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Pakistan and Democracy: Before and After Musharraf by Abhishek Kaicker* Executive Summary

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Pakistan and Democracy: Before and After Musharraf by Abhishek Kaicker* Executive Summary November 2007 www.asiapacifi c.ca Number 47 Pakistan and Democracy: Before and After Musharraf By Abhishek Kaicker* Executive Summary Th e imposition of emergency rule in Pakistan on volatile region that is also rapidly becoming enmeshed November 3 is just the latest and most sensational with Western economies. Even if doomsday scenarios of development to attract extraordinary media attention terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons are never realized, in the past year to President Pervez Musharraf. instability in South Asia could have a very real impact Many Western commentators believe that General on the future of the global economy. Ottawa cannot Musharraf’s days are numbered, despite his latest move remain immune to crises in distant but strategically against those resisting his continued rule, but few have signifi cant countries. seriously considered what will come aft er his departure. Th is question has gained in importance following the While Ottawa’s policy options toward Pakistan are almost-successful suicide-bomb attack against former very limited, Canada is not regarded with the distrust Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who returned from that Pakistanis reserve for their traditional interna- exile in late October with the support of Washington. tional partner, the United States. A window of op- It is diffi cult to avoid the conclusion that some sort of portunity may open if a civilian government comes nominally democratic regime will eventually emerge to power next year. If this comes about, Canada in Islamabad. But the state’s structural characteristics must rapidly increase international development aid suggest that true democracy is a distant dream. and, most importantly, support government capac- ity-building initiatives in Pakistan. Such long-term Th e future of democracy in Pakistan has serious initiatives represent the only way to ease Pakistan’s implications for Canada: Ottawa needs Pakistan’s help structural problems which are far more threatening in fi ghting the Taliban in Southern Afghanistan. But than the day-to-day turmoil which rules the headlines far more importantly, complete state failure in Pakistan, of most newspapers. Canada’s assistance may be able while unlikely, would have serious regional and global to transform the uneasy relationship between Islam- repercussions. Lingering instability, too, will have very abad and its Western counterparts into a functioning serious consequences for Canada that should not be partnership directed toward the accomplishment of underestimated: a weak and semi-governed Pakistan mutual objectives, including the destruction of Al- may provide safe haven to proponents of global jihad, Qaeda and Taliban forces and regional stabilization. and could contribute to uncertainty and confl ict in a * Abhishek Kaicker is a doctoral student in Indian History at Columbia University, New York. He was born in India and raised in New Delhi. He studied History, Classics and Economics at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minnesota. He received an MA in Indian history from the University of British Columbia before beginning a Post-Graduate Research Fellowship at the Asia Pacifi c Foundation where he focused on South Asian economic and political issues, with a particular interest in regional security and strategy. ISSN 1481-0433 November 2007 Pakistan and the West: Failures of Understanding Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, President At the same time, Pakistan has been very protective Musharraf’s international backers have applied a of its sovereignty and has refused to permit US-led Carrot and Stick approach to gain the support of forces to strike at known targets within its borders. Afghanistan’s key neighbour. Th e carrot, off ered NATO commanders watch with chagrin as Taliban immediately aft er September 11, was a massive forces move with impunity from their sanctuaries in transfer of American funds to encourage the regime Pakistan to Afghanistan and back again. to prosecute the War on Terror. Generous debt restructuring programs and increased development Despite a few high-profi le arrests, assistance to assistance funding have been implemented in Pakistan has not achieved its purpose. Indeed, a July the hope that Pakistan’s military establishment 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate bluntly stated will actively destroy Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces that Al-Qaeda forces had reconstituted in Pakistan’s operating from within its borders. According to one Federally Administered Tribal Areas during the estimate, the US alone has supplied Pakistan with as cessation of military activities from September 2006 much as US$25 billion in aid since 2001.1 to July 2007.2 Yet, there has been little to show for this in the six years Now calls for the “stick” are growing louder. Th e since Pakistan became a front-line state in the war US Congress has passed legislation tying the against terror. Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership have disbursement of aid to Pakistan to its progress against reconstituted themselves across Pakistan, most likely Al-Qaeda.3 In newspapers, policy journals, and with the collusion of elements within the Pakistani across the blogosphere, even before the imposition security services. From their safe havens in Quetta of emergency rule, there were rising demands for and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), ter- Western nations to curtail aid to Pakistan if it did rorists have repeatedly organized attacks on targets in not show tangible progress in the war against Al- the West and on coalition forces in Afghanistan. At- Qaeda and the Taliban.4 Since the imposition of tempts to subdue them by military force have stalled, Martial law, the pressure on Western governments to and Pakistan has lost over a thousand soldiers fi ght- demand General Musharraf abdicate power and hold ing militants across the western part of the country. elections has increased further. Many in the policy establishments of the West believe that a return to democracy will lead to the return of an accountable civilian leadership, pressure the army to take the fi ght to the Taliban, halt the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism and lead to the development of a stable and progressive Pakistani state. Musharraf has promised to hold new elections in February, despite emergency rule. Other Western analysts go further, recommending that US or NATO Special Forces should strike at Al-Qaeda or Taliban targets inside Pakistan.5 In response, Pakistan has stated that any violation of the country’s sovereignty or reduction in aid would have General Pervez Musharraf . days may be grave consequences for the “strategic partnership” numbered. with the US and, by implication, other partners in the War on Terror.6 APF Canada - Canada Asia Commentary No. 47 2 November 2007 Notions of both the Carrot and the Stick are Th ere is a ray of hope. General Musharraf’s longer- predicated on a false assumption about Pakistan. term hold on power is loosening, and popular Despite a well-developed academic understanding of support for movement toward a more democratic Pakistan,7 many Western observers think Pakistan is and autonomous state is growing. Th is is disturbing a fully rational state -- a black box that will deliver for many in the West, who would prefer to have a results directly commensurate with the amount of strong central authority lead the fl agging war against international pressure and aid. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Th ere is no guarantee that a democratic regime in Pakistan would be No combination of cajolery or intimidation will force more amenable to the wishes of the international Pakistan to perform in the manner outside observers community: in fact, a weak democratic government expect. In part this is because Pakistanis are better in Pakistan might respond more to its constituency’s at the art of persuasion than their Western partners: dislike of American meddling than to the demands as Stephen Cohen dryly notes, “Pakistanis are expert of NATO forces. But it is becoming increasingly at deciphering American interests and appealing to clear that the current state of aff airs is unsustainable. short term American fears in the hope of establishing General Musharraf has become hugely unpopular a relationship of mutual dependency in which at home, and American offi cials have been pushing Pakistani obligations are minimal while American Pakistan to move toward a semblance of democracy.9 ones are substantial.”8 More importantly, Pakistan Middle-class Pakistanis see Washington’s pressure itself remains divided on ideological, regional, ethnic, to bring Benazir Bhutto (who has been convicted of linguistic and sectarian grounds, the unhealed legacy money-laundering in Switzerland) back to Pakistan of the partition of British India. Th e state is reduced as a false concession to domestic public opinion. to constantly fi ghting fi res on the home front. But it seems likely that some sort of power-sharing mechanism between army and civilian leadership A false dichotomy between ‘coddling’ and ‘punishing’ will eventually emerge. Such an arrangement is of Pakistan has led to an impasse for Western policy- the greatest importance, because Pakistan today faces makers. Th e generally muted response to Musharraf’s an unprecedented set of challenges. suspension of the constitution is only the latest demonstration of this policy bind. How to formulate policy solutions for structural problems that demand a long-term approach when the problems facing Pakistan and its relationship with the West are so immediate? While some would prefer to return to the state of willful ignorance that has characterized the Euro-American relationship with Pakistan, Islamabad can no longer be left to its own fate: State failure will have catastrophic consequences not only for the region but for the world. A perpetually dysfunctional Pakistan will continue to destabilize the region by its hospitality to Islamic terrorists. Th is will threaten the current rapid economic development in the region. Th e prospect of political or economic instability in a nuclear-armed South Asia poses a genuine threat to global security.
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