France's Policy Towards Africa
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3 France’s policy towards Africa Continuity or change?1 Daniela Kroslak The end of the Cold War and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 had a signifi- cant impact on French policy towards Africa. A continent of particular importance to Paris, post-Cold War events and circumstances have contributed to the revision of French involvement in Africa and triggered several political, economic and military reforms. This chapter highlights the changes that French African politics have undergone over the last decade and argues that although a substantial revision has taken place, the effects of which should not be underestimated, certain aspects of the special relation- ship between France and francophone Africa remain firmly in place. This is even more so since a new government (led by Jean-Pierre Raffarin) was elected in 2002. The chapter analyses French African policy and its changes in four parts: the systemic characteristics and institutional intricacies of French policy towards Africa; the political and cultural features that mark the Franco- African relationship; French economic activities and development aid; and France’s military involvement on the continent. Systemic characteristics Traditionally France’s African policy rested on two main pillars: the exclu- sive power of the President and the continuity of a cross-party policy. This has given a highly personalized character to Paris’ policies towards Africa. Due to the French President’s prerogative in foreign policy, which is enshrined in Articles 14 and 52 of the Constitution, French African policy has been almost solely under the control of the Elysée (Presidency). Via the Cellule Africaine (African Unit) of the Elysée (headed between 1986 and 1992 by Mitterrand’s son Jean-Christophe), all important decisions concerning Africa were made by the Presidency, and not as one would expect by the Quai d’Orsay (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). In addition to the President’s power over foreign policy, he alone has ‘the power to dispatch regular … troops overseas without reference to parlia- ment or ministers’ (McNulty 1997: 6). This is a result of the President being the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (Article 15 of the Constitution). 62 Daniela Kroslak During his term in office François Mitterrand made sure that his authority remained uncontested. As Mitterrand said in Le Monde in 1993, ‘Not my ministers, but I am the one who determines French foreign policy … Of course, my ministers are allowed to have their own opinion, but a policy which does not have my approval is unthinkable’ (Brüne 1995: 135). African politics in particular has emerged over time as the French President’s favourite fiefdom. As Smith and Glaser (1997a: xiii) have argued, ‘if, under the Fifth Republic, French foreign policy is considered the domaine réservé of the head of state, Africa, even inside this exclusive notion, constitutes the chasse gardée (private hunting ground)’ of the President. Although the Presidency and its African Unit play the predominant role in French policy towards Africa, a great number of subordinate actors are involved in African politics: the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Defence, the former Ministry of Cooperation, and of Finance, the Caisse Française du Développement and the French Secret Service (DGSE), as well as a powerful network of directors of important public and private compa- nies, the so-called réseaux (Chafer 2002: 347). Jean-François Bayart (1995: 46), scholar and former advisor to the French Foreign Ministry, would add a few more agencies, namely ‘the Prime Minister’s Cabinet … the treasury … the high command of the armed forces … [and] the Ministry of the Interior’. This coterie indicates not only the complexity of French African politics but also the effective lack of trans- parency, reinforced by an absence of democratic control and the influence of a small powerful elite. According to Marchal (1998: 357), this multiplicity of actors dilutes ‘the political priorities that are officially proclaimed’, promotes ‘secret alliances’ and has given ‘remarkable leeway to African heads of state to pursue their own objectives’. Commenting cynically on this system, Verschave (1995: 29) remarked that ‘the demoralisation of the actors of this system are such that one could compare them with the Chernobyl nuclear power plant: any accident becomes possible’. French African politics was thus dominated and managed by a small, tightly knit community of politicians, diplomats and businessmen surrounding the President. As mentioned, Mitterrand’s son Jean-Christophe became presidential advisor in October 1986, ensuring that the President’s and his own entourage’s interest were preserved. Some experts have even insinuated that ‘the majority of political leaders responsible for France’s African politics are “masons” ’, alluding to the secretive and elitist character of Paris’ activities on the conti- nent (Smith and Glaser 1997a: 173). In addition to the selected few involved in the decision-making of Franco-African affairs, the President has ensured that other governmental agencies, such as the Ministry of Cooperation and the DGSE, work within the parameters set by the Elysée’s policies. Intelligence on client states in Africa has been invariably first class2 and first hand since: ‘Beside almost every president of France’s African pré carré (backyard) is a colonel of the DGSE’ (Smith and Glaser 1997a: 104). With the creation of the Ministry of Cooperation in 1961 France’s policy towards Africa 63 (designed to manage French African policy with regards to decolonization), the Elysée found a way to side-step the Quai d’Orsay and ‘continue its peculiar form of personalised diplomacy with African autocrats’ (Adebajo 1997: 148). Politics towards Africa has thus traditionally been marked by a lack of control by and consultation with the National Assembly and various ministries which would normally have their say in foreign interventions, such as the Foreign Ministry or the Ministry of Defence. Having said this, several factors have encouraged the reform of French African policy in general and the systemic intricacies that were so specific to Paris’ policy. First, several setbacks on the African continent have contributed to change. The Rwanda debacle, the crisis in Zaire and the rebellions in the Central African Republic made a new generation of leaders, such as Alain Juppé and Lionel Jospin, realize that French African politics urgently needed an overhaul. Second, the election of such leaders impacted upon Paris’ African policies as these new leaders were much less convinced of the benefits of such a closely knit relationship with Africa and did not enjoy any significant personal links with the continent. Third, a succession of scandals that involved parts of the réseaux deeply affected the political elite in Paris. The structural consequence of the first and second factors was that the Ministry of Cooperation (the ministry often considered by African leaders as ‘theirs’) was integrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although many attempted in vain to abolish the so-called ‘Rue Monsieur’, such as Foreign Minister Michel Jobert in March 1974 or Mitterrand’s Minister of Cooperation, Jean-Pierre Cot, it took until 1998 for the integration to be finalized. The battle had started in June 1995 when Prime Minister Juppé decided to confront his Minister of Cooperation, Jacques Godfrain, with the incorporation into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Jacques Chirac, however, blocked the merger in 1996 on the advice of Jacques Foccart, the ‘Monsieur Afrique’ of several administrations (Bourmaud 1996: 438). It was on Jospin’s initiative in 1998 that the Ministry of Cooperation came under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet compromise between modernizers (Jospin) and traditionalists (Chirac) prevailed and the ministry was not entirely absorbed into the Quai d’Orsay. It maintains a position in the Cabinet through its Minister for Cooperation and Francophonie. Furthermore, a government official affirmed that the collaboration between the ‘Rue Monsieur’ and the Quai d’Orsay remains sporadic.3 The election of a new generation of leaders was, as suggested, key to transforming French African policy in the 1990s. Until then, cross-party agreement had characterized policy. However, the second cohabitation with Edouard Balladur as Prime Minister (1993–5) significantly changed the direction and led to a ‘radical transformation of the Franco-African complex’ (Bourmaud 1996: 435). Alain Juppé, his Foreign Minister (who became Prime Minister 1995–7), also wanted to reform a discredited system. This was, as one commentator put it, managed by 64 Daniela Kroslak people responsible to the Elysée [who] were diplomats inclined to sacri- fice their professional prerogative to certain ambiguous middlemen who, while ostensibly representing France’s interests, in fact were doing little more than acting [for] private interests or financing their own political structures. (Marchal 1998: 358–9) It was, however, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (1997–2002) and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Védrine, who, during another period of cohabitation, launched a multilateral approach to Africa, much to the dismay of many African leaders. It is important to underline two aspects: first, these modernizers come from both sides of the political spectrum and opposed adversaries from within their own political camps; second, since the 2002 elections the idiosyncratic African Unit of the Presidency has been sidelined by de Villepin, which added to a more transparent policy (in rela- tive terms) towards Africa.4 However, old ‘Africa hands’ retain a presence in France’s Africa policies. Jacques Chirac, for example, belongs to, as Bourmaud (1996: 435) put it, ‘the galaxy of “Africans”’. A Gaullist to the core, Chirac has clearly absorbed the idea of the ‘grandeur de la France’ that so marked French African politics of the Fifth Republic. Also a pragmatist, Chirac has tried to reconcile both reformers and traditionalists, reflected in his appoint- ments to key posts where, ‘for lack of an established personal doctrine’, he aimed to strike a balance in order to counter radical reform attempts (Bourmaud 1996: 436).