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The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare
Rod Thornton
To cite this article: Rod Thornton (2015) The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare, The RUSI Journal, 160:4, 40-48, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047
Published online: 04 Sep 2015.
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Download by: [Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies] Date: 19 September 2015, At: 07:11 THE RUSI JOURNAL
THE CHANGING NATURE OF MODERN WARFARE RESPONDING TO RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE
ROD THORNTON
While Western militaries recognise the logic and necessity of ‘irregular warfare’ in their military operations, the manifold aspects of irregular fighting have yet to be mastered fully. Information warfare, for example, appears to be a tool more capably employed by Russia, to the detriment of NATO.Rod Thornton explains how and why Russia has ‘won’ in Crimea by affording subversive information campaigns primacy in its military operations. Acknowledging the twofold constraints of international law and co-ordination that face Western governments seeking to play the same game, Thornton nonetheless expounds how the West might better pursue asymmetry in the security realm.
or severalyearsnow,the Baltics, Georgia and Moldova.There their ownuse of information. Anysuch phenomenon of ‘irregular warfare’ has beenamajor changeinthe way responses should, of course,besuitable F(principally of the counter- the Russian military regardsthe and sound in nature. Unfortunately,as insurgency variety) hasbeen themain conduct of its regular warfarecampaigns this article will show, responses so far focus of majorWestern militaries and –fromthe strategic to the tactical have beenneither.Instead, theyappear their doctrinecentres. In accordance perspectives. Indeed, whathas been to representatwenty-first-century with such afocus, the armiesofthese called a‘newgeneration of warfare’ equivalentof‘MaginotLine thinking’. 3 militaries have become smaller,more (voina novogo pokoleniya)has been agile and betterequipped to dealwith developed. Centraltothis concept is the The Drivers of Change the likes of Al-Qa’ida, the Taliban and use of information. It is instructivefirsttodiscuss whythe Daesh (alsoknown as the Islamic State Russia‘won’ in Crimea recently Russianmilitaryfelt it necessaryto of Iraq and Syria,ISIS). In this context, through acampaign based principally adoptthis newthinking.The literature the study of ‘regular warfare’ against on informationwarfare. Thisisnow on changeinmilitaryorganisations
Downloaded by [Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies] at 07:11 19 September 2015 opponents from developedstates not only seen by the Russian military suggeststhat‘majorchange’ only appearstohavebeen neglected.1 In as aforce multiplier,but also as a comes about through adefeatinwar or particular, the militaries of theUSand war-winning tool. NATO’s Supreme Allied through significantcivilianintervention.4 the UK have takentheir eyes off this CommanderEurope (SACEUR),General In Russia’scase, it wasthe result of a conventional-warfareball. In contrast, PhilipBreedlove, hasrightly noted that combination of both. The2008 warwith the militaryofone countryhas clearly Russia is nowwaging ‘the mostamazing Georgia wasperceivedtobesomething been thinking very seriouslyabout the informationwarfareblitzkrieg we have of a‘defeat’interms of thefailings it conduct of conventional warfarebetween ever seen in thehistory of information highlightedand the problemsthatwere developedstates, and thatcountryis warfare’.2 self-evident to senior militaryofficers. It Russia. Apressing imperative therefore wasVladimir Putin, however, who was The results of this deliberation are presents itself.Western governments the chiefcriticofthis poor performance evident todayinUkraine, andmay later andtheir armedforceshavetorespond andwho became the main driver of extend to othertheatres,notably the to these Russian successes through change, aiming to create amilitarythat
©RUSI JOURNAL AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2015 VOL. 160 NO.4pp. 40–48 DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047
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would be amuch moreeffectivelever –would be the next in line.Indeed, Russianmedia, itsoutput being almost of Russianpower on theinternational in the Kremlin thereisthe ‘conviction universally in his favour.17 stage.5 thatthe West intends to bringabout Some analystshavesuggested that regime changeinRussia’.10 Such thinking Hybrid Warfare Putin needed amorepowerful militaryto mayappeardark, yetitisperfectly Havingbeen instructed to reform, from help him in aprocess of empire-building.6 understandable if one accepts thatthere 2010 the Russian militarybegan to debate This,however,israther simplistic. Amore is abeliefinthe Kremlin,and in Russia whatwould be the bestway forward. cogent explanation is thatPutin wanted moregenerally,that‘international politics With the ‘colour revolutions’inmind, the to stop both himself and Russia –as is essentially aDarwinian or Hobbesian Russian Ministry of Defence analysed(in he and his advisers sawit–frombeing competition’.11 printand at conferences18)how the West pushed around by Western powers,in It waswith this ‘competition’ had –seemingly–gone about ‘nurturing particularbythe US. As Andrew Kuchins in mind that, following the warwith regime changebyusing political, and Igor Zevelevargue, in Russia,‘an Georgia,Putin setintrain aseries of economic or militarysupport to selected enduringbelief exists that[the country] reforms within those state structures that groups, covert action andinformation is agreat powerand mustbetreated could contributetoastrengtheningof operations’.19 This analysis identified as such’.7 However, the West has not Russian poweronthe international stage the concept known as ‘hybridwarfare’ obliged. ‘They’,asPutin put it, ‘are –including themilitary.12 Furthermore, or ‘ambiguouswarfare’ (‘non-linear constantly trying to sweep us into a Putin wasable to ensurethatthe reforms warfare’ in Russian parlance20)asthe corner’. 8 The Cold Warseems, in Russian would mesh and complementeach other method employedbythe Western
Downloaded by [Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies] at 07:11 19 September 2015 eyes, to have simply movedontoa across the rangeofstructures involved powers to achieve their aims. The idea newphase.9 The‘colour revolutions’ due to the ‘powervertical’system of hybrid warfare(growing out of work exemplified theproblem forPutin thatoperates in Russia.13 In this,Putin on theconcept of asymmetric warfare) and the Kremlin.Countries in Russia’s maintains ahighly centralised, top-down hadbeen givenform and substance traditionalsphereofinfluence were being systemofcontrol where he ‘directly mostnotably by Frank Hoffman in the turned away from Moscow by regime manages the government’14 –assisted US,21 and is seen, in essence,asaform changes thatput in place pro-Western by a‘loyalsupport group’,15 known as of warfarecharacterisedby‘blurring’. governments. In Putin’sview, these the ‘collective Putin’.16 This consists of a At its mostbasic level, the aim is to revolutions had been organisedand close cohort of advisers and membersof generateasituation where it is unclear financed in Western capitals. Moreover, the Russian elitewho have benefited – whetherastate of warexists –and if it the logical extension of blaming mainly financially –fromhaving Putinin does,who is acombatant and who is Washingtonand its allies forthese power. His authority is further enhanced not.22 Afeature of hybrid warfareisthat ‘revolutions’ wasthatPutin –and Russia by the grip he has gainedoverthe the modesofconflict overlap andmeld.
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Thus, the ‘battlespace’,such as it is, can theseelements in its ownplanning subject to various manifestations of be shaped on one levelbyconventional formodern militaryoperations’. 31 The Russian pressurefor some time prior to operations and irregular activitiesand end result has been acompletely new anyRussian troopsleaving their barracks concurrently,atahigherlevel, by the doctrinalapproach. Russian‘operations’ on the peninsula. The ground had already application of background political and nowreflect the‘integrated useof beenprepared before anyRussian forces economic pressures.The energetic militaryforce and political, economic, were committed.38 employmentofcyber-warfarelendsitself informationaland othernon-military Ayear before the Ukrainecrisis, well to such hybrid efforts, while opinions measures’. 32 As the head of the Russian thenatureofthis processofpreparation of both supportersand opponents can military, General ValeryGerasimov, put it, wasdiscussedinanarticleinaRussian be moulded by informationoperations. ‘thevery“rules of war” have changed’.33 militaryjournal, Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Ideally,the various inputs into ahybrid- This integration is at the heart of Thought).Indescribing this ‘new warfarecampaign will be closely hybrid warfare. If military activities can generation of warfare’,the article outlined co-ordinatedand controlled by acentral be usedincomplete concert with other eightphases,‘the first four of which guiding authority.23 stateleversofpower,then theywill be entail non-military, covert andsubversive Moscow has openly accused muchmoreeffectivethan if theywere asymmetric means to reduce the enemy’s Washingtonofconducting such hybrid merely thesum of their parts. However, morale and willingness to take up arms’ warfareagainstRussia during the ‘colour such integration is difficult to achieve, –therebyrendering theviolentuse of revolutions’. AreflectionofRussia’s but Russia has successfully refined this militaryforce unnecessary.39 This process longstanding suspicion of the US role in element,therebymoving the hybrid- has variously been described as the post-Sovietsatellitestates, SergeyLavrov, warfareconcept beyond whatwas ‘internaldecay’ofthe enemy;40 ‘freezing Russia’sforeignminister, chargedthat possible in the (perceived) Western society from within’;41 and an intention to such techniques were usedto‘chang[e] variant.Ofcourse,the process of ‘paralyse an opponent’.42 the regimes in the states that pursue a integration is considerably eased in Russia Such ‘subversiveasymmetric means’ policy Washingtondoes not like’.24 He by the central guidingauthority thatPutin aredesigned to generatedefeatismintwo blamedthe US forusing ‘financial and exercises in theaforementioned ‘power ways:either the adversary’sgovernment, economic pressure, informationattacks, vertical’system. Theconsolidation of military and population arepassively proxyintensification of pressurealong poweraround Putinhas a‘disciplining persuaded thatRussian occupation is not the borders of the stateinquestion effect within theRussian bureaucracy’ something to be feared –indeed, it is to as well as propaganda and ideological thatallows fora‘comprehensive be welcomed –ortheybecome convinced influence throughexternallyfinanced approach’ to governmentfunctions.The thatopposing such an occupation is futile non-governmentalorganisations’.25 ‘Is degreeofintegration this facilitates thus and will lead to unimaginable destruction. this not’, he asked rhetorically,‘ahybrid meansthatthe Russianversion of hybrid The former relies on presenting apositive processand not whatwecall war?’26 warfarecan be very effective.34 image, the latteroninculcating fear.The TheMaidan events in Ukraine in This wasclearly demonstrated in principal tool in engendering both is 2014 furthered Moscow’s perception theoperation to seizeCrimea, which informationwarfare. In the newRussian thatitwas at war: thatis, ‘in apermanent morethan amply confirmed theRussian militarymindset, informationwarfare stateofconflict’with the US and its ability to ‘[integrate] military tools with enables wars to be wonwithout ashot allies.27 Itschosenbattleground wasthe moreunconventional tools …onthe being fired. former Sovietstates, which Moscow “battlefield”.’35 Indeed, Russian troops wanted to bring back into the fold or, managed to take controlofCrimea Information Warfare at the very least,destabilise in order to withoutfiringashot. This is whatSun Western militaries tend to look upon ‘showwho is boss in Russia’s backyard’. 28 Tzuwould call the ‘acme of skill’ –the whattheyrefer to as ‘information This wasaHobbesian rationale writlarge subduing of an enemy withoutany operations’ merely as an adjunct to their and very much redolentofCold War fighting. It wasneverthelessadeparture campaign plans.Incontrast, forRussian Downloaded by [Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies] at 07:11 19 September 2015 thinking.29 foraRussian army once doctrinally militarythinkers, informationnow has wedded to the use of destructive ‘primacyinoperations’,while ‘more Integration firepower. It wasalso reliant, in its conventionalmilitaryforces[are] in a ‘Drawing lessons from differentAllied success, on remarkable troop discipline; supporting role’.43 operations’ as part of the reform again, something thatisnot usually The Latvian analyst JanisBerzins process,30 Putin’smilitarythen embarked associatedwith the Russian armed observeshow this newRussian emphasis on an attemptto‘reverse-engineer’a forces.36 Theway in whichtheseforces on informationhas changed the focus Russian version of the hybrid-warfare operated in Crimea wasthus a‘real in today’smajor conflictsfrom‘direct measures thatthe Kremlin sawasbeing novelty’. 37 destruction to directinfluence, from a used againstthe country. As Kristin Ven It shouldberemembered, however, warwith weaponsand technology to … Bruusgaardobserves, ‘Despiteheavily thatRussian forces were at the spearhead information or psychological warfare’.He criticising such Western practices, of amuch largerhybrid-warfare further highlights the centreofgravity Russiaclearly adoptedand refined campaign in Crimea –with Ukraine that is nowatarget–people’sminds:44
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Thus the Russianviewofmodern course,direction comes from the very ideological links. The plan is thatthis ‘may warfareisbased on the idea thatthe top: as NATO’s StrategicCommunications evolveinto amoreformal relationship in main battlespace is in the mind and, CentreofExcellence(STRATCOM COE) future,iforwhen needed’.53 The second as aresult,new-generation wars are puts it, in Russian information-warfare goal is to instil fear among these target to be dominatedbyinformation and campaigns, ‘control is exerted directly by groups thattheir hostgovernment psychological warfare[with]the main the Presidential Administration’.50 will oneday turn on them. Messages objective [being] to reduce the necessity The highly professional and aresentout that‘leverage historical fordeploying hardmilitarypower to voluminous output of Russian memory’. Particularemphasisisput on the minimum necessary, makingthe propaganda thatiscurrently evident the natureofthe Nazi tyrannysuffered opponent’smilitaryand civil population is the result of yearsofsignificant during the occupation of countries support the attacker to the detrimentof worldwide investment. Turning Russian including Ukraine and the Baltic States their owngovernmentand country. state-controlled media outletsinto during theGreat Patriotic War–and tools of informationwarfarehas on the fact thatthe RedArmycame to As Berzins makes clear,fromthe Russian been part of the Kremlin’s perceived the rescue of those under this tyranny. perspective, ‘modernwarfare’ is to be needto‘compete’inthe ‘permanent Moscow’s messagetodayisthatthe foughtinthe mind –and information war’ in whichitconsidersitself to current governments in these countries will be theprincipaltool in this fight, be involved.New Russian television also have their ‘Nazi’elements, and so creating aversionofrealitythatsuits stations, broadcasting in both Russian it maybebetter forcompatriot Russians political and militarypurposes at all and local languages, have recently been to seekprotection and ‘thinkabout a levels of warfare. Theinformation is established across the world.They future jointdestinywith Russia’.54 Having disseminatedvia, forexample, television areatthe frontand centre of Russia’s succumbedtosuch influences,itis stations, websites,social media and information-warfare‘blitzkrieg’.Indeed, intended thatcompatriot Russians then even theleafletingofindividual homes. as noted in areport by NATO’s STRATCOM become channels of communication Veracity is notnecessary–indeed, as COE: ‘One cannot underestimate the role themselves. As the ‘multipliersofdesired MargaritaSimonyan, the editor-in- of the massmedia in executingRussia’s information, attitudes and behaviour’, chiefofthe Putin-leaning Russia Today foreign policy goals’.51 theyshould setabout convincing their satellitetelevision station and website, non-Russianneighbours to adoptthe assertedwhen describing Russian Compatriot Russians samethinking.55 The primarygoal is media output: ‘Thereisnoobjectivity The Russian informationoutput is forlocal populations in the targeted –only approximations of the truth by designedtoinfluenceminds. However, countries,betheyRussian-speaking or as manydifferentvoicesaspossible’.45 the subjects mustbereasonably not, to protestagainstthe governing It is thus notthe quality of information receptiveinthe first place.Moscow authorities, andfor Moscow to be able that is important in Russian information is fortunate in this respect in thatthe to use anysubsequentclampdown by warfare, butthe quantity.46 If enough now-independent states that were these authoritiesasanexcuse forsetting outlets spreadRussian propaganda at a once partofthe SovietUnion contain a up local vigilante squads to provide sufficientratethen, seemingly,wherever significantnumberofethnicRussians,as ‘protection’.These squads may, of course, anyindividual (civilian or military) in a well as Russian speakers. These Russian contain Russian special forces in civilian target countryobtains information–be minoritiesinplacessuch as Ukraine,the clothes or unmarked uniforms–orthey it from atelevision station or through Baltic States, Moldovaand Georgia are maynot; the situation maybe‘blurred’. rumour on the street –heorshe will the principal focus of Moscow’s current The end-game comes when those be receivingthe Russianversion of it, information-warfarecampaign. influenced by the informationcampaign or oneofanumber of versions at least. Russian lawlabels these individuals seek a‘humanitarian intervention’ by Moreover, these versions arelentextra as ‘Compatriots Living Abroad’,52 and Russian troopsorultimatesafetyby mileagebymakingthem as interesting as they areseen as requiring the protection joining Russia itself.Ideally,though, in Downloaded by [Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies] at 07:11 19 September 2015 possible,ofteninthe form of conspiracy of Mother Russia.While Moscow may Kremlin thinking, this would be achieved theories, which gain muchgreater have altruistic motives forproviding via theballotbox through the ‘clever traction –and therefore moreinfluence such protection, thepresence of manipulation of localpolitics’.56 Russia –than the mundane.47 these minorities does also provide a thus obtains anew pieceofterritory Forsuch atumult of information convenientexcuse forRussia to interfere through not much morethan the passage to be truly effective, of course,itall in theinternalaffairsofthesestates, of information.57 has to be controlled;ithas to be the an interference in which Putinisall too Therewill, of course,bethose result of ‘the synchronous executionof ready to engage. compatriots abroad or nativeinhabitants messaging’. 48 Thisiswherethe ‘power Thefirstgoal of the information- of the former Sovietstatestargetedby vertical’systemiskey:itis‘controlof warfarecampaigns is to instil in these Moscow who rejectthe Russianmedia the media by the Russian powerelite ‘compatriot Russians’whathas been message. In theintegrated system, [which] has ensured the systematic called a‘soft loyalty’toRussia through though, anysuch waverers canbe controlofnarratives’.49 Ultimately,of an emphasis on cultural, linguistic and persuadedbyactivities intended instead
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to build psychological pressure. The Contactless War Responses to Russian open massing of troopsonbordersor Russia’sinformation campaigns arethus Information Warfare an increased number of incursions by supposedtoremove,asfar as possible, Russia has shown it canoccupywhole Russian military aircraft or navalvessels displays of ‘hardmilitarypower’from slicesofanotherstate’s territoryusing canprove influential. ‘Terrorist’bombing modern warfare, with ‘war’becoming no morethan informationwarfare, campaigns or street demonstrations, something fought‘at arm’slength’ deniability and afew highly disciplined both organisedbyMoscow,can add to withoutthe needtoengagewith an special forces. TheRussian military, the mix.58 In addition, cyber-warfare adversary’sforces.65 This ‘contactless supported by asubstantial information- canbeused to generateits own war’ has manyadvantages.66 Obviously,in warfareinfrastructure, hasemployed psychological effects.ARussian terms of costs–both financial and human thetenets of hybrid warfareremarkably distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) –itisbeneficial. However, contactless war skilfully.Such activitieshave, of course, attack in 2007 on Estonia’snetworks is also crucial, from aRussian perspective, to be counteredbyNATOand the EU proved just howvulnerable modern in blurring thelines sufficiently to prevent to ensureMoscow cannot use these economiescan be to such tactics,59 and intervention by Western powers on behalf tactics so easilyinfuture. As NATO sentaclearmessagefromMoscow:‘this of the states targeted. In this way, Russia STRATCOM COEputs it, ‘analysis of the is whatwecan do if youcross us’.In cannegatethe significantadvantage held Ukraine conflict suggeststhatNATO the face of such pressure, therewill be by the US and its NATO allies in terms of and the EU mustadapttothe new thosewho submit to fear and who even theirconventional militaryforces, mostly reality whereinformation superiority,as come to viewRussian occupation as a in the technological realm. If Moscow can opposed to militarypower,isbecoming betteralternativethan going to warwith achieve its aimswithout any‘contact’, increasinglyimportant’.70 If today‘the Russia. Forthesepeople, revertingback then therecan be no justification for main battlespace is in the mind’,itmust to Moscow’s rule would seem preferable Western intervention. True to the concept be consideredhow Western powers and to living in acountrydevastatedby of asymmetric warfare, Russian military institutionsengageinthis arena. conflict.60 theorists want to turn whatisaUS The first option, censorship of strength (its firepowerand technological the Russian media message, is widely ‘Contactless war’ is sophistication) into aweakness(rooted in dismissedacross the EU and in the US. the requirementthatits use is properly As JohnWhittingdale,the UK’s current crucial in preventing justified). Thisapproach wasmanifested secretaryofstate forculture, media in the extraordinaryfire discipline of and sport,stressed in 2014: ‘Thereis Western intervention Russianforces in Crimea and the use of nothing Russia would likemorethan the infamous ‘little green men’ in Ukraine to be able to saythe West is censoring Of course, the mostrecentprincipal (the ‘plausibly deniable’ Russiantroopsin [it]’.71 The second alternativewould be targetsofthis type of campaign have unmarkeduniforms). forWestern powers,through NATO,to beenthe audiencesinCrimea and This aspect of deniability is employtheir owncounter-information- eastern Ukraine. Indeed,‘the Russian also importantinterms of thewider warfarecampaigns to matchthose of media has systematicallycultivated a international audience to which Moscow Russia. However, this would be futile, not feeling of fear and anxiety in [both] the wantstoappeal. In the ‘Hobbesian least because NATO’s membersare,for ethnically Russianand non-Ukrainian struggle’,allies areessential. Moscow has the mostpart, liberaldemocracies whose populations of Ukraine’. 61 Other post- such allies among,for instance, the other governments areexpected to remain Sovietstatesare being lined up forthe BRICS countries (Brazil, India, China and wedded to the truth in the information sametreatment. Today, ‘Russianmedia South Africa), some of which seem all too they provide to both domesticand dominate in the Russian-speaking ready to acceptRussia’sversion of events internationalaudiences.Moreover, communities of Moldova,Belarus, with regardstoUkraine.67 However, to theyhaveafreemediaacting as the Georgia, the Baltic states andalso the keep thesestatesonboard, Moscow must fourthestate to ensurethatthe truth Downloaded by [Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies] at 07:11 19 September 2015 former USSRrepublicsofCentral Asia’.62 givethe impression thatitis‘lawabiding is told. Whenitcomestoconducting It is theBaltics, though, thatrepresent and “doing the right thing”’. 68 Of course, information-warfarecampaigns, this aspecial target.Estonia and Latvia have as evidence inevitably accumulatesto predilection forthe truth canbe large Russian minorities and Lithuaniais showthatRussian forces are, indeed, something of ahandicap, allowing forthe vulnerable because it separates Russian operating within Ukraine,the natureof projection of only one narrative amid the forces in theKaliningrad exclave from Russia’sinformation messagewill have welter of counter-narrativesproduced by Belarus and the rest of Russia.63 Russia’s to change69 –possibly to an emphasis Russian outlets. Furthermore, Western information-warfarecampaign vis-à- on Russia’s‘responsibility to protect’ effortstopromotethis singularmessage vis these Baltic States is very slick, with its ‘compatriots’ in othercountries. It have beenunderwhelming.Asthe UK PeterPomerantsevobserving that in should be expectedthatthe Russian parliamentaryDefenceCommittee was Estonia, forinstance,‘hugeparts of information-warfarecampaign would be recently told, ‘althoughthe BBC Russian [the] population liveinaseparate reality flexible enoughtoreact adroitly to any Servicewas available, it wasonly online createdbythe Russianmedia’.64 such changes in circumstances. andwas in no wayacounterweight to
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the propaganda channelled through howbesttopresentit. As one Estonian least not overtly.Indeed, Russia’s ‘new Russian Television’.72 One outlettucked militaryofficer concernedwith NATO’s generation of warfare’ is specifically away on awebsite is no answertoa information operations put it, ‘if we want designed to achieve results without the Russian information-warfare‘blitzkrieg’. to counterRussian propaganda…we needfor anysuch crass action thatmight, Thereissimilarreluctance, forinstance, have to uniteour lines and speak with the in turn, provide an excuse forNATO(or in Washington, to use the Voice of same voice’. 80 However, thereisnosuch others)tointerfere–therebyparalysing Americaradio station in an ‘overtly unity in these international organisations both the target countryand those that propagandisticrole’.Meanwhile, in the and thus the idea of NATO producing its might come to its defence. Moreover, Baltic States theattempts to counter own‘synchronised messaging’remains a one aim of the Russian information- Moscow’s ‘informationwar’are seenas pipe-dream. Therefore whatcollectives warfarecampaign has alwaysbeen to ‘uncoordinatedand weak’.73 The basic such as NATO willalwayslack is what ‘sow discord’ within NATO.83 ‘Russia’,as problem across the boardisthatliberal makes Moscow’s informationassault so the former headofPolish special forces, democracieshaveaninherentdistaste effective: atrulyintegrated approach. Roman Polko, says,‘is mercilessly using forproducing anything at the strategic Themajor threattoWestern NATO’s weaknesses in order to playits levelthatresembles propaganda or could interestsanywhereinthe world is not owngame’.84 Of prime importance to be classedaspsychological warfare.74 terrorism, it is thethreatposedby Russiaistoprevent the invocation of In fact, oneofthe reasons thatthe informationwarfaresuch as thatrecently Article Vbyavoiding the triggerfor ‘an Russians concentrate so much on their conducted by Russia. It has achievedclear armed attack’ on anyone NATO state.85 information-warfareoutput is thatthey results and this success canberepeated. knowitcannotbecounteredeffectively; As NATO finds it almostimpossibleto Russian information indeed, theyhaveshown a‘readiness react effectively in asymmetricalfashion to stoop to methods the West cannot to this threat, it has felt the need to warfare is designed to emulate withoutsullying itself’. 75 As resort to moretraditional means. Yet ‘sow discord’ within PeterPomerantsevand Michael Weiss the responses seensofar areredolent pointout, the Russians arethinking of ‘MaginotLine thinking’–inother NATO asymmetrically: ‘Feeling itself relatively words, these areresponses that are weak, the Kremlin hassystematically bettersuited to the ‘lastwar’. Unlikethe This weakness of Article Vhas been learnttouse the principles of liberal Russianmilitary, NATO is still putting the recognised –with the UK parliamentary democracies againstthem’. 76 use of militaryforce ahead of information Defence Committee one voice among This asymmetryinwillingness and warfarebecause –asaninstitution–it many calling forthe word ‘armed’ to be abilities does not, however, mean thatno knows no otherway of reacting. removed:86 action has been takenbyWestern powers. The US and the UK have,for In January2014, NATO setupaStrategic instance, decided to send asmall number NATO mustresolvethe contradiction Communications CentreofExcellence of (non-combat)troopstoUkraine.81 This, betweenthe specification in Article in Rigaasadirectconsequence of the though, is anaivemovethatdoes no 5thataresponseshould be to an Russian information-warfarecampaign in morethan playinto the Kremlin’s hands. ‘armed attack’ and the likelihood on an attempttocounterRussia’ssignificant The messagethatMoscow cannow the other hand of an ‘unarmed attack’ advantage in this realm. Yeteventhis send out to those who would support (such as acyber attack or another form body recognises thatitisdifficult forthe its actions is thatwhile Russia is not of ambiguous warfare). NATO must West with its free media ‘tocompete with sending anyofits owntroopsoverthe consider whetherthe adjective‘armed’ the forceful, synchronised messaging of border into Ukraine (officially,atleast), should be removedfromthe definition the Russiangovernment’.77 theUSand UK aredoing so –and from of an Article 5attack. Forits part, the EU is discussing thousands of milesaway. Under such sponsoringits ownRussian-language circumstances, it raisesquestions as to MostNATOstatesare,however,unlikely Downloaded by [Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies] at 07:11 19 September 2015 channel as ‘The truth is the bestweapon who the aggressor really is. It is an easy to agree to this –again showing the the EU has’.78 However, doubts remain as sell forthe information-warfare-savvy weakness of amultinational body.They to howmuch impactasingle channel can Russians. will not want to engagemilitarily with have;indeed, this channel‘needs to find Thereistalk, too, of NATO Russia just because one of their number away to counterMoscow’s grip on the responding both by beefing up the rapid- mightbesubject to a(plausibly deniable) Russian-languageairwavesorits target reaction forces currently on standbytobe ‘form of ambiguous warfare’,however audience will neverhear [thetruth]’.79 senttothe Baltic States andbyholding disruptive. Furthermore, it will always be moreexercisesthere.82 This, though, Thus, such debate over rapid- difficult forany collectiveofstates– raises the question of to whatexactly they reaction forces andArticleVmerely whether NATO or the EU –toagree on aresupposed to ‘react’. Russian troops, facilitates Moscow’s information-warfare the natureand contentofinformation whiletheymightone daymass near the campaign. It shouldberemembered that campaigns,not leastdue to disagreement Baltics to applypsychological pressure, NATO’s offer of militaryassistance to the over what exactly the ‘truth’ is and areunlikely to cross anyborders, at Baltic States is also an offer to fighta
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war–avery destructiveone –ontheir and hinder their ability to move freely avenueistobepursuedthen there are territory. Such an offer maywell have the around the world,then these individuals some legal matters thatwill need to be effect of stoking fear among both Balts will put pressureonPutin to rein in his addressedinorder to makeiteffective. and compatriotRussians,once again efforts to ‘compete’. 89 Russian aggressive The West mustadjusttothe situation providing potential gristtoMoscow’s behaviour should thus be toned down as in which it nowfinds itself in relation to information-warfaremill. it seekstoavoid its own‘internaldecay’. Russia–a‘permanent’,hybridwar.The Such sanctions have beentried already, goalpostshavetobemoved. General ‘Going Asymmetric’ of course, if only half-heartedly.However, Gerasimovhas said thatthe ‘rules of war’ The best means of counteringRussian theycould yetprove to be the answer. have changed; thus, the Western powers actions regarding Ukraine and the As TheEconomist puts it: ‘It is long past mustchangetheir ownrules and adopta Balticsisinall likelihood not military time forevery Russian parliamentarian ‘newthinking’oftheir own. in natureatall.Western powers need and senior official to join the sanctions to ‘start thinkingabout security in a list’.90 These arethe only ‘minds’ that Rod Thornton works in the Defence muchmoresophisticated way’87 and needtobeinfluenced by multinational Studies Department of King’s College ‘tocraftaresponse as subtle as the bodies such as NATO and the EU; here London. He originally served in the onslaught’.88 Theyneed to employtheir is the centreofgravitythatneeds to be British Army and later studied Russian at ownasymmetric approach and turn what targeted in order to truly stymieRussia’s university. He is the author of appearstobeaRussian strength –the hybrid-warfare campaign. NATO should Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and ‘powervertical’–into aweakness. If the be using its technological capabilities Response in the Twenty-First Century individualsinthe ‘collective Putin’ are to track the business interestsofthese (Polity Press, 2007) and of several targeted with sanctions that limit their acolytesofPutin and to disrupt them monographs and articles about the personal wealth, damagetheir companies by anymeanspossible. Of course,ifthis Russian military.
Notes
1 Over thelastten yearsorsothe allies-must-prepare-for-russia-hybrid- Survival (Vol. 57, No. 1, February/March academic literaturedevoted to war-1.301464>,accessed 15 July2015. 2015), pp. 53–54; PeterApps, ‘Russia ‘warfare’ hasbeen dominatedbythe RaisesMilitaryClout WithReformsafter issue of counter-insurgency.Gian Gentile 3 In the 1930s, theFrench army Georgia War’, Reuters,27February has remarked, forinstance,thatthe constructed the Maginot Line 2014;Con Coughlin, ‘Putin Wantsa study of counter-insurgency in the US fortifications running along the country’s NewRussian Empire’, Daily Telegraph,5 militaryhas become central ‘dogma’ border with Germany. Based on September 2008; LiliaShevtsova,‘Putin’s to the exclusionofthe study of regular experiencefromthe First World War, it AttempttoRecreate the SovietEmpire is warfare. See GianPGentile, ‘Let’sBuild wasthoughtthatsuch astructurewould Futile’, Financial Times,8January2014. an Army to Win All Wars’, Joint Force halt anyfutureinvasion by Germany. It Quarterly (No. 52, January2009), did not. 7 Andrew CKuchins and Igor AZevelev, p. 31. Militarydoctrine centresfollowed ‘RussianForeignPolicy: Continuity in this trend. The UK’sDevelopment, 4 See Deborah DAvant, Political Change’, Washington Quarterly (Vol. 35, Concepts andDoctrine Centre(DCDC) Institutions and Military Change: Lessons No. 1, Winter2012), p. 147. has also produced keypublications from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: without anyemphasisatall on the Cornell University Press, 1994); Barry 8 Cited in NATO Strategic Communications natureoffuturestate-on-state war. See Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: CentreofExcellence(STRATCOM ‘Strategic TrendsProgramme: Future France, Britain, and Germany between COE), ‘Analysis of Russia’s Information
Downloaded by [Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies] at 07:11 19 September 2015 Character of Conflict’, Ministry of the World Wars (Ithaca, NY:Cornell Campaign againstUkraine’,Report No. 3, Defence (MoD), 2010,
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12 Fred Weir,‘Oligarchs Out, “Siloviki” Warfare” Strategy since the Start of 2014 of Russian Power (NewHaven, CT:Yale In: WhyRussia’sForeignPolicy is (Part 1)’, Eurasia Daily Monitor (Vol. 11, University Press, 1998). Hardening’, Christian Science Monitor, No. 184,17October 2014). 2February2015. 37 Ibid. 21 Frank GHoffman, ‘Hybrid Warfareand 13 Andrew Monaghan, ‘The Russian Challenges’, Joint Force Quarterly 38 STRATCOM COE, ‘Analysis of Russia’s Vertikal:The Tandem,Power andthe (No. 52, 2009), pp.34–39. InformationCampaign againstUkraine’. Elections’,Russia and Eurasia Programme Paper 2011/01, Chatham House,June 22 James NMattisand Frank Hoffman, 39 See Chekinov and Bogdanov, ‘The Nature 2011,
Downloaded by [Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies] at 07:11 19 September 2015 ColorRevolutions: Russia’sNew Security Strategic Overhaul’, p. 83. Unreality: Howthe Kremlin Weaponizes Strategy andits Implications forUS Information, Cultureand Money’, Policy’, Russian Military Reform Blog, 32 BBC Monitoring, ‘Analysis: What’sNew Interpreter,InstituteofModernRussia, 15 September 2014,
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52 STRATCOM COE, ‘Analysis of Russia’s Russia on Crimea?’, Diplomat, 22 January2015,
56 Coughlin, ‘Putin WantsaNew Russian 71 JoshHalliday, ‘BBC World Service Fears 82 Ewen MacAskill, ‘NATO to Announce Empire’. Losing the InformationWar as Russia 4,000-Strong Rapid Reaction Forceto TodayRampsupPressure’, Guardian, CounterRussian Threat’, Guardian, 57 STRATCOM COE, ‘Analysis of Russia’s 21 December 2014, p. 9. 5September 2014. InformationCampaign againstUkraine’, p. 22. 72 House of Commons Defence Committee, 83 The Economist,‘Putin’sWar on the ‘Towards the Next Defence and Security West’. 58 Allison Quinn,‘Experts See Dark Plot in Review: Part Two–NATO’,p.28. Spate of Mystery Bombings in Ukraine’, 84 Delfi,‘Former Polish Special Forces Moscow Times,25February2015. 73 ChrisMcGreal, ‘Vladimir Putin’s Commander: Polish Soldiers Would “Misinformation” OffensivePrompts Defend Lithuania’,16March 2015. 59 BBC News,‘Estonia Hit by “Moscow US to Deployits ColdWar Propaganda Cyber War”’, 17 May2007. Tools’, Guardian,25April 2015. 85 Michael John Williams, ‘Russia’s NewDoctrine: Howthe Kremlin Has 60 VenBruusgaard, ‘Crimea andRussia’s 74 Ibid. Learned to FightTomorrow’sWar Strategic Overhaul’, p. 85. Today’,Centerfor European Policy 75 The Economist,‘Putin’sWar on the Analysis, 9May 2014,
Downloaded by [Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies] at 07:11 19 September 2015 66 Berzins, ‘Russia’sNew Generation Independent,1January2015. Affairs (January/February2015). WarfareinUkraine’,p.5. 80 Valentina Pop, ‘Nato Colonel Sheds Light 90 The Economist,‘Putin’sWar on the 67 ZacharyKeck, ‘Why Did BRICS Back on Russia “Psy-Ops”, EU Observer, West’.
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