Modern Warfare Framework Duty First Exhibit This Framework Was Created in Partnership with Justin Riskus of York High School

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Modern Warfare Framework Duty First Exhibit This Framework Was Created in Partnership with Justin Riskus of York High School Modern Warfare Framework Duty First Exhibit This framework was created in partnership with Justin Riskus of York High School. It is intended as an educator’s guide to modern American military conicts (post-Vietnam). Those wishing to incorporate modern military warfare into their teaching can use this framework in parts or as a whole to help them determine what to teach and emphasize in the classroom. BIG IDEA In the complex global security environment since 1970, soldiers are asked to do more than ght wars. BATTLE- Fighting the armed forces of another state. STRATEGY TACTICS TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP LOGISTICS Post Vietnam-US military Recent and ongoing Airpower is one of the More and more soldiers in The logistical capabilities of planning has emphasized conicts have required the greatest advantages of the positions of leadership are the US are, in many ways, “shock & awe” (ie Panama, US military to adapt, American soldier. required to take on more unmatched by allies, rivals First Gulf War, Afghanistan, improve its ghting abilities complex roles and responsi- and enemies and allow it to Iraq) in urban settings and versus Armored warfare has been bilities outside combat, project its power and insurgencies. forced to take on less such as peacekeeping and protect its interests around The core function of the traditional roles. nation building. the globe. military is to ght a conventional war. American soldiers have In 2016, all combat some of the most advanced positions became open to Battle planning requires the weapons in the world. This women. consideration of many technology requires dierent factors. training and is eective because good training is The US has been committed used properly. to protecting its interests in the Middle East for decades. CONNECT WITH US: rstdivisionmuseum.org COUNTER-INSURGENCY- Finding and confronting enemies hidden within a population. STRATEGY TACTICS TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP LOGISTICS Following the end of the Successful counter Unmanned Arial Vehicles The quality of leadership Counter insurgencies Cold War, the US military insurgencies require forging (UAVs) have played an can easily determine waged across the world has been primarily focused close relationships with increasingly prominent role success or lack thereof in a require a long term on countering stubborn locals, often placing soldiers in COIN, as they are low risk mission. This is true from commitment. The sustain- insurgencies in Afghanistan in greater danger. Combat and eective. They squad level on up to ment of which can be and Iraq. This has led to is often waged in urban or represent one way the US Congress and the oce of eective, but costly. signicant changes in rugged areas in which military achieves security the President. strategic planning and insurgents can be dicult objectives without having Bases must often be built forced the US to reevaluate to distinguish from to deploy troops. Leaders are developed and and sustained, national traditional modes of non-combatants. tested at all levels. The forces (ie Afghanistan and thinking. Relatively low tech decisions of even the Iraq) must be trained and COIN requires soldiers to insurgencies (utilizing newest Private at a equipped, and humanitari- Counter insurgencies are perform both hard civilian cover and IEDs) are checkpoint can have major an and nation building complex, requiring the (traditional ghting) and enough to erode support implications to the overall eorts (food aid, infrastruc- cooperation of local forces soft (non-combat) duties. for a conict in America. mission. ture projects, schools, etc) along with civilian These are not always require enormous amounts assistance and “buy-in”. distinct and could Technological advantages Political pressure and public of resources. transform from one to the provide US soldier with opinion play an increasingly Following the end of other. signicant advantages over larger role in military Female Engagement Teams combat against convention- insurgents. decision making and have a (FETs) were necessary in al enemies, the US military COIN operations were great inuence on civilian dealing with women in Iraq fought a sustained initially conducted on an Insurgents use convention- and military leaders. and Afghanistan. counterinsurgency in Iraq ad-hoc basis but became al and improvised weapons and Afghanistan to protect codied. to inict casualties and COIN operations forced the US and its interests. disrupt daily life and women to take more active Snipers play an integral role military operations. roles in combat zones. Iraq and Afghanistan are in counterinsurgency dierent and had dierent missions. insurgencies. DETERRENCE- Displaying military force to prevent attack. STRATEGY TACTICS TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP LOGISTICS A US show of force can be Eective deterrence To maintain military At the higher level, US Maintaining the world’s an eective method of requires elements of US supremacy, the US typically presidents often play an most eective military in a maintaining peace. This is forces to be combat ready devotes half of its discre- outsized role in their state of constant readiness true on a global level (ie at all times. This is true at all tionary annual budget to approach to using requires signicant NATO or the South China levels, from a patrol in defense spending, much of deterrence to curb the amounts of resources but Sea) or in embattled Afghanistan to the US this going to the develop- inuence of rival powers (ie helps curb rivals and nations (Afghanistan, Iraq) nuclear arsenal (ie the ment of new weapons, Reagan vs. the “Evil enemies from taking or in peacekeeping triad). vehicles and technology (ie Empire”). The robustness of military action. missions (the Balkans). F22, F35). US deterrence often vary In many scenarios restrain- based on a variety of US allies play a critical role Nations and individuals ing and limiting use of force Proponents argue that such political and economic in deterrence, allowing the often take notice of a US is often necessary to win spending is necessary for factors. US to project its power military presence and make over local populations. Ie, the US to maintain its around the globe. strategic decisions (to the debate on the use of military edge, while critics On the ground, ocers and support, resist, etc) based UAV strikes balances their argue that the government other leaders must often Deterrence needs to be on it. eectiveness at killing can aord to spend much make critical decisions that credible to be successful. terrorists vs. alienating less, still maintain suprema- balance the use of force (Ex. During the Cold War the US military alliances around civilians. cy, and devote those funds with that of diplomacy. professionalism and the globe play a key role in to domestic projects. training increased military deterring conict. There are 5 components to power.) deterrence: Show of force Preventing war is as (Reforger exercises), important as waging war. Training (NTC), Equipment Integration (big 5), and Deterrence missions can strategic positioning (1ID last so long they become Forward in Germany). the status quo (ie Cold War). MILITARY ASSISTANCE- Training and helping the armies of friendly foreign countries. STRATEGY TACTICS TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP LOGISTICS Equipping and training the US forces are often Providing allies with At the higher level, Logistical support is often a militaries of allied nations embedded with foreign military equipment presidents and Congress key form of assistance and governments is seen as units to train and equip represents one of the determine who gets what provided by the US military a necessary and viable them in various ways. (Ex. largest aspects of military based on a variety of to our partners (ie US aerial alternative to the use of US Military Transition Teams, assistance (and its budget). political and sometimes refueling in the Libyan Civil ground troops. MiTT, of 10-15 soldiers train One can often determine economic factors. Histori- War, UK & France or US and advise local forces on US allies from the hardware cally, the decision to arm airstrikes and supply In many instances, particu- intelligence, communica- they use (ie F16s, M16 ries, certain groups has been convoys to Iraqi security larly following the failures tions, re support, logistics etc). controversial (ie Contras, forces). of Vietnam and diculties and infantry tactics. Mujahedeen) in hindsight. in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Closer and more trusted The military uses more than American public is much Special Forces other play an allies (ie the UK, Israel) The role played by US weapons and armored more willing to accept outsized role in military receive higher grade military trainers is often vehicles on military involvement in foreign assistance programs (ie technology than others complex and can be assistance missions. These conict if largely local forces Syrian Civil War). (Pakistan). dangerous (ie Blue on missions require a lot of are used. Green violence, Afghani- equipment. Often times, US forces will stan). They must balance The size of an all-volunteer, accompany foreign units in cultural norms and social professional force in the US specialized roles, such as customs with eective discourages the use of large operating new weapons training. number of personnel in systems or calling in various actions. airstrikes (ie Afghanistan 2001-Northern Alliance). The US military participates in military assistance missions around the world to establish a secure environment that protects US security interests. PEACEKEEPING- Enforcing peace agreements between hostile groups. STRATEGY TACTICS TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP LOGISTICS Since the end of the war in US peacekeepers receive In addition to lethal The decision to embark Peacekeeping missions Vietnam, US forces have additional training as their weapons, peacekeeping upon a peacekeeping often involve multi-national played an extensive role in ability to use force can forces may also be mission often comes from forces that may or may not various peacekeeping often be restricted in the equipped with a variety of the executive and legisla- require additional support.
Recommended publications
  • Blitzkrieg: the Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht's
    East Tennessee State University Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Student Works 8-2021 Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era Briggs Evans East Tennessee State University Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.etsu.edu/etd Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Evans, Briggs, "Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era" (2021). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 3927. https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/3927 This Thesis - unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era ________________________ A thesis presented to the faculty of the Department of History East Tennessee State University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in History ______________________ by Briggs Evans August 2021 _____________________ Dr. Stephen Fritz, Chair Dr. Henry Antkiewicz Dr. Steve Nash Keywords: Blitzkrieg, doctrine, operational warfare, American military, Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, World War II, Cold War, Soviet Union, Operation Desert Storm, AirLand Battle, Combined Arms Theory, mobile warfare, maneuver warfare. ABSTRACT Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era by Briggs Evans The evolution of United States military doctrine was heavily influenced by the Wehrmacht and their early Blitzkrieg campaigns during World War II.
    [Show full text]
  • "Artillery Lends Dignity to What Otherwise Would Be a Common Brawl": an Essay on Post-Modern Warfare and the Classification of Captured Adversaries
    Pace International Law Review Volume 14 Issue 1 Spring 2002 Article 5 April 2002 "Artillery Lends Dignity to What Otherwise Would Be a Common Brawl": An Essay on Post-Modern Warfare and the Classification of Captured Adversaries Ralph Michael Stein Pace University School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr Recommended Citation Ralph Michael Stein, "Artillery Lends Dignity to What Otherwise Would Be a Common Brawl": An Essay on Post-Modern Warfare and the Classification of Captured Adversaries, 14 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 133 (2002) Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol14/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact [email protected]. "ARTILLERY LENDS DIGNITY TO WHAT OTHERWISE WOULD BE A COMMON BRAWL": AN ESSAY ON POST-MODERN WARFARE AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CAPTURED ADVERSARIES Ralph Michael Stein* I. Introduction ....................................... 133 II. What is "War" in a Post-Modernist America? ...... 134 III. Warfare Moves in Two Contradictory Directions .. 140 IV. The Protection of Prisoners of War ................ 141 V. And Now, What Do We Do With the Taliban and Al Qaeda Fighters? ....... ......................... 148 1. INTRODUCTION As this essay is written many individuals believed to have adhered to the cause of terrorist activities against the United States, including participation in or support of the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and at the Pentagon building, are in U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Lessons from Modern Warfare: What the Conflicts of the Post–Cold War Years Should Have Taught Us
    FALL 2013 Vol. 7, No. 3 Commentaries The Need for a Strong US Nuclear Deterrent in the Twenty-First Century Franklin C. Miller Space: Tomorrow and Beyond Lt Gen Garry Trexler, USAF, Retired Lessons from Modern Warfare: What the Conflicts of the Post–Cold War Years Should Have Taught Us Benjamin S. Lambeth FALL 2013 FALL Missile Defenses and Nuclear Arms Reductions: Moving Deterrence Forward, or Backward? Stephen J. Cimbala Scramble in the South China Sea: Regional Conflict and US Strategy Lt Col Aaron W. Steffens, USAF Astroimpolitic: Organizing Outer Space by the Sword Maj Matthew Burris, USAF Book Essay Decade of War: No Lessons Endure Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen Mark A. Welsh III Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Edward A. Rice Jr. Commander and President, Air University Lt Gen David S. Fadok Director, Air Force Research Institute Lt Gen Allen G. Peck, USAF, Retired Editorial Staff Col W. Michael Guillot, USAF, Retired, Editor CAPT Jerry L. Gantt, USNR, Retired, Content Editor Nedra O. Looney, Prepress Production Manager Tammi K. Dacus, Editorial Assistant Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator Advisors Gen Michael P. C. Carns, USAF, Retired Lt Gen Allen G. Peck, USAF, Retired Christina Goulter-Zervoudakis, PhD Colin S. Gray, DPhil Robert P. Haffa, PhD Charlotte Ku, PhD Benjamin S. Lambeth, PhD John T. LaSaine, PhD Allan R. Millett, PhD Contributing Editors Air Force Research Institute Panayotis Yannakogeorgos, PhD School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Stephen D. Chiabotti, PhD James W. Forsyth Jr., PhD The Spaatz Center Edwina S. Campbell, PhD Charles E.
    [Show full text]
  • The Time Value of Military Force in Modern Warfare the Airpower Advantage
    The Time Value of Military Force in Modern Warfare The Airpower Advantage WALTER D. GIVHAN, Major, USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES, MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, ACADEMIC YEAR 1994–95. Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama March 1996 Disclaimer The author produced this paper in a Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government. This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release. ii Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii ABSTRACT . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . ix 1 INTRODUCTION . 1 Overview . 1 Methodology . 2 Definitions . 2 Limits of the Argument . 3 Notes . 3 2 TIME IN THE THEORY OF WAR . 5 War Theorists on Time . 6 Characteristics of Time in War . 7 Physical and Psychological Aspects of Time . 8 Political and Military Dynamics of Time . 9 Summary . 10 Notes . 11 3 THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF 1967 . 13 The Course of the War . 13 Political Imperatives . 14 Military Imperatives . 15 The Time Problem . 15 Operational Consequences and Risk . 16 Airpower’s Role . 17 Summary . 19 Notes . 20 4 THE FALKLANDS WAR . 21 The Course of the War . 21 Political Imperatives . 22 Military Imperatives . 24 The Time Problem . 25 Operational Consequences and Risk .
    [Show full text]
  • Vauban!S Siege Legacy In
    VAUBAN’S SIEGE LEGACY IN THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, 1702-1712 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Jamel M. Ostwald, M.A. The Ohio State University 2002 Approved by Dissertation Committee: Professor John Rule, Co-Adviser Co-Adviser Professor John Guilmartin, Jr., Co-Adviser Department of History Professor Geoffrey Parker Professor John Lynn Co-Adviser Department of History UMI Number: 3081952 ________________________________________________________ UMI Microform 3081952 Copyright 2003 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ____________________________________________________________ ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road PO Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 ABSTRACT Over the course of Louis XIV’s fifty-four year reign (1661-1715), Western Europe witnessed thirty-six years of conflict. Siege warfare figures significantly in this accounting, for extended sieges quickly consumed short campaign seasons and prevented decisive victory. The resulting prolongation of wars and the cost of besieging dozens of fortresses with tens of thousands of men forced “fiscal- military” states to continue to elevate short-term financial considerations above long-term political reforms; Louis’s wars consumed 75% or more of the annual royal budget. Historians of 17th century Europe credit one French engineer – Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban – with significantly reducing these costs by toppling the impregnability of 16th century artillery fortresses. Vauban perfected and promoted an efficient siege, a “scientific” method of capturing towns that minimized a besieger’s casualties, delays and expenses, while also sparing the town’s civilian populace.
    [Show full text]
  • Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths
    FOURTH-GENERATION WAR AND OTHER MYTHS Antulio J. Echevarria II November 2005 Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. This publication is a work of the United States Government, as defined in Title 17, United States Code, section 101. As such, it is in the public domain and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, section 105, it may not be copyrighted. ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** This monograph is an expanded version of an article entitled "Deconstructing the theory of Fourth-Generation War," published in the August 2005 symposium of Contemporary Security Policy. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be ordered from our Homepage. SSI’s Homepage address is: www.StrategicStudies Institute.army.mil. ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts.
    [Show full text]
  • Four Lessons That the U.S. Navy Must Learn from the Dreadnought Revolution Angus K
    Naval War College Review Volume 63 Article 12 Number 4 Autumn 2010 Four Lessons That the U.S. Navy Must Learn from the Dreadnought Revolution Angus K. Ross Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Ross, Angus K. (2010) "Four Lessons That the U.S. Navy Must Learn from the Dreadnought Revolution," Naval War College Review: Vol. 63 : No. 4 , Article 12. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/12 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen Ross: Four Lessons That the U.S. Navy Must Learn from the Dreadnought R FOUR LESSONS THAT THE U.S. NAVY MUST LEARN FROM THE DREADNOUGHT REVOLUTION Angus K. Ross There is only one thing harder than getting an old idea out of a military mind, and that is to get a new one in. SIR BASIL H. LIDDELL HART our years ago, on 14 June 2006, at a Current Strategy Forum held at the Na- Fval War College, the then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Mi- chael Mullen, challenged the audience to think about a new strategy for the U.S. Navy.1 Recalling the enthusiasm and fresh thinking that had surrounded the de- velopment of the World War II ORANGE plans against Japan and a later, Cold War, naval strategy, he urged that the time was ripe to take an equally fundamen- tal look at the needs and constraints of the modern age and to codify a possible maritime contribution to emerging national objectives.
    [Show full text]
  • Rainbow Six Siege Recommended Settings
    Rainbow Six Siege Recommended Settings Superfluid and cancrizans Theodor unlays: which Shem is apostolic enough? Bernd overprizes his andescorts springtime. estating Hardierroundabout and epistolicor staccato Hastings after Toddie never glad-handsled his mingling! and etymologizes ferociously, chirpier But for rainbow six siege random op generator for third year is recommended settings recommendations made. Xim apex legends, footsteps to create a wide range is massive input device will continue to learn and they suit you the framerates and. Proper recoil settings rainbow six: setting sets it, recommended system is xresolver still hope you to help you have to the map, which enables gamers. XIM APEX Player Slamming Champs In Ranked! Sizzlerb from rainbow siege. End pcs which need something to actually set the game settings; audiophiles please check out, sets a violent mob ai for. Bir de çok pahalı gibi, kullanan varsa aldığı linki atabilir mi? This was gambled that i run it initially received a quick access and recommended settings that is recommended system of your. Xt low settings rainbow six siege settings, recommended to date, right click on a tutorial missions and latest. Fps looks like you also recently. Does also increase FPS? The recommended settings recommendations for gain the action within siege transparent background or console vod review before your performance on and recommend? So it is the latest information comes to the action, these are recommendations! Desktop Window Manager consumes high CPU or memory. To rainbow six. Gaming settings set the recommended for team is such clear happens more unusual choice for anyone who are available for a fluid and.
    [Show full text]
  • Third-Generation Warfare
    Generations, Waves, and Epochs MODES OF WARFARE AND THE RPMA* DR ROBERT J. BUNKER HE PUBLICATION of the article written by Col Specifically, these modes of warfare and perspectives Owen E. Jensen, USAF, entitled “Information on the revolution in political and military affairs TWarfare: Principles of Third-Wave War” in the (RPMA) need to be analyzed because these assump­ Winter 1994 issue of Airpower Journal represents a tions provide the foundations behind each theory’s pro­ significant event. Tofflerian concepts, which have jections of future warfare. 3 Instances where the meth­ gained so much credence with the Army, are now be- odology behind such assumptions falls short should thus ginning to openly influence Air Force dialogue on in- be a cause for concern because if a theory cannot accu­ formation-based future war. In that article, Colonel rately explain past modes of warfare and military revo­ Jensen states that “the Tofflers provide probably the lutions, it will surely be unable to account for future clearest and most accurate explanation of how this new ones. type of warfare evolved.” 1 Only after such analysis is undertaken can Air Force Before the Air Force openly embraces the officers decide what attributes of the Tofflerian frame- Tofflerian trinity of agrarian, industrial, and informa­ work, and potentially those of the competing frame- tional war forms, some well-informed reflection should works, should be utilized in the creation of post- first take place. This reflection requires an understand­ Clausewitzian principles of future warfare. 4 This ar­ ing of the three dominant theories of future war cur­ ticle provides an overview and synopsis of each com­ rently debated in the military journals— fourth-gen­ peting theory, discusses its impact and shortcomings, eration warfare, third-wave war, and fourth-epoch war.
    [Show full text]
  • Total War" Author(S): Hans Speier Source: American Sociological Review, Vol
    Class Structure and "Total War" Author(s): Hans Speier Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Jun., 1939), pp. 370-380 Published by: American Sociological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2084924 . Accessed: 27/09/2011 20:49 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Sociological Review. http://www.jstor.org CLASS STRUCTURE AND "TOTAL WAR" HANS SPEIER New Schoolfor Social Research W ARS ARE the products of the civilization in which they are waged. Their specific character is dependent upon the specific organization of society in times of peace. Since it is always a society that is at war with another society, any aspect of war is fully intelligible only when it is seen in relation to the given organization of those societies, their tech- nologies and their institutions, their material resources and their morals. In this broad sense war has always been totalitarian, but today, the term "Total War" has a special connotation, and there is a good reason for using it in a narrower sense. Total war is unlimited in character; it is what Clause- witz called "absolute war." It differs from that type of war which prevailed in the two centuries prior to the World War.
    [Show full text]
  • Command & Commanders in Modern Warfare
    COMMAND AND COMMANDERS , \ .“‘,“3,w) .br .br “Z ,+( ’> , . I ..M IN MODERN WARFARE The Proceedings of the Second Military History Symposium U.S. Air Force Academy 23 May 1968 Edited by William Geffen, Lt. Colonel, USAF, Air Force Academy O5ce of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF and United States Air Force Academy 1971 2nd edilion, enlarged let edition, United States Air Force Academy, 1969 Views or opinions expressed or implied in this publication are those of the authors and are not to be construed as carrying official sanction of the Department of the Air Force or of the United States Air Force Academy. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $2.65 Stock Number 0874-0003 ii PREFACE The essays and commentaries which comprise this book re- sulted from the Second Annual Military History Symposium, held at the Air Force Academy on 2-3 May 1968. The Military History Symposium is an annual event sponsored jointly by the Department of History and the Association of Graduates, United States Air Force Academy. The theme of the first symposium, held on 4-5May 1967 at the Air Force Academy, was “Current Concepts in Military History.” Several factors inspired the inauguration of the symposium series, the foremost being the expanding interest in the field of military history demonstrated at recent meetings of the American Historical Association and similar professional organizations. A professional meeting devoted solely to the subject of military his- tory seemed appropriate. The Air Force Academy’s Department of History has been particularly concerned with the history of military affairs and warfare since the founding of the institution.
    [Show full text]
  • Industrial Modernization and the American Civil War Corey Patrick Gray
    Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2015 Industrial Modernization and the American Civil War Corey Patrick Gray Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES INDUSTRIAL MODERNIZATION AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR By COREY PATRICK GRAY A Thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts 2015 Corey Patrick Gray defended this thesis on April 27, 2015. The members of the supervisory committee were: Michael Creswell Professor Directing Thesis Ronald E. Doel Committee Member G. Kurt Piehler Committee Member The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and certifies that the thesis has been approved in accordance with university requirements. ii This thesis is dedicated to my wife, who has been steadfast in her support and encouragement. It is also dedicated to Michael Creswell, my mentor and friend, who taught me that a steadfast focus on the fundamentals and constancy are key ingredients for success, no matter the endeavor. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Dr. Michael Creswell has been the ideal thesis supervisor. His sage advice, insightful criticisms, and patient encouragement aided the writing of this thesis in innumerable ways. I would also like to thank Dr. Nancy Marcus, Dean of Graduate Studies, whose steadfast support of this project was greatly needed and deeply appreciated. To Dr. Neil Jumonville for his tireless support and encouragement. To Dr. Matt Childs that taught me to strive for richer context in the historical narrative.
    [Show full text]