The RUSI Journal ISSN: 0307-1847 (Print) 1744-0378 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi20 The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare Rod Thornton To cite this article: Rod Thornton (2015) The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare, The RUSI Journal, 160:4, 40-48, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047 Published online: 04 Sep 2015. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 254 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rusi20 Download by: [Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies] Date: 19 September 2015, At: 07:11 THE RUSI JOURNAL THE CHANGING NATURE OF MODERN WARFARE RESPONDING TO RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE ROD THORNTON While Western militaries recognise the logic and necessity of ‘irregular warfare’ in their military operations, the manifold aspects of irregular fighting have yet to be mastered fully. Information warfare, for example, appears to be a tool more capably employed by Russia, to the detriment of NATO.Rod Thornton explains how and why Russia has ‘won’ in Crimea by affording subversive information campaigns primacy in its military operations. Acknowledging the twofold constraints of international law and co-ordination that face Western governments seeking to play the same game, Thornton nonetheless expounds how the West might better pursue asymmetry in the security realm. or severalyearsnow,the Baltics, Georgia and Moldova.There their ownuse of information. Anysuch phenomenon of ‘irregular warfare’ has beenamajor changeinthe way responses should, of course,besuitable F(principally of the counter- the Russian military regardsthe and sound in nature. Unfortunately,as insurgency variety) hasbeen themain conduct of its regular warfarecampaigns this article will show, responses so far focus of majorWestern militaries and –fromthe strategic to the tactical have beenneither.Instead, theyappear their doctrinecentres. In accordance perspectives. Indeed, whathas been to representatwenty-first-century with such afocus, the armiesofthese called a‘newgeneration of warfare’ equivalentof‘MaginotLine thinking’. 3 militaries have become smaller,more (voina novogo pokoleniya)has been agile and betterequipped to dealwith developed. Centraltothis concept is the The Drivers of Change the likes of Al-Qa’ida, the Taliban and use of information. It is instructivefirsttodiscuss whythe Daesh (alsoknown as the Islamic State Russia‘won’ in Crimea recently Russianmilitaryfelt it necessaryto of Iraq and Syria,ISIS). In this context, through acampaign based principally adoptthis newthinking.The literature the study of ‘regular warfare’ against on informationwarfare. Thisisnow on changeinmilitaryorganisations Downloaded by [Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies] at 07:11 19 September 2015 opponents from developedstates not only seen by the Russian military suggeststhat‘majorchange’ only appearstohavebeen neglected.1 In as aforce multiplier,but also as a comes about through adefeatinwar or particular, the militaries of theUSand war-winning tool. NATO’s Supreme Allied through significantcivilianintervention.4 the UK have takentheir eyes off this CommanderEurope (SACEUR),General In Russia’scase, it wasthe result of a conventional-warfareball. In contrast, PhilipBreedlove, hasrightly noted that combination of both. The2008 warwith the militaryofone countryhas clearly Russia is nowwaging ‘the mostamazing Georgia wasperceivedtobesomething been thinking very seriouslyabout the informationwarfareblitzkrieg we have of a‘defeat’interms of thefailings it conduct of conventional warfarebetween ever seen in thehistory of information highlightedand the problemsthatwere developedstates, and thatcountryis warfare’.2 self-evident to senior militaryofficers. It Russia. Apressing imperative therefore wasVladimir Putin, however, who was The results of this deliberation are presents itself.Western governments the chiefcriticofthis poor performance evident todayinUkraine, andmay later andtheir armedforceshavetorespond andwho became the main driver of extend to othertheatres,notably the to these Russian successes through change, aiming to create amilitarythat ©RUSI JOURNAL AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2015 VOL. 160 NO.4pp. 40–48 DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047 RUSI 160_4 TEXT.indd 40 24/08/2015 13:34:48 Local residents carryaRussian flag in Simferopol, Crimea, March 2014. Courtesy of AP Photo/Ivan Sekretarev. would be amuch moreeffectivelever –would be the next in line.Indeed, Russianmedia, itsoutput being almost of Russianpower on theinternational in the Kremlin thereisthe ‘conviction universally in his favour.17 stage.5 thatthe West intends to bringabout Some analystshavesuggested that regime changeinRussia’.10 Such thinking Hybrid Warfare Putin needed amorepowerful militaryto mayappeardark, yetitisperfectly Havingbeen instructed to reform, from help him in aprocess of empire-building.6 understandable if one accepts thatthere 2010 the Russian militarybegan to debate This,however,israther simplistic. Amore is abeliefinthe Kremlin,and in Russia whatwould be the bestway forward. cogent explanation is thatPutin wanted moregenerally,that‘international politics With the ‘colour revolutions’inmind, the to stop both himself and Russia –as is essentially aDarwinian or Hobbesian Russian Ministry of Defence analysed(in he and his advisers sawit–frombeing competition’.11 printand at conferences18)how the West pushed around by Western powers,in It waswith this ‘competition’ had –seemingly–gone about ‘nurturing particularbythe US. As Andrew Kuchins in mind that, following the warwith regime changebyusing political, and Igor Zevelevargue, in Russia,‘an Georgia,Putin setintrain aseries of economic or militarysupport to selected enduringbelief exists that[the country] reforms within those state structures that groups, covert action andinformation is agreat powerand mustbetreated could contributetoastrengtheningof operations’.19 This analysis identified as such’.7 However, the West has not Russian poweronthe international stage the concept known as ‘hybridwarfare’ obliged. ‘They’,asPutin put it, ‘are –including themilitary.12 Furthermore, or ‘ambiguouswarfare’ (‘non-linear constantly trying to sweep us into a Putin wasable to ensurethatthe reforms warfare’ in Russian parlance20)asthe corner’. 8 The Cold Warseems, in Russian would mesh and complementeach other method employedbythe Western Downloaded by [Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies] at 07:11 19 September 2015 eyes, to have simply movedontoa across the rangeofstructures involved powers to achieve their aims. The idea newphase.9 The‘colour revolutions’ due to the ‘powervertical’system of hybrid warfare(growing out of work exemplified theproblem forPutin thatoperates in Russia.13 In this,Putin on theconcept of asymmetric warfare) and the Kremlin.Countries in Russia’s maintains ahighly centralised, top-down hadbeen givenform and substance traditionalsphereofinfluence were being systemofcontrol where he ‘directly mostnotably by Frank Hoffman in the turned away from Moscow by regime manages the government’14 –assisted US,21 and is seen, in essence,asaform changes thatput in place pro-Western by a‘loyalsupport group’,15 known as of warfarecharacterisedby‘blurring’. governments. In Putin’sview, these the ‘collective Putin’.16 This consists of a At its mostbasic level, the aim is to revolutions had been organisedand close cohort of advisers and membersof generateasituation where it is unclear financed in Western capitals. Moreover, the Russian elitewho have benefited – whetherastate of warexists –and if it the logical extension of blaming mainly financially –fromhaving Putinin does,who is acombatant and who is Washingtonand its allies forthese power. His authority is further enhanced not.22 Afeature of hybrid warfareisthat ‘revolutions’ wasthatPutin –and Russia by the grip he has gainedoverthe the modesofconflict overlap andmeld. 41 RUSI 160_4 TEXT.indd 41 24/08/2015 13:34:50 THE CHANGING NATURE OF MODERN WARFARE Thus, the ‘battlespace’,such as it is, can theseelements in its ownplanning subject to various manifestations of be shaped on one levelbyconventional formodern militaryoperations’. 31 The Russian pressurefor some time prior to operations and irregular activitiesand end result has been acompletely new anyRussian troopsleaving their barracks concurrently,atahigherlevel, by the doctrinalapproach. Russian‘operations’ on the peninsula. The ground had already application of background political and nowreflect the‘integrated useof beenprepared before anyRussian forces economic pressures.The energetic militaryforce and political, economic, were committed.38 employmentofcyber-warfarelendsitself informationaland othernon-military Ayear before the Ukrainecrisis, well to such hybrid efforts, while opinions measures’. 32 As the head of the Russian thenatureofthis processofpreparation of both supportersand opponents can military, General ValeryGerasimov, put it, wasdiscussedinanarticleinaRussian be moulded by informationoperations. ‘thevery“rules of war” have changed’.33 militaryjournal, Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Ideally,the various inputs into ahybrid- This integration is at the heart of Thought).Indescribing this ‘new warfarecampaign will be closely hybrid warfare. If military activities can generation of warfare’,the article outlined co-ordinatedand controlled