A CONSERVATIVE AGAINST IDTLER a Conservative Against Hitler

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A CONSERVATIVE AGAINST IDTLER A Conservative Against Hitler

Ulrich von Hassell: Diplomat in Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, 1881-1944

GREGOR SCHOLLGEN Professor of Modern History University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

Translated by Louise Willmot Foreword by Michael Balfour

Palgrave Macmillan ISBN 978-1-349-21759-5 ISBN 978-1-349-21757-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-21757-1 English translation© Louise Willmot 1991 Foreword© Michael Balfour 1991 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1991

First published as Ulrich von Hassell, 1881-1944 by Verlag C. H. Beck, Miinchen, 1990.

First published in the United States of America in 1991

ISBN 978-0-312-05784-8

Ubrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schollgen, Gregor [Ulrich von Hassell, 1881-1944. English] A conservative against Hitler : Ulrich von Hassell, diplomat in imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, 1881-1944 I Gregor Schollgen; translated by Louise Willmot; foreword by Michael Balfour. p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-312-05784-8 1. Hassell, Ulrich von, 1881-1944. 2. Ant-Nazi movement• Germany-Biography. 3. Statesmen-Germany-Biography. 4. Germany-Politics and govemment-1933-1945. I. Title. DD247.H33S3613 1991 943.086'092---dc20 [B] 90-48824 CIP Contents

~~~~ ~ List of Abbreviations ~i Foreword by Michael Balfour viii ~~ ~ Introduction 1 PART I THE YOUNG CONSERVATIVE (1881-1919) 5 1 Background, Education and Early Diplomatic Experiences 7 2 In the Prussian Administration 14

PART II THE DIPLOMAT (1919-1938) 27 3 Preparing a Career 29 4 Envoy of the Weimar Republic 35 5 Ambassador of the Third Reich 44

PART III THE OPPONENT (1938-1944) 65 6 Activities and Occupations 67 7 Foreign Contacts and Peace-feelers 78 8 The State of the Future: Visions in Wartime 95 9 Failure 116 Conclusion 122

Appendix: 128 Document I Ulrich von Hassell, We Young Conservatives. An Appeal (1918) 129 Document II Press Declaration of Envoy Ulrich von Hassell on the Tensions in Germany and the Questions of Reparations and Disarmament (1932) 133 Document III Ulrich von Hassell, Germany Between West and East (1944) 136

Not~ 147 Bibliography 173 Index 185

v List of Plates

1. The student at Prinz-Heinrich-High-School in Berlin. 2. The father-in-law, Alfred von Tirpitz, with his daughter Ilse, Ulrich von Hassell's wife, 1914, in Karlsbad. 3. The envoy Ulrich von Hassell and his family, 1926, in Kopenhagen. 4. Ulrich von Hassell and Benito Mussolini in the garden of Villa Massimo in Rome. 5. Mussolini welcoming Hitler upon his arrival in Venice, 14 June 1934. Behind the 'duce' the pensive Ulrich von Hassell, who was largely responsible for arranging this meeting. 6. Ambassador von Hassell, Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Min- ister von Neurath, June 1934, in Venice. 7. Ilse von Hassell, in the mid-1930s. 8. Ulrich von Hassell, in the early 1940s. 9. Ulrich von Hassell and Carl Goerdeler standing trial in the Volksgerichtshof, 7 September 1944. 10. Ulrich von Hassell, trying to get a word in with the screaming president of the Volksgerichtshof, Roland Preisler.

vi List of Abbreviations

AA Auswartiges Amt ADAP Akten zur deutschen auswiirtigen Politik AP Auswiirtige Politik. Monatshefte des Deutschen Instituts fiir Aussenpolitische Forschung [etc.] BA Bundesarchiv Koblenz DBFP Documents on British Foreign Policy DGFP Documents on German Foreign Policy FDLR Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Hyde Park (New York) FO Foreign Office FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States HZ Historische Zeitschrift HZ Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte Munich MWT Mitteleuropaischer Wirtschaftstag NA National Archives Washington, D.C. PA/AA Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes Bonn PRO Public Record Office London Tagebiicher Die Hassell-Tagrbiicher 1938-1944 VfZG Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte

vii Foreword by Michael Balfour

I am delighted that a biography of Ulrich von Hassell should be published in English. At first sight Hassell's influence upon events may not seem great enough to justify devoting a whole book to his career. The highest post which he reached was that of German Ambassador to Italy at the time when the Axis Pact was concluded between the two coun• tries. But he disapproved of the policy which the pact represented and for that reason was sacked by Hitler and Ribbentrop. He was executed for taking part in the conspiracy against Hitler but was not directly involved in any of the attempts on the Fuhrer's life for the good reason that he did not have access either to the target or to the explosives which were indispensable for such an attempt. His plans for a post-Hitler Germany were not exclusive to him and were not in fact adopted. There are, however, two reasons why I consider him to be an interesting subject of study for British readers. Firstly, while his personality and ideas embodied the German conservative outlook at its best, they also demonstrated the limitations of that outlook. For it gave pride of place to 'heroic' virtues such as courage, discipline, loyalty, industry and self-denial, qualities whose merit depends on the ends which they are exerted to serve. The overriding importance of such ends as respect for the individual personality and for truth tended to be put second. The claims of the sovereign national state were exalted, the counter-claims of humanity overlooked and even ridiculed. Hitler's access to power was in the last analysis due to his exploitation of the false balance between these two groups of values. Many Germans who helped him to power, or at least acquiesced in his acquisition, of it were horrified at the result but found it hard to understand how they had contributed. Most of them managed in one way or another to avoid facing the issue or were inhibited by loyalty to their country from supporting action to change the regime at the risk of losing the war. Von Hassell was one of the few whose consciences convinced them that, for the sake of Germany's

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reputation in history, such a risk ought to be run, although he hoped that the Anglo-Americans would have enough vision to deal gently with a defeated foe. One almost inevitable result of this German conservative out• look was the antagonism which dominated Anglo-German relations between 1870 and 1945. This is the second reason why von Hassell has a claim to British interest. At first sight there may not seem to be much difference between him and his counterparts among British diplomats. He was a cultured man with a wide knowledge of history and European literature, articulate and thoughtful, who could have had a distinguished academic career had he so desired. He may have been deaf to the claim of ordinary men to have a say as to how the world they live in should be run. But his sincere protestant faith (possibly underemphasised in this book) made natural to him a benevolent attitude towards his fellow-men. Although he could talk in 1920 about the need for protection against an excess of harmful foreign and particularly Jewish influences (19), he was appalled by the Final Solution. Yet von Hassell's thinking was based upon a principle which would have been firmly repudiated by his opposite numbers in Brit• ain. He believed fundamentally that Germany's genius for organi• sation, along with her culture and inventiveness, made it in the common interest of Europe for her to dominate that continent. 'A healthy Europe never has and never .will exist without Germany as its healthy and strong heart' (145). He venerated Bismarck above all other statesmen for having realised the potentialities of German resources by ending the age-old division into small weak units. In the years before 1914 he felt that only by becoming a Great Power and winning world stature could Germany have a chance of maintaining herself among the other Powers and survive (24). His father had regarded England as Germany's chief enemy (10) and it is now clear that his father-in-law Admiral von Tirpitz took it as a fundamental if unspoken assumption that German ambitions could not be realised without war with Britain. Not only would his elders have justified this attitude by arguing that war was the traditional method by which the international status of nations was adjusted to changes in their relative strength but they would also have claimed that, if other states joined together in encircling Germany with a view to preventing her from obtaining her desires, they were as much to blame as she for any consequent conflict. They might further have argued that Germany could not X Foreword by Michael Balfour afford to let Austria-Hungary be beaten by Russia (as she would have been if left unaided) because Germany would then have to face a Franco-Russian Alliance and a two-front war on her own. The solution of relying on British friendship would be ruled out by the fact that Britain's price would be Germany's abandonment of her World Power ambitions. The flaw in this outlook became evident when Germany lost the war. As Schiller said, 'World History is the World's Court of Judgement'. Ulrich von Hassell would seem to have taken the Court's ruling to heart. As Hitler for long did himself, he made it a basic pdnciple of German policy after 1919 to maintain good relations with Britain. He ceased to emphasise the need for Germany to become a World Power. He did not ask for the return of German colonies. His dismissal in 1938 resulted from his objection to Ribbentrop's policy of organising an anti-British coalition. He was one of the few Germans who realised that Hitler's fatal mistake was the occupation of Prague in March 1939 because it decisively alienated British opinion (Diary, 20-vii-43). But he cannot be said to have been 'pro-British'. He only seems to have visited Britain once, for six weeks in 1909. His wife spent the year 1902-3 at Cheltenham Ladies College and her sister followed her two years later. She must have looked back on the experience with some satisfaction since she kept in touch with a member of the staff and sent her daughter to stay in Cheltenham in the 1930s. Except for four years in Denmark, her husband never served in a democratic country. The only British colleague whom he carne to know at all well was Nevile Henderson, who was in Belgrade with him for two years. In 1918 he expressed great misgivings about the 'mechanical' form of society which he saw embodied in the Anglo-American world (16). He never got over his dislike for and cultural contempt of the US; in 1943 he wrote of 'Americanised mishmash' (147). He found fault with Helmuth von Moltke for his 'Anglo-Saxon mentality' (Diary, 7-ii-44). His desire to keep on good terms with Britain did not involve any scaling down of his ambitions for Germany inside Europe but rather a hope that a more friendly atmosphere would enable Germany to convince Britain of the advantage to herself of having a strong Power organising at any rate East and South-east Europe and in particular acting as a bulwark against the Western spread of Bolshevism. German hegemony was to replace the Balance of Power. 'London' must be induced to give up finally its view of Foreword by Michael Balfour xi

itself as a central point supervising Europe (142). Until 1939 von Hassell's basic aim was to secure by consent the cancelling-out of the consequences of losing the war embodied in the Treaty of Versailles. When in 1940 Hitler completed this process, von Hassell, although doubtful about some of the methods used, found it 'very hard not to take pleasure in the achievement' (Diary 24-vi-40). In judging this attitude, certain points need to be borne in mind. Firstly, the Treaty of Versailees was a document to which no sensible man would ever have set his hand if he had known that the forces which had been available to impose it were not, after the withdrawal of the US into isolation, going to remain available to maintain it. Indeed, as Professor Schollgen points out, the British Government between 1935 and 1939, in its anxiety to avoid war, showed readiness to let Germany acquire not merely what she had lost at Versailles but also Austria and the Sudetenland. Secondly, von Hassell professed and probably believed that these acquisitions should be the limit of German ambition; he did not support Hitler's desire for Lebensraum in areas inhabited by non-Germans. Thirdly he had an answer to the British argument, much used during the war, that if Germany were allowed to dominate Europe she would do so in her own interest and at the expense of all the other Europeans. As will be seen below (104-5), he wanted all European states given freedom to develop their spiritual and national qualities, whereas he considered that British imperialism had been characterised by the exploitation of subject peoples. A man who could express such hopes after first-hand experience of Nazi methods was hardly entitled to criticise the Kreisau group for seeing the world as they wanted it to be rather than as it was. But a tendency to self delusion as to the purity of one's own motives is by no means confined to German conservatives. On 15 August 1943 Hassell wrote in his diary that there was only one argument left for Germany to deploy. She must convince either the Russians or the Anglo-Americans that it would be in their interests for Germany to remain intact (adding that while he himself preferred the Anglo-Americans, he had become ready to accept an understanding with the Russians). Four days later he recorded that, when the inevitable moment of change came in Germany, everything possible must be done to rescue at any rate the rudiments of the Bismarckian Reich. He does not seem to have considered the effect which such an approach was likely to have on the enemy, especially if, as he hoped, the Nazis adopted it too. He xii Foreword by Michael Balfour and his friends could not conceive that the Anglo-Americans might prefer to have Eastern Europe dominated by the Russians rather than Central Europe dominated by the Germans. He was playing into the hands of those British ministers and officials who argued that, as far as European security was concerned, there was little to choose between Nazis and Nationalists and that, for that very reason, Germany must not be allowed to remain a power factor. There are of course many in the Western world who would argue that von Hassell and the German nationalists were perfectly right and that a lot of trouble could have been avoided if a united and armed Germany had been kept as a bulwark against Bolshevism. But this is a subject which we cannot as yet see in sufficient perspective to hope for a consensus of opinion; the picture today is already different from what it was thirty years ago. What is more important for the moment is to realise the limitation in the outlook of von Hassell, who thought it perfectly desirable for Germany to dominate Europe, and in that of his British opposite numbers who were determined that Germany must be prevented from doing any such thing. The cultural values of both groups had been largely drawn from common sources. It should have been possible in such a setting to evolve compatible views of the status to which each country was entitled and a considerable amount has been achieved in this direction since 1945, aided perhaps by the fact that it has been absurd for West Germany to think of dominating Eastern Europe. What is certain is that, without such working agreements, the insistence of a partial culture on its entitlement to dominate will complete the destruction of civilisation, already shaken by Europe's two wars. In the nuclear age, patriotism by itself is less than ever enough. Preface

This book is a biographical portrait of Ulrich von Hassell, the conservative, diplomat and opponent of Hitler who was executed in September 1944. It is based on extensive research in German, British and American archives. Footnotes are provided only for direct references and records. For more detailed references the reader is directed to the extended German edition of the study. I am grateful for the expert support of Maria Keipert of the Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry (Bonn), and of the diplomat's sons, Johann Dietrich von Hassell (Ebenhausen) and Wolf Ulrich von Hassell (New York). My thanks are also due to Michael Balfour (Oxford), Ralf Dahrendorf (Oxford), Mark Nelson (New York), and Anthony Nicholls (Oxford) for their attentive reading of the manuscript.

GREGOR ScHOLLGEN

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