COPYRIGHT AND CITATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR THIS THESIS/ DISSERTATION o Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. o NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes. o ShareAlike — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you must distribute your contributions under the same license as the original. How to cite this thesis Surname, Initial(s). (2012) Title of the thesis or dissertation. PhD. (Chemistry)/ M.Sc. (Physics)/ M.A. (Philosophy)/M.Com. (Finance) etc. [Unpublished]: University of Johannesburg. Retrieved from: https://ujcontent.uj.ac.za/vital/access/manager/Index?site_name=Research%20Output (Accessed: Date). Cooperation of South African democratic intelligence oversight structures for good governance by NAKAMPE MICHAEL MASIAPATO A thesis submitted in fulfilment for the Degree of Doctor Litterarum et Philosophiae in Public Management and Governance at the College of Business and Economics UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG Supervisor: Prof F Cloete Co-supervisor: Prof CJ Auriacombe 2017 DECLARATION I certify that the thesis submitted by me for the degree at the University of Johannesburg is my independent work and has not been submitted by me for a degree at another university. Nakampe Michael Masiapato ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my sincere thanks and appreciation to: Almighty God who through His grace and mercy empowered me to successfully navigate and survive all kinds of weather. He gave me the ability, strength and resilience to complete this project. Prof Fanie Cloete, my mentor and supervisor, for his patience, guidance and friendly advice during the entire project. Prof Christelle Auriacombe, my co-supervisor for her resilience, patience and perseverance during trying times. My Apostle (Dr) Lucky Chawane and the entire KCA congregation for their prayers and understanding during difficult days. Ms Sarah Monyaki and Ms Karen de Lange for their inputs and contributions in IT and graphics work respectively. All oversight, ombud, audit and other officials for the professionalism in answering the interview questions as posed. All oversight officers and external experts who availed themselves for an interview session and provided expert responses to the posed questions. My parents, Mr Boy and Mrs Mmaselaelo Masiapato for their continued sacrifices, patience and encouragement during the entire project. iii My friends and colleagues at the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC) for their pieces of advice and inputs during the compilation of this thesis. iv DEDICATION I would like to dedicate this thesis to my lovely wife Ms Shirley Masiapato and our three boys, Quincy, Quinton and Mike Junior for their understanding during my absence in pursuit of this agenda. v ABSTRACT Before 1994, members of the intelligence services did not operate within a particular set of statutory and regulatory frameworks. At the time, there was no clear separation of civilian, police and/or military intelligence services (Bruneau and Boraz: 2007). Their priorities were centred on the collection, analysis and dissemination of internal security threats posed by the liberation movements. Further, their preoccupation was to fiercely enforce the draconian statutory and regulatory frameworks to protect white supremacy and advance the apartheid agenda (Dombroski in Bruneau and Dombroski: 2001). Given the arrangement, the apartheid government did not make any effort to create any intelligence oversight structure to ensure the compliance of members of the intelligence services to the country’s statutory and regulatory prescripts. However, after 1994 the ANC government undertook a number of measures to correct the situation. These measures gave rise to the creation of the clear civilian, police and military intelligence services with explicit sets of powers and legislated mandates. Through the Intelligence Services Oversight Act, 1994, the government established multifaceted intelligence oversight machinery. This was done to ensure the compliance of the intelligence services with the country’s statutory and regulatory framework. Unfortunately, the operational modalities of the intelligence oversight structures remain fragmented, uncoordinated and reflect a silo approach, thereby playing a minimal or no role in the promotion of good governance results (Dube: 2013); (Dlomo: 2004); (Netshithenzhe: 2005). This thesis seeks to find ways to improve the cooperation of these structures when overseeing members of the intelligence services. To achieve the above-mentioned objective, the thesis firstly described the context - that is, the South African intelligence services and its oversight machinery. Secondly, a global benchmarking exercise on selected countries was conducted for the purpose of drawing lessons for South Africa. Thirdly, the thesis presented techniques, methods vi and procedures for utilisation in the implementation of the research project. Fourthly, it assessed the rationale for, and state of cooperation among intelligence oversight structures. Fifthly, the thesis then assessed the nature of barriers and challenges facing oversight structures when attempting to cooperate with each other. Sixthly, the thesis presented proposals on what to do to improve the cooperation of these structures when conducting their oversight work. Lastly, a systematic cooperation model for guiding the future cooperation of intelligence oversight structures was presented to serve as an instrument for streamlining the work of oversight structures and guide their efforts towards the realisation of good governance results. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Declarations ii Acknowledgements iii Dedication v Abstract vi List of key terms and abbreviations xv CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND SCIENTIFIC ORIENTATION TO THE STUDY 1.1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.2 OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE 2 1.2.1 Pre-1994 period 2 1.2.2 Transitional period 3 1.2.3 Current intelligence architecture 5 1.3 Democratic intelligence oversight structures 11 1.4 Problem statement 15 1.4.1 Fragmentation 17 1.4.2 Lack of coordination 17 1.4.3 Lack of cooperation and collaboration 19 1.5 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 21 1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 23 1.7 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 26 1.8 RESEARCH ETHICS 27 1.9 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 28 1.10 CONTRIBUTION TO BODY OF KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE OF COORDINATION 30 1.11 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY 31 viii 1.12 THESIS STRUCTURE 32 1.12.1 Chapter one: Background to the study 32 1.12.2 Chapter two: Review of good international intelligence oversight systems 33 1.12.3 Chapter three: Research methodology 33 1.12.4 Chapter four: Structural cooperation among oversight structures 34 1.12.5 Chapter five: Barriers to improved cooperation of structures 34 1.12.6 Chapter six: Strategies to improve cooperation of structures 34 1.12.7 Chapter seven: Proposed improved cooperation model 34 1.13 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 35 CHAPTER 2: CONTEXTUAL AND THEORETICAL VARIABLES INFLUENCING GOOD INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 2.1 INTRODUCTION 36 2.2 GLOBAL BENCHMARKING OF DEMOCRATIC INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT 37 2.3 SELECTED INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES ON INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT 38 2.3.1 Australia 40 2.3.2 Canada 42 2.3.3 New Zealand 44 2.3.4 United Kingdom (UK) 46 2.3.5 United States (US) 47 2.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON INTERNATIONAL OVERSIGHT STRUCTURES 49 2.4.1 Rationale for, and state of cooperation among intelligence oversight structures 49 2.4.2 Barriers to effective cooperation of intelligence oversight structures 51 2.4.3 Strategies for effective cooperation of intelligence oversight structures 52 ix 2.5 Theoretical frameworks 54 2.5.1 Systems theory 55 2.5.2 Good democratic governance theory 59 2.6 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOUTH AFRICA 67 2.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 75 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY 3.1 INTRODUCTION 77 3.2 RESEARCH PARADIGM 78 3.2.1 Qualitative paradigm 80 3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 83 3.3.1 Qualitative case study 83 3.4 RESEARCH PROCEDURE 87 3.4.1 Data collection instruments 88 3.4.2 Target population and description of respondents 93 3.4.3 Data presentation 94 3.4.4 Data analysis 95 3.5 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 99 3.5.1 Internal validity 99 3.5.2 Construct validity 100 3.5.3 External validity 101 3.5.4 Reliability 101 3.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 102 3.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 103 x CHAPTER 4: STRUCTURAL COOPERATION AMONG DEMOCRATIC INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT STRUCTURES IN SOUTH AFRICA 4.1 INTRODUCTION 105 4.2 SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT ARCHITECTURE 106 4.2.1 Intelligence oversight by the Legislature 107 4.2.2 Intelligence oversight by the Executive 110 4.2.3 Intelligence oversight by the Judiciary 112 4.2.4 Intelligence oversight by the Administrative Structure 116 4.2.5 Intelligence oversight by chapter 9 institutions 120 4.3 THE RATIONALE FOR EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT COOPERATION 127 4.3.1 Emergence of fourth generation warfare 132 4.3.2 Different intelligence oversight mandates 134 4.3.3 Varied intelligence oversight powers 136 4.3.4 Application of varied intelligence oversight methods 137 4.3.5 Different intelligence oversight intervals 138 4.3.6 Different reporting modalities 140 4.3.7 Potential for human rights violations 142 4.3.8 Need for transparency and public accountability 144 4.4 THE CURRENT STATE OF COOPERATION AMONG OVERSIGHT STRUCTURES 145 4.4.1