“Saddle up . . . Tonight we ride!” Years ago, as gagements in the next century? Things change; there a young captain, I drilled my two- and three-year-old are few constants in life. One constant for 111 years daughters until they responded in unison with the has been ARMOR Magazine, which began life as the refrain “tonight we ride,” when prompted with “Saddle Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association in 1888. For up!” The ritual was cute; the girls enjoyed themselves. over a century, the magazine has served our profes- Today at the advanced ages of seven and eight, the sion as a crucial forum for professional discussion, girls find the ritual demeaning and seldom indulge surviving name changes, 38 editors, budget cuts, and Dad. Fortunately, I have another daughter and candi- a relocation to continue as the premier journal for date for the ritual, so as she closed on her second discussions of mounted maneuver warfare. ARMOR birthday, I shifted my efforts. She grasped the con- Magazine will carry the discussion into the next cen- cept quickly and responded appropriately with “To- tury. “Where are we riding to?” I don’t have a defini- night we ride.” But the ritual took a strange turn when tive answer, but I’m willing to wager that answers will she suddenly paused, fixed me with her big green be postulated and debated in that constant — AR- eyes, and asked, “Where we ridin’ to?” Damn, that’s a MOR Magazine. good question, I thought. Answers will take the form of letters, suggestions, “Where are we riding to?” Cold warriors in Europe dialogue, and material from the field which sustain answered a bugle call which took the form of an this journal. ARMOR Magazine depends upon its early-morning phone call and the words “Lariat Ad- readers. Take a quick glance, if you haven’t already, vance.” They patrolled a border that no longer exists at our masthead. The magazine runs lean; it’s a small and moved to defensive positions long-since forgot- competent team that publishes ARMOR, so I ask you ten. Today, tankers and cavalrymen in Europe patrol to participate in the dialogue and exchange of ideas, countries and republics that until recently did not ex- and to those who have done so in the past, my ist, and a tank battalion from Germany will deploy to thanks. Kuwait this spring for Intrinsic Action. Had anyone It’s my privilege to take up the reins as editor-in- speculated then that tank or cavalry units might in- chief. Like the editor before me, I pledge to dedicate spect weapon storage sites in a country called Bos- my efforts and those of the staff to continue the jour- nia, patrol in the Former Republic of Macedonia, or nal’s focus on warfighting. deploy to southwest Asia, he would have been thrown out of the vault where the trusty battle books My thanks to LTC Terry Blakely, who quite simply were stored. has done a splendid job and leaves a universally re- spected magazine in his wake. To Terry and his fam- Where are we riding to, or better yet, what will we ily we bid in Navy -speak, “Fair winds and following cross the LD in, and how will we fight meeting en- seas.” — D2

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

DENNIS J. REIMER JOEL B. HUDSON General, United States Army Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army 05445 The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-99-2

Editor-in-Chief MAJ DAVE DAIGLE Features

8 Controlling Armor's Destiny Managing Editor by Brigadier General John Kirk (Retired) JON T. CLEMENS 16 Life After Operational Maneuver (a 12-step program) Commandant by Cadet Joseph Berg and Captain Robert Bateman MG GEORGE H. HARMEYER 20 Tips for Tankers or Lessons Learned and Re-Iearned by Colonel Christopher V. Cardine (Retired) ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi­ monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 24 TEAM RECON: A New Approach to Armored TF Reconnaissance Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121. by Lieutenant Colonel Henry M. St-Pierre and First Lieutenant Jamie E. Warder Disclaimer: The information contained in AR­ 27 Will the New Brigade Reconnaissance Troop Be Adequately Protected? MOR represents the professional opinions of the by First Lieutenant Wayne T. Westgaard authors and does not necessarily reflect the offi­ cial Army or TRADOC position, nor does it 30 The Theory and Practice of Armored Warfare In Spain change or supersede any information presented October 1936-February 1937 in other official Army publications. by Dr. John L. S. Daley Official distribution is limited to one copy for 31 Soviet Armor in Spain: each armored brigade headquarters, armored Aid Mission to Republicans Tested Doctrine and Equipment cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion by Colonel Antonio J. Candil, Spanish Army headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head­ quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar­ 44 Weapon Storage Site Inspections by First Lieutenant Justin W. Verhey ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the 47 How the Guard Could Cut Costs on Table VIII Without Really Trying United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, by Dr. Joseph D. Hagman and Dr. Monte D. Smith Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, di­ 50 The ACAV L1ves...in Bosnia rect fire, ground combat systems, organizations, by Sergeant First Class Gregory T. Dean (Retired) and the training of personnel for such organiza­ tions may request two copies by sending a re­ 51 Half Full .... Or Half Empty quest to the editor-in-chief. 52 Tactical Vignette 99-2: "The Passage at Wilcox" Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor 53 Solutions to Tactical Vignette 98-6, Center has proponency. That proponency in­ "Cobra's Counterreconnalssance Fight" cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry 61 1999 Armor Conference ­ "ARMOR: Spearhead to the Future" carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these Back 1999 Armor Conference Tentative Agenda systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; Cover any miscellaneous items of equipment which ar­ mor and armored cavalry organizations use ex­ clusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C Departments officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted sol­ diers; and information conceming the training, 2 Contacts logistics, history, and leadership of armor and ar­ 3 Letters mored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level 5 Commander's Hatch and below, to include Threat units at those lev­ 7 Driver's Seat 55 Reviews els. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to where copyright is indicated. Editor. ARMOR, AnN: ATZK·TOM, Fort Knox, KY 40121·5210. Distribution Restriction: Approved tor public release; distribution is unlimited. March-April 1999, Vol. CVIll No.2 USPS 467-970 Directory - Points of Contact

DSN - 464-XXXX Commercial - (502) 624-XXXX u.s. Army Armor Center

Commanding General (ATZK-CG) ARMOR Editorial Offices MG George Harmeyer 2121 E-Mail: [email protected] Edltor-in-Chief MAJ Dave Daigle 2249 Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) E-Mail: [email protected] BG R. Steven Whitcomb 7555 E-Mail: [email protected] Managing Editor Jon T. Clemens 2249 Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) E-Mail: [email protected] COL Frank J. Gehrki III 1101 Editorial Assistant E-Mail: [email protected] Vivian Oertle 2610 E-mail: [email protected] Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) CSM David L. Lady 4952 Production Assistant E-Mail: [email protected] Mary Hager 2610 E-Mail: [email protected] Directorate of Force Development (ATZK-FD) COL John F. Kalb 5050 Staff Illustrator E-Mail: [email protected] Mr. Jody Harmon 2610 E-Mail: [email protected] Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (ATZK-TD) COL William J. Blankmeyer 8247 u.s. Army Armor School E-Mail: [email protected] TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK-XXI) Director, Armor School (ATSB-DAS) COL Brett H. Weaver 4009 COL Richard P. Geier 1050 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS) Armor School Sergeant Major (ATSB-CSM) COL James H. Nunn 7955 TBA 5405 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab (ATZK-MW) NCO Academy (ATSB-NC) COL Karl J. Gunzelman 7809 CSM Kevin P. Garvey 5150 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) COL Patrick F. Webb 1272 COL Michael D. Jones 7848 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585

1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ) Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) COL Scott R. Feil 6843 LTC Randall Williams 1315 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in edit­ to a format we can use, the shading gets lost or distorted.) If you have ing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or any questions concerning electronic art submissions, call Vivian Oertle printed out double-spaced in near-letter-quality printer mode, along with at the phone number above. a 3'/2 or SV -inch disk in WordS tar, Microsoft Word, WordPerfect, Ami 4 MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, A1TN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY Pro, Microsoft Word for Windows, or ASCII (please indicate wordproc­ 40121-S21O. essing format on disk or cover letter and include a double-spaced print­ out). Tape captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Addition­ PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS/ST. GEORGE-ST. JOAN AWARDS: Con­ ally, we can receive articles as e-mail or attachments at: tact Connie Bright or Darlene Kennedy, U.S. Armor Association, P.O. [email protected] Box 607, Ft. Knox, KY 40121, or call (S02) 942-8624; FAX (S02) 942­ 6219; E-Mail: [email protected]. The Association now has a website SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue, we at the following address: www.usarmor-assn.org. will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for pub­ UNIT DISTRIBUTION: Report delivery problems or changes of ad­ lication by, other Anny journals. Please submit your article to only one Anny journal at a time. dress to Mary Hager, DSN 464-2610; commercial: (S02) 624-2610. Re­ quests to be added to the free distribution list should be in the form of a GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We can accept electronic graphics and letter to the Editor-in-Chief. photo files in most formats except Harvard Graphics. Compressed for­ ARMOR HOTLINE - DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24­ mats - .jpg and .gif take up the least disk space. If you use Powerpoint hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, (.ppt), please save each illustration as a separate file. Try to avoid the training, organizations, and equipment of the Armor Force. use of color and shading, but if you must use shading to illustrate your point, send us an unshaded version of the illustration along with a print­ ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine website out of your shaded version. (We have found that when we convert files at the following address: knox-www.army.mil/dtdd/armormag.

2 ARMOR - March-April 1999 Safety Interlock Developed ing) over-committed Army .. ." Funny, when I matically improved. Reconnaissance and For the M1A1 Driver's Hatch chocked the 1998-1999 GREEN BOOK, the surveillance capabilities were judged to be the U.S. Army had 18 MTOE divisions (10 ac­ most serious mounted close-combat defi­ tive/a Guard). This reference to a "10-division ciency, Dear Sir: army" is often repeated in your magazine and From the mj(j-198OS onward, the Armor PM Abrams has designed and apprOVed a other professional journals. Nothing irks Guardsmen more than to be treated like "un­ Center conducted various concept studies system to prevent the turret from tuming when with the S&T community and searched for a the driver's hatch is opened. This modification persons" in units that don'l exist accOfding to defin~ive strategy. This was part of a broader will prevent many of the accidents that we some narrow-minded bigots. I'm sure ARMOR would not t~erate derogatory racial or ethnic effort that included such issues as retaining have seen in the past. It has been applied to tanks in the division cavalry squadron, recon­ all M1A2 tanks, and we are beginning to apply statements in its articles, but I fail to see why it permits recurrent pemicious slights 01 fellow naissance squadrons in light divisions. and a it to Ml Al tanks. Training lor this modification brigade reconnaissance troop. Desert Storm on the M1Al is being done by an interactive soldiers in its pages. This only contributes to undermining the Total Army. after-action resut\s further substantiated the CD produced by the TACOM New Equipment need for a new scout system and provided Training Group. M1A2 Training is done by a ROBERT A. FORCYZK further momentum. A series of meetings with TV tape which was distributed to each unit MAJ, MI, MD-ARNG British and German counterparts were con­ with M1A2 tanks. along with a lesson plan. G-2(Opns) ducted as part of the Armor Combat Devel­ Each MIAI armor banalion commander and 29th Infantry Division (Ught) opment EKchange Program (ACDEP), but cavalry squadron commander will be mailed a produced no new solutions. Nevertheless, a Future Scout Mission Needs Statement was copy of the interactive CD to train crews on (To quote from Jimmy Buffett: "Mea culpa, prepared, approved by HQ TRAOOC and DA. how to use the Driver's Hatch Intertock. More mea culpa, mea maxima culpa . . . • I believe copies can be ordered by contacting USA­ ARMOR's record speaks for itself in regard /0 but not forwarded to the JROC. An acquisition plan was required. TACOM, ATTN: SFAE-GCSS-W-AB-LF (Mr. its coverage and treatment of both the Na­ Tom Werth), Warren, MI 48397-5000 or email tional Guard and Reserve, but we can always A 1996 TRAOOC Integrated Concept Team [email protected]. do better. - Ed.) crystallized efforts by drafting and presenting Copies will also be sent to the Army National a broad set of requirements and a plan 01 Guard distance learning library, TRAOOC action. More than three years ago Armor distance leaming library, FI. Knox Master Seeking Alternatives to senior leaders set a new course to equip fu­ Gunner School and Ft. Knox OTOO. "Scouting In a Winnebago" ture scouts with a platform that is optimized for reconnaissance and surveillance, rather Installation of this modification will result in than further modify the BFV. That same sum­ crew protection while still allowing for an over­ Dear Sir: mer, an ACDEP exchange revealed a unique ride in the event of an emergency. Skimming through the Jan-Feb edition of opportunity to pursue a collaborative scout TOM WERTH ARMOR, I noted a letter by COL (Ret.) Chris program with the U.K. This last point, in con­ Abrams Net Mgr Gardine on scout vehides, and noted thaI it junction with an innovative new acquisition DSN 786-8201 would provide thoughtful reading. Chris has streamlining approach from DA, provided the been a contributor of ideas to the Armor Force impetus to launch a new program. Inciden­ for many years. Unfortunately, his leiter is ter­ tally, prior to the signing 01 a Memorandum of Army National Guard ribly off mark. So, as the Chief of Armor's Intent between the two countries, an inde­ Has Light Cav Troops, Too agent lor Armor Force modemization, I offer pendent analysis showed that simply putting a our readership the following informed com­ mast with a sensor on a BFV did not result in Dear Sir: ments: increased scout mission performance. The Future Scout MNS was subsequently adjusted Although ARMOR magazine is generally The Armor Center has been part of the and approved by the JROC. A U.S. and U.K. supportive of the Total Army concept, I TRAOOC System Manager Bradley's team in Combat Development team then jointly wanted to point out several omissions in the the development of the M2A3IM3A3 BFV. crafted a Combined Operational Requirement November-December 1998 issue. In the arti­ Armor Center combat developers have par­ Document tor the first phase of the program. de, "Airbome Ground Cavalry," CPT Ste­ ticipated at every level and event. The Armor phens writes that, "there are only three other Cenler's Directorate of Doctrine Development Unfolding doctrinal changes also provided (than the 82nd Airbome's AfH7th CAy] and the School are working to incorporate the Senior Army leaders with rationale for the separate light cavalry troops in the United M3A3's improved capabilities into doctrine FSCS. Obtaining and sustaining information States Army, not including those troops which and our POls. The M3A3 will provide our dominance in knowledge-based warfare is an are part 01 the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment division and armored cavalry scouts with an essential component of Force XXI operations. at Fort Polk, Louisiana. These troops are improved platform and sensors for mission The TF and Division Army War Fighting Exer­ located at Fort Wainwright, Alaska; Fort Drum, accomplishment. Unfortunately, as MG (Ret.) cises showed that the ground scours role New York; and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii: Tom Tait so often notes, it still is "scouting in a becomes more critical In satisfying CCIR in a Obviously, CPT Stephens does not consider Winnebago." timely manner, even with the addition 01 UAVs the Army National Guard's six light cavalry and other aerial sensor platforms. Army After The Armor Center recognized in the mid- troops (one from the 29th Infantry Division and Next and other studies highlight the need for 19805 that the Bradley did not provide scouts five from enhanced readiness brigades) to be rapid inter- and intra-theater air deployment. the capability for successful mission accorn­ part 01 the U.S. Army. In fact, if the 2nd ACR's 50 we are seeking a medium-weight C130- pHshment. The Center, with cooperation from troops are exduded, the Army National Guard deployable system, optimized for mounted other TRAOOC schOOs, instituted doctrine, has 6 of 10 light cavalry troops in the total reconnaissance and surveillance in Force XXI leader development, training improvements, lorce structure. By aHowing such ignorant and beyond. materiel changes in order to overcome comments to be included in your magazine, and deficiencies. When the BFVs in banalion scout The FSCSITRACER program is a c~labora­ ARMOR only helps 10 perpetuate parochial platoons were replaced by HMMWVs, scouts tive venture with the U.K. that is the Army's attitudes. penetrated deeper at the NTC and accom­ first Fast Track acquisition program. It seeks An even more common example 01 ignoring plished more missions - size does make a the latest in technologies by not locking in Ihe Army National Guard's contributions to the difference, but SCOUI survival only marginally designs early. Both nations bring a tremen­ lotal force was found in LTC Stanton's article, improved. NTC results showed, over and dous suite of knowledge and eKperience to "An NTC For the Next Century," when the again, that when scouts were successful, the this effort. The concept article on FSC5 in the author refers to the "10-division (and shrink- task force chances of mission success dra- Jan-Feb ARMOR edition by Asher Sharoni ARMOR - March-April 1999 3

and Lawrence Bacon is a thoughtful work that simulation community: “The simulations in- disciplined unit, are being eroded by loading I recommend to readers. It embodies many of dustry has been a gold mine for retired sol- tanks on HETS to move from the motor pool the components we are seeking. diers now in the private sector. They have to a local maneuver area or range. seduced policy-makers, who should know But what about the near term for the battal- better, into believing that armor and mech Our challenge within the simulation commu- ion scout platoon? Senior Armor leaders also units can be trained on the cheap, and that no nity is to make the simulations we are building recognized that the complete inadequacy of one need any longer scrape their knuckles capable of maintaining high levels of profi- sensors within the battalion scout platoon disconnecting final drives in the dark.” ciency and mitigating lost time in the field. It’s could not wait for FSCS in 2007. The Long a challenge we in industry take very seriously. Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System It’s unfortunate that COL Fairchild holds I believe the tempo and topics of discussions (LRAS3) will fill this void and provide M1114- these views. He has it wrong. Professionals in in ARMOR and other professional journals equipped battalion scouts with a greater sen- the simulation (or defense) industry, many of relating to the pros and cons of simulations sor capability than the M3A3. This will enable us ex-soldiers, care deeply about our respon- cannot be generalized. Let’s not forget the greater standoff detection, survivability, and sibilities to the Army in today’s challenging basics — tasks, conditions and standards. far target location accuracy for the HMMWV- climate. Many of us feel we still wear the uni- Simulations are improving dramatically. The mounted scout. LRAS3 will be rolled over to form under the suit and believe that any com- frustration being voiced by many is really ARNG scout platoons with the fielding of pany marketing a training product (simulation being directed at the inability of legacy (mostly FSCS. See ARMOR Magazine’s November- or otherwise) that doesn’t significantly en- constructive) simulations to keep pace with December 1998 issue for a detailed discus- hance readiness won’t be in business very today’s spiral development process. JANUS, sion of LRAS3. A mast-mounted sensor on a long. CBS, SIMNET, etc., are all showing their age HMMWV was rejected as an interim solution My personal simulation experience started in and are not able to easily link with or fully due to affordability. LRAS3 provides a solid 1985 while commanding 2-64 Armor in stress our emerging C4I systems. The pa- and affordable capability to our battalion scouts in the near term. Schweinfurt, Germany. Well experienced in tience of those responsible for training in the tank gunnery, I was skeptical of the ability of field with a mix of old and new hardware is We have also been examining for the last the newly fielded M1 Conduct of Fire Trainer wearing thin. The generation of emerging year a variant of Land Warrior for dismounted (COFT) to assist in preparing our crews for virtual and constructive simulations, such as operations by our scouts. This could provide Tank Table VIII. To find out, my gunner and I the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT), exciting capabilities, but must wait due to put in many late hours on the COFT to assess Warfighter’s Simulation 2000 (WARSIM), Joint affordability concerns and the re-baselining of its value. And, WHOA, was it good! The abil- Simulation System (JSIMS), etc., will resolve the Land Warrior program. ity to watch, coach, mentor and assess TC- many of these deficiencies. gunner teams in the relative comfort of the The Chief of Armor is executing a scout COFT provided an ability to TRAIN that was This is a challenging time for both combat strategy that is the product of extensive re- never achievable at midnight in the “back 40” and training developers. The fielding of new search, analysis, and debate. To suggest that while sitting on the roof of one of our tanks in simulation systems is taking longer than we he or the Armor Center do not take our re- a driving cold rain and 35o weather during a would like, due both to budgetary issues and sponsibility seriously is ludicrous. The FSCS dry-run TCPC exercise. Fact: Being cold, wet, technical requirements to develop flexible will provide the mounted scout the right tool to or otherwise uncomfortable never improved architectures responsive to dynamic hardware get his job accomplished in the 21st century. gunnery training — it DETRACTED from it. and software changes. In summary, training systems lag behind hardware systems — this JOHN F. KALB We quickly transitioned from COFT skeptics is nothing new. This time, however, as revolu- COL, Armor to COFT zealots, encouraging our battalion’s tionary new information systems are being Director, Force Development crews to achieve high levels of proficiency on fielded, the training systems lag is more ap- USAARMC the COFT while their leaders watched, parent and is having a more noticeable im-

coached, and reinforced their own skills. The pact. battalion proved just how good our belief in Simulation in Training: I assure you, the pledge of simulation “pro- The Other Side of the Story the COFT really was during our next trip to Grafenwoehr. fessionals,” both in Government and industry, is to provide robust, modern simulation tools Dear Sir: Quality simulation translates directly to im- that will better prepare soldiers for live training COL Guy Swan’s article, “Computer Simula- proved performance in the field where “live” or war. WARSIM, CCTT, JSIMS, and other tion Fallacy: Assuming Troops Are Well simulation takes over. To this day, I doubt tools, once fielded, will offer dramatic im- Trained,” in the Jul-Aug 98 issue was a well- many really understand the dramatic im- provements over the legacy systems now in use. written, thought-provoking piece that is of provements in tank gunnery standards (Ph, Pk, opening times, etc.) that were/are attribut- interest to those of us who consider ourselves Keep the faith! But please, don’t ever ques- able to the COFT or today’s second genera- professionals within the simulation industry. tion our support of the force! We are very cognizant of the continuing need tion Advanced Gunnery Training System for training in the dirt, for which it is unlikely (AGTS). I believe the same will soon be true COLIN L. MCARTHUR there will ever be a suitable surrogate. How- of collective training simulations, both at the COL, Armor (Ret.) joint level and within the individual services. ever, for a number of reasons (operating and Orlando, Fla. ammo costs, availability of time, environ- As one who frequently visits Army posts, I mental issues, etc.), live training time has detect a far greater threat to readiness than The Problem with BEAMHIT? become increasingly precious. I believe the an overabundance of simulation — I detect a It Isn’t Authorized, He Says! real question raised by COL Swan’s article is, lack of resources, to include a dearth of qual- “When will our computer simulations better ity training time — simulation or otherwise. replicate and prepare our soldiers for the How many hours per month do TCs and gun- Dear Sir: limited live training that still exists?” ners spend in their AGTSs? What is a battal- First, let me salute the officers and NCOs of ion’s average Reticle Aim level? How fre- Disturbing, however, is COL (ARNG, Ret.) C-3-81 AR for their initiative in not only using quently are units firing Table VIII (can’t be too Robert Fairchild’s letter, ”Excessive Simula- an untried training device but also for develop- many, as I rarely hear a main gun round pop, tion Breeds Training With Little Basis in Real- ing Marksmanship Programs of Instruction ity” in the Nov-Dec 98 issue. even at Ft. Hood). How many days do com- (POI) to go with it. pany commanders have in the field with their COL Fairchild’s letter starts with a somewhat units? Even road march skills, once one of the mean-spirited generalization attacking the best visual indicators of a well trained and Continued on Page 49 4 ARMOR — March-April 1999

COMMANDER'S HATCH

The Armor Force: A Pre-conference Overview

by MG George H. Harmeyer, Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center

The theme of this year’s Armor Confer- recruit and retain enough high quality ence, “ARMOR; Spearhead to the Fu- young men for the force, then we’re not ture” is not simply a catch phrase devoid going to be able to sustain success. of meaning. It is an affirmation that the Today, we have an Army that has be- a direct dialogue with the Armor Center Armor Force’s traditional pre-eminent come increasingly based in the United role will be sustained into the foreseeable folks here and when they travel out to future across the spectrum of conflict. In States, relies to a large extent on the Na- Training Centers and the places where tional Guard and Army Reserve, and you are assigned. this article, I want to preview the Confer- must be able to deploy anywhere, on ence theme with a broad overview of the status of the Armor Force and highlight short notice, with a decisive force. The Training Armor community has led the Army’s some key directions. efforts to train and equip the evolving The changing global operational envi- General force and to teach it how to think and ronment requires Army trainers to re-look fight in revolutionary ways. how training can be most effectively and On a given day, the U.S. Army has over efficiently accomplished for the Total 25,000 soldiers deployed to nearly sev- Doctrine Army. We are pushing ahead with the enty countries, keeping the peace and support of TRADOC and the assistance providing stability in a dangerous and A primary effort in doctrinal develop- of the Infantry School and the Reserve unpredictable world. Our Army’s tankers ment is to refine incorporation of the digi- Component to articulate a Mounted and cavalrymen are doing their share and tal effects on operations. As the 4th In- Training Strategy (MTS) that meets the more. Tank crewmen and cavalrymen are fantry Division continues its effort, we needs of the Total Army. The MTS seeks the most deployed military specialty in continue to gather the TTPs associated to maximize the potential of all training the Army today. From Bosnia to South- with its exercises and incorporate them environments with a focus on individual, west Asia, time and again the Army has into doctrine for use by the rest of the staff and unit proficiency in selected shown that the most effective means to Army. We realize that almost every Ar- “core” tasks across the full spectrum of demonstrate the seriousness of U.S. re- mor and Cavalry unit has some digitized conflict. For more information about the solve is to deploy an armored force. equipment; the bottom line is that we MTS, see the Jan-Feb ’99 “Commander’s When tanks are on the ground, people write doctrine for everyone. Hatch.” take notice. We expect to have FM 71-3 in final The overall capabilities of our weapons Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, draft as this edition of ARMOR gets to systems have outpaced the ability of our we have implemented the most funda- you, and we expect FM 17-97 will be in live-fire ranges to challenge them. We mental change in our Army since World final draft by August of this year. We are have designed the Digital Multi-Purpose War II despite fourteen straight years of developing TTPs for the deployment of Range Complex (D-MPRC) featuring declining buying power, yet we have kept the three-company battalion task force of expanded width and depth, incorporating the force trained and ready. I would be the Force XXI design. These TTPs will the next generation targetry, and numer- less than candid to say that the force is be tested during Force XXI limited con- ous technical innovations to continue to uniformly trained and ready. Due to con- version in the 1st Infantry Division and challenge our soldiers. The solution calls strained resources and the high tempo of applied to the 1st Armored and 3rd Infan- for a “holistic” approach that integrates operations across the globe, certain units try Divisions. live fire, maneuver, simulations, TOC have been unable to maintain the level of Our doctrine needs to look at least as far training and after action review capabili- training and readiness of the deployed ties to train staffs, leaders, and units to units. Despite signs that the trend towards forward as the technology that will be used to implement it. Enlisting force de- use information dominance to attain pre- resource reduction may be turning veloper assistance in the draft of doctrine cision maneuver as well as fires to shape around, we should expect to continue a the battlefield. mindset of high OPTEMPO with very for new systems, like the Future Scout and Cavalry System and Mounted War- limited resources. We increasingly recognize that the abil- rior is one way we can achieve that end. ity of Mounted Forces to fight in an urban There is no secret that the key to contin- Doctrine must be relevant and appropri- environment is more important then ever. ued success is people. Our principal ate for the equipment to which it is ap- Although the Infantry School retains the readiness concerns are continuing to re- plied. Input from the field is essential. I lead on MOUT, our role in developing cruit, retain, and take care of our soldiers encourage broad input to electronic drafts TTPs is increasingly important. The con- and their families. If we are unable to we routinely post to the internet and also struction of a Mounted Urban Combat ARMOR — March-April 1999 5

Training Site at Fort Knox supports this ties along with installation of fiber-optic term focus is on a HQ designed with effort. This state of the art facility will wiring in classrooms has postured the world class C4I. have links to the virtual and constructive NCO Academy for enhanced training Materiel training environment. It has drawn great opportunities in a Classroom XXI envi- interest from across the force to include ronment. Sustaining combat overmatch is a key our sister service; the United States Ma- Leadership component of the Army’s modernization rine Corps. strategy. Planned Programmed Product We are a small branch with a growing Improvements (P3I) will be required to The principles of the Eight-Step Train- ing model underpin our training doctrine. concentration in the Reserve Component maintain this overmatch. Abrams Inte- and with more of a CONUS base than in grated Management (AIM) is the pro- I charge Armor trainers at every level to the past. There is a great demand across gram for tank refurbishment. The pro- rededicate themselves to the application of this model. The thoughtful implemen- the Army for the talents of Armor offi- gram seeks to get the right, yet achievable cers. This is a personnel management mix over time of Abrams variants tation of the Eight-Step model throughout challenge, but is a compliment to the (M1A1, M1A1D, and M1A2s) with as- the training cycle, especially the correct adherence to the doctrine for the conduct truly combined arms character of how we sociated product improvements into the grow our officers. Many Armor officers, right units. The M1A2 will maintain an of After Action Reviews, cannot help but however, are not serving in key troop overmatch differential through the mid- yield tremendous results. assignments as long as they should. Cap- term but the M1A1 capabilities will be The cornerstone of Armor’s institutional tain shortages across all branches are a overmatched in the near-term. Selected training future is embodied in our concept key concern, but Armor has particular overmatch sustainment modifications for the University of Mounted Warfare difficulty in meeting branch-qualified have been identified for the M1A1 (FY (UMW). UMW is a plan for the future demands given our small size. Addition- 06) and the M1A2 (FY 12). Fort Knox school house that fully sup- ally, the Armor Force is required to fill a The Abrams tanks in the ARNG are the ports the Classroom XXI vision by lever- large number of AC/RC slots. Units and oldest in the fleet. A re-capitalization plan aging the power of information age tech- organizations have paid a price in in- nologies to include computer-based in- creased turbulence, an increase in as- is needed to ensure the ARNG tanks maintain their survivability and lethality struction, distance learning, and simula- signment “under-lap,” and unfilled posi- overmatch. Cascading tanks from the tions training. It will allow us to train tions. The restructuring initiatives of digital warriors using the same tools and CINCOS have provided challenges to active component to the ARNG will pro- vide the initial foundation; however, the Force XXI training products students will NCO management parallel to those that ARNG needs to be fully integrated into work with in their units of assignment. the Officer Restructuring Initiative (ORI). In the schoolhouse, we have witnessed an the Army ’s Armored System Moderniza- The institutional Officer Education Sys- tion Plan. tem has witnessed broad and bold fu- unfortunate decrease in seasoned instruc- tors, the ratio of instructors to students, The Scout Strategy combines materiel tures-based innovations. Last year, the and the experience level of our staffs. fielding and development with the organ- Battalion Maintenance Officer Course was the first fully exportable institutional izational and training changes already addressed. The materiel component will instruction offered on CD-ROM. In De- Organization witness the near-term fielding of the cember of 1998 we started the first inter- net-based distance learning RC-AOAC The Armor Center is the Spearhead of M3A3 and up-armored HMMWVs the Army Experimental Campaign Plan equipped with LRAS3, laser range find- course. The course has progressed into (AECP) to take us through Force XXI to ers, and high resolution day TV. The synchronous IDT internet training and will culminate into a third AT phase fea- Army After Next and beyond. A key Future Scout and Cavalry System is a component of this plan is a number of concept vehicle that will have a multiple turing synchronous simulations exercises. organizational design changes. The force advanced sensor array, automatic acquis i- We are facing the challenge in our officer courses of reducing course length while design for Force XXI will eliminate a tion and identification, advanced C4I and tank company from tank battalions, re- stealth features. We look to field the sys- sustaining instruction of essential comp e- duce mortar platoons to four guns, allow tem in FY 07. tencies. The new 18-week course, re- named the Armor Captain’s Career for six scout vehicles, and modify the The Command and Control Vehicle HHC’s CSS platoons. Already we are Course (ACCC), is one such example. standing up and training Brigade Recon- (C2V), the replacement for the M577, is Future courses to prepare digital leaders on track in terms of development but appear likely to require longer, not naissance Troops in Europe. This organi- appears to be falling short in fielding. The zation will have two six-vehicle scout shorter, course length. In November of platoons with a Field Artillery striker Army’s Procurement Objective (APO) is 1998, the Armor Center conducted a 102 C2Vs; however, a minimu m of 130 Digital Instruction Experiment (DIE) that platoon in direct support (DS). The “bub- C2Vs will be required for the First Digi- bled up” demand for 19D Scouts is a will pave the way ahead for the future challenge. Divisional Cavalry Squadrons tized Corps. Digital-ACCC. will pick up the NBC Reconnaissance Soldiers For institutional NCO training, our cur- Detachment from the current divisional rent effort has been a major rewrite of all chemical company organizations. A third I said at the beginning that recruiting and retaining quality soldiers is critical. CMF 19 NCOES Courses in FY 97/98. axis of the AECP has been added along- Everyone is aware of the tough task that Armor Center’s CSM Lady provided an side the light and mounted axis. The Ar- excellent status report on NCO Academy mor Center is the lead proponent in con- confronts all service recruiters in today’s developments in the previous issue of cept development and experimentation of ARMOR magazine. Renovated class- what we term “Strike Force;” a rapidly rooms, billets, and administrative facili- deployable contingency force. The near- Continued on Page 51 6 ARMOR — March-April 1999

DRIVER'S SEAT

CSM David L. Lady

Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Sergeant’s Business: Training Soldiers, Training Records, Training Meetings

Should go without saying, shouldn’t it? sighting, actions on direct or indirect fire 237-10-MTP, FM 17-15, STP 17-19K23- That we NCOs are responsible for train- contact, first aid and casualty evacuation), SM, and STP 21-1-SMCT. It requires a lot ing individual soldier and crew skills; that hinder unit learning curves. of time and attention to detail, but we we NCOs must record our soldiers’ train- By the end of the SLTC, a number of must know what our team must do. ing status; that we NCOs must assess our soldiers’ training status, and help suggestions for improvement were made Create your leader book, and use it! I by commanders and command sergeants don’t mean a “cheese book” for a Mora- plan/execute the training that corrects any major. “Get back to the basics” was one. les or Audie Murphy Board, I mean a weaknesses. “Train our junior leaders in their training useful and constantly used training re- Yet, at the most recent Senior Leader’s management role” was another. Despite cord! However you organize it, a worth- Training Conference (SLTC), our most such problems as OPTEMPO and mon- while leader book must list company senior commissioned and noncommis- ey, we NCOs can improve our unit situa- METL and platoon supporting tasks with sioned leaders agreed that their units are tions by reemphasizing our role in assess- assessments; CTT proficiency (these are not training well, and that too many of ing and executing individual and crew- basic survival skills); essential soldier their units are not well trained in “the level training. task proficiency and status; and crew or basics” (individual and collective skills). section collective task proficiency. Of Many reasons for this situation were dis- I ask all armor and cavalry leaders to course, the soldier-administrative data look at your own unit’s training man- cussed; among them high unit OP- agement cycle. Review FM 25-100 (es- will be in your book, but I am emphasiz- TEMPO, short leadership and staff as- ing the leader’s book as a training record. signments, lack of resources (time, train- pecially Chapters 1 and 2) and FM 25- With the aid of Appendix B, TC 25-30, 101 (especially Chapter 2, the “Near- ing area, money), and unfocused training Term” and “Preparation for Training” the Standard Army Training System environments (can’t train the important (SATS) software package, and a personal tasks because higher guidance does not portions of Chapter 3, and Appendix computer, a well-organized leader book “G”). Find and use TC 25-30, “A Lead- identify or enforce what is important to er’s Guide to Company Training Meet- can be created in less time than it took train). Junior leaders were criticized for SFC Lady to make one with pen and not understanding our Army training ings.” (I am amazed at how few NCOs typewriter (I will always be grateful to know that this circular exists!). At the doctrine (FMs 25-100 and 25-101). individual level, our readiness can be SFC Frank Partyka for loaning me his computer-generated book, and for the After Action Reviews from the CTCs dramatically improved in five steps, even battalion Xerox machine being next to reinforce these senior leader perceptions. without two-year platoon leader tours or Units arrive at the NTC or the CMTC buckets full of money from Uncle Sugar. the staff duty office!). without the ability to execute collective Assess your soldiers’ and crews’ profi- tasks to standard. Weaknesses in simple Know your company METL, your pla- ciency, and tell your leaders what needs individual, leader, and crew tasks, which toon battle tasks, and select all the indi- to be trained next. Tank commander/ must be trained/learned before collective vidual and leader tasks which support scout section leaders had better be pre- task improvement can take place (for (link to) these collective tasks. For an example, precombat checks, preventive armor NCO, it means working with your maintenance inspections, MILES bore- fellow leaders to select from ARTEP 17- Continued on Page 51

ARMOR — March-April 1999 7

Controlling Armor’s Destiny by Brigadier General John Kirk (Retired)

system “leverages” are surprising mostly in their mechanical, Although we pay a lot of lip service these days to the experiential, operational, and conceptual fragility, not innova- need for original, “out-of-the-box” thinking, my IN basket tion or exploited technology. Brigade and Division XXI look does not run over with unorthodox story ideas or revolu- like recycled, decades-old ideas. But whether Rev or Evolution, tionary concepts. These seem to come more frequently new systems must make our “varsity” as winning joint/com- in phone conversations with John Kirk, who remains bined arms teammates, not islands. Their toughest tests are yet to come — field-proofing by troopers that busted the Army’s engaged, concerned...and usually right...after 15 years last improved anvil. All hands need to take part, with ruthless — of retirement. So, dammit, listen up... –Ed. even harsh — fairness and integrity. We all need to take disciplined “time outs” from duties and monitors to view the world farsightedly and refresh our “state of Armor’s active component is an endangered species. We’re mind.” Then we need a blitzkrieg — fast, focused, coordinated, fat, slow deploying, and too terrain-restricted and logistically sponsored action before Armor’s future is surrendered nolo hungry for a force projection Army. And we fight mano-a- contendere, outrun or outflanked by other branches and ser- mano, which means casualties. In contrast, the Navy and Air vices. Read Armed Forces Journal International (AFJI), Octo- Force can deploy fast. Precision weaponeers of our own and ber 1998 issue, let your blood boil, then firewall your throttles brother services claim the ability to achieve politically popular, to: allegedly cheap, “nearly bloodless” victories alone. As a result, we’re losing battles of survival at TRADOC, DA, the Joint · Take the initiative with a forceful, focused breakout from Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Congress. Armor’s life is at risk. encirclement to control Armor’s doctrinal and operational future. Draft FM 100-5, ’98, was withdrawn from circula- tion/comment — again. Good news! Bad book! Its recall was THE CHALLENGE prima facie evidence of doctrine’s unstable future concepts The purpose of this article is to throw down a gauntlet that gyro, ours included. challenges the men of armor and cavalry to fix that — to design · Use futuristic operational concepts to redefine, validate and control your own and your branch’s futures. Our brother- and refine Armor’s long term roles, missions, and systems. hood seems to have lost its historic long-range perspective, fo- The shape of future battle, strategic deployability, joint/com- cus, voice, and impact. Process has become our major product. bined arms conventional operations, those in difficult terrain If this and other military journals are indicators, our mental mo- and Operations Short of War (OSW) remain huge issues. bility and future vision have dimmed. The void in contrasting futuristic arguments hints that political correctness may be sup- · FORCE science and industry to get their snouts out of the pressing concerned divergent views. slow-moving, low/no risk government dollar feed trough to develop the capabilities mounted arms need to meet future THE MESSAGE strategic requirements and complement the projected opera- Our thinking and objective operational systems must reach for tional abilities of our brother services. a distant horizon, unconstrained by the concepts, systems and support structures that are the suboptimal tools of our times. DISHARMONIES “Armor isn’t a branch of service, it’s a state of mind” is an aging but pertinent maxim. It’s now more crucial to Armor and Armor’s future world-mobile, multi-mission combined arms the Army than at any time since the 1930s. Successful Armor doctrine and team are at risk in a vacuum. Senior leaders are leaders, cavalrymen, and fighter pilots share similar skills and trying to meet present needs, satisfy the political, technical, and mindsets. Systems are secondary to their “state of mind” in bat- budgetary interests of “higher” and industry while the force tle — competence, clear concepts, decisiveness, attack spirit, dukes out today’s ground truth. In the meantime, our future’s courage, perspective and flair. doctrinal horse is a runaway headed for the Beltway Corral with too many riders. It won’t be broke right by The Compliance We’re custodians of that spirit, not a thing called Tank or sin- Chorus, SAMS’ Chanters, Jargoneers or Fiscal Strings. gular branch of service. Our heritage is creation and decisive employment of joint/combined arms teams with firepower, pro- The doctrinal vacuum, digital evangelism, damaging budgets tected mobility and shock effect to win battles, wars, and per- and “missions too far” are corrosive to the spirit that’s central to form operations short of war (OSW). the joint/combined arms team’s now and future capabilities. To many, it seems that operations and outfits are being force-

fitted with stovepipe or ad hoc systems, not integrated func- A BEGINNING tional ones or tailored applique. “Revolutionizing” seems to The “challenges” of Force XXI rightly concern many soldiers. have attitudinally divided our combined arms into (Bill) Gate- We need to shake that dinger, fix the force, and move on — sian indentured strata instead of the teams that are Armor’s vital fast. Despite bruised feelings and honest doubts, digitization, commodities. At the high end of the food chain, in environmen- info systems, target acquisition and precision fires are needed tally controlled splendor, are the info, process, and precision operational evolutions (EMA). They’re speed bumps, ramps and warriors. Middlemen target and send undigested data masses transitions, not a “revolution.” From my grille door view, new down. The low end seems to be the combined arms, now appar- 8 ARMOR — March-April 1999

ently relegated to base establishment, housekeeping, and killing REFORGING I — HAMMERING (Confessions of an Iclauseclast) trickle-throughs. Doesn’t look or sound like joint/combined arms or any possi- The Principles of War have become an atrophied, unaccount- able list, not organs of a living, evolving operational being. ble future battlefield to me. We’ve perpetuated dated concepts — levels of war as a con- struct, Mass and Offensive as Principles, determinism as a stra- OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS tegic/operational calculus. We, like the classicists, are looking for the yellow brick road to “certain” success, fighting past wars Rifts are constructive opportunities. A unifying joint/combined arms operational concept (construct) must be the driving force deterministically better, not future ones probabilistically well. behind new doctrine and future systems. Clear, clean, impartial The Principles were first published as War Department Regu- concepts must displace zealotry and uncertainty, then be imbed- lations No.10-5 in 1921. In the 78 years since, and lacking ded in people, schools, system designs, operational tests and go assertion-challenging institutional or academic cultures in our to war (or close to it). Troopers in the holes, hulls, cupolas and Army, we’ve questioned them less than involved, educated pro- CPs of the Armor Force need to mount up, take their initiative fessional soldiers should. We and our field manuals have re- and challenge the system to make the positive, assertive, for- peated 18/19 century fossils like nodding dogs. Wordsmithing ward-looking changes that Reforge the Thunderbolt. has been substituted for thoughtful changes to compensate for the hugely altered dimensions, conditions, and tools of 20th century war. The lapse has often profoundly damaged or re- REFORGING THE THUNDERBOLT tarded Army doctrine, systems and battle performance. “Forge...to beat into shape.” Webster Clausewitz’ “Vom Kriege,” 1832, is widely accepted as form- “Reforging’s” Line of Departure is the Principles of War. ing much of the theoretical foundation of the art of war. It’s Paraphrasing Will Rogers’ famed comment on weather, “Al- gained and retained neo-biblical status. His works and those of most nobody talks about the Principles of War and nobody does other “masters” of military theory — Du Picq, Jomini, Sun Tzu, anything about ’em.” We need to cross the LD with common et al, (Who’s read Seversky, Douhet, Mahan?) have earned our sense and plain talk leading. We must modernize, then integrate admiration, not fawning recitals. They’d have expected better of the Principles into a coherent body of things good leaders and us than rote repetition in the face of sweeping geopolitical, so- outfits really do, not let them continue to stand as moss- cioeconomical, and technological changes in this century. gathering totems. History, experience, and reality must be “Visions” being “in,” here’s one — Clausewitz, Du Picq, & merged smoothly with operational/technological developments Co. (absent Fuller), in Bierstube Valhalla, sobbing or laughing in a flexible, mission-centered way. Our doctrinaires must get to the core, say what they mean simply and cleanly in our profes- uncontrollably because we haven’t updated their stuff in 100- 150 years. Think about it. What’s the likelihood that those sion’s language, free of distorting “interdisciplinary” jargon, bright guys’ ideas would be unaffected by: rifled/automatic foggy metaphors, fuzzy logics and abstruse ideas. Their prod- ucts need brutal probabilistic tests against the next century’s weapons; internal combustion engines; global mass transport; flight/aerospace power; ICBMs; nukes; acquisition means; tele- known and potential threats in real places, with critical audi- communications; info technology; huge jumps in weapons ences, not demonstrations among friends and “interests.” ranges and lethalities; geography; socioeconomic structures; FM 100-5 (’98 Draft) said “..Principles...are the foundation of others? C’mon, doctrinaires and reviewers, think again. Army doctrine.” Yeah, right! So that’s why writers led them We need a reality check. Many of Clausewitz’s loudest cham- with 22 pages of superfluous executive summary and intro ex- pions are pretenders. No one used Clausewitz or the Principles planations with text by operational dilettantes, systems analysts, engineers, designers and code-writers. Wrong stuff! We need to of War in my 27+ years’ service — in command guidance, war plans, orders, exercises, critiques, or after-actions (AAR) from shut down, then restart the engine of change. Here’s an ap- platoon to department, peace, war or at the NTC — except me, proach to creating a “type” framework and logic that leaders and technocrats can use to mutually shape technology into opera- badly. Almost no one’s read his 19th century original. Few have struggled through his translated tangled logics and turgid prose. tions’ hammer rather than stamping joint/combined arms into In their essays in Makers of Modern Strategy, Rothfels (’44) shapes determined by technology’s human nature-free, process- oriented mechanics: noted that “On War...is reverently called a ‘classic,’ though one that seems more quoted than actually read.” Paret (’86) said · Update the Principles of War (Operations). Displace Cen- Clausewitz’s “...influence on the manner in which wars are pre- turies 18/19 to Century 21 ASAP. Year 1800 concepts don’t pared for and fought is difficult to discern and even harder to fit the weapons, concepts, or experience of the last 200 years verify.” or 2010/2025 estimates. Impose high probability demands on Levels of War - Clausewitz’s simplistic concept of three lev- information systems, weapons, forces, multi-mission opera- els of war — strategic, operational, tactical — reflects a small tional concepts and human factors. nation and its continental conflicts in simpler times. Today, our · Connect ’em with what outfits really do. Get “principles” Armed Forces serve in a volatile world whose aerospace sys- into a context everyone can understand and use. Institutions tems, geopolitics, global transportation, and telecommunications and leadership must create an operational construct and spread have added complexities Clausewitz never imagined. Army it throughout the force so that E4 through fielded O10 have doctrine must now embrace not just war, but the spectrum of shared concepts and the tools to execute them. Then we must operational tasks U.S. forces may perform. create a reciprocal top-to-bottom climate of absolute mutual A couple of examples tell the tale. The two-team, locked and trust and gain freedom of action from our superiors instead of their mission and careerist fail-safe constraints. loaded Task Force Tyree that confronted the Soviets at Berlin’s Checkpoint Charlie in 1961 was controlled by SACEUR under · Project them into the future. More later. the National Command Authority (NCA). Its commanders ARMOR — March-April 1999 9

knew they were strategic instruments, not mere “tactical” units. sis in both old and modern war. Nathaniel Greene wrote the President Lyndon Johnson’s Red Rocket messages, circa the “irregular” warfare book in our own Revolution. His exhaustion mid-60’s, could reach a force of any size and stop its action in of Tarleton led to Yorktown. Tito, Mao and Giap showed us minutes. We’ve seen similar deviations from Clausewitz’s the- that, like Superiority, Initiative can be gained or seized in many ory in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Bosnia, Mogadishu ways, only one of which is the offensive. They include defen- etc. The NCA now often takes virtual control of parts or all of sive-offensive, mobile defense, ambush, surprise, attrition, psy- strategy and operations as it did in Desert Storm and last No- war and other combinations of means, times, places and meth- vember’s recall of strike aircraft headed for Iraq. ods. An attack spirit and capability is central to successful of- Today, a single headquarters may fulfill the operational and fense, defense, or retrograde operations. An attack completes a strategic defensive-offensive for the winner. one or two other roles simultaneously. Operations may be uni- service, joint, interdepartmental, combined or United Nations Simplicity was in Clausewitz’s book, but he couldn’t think or operations. The bottom line is that Clausewitz’s tidy concept write that way. Our concepts and language have followed his just doesn’t fit our often complex goals, force mixes, and com- lead and need treatment as a sucking head wound. We can only mand and control, which are task-organized as needed in any hope we confuse our enemies more than us. We’ve created combination (or omission) from these “levels:” modern battle’s most effective obscurants with “military lan- Strategic. Establishes policies, aims, provides resources, guage” reports, orders, and “information systems” which make quantity and dominance synonyms! MG “P” Wood led 4th Ar- controls as desired. mored in WWII without a single formal order. Conversely, Operational. Conducts operations to successfully prosecute we’ve created classic Clausewitzian friction with complex con- the strategy. cepts; functional misfits (domains, cognitive, “branches and sequins,” etc); approval-seeking, trendy, murky verbiage; Mala- Task(s). Loosely categorized as war (or combat) and Opera- tions Short of War (OSW). propisms (asymmetry, synchronization); hosts of restrictive measures by no-casualties/zero-defect leaders; diarrheaic intent; Mission(s). “Secure..Stabilize..Restore..” etc. Tactics are a multi-word missions (where one would do); interdisciplinary mission function, not a level. jargon; newly coined words; complex maneuvers, orders, and control measures. Mass as a Principle is dead, too. From Neanderthal man through the musket, massed formations were generally needed Determinism Versus Probabilism. Our operational theory to produce winning combat power for forces armed with short and practice have been and remain habitually deterministic, a range, limited lethality weapons. Clausewitz, “the Mahdi of characteristic which history, logic and experience weigh heavily mass,” deduced law from that past, but lacked a crystal ball. against. Few soldiers or their political masters understand prob- Mass shouldn’t have been more than a tactic or technique since ability in operations or how multipliers and risk-taking affect the advent of rifled small arms and cannon. Technical evolu- winning economically in war’s jungle of random events and tions were generally unrecognized by doctrine in WWI, except probabilities. Let’s look at both. by the Germans at the Somme. Clausewitz’s disciples, Luden- · Determinism, endemic to man, is epidemic in the Army. dorf and Foch, threw wool-clad soldiers at Maxim machine The causes are complex. They start with playground logic: guns, rapid fire cannon and gas in mass “offensives.” Airpower, Sagger swarms, modern target acquisition, precision munitions, “I’ve got mor’n you got, so I’ll win.” When we enter adulthood discomfort arises over the uncertain game ends of life, death, and exponentially increased lethality should have written finis to and career. Many adopt rule-based value systems, “guaran- this notion. The crosses manning countless cemeteries from Shiloh to the Somme, at San Pietro, Huertgen, the Pacific, Ko- teeing” a “successful” result: “If I do this, what I want will result.” Stairway to the stars personnel systems and pro forma rea, and Vietnam, as well as charred hulls from Algeria to the measures like CTLs, ARTEPs, matrices, decision lines, and Euphrates, mutely demand elimination of mass as a principle. The constituency of our dead have a doctrinal voice we must some checklists reinforce our early learning by seeming to guarantee “right” outcomes. It’s also a fool’s-safe approach to hear — compellingly — or their sacrifice will have been vain. war and OSW, a comforting, simplistic logic that’s consistent Superiority of joint/combined arms combat power is mass’s with computers, but contrary to many acts of man, natural law, modern descendent. Created at decisive times and places, it’s and probability. Operationally, it’s created: “correlation of elemental to winning. Superiority normally results from maneu- forces;” mass-reliant frontal attacks; sieges; attrition warfare; ver and the focused effects of multiple systems. Mass, like infil- indecisive, shallow envelopments; and slow recognition and tration, is a situation-dependent tactic to attain decisive Superi- exploitation of opportunities. Determinism demeans the ority. For obscure reasons, the change is unrecognized or not intelligence, creative thought, will, worth and imagination of clearly articulated. “Effects of mass” (Draft FM 100-5), is an men on both sides. It also needlessly expends resources and kills unstudied preservation of a bloody sacred cow. Such Closetwits soldiers in high density, low-to-no career risk operations. It should read Hart’s Strategy, Jomini and Napoleon’s Maxims 42, exalts both correlation and diminishing returns — Monty of 72, 73, 74, 77, 81, 93, 95, and 115 ’til they pass Military Alamein/Goodwood/Market Garden, Clark of Cassino, and Thought, K thru 8. Orlando at Anzio — counting tubes, rounds, treads, heads, fears and escalating resources toward an impossible probability of Offensive , conjoined with “mass,” was blindly adhered to in WWI, costing Europe a generation of men. It was little kinder to one (P=1) instead of weighing capabilities and opportunities. Determinism’s utility is limited — rough estimates, mainte- Pershing’s Army. Clausewitz hypothesized that the offensive nance, pre-combat and prep-to-fire checks, pre-flights, small was central to gaining the Initiative and thus was key to win- ning. Our doctrine has slavishly followed. Both are wrong. units and operations where Rule One, Rogers’ Rangers, means life or death. There’s no doubt that Initiative is vital to winning. The force having it plays the tune while the other guy dances. But early · Probabilism’s more realistic, analyzing the “...likeli- and recent history disproves Clausewitz’s “offensive” hypothe- hood...an event will occur..” or “If we do these things, we’ll 10 ARMOR — March-April 1999

feasible courses of action with varying degrees of likely winning payoff, human costs, attendant risk, and rigorous examination of governing factors. “It seems no accident that a good number of our better WWII leaders, civilian and military, were pretty REFORGING II: good poker players. They understood risk, probabil- Blending the Principles, or Common Sense Operations ity, human psychology and the likelihood that an Half a career ago, a CG asked his ADC(M)’s prediction of the event would or wouldn’t happen.” division’s likely performance at the NTC. Reply: “If we don’t win, you should fire me.” They “won,” by throwing out the FM 100-5 and training dogma of the time. Leaders, troopers, and serendipity evolved a doctrine for the division. Its two consecu- probably get this result.” In war and life, probability’s king, tive “winning” rotations left a demoralized OPFOR as their randomness and accident its court jesters, diminishing returns a footprint in the NTC sand. There have been too few “winnings” law. “Certainty” normally isn’t, and “probably” most often is. since. As a discipline, probabilism’s gaining fast among doctors and Twenty years of outcomes at the NTC show that we haven’t others who find that determinism’s rule-based logics or gained much from the adventure, doctrinally or operationally. specialist medicine often produces marginal or just plain wrong answers. They’re turning (returning) to “whole-person” The OPFOR was born to lose — to well-led, genuinely combat- ready (C1) outfits. Failure of BLUEFOR to “win” suggests seri- medicine. We should join’em! Probabilism in operations isn’t ous shortfalls in doctrine, schooling, “mentoring,” force train- science or mathematics! It’s a complex of “whole battlespace” situational estimates linked to FOCUS (see below). Its got to be ing, resources — or the will to tell it like it is. The NTC has long offered the Army an unprecedented world-best tool to measure taught historically, academically, in AARs and repeatedly in its products, then correct deficiencies in the processes that made simulations. Hannibal, Napoleon, Jackson at Cross Keys and Port Republic, Grierson and Grant at Vicksburg, Patton, them. Its data could also provide the objective foundation for training budgets and readiness risk analyses for DoD and Con- MacArthur at Inchon were probabilists. Guderian, Rommel and gress, instead of the subjective guesses still used at the NTC or Balck, too, who did the “impossible” with 20-60 tanks. It seems no accident that a good number of our better WWII leaders, JRTC. civilian and military, were pretty good poker players. They Doctrine based on ephemeral intellectual hypotheses and per- understood risk, probability, human psychology and the formance-shrouding euphemisms won’t fix what’s broke. Offi- likelihood that an event would or wouldn’t happen. Probabilis- cials intone “great training”...”super leader learning”...and other tic tactics make deep and/or double envelopments, turns, deep phrases for losing. We’re only fooling us. Blue soldiers and exploitations and fluid defense majority, not minority, tactics unquotable outside observers mostly describe results as “We and Speed a critical factor in force operations. But, from lost,” adverbed by “bad” or “again.” Rationalization isn’t readi- Rommel’s papers, “..Men should never be allowed to get the ness to troops. Transmogrifying “go to war” training into paint- feeling that...casualties have been calculated...that is the end of ball games with camouflaged results and no accountability pro- all enthusiasm.” Napoleon’s supposed to have said, “I don’t motes denial, not candor. Too few grime time “Top Guns” in want marshals who are good, just those who are lucky.” commanders’ hatches in an environment free mostly of free maneuver and loaded with constraining orders, control meas- · Blending and situationally balancing determinism and ures, and other initiative-killers, are clear predictors of their probabilism is the right operational answer and must be embedded in the “art” part of war (See FOCUS, later). No futures in live operations. Marshall MacLuhan said the medium is the message. The NTC’s message is Process=Product. We’ve single equation or method of estimation will work. Whole busted the corporate leveling bubble, reversed alchemy, or built battlespace probability, a minimum of prudent determinism, and related evaluative disciplines are critical skills to be taught and a perpetual motion mediocrity machine. practiced, cradle to grave, and be rigorously applied to war and If war and preparation for it are man’s most perfect forms of OSW. Our officer and NCO corps have not been taught them, or waste, the only product an army can have is winning, anytime, practiced them in disciplined school, simulation, or active at least cost, in its nation’s human or other resources. In that operations environments. The estimates taught in schools are context, our Continental European-based doctrine doesn’t pro- long on processes, short on product, and a separate subject. vide the sound conceptual footings modern war, operations Today, we must teach estimation in minutes and seconds, not short of war, or training demand. The construct below is a rec- hours or days. Tactical exercises should have no less than three reation and small tribute to thousands of men and women who

ARMOR — March-April 1999 11

did or will do the job right – winning. It isn’t too divergent from intercede only as essential. “Command/control what you the “masters” and seems supported by history. It’s a trial balloon should, not what you can” should be the Bible’s 11th com- for your consideration, argument, and hopefully one start point mandment! (See Letters, Jan-Feb ’98 ARMOR, p. 55.) for Armor’s future. Certainty ISN’T included. Whatever evolves, remember that every operation has an inherent degree · Focus, the battle art of command and staff, is an institu- tionally taught, self-studied and mentored skill which results in of probability and risk you must identify, weigh, and be bal- a disciplined, integrated continuum of concept(s), convergent anced for. employment of superior joint/combined arms combat power and actions directed at attaining a goal or specific objective. It is PRINCIPLES analogous to a lens — light from many sources is concentrated to produce controlled effects at a place and time. Focus is the Principles are the bases for conduct of all Joint and Combined commander’s version of the fighter pilot’s OODA loop (Obser- military operations in the accomplishment of a Joint force, na- vation, Orientation, Decision, Action). In single word Armyese: tional, or supranational purpose. There are two, GOAL (or ob- See; Sort; Orient; Decide; Act; Recyle. jective) and FOCUS. See your battlespace, Decide, fast (“Like lightning”— Goal (or Objective). Define a clear, decisive, attainable and those adjacent. Rommel). unambiguous goal (strategic) or objective (operational) for military operations. At high levels, military force is used to ac- Sort out the mission’s Act, fast (same). complish largely political ends. Operationally, terrain or force success vitals. objectives are often assigned as means to accomplish the overall Orient on exploiting vitals/ Recycle to See for goal. The goal or objective (aim in some armies) is the driving fixing busted ones. continuous follow -through. force for mission statements and concepts of operations. Clarity and Simplicity must dominate. Commanders and staff, Army -wide, must be schooled and ex- perienced so they share a habitual, almost subconscious, com- Focus. Converge decisive, unified combined arms combat mon operational concept and thought pattern. Staffs must use power and the collective will of the force on the fast, economical decentralized authorities to make their own estimates and take accomplishment of the goal or objective. Focus functionally actions in parallel with fast (not hasty) command estimates, integrates minds, concepts, means and spirit to splinter (disinte- without guidance or approval, knowing that they and their grate, destroy coherence of, disassemble) enemy operations commander have a high likelihood or certainty of reaching the rapidly, defeat him in detail (piecemeal) with superior forces, same or similar conclusions and decisions. They complete an- exploit outcomes quickly to win at least practical cost in the ticipatory actions, often through and including warning orders, nation’s human and other resources. Focus is simultaneously a and some unit moves, and have to recall or modify almost none principle of war, a property of the force and the battle art of with command guidance and decisions only fine-tuning staff command and staff. preps. Linear, metronomic sequences cost time, inhibit early, free coordination/flow of ideas, and create event-driven execu- · Focus, the principle, stresses disassembling enemy con- tion, not opportunity-driven exploitation. This characteristic of cepts, forces, and their will and ability to fight while retaining Manstein, Rommel, Balck, Patton, their chiefs of staff , and their perspective of the operation’s relation to and interdependency staffs permitted dramatic feats of combined arms. At Tobruk, with the larger force. It aims at disintegrating the enemy and LTC Westphal, G3 of the Afrika Korps, recalled a Rommel- killing them in detail (piecemeal) rather than a single large, de- directed division attack on his own authority. A furious Rommel structive fight, unless that’s the best or only option (kill with sulked, but said nothing. Westphal was right. rapiers, not clubs). Converge all available means on contributing directly or indirectly to winning. Forces may, but need not be, DRIVERS physically massed in time or space. Integrate available combat power of all arms/services into unified joint/combined arms Drivers create force, disintegrating speed, high tempo, over- teams reporting to or cooperating with one boss to perform or whelming momentum and/or psychological advantage in offen- support stated or implied mission(s). Prioritize (economize) to sive, defensive, and retrograde operations. create superior joint/combined arms combat power in the main Speed. Attain/maintain the highest possible speed in every- effort. Unity includes cooperation, supporting, OPCON or at- thing the command does consistent with accuracy, carefully tachment. Assure mutual maneuver support in time and space, maintaining the distinction between accuracy and precision not just fires. If that’s infeasible, weigh risks. “Simultaneity” (often unrelated). Lightning decisions, instant initiative on op- violates Focus. Wrongly interpreted, it may unduly dilute the portunities, rapid and accurate response to any valid order are main effort, slow tempo, or cool fast burners by shooting too keys to success of own, next higher and lower commands. many targets with too many things at once. Birdshot’s no substi- Speed is reasoned and modestly orderly, haste often an ill- tute for concentrated fires. A similar malapropistic mistake cre- considered, imbalanced knee-jerk response. Speed exponen- ated the “synchronized” corps’ creeping steel trench in the Gulf. tially increases shock effect of any action. It facilitates Surprise, · Focus, the property is the ingrained ability of the force as by acting faster than the enemy expects, imbalances him with a whole to execute operations using commonly shared concepts, ability to hit him several times, ways, and places in a short time methods, and tactics to accomplish the mission fast with mini- and clouds and confuses his estimate of you. It also creates mum guidance or detailed control by commanders. From quickness — fast response to orders, reports or threats to the squad to joint headquarters, shared understanding of the outfit. It may give “armor protection” in some situations by Army’s concepts and methods of operations should — with making targets so fleeting the enemy can’t engage. Unsure mission, a sketch, and a small number of least restrictive commanders who demand precise versus accurate information control measures possible — convey command intent com- waste time, destroy speed, frustrate subordinates, and kill ex- pletely. Command at the critical point, not at a monitor, and ploitable opportunity and troopers. The distinction between un- 12 ARMOR — March-April 1999

digested, time-wasting data and decision-critical information and integrity. It mandates a tow bar on every second vehicle. must be made and disciplined without quarter, Army-wide. In the Gulf, one artillery battery lost a tube early, towed it Initiative. Seize and retain freedom of choice of where, when, throughout the operation. It fired every mission. An adjacent unit with a like problem destroyed the gun “to prevent cap- how or if you will fight. Gain Surprise by any means, maintain ture.” Stupid. Our Army won’t have this right until the capa- continuous pressure and high apparent operational tempo. Force the enemy to react to your threats, real or imagined. Exploit bility’s provided and the habit is burned into every outfit. We also have to figure out who’ll do triage, perform last rites, every profitable opportunity consistent with mission/risk. Use wash body parts from hulls, reform, rearm, and lead renewed raids, patrols, limited objective attacks, sweeps, attacks by fire, interdiction and disinformation. Delegate exploitation authority units back to battle. Unpleasant. to the lowest competent level with the abilities and resources. Superiority. Employ all available joint/combined arms forces, Leaders seeing a high value, low risk opportunity within the drivers, and multipliers, particularly Maneuver, Surprise and context of the operation should take it, report the decision and Initiative, as an integrated whole to attain a winning qualitative results, and support or join its exploitation by their parent com- advantage over the enemy, a quantitative one when necessary mand as a whole. or advantageous. We must become maneuver, not firepower addicts. Fully integrated combined arms smartly employed in Superior Relative Mobility. Gain and sustain the (mounted)(dismounted) ability of the force to move faster than decisive maneuver create effects disproportionate to their num- bers. The best results are had when enemy capabilities critical to the enemy under any conditions of weather (WX) and terrain. his physical, conceptual or psychological success are selectively Mobility is not mere movement of men and machines about the battlefield. Broadly, it’s an integral comprised of the clearly killed, neutralized, or immobilized — fast — in a priority that creates economy. Concurrent rapid, violent, deep envelopments focused mental, physical, operational, judgmental, and me- disintegrate or destroy the rest, and on own initiative roll into chanical skills of the outfit as a team. Decisive maneuver almost always demands Mobility superior to that of the enemy. Next to exploitation nonstop. Force ratios, correlation of forces, and decision lines are the absolute deterministic enemies of good Focus and Initiative, Mobility is key. Keep yours, restrict or operations in any but exceptional, tightly orchestrated cases like remove his, and you normally win. Demand/attain near design rates of speed from troops/systems, despite often adverse condi- crossing the Atlantic (or the Alps). tions. High Mobility is an act of will and unit pride, leader MULTIPLIERS through soldier. There are seven parts: mental; physical; speed (see above); fixing; weather/terrain; breaching/crossing, and Multipliers create combat power exponentially greater than the recovery. resources committed. They must be rigidly disciplined and ad- hered to almost unexceptionally. Commanders deviate at their · Mental toughness, the ability to inspire yourself and your discretion, but only after carefully weighing risks of doing so outfit beyond norms, is basic — toward design max of vehi- cles/aircraft. A near-fanatical “We can’t be stopped” spirit in against opportunity, and concluding that probability of success outweighs risks and that coherence of the overall operation will crews, units, support. Max use of air fires, drops. In Table 91, be kept. Other factors the commander considers vital to success Gulf War, command caution, control measures, and dressing artillery lines constrained speed, decisive maneuver, hence re- may be added, but not many. There are two times in a soldier’s life when he should lie and cheat — to gain surprise and to pro- sults. Imagination often needed. See Jackson, Sherman, Grier- tect his force using every deception the outfit’s capable of. son, Crook, Moseby, Rommel Papers, etc. Maneuver. Dynamically employ superior, fast-moving joint/ · Physical mobility requires intimate knowledge of men and machines. Patton’s aphorism on fatigue applies to mental combined arms forces to gain a time/space/place advantage over an enemy, disintegrate his operations, destroy his forces or (above), soldier stamina, and maintenance. You must push the seize an objective as stated or implied by the mission. Maneu- limits of human endurance. Logistics can kill mobility. ver’s purpose is to gain a positional leverage which creates deci- · Fix by removing the enemy’s mobility with whatever sively superior force at a time and place of your choosing, win- works. Use man’s/nature’s obstacles and USAF/Army Avia- ning that fight and flowing into exploitation fast. It’s ubiquitous, tion in attack and defense to temporarily protect flanks. Para- casting its shadow over all combat (and political) operations. It lyze small threats with quick MLRS strikes. Good deception is the major reason for the existence of Drivers and Multipliers can freeze enemy maneuver forces, reserves. and establishes their relative value in each operation. Surprise is · Wx/Terrain must be a leader’s personal field skill more normally an essential part. than G2/S2/ALO estimation. Needs keen observation/Imita- Maneuver’s a strolling window shopper in our Army — cau- tion Intuition Extract (IIE) (Call or write). Ability to weigh tious, shallow, pleasantly indecisive. Simple mob tactics relying Wx/terrain risk to advantage often beats pro-pessimists’ fore- on mass and throw weights to make right are more the rule. casts, produces biggest payoff with decisive maneuver/sur- Post-WWII, Armor and Cavalry lost their way in Korea, prise. Use Cav/Scouts as themselves, not phony tanks or infan- Europe’s Cold War neo-trench warfare, and the jungles of Viet- try. Commander and at least one crew/squad per platoon, nam. Infantry still view any mobility means other than shanks’ corps wide, must be scout-trained. Maximize use of trusted de- mare and parachutes as just trucks — helitrucks, armored tainees/EPW. trucks, and wheeled trucks — useful for movement, but not related to real maneuver. Artillery’s flirtation with mobility and · Breach/cross obstacles fast as in-stride, impromptu drills. Engineers up! Deliberate’s slow, costly – a method for the un- maneuver in the Gulf may be diluted, and “fire-base-itis” re- vived by long-range, precision munitions whose success is more skilled, unready, or Volga crossings. video-apparent than real. Beyond that, we’re historically fixated · Recovery/evacuation is a drill skill and art d’triage on the big shows, rather than gut lessons for our future. The through corps. It should never slow mission accomplishment. Civil War, blitzkreig, and the Patton dramas, among others, Mutual recovery is a vital capability to maintain unit strength have blinded us to many maneuver lessons of American and ARMOR — March-April 1999 13

other arms. This “Gettysburg-itis” leaves the Khan, Subutai, (smell) of “expert” language, then rush to inflict the same junk Grierson, Crook, Moseby, Forrest, the British Long Range De- on seniors and subordinates for effect when simple words would sert Group, Merrill, Inchon, the battles of the German Eastern do. Troopers who roll their eyes up and slump in their seats are Front, and others largely unstudied despite messages that often sending them a message, Over. transcend those of Overlord and the Bulge. We’ve lost the ma- Give plans and orders that see operations in as great a depth in neuver message. time and space as you can foresee to assure understanding, Maneuver of joint/combined arms demands men and women delegate freedom of action, gain and retain momentum. After steeped in history, command, and field operations since their their planned start, operations generally become improvs (as in oath, and brutal, career-affecting realism in our training and music), so use the minimum number and least restrictive control readiness centers. It needs corporate emphasis, in-depth histori- measures possible to reduce change conflicts, retain flexibility, cal and experiential grasp, mentoring, the ability to thrust trust and promote sub-leader initiative. Excessive detail in orders to the lowest level (power down), accept some disorder, take erodes confidence and morale by conveying distrust. Control some risks. Planning for and execution of modern battle and measure-induced “slowth” often kills more of our men/things maneuver are too important to be left in the hands of operational than direct hostile action. “Intent” paragraphs, perhaps needed gadflies, pedants, or mere theoreticians. Commanders who are at corps and division, should be infrequent at brigade, superflu- unwilling to put their futures in the hands of squad leader, O3s, ous below that, except in extraordinarily complex or subtle O5s, and O6s, whom they were responsible to mentor, opt for operations. safety rather than making bold strokes. Stochastic, man-in-the- In all but rare cases, written intent from brigade down is prima loop simulations give us an unprecedented opportunity in this facie evidence that the Army’s institutions, its officer corps and respect, but back-spacing is no substitute for being smart enough to do things right. Some points: NCO corps, haven’t gotten their conceptual and mentoring acts together or are personally insecure. Intent that is understood and · Risk is part of life and maneuver. Learn to exploit it, not acted upon by all hands consistently over time comes from run from it. force-wide shared operational concepts, effective education, officer and NCO mentoring by capable seniors, trust-based · Fire and airpower alone seize and retain or physically con- training, simple mission orders and pictures in the sand, on trol nothing. butcher paper, in person, or via teleconference. Examples from · EMA notwithstanding, fire supports maneuver, not the re- the Gulf War are atrocities that seem written for “I ordered ’em verse. to” defenses against the press or a special prosecutor rather than Successful maneuver demands a high degree of subordinate operations. Some mission orders start at stand-to, finish at · lunch. Two-minute FRAGOs draw fire and EW. Most of the initiative, operations decentralized to the lowest competent FRAGOs sent in to this magazine as solutions to tactical vi- level, and few restrictions. Unwillingness or inability to decen- tralize shows subordinate resources are too low, mentoring gnettes deserve burning because of length, complexity, and tell- ing folks what the commander should have already taught them. failed, or you distrust your own products. In sum, simplicity must be branded on the minds of the Army’s · Threat gaps or discontinuities must be sought continuously, body politic, then be bodyguarded by draconian discipline to exploited instantly. restore it to our concepts and the words and pictures used to express them. It’s professionally embarassing that Tom · Envelopments must be decisively deep and exploited fast. Double envelopment’s an art form to be mastered, team through Clancy’s Into the Storm captured the essence of Army doctrine better in fewer, simpler words than our doctrine writers. fielded army. Surprise. Hit the enemy with fire, maneuver, or both in times, · Flank attacks are generally useful only to small units. places, weather, or ways he least expects and for which he’s Higher, they’re indecisively shallow. physically or mentally unready. Create virtual unreality in your · Delay must be a “defend” nature of resistance, including opponent’s head. Make him disbelieve his ability to execute his violent local counterattacks, not fire and fall back. Corps should doctrine, or beat you mano-a-mano, or as an outfit. Use decep- practice having divisions do it so cavalry can get back to cavalry tion, Speed, Initiative, Maneuver to gain Surprise. Strike at un- business. expected times and places with unexpected tactics, speed, vio- lence, or strength. Create and sustain an ambush mindset in · Ambush psychology (sneak, hide, deceive, pounce) and forms are elemental to smart maneuvers. It leverages force, subordinates. Use ambush forms in defense, adapt them to of- fense. They convey mission, concept, intent and coordination in simplifies orders, forms mental pictures easily, has intent word- FRAGOs fast, simply, completely. Avoid predictable patterns in lessly embedded. feeding, fueling, arming, and fixing. Exploit enemy habits. Fa- · Winning’s your sole criterion, not process or press (media). tigue can be your ally or enemy, so sustain a tempo and pressure that tires him without collapsing you or your soldiers. Reverse Simplicity. Make Simplicity permeate everything the com- mand does — concepts, plans, orders language, and actions. cycle operations work well mixed with others. Until all threats equal our night vision and acquisition systems, smoke is a val- Simplicity is our Army’s longest term deserter, not a simple ued ally. AWOL. As a multiplier, Simplicity counters Clausewitz’ fog and friction of war. With Focus and freedom of Maneuver, Protection. Never allow the enemy to understand your intent, Simplicity hatches Initiative in subordinates! It’s heavily reliant concept, or method(s) of operation, scheme of maneuver, to on the Army, its institutions, and commands mentoring and strike you or gain an unexpected advantage in time, place, posi- leading by example. A common operational framework and tion, or means. OPSEC deserves bastardly enforcement, as well concepts, single or few-word mission language, an ambush psy- as leadership by persuasion and example. Use organic cavalry chology, and ruthless elimination of toney vocabularies and cool mostly for intelligence, reconnaissance, and targeting. Push your jargon would help. Ambitious people capture the “essence” cavalry out to the limits of commo and supporting fires. Deceive 14 ARMOR — March-April 1999

or destroy direct or clandestine observation, and overhead plat- put an exclamation point behind this estimate, written weeks forms. Prevent standoff attacks by fire, infiltration or terrorist before DF was executed and its BDA in. DF showed again that penetration. Protect forces from acquisition or engagement by after 30+ years of effort and hundreds of billions in expenditures enemy ground, air, and missile forces. Destroy enemy intelli- by all services, “near-real time,” “perfect knowledge,” “preci- gence collectors, in a priority, with any means available. Use sion delivery,” “destruction,” a PK of 1.0 and control of battle- surveillance, OPSEC, outside resources, overheads. Decoy with space without ground forces still escape us. Precision weapons visuals and reduce or multiply RF and heat emitters so all head- and air power alone can’t win wars. When airmen and precision quarters and their decoys look alike. artillerists assert their omnipotence to you, cheerily ask, “Have See the Enemy (ENINFO). Analyze current enemy strengths, you killed a SCUD today?” operations, forms, and patterns, getting critical enemy info to the Future operational fluidity, realistic targeting/shooting system echelon most effected NOW. (Readers are warned that these probabilities, and holey battlespace mandate mobile, lethal comments are biased by having received only two useful intel forces far forward. The holes are the future Armor force’s natu- reports in a career, but rooms full of failures.) Recommend/ ral battleground and present Armor with both its greatest chal- decide based only on enemy capabilities and probable courses lenge and opportunity — IF we create a concept and move dy- of action, never try to guess his intent. Western rationalities are namically and resolutely to grab the brass ring. Manned recon uncharacteristic of many likely opponents. Some individuals and very deep (40-400km) ground maneuver forces to gather and their forces exhibit unexpected patterns, behaviors or capa- HUMINT, target, destroy forces, and seize objectives seem bilities. essential complements to remote systems. Mobile commands of Don’t confuse data with intelligence. Until data is sifted, ana- extraordinary speed, operational radius, lethality and remote sustainability will be necessary to operate in time-distance har- lyzed and compressed into decision-critical probabilistic infor- mony with AWACS/JSTARS and deep precision Naval and mation, it’s ration-heating trash. It must contribute directly to Speed, violence, and integration of joint/combined arms at the USAF Air Expeditionary Force fires. Armor’s roles in limiting terrain, “constabulary” operations, and nation-building must be mission level. established, not waived. In all cases, Armor’s future leaders To read capability/probability, put collection assets at the eche- must be marked by their “state of mind” excellence, winning lon that needs them. Use ethnic minorities for SIGINT despite exp erience, and performance in operations and command more clearance rules, or timeliness is lost. Nuke black boxes/ green than by their 8x10 glossies and gold-plated, multi-track ORBs. doors. At corps or lower, purge people and systems that brought These future-oriented notions emerge: national and theater intel arrogances with them. Fight to get and create your own HUMINT. It’s potentially your greatest · Armor must make time/space our strategic and opera- strength, but still our system’s biggest weakness. Finally, re- tional allies, not adversaries. We must equip and size to fit member that overactive situational awareness glands are human, the lift we’ve got, get to/perform any mission anywhere exist everywhere, may fog Focus, situations or destroy wanted and be operationally complementary, budget and strate- outcomes. They can become fear/rumor machines, prompting gic-mobility competitive with sea and air power or we lose. wrong reactions by men, leaders, and units. Corrupt filtering of situational awareness information to produce “desired results” is · The Armor team must develop a dynamic future-oriented combined arms concept and the expertise needed to force a sad systemic and dangerous potential. it through Army and interdepartmental developmental and budgetary processes. ARMOR’S NEW HEADING · Armor forces and leaders for foreign and domestic con- As complex as blending Principles with operational concepts tingencies must be historically many-dimensioned, experi- may seem, it pales compared with what’s needed to assertively enced operators, not mere multi-track Process Prinzen or project Armor into the future. Potential battlefields (spaces) and regimental retreads. OSW defy prediction as to time, place, and their military and human contexts, including religion and ethnicity. Even our own · We need to move out 40 years ago. nation isn’t immune from concerns of social or terrorist- Future victors won’t be thick-lensed nerds, heads-down in stimulated unrest or destruction. The assertion that any projected their turrets or welded to work stations and large screen displays future battlespace will be reliably saturated by acquisition, tar- in search of checklisted, matrixed, summed and scored determi- geting, and delivery means is a grotesquely huge assumption nistic answers. that rests on bum joints and shaky legs. Mother nature’s mis- chiefs, terrain, rapidly evolving countermeasures, mobility, or- They will be bold, confident, tough, smart SOBs who lead in front, think fast in the heat of combat, are comfortable in uncer- bital periodicities, other service priorities, physical fragility, tainty, weigh probabilities and risks, make apparent order from human error, our inability to produce systems that meet adver- tisements, budgets, and probability are among limiting factors. obvious chaos and WIN. The battlespace of the forseeable future will remain discon- GOOD HUNTING! tinuous — a big, porous Swiss cheese full of moving “black holes” often free of technological intelligence, HUMINT BG Kirk served 24 of 27 years “happily undiversified” sources, or fires. Without hunter-killer air teams and mobile, in command, operations and training. Seven consecu- lethal ground maneuver elements those “Black Holes” contain- tive years of grime time as 1 AD G3, Bde Cdr, C/S and ing armed, operationally effective enemy will be undetected, uncountered threats. In the Gulf, HUMINT-free depth was a 5 Mech ADC(M) preceded terminal posting as Director strategic and operational flaw that hurt estimates, decisions, and of Training, ODCSOPS, DA. He retired in 1983. For outcomes. Lack of HUMINT and bureaucracy killed in Moga- terse replies on this or other stuff, fire flak at: dishu. Desert Fox (DF) air operations against stationary targets [email protected] starting 17 Mar ’99. ARMOR — March-April 1999 15

Life After Operational Maneuver (a 12-step program) by Cadet Joseph Berg and Captain Robert Bateman

History and Heresy In the 82 years since the invention of a practical tank, the sum of its use in a conventional situation consisted of two years in the First World War, seven in the second, and probably four additional years in places such as India, Ko- rea, and various Middle East locales. This is a refrain famil- iar to the armored community. Yet what is rarely pointed out in counter-arguments are the accounts of when and how armor was used in ways planners did not anticipate. The service of armored vehicles in the remaining 69 years includes an almost unbroken string of engagements in low intensity conflicts or employment in unconventional roles, important attribute of armored vehicle design. Since many un- beginning with the British in Palestine and continuing through conventional conflicts occurred in restricted terrain that limited the American involvement in Somalia. Combatants in these the mobility of mechanized forces, military thinkers often dis- situations almost invariably lacked a thorough intellectual foun- missed armored vehicles as irrelevant to that type of warfare. dation for conducting an unconventional war. The majority of But the historical record shows that tanks and tank-like vehicles commanders sought to employ conventional doctrine on ar- were often used in these roles, and their employment often took mored operations, but combat experience often produced an on a form greatly changed from the conventional practice. improvised doctrine separate from established thought. Because of their improvised and local nature, these decision-making Current discussions of tank operations show a particular trend guides rarely found their way into broad circulation among con- which developed after World War I, but the intellectual consen- ventionally-minded armies. sus on the role of tanks in warfare was the original motivation for their creation — infantry escort and support. Richard M. Reading accounts of participants in armored, unconventional Ogorkiewicz’s Armor: A History of Mechanized Forces de- battles reveals similar local operating procedures which soldiers scribes them as, “barbed wire crushers and machine- gun de- innovated to cope with unexpected situations. To avoid falling stroyers.... a useful auxiliary.”1 This role as conventional infan- into this pitfall of unpreparedness, the United States Armored try support continued throughout the inter-war period. The Brit- Force must plan changes in organization, equipment, and doc- ish publication Tank and Armoured Car Training of 1927 de- trine which address the dichotomy between the wars we are scribes the tank as “especially suitable for facilitating, by fire planning for and the wars we are likely to get. Specifically, the action, the forward movement of other arms.”2 Simultaneously, Army should consider a force structure that assigns tanks and a new, and eventually dominant, viewpoint emerged. Armies armored vehicles directly to the light infantry in a supporting began to think of employing tanks in the old cavalry role, “re- role across the Army. The concepts behind this historically- connaissance, screening, exploitation, pursuit, and raiding op- based recommendation ought to influence all future force struc- erations... [necessitating] a more dynamic use of the tank than ture modifications, such as the creation of the Strike Force. This the simple close support role.”3 recommendation would likely be most effective if accomplished at the brigade level (for the infantry), perhaps with an armor Although methods and tactics varied greatly, to large degree company assigned to each light infantry brigade. most participants in World War II began with armored doctrine that reflected this divergence of mission between the infantry and cavalry branches.4 The French offer, perhaps, the most stud- The Road Behind Us ied lesson in armored tactics. Despite their early development of The tank was born of the need to provide mobility, firepower, armor during the First World War, they did not follow the same and protection on the battlefield. Initially this mission was design or doctrinal path as did the Soviets, British, or Ge rmans viewed entirely through the lens of infantry support. During the between the wars. From the outset, the majority of French tanks years between WWI and WWII, this vision changed, as tanks were designed solely for infantry support. began to assume the cavalry role. Based upon experience in This philosophy affected the design of French tanks. The World War II, most armies viewed armored vehicles as a means French developed some of the heaviest tanks ever seen. The to restore operational maneuver to the conventional battlefield. Char 2-C heavy tank weighed in excess of 70 tons with a crew As a result, tactical and operational mobility became the most 16 ARMOR — March-April 1999

of between 13-19 personnel. For firepower, one experimental cases, doctrine was developed on the spot to meet local condi- model mounted a 155mm main gun.5 Such huge tanks could tions. travel only 3-6 miles per hour, a sufficient speed to accompany In Afghanistan, Soviet forces chose to employ tanks and other infantry moving at an absolute top speed of five miles per hour, fighting vehicles from the very start. “Armor in Low Intensity but inadequate for rapid offensive warfare. Additionally, French tank designs developed in the interwar years often had a one- Conflict,” a study published at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, concludes that the Soviet forces viewed man turret. Even their most successful designs, the Char B-1 the counter-insurgency campaign in that country as merely an heavy tank and the Char Somua S-35, with three- and four-man crews, retained this single-man, cast-iron turret design. extension of their conventional mountain warfare doctrine, which included heavy armor.11 After indifferent results or out- The result of this doctrine and training was tanks with good right defeats resulted from attemp ts to employ armored units in armor, decent automotive power and sufficient weaponry, but maneuver warfare against the Afghani guerrillas, the Soviets tanks unsuited to the tempo of mobile warfare.6 In simple terms , began to reorganize their forces locally. The Bear Went Over the a tank with a one-man turret is at a severe tactical disadvantage Mountain, a translation of Soviet staff studies of the Afghan against a tank with a two-man turret. The extensive study and War, reflects the increasing dispersion of Red Army armored myth-making which surrounded the subsequent French defeat units to support outposts and convoys. Additionally, the Soviets led many members of the armor community to conclude that began to organize special groupings of armored vehicles to pro- mobility and not protection was the dominant trait needed in an vide close support to advancing infantry.12 Armor of the Af- armored vehicle. Indeed, armies who trained to conduct infantry ghanistan War points out that Soviet airborne troops rapidly support were doomed to defeat from the outset. By the war’s exchanged their light BMD personnel carriers for more durable end, a loose consensus emerged on the employment of armor BMPs.13 What emerged from the Soviet experience there, at which holds even in the present day. Generals should employ least in theory, was an appreciation by the Red Army that opera- tanks, in mass, on the operational level to exploit weaknesses in tions in restricted terrain, which rely primarily upon the infantry the enemy’s initial positions and rear areas. Works by B.H. Lid- for execution, require a re-thinking of the concept of the purpose dell Hart, Heinz Guderian, and various Soviet theorists all of the armored vehicle.14 pointed in this direction, even if they disagreed on methods.7 In similar fashion, the Israeli involvement in a prolonged un- The current-day western military thought on the topic of ar- conventional war in Lebanon began as a conventional operation mored force employment is stated nowhere more clearly than in and is well documented as such in Operation Peace for Galilee civilian military analyst James Dunnigan’s 1993 edition of How by Richard Gabriel.15 After the Israeli Defense Force crushed to Make War. According to Dunnigan, “The concentrated com- organized conventional resistance, the war entered a prolonged bat power of tanks makes them alone of all the combat arms, period of unconventional attrition warfare. Lieutenant Colonel capable of forcing a decision quickly and decisively.”8 David Eshel’s article in ARMOR is particularly useful in assess- ing the changes wrought on the Israeli armored force by uncon- Yet in the aftermath of World War II there was a long series of 16 wars which saw armor employed around the globe, often in ventional opponents. Tanks were deployed in “a series of strongpoints located widely apart,” as well as “maintain [-ing] violation of this consensus. For all intents and purposes, neither 17 the French, Israelis, British, nor the Soviets possessed a pre- open supply routes to the strongpoints.” The article goes on to meditated theory for employing armor in a limited war against detail a staggering array of upgrades to armored vehicles to an unconventional foe prior to their respective interventions in make them less vulnerable to guided missile ambushes, a weak- Indochina, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, or Afghanistan. Exa min- ness enhanced by Lebanon’s rugged terrain. Again and again, ing the experiences of these other nations, as well as our own the historic record displays the same tendency to use armored historic record, will validate this basic premise. vehicles in defensive and supporting roles. During French combat operations in Indochina, terrain and the As seen earlier, during the years between World War I and II, nature of the combat dictated that armored forces would not the British Army began following two paths in developing their operate in large formations against conventional forces similarly designs for new armored vehicles, one of traditional infantry equipped. Instead, as was so well illustrated by the fate of the support, but also a newer role of fulfilling the cavalry mission. now famous Groupment Mobile 100,18 they were to operate as But they remained wedded to the idea that tanks were for use fire brigades at best, rushing from location to location where solely in conventional warfare scenarios. Limited British ex- they would be employed in infantry support operations. At perience in policing areas such as the Palestinian Mandate with worst, they would serve as near-static defenses in strongpoints armored cars was eclipsed by the campaign experience of the across the landscape in contention. Yet the French, due to the Second World War. lessons learned from World War II, remained wedded to the As a result, the British did not foresee the potential of tanks in idea that armored forces must be utilized in highly mobile reac- policing the rebellious provinces of Northern Ireland. Yet when tion forces. Having abandoned the idea of armor designed for faced with increased violence in the province during the 1970s, infantry support, they were extremely loath to return to that in- the British did eventually deploy armored vehicles there. Al- tellectual terrain. As a result, light American supplied M-24s, though tracks proved less than ideal for the narrow Irish streets, half-tracks, and 2-1/2-ton trucks proved highly vulnerable to Michael Dewar’s The British Army in Northern Ireland contains Vietnamese mines and RPGs because they were designed as descriptions of at least four different types of armored vehicle scouting and transport vehicles and not stand up firepower. that served with the British troops there up to 1985. These vehi- All of this leads us to an examination of the American military cles ranged from armored Land Rovers to Saladin armored experience. Here the record is relatively clear. Following World cars.9 Missions for units with armored vehicles included secur- War I, the Tank Corps was disbanded, and tanks were subordi- ing roadways and close support of dismounted patrols. The first- nated to the infantry. Tanks were, officially at least, solely for person account, Contact, emphasizes the role “pigs” (nickname the support of the infantry. Beginning in the late 1920s, ideas for the standard APC) played in force protection.10 As in other started to circulate that perhaps there was a potential for mobile

ARMOR — March-April 1999 17

warfare in the budding technology as well. For the sake of ar- Our Army’s deployment to Somalia once again highlighted the gument, let us refer to this period as “the bad old days.” vulnerability of light and even lightly armored vehicles to mines Following the 1940 creation of the Armored Force, and its and light anti-armor weapons. Simultaneously it demonstrated the need for armored forces in direct support of the infantry. The successor, the Armor branch, the Army followed the path of so improvised nature of the logistic arrangements provided for the many other nations. Armor was designed for and conceptually assigned the mission of mobile warfare in conventional war- Abrams upon its arrival in theater was less than optimal. fare.19 Planners focused solely upon tank-heavy or tank-pure Deployment to Haiti again featured hastily attached armored operations at the tactical and operational levels. This despite the units (Bradley Fighting Vehicles) to the entry force, and al- fact that during the war itself the actual majority of all tank bat- though the IFOR deployment into Bosnia recognized the neces- talions that saw combat were not members of the 16 armored sity of armored force in a support and stability operations mis- divisions but separate battalions operating in a habitual direct sion, few of the crews there performed in a role for which most support role to the infantry divisions.20 of their military training prepared them. Reflective of the mis- Thus, the American armored experience should appear this sions which occurred in the past, the Bosnia deployment fea- tured tanks and fighting vehicles deployed piecemeal in support way: of strongpoints, performing route security, and, should conflict - In World War I, tanks supported infantry only. have arisen, direct support of an infantry-dominated operation. - In World War II, most tanks supported infantry. The Road Ahead - In Korea, American tanks came in very little contact with opposing armor — almost all tank combat operations were Of course, the Armor Force must be trained and prepared to in support of the infantry. fight and win a conventional conflict characterized by large scale operational maneuver. The authors are not advocating a return to the “bad old days” of infantry dominance of the ar- mored force. Yet, the tactics and missions performed by ar- mored units in areas other than the high intensity battlefield, Our Army’s deployment to Somalia once often in restricted terrain, are fundamentally different, beyond mere revalidation of the importance of some missions such as again highlighted the vulnerability of light Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT). In an environ- and even lightly armored vehicles to mines ment of long-duration occupation and relatively predictable and light anti-armor weapons. Simultane- operational patterns and tempos, high mobility simply means ously it demonstrated the need for armored that the task force reaches the ambush site quicker. Instead, our focal points must become protection against mines and light, forces in direct support of the infantry. easy to acquire anti-tank weapons. That protection is most likely to come from walking infantrymen on the ground. Tank crews must be trained, equipped, and organized to sup- port operations restricted to the pace of the walking infantry- In Vietnam all tanks supported the infantry. American armored man. Fortunately, the Armored Force is not hampered by the troops found their biggest threat to be the anti-tank mine and the technological hurdles of the 1920s and 1930s. What we are light anti-armor rocket. The variety of ammunition available to lacking is a true linkage to what will in all probability be the real the M-48’s 90mm gun proved to be a valuable asset in security future: combined arms at the worm’s-eye level. To illustrate and support missions remarkably similar to those performed how far we have diverged from this mission, look no further nearly a decade later in Afghanistan. Despite this, by the time of than a few of the design flaws of the M1 family of vehicles, as American involvement in Vietnam, the Army was fully com- seen from an infantryman’s perspective. The Abrams is both mitted to the use of armor in primarily a tank-versus-tank role. mobile and very well protected. Excellent for those of us inside General Donn A. Starry emphasized that Bernard Fall’s descrip- the hull or turret, but it comes at a cost. No infantryman in his tion of the fate of French mobile forces in Street Without Joy right mind is going to provide close dismounted escort to an M1 carried great influence in American circles.21 In addition, he in a MOUT environment from the traditionally most effective noted that the U.S. Army enjoyed “a singular lack of doctrine location, directly behind the tank, for obvious thermal reasons. for mounted combat in areas other than Europe and the deserts Nor are stopgap communications measures, such as hanging of Africa.”22 In many ways, despite the publication of local TA-1 and field phones off the side of the tank, a truly reliable training circulars, it was not until the 1982 Jungle Operations replacement for the old “escort phone” that was once included manual that a comprehensive set of instructions for armored on U.S. tanks. Another lesson handed down by past combat combat in restricted terrain appeared for Army -wide consump- tankers was that having a wide variety of munitions available tion.23 for the main gun proved beneficial. Yet we no longer have the WP, canister, or smoke shells of the past, three munitions cru- A host of current military operations demonstrate the need to cial in close fighting with the infantry. rethink our concepts of how armor should be organized and doctrinally employed. The American deployment to Panama in Simply put, our current tank reflects better than anything else Operation Just Cause included an armor unit integral to the how far we have diverged from any idea that we might again 82nd Airborne (3-73 AR). However, anticipated resistance dic- have to work with the infantry in close quarters. Work at the tated that planners add additional mechanized units in an ad-hoc new Fort Knox MOUT site may well highlight these limitations manner from the 4th Infantry Division. Both the M551s and and lend current validity to our historically based recommenda- M113s utilized in the operation were needed in support of light tions. Yet, there is a need for larger change in the organizational infantry units in operations in urban terrain. structure as well. Among other things, we must acknowledge 18 ARMOR — March-April 1999

that infantry support does require specialized knowledge and 11Michael R. Matheny, “Armor in Low Intensity Conflict: What is the training not developed on TT VIII. What we need is tankers Best Doctrine for Counterinsurgency?” School of Advanced Military Stud- who are well trained to support the infantry. The permanent ies (Fort Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 1987), 23-26. attachment of a tank company directly to each light infantry 12Lester Grau, ed. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tac- brigade would standardize logistic arrangements and command tics in Afghanistan (Portland: Frank Cass, 1998). procedures, greatly enhance the firepower of the brigade, and 13 provide a critical force protection asset. Steven Zaloga, Wojciech Luczak, and Barry Beldam, Armor of the Af- ghanistan War (Hong Kong: Concord Publications, 1992), 9-12. United States Army armored force doctrine and organization 14“At least in theory” because, as evidenced by Russian operations in the does not entirely reflect how our forces were actually employed breakaway province of Chechnya, the Russians may have forgotten this over the course of the past 50 years. America’s enemies identify lesson in the intervening years. casualties as a key center of gravity for our forces. Heavy armor 15Richard A. Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee (New York: Hill and provides the infantry with protection they need. As the French Wang, 1984). used to remind their troops in Vietnam, “Remember, the enemy 16David Eshel, “Armored Anti-Guerrilla Combat in South Lebanon.” is not fighting this war as per French Army regulations.”24 AR- MOR (July-August 1997), 26-29. 17Ibid., 26. Notes 18Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1961), 185-250. General Westmoreland notes in his memoirs that he kept a 1Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, Armor: A History of Mechanized Forces (New copy of this book on his bedstand at night. G.M. 100 was a combined arms York: Praeger, 1960), 8. task force decimated in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. Interestingly enough, in his revisions, Fall suggests that the performance of the armor 2War Office, Great Britain, Tank and Armoured Car Training (London: platoon was perhaps the most effective unit employed (p. 356). H.M. Stationery Office, 1927), 16. 19 3Robert S. Cameron, “Armor Combat Development 1917-1945,” ARMOR There was one minor exception to this modern consensus, the United (September-October 1997), 14. States Marines maintained an armored force whose purpose resided solely in the province of a supporting arm. , a Marine Corps 4 Progress and Purpose All of the following feature some discussion of this debate over the role developmental history, attributes this tendency to the difficulty in landing of armor: Cameron, 14-19; Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the large numbers of tanks in amphibious operations. Discussion of the role Theory of Armored Warfare, 1918-1940 (Newark: University of Delaware armored forces should play in any unconventional situation was largely non- Press, 1984); Ogorkiewicz; A.J. Smithers, A New Excaliber: The Develop- existent. The U.S. Marine Corps made a small attempt in their Small Wars ment of the Tank 1909-1939 (London: Leo Cooper, 1986); Harold R. Win- Manual of 1940. The extent of this commentary was merely to state that ton, To Change an Army (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1988). armored vehicles might have a significant psychological value against an 5Major John W. Leonard, “The Development of Tanks,” Infantry Journal insurgent and reduce casualties in the initial stage of an intervention. 27 , No. 5 (1925), 486. This article was a survey of then current armor de- 20Ultimately only around 20% of the tank rounds fired in combat were of velopments around the world. The model which Leonard identifies as hav- the armor-piercing variety and even the single-purpose tracked tank destroy- ing a 155mm gun mounted was the Char 2C-bis, of which only one was ers found use mainly as assault guns. made. Additional information regarding French interwar armor is found in Mildred Gillie, Forging the Thunderbolt: A History of the Development of 21Donn A. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam. (Washington: U.S. Gov- Armor (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1947), 19. ernment Printing Office, 1989), 4-5. Gillie also states that there was one French tank weighing 144 tons. The 22Ibid., 7. nomenclature of this tank is not recorded. The only substantiation to this claim I have found is a small note in the “Technical Services” portion of the 23United States Department of the Army FM 90-5: Jungle Operations Infantry Journal circa 1930 which makes the same claim. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), chap. 6, 5-14. 6Christopher Foss, Tanks and Fighting Vehicles, (London: Salamander 24Fall, 381. Books, 1977), 79. Foss makes this point repeatedly in a technical analysis of numerous French armored vehicles of the pre-war period. As a regular con- tributor to Jane’s Defense series books, this analysis is probably based less on historical documentation than on modern ergonomic designs which Foss CDT Joseph E. Berg will be commissioned this encounters in his work in modern armored vehicle analysis. However, his May from the United States Military Academy as a point would appear to be validated by both common sense and the empirical second lieutenant of Armor and is slated to serve at data collected by modern U.S. Army automated armored vehicle crew train- Ft. Hood, Texas. He is a Military History major with ing such as the UCOFT as observed by the author. (Unit Conduct Of Fire a secondary field of study in Systems Engineering. Trainer) In UCOFT engagements, the crews of modern U.S. vehicles are forced to undergo simulated “degraded operations” and “commander only” engagements. The target kill/target presented ratio for these types of en- CPT Robert Bateman is currently an instructor of gagements are generally much lower than the kill ratio of the full crew even military history at the United States Military Acad- though the commander has a fully operational station to engage targets. emy. He recently received his MA from Ohio State 7B.H.Liddell Hart, The Future of Infantry (Harrisburg: Military Service University, where he is now a Ph.D. candidate. He Publishing Co., 1936). Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader Trans. by Constan- previously served as a company commander for 25 tine Fitzgibbon, (New York: Dutton, 1952). John Milsom, Russian Tanks, months in 2-7 Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division. He is a 1900-1970: The Complete Illustrated History of Soviet Armoured Theory and Design (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1970). graduate of IOBC, Airborne, Air Assault, and 8James F. Dunnigan, How to Make War (New York: William Morrow and Ranger courses, as well as the Armor Officer Ad- Co., 1993), 70. vanced Course. He is a frequent contributor to sev- 9Michael Dewar, The British Army in Northern Ireland (London: Arms eral professional journals. He welcomes e-mail on and Armour Press, 1985), 196-200. this or any of his previous articles. His email address 10A.F.N. Clarke, Contact (New York, Schocken Books, 1984), 45-71. is: [email protected]

ARMOR — March-April 1999 19

Tips for Tankers or Lessons Learned and Re-learned by Colonel Christopher V. Cardine (Retired)

The M1 series of tanks have been in the field for 18 years. However, many sol- diers and leaders continue to make the same simple mistakes when using and maintaining these vehicles. This is de- spite many material changes in the vehi- cles’ design and continuous changes in our training programs. Hopefully this article will give tankers a quick reference to the most common problems and their cures. Since the very first XM1 tanks were sent to operational testing at Ft. Bliss, the Project Manager Abrams and the prime contractor, General Dynamics (originally Chrysler), have been recording and re- sponding to problems seen in the field. This program is called the Abrams Field Problem Management system, and is funded as part of an engineering services contract. Every time a tech rep comes to visit you to help solve a new problem, or whenever you send an Equipment Improvement Report into TACOM, the data is recorded as a unique field incident report. All acci- dent reports are also entered into the data Fig. 1 base. These incidents are continuously evaluated for trends that may require equipment changes through modification work orders (MWO), safety of use mes- sages (SOUM), maintenance advisory PM M1/M1A1) personally chair the many repeat incident reports! We are not messages (MAM), changes to technical board. learning from our own mistakes. Even manuals (TMs), and/or changes in the after material changes are made to the After the board meets, a complete sum- equipment and the TMs are updated, programs of instruction (POI) at the mary is published of all incidents and TRADOC schools. what is being done about them. The soldiers are still making simple, costly maintenance and operational errors. I will There is a very regimented review proc- FPRB books were previously published try to summarize some of the classics, ess in place, the Field Problem Review and mailed to battalion commanders and their maintenance officers, but the costs explain what the symptoms are, and how Board (FPRB), and a separate but related you as leaders can do something about System Safety Working Group (SSWG). became prohibitive. The results and other them. current tank information will soon be The FPRB evaluates problems and makes available on the Internet on the PM a determination of what actions are nec- HULL/AUTOMOTIVE essary. The SSWG addresses and re- Abrams web site. You may also get cop- solves Abrams safety issues. Members of ies from either your local GDLS techni- these boards include the user representa- cal representative or TACOM Logistics Sprocket Cupping tives from the TRADOC Systems Man- Assistance Officer (LAO). They are pub- Have you ever wandered through the ager’s (TSM) Office for tanks at Ft. Knox lished after every FPRB, about once every two months. motor pool on an inspection and found a and Aberdeen Proving Ground, the Army tank that has strangely worn end connec- Safety Center, TACOM, the contractors, As an original member of the XM1 Test tors and sprockets that have cups in their and the logistics and system engineers Set Incident Reporting System (the FPRB teeth? (See Fig. 1) Is it bad track quality? from the Project Manager’s Office. Either precursor) while a captain, through battal- Improperly hardened sprockets? A bent the Project Manager Abrams or one of ion command in the field, and finally as roadwheel arm? No, it’s a crew that his two Product Managers (PM-M1A2 or PM Abrams the last four years, I saw too thought they followed the track adjusting 20 ARMOR — March-April 1999

procedure, but really did not. The track is actually overtightened. This, despite the fact that the track adjusting link (TAL) has an automatic relief valve to prevent this. How do they do that, you ask? Sim- ple. If you refer to the technical manual, it tells you before adjusting track to move the tank forward on a level surface and let it coast to a stop without applying the brakes. This is so the TAL will be the only thing pressing against the track while you add grease. When the appro- priate tension is there, the grease will come out through a one-way relief valve. (Fig. 2) If you go down to the motor pool to do maintenance and tell soldiers to adjust track tension, they will do the following: Fig. 2 They get their grease guns and pump grease into the TAL until it comes out. Unfortunately, when they parked the tank Sprockets and Hub Carriers Loose End Connectors and That Shear Their Bolts Missing Wedge Bolts the night before, they stepped on the brakes and then set the parking brake. Seen this one before? This happens These are the bane of every tank crew’s My soldiers never do this, you say. quite frequently about 200 miles after the existence. With 156 track blocks con- Walk through your motor pool and crew has rotated the sprockets. The cause nected together with two end connectors is usually that they have reused the fas- each, there are 312 wedge bolts to come watch! Also, see how many tanks have cupped sprockets. It is a great mainte- tening hardware. The TM calls for replac- loose. Even if you are 99% good, there nance indicator. ing bolts when two or more sprocket are three loose ones out there! The newer bolts, or four or more hub bolts, are found T-158 and T-158LL track have a new Blown Main Hydraulic loose during normal operations. Left un- crimped wedge that acts as a locking nut Pumps/Fires said: if you loosen them all to replace or to make life better. However, if you do rotate the item, you have exceeded this not assemble the track properly in the Had any instances where mechanics criteria and they should all be replaced. first place, the wedge bolts will still come were complaining about poor quality Even if you properly re-torque these loose. pumps that blew out? Had a mysterious bolts, they often have been stretched be- hydraulic oil fire caused by a pump that Most crews assemble a set of track by yond their elastic limit and will again laying out the eight block sections and split a seam? Know what causes this 99 come loose. The result is a tank on the times out of 100? roadside missing training while someone hooking them together. They then tighten the end connector bolts down with all When a pack is pulled and reinstalled, looks for bolts. their might or actually using a torque most mechanics do a good job of tighten- The solution here is simple. Each com- wrench. Unfortunately, they are doing a ing the new style main hydraulic lines on pany team PLL clerk or the top of the pump. Where they make maintenance leader should mistakes is when reconnecting the hy- have one or two sets of draulic pump case drain (return line) sprocket and hub bolts al- quick disconnect coupling. (See Fig.3) If ways on hand. When the it is not properly seated and positively crew replaces or rotates the locked, the oil flow is off. There is no oil sprockets or hubs, they can leak because the quick disconnect is self- be given a new set on the sealing when improperly installed or dis- spot to get the job done right connected. Unfortunately, there is also no the first time. If you are a oil flow out of the pump during certain leader and are walking overflow conditions. This can generate around the motor pool and sufficient pressure to cause the pump to see a crew changing sprock- burst, spraying hot oil in the engine com- ets or carriers, you should partment. take the old bolts, instructing What’s the cure? Training your mechan- the crew on why they should only use new. ics, and a quality check by your mainte- nance supervisors of the quick discon- nects after services. A leader who knows how to reach in and check for a properly seated QD does a lot to ensure that the soldiers do it also. Take your time to Fig. 3 learn the feel on this one, as it is tricky. ARMOR — March-April 1999 21

lot of work for nothing as the wedge bolts will be loose as soon as the track is on the tank. To properly torque the wedge bolts, the two track blocks must be at an angle to one another. If you look at a mounted track as it comes down from the front idler wheel and goes under the #1 road- wheel, it makes the only angle where there is no tension between the wedge bolt and the angled face on the two track pins. Unfortunately, this is the only spot where you can torque the end connector wedge bolts properly. When you assemble a new track or re- place track blocks, paint each of the new end connectors and torque it only at the #1 roadwheel pivot point. This is also true for any loose end connectors you find during inspections. It does no good to “tighten” them unless the two blocks are properly angled. We have run many tracks for thousands of miles after prop- Fig. 4 erly torqueing the wedge bolts and have rarely had one come loose. The secret is crew compartment before it is bulk the heat exchanger and into the ACM. in the location where you torque them dumped and/or delivered to the individual This debris can cause high speed fan in- and not how tightly you screw them crewman’s protective mask. Cooling air stability. This instability can cause an down. is also drawn into this area through a ACM stall/seizure resulting in high tem- particle separator that shares the incom- perature bleed air reaching the M48 char- T-158 and T-158LL ing raw air by the engine air filter intake. coal impregnated paper filters in the crew Track Differences on M1A2s The main cause of problems is the ne- compartment. A spontaneous fire can glect of the sponson area. (See Fig. 4) result if the crew does not shut the NBC T-158 track will soon be replaced in the During semiannual services, the spon- system down when an overtemp warning inventory with T-158LL track. Although light illuminates. Letting the system “cool both types of track are interchangeable son area must be thoroughly cleaned and down” and then restarting it does not and the T-158 costs less, you cannot use inspected. All hoses and clamps must be perfect. There must be no water or dirt in solve the problem; it only makes the it on newer M1A2s. If you use T-158LL probability of a fire greater! An MWO is track on an M1A1, the vehicle will actu- this area. There are three radiator-like being worked to try to limit mud inges- ally weigh less than its 68.4 ton rating devices in the sponson (heat exchanger, condenser, and pre-cooler) that must not tion in this area, but for now it must be because it was designed with the T- inspected and cleaned during semi-annual 156/T-158 track weights in its budget be clogged with dirt. Water and dirt enter services. allocation. This is OK. However, the this area when mud builds up in the en- newer M1A2s have used the T-158LL gine air intake area and the tank is parked Several Safety of Use Messages have weight savings by incorporating newer, facing downhill. Although the system been released about how to check the more effective survivability improve- was designed to operate in adverse condi- NBC system and the importance of the ments in the vehicles. To keep the vehicle tions, when it is not operating, water can warning lights to the crew. Additionally, within its weight of 68.4 tons, you must accumulate in the sponson area. A mix- there is a new MWO to add a warning only use T-158LL track on these vehi- ture of water and fine dust can enter the buzzer when an over-temperature condi- cles. Both track types (T-158 and T- heat exchangers and the air cycle ma- tion exists. None of these measures will 158LL) have a 2,000-mile life expec- chine. If they are allowed to remain sub- work unless leaders understand both how tancy. merged in this corrosive, cement-like the system functions and how well their mixture, the ACM can corrode over time crews and mechanics are trained. NBC System and the exchangers can become blocked. Another unnecessary damage area can This is why it is essential that a tarp be The sponson-mounted NBC system and placed over this area and tanks parked occur when you replace the bolts on the its filters located in the crew compart- sponson covers over the NBC system. with the rear end facing downhill in wet Not all bolts are the same length, and if ment are one of the best and most reliable climates. protective systems in the world. Unfortu- the longer bolts are used over the pre- nately, because of their reliability, they cooler location, they will do about $4,200 The most difficult radiator face to check worth of damage. An MWO is also in are one of the most neglected items on for dirt blockage is the heat exchanger the tank. This neglect, and ignoring safety because its inlet face is inboard, by the process, but in the meantime, study warnings, has led to the injury and deaths which bolts go in which holes carefully. turret wall. In normal operation, the of several soldiers in the last several dirt/dust passes through the heat ex- Self Cleaning Air Filters years. All were avoidable. changers, ACM, and pre-cooler and is The NBC system utilizes bleed air from dumped overboard. When also mixed One of the greatest inventions of the the turbine engine intake. This air is tem- with water, it tends to stick to the face of 20th century is being added to many of perature and humidity regulated in the the heat exchanger. During operation, your tanks — the Pulse Jet System (PJS) sponson box area and then filtered in the chunks of mud may be passed through self-cleaning air filter. For 18 years, 22 ARMOR — March-April 1999

we’ve trained soldiers to check and clean system and in the handheld extinguishers. Now you will always start the EAPU their air filters at every available opportu- First of all, Halon is safe to breathe. It from the vehicle batteries, or it can be nity. Now, along comes a self-cleaning irritates your throat, but it will not harm slave-started from any 24 volt source. As air filter, and the worst thing you can do you in the concentrations that are used to a backup, there is still the manual rope. is open it and check it. Yes, it’s true: extinguish fires inside the crew compart- The procedures for both starting the we’re actually telling you to do less main- ment. Halon is, however, an ozone- EAPU and generating power to keep the tenance! Let me explain why. depleting chemical and may be replaced vehicle batteries charged have been care- for environmental, not health, reasons. fully rewritten in the -10 TMs. You can The PJS works by back-flushing differ- ent sections of the air filters sequentially A replacement for Halon for use in en- run the EAPU and not charge the batter- ies if you do not have all switches in the with pulsed air to remove accumulated gine compartments has been found and is proper position during operation. This is a dirt. The dirt is drawn out of the filter being tested. Eventually all tanks will plenum area by the scavenger fan and receive a free MWO to change out their crew skill, just like everything else on the tank, and leaders should know and under- tossed overboard through the left rear Halon engine fire extinguishers. The stand all of the operational modes. grille door. The cycling of this function is crew compartment is a different story. determined by a number of calculations Operationally, we are still not exploiting The entire Army, less the Abrams tank, and the engine speed. At any given time, has returned to using CO2 hand-held fire the capabilities of the EAPUs. SOPs need if you open the air filter box, there may to be revised and TTPs developed that be a dirty filter, or there may be unscav- extinguishers in vehicles. The reason have crews power up their EAPU and Abrams tanks still have Halon is because enged dirt in the bottom of the box. Un- CO2 will suffocate you if you do not shut down their main engine whenever fortunately, you cannot tell by looking 2 they will be stationary for more than 5 whether or not the PJS is working or evacuate the vehicle. CO is heavier than minutes. The savings in fuel and engines air and quickly settles in the driver’s where it is in its cycle. You must rely on compartment. The driver can be quickly could be astronomical! the low inlet pressure warning light. If it knocked out and impossible to evacuate does not come on, all is well. Additional 2 Muzzle Reference Sensor if you use CO inside the crew compart- checks are in the new TM change and a ment on a tank! Safe alternate agents are The muzzle reference sensor (MRS) MAM that has been distributed to the field. In the case of PJS, less crew main- under investigation, but until a solution is contains a radioactive tritium light found both the crew fixed extinguishers source. Some crews and master gunners tenance is better! and hand-helds must be Halon-only. Do have been attempting to adjust the focus Another great killer of both old and PJS not try to improvise on this one. You with improper tools. This is not an organ- filters is soldiers with hoses on wash could cause a death! izational level task, and the safety and racks. Do not spray water directly into the administrative complications if you break Leaders should also thoroughly under- air intakes! Although the tank can operate stand how to safely remove and replace the tritium vial are not worth attempting in a downpour, washing a lot of water this task. into the intake and then turning the vehi- fixed fire extinguisher bottles. If done improperly, they can become deadly mis- This article was not intended to be a cle off in a short while will leave you siles. Maintenance people have been complete rundown of everything you with a plenum full of wet, rotting filters. killed by not properly following the pro- need to know about Abrams maintenance cedures. Another aspect of this is that as an Armor leader. It is, however, a Engine and Transmission Oil many mechanics forget to rearm the bot- minimal list of everything that you should Coolers tle after it is remounted in the vehicle. As not let go wrong as a responsible leader. Speaking of things that dump air out of a pre-combat check, this is a must-do! It If every vehicle commander simply knew the rear grille doors, one neglected area is is also an important post-maintenance and did the above items properly, you the oil coolers. They will frequently be- quality check. would all have a lot more dollars to spend come clogged from the inside because the on training. These vehicles are going to fans that drive cooling air through them TURRETS be with us for a long time, and it is your utilize air that is drawn from around the responsibility to pass these lessons tank as it moves. If the air is dusty or wet, learned on to the next generation of tank- eventually there is a deposit built up on External Auxiliary Power Units ers. (EAPU) the coolers. The easiest method to clean them is to remove the two access covers For years, we all screamed for an auxil- on the top of the ductwork, and with the iary power unit (APU) on the Abrams. engine running, flush large amounts of We finally have one, but are not using it COL Christopher Cardine, a 1971 water through them. On older tanks, you enough. Yes, there were problems when graduate of the U.S. Military Acad- must remove the rear deck to do this; it was initially fielded, but they are being emy, served over 27 years in vari- newer tanks have access hatches in the fixed free of charge to the units. ous armored and cavalry units in- back deck. High engine or transmission oil temperature lights are a sure sign of Currently, there is an MWO team going cluding the 68th and 77th Armor around to replace the 12 volt starter with and 7th and 11th Cavalry. His last clogged coolers. Any fuel or oil leak that a more durable 24 volt one. A new volt- occurs and is repaired is also a reason to three assignments were as Com- clean the oil coolers as some of this liquid age regulator will also be installed. This mander, 3-68 AR, Product Man- will allow a full 2 Kw of power at high ager M2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehi- will have been drawn through and depos- temperature and high load — a condition ited on the fins. cle, and Project Manager M1 that would cause the original design to Abrams Tank. He is currently Di- Fire Extinguishers and Halon cut back to only a 1 Kw output. And fi- nally, the more than useless 24 volt rector of Business Development for There are a lot of rumors about the Ha- EAPU battery is being removed and re- Signal & Systems, Inc., in Troy, lon that is used in the fire suppression placed with a NATO receptacle. Mich. ARMOR — March-April 1999 23

TEAM RECON: A New Approach To Armored TF Reconnaissance

One Unit Hardens the HMMWV Scout Platoon to Increase Its Survivability

by Lieutenant Colonel Henry M. St-Pierre and First Lieutenant Jamie E. Warder

Overview tion not only increases Team Recon’s (NAIs) assigned to him by higher head- long-term use as a reconnaissance asset quarters, conduct dismounted ambushes, HMMWVs have given the scout excel- over an extended amount of time, but and perform covert breaches before the lent mobility, a decreased signature, and also increases its ability to provide fires attack. maximum flexibility in task organization. on an enemy force and help extricate the In both training and war, HMMWVs scout platoon should it get into trouble. have proven to be an effective platform Task and Purpose of Each This hybrid organization takes advantage Element for Reconnaissance for reconnaissance at the armored task of the scout platoon’s stealth while at the force level. This is not to say, however, same time increases its lethality and sur- Operations (Task Force Offense) that the HMMWV is a perfect match for vivability by adding armor and indirect The role of the scouts in Team Recon is mounted scouts. The 1995 Rand Study on fires as combat multipliers. Using this very similar to their role when conducting Reconnaissance concluded that the issues concept, TF 1-33 has enjoyed success operations without the benefit of added of HMMWV mounted scout capability during brigade level exercises in the de- firepower/protection. Scouts are the for- and survivability remain unsolved. That sert of Yakima Training Center and in the ward element in Team Recon and the is, the same aspects that make the light heavily wooded defiles of Fort Lewis, platoon conducts zone, route, or area scouts stealthy also make them very vul- Washington. reconnaissance to provide critical battle- nerable. The HMMWV organization field information to the task force com- means today’s scout platoon goes into Team Recon normally consists of the mander. Good communication between combat essentially unarmored and too scout platoon, a tank platoon, a mortar section, an engineer section, two infantry the scouts, the tanks, and the Team Recon lightly armed against even the most ru- commander is critical to ensure that the dimentary of heavy weapons a Third dismounted squads, medical and mainte- tanks operate far enough back to preserve World nation can bring to bear. This or- nance assets, and a command and control slice controlled by the HHC commander the scouts’ stealth, but close enough to ganization presents two challenges to the allow them to bound forward and provide task force commander. The first is that who, again, non-doctrinally, becomes direct fire support if necessary. The in- when the platoon, whether in its entirety Chief of Recon. Team Recon’s basic concept was borrowed from the armored creased forward security from tanks al- or in part, is unfortunate enough to be- lows scouts to leave fewer personnel with come decisively engaged, scout elements cavalry troop. The force was tailored by the vehicles and put more dismounts on in contact do not have the organic assets TF 1-33 based on the observations gained by units undergoing training at NTC, the ground. Additionally, with the Team to effectively break contact and “retain Recon NCOIC controlling vehicle and the freedom to maneuver.” Second, the JRTC, and the CMTC. casualty evacuation, the scout platoon scout platoon’s lack of survivability often Team Recon addresses and, in part, rec- sergeant is able to concentrate more on presents the task force commander with a tifies two problems inherent to the fighting a reconnaissance fight and less dilemma — “send maximum reconnais- HMMWV-pure scout platoon — surviv- on the logistical fight. sance forward” and risk losing it early, or ability and lethal capability. Having “kill- The tank platoon can remain as a pla- husband his forces and miss some impor- ers” forward to interdict quickly if the tant piece of information because not all scouts are decisively engaged makes it toon, with the four tanks working to- “eyes” were forward where they belong. gether, or fight as two sections. Their easier for scouts to break direct fire con- mission is to provide firepower to support To help resolve this problem, 1st Battal- tact, maneuver, and regain visual contact. The result is that the scouts stay alive, the extraction of reconnaissance elements ion, 33rd Armor, 3rd Brigade Combat if they become decisively engaged. The Team, 2nd Infantry Division, at Fort retain maneuverability, and continue to armor platoon does not operate as part of Lewis, Washington, has developed a report accurate information. Team Recon also makes it easier for the task force a hunter/killer concept. Rather, the tanks unique solution, Team Recon. We task become killers only if the scouts become organize the scouts with heavy assets commander to put maximum reconnais- embroiled in a firefight from which they sance forward. With tanks to protect for- such as tanks or Bradleys, along with cannot safely withdraw. mortars, and if the situation warrants, ward assets, infantry, mortars, and engi- neers can become major force multipliers engineers, and put them under centralized The tanks do, however, play an active command and control to accomplish a in the reconnaissance fight. Team Recon affords the commander the ability to role in the reconnaissance fight. They can myriad of security and reconnaissance use thermal capabilities to assist in long- tasks. This non-doctrinal task organiza- overwatch Named Areas of Interest 24 ARMOR — March-April 1999

TEAM RECON

kilometers behind the FLOT. The Recon NCOIC acts as a first sergeant for Team Recon. He is responsible for logistical execution, battle tracking, and employ- HQ ment of the medics and maintenance. 10 M1025 HMMWV 1 M113 Dismounted Infantry 1 M577 The Team Recon NCOIC for TF 1-33 1 M998 Cargo HMMWV comes from the S-3 shop and uses an M577 from the battalion communica- 4 M1A1 Tanks 1 M577 FDC tions section to track the battle. All tacti- 3 M1064 Mortar Carriers cal and logistical reports are sent to the

1M998 Cargo HMMWV 1 5 ton Wrecker NCOIC and he is responsible for re- 1 M88 Recovery Vehicle laying the reports to the battalion TOC.

Team Recon and Counter-Recon Figure 1. (Task Force Defense)

2 M113 Ambulances Team Recon Elements Although Team Recon was originally conceived for reconnaissance operations, the embedded command and control range reconnaissance. They have the task force LD (without compromising aspect of its organization makes it very responsibility to locate enemy that has scout assets). The dismount squads or compatible to counter-reconnaissance infiltrated behind or to the flanks of the sections also provide additional personnel operations as well. In traditional counter- scouts. Additionally, they provide local to watch NAIs and set direct fire am- reconnaissance operations, the scout pla- security for mortars and the Team Recon bushes. Rather than attrit the reconnais- toon usually establishes a screen line in CSS assets. sance effort by leaving scouts in contact front of a company team designated as a The mortars provide indirect fires for with all enemies they encounter; the “counter-reconnaissance” team. There are targets of opportunity under the control of scouts can pass visual contact off to the some common problems when this type Chief of Recon or the scout platoon infantry early and then continue to con- of counter-reconnaissance organization is leader. The protection provided by the duct forward reconnaissance. The infan- used. First, there is often a muddled tanks allows the mortars to bound much try allows Team Recon to put maximum command and control relationship be- closer to the scouts. This gives scouts reconnais sance forward. The dismounts tween the task force, the counter- greater range in engaging targets with are inserted using IFVs, trucks, or even reconnaissance company team, and the mortar fires. The mortars also continu- tanks. scout platoon. This is a result of a task ously update final protective fires, based organization which is usually thrown The headquarters element of Team Re- on the scouts’ front line trace, and are con consists of a Chief of Recon, a Recon together quickly and with limited com- prepared to provide immediate HE and mand and control planning. Second, dur- smoke to facilitate the safe extraction of NCOIC, a jump aid station, and a main- ing continuous operations, the reconnais- tenance/recovery slice. The Chief of Re- forward reconnaissance elements. The con is the HHC commander. As the most sance and security planning phase usually mortars operate on the Team Recon radio takes place while the company teams are net and clear all fires through the Chief of senior and experienced company grade conducting operations. This makes it officer in the task force, he can provide Recon. the leadership necessary to command and extremely difficult for the leadership of the counter-reconnaissance units to par- For reconnaissance operations, Team control the many elements of Team Re- ticipate in the R&S planning process or Recon may utilize a squad or section of con. The Chief of Recon uses a Head- combat engineers to provide forward quarters’ tank or an APC platform and conduct any meaningful troop leading procedures together. Finally, when a mobility and countermobility expertise. usually operates with the tanks one to two The engineers often are attached directly to the scout platoon. They are task organ- ized according to the mission and are transported either in the scout HMMWV TF TOC Battle Captain (MAJ or LTC) or in their own cargo HMMWV. The engineers are responsible for conducting detailed obstacle intelligence, bypass/ TM Recon NCOIC (SFC) Chief of Recon (CPT) breach marking, and bridge classifica- tions. The sappers also have the ability to conduct covert breaches or prepare com- mand-detonated demolition for a breach Infantry Sqd Ldr (SSG) Tank Plt Ldr (2LT) Scout Plt Ldr (1LT) Mortar FDC (SFC) effort at a later time (i.e. task force LD). Task Force Net Engineer Squad Leader (SSG) When the Task Force is in the offense, Team Recon Net dismounted infantry give the task force Scout Platoon Net commander the option to destroy or fix opportunity targets with direct fire, either Figure 2. Command and Control and Information Flow during the reconnaissance fight or after ARMOR — March-April 1999 25

1 2

FPF

Scout Element makes contact with obstacle and moves to a Dismounted infantry squad sets far side security. Mortars plan linear covered and concealed position. Tanks move into a position target for FPF on far side of obstacle. to assist in near side security with thermal sights.

3 4

FPF

Scout dismounted recon team team augmented with dismounted engineers The infantry element maintains visual contact with the obstacle, allowing the conduct detailed obstacle reconnaissance and mark bypasses. All reports are scouts to continue the forward reconnaissance mission. sent to the Team Recon NCOIC who in turn reports to the Task Force TOC.

Figure 3. Team Recon Obstacle Drill — Showing the Elements of Team Recon Working Together company team fights in the counter- Team Recon alleviates many of the leading procedures with his team prior to reconnaissance fight, they are usually difficulties associated with a traditional the mission. The result is a counter- severely handicapped for the ensuing counter-reconnaissance organization. reconnaissance effort that is much better defensive operation. Usually, the com- Team Recon organically contains all of informed and fights more like a cohesive pany team leadership is not part of the the elements necessary to create a formi- team. Additionally, with Team Recon battalion orders process and dissemina- dable screen line, scouts, armor, indirect, handling the counter-reconnaissance tion of orders at the company level is and a well established command and fight, the task force commander is no very difficult while in the screen line. The control cell. As the commander dedicated longer a full company team short during result is a company team that is not well solely to the reconnaissance/counter- preparation, planning, and fighting of the prepared for follow-on operations and reconnaissance fight, the Chief of Recon defense. Once the screen is complete, usually has little or no effect on the de- can take an active role in the planning fensive battle that occurs once the screen process at the task force level. He also Continued on Page 29 ends. can conduct much more detailed troop 26 ARMOR — March-April 1999

Will the New Brigade Reconnaissance Troop Be Adequately Protected? by First Lieutenant Wayne T. Westgaard

General William Hartzog, former com- Bosnia mission has gone through some article by an engineer in this field, “In mander of TRADOC, held a press con- design changes, including the addition of general, wheeled platforms are more vul- ference on June 9, 1998 to outline the some 6,000 pounds of armor. This af- nerable to small arms fire, grenades, New Division Design for the next cen- fords more crew protection against mines mines, and artillery fragments; due to the tury. General Hartzog explained the rea- in the UXO-rich environment of Bosnia. inherent weakness of wheeled suspension son for the changes in the division or- This adaptation, coupled with mine designs, components, and tires.”4 The ganization: “At the end of the Cold War, awareness training of all crews, has re- HMMWV cannot take prolonged attacks the U.S. Army was largely a very heavy sulted in few injuries due to mine strikes by small arms or mines due to the light army, not as strategically relevant to all of in Bosnia. The XM1114 has been a great armor protection. The armor package the tasks of the early 1990s that were success story of the Bosnian mission, added to the XM1114 consists of ballistic emerging, and certainly not anticipating although the added weight has caused windows and rolled homogeneous armor to be strategically relevant to the future in rapid wear of some components. plates added to doors, sides, and under- 1 the early 21st century.” In support of the brigade reconnaissance carriage. The armor and the ballistic win- dows provide protection for up to a From the cavalry community perspec- mission, the new reconnaissance troop 7.62mm round, but if bullets strike the tive, the most notable change is the crea- will push out ahead of a brigade-sized tion of the brigade reconnaissance troop element, confirming or denying the en- windows, visibility is reduced signifi- cantly. And the armor doesn’t protect assigned to each maneuver brigade. emy’s activity. The troop will need to against RPGs, making the vehicle vulner- “There’s a brigade reconnaissance troop conduct such missions as route, zone, that’s never existed before... mounted in area reconnaissance, and screens for a able to almost every threat reconnais- 3 sance element. The light armor provides armored HMMWVs with some very brigade-size element. During these mis- protection against AP mines and gre- good devices for ground intelligence col- sions, the troop will also have to fight the lection,” Hartzog said.2 counterreconnaissance battle for the bri- nades, but not for the entire crew: the gunner is always exposed to the dangers I suggest that the XM1114 HMMWV gade commander, and will need to de- of mines, grenades, and small arms be- stroy the oncoming threat reconnaissance does not have enough armor protection, element while conducting a battle hand- cause the vehicle’s weapon is mounted mobility, or firepower to sustain a brigade externally. reconnaissance role. over with the following battalion. It is vital to the maneuver brigade that the The fundamentals of reconnaissance call The new brigade reconnaissance troop reconnaissance troop survives long for gaining and maintaining contact with will take on the traditional cavalry roles enough to pinpoint the enemy positions, the enemy. Because the XM1114 is so on the battlefield by performing recon- axis of advance, and disposition. Is the vulnerable to dismounted enemy OPs I naissance and providing security in close XM1114 the best vehicle for this mis- believe this will lead to a shallow recon- operations for the brigade. The new or- sion? I do not think the troop will last naissance of the enemy’s main defensive ganization will, according to General long enough in battle to complete its mis- belt during offensive operations. In order Hartzog, consist of 49 soldiers using the sion. A troop using the CFV would sur- to conduct an in-depth reconnaissance of XM1114 Up-armored HMMWV. Cur- vive longer in the same situation. a main defensive belt without suffering rently, a divisional cavalry squadron uses high attrition rates, a CFV would be pref- the M3A2 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle The survivability of a combat platform erable to the XM1114. relies on the following: mine and ballistic (CFV) as its scouting platform while a protection, size and silhouette, and The Army wrestles with the question of heavy task force uses the HMMWV. The mission of the new reconnaissance troop stealth. According to a recent ARMOR whether to use a tracked vehicle or a will more closely resemble that of a divi- sional cavalry squadron than a task force scout platoon. I believe the HMMWV’s lack of survivability, lack of mobility, and lack of firepower render it the wrong choice for this role. For almost 20 years, the HMMWV has served the U.S. Army as an all-terrain, all-purpose vehicle. During these years, the design has been adopted to serve as a field ambulance, an air defense artillery vehicle, and an armored cavalry anti- armor vehicle equipped with TOW mis- siles. The HMMWV in support of the

ARMOR — March-April 1999 27

Percent Cross Country Travel

70 60 50 40

wheeled vehicle each time a new plat- · Tires wore down Hours 30 form for a ground weapons system is notably faster. 20 needed. The Army has tested and studied Lug nuts and bolts the advantages and disadvantages of · 10 often sheared off. wheeled and tracked combat platforms 0 for the past 30 years.5 · Engines overheated from turbocharger 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 In 1988, TRADOC conducted such a placement on en- Kilometers study. The findings are shown in the table at right, which compares the average gine. The turbo- Tracks Wheels charger blocks the 100km-mission travel time for both natural convection wheeled and tracked platforms as off- During Operation Restore Hope, ar- road usage increases. The data clearly heat loss of the engine, holding all the heat near the fuel pump, which causes mored vehicles would have made a great shows that, as cross-country travel in- vapor lock. impact on force protection by providing creases, wheeled vehicles require more more security for dismounted infantry. travel time than do tracked vehicles for 6 This operation is an examp le of how a the same distances. Tracked vehicles The new XM1114 is not the same low intensity environment goes high in- offer the best solution for a versatile plat- HMMWV you enjoy back in the garrison tensity rapidly. The ability to show force form that is required to operate over di- environment, a vehicle that requires little is a great deterrent to a warring faction verse terrain. Some opponents to this may maintenance and is able to leap small during OOTW. “Crowds keep their dis- say that wheeled vehicles have worked mountains in a single bound. More field tance from armored vehicles while crews well for the many miles traveled during studies of the XM1114 and capability can safely operate from an open protected the Bosnia mission and wheeled success comparisons using track vehicles must be position. Their physical height over the must translate into other operations. conducted before a final decision is made crowds makes them an asset in However, when making these assump- on whether to outfit the new brigade re- OOTW.”12 tions remember that future combat will connaissance troop with XM1114s or not always be on roads and unrestricted CFVs. “The HMMWV has no more than The new brigade reconnaissance troop terrain. bare minimum capabilities in close com- will encounter threat armored vehicles on the future battlefield. MK19s and ma- On the future battlefield, the brigade re- bat. Mobility is inferior to tracked vehi- cles,”8 “as is armor protection and load chine guns won’t defeat enemy armor, connaissance troop will deploy anywhere carrying capacity.”9 only suppress it. The weapons systems on in the world and on all types of terrain. the XM1114 will not pack enough punch Using Bosnia and the NTC as the only Firepower! There is no accurate heavy for the troop to survive and report, test beds for maneuver studies adds incor- weapons system for the XM1114. Most thereby rendering the unit useless. The rect assumptions to equipment capabili- often, HMMWV scouts use the M2 .50 troop will need the capability to defeat ties. I mentioned the Bosnia mission as a cal MG and the MK19 grenade launcher. light armored reconnaissance vehicles. success story for the HMMWV. As one Rememb er the mission of the brigade recent account by another ARMOR author reconnaissance troop. Gain and maintain The Army has already built the vehicle described it, “While the up-armored contact with the enemy while fighting needed for this reconnaissance mission, HMMWV is great to patrol the country- the counterreconnaissance battle for the the CFV. In so many other ways, the side and perform administrative tasks… brigade commander. Read an example CFV allows the scouts to accomplish the they are not, and should never be consid- from the recent past of the HMMWVs fundamentals of reconnaissance. Look at ered a suitable substitute for the Abrams outfitted with MK19 and heavy ma- 7 the comparison at right, from FM 17-98, and CFVs of our cavalry organizations.” chine guns tested under enemy contact in The Scout Platoon, and note in how many Somalia: Adding six thousand pounds of armor to categories the CFV excels compared to the weight of the XM1114 without modi- “In the breakthrough to Task Force the HMMWV: “To some degree the fying the chassis to accommodate the Ranger during 3-4 October 1993, 40mm scout’s capability is dependent on his added weight was not a good idea. The MK19 grenade machine guns mounted equipment. The two types of scout plat- great success of this vehicle in Bosnia is on HMMWVs were used by the 10th forms have distinctly different character- due in part because patrols are told to Mountain Division to provide direct fire istics. Both vehicles, when employed “stay on approved routes.” From June to support during the movement through with the appropriate tactics, techniques, September 1998, my platoon encountered Mogadishu’s streets.10 The minimal ca- and procedures, are effective reconnais- the following problems with our vehicles pabilities of the 40mm HEDP rounds sance platforms. The scout must under- due to the added extra weight: seemed unlikely to overcome a well forti- stand his equipment and its capabilities, fied bunker, let alone the steel hide of any then minimize its limitations.”13 The · Brake system components routinely HMMWV is a great platform for the bat- needed replacement every six weeks but the lightest of armored vehicles… the small amount of explosives in the 40mm talion scout’s mission but not for a divi- due to brake wear. projectile seriously limited its usefulness sion cavalry or brigade reconnaissance · Power steering pump seals blew out against well trained and well prepared troop. The CFV will provide a more sur- under increased stress. foes.”11 vivable platform to conduct reconnais- 28 ARMOR — March-April 1999

sance in support of a brigade-size ele- Army XXI Heavy Division” TRADOC News Robert F. Unger, Geotechnical Laboratory, De- ment. Service, Washington, D.C. June 9, 1998. partment of the Army, Waterways Experiment 3FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, Headquarters Station, Corps of Engineers, Vicksburg, Miss., Department of the Army, December 1996, Wash- September 1988, p. 1. Notes ington, D.C., p. 1-15. 7LTC Michael Prevou, “HMMWVs Lack the 4 Firepower and Protection for Bosnia Role,” AR- 1General William Hartzog, “News Briefing On Paul Hornback, “The Wheel Versus Track Di- lemma,” ARMOR, March-April 1998. MOR, January-February 1998, p. 36. The Army’s Redesign Of Divisions,” U.S. Army 8 Training And Doctrine Command. Washington, 5Hornback. CPT Kevin J. Hammond and CPT Frank D.C., June 9, 1998. 6 Sherman, “Sheridans in Panama,” ARMOR, “Mobility Analysis for the TRADOC Wheeled March-April 1990, p. 1. 2Jim Caldwell “New Design Framework For Versus Track Vehicle Study, Final Report,” 9Stanley C. Crist, “Too Late the XM8: Alterna- tives to the Armored Gun System,” ARMOR, January-February 1997, p. 17. Scout Platform Comparison 10CPT Charles P. Perry, “Mogadishu, October EXCELLENT 1993: Personal Account of a Rifle Company XO,” INFANTRY, September-October 1994, pp. 28-29. 11Crist, p. 17. GOOD 12Prevou, p. 36. 13FM 17-98, Scout Platoon, Headquarters De- partment of the Army, September 1994, Wash- ington, D.C. FAIR 1LT Wayne Westgaard is a 1996 graduate of Texas A&M University POOR with a BS in political science. He received his commission as an armor officer through ROTC. Cur- rently, he serves as a scout pla- toon leader for Bandit Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry in Büdin- Night Mobility Haul Capacity gen, Germany. He has also Weapons Range Armor ProtectionOff-RoadOn- Mobility Road Mobility Physical Signature Thermal FordingSignature Capability served as asst. S4 for 1-1 Cav and Acoustic SignaturePersonnel Capacity Weapons Capability Base Defense Operations Officer Thermal Sight Capability at Comanche Base, Bosnia, for Bradley HMMWV 4th Bde, 1AD.

TEAM RECON From Page 26

Team Recon is a perfect force to provide very difficult. Team Recon often contains LTC Henry St-Pierre is a 1979 rear security for the task force in the de- elements that have not trained extensively graduate of the Virginia Military Insti- fense. together. Habitual relationships, a good tute. He served as a platoon leader SOP with easily rehearsed extraction and company commander in 82nd Issues and Working Solutions drills, and good command and control Airborne Division, a tank company mitigate this problem but do not solve it. Whereas Team Recon has proven to be commander in 4-69 AR, an opera- an excellent asset to Task Force 1-33, it Conclusion tions officer and executive officer in has also been a challenging endeavor that 1st Squadron, 2nd ACR, and the presents many difficult issues. The Chief Preservation of the scouts is critical to Senior Armor OC at the JRTC. Cur- of Recon is a very time consuming, and winning the reconnaissance/counter- rently, he is the commander of 1-33 possibly, a full-time job. Understanding reconnaissance battle and essential to the Armor Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 2nd the doctrinal responsibilities of the HHC commander’s IPB and decision-making Commander, we made the decision to process. Team Recon may not be the best Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, remove him from the field trains and answer nor is it the only answer, however Wash. make him a forward combat commander. it has provided 1-33 AR a mix of stealth His role in the field trains is taken over by and lethality that, in past tactical training, 1LT Jamie Warder is a 1995 the HHC 1SG, XO, and CSM. The S-3 helped set the conditions necessary for us graduate of the U.S. Military Acad- Air is also a good candidate to be Chief to win several of our reconnaissance bat- emy. He has served as a tank pla- of Team Recon, depending on his experi- tles. The success in these fights later toon leader and a task force scout ence. The non-standard task organization proved critical to winning the overall platoon leader. Currently, he is the makes training and fighting as a team fight. adjutant for 1-33 Armor Battalion. ARMOR — March-April 1999 29

An Experiment Reconsidered:

The Theory and Practice Of Armored Warfare in Spain

October 1936 – February 1937 (Part 1 of 2) Drohne group aiding Franco nor the So- viet Krivoshein Detachment, which by Dr. John L. S. Daley brought the tank to the Republic’s Popu- lar Army (Ejercito Popular), possessed enough tanks to execute the tactically Over fifty years after its conclusion, the took this assumption more or less at face independent exploitations envisioned by Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 contin- value: If tactically independent mecha- interwar theorists. Tank companies were ues to pose a problem for historians of nized corps were massed in sufficient employed piecemeal, in support of dis- armored warfare: In seeking the roots of density against a sufficiently narrow mounted infantry, and often without the the mechanization-oriented doctrines segment of the enemy’s defenses — a element of surprise. Nevertheless, tank which were to become a prominent fea- strategically significant success would forces proved useful in these limited op- ture of World War II, some historians follow. Small unit tactics — particularly erations once effective small unit tactics have held that Spain was an almost ideal those involving the close coordination of had been developed. Moreover, contrary tactical laboratory; others have concluded tanks with non-mechanized infantry — to another article of contemporary con- that experiments conducted there yielded would scarcely matter where the tank ventional wisdom, the Germans were not few if any definite conclusions.1 These formations were too small to meet the the only ones to benefit from experimen- opinions, although diametrically opposed larger requirement. tation in the “Spanish Laboratory;” their on the question of Spain’s viability as a Soviet counterparts not only learned, but testing ground, share a common founda- From October 1936 to February 1937, learned first. Early Republican tank op- tion: an assumption that only grand tac- as Francisco Franco’s Nationalist rebels erations, although hardly the theoretical tics are deserving of the military intellec- laid siege to Republican Madrid, contem- tual’s attention. The most prominent mili- porary military intellectuals were proven tary intellectuals of the interwar period wrong. Neither the German Imker Continued on Page 39 30 ARMOR — March-April 1999

Soviet Armor in Spain:

Aid Mission to Republicans Tested Doctrine and Equipment By 1936, the year the Spanish Civil War by Colonel Antonio J. Candil, Spanish Army started, the Soviet Army’s mechanization doctrine was well advanced. The Red Army had established four mechanized corps, six independent mechanized bri- gades, and six independent tank regi- For many years, the Spanish Civil War Soon after the conflict began, the Re- ments, putting them far in advance of has been portrayed as a romantic episode publicans were being used as a tool of some Western armies, where conversion of the 20th century, with defenders of convenience by the communists, and ul- to mobile warfare was much slower. It is freedom and democracy confronting the timately by the Soviet Union, and the generally agreed that this advantage was evil forces of totalitarianism and dicta- Nationalists had become easy prey for later squandered by Stalin, who, among torship. This is the picture that emerges the rising Axis powers. In the end, the other reasons, drew the wrong lessons from some of Ernest Hemingway’s books Spanish Civil War came to be a clash from the Spanish conflict. As a result, he and also to some extent in Hollywood’s between Soviet communism and the Nazi disbanded the mechanized corps and movies. In reality, the civil war was not and Fascist ideologies, resulting in the limited tanks to the role of infantry sup- simply a battle between defenders of deaths of more than half a million people port. As events would later prove during freedom and evil Fascists. The truth was and the destruction of the country. World War II, the Soviet Army would that those who rallied behind the flag of pay dearly for this fateful decision. democracy and freedom were a mixture This article focuses on the role played Among Soviet military personnel fight- of romantic and idealistic people, while by Soviet armored forces with the aim of ing for the Republican side were a num- most of the conservative forces of the examining the experience they obtained ber of officers who rose to prominence nation aligned with the Nationalist side. in the field of armored warfare. during World War II and were still active ARMOR — March-April 1999 31

in the 1950s and ’60s, among them Mali- Additional armored vehicles were m-i Officers review an armored regiment of the novsky, Koniev, Voronov, Batov, and ported under foreign aid programs, Spanish Popular Army, which was Meretskov. All reached four-star rank or mainly from the Soviet Union, but also equipped with T-26 tanks, at left, and So- higher, and later contributed much to the from France. viet-built armored cars, right. shaping, role, and employment of the The first modern Soviet armor arrived at armored forces of the Warsaw Pact. the Spanish naval base at Cartagena, on As a result of their studies of the war, the southeastern coast, on October 15th, By the end of November 1936, the train- Soviet leadership at the time believed that 1936 on board the Soviet vessel Komso- ing center in Archena was under com- their own military doctrine, strategy, and mol. The shipment included 50 T-26B mand of Soviet Major Greisser, Colonel tactics were seriously deficient. Major tanks and about 40 BA-6 armored cars Krivoshein’s deputy. Colonel Krivoshein changes were made in the Soviet Armed for the Republican forces. The Soviet went to Alcala de Henares, a city 20 Forces, based on their Spanish experi- equipment came to Spain with full crews miles northwest of Madrid, where he ences — changes that subsequently, dur- and auxiliary personnel, even though started to organize a second training cen- ing the Russo-Finnish War and World Spanish troops would also be trained to ter for the Republican Army. At this stage War II, often proved to be ill-advised or use the equipment. In contrast, the Ge r- of the war, the Republican Army had wrong. man equipment provided to the National- officially changed its name to Popular Army and added the red star to its uni- ist forces was not operated by German Organization and Structure crews, but was maintained by them as form. The Nationalists never changed the original Spanish Army name, wearing On July 18th, 1936, the day the state of they trained Spanish crewmen to operate the vehicles. neither swastikas nor fascist symbols on war was officially declared, the Spanish its uniforms. Army’s armored forces included two tank The first Soviet tanks and armored cars regiments, and a squadron of armored came to Spain under command of Colo- With the first 50 T-26B tanks the Popu- cars, the outdated tanks used at the only nel Krivoshein, who had led the training lar Army organized its first tank battalion, armor training center, the Central Gu n- department of the Soviet tank school at under command of Colonel Krivoshein, nery School in Toledo, and various other Olianovsky. The Germans knew immedi- and started to organize a second battalion. armored vehicles in storage and consid- ately of the Soviet shipment because the Each battalion had three tank companies ered unsuitable for combat operations. unloading of the tanks was observed from plus a headquarters company. Each com- The standard battle tank was still the a German Navy ship anchored at Cart- pany had ten tanks, with three platoons Renault FT-17, an obsolete model dating agena harbor. (Germany was still offi- and three tanks per platoon. By mid- from World War I. cially a neutral country with effective November 1936, two tank battalions were diplomatic relations with the Spanish considered operational and were de- The Republican side had control of ployed for Madrid’s defense, already Tank Regiment 1, in Madrid, and the Republic.) The news of the ship’s arrival was reported to Berlin and henceforth to threatened by General Franco’s leading armored cars, and also controlled the Ge neral Franco, so the Nationalists knew formations. Gunnery School and all depots. Almost without exception, this equipment was very early about the arrival of the tanks A month later, these two battalions were and armored cars, and could begin to withdrawn from the front line for a major destroyed in combat between July and prepare to fight them. October 1936. The Nationalist forces, reorganization with more equipment that who moved into mainland Spain from Immediately after disembarking, Colo- had arrived from the Soviet Union. Both Morocco, then a Spanish Protectorate, nel Krivoshein established the main ar- Colonel Krivoshein and Major Greisser had no armor at all. Tank Regiment 2 in mor base and training center of the Re- were called back to Russia. Krivoshein Zaragosa, in northeastern Spain, was publican Army at Archena, not far from was later awarded the title of Hero of the loyal to the Nationalist side but the city Cartagena. He began training right away, Soviet Union for his participation in op- was surrounded by Republican forces recruiting mainly among truck and bus erations in the defense of Madrid. Ac- and, so it was employed only in defensive drivers from the cities of Madrid and cording to some sources, Greisser came operations until late 1937. Barcelona. under suspicion of conspiracy in one of Stalin’s purges, and was shot. Other After some armor was lost in combat, Nevertheless, before the end of the sources claim he died in the Volkhov the Republicans attempted to provide the month, a reinforced tank company en- sector of the Leningrad front early in Army with improvised armored vehicles. tered in combat against Nationalist forces 1943, fighting against the Germans and Some armored cars were locally pro- South of Madrid, with all-Soviet crews also against the Spanish volunteers of the duced, generally with disastrous results. and under Soviet command. Blue Division. 32 ARMOR — March-April 1999

Armored Division – Spanish Popular Army October 1937 Krivoshein would later reappear as commanding officer of a Soviet armored brigade during the German invasion of 260 T-26 B Poland in September 1939. Later on, as a lieutenant general, Krivoshein com- 310 TKs 50 BT-5 manded the III Mechanized Corps, one of the main Soviet armored formations de- stroyed during the very first moments of the Battle of Kursk, in July 1943. HQ 260 TKs 50 TKs By the end of 1936, the Soviets had de- livered about 360 tanks to Spain. In T-26 B BT-5/7 AT Guns 45 mms command of all armored forces was Ma- jor General Pavlov, who had been com- manding officer of the 1st Armored Divi- HQ sion of the Soviet Army. (General Pav- lov, nicknamed “Pablo“ in Spain, would later be executed for negligence after failing to stem the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.) Armored Brigade – Spanish Popular Army With the new tanks, General Pavlov December 1936 created the 1st Armored Brigade of the Popular Army, the first major armored unit ever formed in Spain. The credit then for creating the first mobile force 130 TKs went to the Republican side. On the Na- T-26B tionalist side, Franco never employed anything larger than a battalion. This first armored brigade included four tank battalions and a reconnaissance HQ 6 TKs 124 TKs company mounted in wheeled armored cars. The brigade was actively employed at the battles of Jarama River and Guada- lajara, during the first part of 1937, but it was limited to a defensive role, so it HQ never achieved as much success as could be reasonably expected. About 120 Soviet tanks were also deliv- ered to northern Spanish ports. These to the Nationalists, both in quantity and in spite of its apparent superiority, this unit were used to form the Northern Front technical quality. failed to answer the tactical requirements Tank Regiment. This unit would be the of the Popular Army. first to be under command of a Spanish By the end of June 1937, General Pav- officer, Cavalry Lieutenant Colonel An- lov had been replaced by Major General (General Rotmistrov later fought at the selmo Fantova. All these tanks were lost Rotmistrov, nicknamed “Rudolf” in Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, by October 1937, when the Northern Spain, who again reorganized the forces commanding the Soviet Fifth Guards front collapsed and the whole region was available, creating by the end of 1937 the Army, with the rank of lieutenant- taken by the Nationalist forces. Most of first armored division of the Popular general. He opposed the powerful panzer these tanks were captured and put back Army. This division integrated the two forces of Colonel-General Hoth. His ac- into action, but this time with Nationalist existing armored brigades, plus an inde- count of the impressive tank battles crews. pendent tank regiment — as all Soviet around the Prokhorovka hills remains armored divisions would do later on. The among the best in modern Soviet military During the first quarter of 1937, another division was equipped with brand new history. He ended the war as Marshal. His batch of 300 Soviet tanks made possible BT-5 tanks received in August 1937. The Guards Army had been one of the crack the reorganization of the available ar- division came under the command of units, advancing inside Germany and mored force into two armored brigades, Major General Sanchez Paredes, with reaching Berlin by April 1945.) plus a light armored brigade with General Rotmistrov acting as a kind of wheeled armored cars. The light armored Inspector of Armored Troops at the Su- An additional 50 BT-5 tanks arrived brigade came under command of a Span- preme HQ of the Republican Army. from Odessa in August, 1937. They were ish officer, Colonel Enrique Navarro. organized into a tank regiment with So- The armored division of 1937 included viet crews, under the command of Colo- In addition, each of four Republican two armored brigades, one motorized nel Kondriatev. By the end of the war in armies was assigned one independent infantry brigade, one independent tank 1939, all but one of the BT-5s had been tank battalion. So by mid-1937, the Popu- regiment, and one antitank company, destroyed in combat. After the Spanish lar Army had a total strength of 12 tank equipped with towed 45mm antitank Civil War, the only surviving example battalions, a force substantially superior guns, plus combat and service support. In was apparently presented as a trophy by

ARMOR — March-April 1999 33

PzKpwI T26B

WEIGHT: 5.4 T WEIGHT: 10.3 T CREW: 2 CREW: 3 SPEED: 37 km/h SPEED: 27 km/h

2 MG 1 Gun: 45mm 2 MG: 7.62mm

General Franco to Mussolini. It is today for the engine of the T-34, and of new nesses in armor were clearly revealed, somewhere in Italy preserved in a mili- types of running gear, including the ex- and a newer version with improved armor tary museum. cellent Christie suspension, which was was introduced. More tanks and wheeled armored cars invented in the United States and adopted Next to the T-26, the BT-5 fast tank was by the Soviet Union after all other tank- were delivered to replace losses, and by producing countries had rejected it. The the other main battle tank also employed mid-April 1938, the Popular Army man- by the Soviets during the Spanish Civil aged to reorganize its armored forces intense activity of the second half of the War. The BT (Bistrokhodny Tank = Fast Thirties culminated in the introduction, in again, creating two armored divisions. 1940, of the T-34/76, an outstanding tank Tank) was derived from the American The First was assigned to Army Group Christie design and was intended for East, located in Catalonia, and the Sec- that could be considered the archetype of large, independent, long-range armored all successful tanks so far introduced, ond, subordinated to Army Group Center, starting with the Wehrmacht’s Panther, and mechanized units. Originally, one of fought around Madrid under command of its basic attributes was its ability to run on another Spanish officer, General Parra the British Centurion, the M60 series, either its tracks or its road wheels, but this certainly the Soviet T-54, and to a certain Alfaro. In total, these forces accounted extent even the German Leopard 1. advantage was never actually exploited for between 360 and 400 tanks, a consid- by the Spanish Popular Army. As a mat- erable force. As a general rule, Soviet tanks have dis- ter of fact, the system proved unreliable, After the summer of 1938, there are no tinguished themselves by their reliability and due to mechanical failures and bad in the field, their low unit cost, and their employment, all tanks of this type were records of any more tanks delivered to ease of manufacture. They have proved to lost by mid-1938 and never replaced. BT the Spanish Popular Army. Tank strength started to decline quickly, due to combat be simple, robust vehicles, requiring a series tanks also saw service during the minimum of daily maintenance, and well battles against the Japanese in Manchuria losses and the capture of equipment by suited to the average mechanically naive and during the Russo-Finnish War. They the Nationalists. Nevertheless, the total number of tanks delivered by the Soviet tank crewman, as was the case for both were employed during the early months Russian and Spanish soldiers in 1936. after the German invasion in 1941, but Union between 1936 and 1938 was 900, Soviet tanks have been generally de- they were obsolete by then, resulting in of which about 600 were recovered and repaired by General Franco’s forces. No signed with a ruthless, no-frills philoso- their total destruction by technically supe- phy that leaves them with a very rough- rior German forces. Nevertheless, the less than 250 remained in service within edged finish but without compromising experience gained with the BT series was the Spanish Army after the war, until the late 1940s and early ’50s, when they any of their key performance require- of great help to the designers of the T-34 ments. The welding, for example, might later on. were replaced by new M-24 Chaffees, M- have appeared crude, but it never com- 41 Walkers, and M-47 Pattons supplied The main armament of both the T-26 by the United States. promised the level of protection. Exterior and BT-5 was the standard Soviet 45mm machining, too, seemed unfinished, ex- Equipment cept at key joints and interfaces where it antitank gun M-1932/35, which fired an AP round with a muzzle velocity of In 1933, the Soviet Army had six types was quite good. 820m/sec. It also fired HE shells at a of tanks in service: the T-26 for tank bat- The main battle tank of the Spanish slower muzzle velocity in an arcing flight talions of infantry divisions; BT-5 and Civil War was clearly the T-26; it was the path. BT-7 for mechanized cavalry; T-35 for most widely used and the most successful As secondary armament, both types of heavy tank brigades; and amphibious T- of any used by the warring parties. As tanks were armed with one coaxial DT 37/T-38, and T-27 light tanks for recce was the case with many other Soviet and scout purposes. Of these, only the T- tanks of the early 1930s, the T-26 was machine gun of 7.62 x 54mm. Sometimes an additional machine gun was externally 26 and BT-5 tanks saw service in Spain. developed from a British design pur- mounted for use by the tank commander. All these tanks varied in firepower and chased from the Vickers-Armstrong mobility, but none offered protection company. As a matter of fact, it was The T-26 carried 169 main gun rounds while the BT-5 carried 144. against anything more than small arms — commonly referred to as the “Vickers armor piercing bullets all round and tank” by Spanish soldiers, rather than by Armor protection was certainly a weak- heavy machine gun fire at the front. its Soviet designation. ness in both tanks. Maximum thickness The experience gained in Spain gave The Soviets built more than 12,000 ve- was 15-16 mms of RHA, and its inade- quacy led to some improvement. By new impetus to tank design and to a point hicles of the T-26 series between 1931 1940, the latest version of the T-26, the sparked some revolutionary thinking. and 1940, and at the time of the German During the period of the war, from 1936 invasion in 1941, it still formed the back- T-26C, had an equivalent of some 25 mms of RHA, but was still no match for to 1939, we saw the adoption of armor bone of Soviet armored troops. The T-26 almost any German antitank gun in ser- capable of keeping out shell splinters, the saw action not only in Spain and Russia development of electric welding for ar- but in Manchuria against the Japanese in vice. mor plate, introduction of a special tank 1939 and in the Russo-Finnish War in Combat weight was around 10 tons for engine, the C2, which was a forerunner 1940. Against the Japanese, its weak- the T-26B while the BT-5 was slightly 34 ARMOR — March-April 1999

With a weight of only 10 tons, the T-26 could actually be carried on a heavy truck. This is one of the T-26s captured by the Nationalists during the civil war, but the photo was actually taken in 1945, when the vehicle was still in Spanish colonial service in Northern Africa!

supported by two Italian field artillery batteries equipped with 65mm light how- itzers. The Popular Army concept of maneuver was to conduct an encircling movement of the Nationalist advance guard, pene- trate in depth against the bulk of Franco’s forces and recover the main town of Toledo, located 40 miles SW of Madrid. The main effort was carried out by the First Infantry Brigade of the Popu- lar Army, supported by the tank company team of Major Greisser (15 T-26B tanks). Soviet General Batov was in overall command of the operation, and artillery support was commanded by Soviet Colo- nel Voronov. It was the first action really undertaken by the Soviet military in Spain, and it clearly shows the involve- ment and commitment of the Soviet Union at such an early stage of the war. (Gen- eral Batov was commander of the Soviet 65th Army in 1941, subordinated to Mar- shal Budenny. All his forces were de- stroyed by the Germans in the first battle for Kiev, and after that nothing more was heard of General Batov.) While the concept of maneuver was ap- propriate and well planned, the execution was poor. The Soviets failed in their mis- sion because they failed to back up the tanks with equally mobile infantry and artillery, and because fuel resupply broke down. heavier, about 12 tons; nevertheless, matically unveiling to the Nationalist Early in the morning of October 29th, when the Germans invaded the Soviet forces the arrival of Soviet equipment and 1936, after the initial attack started by the Union in 1941, the bulk of Soviet ar- Soviet military “volunteers.” Republican Air Force — also Soviet- mored forces still fielded T-26 and BT equipped and led — the T-26 tanks began tanks. It took some time until more heav- Franco’s forces continued unhindered in to move, taking advantage of the morning ily protected tanks like T-34s and KV-1s their advance on the Spanish capital. fog that is typical of the southern Castile appeared within frontline units. plains during the early autumn. At first, According to a witness who was then they managed to penetrate the Nationalist part of the Nationalist forces that took forces’ deployment, creating some confu- Combat Operations part in the encounter: sion and disorder, but soon, lacking in- Soviet tanks first saw action in the Span- fantry support and liaison with higher ish Civil War on October 29th, 1936, The advancing Nationalist forces, un- echelons due to poor communications, der command of General Varela, had when a tank company team led by Major Madrid as their ultimate objective, and the tanks were brought to a halt. It is not Greisser met an advance guard detach- difficult to imagine the feelings of the ment of General Franco’s spearhead, then were composed of eight infantry brigades Soviet tankers in the middle of Spain, with the fire support of 23 field artillery advancing at full strength towards Ma- batteries, but no tanks at all, except for a facing a completely new environment, not drid. understanding a single word of Spanish, single light tank company equipped with likely without adequate maps and without The encounter took place about 25 miles Italian FIAT L3 tankettes armed only southwest of Madrid, at the edge of the with machine guns, recently supplied by liaison with their superiors. They must have felt completely lost. small town of Sesena. The outcome was Italy to General Franco. The advance disappointing for the Soviets and, in the guard was a mounted cavalry brigade Still advancing but without clear refer- end, served no purpose, apart from dra- under command of Colonel Monasterio ences, they came under direct fire of the ARMOR — March-April 1999 35

howitzers attached to the Nationalist recovered immediately and sent to the the end of November 1936, the National- cavalry. One tank of the leading platoon rear support services. It is interesting that ists had lost 28 Panzer Is plus several was destroyed by a direct hit, and a sec- the Germans offered the sum of 500 Italian L3s. This brought their efforts to a ond was damaged but managed to find a Spanish pesetas (about five dollars at stalemate and forced them on to the de- hull-down position from where it contin- today’s rate of exchange!) for each T-26 fensive. At this point, the Popular Army ued firing on the Nationalist forces. The tank captured intact. This reward, a clear made its main mistake, not going on the third tank in the platoon started to with- proof of the German interest in Soviet offensive. draw from combat but committed the equipment, attracted a lot of attention Also, in the fighting around Madrid, the mistake of entering the narrow streets of among colonial Nationalist troops, mostly Nationalist forces first employed the Sesena where it was soon destroyed by of Moroccan origin, who on many occa- the Nationalist cavalrymen with the help sions got killed in their efforts to capture 88mm antiaircraft gun in an antitank role, with great success. These guns, which of improvised “Molotov cocktails.” The the Soviet tanks at whatever cost. were later developed into one of the most rest of the tank company disengaged from the action and retired towards the Repub- In October 1936, almost at the same dreaded weapons of WWII, literally dis- time as the initial Soviet tanks arrived, the integrated the T-26s at the first hit. Luck- lican lines, putting an end to the planned first contingent of 33 German PzKpw I ily for the Soviets, the 88s were supplied operation. light tanks were shipped from Germany to the Nationalists in very small numbers. to General Franco. The tanks were under The second tank of the unfortunate lead- the supervision of Oberstleutnant Von The front remained stabilized during the ing Soviet platoon became immobilized in winter of 1936-37, but 1937 saw the em- its hull-down position but continued fir- Thoma, who later distinguished himself ployment of armor on a much bigger in WWII as a brilliant commander of the ing on the Nationalist forces with un- Afrika Korps and was captured by the scale than in 1936. On February 13th, doubted resolution and courage, its crew 1937, the Nationalist Army — in one rejecting all Nationalist attempts to de- British at El Alamein in November 1942. more attempt to occupy Madrid — started As mentioned earlier, German crews stroy it. The Nationalist cavalry com- were sent to provide support services, and an ambitious encircling maneuver from mander decided to commit the Italian L3 the southeast that led to the battle that has light tanks, but they proved completely were not to engage in combat. By Octo- been called the Battle of Jarama. The ber 30th, panzers with Spanish crews inadequate and soon one was damaged, were engaged in combat against Soviet campaign was pretty well described by being overturned by a direct hit from the Hemingway and perpetuated in many T-26. Miraculously, its crew escaped armor at the outskirts of Madrid. songs of the time, including some sung From the very beginning, Soviet gun- alive. Another Nationalist L3, a flame- armed tanks were superior to German and by Pete Seeger many years later. At the thrower version, was totally destroyed Battle of Jarama, the First Armored Bri- and its crew killed, also by a direct hit. Italian machine gun-armed light tanks. gade of the Popular Army, under the Nevertheless, during the first days of After 40 minutes, the Soviet tank was combat, the German Panzer Is equalized command of General Pavlov, managed to finally destroyed by a direct hit from a delay the advance of General Franco’s Spanish 75mm field howitzer, and its this disadvantage by using special armor- troops precisely at the Jarama River, but piercing ammu nition whenever the Soviet entire Soviet crew was killed. Thus, at tanks appeared. The Soviets quickly dis- as happened in Sesena, the Soviet tanks their first action the Soviets failed in their acted without infantry support and re- mission and lost three tanks out of 15 covered that their tanks were being pene- mained in a defensive attitude, not ex- trated at ranges up to about 120 to 150 committed, destroying in exchange two meters. Countermeasures against the ploiting their success and technical capa- light Italian L3 tanks. Not a very bright bilities. The Soviets lost 24 T-26s de- start. ammunition used by the Nationalists stroyed and captured against 17 Panzer Is were very simple and immediately ap- Nevertheless, the action at Sesena had plied: the Russian tanks no longer ad- destroyed and damaged. the effect of sounding the alarm among vanced to close the range. As soon as At dawn on March 8th, 1937, ten field the Nationalist forces and convinced they noticed the panzers, they usually General Franco that Madrid was being remained over 1,000 meters away, firing artillery battalions of the Italian expedi- tionary force opened fire on the lightly defended with Soviet troops, both on land very accurately with their effective 45mm defended positions of the 12th Infantry and from the air. But due to the failure of guns. the Soviets in Sesena, Franco ordered his Another factor was that the gun sights in Division of the Popular Army, which barred the avenues of approach to Madrid units to continue advancing towards Ma- Russian tanks allowed targets to be en- from the northeast. The battle for Guada- drid. Not very soon afterwards, the Na- gaged at up to 3,000 meters while sights tionalists got proof that Sesena had been on the Pak 37, the antitank gun supplied lajara had started. Four motorized infan- try divisions of the Italian Volunteer only the result of bad luck and some poor by the Germans to the Nationalist forces, Corps attacked on a broad front. One of planning. were calibrated to only 900 meters. This forced the Nationalists to attach no less them was an elite division of the Italian The Soviets lost about six more T-26 regular Army, the “Littorio” Infantry tanks in subsequent combats with the than five antitank guns to each light tank Division under command of Major Ge n- company to at least provide some protec- advancing Nationalist troops. The de- tion against the Soviet guns. The effect eral Bergonzoli, who had served previ- stroyed tanks were carefully examined ously in the Ethiopian campaign under and studied, and some of their main com- was minimal; coordination of the new Marshal Graziani. The division acquitted tanks and antitank guns proved extremely ponents were sent to Italy. Some of the difficult for the Nationalists. In spite of itself very well later on in North Africa experience obtained was used in develop- under Field Marshal Rommel, although it ing the Italian M-13/40, a tank later em- all training, and to the dismay of the was ultimately defeated and annihilated German instructors, the gunners normally ployed in the North African campaign of started shooting at ranges far over 1,000 by the British Eighth Army. The Italians 1941-1943 alongside the German Afrika committed a total of 35,000 men to the Korps. On November 3d, 1936, the Na- meters. fight at Guadalajara, but armor was tionalists captured the first Soviet T-26 Soviet tank superiority was clearly scarce, limited to a reinforced battalion- tank, in almost mint condition. It was shown in the combats around Madrid. By strength unit of FIAT L3 light tankettes. 36 ARMOR — March-April 1999

The objective of the Italian High Com- mand was to take the cities of Guadala- jara and Alcala, the latter only 20 miles from Madrid. They hoped the Republican forces would crumble, Madrid would be occupied, and a quick surrender would follow, bringing an end to the war. Such a victory would have been of immense propaganda benefit to the Italian Fascists, and would establish the claim of Musso- lini’s regime to leadership in Southern Europe. But the Italians made several mistakes: first, they underestimated the ability of the Popular Army and did not take into account the Soviet presence and reinforcements around Madrid. Secondly, they disregarded the weather forecasts, perhaps thinking that Spain was as sunny as the tourist brochures advertised. And tant strategic consequence of the battle The Christie suspensions of the Soviet they failed to do adequate terrain recon- was the abandonment of the Nationalist BT-5s were capable of running on naissance. The results were a disaster for goal of conquering Madrid; the capital both wheels and tracks. This one is in city remained in Republican hands until the wheeled configuration, which did the Italian forces, and the Nationalist not prove to be useful in the Spanish forces as a whole. But even today, it is the end of the war, on April 1st, 1939. conflict. impossible to understand why the Popu- Armor losses in the battle for Guadala- lar Army and the Soviet forces never jara were extremely moderate: the Sovi- exploited their success. ets lost only seven T-26 tanks and the Italians 19 FIAT L3s. The Battle of Brunete was called the The Italian attack began in the midst of “Battle for Thirst” because very hot a severe windstorm, freezing tempera- The summer of 1937 brought one of the summer weather played havoc with tures, and heavy snow. They were limited bloodiest battles of the Spanish Civil troops on both sides. Temperatures to a visibility of only 2 to 3 meters! War: the Battle of Brunete. Brunete is a reached 102 degrees. By July 12th, the Somehow, they managed to penetrate small town about 15 miles northwest of Republicans stopped the attack and as- about 15 miles into the Republican de- Madrid, and by mid-1937, it appeared to sumed the defensive, trying to consoli- ployment. Weather conditions did not the Popular Army high command as a date its lines. permit the air support planned, which was convenient spot to create a diversionary In the skies over Brunete, the German to come from the entire Italian expedi- offensive. They hoped to attract the atten- tionary air forces in Spain, some units of tion of General Franco and alleviate the Luftwaffe employed for the very first the German Luftwaffe’s Condor Legion, pressure of Nationalist forces in Northern time Messerschmitt Me-109 fighters, Heinkel He-111 bombers, and Junkers and the Spanish Air Force. They were Spain, then committed to the conquest unable to take off to support the ground and occupation of the entire Basque re- Ju-87 Stuka dive-bombers that swept the forces because of the weather. After two gion. The initial planning and full concept once powerful Soviet-Spanish Republi- can Air Force from the sky. In total, the days, the Popular Army had managed to of the operation of the Brunete offensive reorganize their front and stop the Italian is today attributed to the late Soviet Mar- Republican forces lost near 30,000 dead offensive. The key to this was the em- shal Malinovsky. and 61 T-26 tanks destroyed and captured ployment of Pavlov’s First Armored Bri- while the Nationalists lost 20,000 dead gade and the air support provided by On July 5th, 1937, three Army corps, and only two light tanks. Spanish Republican and Soviet aircraft supported by 250 artillery pieces and 300 Armor had been very badly employed who flew in from airfields that were not aircraft, began an offensive against on the Soviet side. Tank units were bro- affected by the weather around Madrid. Franco’s six divisions around Madrid. ken up, and the individual tanks were The attacking force, 125,000 men with employed like assault guns to provide fire The Italian casualties included 1,400 130 tanks, was the largest military force support. A lack of initiative, combined dead, 4,500 wounded, and 500 missing in ever assembled in Spain. It faced a Na- with inability to exp loit their initial suc- action. While losses on the Republican tionalist force of 50,000 men and 50 light cess, led the Popular Army to a major side were even higher, the Italians were tanks. At first, the Republican forces disaster. Although at a much different forced to withdraw to their original line managed to advance and penetrate be- scale, we can compare Brunete with of departure. But incredibly, the Popular tween 10 to 15 miles inside the National- Kursk. After Brunete, the Popular Army Army that had done such a brilliant job of ist lines but again, they moved with ut- was never again a coherent force capable coordinating air support, artillery, tanks most caution, showing a lack of audacity of matching the Nationalists. From that and infantry on the defense, lacked offen- and initiative. Their hesitancy allowed the stage of the conflict, their superior ar- sive spirit, and never exploited its suc- Nationalists to react in strength. By July mored forces were unable to present a cess. This allowed the Littorio Division to 7th, the Battle of Brunete had trans- real threat to the technically inferior ar- make a neat and tidy withdrawal. Guada- formed itself into a battle of attrition. In mored forces of General Franco. By the lajara, a defeat for the Nationalist forces, this battle, General Franco maintained a last days of the battle, the Nationalists delivered a severe blow to Italian pres- good grasp of the situation and his logis- even dared to employ for the first time tige, but never amounted to a real success tics, repeatedly moving the Nationalist their captured T-26 tanks, a fully opera- for the Popular Army. The most impor- reserves to the right spot at the right time. tional company-size unit of 16 tanks, but ARMOR — March-April 1999 37

they also employed their tanks in an in- On the Soviet side, the mistakes Von Thoma noted that General Franco, fantry support role. made by the combined Soviet- as a typical general of the old school, After Brunete, the Popular Army never Spanish leadership were not cor- always wanted to distribute his available rectly understood. This led to the tanks among infantry units. But most of employed its armored units to their full disbanding of existing large armored the Nationalist victories, Van Thoma advantage, and never capitalized on the major armored units they had created. In formations in Russia, which proved said, happened when tanks were em- disastrous in 1941. ployed in larger numbers. Franco and October 1937, while trying to create an- Von Thoma remained at odds on this other diversionary effort to alleviate the Nationalist pressure on all fronts, the issue, prompting Van Thoma to com- the Spanish Civil War ultimately helped ment: “The Spaniards learned quickly, Popular Army attacked in southern Ara- them in speeding up the production of but also forgot quickly.” gon, employing there for the first time the gun-armed tanks, especially the Panzer heavy tank regiment that had been re- III and IV types, but the misleading re- On the Soviet side, the mistakes made cently organized with the newly arrived sults of the Nationalist victory probably by the combined Soviet-Spanish leader- BT-5 tanks. gave them some false reassurance. When ship were not correctly understood. This led to the disbanding of existing large The BT-5 tanks tried to take advantage the invasion of Russia began, the bulk of of their speed and, to benefit from infan- the German armored force tanks were of armored formations in Russia, which the PzKpw I and II types. Only their proved disastrous in 1941. The superior- try support, also carried on their decks a ity of their equipment in the Spanish con- full squad of infantrymen in the style later PzKpw IV, with its 75mm gun, was at all employed by the Soviets on the Eastern capable of matching the soon-to-be- flict also made the Soviets overconfident, introduced T-34 and KV-I Soviet tanks. and this dangerous peace of mind led to Front. Many of these infantrymen were disaster in 1941, at least until the T-34 killed by the combined fire of all weap- Other conclusions about tanks were was introduced in sufficient numbers. ons, but especially artillery. The tanks drawn by foreign observers, among them also lost the advantage of their speed the British theoretician J.F.C. Fuller, who The Soviets also never understood the when they got bogged down in an area of drew the lesson that light tanks were in- importance of close cooperation between marshes and muddy soil near the small adequate: “The three types of tanks that I air support and armor, nor the key role of town of Fuentes de Ebro. The result was have seen in Spain — Italian, German, mechanized infantry working together loss of 29 BT-5 tanks out of the 61 com- and Russian — are not the result of tac- with tanks. But their solution to the or- mitted. The Nationalists succeeded be- tical study, but are merely cheap mass ganization of armored units proved more cause of well established fire planning production. From the standpoint of efficient and persists today — three tanks and good employment of well positioned mechanization, up to now this war has per platoon, ten tanks per company, thirty and well camouflaged antitank guns. The proven my opinion that the light tank is tanks in a regiment, and one independent graveyard of wrecked BT-5 tanks was absolutely no combat machine.” Instead, tank regiment per division. left in place for a long time afterward, Fuller advocated gun-armed tanks with and was shown frequently to the interna- Not much has been written on the em- full protection and high reliability. ployment of armor during the Spanish tional media as a clear example of the Civil War. Certainly, in comparison with extent of the Soviet intervention in Spain. The following major conclusions were also reached as a result of major opera- what happened in World War II, it is easy Tanks continued to be employed until tions during the war: to overlook, but it certainly was in its way the end of the war in a secondary role, a foreword to what was coming, and Tanks need to be supported by motor- mainly providing infantry support as mo- · many of the lessons learned just confirm bile assault artillery. Generally speaking, ized infantry. Failing to do that caused what we know today as key principles of the Popular Army assigned one tank bat- many of the Soviet mistakes. Only in rare armored warfare. cases, or against limited objectives, talion to each infantry division and to each army corps. Their armored brigades should tanks proceed alone. and divisions were never employed as · The speed of tanks complicated com- such, and the war devolved into a series mand and control and made timely as- Colonel Antonio J. Candil gradu- of infantry battles. The Nationalists also sessments of a situation more difficult. ated from the Spanish Military employed their armor mainly in support A great advantage accrued to close Academy in 1972 and was com- of infantry. · cooperation with aircraft, which could aid missioned in Armor. He has The main and final battle of attrition of command and control, provide combat served as a tank platoon com- the war began on July 24th, 1938, near support, and perform reconnaissance. mander in the Spanish Western the river Ebro. Armored units didn’t play Sir Basil Liddell-Hart made some inter- Sahara in 1973-76, and is experi- a key role in the four month battle, and esting comments about the employment enced as an XO and company when it was over, the Popular Army had commander. A graduate of the ceased to exist as an organized combat of armor in the Spanish Civil War in his book, Europe in Arms. He said it was a Armor Officer Advanced Course at force. From December 1938 until April Fort Knox, he is also a graduate of 1939, the Republican forces were only great mistake to consider the war as proof capable of conducting a disorganized of the inefficiency of mechanized forces. the Spanish Army Command and On the contrary, mechanized troops defense that ultimately resulted in their Staff School, and the Italian unconditional surrender and the end of proved that they could move cross- Army’s War College. He has been the Second Spanish Republic. country and across a wide front and that assigned to several posts abroad, when employed in such a way they con- in Belgium, Italy, the UK, and Conclusions and Remarks tributed a great deal to the achievement of success. They could also contribute to a Germany, and is now director of According to reports sent to Germany defensive situation, he said, arguing that the Leopard 2 Program with the by Oberstleutnant Von Thoma, the ex- the mobile defense was more effective Spanish Army Logistics Com- perience obtained by the Germans from than a static, strongpoint defense. mand. 38 ARMOR — March-April 1999 Armored Warfare in Spain, Cont’d from Page 30 ideal of mechanized mobility, bought Heinz Guderian’s armored drive to the account as well. In July 1939, the four time for Madrid’s defenders and contrib- mouth of the Somme was proof enough Soviet armored corps were disbanded, uted to a strategically significant result; of that. Tellingly, Miksche did not see the and the brigades of their component divi- the capital remained in Republican hands Soviet tank officers operating on his own sions were distributed among infantry until the war’s final campaign well over side as innovators, but regarded them divisions. For Miksche, Pavlov’s 1941 two years later. instead as slaves to the same antiquated defeat indicated that the Soviets, like the tactical conception as that of the French. French, had neither learned from the Balanced assessments of armored war- Republican tanks in 1937, like French Spanish experience nor heeded the find- fare in the Spanish war — particularly 5 that war’s opening phase — are rarely tanks in 1940, were largely infantry sup- ings of those who had. However, when port weapons, parceled out to line units in German accounts became available after seen; works that focus on World War II small groups, rather than concentrated for World War II, a different picture emerged. or encompass the entire history of the tank either avoid this subject altogether or effective offensive or counter-offensive Thoma spoke not of a perfect laboratory, actions. but of practical limitations which ren- treat it cursorily — as a prologue to more dered effective mechanized experimenta- significant events. A more detailed ex- As is so often the case with such pointed amination of tank employment in Spain is theses, this one was oversimplified. In tion impossible. Similarly, Guderian be- lieved contemporary developments in therefore necessary. The first problem 1939, Miksche had attempted to warn Germany to be much more important. A encountered in such an examination is the Western military authorities that Gu d- historiographical one mentioned above. erian’s schwerpunkt, or thrust point, tac- bizarre byproduct of this interpretation was the partial rehabilitation of Pavlov — The “laboratory” and “false start” schools tics were indeed viable. The warning had from moron to ignoramus: He failed on were both conceived to explain military been taken lightly, and Miksche’s selec- disasters of 1940 and 1941, rather than tion of historical evidence for Attack was the West Front because he could not pos- sibly have learned anything of value in those of the Spanish conflict, and the correspondingly tendentious. He ignored Spain anyway. More important was the evidence was duly cooked. Only when even more concerted — and earlier — these after-the-fact rationalizations are Soviet attempts at tactical reform, espe- historiographical effect wielded by the Allies’ reversal of their earlier fortunes. stripped away does the true picture cially those of the first two senior tank Just as the blitzkrieg’s victims sought an emerge: the experimenters were far less officers in Republican Spain: Lieutenant- sure of themselves than is often sup- Colonel Semyon M. Krivoshein and his explanation for its short term success, its designers now grasped at any opportunity posed. Both sides addressed the promise successor, Major-General Dmitri G. Pav- to account for its ultimate failure. of independent mechanized operations, lov. Not only did the Soviet field regula- but had done so fitfully and with reserva- tions of 1936 deem independent mecha- tions. So, too, did both sides employ re- nized operations necessary, but their re- Imported Theories: cently designed tanks only to find that jection over the next three years had little A Common Thread those tanks were not always ideally suited to do with tactical failures in Spain; Mik- German doctrinal reform of 1926-1937 for the missions they performed. Training hail N. Tukhachevsky, their chief propo- paralleled its Soviet counterpart in con- was difficult and, even when successful, nent, was executed for espionage and could not always atone for limitations of treason in June of 1937. Nor did Miksche tent as well as timing, although the simi- larities were to be obscured by compari- doctrine and technology. note that, by February 1937 — scarcely sons of the blitzkrieg’s success to Pav- four mo nths after their arrival — the pan- Hindsight or History? zer crews of Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma’s lov’s 1941 failures. Before Tuk- hachevsky’s downfall, however, the mu- Conditions in a laboratory can be con- Imker Drohne group had been repeatedly tual affinity of Soviet theorists and their ordered to avoid enemy tanks.3 Not until trolled, and it is extraordinary that a com- early 1939 were those panzers committed “bourgeois” German contemporaries was bat veteran would liken a war zone to strong. That affinity had been fostered one. But Ferdinand O. Miksche did pre- under Spanish command to a war- during the 1920s by joint military exe r- winning offensive. Nevertheless, Mik- cisely that. Miksche, a Czech artillery sche’s glowing assessment of the cises conducted under a secret provision officer who commanded an artillery of the Rapallo Pact. During those exe r- group in the Spanish Republic’s Ejercito Wehrmacht’s “Spanish Laboratory” was cises, Tukhachevsky studied the reform taken at face value by a generation of Popular, was the first to propose that the blitzkrieg victims in search of an explana- initiatives of Hans von Seeckt. As chief “Spanish Laboratory,” as he called it, was of the Reichswehr’s troop bureau and de ideal for the testing of mechanized tac- tion. facto Chief of Staff from 1920 until his tics.2 “The pace was slower and the scale The seeds of the historiographical coun- death in 1926 Seeckt argued that, con- was smaller” than that of later operations terpoise to Miksche were sewn in June, trary to the apparent lessons of the recent in Poland, France, and North Africa, he 1941, when the Soviet West Front, under World War, the defense was not inher- reasoned. Written in the aftermath of the the command of Dmitri Pavlov, col- ently superior: “Science,” he observed, French army’s 1940 collapse, Miksche’s lapsed. This collapse resulted partly from “works for both sides.”6 Although in- Attack: A Study of Blitzkrieg Tactics was the misapplication of conclusions that clined toward small mobile forces, a resounding I-told-you-so which treated Pavlov had formulated while serving in Seeckt, like Tukhachevsky, held that, the operations of the German Imker Spain. Frustrated with the failure of inde- even with their mechanical limitations, Drohne advisory group operating with pendent armored operations there, and vehicles held significant advantages over Franco’s Nationalists as unqualified suc- knowing that Tukhachevsky had incurred men. Guderian also considered Tukha- cesses. “The road that the evolution of Stalin’s wrath, Pavlov convinced the chevsky’s work carefully: “[T]here is war was taking could not fail to be seen People’s Commissariat for Defense in something to be said for the way the Rus- by an attentive observer who studied it in July 1938 that tanks were suited only to sians have organized their [tank] forces,” Spain,” lamented Miksche in his intro- the close support of infantry formations.4 he later noted. But this approval was con- duction, and the French clearly were not He had also replaced Tukhachevsky as ditional; the Soviet demand for immedi- paying attention. Only the Germans his army’s senior tank officer, and his ate infantry support, long range artillery “learned...that war had changed” and views held official credibility on that support, and independent tanks required ARMOR — March-April 1999 39

“a whole inventory of specialized tanks, armament: “a modicum of defense The most significant advances, both tac- with all the attendant disadvantages.”7 against enemy tanks.”11 Conversely, the tically and technologically, occurred dur- Guderian intended that the tank fulfill its exploitation-and-pursuit mission de- ing Tukhachevsky’s tenures as Director manded a sacrifice of some armor in the of Armaments (1931-1934) and as a Di- potential for concentrated independent interests of speed and, especially, fire- rector of the Military Soviet (1934-1937). action against the thrust point, but contin- ued to address the need for cooperation power. Well before the Spanish Civil The Soviet Army’s 1932 Combat War, Guderian specified a main gun of Regulations for Mechanized Forces, with non-mechanized infantry. Inherent up to 75mm because he regarded future which also reflected the influence of Tuk- in this compromise were two equally weighted reservations. On the one hand, tank-versus-tank combat as an absolute hachevsky’s former Deputy Chief of certainty. As for organization, infantry Staff, Vladimir K. Triandafillov, served he criticized those who sought to limit support tanks would operate in small as a starting point for both tank design tanks to the infantry support role as prone to underestimate the tank’s firepower detachments whereas independent mech- and employment. Under this policy, each anized action called for large formations of three distinct tank missions was as- while overestimating that of equally un- composed of tanks and lightly armored signed its own purpose-built tank, and the tested antitank guns: infantry carriers. Each type of formation likelihood of overlap between one cate- It is alleged that the defense will no required specialized training. Tank offi- gory and the next was generally mini- longer be susceptible to surprise by cers detailed for infantry support were de mized. Light tanks grouped into N[iepos- tanks; [that] antitank guns and artillery facto advisors to infantry commanders, redstviennoy] P[odierzhki] P[iechotiy], always find their mark, regardless of rather than unit commanders in their own or short range infantry support forma- their own casualties, of smoke, fog, trees, right. In contrast, those leading exploita- tions, were to supply direct support to or other obstacles and ground contours; tions were dictating the course of events conventional infantry formations operat- the defense too, is always located exactly and therefore required command, as well ing against the enemy’s front lines. Infan- where the tanks are going to attack; with as technical, training. Only when em- try support against successive defensive their powerful binoculars, they can easily ployed in the independent role could belts between 1.5 and 2.5 kilometers see through smoke screens and darkness, tanks contribute directly to a long term, from the line of departure was to be pro- and despite their steel helmets they can strategically significant result. By 1936, vided by heavy tanks of the D[alshiy] hear every word that is said.8 Guderian’s superiors were intent on put- P[odierzhki] P[iechotiy], or long range ting this theory, as well as their tanks, to infantry support formations. Lastly, inde- On the other hand, he warned: the test. Thoma later hinted, a bit defen- pendent mechanized operations against [A]s with all innovations in the field of sively, that Spain’s role as a “European enemy headquarters, reserve, and artillery military technology, it is unwise to jump Aldershot” had been designated at higher elements were the province of the to conclusions before undertaking a seri- levels of command than his own.12 D[alnogo] D[ieystviya], or long range ous examination of the pros and cons of operation group, equipped with B[ystro- new forces and the necessary counter- Unlike the Germans, who practiced ar- chodny] T[anki], or fast tanks.15 measures. Otherwise, there will be some mored warfare in secret because the Ve r- painful surprises in store when it comes sailles Treaty had prohibited their posses- In the 1932-3 expositions of this three- to real combat.9 sion of tanks, the Soviets suffered more tiered concept, infantry support tanks from limitations of domestic origin. outnumbered the fast tanks at least partly Like Tukhachevsky, Guderian had sur- mised that coordinating with muscle- When appointed as Army Chief of Staff because the latter represented a contro- in 1925, Tukhachevsky inherited an or- versial and untested departure from linear powered infantry did not necessarily ganization in which tactical and techno- tactics. If the fast tanks could indeed ex- mean co-locating with it in all situations. However, Guderian was far more deter- logical modernization had been thwarted, ploit gaps created by the other forma- not only by the lack of a viable automo- tions, the extent of those exploitations mined that the new tactical guidance be tive industry, but by the then prevailing was open to question, and the guidance more adaptable than the old. Local com- manders — not field regulations — interpretation of Marxist-Leninist dogma. for DD groups, the Preliminary Instruc- Leon Trotsky, the People’s Commissar tions for Waging Deep Battle, did not should determine the direction and for- for Military Affairs until 1923, had fa- gain official approval until 1935. Tukha- mation of an assault because those deci- sions depended ultimately upon the com- vored large, semi-trained militias as the chevsky continued to test the concept only true military expression of proletar- intensively and, although the next doc- position of the attacking force, enemy ian revolutionary zeal. His successor, trinal revision retained the infantry sup- dispositions, and terrain. Tanks should precede infantry in exposed areas, follow Mikhail V. Frunze, allowed that even port and independent functions outlined violent political revolution was to be ef- in 1932, the exploitation was now receiv- infantry where sufficient engineer and fected by bourgeois military methods, but ing as much attention as the break- artillery support was available, and attack the infantry’s objective from a different Frunze’s premature death in 1925 left through. According to the Provisional 10 some ramifications of this reinterpretation Field Service Regulations of 1936, direction if the terrain allowed. This unclear.13 Although official support for P[olevoy] U[stav]-36, a decisive victory demand for flexibility, rather than the simultaneous demand for an independent modernization had taken hold by the first could only be achieved by offensive ac- Five Year Plan’s initiation in 1927, the tion in depth. But Tukhachevsky and his mechanized capability, distinguished the first and second priorities went to infantry followers also noted a caveat which ap- German guidance from its Soviet coun- terpart. and artillery, respectively. Thus, although plied especially to technologically sophis- the Revolutionary Military Council’s ticated forces such as the DD group: But even Guderian expected that tactical Summer 1929 Preliminary Correct Line flexibility would be circumscribed by for the War Doctrine of Tanks reflected It is impossible to be equally strong eve- technology, organization, and training. the Party’s desire for both new armored rywhere. To guarantee success, troops Where technology was concerned, differ- forces and the motorization of extant and war material must be deployed in ent missions called for different tank maneuver arms — infantry and cavalry such a way that superiority is obtained at types: The close support variant needed — the first stage of that policy’s imple- the decisive points. On sectors of secon- much armor protection, but only light mentation took another two years.14 dary importance, all that is necessary is 40 ARMOR — March-April 1999

the employment of sufficient forces to hold the enemy.16 This emphasis on concentration against decisive points was a direct reflection of Tukhachevsky’s familiarity with “bour- geois” tactical theories; theories whose acceptance in the Soviet Union stemmed partly from the fact that a now out-of- favor Trotsky had earlier dismissed them. More specifically, it was a common de- nominator shared with Guderian’s Schwerpunkt und Aufrollen conception of mechanized warfare. So, too, was PU- 36’s demand for cooperation of all com- bat arms and the employment of each “under the conditions most favorable for developing its possibilities to the fullest extent.” However, although Soviet doc- trine of the 1930s often expressed the same general principles as its German counterpart, it also retained elements of the earlier, non-Western fixation on mass: Even though PU-36 urged offensive ac- tion “throughout the whole depth of [the enemy’s] position” for an attacker who could not be “equally strong every- where,” it added with equal conviction that “the simultaneous defeat of the en- committed were yet in a state of transi- emy along the whole of his battlefront” The Soviet T-26B was the most common tank was technologically possible.17 Calling tion. Official acceptance of PU-36 was on the Republican side, and clearly out- over two months away and would be classed the German and Italian armor em- the previous generation’s linear tactics temporary in any case. And although ployed by the Nationalists. into question, PU-36 had thus retained at least some of that generation’s linear Krivoshein himself adhered to the princi- ples of Deep Battle, his tankers came orientation, especially where the use of from different units, some of which had ments, was the same as that carried by the massed artillery and air support at higher operational levels was concerned. This trained only for close support operations. BT-5, and the T-26’s top speed of 23 In the following weeks, as the detach- miles far exceeded that of a walking in- duality had no direct German equivalent, ment’s cadre began to select and train fantryman. Like its British precursor, the and probably stemmed from Tuk- hachevsky’s own knowledge of the fast Spanish Republican tanquistas, it also T-26B1 carried the designation light tank, learned. but was over three tons heavier and em- tank’s limitations; knowledge which had bodied a number of added design features been gained since 1932. Although fast tanks had been designed to destroy the Soviet tank design, like Soviet tactics, which in retrospect make doctrinal dis- reflected a need for both independent- tinctions between it and the fast tank ap- enemy’s artillery and prevent the con- and infantry support mis sions. The 50 pear artificial. The periscopic sight fea- certed action of his reserves, redundancy in the form of massive indirect fire sup- tanks unloaded at Cartagena belonged to tured Zeiss optics, and many later models the T-26 series, originally designed for came equipped with a photoelectric firing port would help preserve the “harmonic” the latter. These equipped the first four circuit, which enabled gunners to engage aspect of combined arms offensives.18 Republican tank battalions to be organ- moving targets more easily — when it Krivoshein’s selection as the first com- ized. The fifth battalion, and several sub- was working. Radios were equally impor- mander of Soviet tank forces in Spain sequent ones, used the BT-5, a vehicle tant in wide-ranging tactically independ- stems as much from his fundamental intended solely for independent mecha- ent operations, and most early T-26s car- agreement with Tukhachevsky’s concep- nized operations. Not only did subse- ried them as well.20 tion of future wars as from his command quent events in Spain suggest that this experience in field training exercises of strict division of responsibilities was far The BT-5 also evolved from a foreign the early 1930s. Conceding that the infan- less sound in practice than in theory, but prototype tested at Tukhachevsky’s be- try support mission was still relevant, the two tanks were remarkably similar in hest in 1931. This was J. Walter Krivoshein had increasingly viewed the terms of armor and armament. The T-26 Christie’s T-3 design: a model that tank as “a very important instrument of series was a direct descendant of the Brit- American ordnance experts had rejected. pursuit,” a view which he still held in ish Vickers “six-ton,” 15 of which had Like the T-26A, the first production BTs October 1936, when his advisory de- been purchased on Tukhachevsky’s order mounted machine guns only, but the tachment deployed to Spain.19 in 1931. Originally equipped with dual same 45mm gun was added soon thereaf- side-by-side turrets, subsequent variants, ter. The BT-5’s frontal armor was 13mm Imported Tanks: The Soviet Advantage including the later T-26B1s, mo unted a thick, as opposed to 15mm for the T-26, single hull-width turret housing a 45mm and it weighed in at 11.2 tons combat When the first shipment of Soviet tanks main gun and coaxial 7.62mm machine loaded — less than two tons more than its arrived at Cartagena on 16 October 1936, gun. The new main armament, although stable mate. Also suggestive of accidental the tactics to which Krivoshein had effective against machine gun emplace- doctrinal overlap between officially dif- ARMOR — March-April 1999 41

ferent roles is the retention of the T-26B1 Considerably smaller than its Soviet point forward, German forces were to be turret — with its infantry handrail — on counterparts, it was limited to a crew of commanded by Germans, and German BT-5s. Only the BT-5’s top speed under two: a driver and a gunner/commander equipment was not to be used without ideal conditions — 36 miles per hour — who also served as the loader.23 Well German advice. Faced with an opponent set it apart from the T-26B1 but, because before 25 August 1936, when the first who was also receiving outside assis- conditions in Spain were seldom ideal, shipment of Mark Is reached Nationalist tance, Franco had no choice but to com- the extra 13 miles per hour was rarely forces, larger purpose-built medium tanks ply, and this compliance was to be ef- attained.21 Moreover, not even devotees were on German drawing boards, but fected even at the lowest levels of com- of independent mechanized action always none were available for Thoma. As a mand. Spanish tankers were to learn from agreed on the need for speed. B.H. Lid- result, Imker Drohne tank crews stood no German instructors. dell Hart, for example, argued that the chance in tank-versus-tank combat Thoma, who had personally arranged BT’s high power-to-weight ratio did not against Republican opponents. the armored assistance with Franco back make for accurate gunnery, and his ar- gument was, to a large extent, borne out: Training the Tanquistas in July, did not return to Spain until the August shipment of Mark Is, operated by When reporting on his first few tank op- The subsequent showdown on the Ma- scarcely trained Spanish crews, had al- erations in Spain, Krivoshein emphasized that most effective large caliber gunnery drid Front (Central Front was the Repub- ready seen combat. He agreed with Ca- lican designation) also introduced an naris on the importance of training, but occurred from the halt, and that effective element of default over the next five his initial calls for both German and coordination of tanks and infantry was the tactical ingredient most sorely lack- mo nths: when armored exploitations Spanish volunteers fell far short of expec- 22 proved impractical, the consequent pres- tations. With less than 150 Germans in its ing. One reason for this deficiency was sure on conventional infantry formations initial complement and only around 600 the three-man crew. Because the gunner doubled as tank commander, simultane- was likely to increase the number of re- when it reached maximum strength in quests for tanks in the close, direct fire 1938, Imker Drohne was a skeleton to be ous firing and communication with sup- support role. And these requests usually fleshed out by Spanish crewmen. Tank ported elements was impossible. originated among infantrymen who could crews were integrated where possible, but The implicit message from the Madrid not have cared that theorists had intended the language barrier remained significant. Front between October 1936 and March at least some of those tanks for other mis- Frustrated that the Spanish trainees were 1937 was clear: whatever promise inde- sions. Guderian and Tukhachevsky both “quick to learn” but “also quick to forget” pendent mechanized action held at the preferred larger, domestic maneuvers, how to operate tanks, Thoma was equally operational and strategic levels, frequent and each viewed his nation’s military disappointed with the Nationalist leader- combined arms operations involving involvement in Spain as a dubious, politi- ship’s willful rejection of the Schwer- tanks and dismounted infantry were to be cally motivated venture.24 However, mat- punkt tactics he sought to test: expected regardless of the larger scenario. ters were now beyond their control and, The corollary, of course, was that local when committed to combat, general theo- General Franco wished to parcel out conditions might require light infantry ries would be of little use without specific the tanks among the infantry — in the support tanks to participate in fast tank modifications. Those modifications, usual way of generals who belong to the operations and, by late 1937, infantrymen made by both advisory groups, some- old school. I had to fight this tendency were riding into combat on both types. times contravened official guidance but constantly in the endeavor to use the Not surprisingly, post-1939 BTs and their were made nevertheless. Miksche’s over- tanks in a concentrated way. The Fran- more famous successors, the T-34s, re- stated, hindsight-oriented comparisons of coists’ success was largely due to this.26 tained both reasonable degrees of speed Soviet stagnation and German innovation and infantry rails. These two features say little of this bottom-to-top phase of On the other hand, the capacity of Thoma’s small force to give the new doc- underscore the stark disparity between an doctrinal formulation. So, too, do those trine a fair test remains questionable; in overly complicated peacetime theory and comparisons belie the fact that Soviet its less elaborate wartime expression. officers far more attuned to the tank’s the opening battles around Madrid, he rarely had more than 50 Mark Is at his Germany’s first mass production tank operational potential than Pavlov — disposal. Konev, Rokossovsky, and Malinovsky, reflected less of Guderian’s tactical phi- for example — adopted small unit infan- losophy. The Panzerkampfwagen Mark Krivoshein’s frequent failure to over- IA had begun in 1932 as a prototype for try support tactics in Spain when neces- come an identical tendency among Re- sary. Forearmed more with ideas than an armored anti-aircraft gun carriage experiences, Krivoshein and Thoma col- publican commanders was probably no rather than a tank. Only during the next more significant a factor in the war’s two years, as Guderian’s theories were lided with the Clausewitzian concept of outcome, and he, like Thoma, labored friction as much as with each other: the gaining acceptance, was a tank turret theories were simple enough, but putting under a prohibitive tank shortage. But he added, but that improvement came at a had other problems as well. Whereas cost: Although roofed and capable of them into practice was another issue. Thoma’s first volunteers all came from 360-degree traverse, the new turret In Spain, a good deal of the friction oc- the 29th Armored Defense Regiment in mounted two 7.92mm machine guns, curred before combat. For Thoma, the Kassel, the Krivoshein Detachment was rather than the original 20mm AA situation was defined by Franco’s initial drawn from several different divisions of weapon. Smaller weapons meant more failure to take Madrid. On 30 October the Belorussian Military District, and few ammunition and, because the resulting 1936, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris of Ge r- of its original 180-man complement had hybrid was intended primarily for train- man military intelligence complained to trained together. Moreover, a high per- ing purposes, this increase was deemed Franco that Spanish battle tactics were centage were administrative or mainte- far more important than the simultaneous not “promising of success” and that, due nance personnel with no tank training, loss of firepower. The Mark IA weighed to the rebels’ misuse of air power in small and most of the tankers were officers and 5.4 tons, had frontal armor of 15mm, and disjointed operations, many early advan- senior NCOs. Beneath this cadre, only a carried a basic load of 1,525 rounds. tages had gone unexploited.25 From that third of the authorized enlisted men were 42 ARMOR — March-April 1999

present, and the biggest shortage was Notes 17Ibid., Chapter 1 Articles 7, 9. Milsom’s trans- among tank crewmen.27 lation of article nine uses “battle front,” whereas Far more desperate for Spanish volun- 1Kenneth Macksey, Guderian: Panzer General Simpkin uses the less linear “tactical layout.” 18 teers than his German opponent, Krivo- (London: Macdonald and Janes, 1975), p. 72; J. PU 36, Articles 7-9 passim. shein was also far more constrained by Mackintosh, “The Development of Soviet Mili- 19Semyon M. Krivoshein, in Taktik Schneller tary Doctrine since 1918,” in Michael Howard, Verbände (Potsdam: Voggenreiter Verlag, 1934), his superiors in matters of recruiting. ed., The Theory and Practice of War: Essays Because the T-26 was a concrete mani- p. 42. presented to Captain B.H. Liddell Hart on his 20 festation of proletarian revolutionary Seventieth Birthday (New York: Praeger 1966), Milsom, pp. 83-86; Richard N. Ogorkiewicz, might, only devout Communists were pp.249-269; Robert O’Neill, “Doctrine and “Soviet Tanks,” in Liddell Hart, ed., The Soviet allowed to operate it. Training in the German Army, 1919-1939,” in Army (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1956), Howard, pp. 143-165; Ian V. Hogg, Armour in pp. 298, 300-302; Denis Bishop and Christopher Although Krivoshein would later write Conflict: The Design and Tactics of Armored Ellis, Vehicles at War (London: Allen & Unwin, of his first trainees as “a Popular Front Fighting Vehicles (London: Janes, 1980); Robert 1979), p. 72; Macksey, A History of Armored in miniature,” accounts from the ranks Citino, Armored Forces: History and Sourcebook Fighting Vehicles, (New York: Scribners, 1977), indicate that non-Communists with me- (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 1994). p. 57. 21 chanical backgrounds were often rejected 2Ferdinand O. Miksche, Attack: A Study of Milsom, pp. 96-98; Macksey, Armored Fight- in favor of more politically acceptable Blitzkrieg Tactics (New York: Random House, ing Vehicles, p. 139. but technically unqualified inductees.28 1942; reprinted., Carlisle, Penn.: U.S. Army War 22Ogorkiewicz, p. 300; Krivoshein, “Tanquistas Worse yet, the instruction was conducted College, 1983), pp. vi, 9, 11. Voluntarios Sovieticos en la Defensa de la Ma- via an interpreter, for not one of 3Manfred Merkes, Die Deutsche Politik im drid,” in N.N. Voronov, Bajo de la Bandera de la Krivoshein’s instructors spoke Spanish. Spanischen Burgekrieg 1936-1939 (Bonn: Espana Repubicana: recuerdan los voluntarios The training, he dryly noted, “was not Ludwig Rohrscheid, 1969), pp. 67-68; Werner sovieticos participantes en la guerra nacional easy.” Beumelburg, Kampf um Spanien: die geschichte revolucionaria en Espana (Moscow: Editorial der Legion Condor (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, Progreso, 1971) pp. 320-323. Originally pub- lished as “Tankisty Dobrovoltsy,” in Voronov, Nor was it always complete. Not all 1942), p. 36. 4 Pod Znamenem Ispanikoi Respubliki: 1936-1939 drivers knew how to get their tanks out of John Milsom, Russian Tanks, 1900-1970 (New (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), pp. 446-468. York, Galahad, 1970), p. 52; David Glantz, So- first gear and, in one instance, a tank 23Ellis, Tanks of World War II (London: Octo- commander broke contact with the en- viet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle (London: Cass, 1991), pp. 92-93. pus, 1981), p. 103; F.M. Senger und Etterlin, emy because he had not learned how to 5 German Tanks of World War II, trans. J. Lucas fire the main gun. Miksche, pp. 4-12 passim. (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1969), pp. 21-23, figs. 6Hans von Seeckt, “The Armies of Today,” 11-15. Even had the training conditions been Cavalry Journal, vol. 39 no. 159 (April 1930), 24 ideal and the Spanish tankers appreciative John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A pp. 256-7. Military-Political History (London: Macmillan, of independent mechanized operations, 7 Heinz Guderian, Achtung--Panzer! 1937; (re- 1962), pp.428-436 passim; Matthew Cooper, The an inescapable irony would have re- print ed., trans. Christopher Duffy, London: German Army, 1933-45: Its Political and Mili- mained: Both Tukhachevsky and Gu d- Cassell, 1995), p. 153. tary Failure (New York: Stein and Day, 1978; erian had intended such operations to 8Guderian, in Journal of the National Union of reprint edition., Lanham, Md.: Scarborough preclude strategic stalemates. In Spain, German Officers, 15 Oct. 1937, reprinted in House, 1985), p. 55. however, all but a handful of the ap- Panzer Leader (trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon, 25Canaris, quoted in Peter Elstob, The Condor proximately 180 German and 700 Soviet New York: Dutton 1952, reprint edition., New Legion (New York: Ballantine, 1973), pp. 107-8. tanks to see action arrived well after ini- York: Da Capo, 1996), p. 39. 26Thoma, quoted by Liddell Hart in The German tial Spanish dispositions, political priori- 9Guderian, Achtung, p. 153. Generals Talk (New York: William Morrow, ties, and physical geography had created 10Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 39-44 passim; 1948), pp. 92-3. precisely that problem. Although thinly Achtung, pp. 154-155, 188-198 passim. 27Krivoshein, “Tanquistas Voluntarios,” pp. defended in many places, the line separat- 11 Guderian, Achtung, p. 169. 320-323. ing Nationalist from Republican territory 28 12Thoma, quoted in B.H. Liddell Hart, The Ibid., p. 324. Robert Gladnick, who com- existed for the most part by October manded a section of Republican tanks, asserts 1936. In the Madrid area, where political German Generals Talk (New York: Wm. Mor- row, 1948), p. 92. that the politicized nature of tanker candidate imperatives demanded that both tank 13 selection prolonged the process unduly. See forces be committed prematurely, ideal Walter D. Jacobs, Frunze: The Soviet Clause- Robert Gladnick, quoted in Peter Wyden, The tank terrain was in limited supply. witz, 1885-1925 (The Hague: Martinies Nijhoff, Passionate War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), pp. 20-1, 46-9, 52-3, 83-4; Milsom, p. 31; 1983), pp. 172-3. Glantz, pp. 74-76. Because of these geographic and politi- 14 cal constraints, the technological superi- Milsom, p. 31; Glantz, pp. 74-76. ority of Soviet armor came to matter only 15Milsom, p. 38; Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky, John L.S. Daley, currently an in- at the tactical level and, where imported “New Questions of War,” (written in 1932) in structor at Pittsburg State University, doctrines were concerned, neither Gu d- Voyenno-Istoricheski Zhurnal (February 1962), has previously taught at Kent State translated and reprinted in Richard Simpkin, erian’s schwerpunkt (thrust point) nor Deep Battle: the Brainchild of Marshal Tuk- University. A former Armor officer, his Tukhachevsky’s glubokiy boi (deep bat- hachevskii (London: Brassey’s, 1987), pp. 139- military experience includes assign- tle) were to receive fair tests. By default, 142; “The Development of Forms of Command ment as a platoon leader, A Com- experimentation in the “Spanish Labora- and Control” in Krasny Zvezda (21 February pany, 2-37 Armor; XO, C Company, tory” degenerated into a series of ad hoc 1934) translated and reprinted in Simpkin, pp. 2-37 Armor; and Assistant Deputy tactical adjustments by commanders who 155-156. Sub-Community Commander, 2d were understandably more concerned 16PU-36, Chapter 1, Article 3, translated and about accomplishing missions than prov- reprinted in Simpkin, p. 178; also partially trans- Bde, 1st AD. He holds a Ph.D from ing theories. lated in Milsom, pp. 46-48. Kent State University. ARMOR — March-April 1999 43

Weapon Storage Site Inspections by First Lieutenant Justin W. Verhey

Weapon storage site inspections complemented by satellite images are used to ensure the Entity of the site. Using these assets, plan Armed Forces (EAF) of Bosnia- where to position your vehicles (we Herzegovina maintain account- normally utilized up-armored ability of their weapons and mu- HMMWVs for the inspections). The nitions. The accountability is outside vehicles need to be posi- then checked regularly by SFOR. tioned both to provide security of the The Dayton Accords and the site and to aid in quick entrance and General Framework Agreement exit to foster a professional image. for Peace (GFAP) make the EAF Some sites have room inside for store all their weapons in central- parking the vehicles, while some ized locations. These sites range don’t. In the first case, at least two in size from company-sized arms vehicles must be positioned outside rooms to corps-sized installa- the compound to provide security tions. Each location is responsi- and possibly isolate the compound if ble for maintaining accountabil- a situation arises. When positioning ity of all the weapons and am- the vehicles, analyze the terrain and munition at the site. The sites are the buildings in the area to maximize checked regularly to ensure no the fields of fire into a compound. weapons have been moved on or Also consider the avenues of ap- off the site without permission Inspecting officer checks small arms storage at Bosnian proach into the compound. What can from SFOR. These inspections site. - Photos: 1LT Shane Celeen you realistically cover? The vehicles are important since they ensure on the inside need to be positioned so the EAF are not mobilizing their they can quickly leave and do not equipment for use against SFOR or an- The most imp ortant information in the interfere with movement inside the camp. other entity. folder is the inventory list. The nomencla- If there is no room for the vehicles inside, This article will outline the steps neces- tures of some items on the list are in the inspection team should park as close Serbo-Croat, while others are in English. to the gate as possible, while the outside sary to successfully complete an inspec- The inspector should become familiar security section needs to set up in a good tion. The article is based upon the Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 37th Armored with as many of the weapons on the list overwatch position. If possible, coordi- as possible. I found a good way to ac- nate with the previous unit that inspected Regiment’s SOPs and experiences in complish this was asking interpreters the site to find out where they positioned Bosnia. It is also based upon observations watching the Russians conduct inspec- with military experience to help in identi- their vehicles and any problems that arose fication. In an ideal operation, this same during the last inspection. tions around Bijelina, in Northeast Bosnia. interpreter will accompany you for the During the preparation phase, we re- The inspection process can be broken inspection to aid in the identification. hearsed detailed contingency plans. We down into three distinct phases; prepara- Another good source of weapon and tion, pre-inspection, and the actual in- ammunition identification is the EOD foresaw several possible areas in which problems might arise. The contingencies spection. The process should begin a team. They often have pictures of all the we foresaw included weapon seizures, a week before the actual inspection occurs weapons and in some cases the weapons with the preparation phase. The success themselves. The time spent learning the fire or explosion in the compound, threats to the inspection teams by the EAF, hos- of the operation is dependent upon this equipment saves time during the actual tage situations, or a large civilian crowd first phase of the operation. inspection. Also, if you are familiar with the weapons and ammunition, ti will assembling at the compound. Every sol- The preparation phase begins by signing dier must know exactly what to do in out the weapon storage site (WSS) folder eliminate confusion during the inspec- these situations to avoid confusion. tion. from the S2. As a minimum, the folder contains a map of the compound and an The most important contingency to re- inventory of what is stored there. How- The inspection list is also invaluable be- hearse is that of a weapon seizure. If a cause it will aid in the plan of execution ever, most folders contain much more. for the site. The smaller the inventory, the weapon needs to be seized, wait until the The better folders also have all of the entire inspection is complete to seize the previous inspections, movement docu- fewer people need to be involved in the weapon. Assess the stability of the operation. The most basic site will just ments, and destruction certificates. While need an inspection team of 3-4 people weapon. If there is a question of the sta- at the S2, the inspection leader should bility of the weapon, call higher and ask also make sure the EAF is notified and an outside security team made up of for EOD assistance at the site. If the 5-6 soldiers. If the site is large, several through the Joint Military Commission inspection teams might be needed along weapon is safe, have the vehicles go to (JMC). Also, he should ask if there are REDCON 1. If vehicles are inside the any PIR for the site, such as conditions of with the outside security team. compound, drive a vehicle to the building the weapons, construction at the site, or The second vital item in the WSS folder where the weapon is stored and quickly weapons of special interest. is the site map. Sometimes the map is place the weapon inside the designated 44 ARMOR — March-April 1999

At left, a column of T-35-85s and a Soviet-built transport helicopter in storage at a weapons site in Bosnia. At lower left, a T-54 and an APC.

this case, note the new location of the weapon and move on. Sometimes, major movements occur inside the compounds and writing down the new locations is not practical. When this occurred, we demanded that the EAF provide us a copy of the new inventories to avoid confusion on where the equipment was moved. If a discrepancy cannot be explained dur- ing the pre-inspection, remind the entity that if the discrepancy cannot be resolved during the inspection, the equipment is subject to confiscation. Only two teams are involved during the pre-inspection, the outside secu- rity team and the inside paperwork team. The inside team should only have three people involved in the inspection; the inspector, an inter- preter (again the interpreter should have military experience), and a se- curity/RTO man positioned outside any building the team goes to. The outside security team consists of ve- vehicle. We brought a five-ton truck to personnel are taken hostage, then SFOR hicle drivers, vehicle gunners, an inter- sites where we had problems with the will hold everyone at the site hostage. preter, and a team leader. pre-inspection, to ensure we could re- During the preparation phase, assemble Another reason for the pre-inspection is move any type or amount of ammunition and check the necessary equipment. We or equipment. The key to this contin- to quickly brief the EAF on your inspec- gency is speed, so the EAF does not have used the PCI list shown in Figure 1. As tion plan. Tell the EAF the day of the soon as your NCOs complete the PCI actual inspection and roughly what time time to alert the local population that checklist, the pre-inspection can begin. SFOR is taking their weapons. the inspection will start. Also tell them The next phase is the pre-inspection how many inspection teams you will Another contingency that needs to be phase. The pre-inspections are conducted have in the compound so they will have addressed is that of a fire or explosion 48-72 hours prior to the actual inspection. the correct number of guides. During the inside the compound. A centralized rally The pre-inspection compares SFOR’s entire pre-inspection the EAF will feel point needs to be designated for this con- and the entity’s paperwork to identify and you out. Act professionally to gain their tingency. If the inside inspection team felt resolve inventory discrepancies before confidence, which will aid in the inspec- threatened, the contingency plan called the inspection. If there is a discrepancy, it tion itself. The EAF are striving to be for everybody at the site to chamber a is usually explainable. The normal causes professional soldiers and will be easier to round, the vehicles to go to REDCON 1, of discrepancies are that weapons were work with if you are also. and the inspection team to quickly go to moved or destroyed since the last inspec- The last phase is the actual inspection. its vehicles and leave the compound. The tion and SFOR’s inventory has not been The same personnel that participated in same plan would be implemented if the updated. If this situation arises, find the the pre-inspection need to participate in outside security felt threatened by either a document that details the movement or the actual inspection. The inspection large crowd or by the EAF. Finally, if a destruction and note the document con- team’s vehicles need to be positioned hostage situation ever developed, the trol number. Another cause of discrepan- before the inspection starts, preferably in outside vehicles would immediately seal cies is that the EAF moves weapons be- the same positions. At the minimum, off the compound and would not let any- tween arms rooms and does not tell each inspection team needs an inspector, one in or out. The idea is that if SFOR SFOR about it until the pre-inspection. In an interpreter, and a security/RTO ele- ARMOR — March-April 1999 45

Example Weapon Storage Site

OUTSIDE SECURITY the same due to unit EAF. Do not apologize for the confisca- SECURITY MAN XM 1114 HMMWVs rotations and troop tion. The EAFs signed the GFAP and taskings. The best way agreed to abide by the rules. SFOR is to inspect the site is to merely in Bosnia to fairly uphold the simply count 100% of agreement. HQ BUILDING BARRACKS all categories. Regardless of whether a seizure occurs, execute a professional exit. This com- No matter which plements the entire professional appear- SECURITY MAN category you decide to ance that you uphold throughout the en- inspect, decide upon a INSPECTION way to inspect each tire inspection. When the platoon returns TEAM from the inspection, completely debrief VEHICLES room and stick with it ARMS ARMS the S2 and the battle captain on what XM 1114 ROOM 2 ROOM 3 throughout the entire HMMWVs inspection. The key to occurred during the inspection. Remem- ber to cover any PIR that was requested. the actual inventory is Also update the WSSI folder with any counting the munitions at the site in a consis- changes to the inventory or site plans that you discovered. It is a good idea to check SECURITY/RTO MAN tent manner. If you do the folder a week after the inspection to ARMS ROOM 1 not inventory the site in a consistent manner, ensure these changes were noted. Finally, conduct an AAR with the entire inspec- you will fail. I found tion team. More often than not, even the EAF GUIDE INTERPRETER INSPECTOR the best way to inspect was to start at one side lowest-ranking soldier can see something to improve upon. As soon as this is done, of the room and work the mission is complete. across the room. A lot ment. The idea is to minimize the number of people inside the buildings of the of the equipment is stored in crates with compound. On some inspections other the type and number of items inside clearly labeled on the crate. It is fine to 1LT Justin W. Verhey was commis- people, such as the S2, EOD, or a JMC sioned at the University of Colorado representative, will accompany the in- count the numbers on the crates, but spot- spection. The rest of the platoon needs to check a few of the crates to ensure the at Boulder in December 1996. He stay with the vehicles and maintain secu- numbers are correct. If a discrepancy deployed to Bosnia from October rity around them. The inspection teams exists for a particular room, recount the 1997 until March 1998, working out of should immedately link up with the EAF disputed item. If the discrepancy still Eagle Base, Camp Bedrock, and and begin the inspection. During the in- exists, note it down and move on. More Camp Uglivek. Currently, he is the often than not, the discrepancy will be spection, the security man should remain scout platoon leader for 1-37 AR in corrected in another room. This is fine as outside the EAF’s arms rooms and keep Friedberg, Germany. He has at- the rest of the platoon informed of the long as the amount of equipment or am- munition at the site remains the same. tended the Armor Officer Basic location of the inspection team. It is im- Course and Airborne School. portant for the security man to send regu- While you are at the site, ensure you check all the items on the lar SITREPS even if there is little to re- port. This keeps the outside element alert inventory. When this is and ready to react if a situation arises. done, the inspection is com- plete. Weapon Storage Site Equipment/PCI List The platoon leader who conducts the inspection is the key to the entire opera- If there was a discrepancy Per Team In a Vehicle tion. He needs to be organized and effi- that was not resolved, the Short Range Commo Crow Bars cient. All the equipment at the site does disputed equipment is sub- like PRC 126 Hammers not need to be counted every time. The ject to confiscation, which Inventory of Site Bolt Cutters JMC handbook states all air defense, must be authorized by the Site Map Chisels heavy weapons, and heavy weapon am- battalion commander. He Clipboard Tanker Bars munition needs to be counted every time. can also adjust the inventory Camera Wire Cutters Then only one of the following needs to at the site and hold the EAF Extra Pens be counted: long-barreled weapons, responsible for the new Flashlight w/extra batteries mines, tube-launched projectiles and number on future inspec- DA 4137S ammunition (37mm and above), and gre- (for confiscation) tions. If a confiscation does JMC Handbook nades. The remaining three categories occur, all equipment will be Interpreter need spot-checking. The next time the confiscated 1 for 1, regard- Chalk site is inspected, chose another category less of whether it is an over- Seals (To seal boxes to inventory. Then repeat this process on age or a shortage. For exa m- that you want to avoid future inspections until all categories ple: if the EAF is account- re-inventorying in the future) have been inventoried. In reality, the pro- able for 100 AK-47s and you Scratch Paper cess the handbook recommends will only can find 95, confiscate Calculator rarely work because the EAF may move 5 rifles. When a confiscation equipment in and out of arms rooms, and occurs, fill out a DA 4137 Figure 1: WSSI Inspection Packing List the unit doing the inspection is not always form and give a copy to the 46 ARMOR — March-April 1999

How the Guard Could Cut Costs on Table VIII Without Really Trying by Dr. Joseph D. Hagman and Dr. Monte D. Smith

In today’s environment of ever dimin- won’t, first-run qualify (Q1). These pre- TTVIII by firing the first two of the 10 ishing resources, do you as an Army Na- dictions are then used to qualify some scheduled engagements. Those scoring tional Guard (ARNG) armor unit com- crews and to send others back for reme- 109 or lower would be pulled from the mander find yourself under pressure to do dial training — two actions that to date range and given remedial training, per- more with less, especially when it comes have had to await the firing of all 10 en- haps on the Conduct-of-Fire Trainer to your tank gunnery program? Back in gagements. (COFT) or Abrams Full-Crew Interactive 1 1996, we developed a timesaving, de- Table 1 shows what the cutoff scores Simulation Trainer (AFIST). Following vice-based gunnery training strategy to remediation, they would be given one provide you with some relief. Nonethe- would be, based on the performance rerun attempt, starting at the top with the analysis of our tank crew sample. For less, you say the prospect of more re- example, crews scoring 109 or lower first two engagements. source cuts looming on the horizon is still making you nervous. So, where else can after two engagements would be pre- First-run crews scoring 176 or higher dicted to achieve Q1 no more than 5% of after the first two engagements would be you turn to cut costs without sacrificing the time, whereas those scoring 176 or awarded early qualification (Q1e); those the gunnery proficiency of your tank crews? higher would be predicted to achieve Q1 scoring from 110 to 175 would go on to at least 95% of the time. Crews scoring the third engagement. Crews scoring 164 While training devices may once again 164 or lower after three engagements or lower after three engagements would provide an answer, we’ve been looking would be predicted to achieve Q1 no undergo remediation before beginning instead for a way to cut the cost of live- more than 5% of the time, whereas those their rerun from the top. Rerun crews fire gunnery evaluation. After analyzing scoring 256 or higher would be predicted would be evaluated as if they were firing the 1993-1997, first-run, Tank Table VIII to achieve Q1 at least 95% of the time, their first run, except that predictions (TTVIII) scores of 716 ARNG crews in and so on. Crews firing between the cut- would now apply to Q2 rather than Q1. Project SIMITAR’s (Simulations in off scores would continue firing. Those Those predicted to need remediation as a Training for Advanced Readiness) gun- scoring between 109 and 176 after two result of poor performance on their rerun nery database,2 we’ve come up with what engagements, for example, would con- would receive an unqualified rating. we think is an easy-to-implement strategy tinue on to the third engagement. They First-run crews scoring 256 or higher for cutting the range time, ammunition, would then be reevaluated on the basis of after three engagements would be and OPTEMPO costs of TTVIII. how they scored in relation to the cutoff awarded early qualification; those scoring scores provided in Table 1. from 165 and 255 would go on to the Although it may sound like heresy to suggest a change in how TTVIII is evalu- fourth engagement, and so on. These predictions will apply to whatever ated, the threat of future resource cuts has set of 10 TTVIII engagements you plan What’s The Payoff? given us little choice but to at least con- sider the notion. In reading on, you’ll find to fire. Thus, you don’t have to modify Generally speaking, the earlier in the your training program or your TTVIII out exactly how the strategy works and engagement scenario for the predictions TTVIII engagement firing sequence that the kind of resources it would save. predictions can be made, the greater the to hold up. You just have to be willing to resource savings will be. Assuming that How the Strategy Works use them in making early qualification and remedial training decisions based on each engagement accounts for roughly 10% of the total resources spent on The strategy uses cutoff scores to pre- the cutoff scores provided. It’s that easy, TTVIII, crews predicted to Q1 after only dict, as early into TTVIII as possible, and your decisions will be correct at least which crews will, and which crews 95% of the time. two engagements would save about 80% of the resources needed to fire all 10. Those predicted to Q1 after three en- # of Remediation Implementing the gagements would save about 70%, and so Engagements Cutoff Scores Q1 Cutoff Strategy on. Fired ( ) Scores ( ) £ ³ Figure 1 shows, in part, We believe that resources can be saved 2 109 176 how the proposed evalua- by predicted Q1 crews as well as by those 3 164 256 tion strategy would be predicted to need remediation. Using our 4 215 317 implemented using the tank crew sample, we calculated (a) the 5 304 390 cutoff scores in Table 1. In number of crews in a typical 58-crew 6 357 458 general, crew gunnery battalion that would be predicted to Q1 7 439 524 proficiency would be after each engagement, and (b) the pre- 8 500* 592 evaluated after the firing dicted number of engagements they 9 600* 643 of each TTVIII engage- would save. As shown in Table 2, the ment, rather than after the seven crews predicted to Q1 after two *Mathematically eliminated firing of all 10. All crews, engagements would save a total of 56 Table 1. Cutoff Scores for Remediation and Q1 Predictions for example, would begin engagements (7 crews x 8 engagements = ARMOR — March-April 1999 47

Fire Two Engagements rerun

176 £ 109 Award Early Qualification (Q1e) Score £ 56), the one crew predicted to Q1 after ? Remedial Training three engagements would save seven (or Q2 if rerun) engagements, and so on, with 121 en- gagements saved in all by the entire bat- 110-175 talion. Thus, on predicted Q1 crews alone, 21% (121/580) of an armor battal- Fire Third Engagement ion’s first-run engagements could be saved merely by applying the proposed evaluation strategy. Battalion resources should also be saved 256 £ Score £ 164 on crews predicted to need remedial ? training simply because they can be iden- tified before they’ve fired all 10 TTVIII 165-255 engagements. Just exactly how much savings, however, would depend on how Fire Fourth Engagement, many rerun engagements are fired. Hav- etc. ing crews start their reruns from the top, and then reapplying the proposed cutoff- Figure 1. Flowchart of TTVIII engagement sequence score strategy, should help to maximize the savings on each rerun attempt. Thus, in general, reducing the number of en- We also need to extend our investiga- Notes gagements fired through early prediction tion to the Active Component (AC). Just to see what would happen, we did ana- 1Hagman, J. D. & Morrison, J. E. (1996, No- of which crews will, and which won’t, vember-December). “Research Pays Off for the first-run qualify should translate into less lyze the 1993-1994, first-run TTVIII scores4 of 838 Grafenwoehr-firing crews Guard: A Device-Based Strategy For Training range time, fewer rounds, and reduced Tank Gunnery,” ARMOR, pp. 48-50. and found no need to develop early quali- OPTEMPO costs each year on TTVIII. 2Smith, M.D. (1998). User’s Manual for an These savings can be used to offset future fication and remediation cutoff scores because the Q1 rate was so high (98%). Army National Guard (ARNG) Armor and resource cuts or, until then, be either Mechanized Infantry Gunnery Training Assess- pocketed or used for other purposes such Thus, before even a single round is fired ment Database. (Res. Product 98-34). Alexan- as platoon-level gunnery. downrange, one could predict with near dria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute. certainty that any particular AC crew 3Department of the Army (1998). Tank Gun- What Next? would Q1. Given such a high Q1 rate for nery Training (Abrams) (FM 17-12-1-2). Wash- “Graf-firing” crews, one has to wonder ington, D.C. Since we started looking for a way to why they fire TTVIII at all in these days 4 cut the cost of live-fire gunnery evalua- Thanks to Mr. Al Pomey of the U.S. Army of tight resources. But that’s another mat- Armor School for providing these data. tion, the TTVIII engagements have been ter. An answer to the question of whether changed.3 So, we still need to test our such a high Q1 rate will be fired on the strategy out on the new engagements new engagements by Graf-firing crews, once enough first-run data become avail- or by AC crews stationed stateside, must Dr. Joseph D. Hagman is a senior able. Although the specific cutoff score await further data collection. We’ll get research psychologist at the U.S. values for early qualification and reme- back to you on what we find. Army Research Institute’s field office diation, as well as the level of expected at Gowen Field, Idaho (208-334- resource savings, may change somewhat In the meantime, we believe that range 9390). He received a Ph.D. in engi- from that reported here, the notion of time, ammunition, and OPTEMPO costs neering psychology from New Mex- using cutoff scores for prediction pur- can indeed be cut considerably on ico State University. His research poses should still work. We’ll just have to TTVIII, without jeopardizing its purpose interests are in human learning and wait and see how well. and intent, by simply evaluating crew memory, and more recently, in sol- performance as you go dier performance on armor-related along, rather than waiting simulation and training devices. # of Predicted # of until all TTVIII engage- Engagements Predicted # of Engagements ments are fired. The strat- Fired Early Q1 Crews Saved egy just described is an Dr. Monte D. Smith is a senior re- 2 7 56 easy way of doing so that 3 1 7 we think makes sense. search scientist with Raytheon Sys- 4 3 18 tems Company, Boise, Idaho (208- We’d like to hear your 362-2757). He received a Ph.D. in 5 4 20 thoughts on this. You can 6 3 12 social psychology and experimental reach us by regular mail at design from Vanderbilt University. 7 2 6 the U.S. Army Research 8 1 2 Institute, 1910 University His research interests include social 9 0 0 Drive, Boise, ID 83725; by comparison theory, measurement of self-concept, assessment of intellec- Total: 21 Total: 121 telephone at 208-334-9390; tual functioning, and evaluation of or by e-mail at hag- Table 2. Predicted # of Engagements Saved by an Armor [email protected]. training effectiveness. Battalion on the first Run of TTVIII 48 ARMOR — March-April 1999

LETTERS (Continued from Page 4)

Regrettably, that’s about as far as I can go. that doing anything other than obeying orders ness required to execute training at the CTCs BEAMHIT is not an authorized training device, stringently meant an ultimate boot out of the in these days of dwindling resources. Once nor was it procured under provisions of the Army. Perhaps this atmosphere has abated again I reiterate, to be effective, simulations Federal Acquisition Regulation. No unit is somewhat, but I doubt that any real change in must be integrated into a training strategy, authorized to procure training devices with senior level attitudes has materialized. Sen- properly utilized, and professionally observed unit or operating funds, even, as in the case iors have advanced by playing ball (not kick- and controlled. with BEAMHIT, if it is available through GSA ing it out of bounds), and as this worked for catalog … them, their subordinates must do likewise. An The first questions to address is: “Have our entrepreneurial spirit means seizing the initia- current training strategies correctly integrated At a minimum, they violated long-standing tive when the opportunity arises — or is cre- simulations into the Army’s overall training guidance in such matters from HQ DA. All ated — and the encouragement and support strategy (i.e., AR 350-1 and AR 350-2)?” I training aids, devices, simulators and simula- are there, and doing the different that is better. contend that the Army strategy needs tions (TADSS) or procured either by the sys- Challenging the present means some conflict clarification on the WHO, WHAT, WHEN, tem Program Manager or by DA DCSOPS typically ensues, but this can be a positive WHERE and WHY units will use simulation using Training Mission Area (TMA) funds. In development if done right. training. either case, the authorization document is an The second question is: “Are simulations approved Operational Requirement Document There are obvious problems with this envi- systems properly utilized?” First, commanders (ORD). ronment. First, relatively inexperienced junior must understand that unit performance based officers will surely make mistakes that in the on a constructive or virtual simulation cannot As slow and often unresponsive as our sys- recent past have been fatal to careers. Sec- be construed as an assessment of the unit’s tem is, it is what we have to use. The Army is ond, seniors must accept the responsibility for actual tactical abilities in either a live simu- now procuring the Engagement Skills Trainer these mistakes and keep on encouraging lated training environment or war. I believe we (EST) for Army-wide distribution to units and continued effort, simultaneously helping to need to identify the tasks that can be trained, to Training Centers. This device is as far ad- develop these aspiring junior officers. In this partially trained and not trained utilizing simu- vanced from BEAMHIT as the space shuttle is connection, seniors must be prepared to as- lations. After gathering those tasks which from a WWI biplane. Better, it is fully sup- sume certain risks that far too much in the simulations can train (i.e., battle tracking, ported logistically by Army funding. How will past have adversely affected their careers. situational awareness, synchronization, etc.), C-3-81 repair their BEAMHIT? Third, for seniors to be willing to stake their scenarios/operations orders can be developed Finally, in developing the POI used with reputations on subordinates’ learning experi- to train, sustain and/or even test those skills. BEAMHIT, did USAARMC staff the POI with ences, they must be so encouraged by their The scenarios/operations orders can be com- the proponent for all small arms training — superiors. From the Chief of Staff’s office on piled into standard flowcharts/matrices that Fort Benning or with HQ TRADOC? I believe down. Mutual trust and respect must prevail. can be used to meet the training needs of the answer is “No.” Standardized training is each individual unit (i.e., like matrix used to Right now, trust of those at the top hardly is facilitate UCOFT). necessary if the Army is to execute its doc- robust. There are a number of reasons for this trine correctly. If every OSUT unit develops its that require much more extensive treatment The third question is: “Are all levels of con- own, locally unique POI, chaos is sure to than available in this message. Fundamen- structive and virtual simulations professionally follow. tally, junior officers do not believe that seniors observed and controlled?” Years ago, the RICHARD M. POTTER are leveling with them on a variety of critical Army proved the principle that observed and Chief, Combat Arms Team issues. Subordinates can quickly tell when a controlled training is required to obtain a qual- U.S. Army Training Support Center superior is lying. ity result. However, many units conduct simu- lation training with no or unqualified observers Fort Eustis, VA 23604-5166 Trust is so basic that it must be resolved be- and controllers. I believe this is another issue fore anything else of lasting benefit can be to be addressed in AR 350-1 and AR 350-2. An Entrepreneurial Spirit attempted. Would Renew Army Culture COL Swan addresses constructive simula- COL GEORGE G. EDDY tions such as Brigade/Battalion Battle Simula- Austin, Texas Dear Sir: tion (BBS), JANUS and WARSIM 2000 noting that these simulations do not properly address I noted with interest the letter from CPT Co- all Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS). glianese concerning the beliefs and proposals Computer Simulation: Simulations are only limited by the imagina- of MAJ Vandergriff. This brings back the Part of Annual Training Strategy tion. For example, a Field Artillery (FA) Battal- question of long standing as to what our lead- ion could integrate their organic tactical ers at the top are up to after all the turmoil of Dear Sir: equipment (i.e. IFSAS) and operate the digital down-sizing and seemingly endless opera- system. Air Defense Artillery (ADA) could tions such as Bosnia, et al. I don’t pretend to It is refreshing to see continuing debate on integrate their tactical early warning system know what the present culture is in the Army how simulations fit in today’s training strategy. (FAADC3I). Intelligence officers could link to today, so can only surmise. I do agree that a COL Guy Swan III’s letter, “Computer Simula- higher ASAS Warrior systems. Combat Ser- new culture is needed if the Army is going to tion Fallacy: Assuming Troops Are Well vice Support (CSS) capabilities are there handle its future tasks effectively, and that Trained,” addresses the issue of simulations (especially in BBS), but we too often leave this future may not be far off. When I write on the as it relates to maneuver training and troop key BOS idle, because it is too time and per- matter of “a new culture,” I am trying to estab- training readiness. I agree that nothing can sonnel consuming. BOSs can be worked with lish that what has been going on in the Army replace live training on a realistic battlefield small workarounds utilizing constructive simu- since 1992 has got to change. To use the old like the CTCs provide. However, we should lations. phrase, it has been “go along to get along.” remember that all but war is simulations. This is dreadful! Where constructive and virtual simulation Recently, CTC newsletters have addressed training fit into the annual training strategy to I have believed for some time that what is the fact that units are not at entry level when achieve the level of readiness required by our needed is to provide an appropriate entrepre- they arrive at the CTCs. There is no doubt in active and reserve unit is an issue. Virtual and neurial spirit, with emphasis at the battalion my mind that simulation-based training, inte- constructive simulations should be imple- and lower levels — for a start. This has never grated into a training strategy, properly util- mented into the overall training strategy of the been done to my knowledge, as the bureau- ized, and professionally observed and con- Army as discussed previously. cratic mode has prevailed for such a long, trolled, have a place in training the maneuver long time. It has been exacerbated during the forces of tomorrow’s Army. Simulations are an Bottom Line...... we must realize that virtual drawdown as junior officers quickly learned efficient way of achieving the level of readi- and constructive simulations are here to stay. ARMOR — March-April 1999 49

The ACAV Lives...in Bosnia by Sergeant First Class Gregory T. Dean (Retired)

Having just retired from the Army, my access to ARMOR magazine is limited. Finding a copy, I read the article on the need for the ACAV and the absence of the kits for the M113s. Preparing for our deployment to Bosnia in the fall of 1995 while in Graf and seeing the possible threats to the two M113s in our company, I convinced the 1SG to let me attach 20mm ammo cans to the sides of his track. These cans were filled with dirt or An ACAV kit sand; they ended up with extra oil, MREs on an M113, and whatever else could be stuck in there. with impro- This still provides the effect of spaced vised spaced armor. armor made from empty The gun shields were somewhere in the ammo cans. system since some of the M-88s in our battalion had them. Our ever-resourceful motor sergeant found the ACAV kits in the system, and, while back at home sta- M113s were manned by the crews of the The ACAV kits are out there, and they tion in Friedburg, they arrived and were two tanks that were left back at Camp are just as effective today as they were in installed on the 1SG’s 113 and on our McGovern. All these crewmembers were Vietnam. maintenance track. armed with M16s and one M-60 machine gun. Our company was attached to 3-5 Cav from Kirchgoens. Our company was fur- Our Bosnia ACAVs were quite effective Editor’s Note: You can find ARMOR Magazine via the Web at: ther broken up with the 3rd platoon going in patrolling the narrow streets in the to an infantry company and we got one Zone of Separation. It is difficult to ma- knox-www.army.mil/dtdd/armor BFV platoon. So we ended up with two neuver an M1A1 through narrow streets or via Fort Knox’s web page at: mixed platoons and one tank pure. After and laying M-2 Flex is a lot easier than about two months in country, we became slewing a 120 in a narrow side street. http://147.238.100.101/ a tank pure company again. Platoons Mind you, the M1 gets more respect than We are slowly but diligently adding past used in patrolling actions were made up any other vehicle in the area. “Peace issues to our web page. – Ed. of two tanks and our two M113s. The Through Intimidation.”

LETTERS (Cont.)

Leaders must understand simulations. Com- Located in the Warehouse Arts District of said Dr. Gordon Mueller, elected chairman of manders especially must understand what New Orleans, the 67,000-square-foot mu- The National D-Day Museum. simulations will and will not do and then im- seum will house the St.-Lô Collection from La Please pass this information on to your plement simulations into their overall training Musèe de la Libèration de St.-Lô in Nor- readers. For more information, they can con- strategy. mandy, France — a rich collection of artifacts tact: (504) 525-1544. from Utah and Omaha Beaches — including COL (RET.) J.W. THURMAN German vehicles, sentry boxes, and a wide BRIDGET VOIGT Director, Fort Knox Senior Observer array of weapons and equipment used by The National D-Day Museum Controller Team (SOCT) both sides during this conflict, as well as pri- New Orleans, La. vately owned artifacts donated by veterans. The National D-Day Museum A 16,000-square-foot gallery will be divided To Open in New Orleans into four state-of-the-art interactive historical and educational exhibits that will include oral and written histories from veterans worldwide, ARMOR Magazine 1998 Index Dear Sir: military equipment, photographs, and never- before-seen film footage. The ARMOR Magazine 1998 index On the 56th Anniversary of the Normandy is now available. You can request a invasion, June 6, 2000, the National D-Day “This museum is the only one of its kind in copy by email at armormag@ftknox2- Museum will open its doors in downtown New this country. It will celebrate the famous Nor- emh3.army.mil or by contacting Mary Orleans. The Museum will be the first of its mandy D-Day invasion, but it will also portray Hager at DSN 464-2249/2610; com- kind to tell the story of the United States am- all the other WWII D-Day invasions fought by mercial (502) 624-2249/2610. phibious operations around the globe in World the Navy, Marines, Army, Army Air Force, and War II. Coast Guard in every invasion of the war,” 50 ARMOR — March-April 1999

HATCH (Continued from Page 6) SEAT (Continued from Page 7) environment. Pressures to lower stan- pared for platoon training meetings, and dard (often written in bullets on three-by- dards are great but the requirement for platoon sergeants for the company train- five cards in the tank commander’s quality recruits in the Armor Force will ing meetings. Don’t make the company pocket). increase rather than decline. The skills commander or platoon leader base train- that NCO and Officer leaders require are ing plans on guesses! First sergeants must Train to standard and AAR to standard. Be rigorous in executing the tasks, and in challenging and diverse. We are currently help the company commanders conduct assessing how effectively you executed holding the line on the quality of Armor useful training meetings by making sure recruits and our NCO corps is more meetings take place on schedule, and that the tasks. Each leader should conduct his own informal AAR of his soldier’s indi- highly educated than ever. everyone required to attend is there. First vidual or crew tasks, and also bring those sergeants are also the “reality check” to make sure that training planned is com- tasks into the formal collective AAR. Conclusion Individual and leader task weaknesses are I don’t have to remind any of you that pletely planned, and that the training is often at the bottom of collective task doable with time and resources available. we face challenges on a daily basis. It is weaknesses. If the collective task did not essential, however, that we occasionally Plan every training event as a mu lti- go well, do it again. If the individual tasks put things into perspective and remember echelon training event. FM 25-100 states were not executed to standard, retrain the the positives that will forever make ours “To use available time and resources soldiers and or leaders, and practice them the “Combat Arm of Decision.” Armor most effectively, commanders must si- again. and cavalry leaders have a responsibility multaneously train individuals, leaders, None of these steps is too hard, but none to pass on to all newer members of the and units at each level in the organization of them is “too easy.” All of us are pain- Force an appreciation for the “nobleness” during training events.” At company of our profession. Army service, particu- level, make sure that the training plan fully aware of the distractors which work against effective training (certainly our larly as armor crewmen and cavalrymen, includes platoon, crew, and individual senior leaders are; they are even aware has a uniqueness rooted in history and tasks to be trained and assessed. Select a tradition. You can be deservedly proud of limited number of tasks to be formally that they themselves are sometimes the training distractors!). Let’s stay in our where the Cavalry and Armor Force has assessed during each event, prepare and lane, and fix what is within our reach. We been, where it is now and where it is go- rehearse to conduct and assess each of ing. We have undergone the greatest these tasks, and review these preparations can’t fix the budget, or DA assignment policies. We can know what must be transformation since World War II — carefully in your pre-execution checks. trained, track what must be trained, plan and have done it better than any force in Only a few individual tasks should be history. We are, and will continue to be, assessed during each collective task (try what must be trained. We can prepare to train, train to standard, and assess what the Spearhead for the Army. to train and check everything, and you must be retrained. will train and check nothing), but each Forge the Thunderbolt! must be assessed against the formal stan- “SERGEANT, TAKE THE LEAD”

Half Full....Or Half Empty?

Some months ago, we published SFC Stephen A. Krivitsky’s handy chart that helps crewmen report how much fuel is still on board in the M1’s three fuel tanks. (See “Driver, How Much Fuel Do We Have?,” Back Cover, Sept-Oct ’96 ARMOR.) Some of his colleagues complained that it is not as important to know how much you have as how much you’ll need to fill the fuel tanks again, so he recently created a new chart, re- produced here, that calculates how much fuel your tank will require to top up. The method is the same: The driver reports the status of the right front tank, then the left front tank, and then the rear tank, as: “Right front....one half. Left front....three quarters....Rear.... one half.” The TC starts in the left column, moving down to one-half, then moves right to the next column, going to the three quarter fill line, and then moves to the right to the one half fill column, where he reads the result. In that case, 225 gallons will be needed to completely fill all three tanks.

ARMOR — March-April 1999 51

WHAT’S TACTICAL VIGNETTE 99-2 YOUR

NEXT The Passage at Wilcox MOVE??

SITUATION

You are the company team commander of Barbarians Team (mech-heavy), TF 3-68 AR. The task force, which is conducting a movement to contact, is composed of two armor company teams (Apache and Comanche) and one mechanized infantry company team (Barbarians). Your team consists of two mechanized infan- try (BFV) platoons (1st and 3d Platoons), both at full strength, and one M1A1 tank platoon (2d Pla- toon), also at full strength. You also have an attached combat en- gineer platoon, consisting of four squads, two ACEs, and one AVLM. Your team has priority of TF mortars and FA. The brigade commander’s intent is for the task force to secure a passage lane to the east of the town of Wilcox, to vic 548886, for the follow-on unit (TF 2-72 AR). In turn, the TF commander’s in- tent is for your team, the TF main effort, to clear a passage lane to PL TENNESSEE (the LOA) to allow the secure passage of TF 2-72 AR. Once battle handover has occurred at the passage point and TF 2-72 AR has assumed the brigade main effort, TF 3-68 AR will become the brigade reserve and prepare for future operations. Prior to the mission, the brigade S2 provided the task force with a recent aerial photo of Wilcox (see attached aerial photo). Approxi- mately three hours ago, the bri- gade’s cavalry troop identified an enemy column moving into the town from the north; the column consisted of one T-72, two BMPs, and one ZSU-23-4. As the operation begins, Apache Team is on your left flank and must seize OBJ 1 to prevent en- emy reinforcements from reaching

Continued on Page 54

52 ARMOR — March-April 1999 SOLUTIONS — Tactical Vignette 98-6

“Cobra’s Counterreconnaissance Fight,” from the November-December 1998 issue of ARMOR

Author’s Solution BLUE: Send your Alpha section imme- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL diately and set vicinity CP 3. Orient N- NW. The BMP that engaged RED will a. Command: I will move with BLUE’s Bravo section and the medic PC “Guidons, guidons, this is COBRA Six. probably continue to move south along to set vicinity CP 3. Keep me informed. FRAGO follows, break…” the western wall. I will move with this section. Send your Bravo section to set We must cross-talk to prevent fratricide. 1. SITUATION vicinity CP 4. This section will serve as b. Signal: Far recognition signal is FM the safety net for the two BRDMs if they voice. Near recognition signal is two Friendly: slip through WHITE. Cross-talk with infrared flashes returned by three infrared RED’s Alpha section engaged but did WHITE to prevent fratricide. flashes. not destroy 1 BMP, last seen moving south vicinity grid WT086793. Alpha SCOUT 6: Stay on my net and update “ACKNOWLEDGE” reports on any enemy activity that your section has one vehicle with severe track element identifies. You have priority of damage, one vehicle stuck in a wadi, and RATIONALE fires. Be prepared to call for indirect fires a total of four wounded soldiers vicinity on all enemy elements you identify. You WT097786. are my overwatch element. Cross-talk To meet the TF commander’s intent, you have one hour to successfully ac- Enemy: with WHITE and RED on their internal complish the following: nets to conduct a video handoff of the Scouts report: BMP and two BRDMs. Update me fre- 1. Destroy all enemy reconnaissance · Two BRDMs are moving south on quently on those four hotspots, a possible elements in your security area. AA2 vicinity WT132809 at 0400. CRP. 2. Recover your vehicles and evacuate wounded soldiers. · Four unidentified hot spots moving COBRA BAND AID: Move with me south vicinity WT095862 at 0400. to vicinity CP 3. From there you will 3. Withdraw your company team, and be prepared to defend from your BP with assist as needed in treatment and evacua- all of your vehicles. 2. MISSION tion of casualties. The BMP and two BRDMs are most No change. COBRA 5: Move to PP CHARLIE and control traffic flow there. Begin move- likely elements of the enemy’s regimental 3. EXECUTION reconnaissance. The four unidentified hot ment of the trains to the BP. Keep me spots are probably one of the combat Commander’s intent: informed of status. Ensure sappers are prepared to close the lane immediately reconnaissance patrols leading the enemy No change. attack. upon our withdrawal. Get a status on a. Concept of the operation: WHITE’s fourth vehicle. We need to Scouts will maintain contact with the have it in the BP by 0600. BMP and BRDMs as long as they can. (1) Scheme of maneuver. Evacuate RED’s casualties, recover his vehicles, COBRA 9: Move the trains to our BP You must get your killers in position to conduct a “video” handoff from the and destroy any known enemy vehicles in and conduct CSS operations from there. scouts before they lose contact with the our AO, all in less than 1 hour. NLT Coordinate for a hasty rearm and refuel 0500, start movement to PP CHARLIE. there immediately upon our arrival at the BMP and BRDMs. The current “gap” between the hunters and the killers is too NLT 0530, have all elements passed BP. large. If scouts lose contact with the en- through PP CHARLIE, signal engineers to close the lane, rearm and, refuel behind c. Coordinating instructions: emy before they can hand him off to the killers, the enemy may slip through un- our BP, and be established in our BP Add the following additional graphic harmed. Depending on the terrain, you ready to defend NLT 0600. control measures to the current overlay, which remains in effect: may not regain contact with the enemy (2) Fires. Scouts have priority of fires to until it is too late. delay and disrupt enemy reconnaissance CP 1 – WT097786 NOTE: The counterreconnaissance assets entering our security area. Send all CP 2 – WT130790 mission requires extensive IPB. It should calls for fire through me. CP 3 – WT083763 be fought primarily as a defensive mis- b. Tasks to subordinate units: sion from positions of advantage along CP 4 – WT130760 likely enemy avenues of approach; there RED 4: Move your section as quickly as possible to recover your Alpha section We must initiate our withdrawl NLT should be sufficient depth and redun- dancy of observation and fields of fire vicinity CP 1 and evacuate wounded sol- 0500, move all elements through PP within the security area. Therefore, the diers. Since you will be towing the dis- CHARLIE NLT 0530, signal the engi- abled tank, you will be the last vehicle neers to close the lane behind our last commander should position his elements to maximize coverage of likely avenues through the passage lane. vehicle, rearm and refuel behind the BP, of approach and minimize the require- occupy our BP, and be ready to defend WHITE: Move toward CP 2. Find and with all vehicles NLT 0600. ment for friendly movement. By mini- destroy the two BRDMs identified by the mizing friendly movement, the com- scouts on AA2. Cross-talk with the mander also reduces the risk of fratricide. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT scouts. Do not cross PL TENNESSEE Optimally, the hunters provide the killers without my permission. No change. with early warning (on their platoon in-

ARMOR — March-April 1999 53

ternal net) and continuously track the for the four unidentified hot spots will RED and WHITE. The BMP will proba- enemy, providing real-time updates of most likely be designated as PIR for the bly attempt to infiltrate south along the enemy activity as he enters and passes TF commander. western wall to conduct reconnaissance through the security area. The hunters of our defensive positions and obstacles. maintain contact with the enemy and 2. Send RED’s Bravo section to recover Therefore, position BLUE’s Alpha sec- conduct a “video” handoff to the killers, its Alpha section and evacuate the tion against the western wall to block who destroy the enemy with a simple, wounded soldiers because it is closest and potential enemy penetration. gunnery-style defensive engagement. In can be there quickest. If Bravo section encounters the BMP, it is capable of de- 5. Bring the medic PC up with you and this scenario, if the killers had been posi- position it on PL CAROLINA. If RED tioned vicinity PL TENNESSEE to en- stroying the enemy vehicle, although this gage targets on AA1 and AA2, and there is not Bravo’s primary mission. The M88 has any urgent casualties, the senior aid- is in the hide position and is too slow to man can transfer them to the medic PC was depth within the security area from and begin treatment while en route to the the beginning of the operation, we would move up, conduct recovery, and get back probably not be in this situation now. in time. FAS. You are assuming risk by sending your 1SG and trains to the BP. If you take Delegating specific tasks to each section 3. Send WHITE to destroy the BRDMs additional casualties or require additional allows you to conduct many tasks simu l- on AA2 because it is closest and can be recovery, you will have to conduct it taneously. there quickest. You need to conduct a without assistance from the 1SG or com- “video” handoff of the BRDMs from the pany trains assets if you are to meet your 1. You have the TF scout platoon at- scouts to WHITE. If scouts lose contact timeline. tached to your company team. It has the with the BRDMs before they can hand capability of providing overwatch for them off to WHITE, the enemy may slip 6. Throughout this operation, especially your entire company team; use it to pro- through. You may not regain contact with upon withdrawal, cross-talk is a key fac- vide overwatch as you conduct your tasks them until it is too late. tor in preventing fratricide. Position your and withdraw your company team. Since XO at the passage point to control traffic, you have priority of fires, the scouts can 4. Send BLUE’s sections up to PL keep you informed, maintain also impede, harass, suppress, and possi- CAROLINA to add depth to your cover- communications with the TF, and bly destroy enemy reconnaissance ele- age of the security zone and to serve as a coordinate with the engineers to close the ments. Also, the activity and composition safety net in case the enemy slips through lane after you have withdrawn.

Passage at Wilcox (Continued from Page 52) Wilcox from the west and interfering REQUIREMENT with the forward passage of lines for TF 2-72 AR. Comanche Team has cleared Develop your COA and the enemy forces up to the 49-grid line issue your FRAGO and and is in hasty defensive positions. On any other reports you your right flank is TF 4-7 AR, whose would submit. Readers mission is to secure an alternate passage who submit their solu- point in its sector. The TF scout platoon, tions to the scenario with six HMMWVs, is established south should provide the fol- of Wilcox in three section positions, two lowing: FRAGO to the of which are located in your zone vic company team, the ra- 508778 and 504797. The other section is tionale behind your deci- located within Apache’s zone. sion, and a sketch of your plan of action. E-mail Currently, the TF scouts report the situa- your solution to this ad- tion in the town as two-dismounted infan- try positions, each manned by approxi- dress: armordoctrine @ftknox-dtdd-emh5.army mately a squad-size element. One squad .mil. Send your solution is located vic 518785, near an opening that is probably an underground storm by regular mail to Platoon and Company Team Doc- shelter (S) and residences (A); the other is trine Branch, ATTN: located vic 522792, in the school (L). The TF scouts have spotted two enemy vehi- ATZK-TDD-P, Ft. Knox, KY 40121-5210. cles: a ZSU-23-4 located vic 545784 and a BMP located vic 516799. The location of the other BMP is unknown. The TF scouts also report hearing a vehicle they believe to be the T-72; its current location Solutions to this is unknown. A road crater reinforced with vignette will ap- wire and mines is reported vic 524803. pear in the July- The TF scouts report that most civilian August issue of residents have left the town, but that ARMOR. some seem to be hiding in their homes and in the town church.

54 ARMOR — March-April 1999 REVIEWS

His Career Spanned Three Wars

Honorable Warrior: General Harold K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command by Lewis Sorley. University Press of Kansas, 1998. 364 pages, $39.95.

Very few soldiers actually get a chance to influence the decisions of a nation during crucial periods of peace and war. General Harold K. Johnson was a rare individual who participated in World War II, the Korean War, and the war in Vietnam. What kind of soldier survives the trials and tribulations of the Bataan Death March, the rigors of fighting on the Korean peninsula, and the divisive nature of the Vietnam War? Author Lewis Sorley emphatically argues that it is an honorable warrior, a man who came to his enormous responsibilities by traveling a “road of auster- ity, testing, and faith.” with the basic knowledge that we may be such a drastic move, likening it to a “mutiny.” called upon to defend the interests of our As for Johnson himself, later in his life he Sorley’s second biography of a Vietnam-era country wherever it might be.” For Johnson, confided that he made a great mistake in not Army Chief of Staff is enormously successful that next critical assignment was the com- resigning, calling his decision to remain as and instructive (he is also the author of Thun- mand of a battalion and then a regiment in the Chief of Staff and not resign as “a lapse in derbolt, the biography of General Creighton Korean War. There was very little glory in his moral courage.” The great strength of this Abrams). Sorley is careful to balance the early 14 months in Korea, with the burdens of book and Sorley’s account of Johnson’s life career and trials of the young Johnson with command causing Johnson to spend “a great does not lie with this episode or the Vietnam the momentous events and decisions that many nights on [his] knees” in prayer. War, but in the many applicable lessons that would haunt his years as Chief of Staff of the are to be gleaned from nearly every chapter. Army from 1964-1968. The result is insightful, Of the greatest interest for most readers, dynamic, and compelling. however, are the years 1964 to 1968, when Johnson delineated three insights he gained from being a commander: 1) If you could Born in Bowesmont, North Dakota, on 22 Johnson served as Chief of Staff of the Army. McNamara’s account of those years, In Ret- command successfully at battalion level, you February 1912, Harold K. (Johnny) Johnson could command larger formations success- graduated from West Point in 1933. When the rospect, describes Johnson as a soldier with “an iron will, extraordinary toughness of mind fully; 2) Foremost among commanders was Japanese invaded the Philippines in Decem- the welfare of the men they commanded; and ber 1941, he was the operations officer for the and spirit, and a fierce integrity.” (p. 176) Sor- ley shows the reader that this description is 3) The commander has an obligation to im- 57th Infantry (Philippine Scouts). Fighting in prove his technical and tactical competence. the valiant but doomed effort to stop the true. How then, could Johnson support poli- cies that were so tragically flawed and During his tenure as commandant of the Japanese, Johnson survived the Bataan Command and General Staff College, John- Death March, and more than three years in doomed to failure? Sorley builds a compelling portrait of a man in turmoil; a man caught in son urged his students to, “challenge the captivity. When the war in Korea erupted in assertion,” alluding to his own mistrust of the June 1950, Johnson found himself command- the vortex of a war that was consuming the Army, the institution he had served since idea that the Strategic Air Command and ing the 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry nuclear weapons could deter war. Johnson Division, rising quickly to command the 5th 1933. Convinced that General Westmore- land’s search and destroy tactics were not came to the conclusion that “bombs don’t Cavalry Regiment during 14 months of tough accomplish very much in the end.” Are we combat. Rising steadily through the ranks, working, and could not work in Vietnam, Johnson was “unable to get them changed.” seeing the same sort of “strategy” today? Johnson was selected as Army Chief of Staff Johnson was adamant that it was impossible by Secretary of Defense Robert Mc Namara in The author points out that even though he disagreed with what was going on in Vietnam, to solve problems on the ground by merely the summer of 1964. It is difficult to imagine a over-flying resistance on the ground. man more qualified to lead the Army at that as Chief of Staff, Johnson found himself vali- time. dating and praising these same efforts. This Sorley has done a magnificent job of detail- dilemma leads to one of the most tantalizing ing the life of a remarkable American and Sorley’s themes throughout this superb vol- episodes of the Vietnam War. Were the Joint soldier. He epitomized the ideals we all look ume are of Johnson’s moral convictions and Chiefs, and Johnson in particular, willing to for in ourselves and in the officers of the how his impeccable integrity guided him resign en masse in protest to the administra- armed forces. Johnson himself summed up throughout his remarkable career. In Cabana- tion’s handling of the war? the professional values that are essential in taun prison camp, Johnson was appointed any officer, the 4 I’s: Intelligence, Imagination, commissary officer, a powerful position that he Sorley answers the question about the chiefs Initiative, and Integrity. General Harold K. never used to his own advantage. His own of the other services tangentially, but he Johnson lived those values. Lewis Sorley’s self-denial and sacrifice in the war differed sheds new light on Johnson’s feelings con- book is a testament to this outstanding soldier markedly with the “what’s in it for me” attitude cerning such a monumental decision. In an and American patriot. he encountered in the United States after interview with the author, General Earle G. liberation. Even though Johnson felt “let down” (Bus) Wheeler’s widow opines that it was when there were no reinforcements for the Johnson who first talked of resigning to pro- LTC BUCK CONNOR Philippines, Sorley points out that he did not test the conduct of the war. Wheeler, it seems, Cdr, 1st Bn, 12th Cav, 1st CD use it as an excuse for self-pity: “We sign up talked Johnson and the other Chiefs out of Ft. Hood, Texas ARMOR — March-April 1999 55

The Serbs: History, Myth, and the great migrations of people into and out of the policies, and attitudes, the encyclopedia also Destruction of Yugoslavia by Tim Balkan countries as they conquered or were presents over 200 documents (in Volume III) Judah, Yale University Press, New Ha- in turn conquered and the brutal acts that revealing controversial French and American ven, Conn., 1998. 320 pp. Maps, photos, conquerors perpetrated against their foes, so policy, and the gradual evolution of the Viet- notes, appendices, and index, ISBN: 0- that the atrocities committed in the most re- namese revolutionary movement. cent conflict are seen to be but the latest ex- 300-07113-2 (cloth), 0-300-07656-8 (pa- pression of nationalized hatred. Following a disappointingly self-serving, “I per). $35.00 (cloth), $16.00 (paper). told you so” foreword by Admiral Elmo Zum- The chief fault of the book is that it assumes walt, Tucker provides a short but succinct That the interests of the European states a more than casual knowledge of Balkan overview of Vietnamese history as a most and America in the 20th century have been history. Indeed, the non-historian reader can suitable introduction into the whole subject of bookended by the barbaric actions of mem- soon become bogged down in the names of the Indochina conflict. To fully understand the bers of the Balkan states makes Mr. Judah’s historical persons and their various alliances. scope of the war, Tucker has wisely included book about Serbian history both timely and an The maps are not very well done either. They numerous entries reflecting early French colo- interesting read, especially since problems in are lacking in terrain references and are oddly nial rule, and even earlier contentious rela- Kosovo are once again on the international placed in the text. I also felt that Mr. Judah’s tions with neighboring China. He correctly stage. extensive use of population charts in the text states that “history cannot be understood in when talking about the migration of people isolation” and that “if any war clearly demon- Mr. Judah has organized the book in roughly was distracting. strates the need to study history, it is the Viet- chronological order, starting with a summary Overall, though, The Serbs is a very well- nam conflict.” of how the Balkans were settled in the sixth researched and well-written book. Mr. Judah century by Slavic raiders who occupied de- With such an expansive subject, viewed was the Balkans correspondent for the Lon- serted areas that had been depopulated by through time, perspective, and the hindsight of don Times and The Economist who covered warfare. Indeed, the theme of great migrations history, it is no surprise that some biographical Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the former of people is the principal story of this book, as entries are revealing as much for what is writ- Yugoslavia, so he is very knowledgeable throughout history the Serbs, Croats, Bulgari- ten as what is not. President Johnson’s entry about his subject. He injects many personal ans, and other tribes fled from each other or is plain vanilla, with no mention of his being stories into the narrative from interviews with whatever conquering army was on the march. the Great Meddler in the tactical conduct of the principal players and the common people He traces the history of the Serb nation from the war. Secretary of Defense Robert McNa- in order to provide a comprehensive picture of its humble beginnings as the Serbs made the mara is tagged with much of the responsibility what happened in Serbia and Bosnia. I would transition from raiders to settlers and became for the war’s failure, for he “misunderstood the recommend this book as an excellent refer- separated from the Croatians in geography, nature of the conflict.” Ho Chi Minh receives ence to explain the motivation and actions of religion, and dialect, as the Orthodox Church the Serbian leaders and people. high praise as a revolutionary and as a worked with the Serbs and the Roman Catho- statesman, while President Clinton is pilloried lic Church proselytized the Croats. This divi- for his collegiate anti-war sentiments and for sion would have repercussions into modern 1LT STEVEN A. POLICASTRO dodging the draft. General Westmoreland’s times. But, for the Serbs, Mr. Judah writes that Ft. Knox, Ky. bio seems balanced, but is too brief to really the Orthodox Church became the preserver of appreciate the man. And North Vietnam’s Serbian culture during its subjugation by the General Giap is correctly depicted as a master Ottoman Empire. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A of tactics, strategy, and logistics, but also as a Political, Social, and Military History, political uncertainty that the Hanoi government Before the Ottoman conquest, however, edited by Spencer C. Tucker, ABC- kept a close eye on. Lesser, more colorful Serbia reached the zenith of its power in the CLIO, Inc., 1998. 3 Volumes, 1196 figures appear, too, such as Lucian Conein, a ancient world with the accession of Stefan CIA spook code-named Black Luigi, who Nemanja in the 1160s, who created a Serbian pages. $275.00, hardcover. operated an intelligence network in North Empire that was to last for two centuries and The United States’ longest, costliest, and Vietnam. become a major military power in the Balkans. most divisive war, the Vietnam War, can be The Nemanjic Kingdom came to an end at the viewed as our national epic, its story our own The superb entries on battles, artillery and Battle of Kosovo in 1389 between the Serbs Iliad. And now, amidst the popular outpouring artillery doctrine, riverine and naval warfare, and the Ottoman Turks and the country was of memoirs, histories, novels, and films, the massive U.S. air war, and weapons are overrun in 1459. comes this largest and most comprehensive supplemented by information little known to Then, for approximately the next 400 years, presentation of a complex history that will the public. Defoliation efforts involved not just forever be known as the Vietnam Experience. Serbia was tributary to the Ottoman Empire, Agent Orange, but five other color-coded, but the Orthodox Church preserved the leg- The editor of this encyclopedia, Spencer toxic herbicides. Intelligence and counter- end of the Nemanjic Dynasty, and the Battle Tucker, is a noted historian who teaches mili- intelligence entries reveal the basic “cloak and of Kosovo entered into folklore. Indeed, as Mr. tary history at the Virginia Military Institute. He dagger” operations, plus the use of secret Judah rightly points out, the importance of the has written nine books on military and mari- Spike Recon Teams, Hatchet Forces, SLAM Battle of Kosovo cannot be overemphasized time history, including subjects on the Civil companies (seek, locate, annihilate, monitor), as a cultural marker for the Serbians. The War and World War I. Now he spearheads the and clandestine Road Watch Teams deep assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdi- efforts of 135 contributors in a scholarly and within Laos. Several of the documents in Vol- nand in Sarajevo that launched World War I well-researched work that details the full spec- ume III show critical U.S. involvement in the was carried out on the 525th anniversary of trum of the Vietnam War and its impact, politi- bloody coup that toppled the Diem regime in the Kosovo Battle and, closer in time, it was cally, socially, and militarily, on Vietnam and 1963. And, while the subject of atrocities is on the 600th anniversary in 1989 that Slobo- America. Most of the contributors are Ameri- covered, there is no entry on military justice or dan Milovesic became president of Serbia and can academics, with a few military personnel the laws of war and their application during launched his country into the disastrous war of and Vietnamese authors. the war. 1991-95. These three handsome volumes contain This encyclopedia provides a clear, well- After he brings the reader to the modern era, over 980 entries, A to Z, with over 10,000 organized approach to the study of the com- Mr. Judah then explores the unification of separate references listed in the index. Maps, plete history of the Vietnam War. However, Yugoslavia under Marshal Josip Tito, how the photos, charts, tables, a bibliography, a chro- since it is burdened by the encyclopedic style country fell apart in the ’80s, and the Serbian nology of events, and a useful glossary all of writing and its A to Z format, it would be actions that led to the war in Bosnia and Croa- complement the historical and biographical most useful as a companion to any number of tia and the eventual U.N. intervention. entries. In addition to covering people, places, excellent historical narratives such as Stanley Throughout all of this, Mr. Judah explains the events, weapons, tactics, strategies, battles, Karnow’s Vietnam (1984), Phillip Davidson’s 56 ARMOR — March-April 1999

Vietnam at War (1988), or Wilbur Morrison’s book is mostly about Westmoreland’s strategy The Canadian Kangaroos in World The Elephant and the Tiger (1990). and how it was carried out. War II by Kenneth R. Ramsden, Rams- There is an analysis at the end of each chap- den-Cavan Publishing, 1701 Stewart COLONEL WILLIAM D. BUSHNELL ter, giving a broad view of the overall cam- Drive, RR3, Cavan, Ontario L0A 1C0 USMC, Retired paign, but almost no analysis of small unit Canada. ISBN 0-96996-97. Softback, Sebascodegan Island, Maine actions — why a platoon leader or company 200 pages. Available direct from the commander succeeded or didn’t. This may be author, price $16.95 plus $3.00 postage the result of limited space, but the ARMOR etc. in Canada. Overseas, send an IRC Taking the Offensive: October 1966 to reader will miss it. An exception is the descrip- for details. October 1967 by George L. MacGar- tion of the battle of Ong Thanh, a disastrous rigle, Center for Military History, U.S. calamity for the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, Army, Washington, D.C., 1998; 443 whose men “fought well under extreme cir- Among the innovations the Second World pages, maps, bibliography, index; $44. cumstances... taking more casualties in a War brought onto the battlefield was the use single action than any other battalion under of armored personnel carriers to carry infan-

This book is one of a series on the Vietnam [General] Hay’s command.” Reading that part trymen into battle with the same levels of War and it covers the beginning of the U.S. takes you right into the battle. All the way mobility and protection as tanks. Early half- Army’s offensive operations from late 1966 to through the book, the reader gets an increas- tracks went some way toward allowing the late 1967. The build-up had been essentially ing feeling that things were not going well, foot soldier to advance under fire, but both completed (though GEN Westmoreland despite fine planning and courageous sol- German and American designs were not well wanted more troops) and COMUSMACV said diers. The American politicians and senior armored, nor always as mobile as the tank this was to be the “year of the offensive.” He officers simply failed to understand the deter- they were to accompany. Britain’s carrier intended that, finally, the thrust of the war mination of the North Vietnamese and their series were mobile enough, but still not well would be reversed, that the combined forces willingness to absorb terrible losses to realize protected and far too small to carry more than would strike the Viet Cong and the North Viet- their goals, “Hanoi was willing to pay whatever a handful of men. The true breakthrough namese, pin them down, and inflict such price to see the war through, a resolve that came in August 1944 during the Falaise Washington did not share.” heavy losses that the war might end. He “as- breakthrough when redundant Priest self- sumed that the highly mobile American units The author is quite candid in his judgment of propelled guns, withdrawn when Canadian could bring the ragtag enemy forces to battle the South Vietnamese government; of the regiments who used them during the D-Day and defeat them with superior firepower.” refugee problem in Quang Ngai, he writes: landings converted to towed 25pdr guns, were hastily modified and used with great success. “Saigon’s overburdened, inefficient, and often So much for high hopes! “At a 28 August corrupt administration lacked the ability, and [1966] commanders’ meeting in Nha Trang, To man these vehicles, a new unit was at times the will, to improve the refugees’ Westmoreland and his principal staff offi- formed from a variety of sources, which finally condition.” And, in Long Huu, the “government cers...duly noted statistical advances in the became known as the 1st Canadian Ar- forces were unable to provide security, and official “measurements of progress,” which moured Carrier Regiment. The unit and its their thefts of produce and poultry alienated included an estimated enemy attrition rate of vehicles were initially classified “Secret,” so the villagers. Government cadre carried out much so that when they were assigned a 7,000 per month, but had no evidence to indi- their programs indifferently...” cate a decline in overall enemy strength or Regimental padre, it took him a week to find capabilities.” There wasn’t any. The book has numerous lessons learned, his unit. The troops did get regular mail, how- but you have to look for them. One of the ever, and their success in reducing infantry Secretary of Defense McNamara had pos- casualties was such that they were expanded ited a philosophy that there are things which more important is on page 230: “The brigade also lost 15 of 18 key officers, including [the and a British tank regiment was re-equipped can be objectively measured and those that along the same lines. can be only subjectively assessed, and it falls brigade commander] and all three battalion on each of us to discern the difference and commanders. This ‘revolving door policy,’ The regiment fought, literally in the van- evaluate programs accordingly. With the arri- which guaranteed the rapid rotation of officers guard, in many major and minor actions as val of U.S. troops in Vietnam, MACV began to in combat commands, was later criticized as the 21st Army Group advanced across demand various statistics to determine the representing careerism at its worst. It de- France, Belgium, Holland, and Germany. It success or failure of its programs. As the stroyed any prospect for continuity of com- scored many notable firsts, and became the author points out: “The specific approach of mand, it hurt field morale among the enlisted only Canadian unit in the British 79th Ar- Washington’s leaders to the struggle in Viet- ranks, and it ultimately lessened the effective- moured Division. With the war in Europe won, nam emphasized statistical results...” ness of U.S. forces.” This is a lesson we need it was disbanded and as such passed into to review regularly because too often personal history. Its deeds are mentioned in passing The text reflects this: almost every action ambition clouds our judgment of what is best where they affected the course of events, but description ends with a listing of the dead for the Army. apart from a small regimental history pro- found on the ground and the weapons recov- duced for its members, its full story has not Secretary McNamara later wrote to the ered. After numerous pages of this, you begin been laid down until former member Kenneth President: “Nothing can be expected to break to wonder what this recitation is about. And, at Ramsden produced this account. It covers the [the communists’] will other than the convic- the end of this book, MacGarrigle quotes regiment and its actions from beginning to tion that they cannot succeed.” While the McGeorge Bundy, the President’s national end, drawing on the unit’s original war diary North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong suffered security advisor, who warned that both the and recollections of those who were there to terrible casualties in 1966-67, they never lost military and the administration had overem- give a long overdue and detailed account of phasized statistics as an indicator of success their belief that, over the long haul, the Ameri- this unique unit. in Vietnam. cans would give up and they would win. Sta- tistics notwithstanding, they were right! Development of tactics, organization and This book is almost like a diary, a listing of Personal note: I was surprised at the high equipment is interwoven with the battle ac- daily and weekly events in each corps area, number of individuals named in the book that I counts and details of the regiment’s progress. who ran into whom, how the action ended, know and have served with in some capacity. The initial rush to produce the first converted who suffered which casualties, etc., etc. The Reading about your friends and places where Priests, and the changeover to Ram Kanga- book is broken down, logically, into actions in you worked in a “history text” does little to roos, which gave the unit its cap-badge and each corps area, and discusses briefly each make you feel young! this book its name, will be of great interest to major operation and some of the minor ac- anyone interested in these unusual machines. tions involved. (There are 57 major operations JOHN R. BYERS While not technical in style, close reading will described.) There are some maps, but not COL, USA, Ret. give a lot of pointers as to how the vehicles enough for the historical tactician. But this Alexandria, Va. looked. Some photos of the Ram Kangaroos ARMOR — March-April 1999 57

are among the illustrations, although none of The last half of The Desert Fox in Normandy ing aspects of the book is Pidgeon’s analysis the Priests, and there are several of the other contains descriptions of the increasingly des- of how the Germans and the British scruti- 79th Armoured Division vehicles which, perate measures Rommel and his subordi- nized the battle in an attempt to “make sense” though good in themselves, are not strictly nates took to stave off defeat. The book gives of the threat posed by, or possible uses of, the relevant to the story. an appreciation of the tenacity of the German new war machine. soldier, and made me believe that the time it That small drawback apart, the account here The Tanks at Flers is superbly illustrated makes for fascinating reading, with several took the Allies to finally break out of hedgerow country had more to do with the competence with photographs and drawings from the pe- unusual things brought to light. We now know riod. Volume II of the book contains twelve why there was a sudden demand for uniforms of the average German infantryman than with Rommel’s genius. reproductions of the British trench maps used in small sizes, and what lengths the unit’s at the time of the battle with annotations by signals and maintenance sections went to More translations of Rommel’s orders and the author to assist the reader in following the provide radios and keep the vehicles running, dispatches, if they exist, would have been flow of the fighting. Each chapter in Volume I including an unusual use for an 88mm gun especially insightful. In addition, more detailed also contains an extremely useful “Field trailer. Progress can be followed with clear maps would have helped to explain many of Guide” that allows today’s visitor to the battle- maps, and those members of the regiment the operations. field to link the historical narrative to the pre- who died or were wounded are listed. A bonus sent lay of the land. Units wishing to conduct a Mitcham’s use of “mini-biographies” on sev- is the inclusion of the text of the original his- staff ride of the battlefield would find the map eral of the lesser German players involved in tory booklet, and its list of those units carried set and “Field Guide” invaluable to under- by the regiment into action. the battle proved helpful. He also presented a standing the actions of the day. good (but somewhat irrelevant) account of Like a number of units raised during the war Rommel’s involvement in the plot to kill Hitler. The Tanks at Flers is a unique account of a and disbanded soon afterwards, the story of long ignored aspect of the First World War the 1st Armoured Carrier Regiment should The Desert Fox in Normandy would serve as and the development of armored warfare. The have been told a long time ago. Outside the a suitable companion to Stephen Ambrose’s book provides the scholar and military profes- small circle of AFV enthusiasts and modelers, Citizen Soldiers or other books detailing the sional an insight into the difficulties of the they are all but unknown. That situation has at Allied version of the Battle of Normandy. The wartime production and fielding of a new last been resolved; we can now know their book does a good job of presenting the battle weapons system, a better understanding of story, and they themselves will be able to from the German operational view. It showed combat in the First World War, and an appre- know that their efforts are not forgotten. how desperately the Germans — Rommel in ciation for the tanker-pioneers from which all particular — tried to defeat, then to contain, modern armor soldiers have descended. It the Allies in Normandy. PETER BROWN should be remembered that while mechanical Dorset, England difficulties and technological limitations pre- MAJ CRAIG A. COLLIER vented the tank from becoming a critical Ft. Shafter, Hawaii weapon in the First World War, their use on The Desert Fox in Normandy: Rom- mel’s Defense of Fortress Europe by the Western Front at Flers and other battle- The Tanks at Flers by Trevor Pidgeon, fields provided fertile ground for the imagina- Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr., Greenwood Cobham, Surrey, United Kingdom: Fair- tions of military thinkers and armor enthusi- Publishing Group, Westport, Conn., mile Books, 1995. 247 pages (Volume 1) asts like J.F.C. Fuller and George Patton. 1997, 256 pp. $26.95 (hardcover). with accompanying map collection (Vol-

The Desert Fox in Normandy gets off to a ume 2), $69.00. RICHARD S. FAULKNER MAJ, Armor slow start. The book begins with the usual All histories have their start somewhere, and acknowledgements of Rommel’s genius in Department of History for all tankers, our history began on 15 Sep- U.S. Military Academy North Africa (was he really brilliant, or was tember 1916 with the first combat use of the Montgomery responsible for “The Desert Fox” tank at the battle of Flers-Courcelette. When legend?). Mitcham also slips in a few unnec- the 36 British tanks of the nascent Heavy Eisenhower: The Pre-War Diaries and essary comments on the state of liberal edu- Section, Machine Gun Corps attacked the Selected Papers, 1905-1941 by Dwight cation in America and an attack on another German trenches on 15 September, the na- author’s critical writings about Rommel. D. Eisenhower, edited by Daniel D. Holt ture of ground warfare forever changed. While and James W. Leyerzapf, Introduction by the tanks’ performance on that day was un- Despite the slow start, The Desert Fox in John S. D. Eisenhower, published by Normandy picks up steam and provides some even and dubious, those first hesitant steps foreshadowed the possibilities of mechanized The Johns Hopkins University Press, insights into how and why the Germans lost at 1998, $45.00 hardcover. 612 pages, 18 Normandy. The book is at its best when dis- combat. In The Tanks at Flers, Trevor Pid- illustrations. cussing the German plans, operations, and geon has succeeded in creating a well-written, extremely detailed, and commendably re- reactions to Allied maneuvers. As a military historian, I have had several searched narrative of the battle. Pidgeon’s opportunities to conduct research using pri- Several excellent quotes support the au- work is the most complete and comprehen- mary documents such as official battle re- thor’s contention that among the Nazis, sive account of the tank’s battlefield debut yet cords, maps, archival materials, and diaries Rommel understood the Western Allies best published. and personal papers. Any researcher would (especially his appreciation of close air sup- do well to approach the latter category — port). He was clearly the most capable Ger- The great strength of The Tanks at Flers is in man available to defeat the Allied invasion. the detail in which Pidgeon dissects the tanks’ given these documents’ personal association actions during the day. In most cases, Pid- and importance to the historical figure — with Both sides lost opportunities at victory, par- geon was able to sort and analyze a host of a certain sense of skepticism based on the ticularly early on. Rommel’s famous absence often conflicting spot reports, official histories, inevitable bias that must, in one form or an- on June 6th combined with Hitler’s decision to and personal narratives of the battle to deter- other, appear. I myself have often wondered withhold the reserves, ensured defeat. By the mine the actions and accomplishments of what it is that makes a person take the time to 10th of June, with local counterattacks almost all of the individual tanks involved in record thoughts on a regular basis in a diary. thwarted and Allied air wreaking havoc on the assault. This “worm’s-eye” view of the Is it a sense of destiny that he or she feels at German movement, all real hope of forming a fighting not only provides the reader with an an early age? Or is it perhaps that the act of sizeable counterattack force and pushing the increased appreciation for the “face of battle” physically capturing seemingly mundane daily Allies back into the sea was lost. From then in the First World War, but also, for our thoughts serves as a means of self-ex- on, the Germans began their brave yet ulti- techno-centric Army, a compelling historical amination or reflection? For w hatever reason, mately futile attempt to contain the enemy in example of the uses and limitations of new personal diaries and papers can prove valu- the Cotentin Peninsula. weapons systems. One of the more interest- able to the historian and student of human 58 ARMOR — March-April 1999

behavior alike, if the reader places the docu- The Deadly Brotherhood: The Ameri- ory and we face the prospect of peace- ment in its proper context. Students of Dwight can Combat Soldier in World War II by keeping, nation-building, and peace-enforce- D. Eisenhower will welcome the recent publi- John C. McManus, Presidio Press, ment around the world, the hard lessons of cation of his pre-war diaries and selected Novato, Calif., 1998, 353 pages, $28.95, this nasty war may prove useful to American papers as an opportunity to develop a clearer hardcover. soldiers who find themselves in places like understanding of what this soldier thought Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia. before he became the historical giant we re- gard him as today. For those of us tired of works about tactics, Lester W. Grau’s The Bear Went Over the Mountain, Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghani- This collection, edited by the director of the strategy, and major personalities of World War stan is an attempt to present those lessons Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in II, this book provides a breath of fresh air. The from the point of view of both the Soviets and Abilene, Kansas, begins with an introduction author truly “gets dow n in the weeds,” describ- the editor. Since the end of the Cold War, by John Eisenhower that serves to place the ing World War II combat at a very personal western scholars have had increased access book in its proper historical context. The six level. There is little mention of leadership to Soviet archives of all types, including mili- chapters that follow (the first chapter consists above battalion level. In fact, the index does tary historical and operational studies. This of diary entries from 1905 to 1926, with the not list Generals Eisenhower, Montgomery, or book derives from such a study conducted by remaining five chapters covering the period MacArthur. Only one mention is given to Gen- the Frunze Military Academy. The faculty 1928 through December 1941) provide a eral Patton. The Deadly Brotherhood focuses there attempted to capture lessons learned at remarkable perspective on Eisenhower’s on the men who faced combat day in and day the small unit tactical level from the officers development as a young soldier serving in the out. We hear only infantrymen, tankers, com- who participated in these actions. This book is pre-World War II Army. These entries take the bat engineers, and Marine riflemen tell their an edited translation of that study, similar to reader on a journey from Eisenhower’s stories in their own words through exhaustive the historical and “lessons learned” studies graduation from West Point, through his ser- use of interviews, diaries, and manuscripts. From food, equipment, and weapons to envi- produced for our army during and immediately vice in the early tank corps, to his service as a after a conflict. member of McArthur’s staff in the Philippines, ronmental conditions and becoming a casu- alty; the author provides all the nitty gritty To quote the book’s cover jacket, “[these] five The book’s chapters are organized by topics, detail that often is lacking in other works. We diaries, personal and family letters, official with several historical vignettes presented hear the soldiers’ words describing their own military correspondence, speeches, published within each topical area. Topics covered in- feelings towards the enemy and their reasons writings, and reports... offer the most compel- clude blocking and destroying guerrilla forces, for getting out of their foxhole day after day to ling evidence yet of the impressive range of the offensive in populated areas and moun- make another advance. We learn not about Eisenhower’s experiences between the wars.” tains, and march and convoy escort. Com- tactics and techniques but about constant, ments by the Frunze Academy faculty and by This collection of studies, reports, personal grinding combat and its effects on individuals. the editor, a retired American Infantry and letters and diary entries serves to balance the It is the first book I have read that deals en- Soviet Foreign Area officer, place the actions “official” Eisenhower with the less-widely tirely with the frontline soldier and his combat known, reflective family man. Space limits me experience. in context and suggest some of the lessons to to two examples. Early on in the book there be taken away from these stories. Since the appears a rather detailed discussion of the The Deadly Brotherhood is meticulously re- book describes unit actions generally at the capabilities of the tank, written as an article for searched and written. Forty pages of notes battalion level and below, junior officers and the November 1920 issue of Infantry Journal. and a seven-page bibliography attest to Mr. NCOs should find these stories professionally Don’t be misled by the date — young officers McManus’ professionalism and experience as educational. Armor leaders w ill be interested of all branches would do well to read it today, a writer and scholar. This is not a dry scholarly in the Soviets’ use of armor and mechanized for in principle Eisenhower’s comments are work, however. I found the book very readable forces in difficult terrain against the light, ir- still valid. Yet this example is countered in the and fast paced. With two parts divided into regular Mujahideen. Finally, these “snap-shots book by a personal letter, poignant in its brev- twelve chapters, the work is well organized of combat” illustrate that the Soviet (and pre- ity and sincerity, written by Eisenhower just and follows an orderly progression that ex- sumably Russian) military was more adaptive two months after the Infantry Journal article. perienced and casual military history readers and less doctrinaire than commonly believed. The letter extends the Eisenhower family’s alike will easily follow. Thirty-two black and thanks to the commanding officer of the unit to white photographs reinforce the text well. Unfortunately, since the book originated as a which Eisenhower was then assigned for the There is not a single portrait of a field grade or sort of after-action report, it frequently reads soldiers’ sympathies and flowers on the occa- general officer. I think that both the military as such and is mostly devoid of personal sion of the death of young Doud Dwight, their professional and casual reader will enjoy this insight and feeling. The book’s clinical style 3-year-old first born son. What impresses me book because of its strict focus on the combat makes it an unlikely candidate for simple most about this collection is the opportunity it soldier’s experience. I strongly recommend pleasure reading. The maps, while plentiful, provides for the reader to see, through Eisen- that warriors of any variety read this book. It is use Russian graphics and are sometimes hower’s own writings, both sides of a man we an excellent reminder for those of us who oddly oriented, instead of following the com- generally regard as larger than life. Here is have not experienced combat that, in war, mon practice of orienting north toward the top revealed the human side of a soldier as he soldiers suffer extraordinary pain, deprivation, of the page. worked to develop his decision-making skills fatigue, and stress, as w ell as the constant and served in duty assignments that brought threat of death and wounds. Nonetheless, this book offers valuable pro- fessional insight into the Russian military’s him into contact with America’s rapidly devel- oping military-industrial complex. tactics and operational art, and their ability CPT MATTHEW BOAL and willingness to innovate. Intelligence and We as professionals are fortunate that Ei- Ft. Knox, Ky. operations officers might find the vignettes an senhower made the personal effort to record excellent source as they design wargame and his thoughts in his diaries. The editors of this The Bear Went Over the Mountain, training scenarios in preparing units for de- latest edition to the Eisenhower historiography ployment. Since it is likely that we will continue provide us with materials we can use to de- Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghani- stan, Lester W. Grau, editor, Frank Cass to find ourselves as peacekeepers/enforcers velop our own assessment of this important around the world, studying the Soviets’ mili- figure. I recommend strongly the addition of Publishers, London, 1998. 220 pages, tary experience in Afghanistan may provide this work to the collection of any officer or $52.50 (hardcover). useful lessons. military historian who seeks a more intimate understanding of the man the world knows as The Soviet war in Afghanistan has not yet “Ike.” received the attention it deserves from military LTC STEVEN C. GRAVLIN DAVID P. CAVALERI professionals, especially here in the United Inspector General, USA TACOM MAJ, Armor States. As the Cold War recedes from mem- Detroit Arsenal, Warren, Mich. ARMOR — March-April 1999 59

West Front by Talonsoft. Requires IBM gated by the poor playability. Overall, I would Select “Training Reports,” and you have in- PC 133mhz Pentium, Windows 95/98, not recommend WF to the average reader of stant access to a powerful crosswalk of tasks 16MB RAM, SVGA graphics, 4x CD- this magazine. Those with a specific interest directly from ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP Chapter ROM drive, mouse. $54.95. in the period or setting, or those who like the 2 and Appendix C. Here is how this is useful Battleground and/or Campaign series of to the leader: Early in the fiscal quarter, the Reviewed on: IBM 133mhz Pentium with games, may like this game, but I did not. I also commander gives a platoon leader specific Windows 95, 48 MB RAM, 4x CD-ROM drive. did not like the Battleground series or EF, so platoon collective tasks to focus on for the this may be a matter of personal preference. next three months. Push the “Platoon Collec- The sequel to Talonsoft’s East Front, and tive Task Crosswalk” push-button, and the heir to Talonsoft’s renowned Battleground JERRY A. HALL leader knows exactly what crew collective series of computer games, West Front did CPT, Armor tasks apply to the commander’s guidance. little to live up to the hype that has surrounded Fort Carson, Colo. Next, by selecting the “Crew Collective Tasks it and its predecessors. WF is a turn-based Crosswalk,” the leader is shown which specific tactical level simulation of WWII ground com- Tank Platoon Operating System individual tasks require proficiency. As a bo- bat. Icons represent platoons, individual vehi- (TPOS) by David Rennaker and Marc nus, the user can select from buttons labeled cles, and crew -served weapons. The scale is for the Battlefield Operating Systems — by 250m per hex, 6 minutes of real-time per turn. Sanborn. Published by BowTech Inc., Vine Grove, Ky., 1998. $65.00. selecting “Command and Control,” the TPOS First impressions do go a long way, but illustrates every collective task that pertains. there must be substance to back them up. FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training states As a superb data management tool, TPOS Upon first opening WF, I was impressed by that “Leaders are responsible for identifying enables the leader to quickly identify weak- the 256-page manual (I hate on-line manuals; and training essential soldier tasks that sup- port the unit’s mission essential collective nesses and plan and conduct training to im- if you pay enough for a game, it should have a prove proficiency. hardcopy manual, but I digress). After loading tasks… [leaders] must fully understand the it, I was equally impressed with the excellent unit’s collective tasks and how soldier tasks “Gunnery Data” allows the leader to manage quality of the terrain map and units, which are are planned, trained, and evaluated.” Exactly all important tank data used during mainte- modeled on actual micro-armor models. Both how does a tank platoon leader learn to read nance and gunnery while “Serial Numbers” 2D and 3D views allow you to view the battle- a company METL and decide what collective provides for the entry and management of all field from many perspectives. All of these are tasks are in support? Currently, the Armor serial numbered items in a tank platoon. strengths found in both the Battleground and Officer Basic Course POI includes an eight- Campaign series of games from Talonsoft. hour block of instruction entitled “Train the Equally as useful as “Training Reports,” is Martial background music and background Force” that does, in a limited way, discuss the “Soldier Information.” Entry fields cover every- battlefield sounds complete the ambience. highlights of FMs 25-100 and 25-101. Unfor- thing from age to astrological sign and every- tunately, a detailed understanding of the thing in between. When a soldier arrives, the The game comes with a tutorial and several ARTEP manual and its included crew collec- leader prints the data screen and has the “basic training” scenarios, which quickly intro- tive and individual tasks is not included. soldier fill in the blanks. The leader then en- duce you to the mechanics of the game and Eighteen months of senior instructor experi- ters the data into TPOS. Then, using a page its interface. Both the interface and the me- ence has shown me that a newly assigned of “Additional Reports,” the leader can gener- chanics are exactly what the designers in- lieutenant, thrown into the Training Manage- ate a query of any collection of the information tended them: a precise way to control the ment cycle, has no clear response to his with a single keystroke. A practical example of aspects of fire and movement for every unit commander’s question: “What does your this feature and its utility comes from a no- you have on the battlefield. This is not a prob- platoon need to train on?” — whether that tional lieutenant in Camp Casey equipped lem with the smaller scenarios, but it is as you training be an STX or Sergeant’s Time. with TPOS. In preparation for the inevitable progress to the larger ones, where you must artillery strike that always precedes a War- personally control the movement and firing of Enter TPOS — the single Leader Book pro- steed Exercise, the company commander up to a hundred or more units. duction program available utilizing an MS wants a by-name list of every soldier’s cloth- Access Jet Database Engine. Talk to one of ing sizes — from their T-shirts to their OGBs There are options to move units by organiza- the authors, a successful tank platoon ser- (before COB). This information will be sent to tion, but the AI tends to move units along geant, and he will tell you that TPOS was the S-4 to conduct resupply operations. The paths that you would not take, often exposing designed as a research tool for the tank pla- lieutenant with TPOS accesses the database them to fire from spotted enemy units. So you toon leader; synthesizing both FM and and produces the report in three clicks of the must individually move each unit. There is ARTEP and taking the mystery out of produc- mouse; the lieutenant without TPOS spends also a flaw in the relationship between fire and ing training objectives for subordinate leaders. his day with pencil and paper chasing down movement, in favor of movement. In a turn My platoon leader experience, much like 15 soldiers. that represents six minutes of real time, the many others, was that a stubby pencil and average unit can fire twice if it doesn’t move, unlined paper combined with hours of reading, Currently, TPOS is used in the 2nd Squad- but a typical tank can cover 2500m over open note-taking, and cross-referencing could pro- ron, 16th Cavalry Regiment to manage both ground, which often allows you or the enemy duce a decent Leader Book. Yet, all along, I soldier and student personal data and in the to unrealistically maneuver. wondered if there was a better way to cross Armor Officer Basic Course to develop Ma- neuver Lesson Plans. In the near future, both While there are flaws in the game mechan- reference the Company METL with the ARTEP Manual while at the same time track- a Scout Platoon and a Company Commander ics, the biggest problem I have with WF is that operating system will be available. it simply takes too long to play. This is not due ing the platoon’s training status. to the computer or the AI, but due to the ne- The Out-of-the-Box Experience (OOBE) for System requirements: 486 Microprocessor, cessity of issuing so many orders while indi- this product is solid. Whether downloaded Windows 95 or NT, 15 MB of available HD, vidually moving each unit. If you do buy and from the website or installed via 3.5" disks (I VGA, and CD-ROM (3.5" is available). play this game, I would recommend playing did both), this product downloads and installs Using the BowTech, Inc. Website, a TPOS the tank battle scenarios which do not be- in about half an hour. Questions can be an- come as bogged down as the infantry battles. demo is available for review prior to purchase swered via either tech support or the embed- at www.militarytools.com or you can contact Another problem is that the game mechanics ded interactive help menu. reward tactics that take advantage of the BowTech, Inc. at 614 Central Ave., Vine Grove, KY 40175. system, not real WWII tactics. You find your- When you enter the TPOS user-friendly menu screen, you can select from the follow- self fighting the game rather than a real WWII opponent. ing topics: Training Reports, Soldier Informa- CPT MATTHEW R. REDDELL tion, Gunnery Data, Serial Numbers, and Senior Team Chief, WF contains a campaign game and a very Additional Reports (allowing the user to Armor Officer Basic Course good scenario editor, all of which are miti- search for a specific piece of information). Fort Knox, Ky. 60 ARMOR — March-April 1999 1999 Armor Conference: “ARMOR: Spearhead to the Future”

It’s that time of year again! The 1999 Armor Confer- Gamez, will grace Fort Knox with a superb golf exhibition ence is rapidly approaching, and once again the U.S. prior to the start of the Scramble. In addition, 72 local Army Armor Center and Fort Knox will host one of the club pros will participate in a Pro-Am format, making the country’s largest annual military symposiums. First held 1999 Armor Golf Classic Scramble the best to date. in 1946, the Armor Conference has greatly increased in popularity over the years, and it continues to serve as a One of the most popular aspects of the conference is the numerous contractor exhibits that are set up at valuable opportunity for leaders from all branches and Skidgel Hall during the entire week. Last year, over 150 components to come together to discuss current and future issues impacting our rapidly changing profession. displays demonstrating the latest breakthroughs in the defense industry, equipment prototypes, and state-of- This year’s conference will be held Tuesday, May 18th the-art training devices were available for public viewing, through Thursday, May 20th and carries the theme, “ARMOR: Spearhead to the Future.” and we expect an even greater number this year. For many, this is a once in a lifetime opportunity to see the Armor as the spearheading force in adapting to change absolute best our defense industry has to offer in one is the central tenet of this year’s theme. In today’s turbu- consolidated setting. Between the ATU and Armor Con- lent military environment of decreasing budgets and per- ference, we’ve even set aside one entire day for confer- sonnel, yet increasing operational tempo, the Armor ence attendees to walk through the area and observe Force remains the Spearhead for the Army. As stated in the latest innovations. his Commander’s Hatch editorial, Major General George Once again this year, the General Frederick M. Franks Harmeyer, the Chief of Armor, views the challenge as Award will be presented to an individual who has dem- nothing new for the Armor Force since we have led the onstrated a lasting contribution to the ground warfighting military through its greatest transformation since World capabilities of the U.S. Army. This year will mark the fifth War II. As a result, he has extended invitations to some time we’ve made the presentation of an award originally of the Army’s most noted visionaries who will share their conceived by former Chief of Armor, Lieutenant General views on how the Armor Force can adapt to the chal- Larry Jordan. The nominees for this prestigious award lenges and changes that lie ahead. Conference atten- must have demonstrated leadership characteristics pos- dees will find the numerous briefings and open discus- sessed by the award’s namesake, including one or more sions extremely informative and rewarding. of the following: offered a vision for the future of the The annual Armor Trainer Update (ATU) will once mounted warfighting force that significantly improved again precede the conference on May 16th and 17th. combat survivability, lethality, or mobility; developed an This two-day event focuses on the challenges facing our innovation in equipment, materiel, or doctrine that signifi- Army Reserve and Army National Guard brothers-in- cantly enhanced the effectiveness of combat arms’ arms. As the number of military commitments around the mounted elements; exemplified professional excellence world continues to rise, these units face even greater in demeanor, correspondence, and leadership; and dis- training challenges. The ATU provides a perfect forum to played a love of soldiering. Last year’s award recipient discuss these important issues. Last year, over 300 was COL Albert F. Turner, Jr., then Director of JOINT Army Reserve and National Guard members attended VENTURE, who was instrumental in the successful exe- this event, and we hope that an even greater number will cution of the Army’s Task Force XXI and Division XXI join us this year. Advanced Warfighting Experiment and Division redes- ign. The G3/Directorate of Training, Plans, and Mobilization will hold the 7th annual External Unit Scheduling Con- The Armor Conference has attracted a much greater ference at the Armor Inn, held in conjunction with the audience than just the armor and cavalry community. ATU, on May 17th. Units from the Active and Reserve Attendance at this year’s event is an absolute must for Components, as well as from other branches of service, everyone concerned with the current and future states of will vie for the opportunity to schedule Fort Knox’s vast our military, or those who are merely interested in enjoy- simulation facilities and range complexes. As training ing a week of informative briefings, activities, and cama- dollars dwindle, these cost-effective training facilities at raderie. Despite continuing military cutbacks and de- Fort Knox become more and more attractive to units creases in funding, we face increasing mission demands who wish to hone their combat skills. Consequently, the every day. The only way we can survive these constant number of units taking advantage of this opportunity has fluctuations is to demonstrate the resolve and demeanor greatly increased every year. that can inspire subordinates, peers, and superiors alike. The armor force proudly accepts the role as the spear- All work and no play would make any tanker a dull boy! heading force in adapting to the challenges and changes In order to energize and tee-off the 1999 Armor Confer- of the future. If you are willing to accept the challenges ence, the 4th Annual Armor Golf Classic Scramble will and changes that will inevitably affect everyone in the provide some camaraderie, competition, and just some armor and army family alike, we’ll see you at the confer- plain ol’ fun. This year, PGA Touring Pro Mr. Robert ence! 1999 Armor Conference and Armor Trainer Update (Tentative Agenda) 15 May – 20 May 1999 “ARMOR: Spearhead to the Future”

DATE TIME EVENT HOST/SPEAKER LOCATION

Saturday, 15 May 1500-1900 Registration for ATU/Armor Conference Protocol Gaffey Hall, Bldg 2369

Sunday, 16 May 0700-0930 Registration for ATU/Armor Conference Protocol Gaffey Hall, Bldg 2369 1900-2200 No Host Social for ATU SACG-RC Leaders Club

Monday, 17 May 0700-UTC External Unit Scheduling Conference G3/DPTM Armor Inn 0800-1700 Armor Conference Early Registration Protocol Leaders Club 0930-1700 USAARMC Sergeant Major Armor Update CSM Lady Rivers Auditorium 1100-1400 Honorary Colonels of the Regiment OCOA Patton Museum 1200-1700 Contractor Displays DFD Skidgel Hall, Bldg 1724 0900-1700 Brigade and Regimental Commanders’ Meeting OCOA HQ Conference Room 1300-1700 Master Gunner Forum Chief, Master Gunner Skidgel Hall, Clsrm 1 1800-UTC Pre-Golf Classic Social Business Ops Gallotta’s

Tuesday, 18 May 0700-1600 Registration Protocol Leaders Club 0800-1700 Contractor Displays DFD Skidgel Hall, Bldg 1724 0830-1400 4th Annual Armor Golf Classic Scramble Lindsey/Anderson Golf Courses 1630-1830 CG’s Garden Party MG Harmeyer Quarters One 1900-2130 Regimental Buffet and Assemblies OCOA Leaders Club

Wednesday, 19 May 0730-1200 Late Registration Protocol Gaffey Hall, Bldg 2369 0800-1700 Contractor Displays DFD Skidgel Hall, Bldg 1724 1100-1115 Presentation of the 5th Annual Franks Award Haszard Auditorium 1115-1130 USAREC Award Presentations MG Harmeyer Haszard Auditorium 1130-1200 Armor Association Meeting Armor Association Haszard Auditorium 1200-1330 Lunch/Visit Contractors’ Displays DFD Skidgel Hall, Bldg 1724 1830-1900 Pre-Banquet Cocktails Leaders Club 1900-UTC Armor Association Banquet MG (Ret.) Tait Leaders Club

Thursday, 20 May 0800-1200 Contractor Displays DFD Skidgel Hall, Bldg 1724 1145-1330 Chief of Armor Luncheon/ MG (Ret.) Sheridan Patton Museum Patton Museum Groundbreaking Ceremony 1545-1600 Closing Remarks MG Harmeyer Haszard Auditorium

Armor Conference Points of Contact

Event POC DSN Number Commercial Armor Conference CPT Michael Long 464-4007 (502) 624-4007 Armor Conference 1LT(P) Daniel Eckert 464-1065 (502) 624-1065 Armor Trainer Update LTC Randall Williams 464-1315 (502) 624-1315 CSM Update SGM James Anderson 464-1321 (502) 624-1321 External Scheduling Conference William Rosacker 464-3555 (502) 624-3555 Contractor Displays SFC Kim Thompson 464-1250 (502) 624-1250 USAARMC Protocol Jack Eubanks 464-6615 (502) 624-6615 USAARMC Protocol Sherry Cart 464-6103 (502) 624-6103 Armor Association Connie Bright N/A (502) 942-8624 Armor Magazine MAJ Dave Daigle 464-2249 (502) 624-2249 VIP Billeting Reservations 464-6180 (502) 624-6180 On-post Housing* Carolyn Burton 464-3491 (502) 943-1000 Armor Classic Golf Scramble Golf Manager 464-4218 (502) 624-4218 *Reservations will be accepted up to 60 days prior to conference start date

PIN: 076158-000