchieri (Italy) Reconstruction andDevelopment Chief Economist,EuropeanBankfor Erik Berglöf (Sweden) Parliament formerMemberofEuropean office; (Confindustria)-Brussels Industry Director, ConfederationofItalian Gianfranco Dell’Alba (Italy) former PrimeMinister Member ofEuropeanParliament; Jean-Luc Dehaene (Belgium) Poet andCulturalCritic Aleš Debeljak (Slovenia) Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (Turkey) Commission Vice PresidentoftheEuropean President, FriendsofEurope;former Etienne Davignon (Belgium) Aspen InstituteItalia Director GeneralInternationalActivities, Marta Dassù (Italy) Minister andForeign Progressive Studies;formerPrime President, FoundationforEuropean President, ItalianieuropeiFoundation; Massimo D’Alema (Italy) Action Service Counsellor oftheEuropeanExternal Robert Cooper (United Kingdom) Member ofEuropeanParliament Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Germany) former StateSecretary Ambassador totheUnitedKingdom; Nicola Clase (Sweden) of EastAnglia;formerHomeSecretary Visiting ProfessorofPolitics,University Charles Clarke (United Kingdom) Economics Emeritus Professor, LondonSchoolof (United Kingdom) Anthony Giddens International Relations(IPRI) Chairman ofthePortugueseInstitute Carlos Gaspar (Portugal) University Professor ofEuropeanStudies,Oxford (United Kingdom) Timothy Garton Ash Foreign Minister Speaker oftheParliament;former Jaime Gama (Portugal) Minister forClimateandEnergy Lykke Friis (Denmark) Investment Bank Business Leader;formerCEOCarnegie Karin Forseke (Sweden/USA) Chancellor Former ForeignMinisterandvice- Joschka Fischer (Germany) Foreign Minister President, ChamberofDeputies;former Gianfranco Fini (Italy) Policy Representative forForeignandSecurity European Commission/EUHigh Adviser totheVicePresidentof Steven Everts (The Netherlands) former ForeignMinister Chairman, BalticDevelopmentForum; Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Denmark) Former FinanceMinister Hans Eichel (Germany) Member ofEuropeanParliament Andrew Duff (United Kingdom) President, DEMOSHungary Tibor Dessewffy (Hungary) Economy andDevelopment Vice-President andDirectorofGlobal Kemal Dervis (Turkey) (Bratislava) Marshall FundoftheUnitedStates Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Pavol Demeš (Slovakia)

Teresa Patricio Gouveia Caio Koch-Weser (Germany) Cem Özdemir (Germany) Rory Stewart (United Kingdom) (Portugal) Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group; Leader, Bündnis90/Die Grünen Member of Parliament Trustee to the Board of the Calouste former State Secretary (Green Party) Gulbenkian Foundation; former Dominique Strauss-Kahn Foreign Minister Rem Koolhaas (The Netherlands) Ana Palacio (Spain) (France) Architect and urbanist; Professor at the Former Foreign Minister; former Senior Managing Director, International Heather Grabbe Graduate School of Design, Harvard President and General Counsel of the Monetary Fund; former Finance (United Kingdom) University World Bank Group Minister Executive Director, Open Society Ivan Krastev (Bulgaria) Simon Panek (Czech Republic) Alexander Stubb (Finland) Institute – Brussels Chair of Board, Centre for Liberal Chairman, People in Need Foundation Foreign Minister Strategies Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Chris Patten (United Kingdom) Michael Stürmer (Germany) Director of the Centre on International Aleksander Kwasniewski Chancellor of Oxford University and Chief Correspondent, Die Welt Conflict Resolution, Columbia (Poland) co-chair of the International Crisis University (New York); Senior Fellow, Former President of Poland Group; former EU Commissioner Ion Sturza (Romania) Brookings Institution; former Under- President, GreenLight Invest.; former Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Mart Laar (Estonia) Diana Pinto (France) Prime Minister of the Republic of Operations at the UN Operations at MP; former Prime Minister Historian and author Moldova the UN Miroslav Lajcˇák (Slovakia) Jean Pisani-Ferry (France) Helle Thorning Schmidt Fernando Andresen Guimarães Managing Director for Russia, Eastern Director, Bruegel and Professor at Universite Paris-Dauphine (Denmark) (Portugal) Neighbourhood & Western Balkans, Leader of the Social Democratic Party Advisor, Multilateral Relations, European External Action Service; Ruprecht Polenz (Germany) European External Action Service (EEAS) former Foreign Minister MP and Chairman of the Bundestag Teija Tiilikainen (Finland) Foreign Affairs Committee Director at the Finnish Institute for Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg Pascal Lamy (France) International relations (Germany) Honorary President, Notre Europe and Lydie Polfer (Luxembourg) Former Defence Minister Director-General of WTO; former EU MP; former Foreign Minister Loukas Tsoukalis (Greece) Commissioner Professor, University of Athens and István Gyarmati (Hungary) Andrew Puddephatt President, ELIAMEP President and CEO, International Mark Leonard (United Kingdom) Director, European Council on Foreign (United Kingdom) Erkki Tuomioja (Finland) Centre for Democratic Transition Relations Director, Global Partners & Associated MP; former Foreign Minister Ltd. Hans Hækkerup (Denmark) Juan Fernando López Aguilar Daniel Valtchev (Bulgaria) Chairman, Defence Commission; Vesna Pusic´ (Croatia) Former deputy PM and Minister of former Defence Minister (Spain) Member of European Parliament; MP, President of the National Education former Minister of Justice Committee for Monitoring the EU Vaclav Havel (Czech Republic) Accession Negotiations and Professor Vaira Vike- Freiberga (Latvia) Former President Adam Lury (United Kingdom) of Sociology, University of Zagreb Former President Steven Heinz (Austria) CEO, Menemsha Ltd George Robertson Antonio Vitorino (Portugal) Co-Founder & Co-Chairman, Lawyer; former EU Commissioner Lansdowne Partners Ltd David Miliband (United Kingdom) (United Kingdom) Former Secretary General of NATO Annette Heuser (Germany) Andre Wilkens (Germany) MP, Former Secretary of State for Albert Rohan (Austria) Director for International Relations, Executive Director, Bertelsmann Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Stiftung Mercator Foundation Washington DC Former Secretary General for Foreign Alain Minc (France) Affairs Shirley Williams Diego Hidalgo (Spain) Head of AM Conseil; former chairman, Co-founder of Spanish newspaper Le Monde Dariusz Rosati (Poland) (United Kingdom) El País; President, FRIDE Former Foreign Minister Professor Emeritus, Kennedy School Nickolay Mladenov (Bulgaria) of Government; former Leader of the Jaap de Hoop Scheffer Adam D. Rotfeld (Poland) Liberal Democrats in the House of Foreign Minister; former Defence Former Foreign Minister; Co-Chairman (The Netherlands) Minister; former Member of European Lords Parliament of Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Former NATO Secretary General Matters, Commissioner of Euro- Carlos Alonso Zaldívar (Spain) Danuta Hübner (Poland) Dominique Moisi (France) Atlantic Security Initiative Ambassador to Brazil Politician, former EU Commissioner Senior Adviser, IFRI Daniel Sachs (Sweden) and professor of economics and CEO, Proventus since 2009 Member of the European Pierre Moscovici (France) Parliament and Chair of the Regional MP; former Minister for European Stefano Sannino (Italy) Development Committee. Affairs Deputy Director General for Enlargement, European Commission Michiel van Hulten Nils Muiznieks (Latvia) Director, Advanced Social and Political (The Netherlands) Pierre Schori (Sweden) Former Member of European Research Institute, University of Latvia Chair of Olof Palme Memorial Fund; Parliament Hildegard Müller (Germany) former Director General, FRIDE; former SRSG to Cote d´Ivoire Anna Ibrisagic (Sweden) Chairwoman, BDEW Bundesverband Member of European Parliament der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft Wolfgang Schüssel (Austria) MP; former Chancellor Jaakko Iloniemi (Finland) Wolfgang Münchau (Germany) Former Ambassador and former President, Eurointelligence ASBL Karel Schwarzenberg Executive Director, Crisis Management Kalypso Nicolaïdis (Greece/ (Czech Republic) Initiative France) Foreign Minister Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany) Professor of International Relations, Giuseppe Scognamiglio (Italy) Chairman, Munich Security University of Oxford Head of Institutional and International Conference; Global Head of Relations, UniCredit Government Affairs Allianz SE Daithi O’Ceallaigh (Ireland) Director-General, Institute of Narcís Serra (Spain) Lionel Jospin (France) International and European Affairs Chair of CIDOB Foundation; former Former Prime Minister Christine Ockrent (Belgium) Vice President of the Spanish Government Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom) CEO, Audiovisuel Extérieur de la Professor, London School of Economics France Radosław Sikorski (Poland) Foreign Minister Sylvie Kauffmann (France) Andrzej Olechowski (Poland) Executive Editor of Le Monde Former Foreign Minister Aleksander Smolar (Poland) Dick Oosting (The Netherlands) Chairman of the Board, Stefan Batory Glenys Kinnock Foundation (United Kingdom) CEO, European Council on Foreign Former Member of European Relations; former Europe Director, Javier Solana (Spain) Parliament; Shadow Lords Amnesty International Former EU High Representative for the Spokesperson on International Mabel van Oranje Common Foreign and Security Policy & Development Secretary-General of the Council of the (The Netherlands) EU; former Secretary General of NATO Olli Kivinen (Finland) CEO, the Elders Writer and columnist George Soros (Hungary/USA) Marcelino Oreja Aguirre (Spain) Founder and Chairman, Open Society Member of the Board, Fomento de Gerald Knaus (Austria) Institute Chairman of the European Stability Construcciones y Contratas; former EU Initiative and Carr Center Fellow Commissioner Goran Stefanovski (Macedonia) Playwright and Academic 15 [email protected] 35 OldQueenStreet,London,SW1H9JA,UnitedKingdom Published bytheEuropeanCouncilonForeignRelations(ECFR), ISBN: 9978-1-906538-32-3 © ECFRMay2011. its authors. 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