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1995

Between and : Political Reform in

Tom Ginsburg

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Recommended Citation Tom Ginsburg, "Between Russia and China: Political Reform in Mongolia," 35 Asian Survey 459 (1995).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. POLITICALREFORM IN MONGOLIA BetweenRussia and China

Tom Ginsburg

Transformingsocialist regimes can be broadlycharac- terizedin twoways. The Chinesemodel in whicheconomic liberalization is adoptedwithout political competition has been replicatedto varyingdegrees by otherAsian socialistregimes in the Lao People's DemocraticRepublic and the SocialistRepublic of . In contrast,the EasternEuropean modelis one ofpolitical change proceeding apace witheconomic reform. An interestingcase combiningelements of these two models of socialisttransfor- mationis thatof Mongolia,formerly the Mongolian People's . For 70 yearsa clientstate of theSoviet Union, Mongolia was sometimesknown as the unofficial"sixteenth republic" of the USSR. Followingthe radical changesin EasternEurope in 1990,Mongolia's Communist Party introduced politicalpluralism but unlikeits counterpartsin thosecountries, the Mon- golianPeople's RevolutionaryParty (MPRP) has retainedpower since 1990 despiteallowing electoral competition and politicalfreedom. It has intro- ducedsignificant economic reforms, which may soon beginto produceposi- tivegrowth. Amongformer Soviet bloc nations,Mongolia's economy was themost de- pendenton outsideassistance measured as a percentageof GDP. Whenthe Soviet bloc disintegratedand cut offits aid to poorersocialist countries, Mongoliaexperienced the most serious peacetime economic collapse any na- tionhas facedduring this century.' Yet Mongolia'spolitical road has proved remarkablysmooth compared to mostof theformer Soviet . There havebeen no violentattempts to overthrowthe government, and althoughthe oppositionhas been activeand vocal,political conflict has by and largebeen

Tom Ginsburgis a doctoralcandidate in theJurisprudence and Social PolicyProgram, University of Californiaat Berkeley.The authorwould like to thankHashbatyn Hulan and Dan King forhelpful comments on a draftof thisarticle. ? 1995 by The Regentsof theUniversity of California 1. PeterBoone, "Grassroots Economic Reform in Mongolia,"paper prepared for the confer- ence, SocialistEconomies in Transition, Foundation,May 1993.

459

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 14:01:57 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 460 ASIANSURVEY, VOL. XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995 resolvedthrough negotiation and compromise.This articletraces political reformin Mongoliasince of multipartydemocracy in 1990 withan emphasison understandinghow theMPRP was able to maintainits dominantposition in a multipartyera. It arguesthat the MPRP's short-term resiliencehas been based on a combinationof tacticalsavvy and residual public supportcultivated in the one-partyera. Althoughthis support is di- minishingas economicproblems deepen, the MPRP has shownan abilityto adaptto changingconditions and will likelycontinue to maintainits domi- nantposition for the foreseeable future.

Background Situatedin thegrassland between Russia and China,Mongolia has a littleover two millionpeople, several hundred thousand of whomare semi- nomadicherders living a largelyintact traditional lifestyle. Most of there- mainderare concentratedin thecapital city, (red hero). Modem Mongoliais bestunderstood in thecontext of its complexrelationship with China. From1691 until1911, Mongolia was ruledby theManchu conquer- orsof China,but the nomadic Mongol tribes maintained their distinct identity vis-a'-visthe agriculturaliststo the south. Their desire for culminatedwith the 's declaration of an independentstate in 1911 in theaftermath of theChinese revolution. This statewas led by the Bogdo ,recognized as a reincarnatedBuddhist lama who was boththe temporaland spiritualleader. Therefollowed a periodof turmoil,reflecting internaldiscord in boththe new Republicof China and TsaristRussia. In 1921 a groupof Mongolian revolutionaries gained control of the country withthe help of the Russian Red Army.The Bogdo Khanwas re-installedas a constitutionalmonarch but after his deathno reincarnationwas identified; thecountry was renamedthe Mongolian People's Republicunder the leader- shipof the Mongolian People's RevolutionaryParty (MPRP), whichincluded a coalitionof bothrightist and leftistelements. Soviet assistanceplayed an essentialrole in the re-establishmentof Mongolianindependence after centuries of Chinesedomination.2 The inti- materelationship between Russia and Mongoliafor the next seven decades reflectedin partthe fearamong of renewedChinese intervention, forRussia was perceivedas thelesser of two evils. Mongoliannationhood carriedwith it theprice of nearlytotal reliance on theSoviet Union, and this was seen as acceptableby theleadership. Among the population, the close

2. RobertRupen, Mongols of the TwentiethCentury (Bloomington, Ind.: IndianaUniversity Press,1964); C. E. Bawden,The Modern (: KeganPaul, 1989),2nd edition.

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 14:01:57 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TOM GINSBURG 461 identificationofthe MPRP withthe successful anti-Chinese nationalist move- mentof the 1920s is criticalfor understanding its survivaltoday.

The One-PartyPeriod Politicaldevelopments in Mongoliaafter 1924 closelyparalleled those of the USSR. Consistentwith the rise of Stalinin the SovietUnion, the twenties and thirtiessaw a series of violentpurges and forcedcollectivizations in Mongolia,which broke the power of theremaining Buddhist lamaseries and traditionalnobility. By some estimates,over 100,000persons, roughly 15% of thepopulation, were killed during that period.3 Mongolian traditional cul- turewas repressed,and the cyrillic alphabet was introduced.Mongolia's dic- tatorseven became known as juniorversions of their Soviet counterparts: the ruthlessHorolyn (1928-52), who eliminatedhis rivalsto power, became "Mongolia's Stalin"; his successor, Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal (1952-84), became "Mongolia'sBrezhnev" for his stultifyingeffect on the country. Followingthe Sino-Sovietsplit, the USSR tooka moreactive role in the developmentof Mongoliaas a bufferstate, and stationedits troops through- outMongolian territory. Traditional animosity toward the Chinese was exac- erbated,and in 1980 Chineseresidents were expelled. The economybecame increasinglyintegrated into that of theUSSR, and by the 1980s,nearly 95% of Mongolia'strade was withthe and mostof therest with its allies on the Council on MutualEconomic Assistance (CMEA).4 Signs of changein the USSR led the MPRP in 1984 to replace Tsedenbalwith a youngerleader, Jambyn Batmonh, a successionundoubtedly undertaken with approvalfrom . Behindthe scenes,however, two groupsstruggled forpower within the party.5 Cautious calls forreform began to appearas the economydeteriorated further, and in 1988 a programof "renewal"was initi- ated,paralleling Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and . Following theRussian example, the initial objective of Mongolia'sreform process was to revitalizethe socialist economy rather than replace it. Governmentalauthority throughout the communist period resided theoreti- callyin theGreat People's Hural,controlled by itsseven-member Presidium, and in the Council of Ministers.In fact,the MPRP monopolizedpower. Politicalcompetition and dissentwere not tolerated,and the MPRP estab- lisheda networkof controlover the media, the economy, and all aspectsof

3. D. Dashpurevand S. K. Soni, Reignof Terrorin Mongolia,1920-1990 (Absecon High- lands,N.J.: InternationalBook Company,1992), pp. 44-45. 4. CevdetDenizer and Alan Gelb,"Privatization in Mongolia,"in ChangingPolitical Econo- mies,Vedat Millor, ed. (Boulder,Colo.: LynneReinner, 1994), p. 68. 5. Dashpurevand Soni,Reign of Terror,p. 79.

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 14:01:57 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 462 ASIANSURVEY, VOL. XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995 publiclife. The countrywas dividedinto 18 provincesreflecting traditional administrativedivisions, and thesewere subdivided into counties, each with its own communistparty cell. The politicalsystem of theMPR duringthis periodhas been describedas "totalitarianin intent,but less so in factand effectiveness."6The relativelyloose systemof controlreflected the vastly dispersedand self-sufficientnomadic society in whichgovernment provides fewof the people's basic needs. Despitethe collectivization of herding in the 1950s,the nomadic lifestyle of herdsmencontinued and familieslived as in- dividualunits in theirtraditional pastures. There was littlethreat of grass- rootspolitical organization against communist rule, and thereforelittle need forrepression in thecountryside. The samecould not be said forurban areas, especiallyfor intellectuals, who experiencedtight control and repression.7 One of thepoorest nations in thecommunist bloc, Mongolia received sig- nificantexternal assistance. The economywas heavilysubsidized by theSo- viet Union and its tradingregime, the CMEA. Subsidiesincluded blanket grantsto cover the chronicbudget deficit and were applied to tradingar- rangementsand infrastructureconstruction projects. Massive inflowsof aid and goods meantthat the average herdsman enjoyed a farbetter standard of livingthan he would have had withoutthem. Public healthprograms and educationwere extended even to remoteherding families, and luxuryitems fromEastern Europe were available at low prices. Improvedliving standards contributedto thelegitimacy of theMPRP, whichbecame a relativelypopu- lar communistparty, especially in thecountryside. The partyclaimed links withthe national hero Sukhbaatar, who led the1921 revolution and is univer- sally perceivedas the liberatorof the countryfrom the Chinese. These claimswere reinforced through the state-controlled media and educationsys- tems,which repressed alternative views. All of theabove factorswere cru- cial in endowingthe partywith legitimacy and underpinnedthe MPRP's survivalinto a democraticera.

Transition:1989-1992 Followingthe domino-likefall of communistregimes in EasternEurope, a reformistgroup called the MongolianDemocratic Union was formedin Ulaanbaatarin December1989. Earlythe next year, it beganto call forthe regimeto standdown and launcheddemonstrations on the main square of Ulaanbaataras well as a hungerstrike. The MPRP was dividedover how to respond.At the 19thParty Congress in 1990, it debatedwhether to

6. Paul Hyer,"Mongolian People's Republic,"in WorldEncyclopedia of Political Parties, GeorgeE. Delury,ed., 2nd edition(New York: Facts on File, 1987), p. 750. 7. Dashpurevand Soni describethis in some detailin Reignof Terror.

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 14:01:57 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TOM GINSBURG 463 respondwith force, as itsChinese counterpart had donein TiananmenSquare theprevious , or to launchreforms as in theEastern European regimes. The reformgroup within the partywon the day, and Batmonhresigned along withthe entireMPRP CentralCommittee. Batmonh was replacedas chairmanof theGreat Hural and head-of-stateby the48-year-old of foreigneconomic relations and supply,Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat. A new, youngerCentral Committee was appointed,and a new -generalof theMPRP named. Two monthslater, the announced that it would amendthe Constitution to deletethe reference to theMPRP's "leadingrole" in societyand to legalizeopposition parties. It would also createnew polit- ical institutions:a bicamerallegislature, and thenew postsof presidentand vice-president.The firstmultiparty parliamentary 's historywere called forJuly 1990. Thus,the spring of 1990 markeda turningpoint for the MPRP. Unlikeits counterpartsin EasternEurope, the party did notdissolve or handover power to theprotestors; rather, it made a generationalchange in its leadership,and seekingto maintainpower, it called snap electionsto give the minimaltime to organize.The oppositiondemonstrations were catalytic, but the reformsthat followed also stemmedfrom the calls forgreater openness withinthe party that had beenbuilding since 1988. Despitethe magnitude of thepolitical change, it remainsunclear just how widespreadwere the domes- ticpressures for reform. The firstopposition parties were based narrowlyon the urbanintelligentsia who had been educatedin EasternEurope and had followedclosely the dramatic events there in thefall of 1989. These parties formedaround loose groupingsof academicsat theMongolian State Univer- sity. Much of the leadershipof the Social DemocraticParty, for example, was composedof membersof theUniversity's physics and mathematicsde- partments,8while the NationalProgress Party leadership was made up of youngeconomists.9 Only the Democratic Party, the largest of theopposition groups,could boast broadermembership but thatsupport was stillheavily concentratedin Ulaanbaatar.The oppositionparties lacked a significantbase amongthe herds people in thecountryside.10 In 1990 a new bicamerallegislature was electedcomprising the Great Huraland the Small Hural. The GreatHural was a nationalassembly elected

8. These includedS. Batbayar,R. Gonchigdorj,B. Lamjav,and P. Ulaankhuu. 9. Prominenteconomists included the leaderof theparty, D. Ganbold,and the head of the relatedNational Progress Movement, S. Batsuh. Otherwell knowneconomists in theopposition includedformer Central Bank GovernorJargalsaikhan and his brother,Stock MarketDirector ZoIjargal. 10. For an analysisof how herdsmenwere affectedby the politicalchanges, see Melvyn Goldsteinand CynthiaBeale, The ChangingWorld of Mongolia's (Berkeley,Calif.: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1994).

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 14:01:57 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 464 ASIANSURVEY, VOL. XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995 by districts,as in the nominalelections of the communistperiod. It was responsiblefor deciding major affairs of state,appointing the prime minister and the cabinet,and amendingthe Constitution.The Small Hural was a standingparliament elected by proportional representation, and was responsi- ble forpassing ordinarylegislation in betweenthe Great Hural sessions. Over 95% of theeligible voters turned out, and oppositionparties won 40% ofthe seats in theSmall Hural. Butthe Great Hural, the body with the formal powerto constitutethe government,was more conservativewith an over- whelninglyrural MPRP membership.This reflectedthe party's established networkin the countrysideand its significantfinancial and organizational advantagesover the oppositionparties that had been legalizedonly months before. Local communistleaders in the countrysidehad muchmore name recognitionthan opposition figures, who werethemselves divided into sev- eralparties. The MPRP's tacticof callingsnap electionsto defusethe pres- surefor reform appeared to have been successful. Althoughthe Great Hural was dominatedby the MPRP, theparty agreed to forma coalitiongovernment with the oppositionparties, and fourcabinet postswere assignedto them. PunsalmaagiynOchirbat, the leaderwho had presidedover the election,was namedpresident and head-of-state.D. By- ambasurenwas electedprime minister, with National Progress Party leader D. Ganbold as firstdeputy prime minister in chargeof economicaffairs. Vice-president(ex officio)and chairmanof the Small Hural was R. Gonchigdorj,leader of the Social DemocraticParty. K. Zardykhan,a Kazakh who had led calls forreform from within the MPRP, was named deputy chairmanof the Small Hural. The parliamentalso appointeda 20-member multipartyconstitutional drafting commission, chaired by PresidentOchirbat withformer Minister of JusticeBiryaagiyn Chimid serving as secretary."1 Thereare a numberof possibleexplanations for the Party's move to bring in theopposition. One is thatthe younger intellectuals within the party, who had risento positionsof leadershipfollowing the resignation of the Central Committeeand thegenerational change in theMPRP, had morein common withthe intelligentsiaof theopposition than with the staid conservatives of therural leadership. Another is thatmost of the country's economic expertise was concentratedin the ranksof the opposition.Few MPRP apparatchiks knewabout market economics, so thepragmatists within the Party may have invitedthe opposition into government out of genuineconcern for the eco- nomicreform process. A thirdpossible explanation, preferred by manyop- positionleaders, is thatthe MPRP soughtto neutralizeand evendiscredit the oppositionby forminga coalitiongovernment with these parties. By giving

11. WilliamHeaton, "Mongolia in 1990,"Asian Survey, 1991; and Alan J. K. Sand- ers,"Mongolia's New Constitution,"ibid., June 1992, p. 511.

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 14:01:57 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TOM GINSBURG 465 key economicposts to oppositionMPs, theMPRP would be able to blame themshould the economy collapse. The economywas clearlydue fora ma- jor shockwith the inevitableend of Soviet support,so this explanationof MPRP tacticsis a plausibleone. At thevery least, the coalition strategy was effectiveat diffusingopposition to theMPRP. The Small Huraland thenew coalitiongovernment immediately plunged intothe task of reformingthe economic and politicalstructures of thecoun- try.The numberof ministrieswas reducedand thegovernment administra- tion reorganized.Prices were doubled,subsidies eliminated, and private ownershipof herds legalized. An extensiveand radical privatization program was formulated,and legislationto establisha marketeconomy was passed. Politicalreforms were broad-ranging. A commissionwas set up to examine thepurges of the 1930s and to rehabilitatevictims of politicaltrials during thatperiod. The secretpolice were disbandedand controlsover media re- moved. Therewas a renaissanceof interestin traditionalMongolian culture, repressedunder Soviet influenceduring the one-partyperiod. Chinggis Khan,criticized by the Sovietsas feudal,was reinstatedas a nationalhero, and the governmentrevived the . The MPRP distancedit- self fromthe eventsof thepast, blaming them on thepersonal excesses of Choibalsanand Tsedenbalrather than the party itself. Meanwhile,the economycame undersevere pressure when the CMEA traderegime collapsed on January1, 1991. Therewere fuelshortages, and despitethe factthat livestockoutnumbered the populationby more than twelveto one, meatwas unavailablein the cities. Withinthe Small Hural, therewas a good deal of cooperationacross party lines duringthis period. Young reform-mindedMPRP membersoften found themselves in agreement withtheir opposition party colleagues on substantiveissues. The primary cleavagewas overthe pace of reforms,with the opposition demanding rapid liberalizationand theMPRP advocatinga slowerpace. Most of theMPRP leadersin the government,however, were in regularcontact with interna- tionaldonor agencies and financialinstitutions, and understoodthe severity of theeconomic crisis. In policyterms, there was littledisagreement between the governmentand theopposition over what steps to take. This sense of cooperationin the Small Hural did not extendto the rural MPRP membersof the GreatHural, who were not involvedin day-to-day mattersof governance.These local elitesfaced difficulttransitions as the collectiveswere disbanded and convertedinto private companies and cooper- atives. Tension thereforearose withinthe partybetween national policy makersand thoserepresenting its ruralbase. The MPRP of the transition periodwas a broadumbrella containing both groups, and talkthat it might splitin two came up in 1991 whenthe existence of factionswithin the party was admitted.Late thatyear, MPRP reformersunder the leadershipof K.

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 14:01:57 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 466 ASIANSURVEY, VOL. XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995 Zardykhan,deputy chairman of the Small Hural, broke off to formthe MongolianRenewal Party.12 Although they perceived the party as a centrist alternativeto theMPRP, the political base ofthis group was limitedand it did notwin any seats in thenext parliamentary election in 1992. The unintended resultof the splitwas an MPRP dominatedby moreconservative forces.

The Constitutionand the 1992 Elections Aftera longperiod of expertcommentary, public input, and revisionby the Small Hural,a draftconstitution was forwardedto theplenary session of the GreatHural forratification in November1991. The GreatHural had not convenedin fullmembership since shortlyafter the 1990 election;its mem- berswere eager to playa rolein theconstitutional process and deliberatedon the draftfor almost two months.The mostcontroversial issues were sym- bolic ones suchas theofficial name of thecountry, with the MPRP demand- ing thatthe term"People's Republic"remain in place. But debate also centeredon crucialquestions such as the structureof governmentand the wordingof humanrights provisions, and theHural revised the draft several timesin thecourse of its session. Afterintense deliberations, the Great Hural ratified the Constitution in Jan- uary 1992. The finalversion called for a mixed politicalsystem loosely modeledon France's FifthRepublic. The Presidentwould be the head of statewith power to vetoparliamentary legislation,'3 while the Prime Minister would serveas head of the government.The earlierbicameral parliament was to be consolidatedinto a unicameralbody, the StateGreat Hural. The Constitutioncalled forthe formation of newpolitical institutions including a NationalSecurity Council, a ConstitutionalTribunal (called theTsets), and a newbody called the General Council of the Courts to overseejudicial admin- istrationand ensurethe constitutionallydeclared goal of judicial indepen- dence. Legislationpassed along withthe Constitutioncalled fornew parliamen- taryelections to be heldduring the coming summer, as theinterim bicameral parliamenthad accomplishedits maintask. To ensurestability, this imple- mentinglegislation called forstaggered elections for the StateGreat Hural and thePresidency so thatOchirbat would remain in officeuntil 1993. The SmallHural, in itslast session before the parliamentary elections, passed leg- islationto formthe new ConstitutionalCourt, setting up an independentbody

12. Otherprominent members of thisgroup included Minister of JusticeJ. Amarsanaa and L. Tsog, chairof the Legal AffairsCommittee of the Small Hural. 13. The vetocan be overturnedby a two-thirdsmajority of the StateGreat Hural. Constitu- tionof Mongolia,Article 33(1).

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 14:01:57 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TOM GINSBURG 467 to safeguardconstitutional rights and prerogatives as providedby theConsti- tution.The basic institutionsof Mongoliandemocracy had nowbeen created. The elections. If the 1990 electionsmarked the beginningof Mongolia's democraticera, the summer1992 parliamentarypolls saw a conservative backlashsimilar to thoseobserved in otherreforming socialist countries. In thecampaign, the conservative elements of theCommunist Party attempted to blamethe economic collapse on thenew democratic process and theoppo- sition,and exploitedpopular outrage at a bankingscandal in whichcentral bankingtraders with ties to oppositionfigures had squanderedthe country's entiregold reserves (some $80 million)through speculation. Despite the fact thatboth the painful reforms and thebanking scandal had occurredunder an MPRP government,this strategy was effectiveand led to a massiveelectoral victoryin June1992 whenthe MPRP won 71 out of 76 seats. The MPRP's successalso stemmedfrom the . Under the electionlaw, thecountry was dividedinto 26 multimemberdistricts, each of whichelected two to fourmembers of Parliament.Voters had to vote for exactlyas manycandidates as therewere seats available or theirballots wouldbe void. Because theopposition remained divided and had failedsince 1990 to expandsignificantly outside of urbanareas, the MPRP was theonly partyable to fielda candidatefor every seat in thecountry. With the opposi- tionvote splitamong a broadnumber of partiesand coalitions,the MPRP won 93% of theparliamentary seats with only 56% of thepopular vote. The opposition'sweak base in ruralareas was confirmedin the October1992 electionsfor local government,when the MPRP capturedall 18 of thecoun- try'sgovernorships. The MPRP itselfmay have been surprised by themagnitude of itsvictories in 1992. Perhapsthinking it unseemlyfor a partyto win so overwhelmingly in freeelections, it again invitedthe opposition to join thegovernment. But theopposition parties, believing they had madea mistakeby joining the 1990 government,were reluctantto do so again and threatenednot to take their fewseats in theHural. A new governmentwas formedunder the leadership of P. Jasrai,a formerdeputy prime minister known as the architectof the cautiouseconomic reforms of themid-1980s. Although a liberaleconomist by MPRP standards,Jasrai was consideredto be an acceptablecandidate by conservativesas a representativeof the "old" (predemocracy)MPRP. His governmentmaintained the basic policyorientation toward economic reform.

The 1993 PresidentialElections Havingtasted bitter defeat at theparliamentary and local levels in 1992,the oppositionbegan to concentrateefforts on thefirst presidential elections in Mongolianhistory, set forJune 1993. The mainopposition parties this time

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 14:01:57 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 468 ASIANSURVEY, VOL. XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995 agreedto forma coalitionand fielda singlecandidate. Meanwhile, tensions arosebetween the conservative-dominated Hural and President Ochirbat, who beganto use his new constitutionalveto power. Conflictsbetween the presi- dentand theHural emerged on severaloccasions, and thedisputes had to be resolvedby thenew Constitutional Tsets. Ochirbathad maintainedclose ties withliberals he had workedwith during the Small Hural period,and as a leadingmember of thegovernment during the transition, understood the ne- cessityof economicreform. The Hural,by contrast,resisted further reforms. One of theconflicts concerned an internationalpan-Mongolist conference to be hostedby thepresident in 1993,which was challenged,perhaps in fear of Chinesegovernment reaction should Inner Mongolians be allowed to at- tend.14After an appeal to theConstitutional Tsets, the president's right to call theconference was upheld. Anotherconflict arose over tax laws passed in thefall of 1992. Ochirbatwas unhappywith certain provisions in thelaw thathe perceivedto be illiberal,and vetoedthem. The Huraloverturned the vetowith a two-thirdsmajority vote, and thepresident then appealed to the ConstitutionalTsets, arguing that the tax law was unconstitutional.The Tsets agreedand sentthe law back to theHural.15 Thus, although the Hural has takena conservativeturn, the constitutionalbalancing of powershas pre- venteda reversalof thebasic reformorientation. The Tsets and the Presi- dencyhave acted as the primaryconstitutional checks on the conservative unicameralparliament. In thissense, the young institutions of Mongolia's democracyare functioninghealthily. In early 1993, upsetat thePresident's failure to conformto whatit per- ceived as the MPRP line,the conservativewing of the partylaunched an internalfight to rejectOchirbat as thepresidential candidate, even thoughhe was stillwilling to runon theMPRP ticket.The conservativessucceeded in nominatingL. Tudev,long-time editor of theparty newspaper, Unen (Truth), as theircandidate.'6 To retainthe Presidency, Ochirbat would have to make a finalbreak with the party that had broughthim the Presidency. Sensinga tacticalerror on thepart of theMPRP, thecoalition of opposi- tionparties quickly moved to secureOchirbat as theirown candidate.Only the Social Democratshad decidedto go it alone, and theytoo eventually

14. Chinacontinues to suppressnationalist movements in InnerMongolia, and theMongolian governmenthas been carefulnot to antagonizeits neighborin thisregard. 15. Interviewwith G. Nyamdoo,member of theConstitutional Tsets, June 8, 1993. Due to a quirkin thelaw on theConstitutional Tsets, the parliament was able to reinstatethe controversial provisionsover the objectionsof the majorityof the Tsets members.Despite the ambiguous outcome,the underlyingpoint that the Tsets has emergedas an importantinstitutional player remainsvalid. 16. Tudevhad beenan associateof thedictator Tsedenbal, and had beenused as a weaponin Tsedenbal'scampaigns against dissident intellectuals. See Dashpurevand Soni,Reign of Terror, p. 58.

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 14:01:57 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TOM GINSBURG 469 threwtheir support behind Ochirbat. Despite complaints of media manipula- tionby theMPRP17 and polls on theeve of theJune election that showed the race to be a dead heat,Ochirbat won 14 of 18 provinces.The opposition celebratedits first electoral victory in themultiparty period, and a of dividedgovernment was introduced.Despite the victory, however, it would be a mistaketo considerOchirbat's triumph as an overwhelmingvindication of the opposition.As presidentfor nearly three years prior to the election, Ochirbathad a greatdeal of personalappeal amongvoters. Name recogni- tionappears to be moreimportant than ideological factors in Mongolianpoli- tics,consistent with the tendencyof ruralvoters to elect local partyelites whomthey know. Thissuggests that it will take some time for the opposition to makedeep inroadsinto rural areas dominatedby conservativelocal elites. Frustrationwith the MPRP governmentand theconservative Hural contin- ued to buildafter the presidential election. The oppositionparties were par- ticularlyupset about alleged manipulationof the media by the MPRP, arguingthat the Hural's newspaperwas not producingaccurate reports of parliamentaryproceedings, but rather was servingas an MPRP propaganda organ. The issue of themedia is a crucialone forthe opposition if it is ever to expandbeyond the urban centers. Although censorship and formalrestric- tionson newspaperownership had been withdrawn in 1990,newsprint ration- ing preventedmany new publicationsfrom emergingand becoming economicallyviable. In addition,the government'scontinued control over TV and radiowas of vitalimportance in a countrywhere most of thevastly dispersedpopulation does notreceive newspapers. Broadcast media are the onlypractical means of reachingthe remote rural areas. In April 1994,twenty people launcheda hungerstrike in themain square of Ulaanbaatarto protestagainst the government'8; their numbers soon grew to 36, and largecrowds of supportersgathered around. Opposition MPs were amongthe strikers,including former Vice-President R. Gonchigdorjof the Social DemocraticParty, who had been a prominentleader during the rapid liberalizationof 1990-92. The governmentnewspaper reported that protests were spreadingto othercities. Initialreports suggested that the demonstra- torsfocused on parliamentaryand governmentalcorruption, but theyalso called on the MPRP governmentto nullifya pre-constitutionalresolution concerningdemonstrations and submitto the Hural a bill guaranteeingthe rightto demonstrateas well as one on pressfreedom. After meeting with the protesters,President Ochirbat began to mediate.Intense negotiations ensued betweenthe MPRP and theopposition. Ultimately, the government agreed to

17. The head of Mongol TV and Radio was mysteriouslyreplaced by a moreconservative figureshortly before the election. 18. Reutersfrom Ulaanbaatar, April 17-i9, 1994.

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 14:01:57 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 470 ASIANSURVEY, VOL. XXXV,NO. 5, MAY 1995 proposea press freedomlaw and to allow public demonstrations,and the crisiswas resolvedby April25 withoutthe government resigning. The crisiswas significantfor a numberof reasons.As in 1990,the MPRP was forcedto adoptmore liberalpolicies throughopposition pressure, but again the crisiswas resolvedpeacefully. Ochirbat's status was furtheren- hanced. The peacefulresolution reinforced the legitimacy of the Constitution by showingthat conflicts could be defuseddespite the existence of divided government,in thissense a vindicationof Mongoliandemocratic institutions and anothersign of policyretreat by theMPRP regime. Conclusion Whatexplains the continuityof theMPRP in a multipartyera despiteeco- nomiccrisis? First,the Communist Party had a good deal of publicsupport and legitimacyat theoutset of thereform period, especially in thecountry- side. Thiswas due in partto itsassociation with Sukhbaatar, whom it deified as the fatherof the nation. Unliketheir counterparts in the CentralAsian republicsof theformer Soviet Union, Mongolia's communistshave histori- callybeen seen as preservingMongol independence vis-a-vis China, and with itsLeninist roots, the MPRP also has strongcredentials as theonly party able to maintainstability vis-a-vis the Chinese with whom relations have continu- allyimproved since the final Soviet troops were withdrawn from Mongolia in 1992. Finally,the MPRP couldpoint to improvedliving standards over the long termof its rule,even thoughthe economyhad sufferedin the years immediatelyprior to 1990. Againstthese assets, the party had a numberof liabilities,namely, a history of brutalrepression under Choibalsan and Tsedenbal.The post-1990MPRP has blamedthe repression on thetwo rulers themselves rather than the party, and pointedto thecontinued independence of thenation as a signof its suc- cessfulleadership. Generational change within the party has leftno top-level leadersfrom the Tsedenbal period, and has putat leastsome reform-minded membersinto important positions. All in all, thebalance sheet shows a revi- talized MPRP afterspring 1990. The MPRP translatedthis into electoral successin themultiparty era, particularly in thecountryside where local elites wereexclusively identified with the party and wherethe parliamentary elec- tionlaw in partenabled it to over-representrural areas. The importanceof personalcontacts combined with the party's extensive network in thecoun- trysidemeant that herdsmen would be unlikelyto rejectthe MPRP immedi- atelyafter liberalization. This popularitywould have diminishedrapidly had the partynot been pragmaticon policy. Throughoutthe transition, the MPRP has notlaunched a seriouschallenge to an economicreform agenda largely dictated by interna- tionaldonors and the politicalopposition. The MPRP leadershiphas been

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 14:01:57 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TOM GINSBURG 471 able to adoptopposition policies when necessary, and thepolitics of accom- modationwere apparent in itspeaceful response during the 1990transition to multipartydemocracy and again when faced withthe April 1994 hunger strike.The partyhas shownan abilityto backdown when faced with serious challengeand stillmaintain its overallposition of dominance.It has also servedas a kindof umbrellafor a wide spectrumof politicalviews; if it can continueto do so, itmay develop along the lines of the classical ruling parties elsewherein democraticAsia. Mongolia's reformpath has been remarkablypeaceful when compared withits former patron to thenorth or theethnically diverse nations of . Althoughthe MPRP has had to retreaton policycontinuously since 1989,it stillmaintains a degreeof popularityfour years after the first demo- craticelections. The developmentof a seriouschallenge to MPRP poweris likelyto be incremental,and will dependin largepart upon oppositionpar- ties' abilityto gatherlocal elitesinto their ranks. Reformof the electoral systemis criticalif the opposition is to gainground in thenext parliamentary elections,scheduled for 1996.

This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 14:01:57 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions