Literature is related to author’s view, as Rahman Stated in his article that “Literature as an identity is referred to as ethno-literature.” (Rahman, 2020). In another article Rahman stated that “Literature is a source of learning and entertainment for readers.” (Rahman, Amir P., & Tammasse, 2019). Sahib in her journal article explained about the forestry and how to use language as the medium put attention to the forest, she stated that “The desire and effort to improve forestry has not shown a delightful or wonderful result.” (Sahib, Rahman, Duli, & Asba, 2019). began to become a major approach to cultural studies in the late 1960s, partly as a result of the work of . The translation into English of his popular essays in a collection entitled Mythologies (Barthes 1957), followed in the 1970s and 1980s by many of his other , and greatly increased scholarly awareness of this approach. in 1964, Barthes declared that 'semiology aims to take in any system of signs, whatever their substance and limits; images, , musical sounds, objects, and the complex associations of all of these, which form the content of ritual, or public entertainment: these constitute, if not , at least systems of signification' (Barthes 1967, 9).

The adoption of semiotics in Britain was influenced by its prominence in the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham whilst the Centre was under the direction of the neo-Marxist sociologist Stuart Hall (director 1969-79). Although semiotics may be less central now within cultural and (at least in its earlier, more structuralist form), it remains essential for anyone in the field to understand it. What individual scholars have to assess, of course, is whether and how semiotics may be useful in shedding light on any aspect of their concerns. Note that Saussure's term, 'semiology' is sometimes used to refer to the Saussurean tradition, whilst 'semiotics' sometimes refers to the Peircean tradition, but that nowadays the term 'semiotics' is more likely to be used as an umbrella term to embrace the whole field (Nöth 1990, 14).

Semiotics is not widely institutionalized as an academic discipline. It is a field of study involving many different theoretical stances and methodological tools. One of the broadest definitions is that of , who states that 'semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign' (Eco 1976, 7). Semiotics involves the study not only of what we refer to as 'signs' in everyday , but of anything which 'stands for' something else. In a semiotic sense, signs take the form of , images, sounds, gestures and objects. Whilst for the linguist Saussure, 'semiology' was 'a science which studies the role of signs as part of social life', for the philosopher Charles Peirce 'semiotic' was the 'formal doctrine of signs' which was closely related to Logic (Peirce 1931-58, 2.227). For him, 'a sign is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity' (Peirce 1931-58, 2.228). He declared that 'every thought is a sign' (Peirce 1931-58, 1.538; cf. 5.250ff, 5.283ff). Contemporary semioticians study signs not in isolation but as part of semiotic 'sign systems' (such as a medium or genre). They study how meanings are made: as such, being concerned not only with but also with the construction and maintenance of . Semiotics and that branch of known as have a common concern with the of signs, but John Sturrock argues that whereas semantics focuses on what words mean, semiotics is concerned with how signs mean (Sturrock 1986, 22). For C W Morris (deriving this threefold classification from Peirce), semiotics embraced semantics, along with the other traditional branches of linguistics:

 semantics: the relationship of signs to what they stand for;  syntactics (or syntax): the formal or structural relations between signs;  : the relation of signs to interpreters (Morris 1938, 6-7). Semiotics is often employed in the analysis of texts (although it is far more than just a mode of textual analysis). Here it should perhaps be noted that a 'text' can exist in any medium and may be verbal, non-verbal, or both, despite the logocentric bias of this distinction. The term text usually refers to a message which has been recorded in some way (e.g. writing, audio- and video-recording) so that it is physically independent of its sender or receiver. A text is an assemblage of signs (such as words, images, sounds and/or gestures) constructed (and interpreted) with to the conventions associated with a genre and in a particular medium of communication.

Rahman in his journal article stated that ” and their environment are two things that are inseparable from one another. Humans interact with components of the physical environment, both biotic (animals and plants) as well as with abiotic components (soil, water, rocks and others).” (Rahman, 2019). Communication is the main point in society, semiotics is the way to understand the meaning of the language in order to built the communication among people in this world.

II. Discussion

Typology of Signs: Sign, Signal, Index Semioticians have not yet agreed on a general typology of signs. The problem is only partly one of finding a common terminology. Partly it is also due to the multidimensionality of the criteria on which typologies of signs can be based. Some proposals for a typology of signs are an integral part of the semiotic theory of their authors. Such proposals are discussed in the chapters on Peirce and Morris (partly see also of Semiotics). This chapter discusses some common typological distinctions and major dimensions of typologies of signs. It gives a survey of common restrictive definitions of the term sign and discusses definitions of the signal and of the index. For further major types of sign, see and Icon.

1. Some Proposals for a Typology of Signs Medieval semioticians had a great interest in the typology of signs. Modern semioticians concerned with this topic are Peirce, Morris, Husserl, Cassirer, Eco, and Sebeok. For further discussions of the typology of signs, see Schaff (1960: 14580), Resnikow (1964: on indices, signals, and ), Lyons (1977: on indices, icons, symbols, and symptoms), Nattiez (1979), and Clarke (1987: on signals and natural and conventional signs). For Bühler's distinction between symbols, symptoms, and signals, see also Function (3.1).

1.1 Natural and Nonnatural Signs Medieval semiotics began by distinguishing natural (signum naturale) from conventional (signum ad placidum) or intentional signs. Modern semiotics has raised several objections against this dichotomy.

1.1.1 Nature vs. Convention and Intention Augustine opposed natural and conventional signs (cf. Sign 2.2.2; for further aspects of Augustine's typological system, see Todorov 1977: 4554): Natural signs are those which, apart from any intention or desire of using them as signs, do yet lead to the of something else, as, for example, smoke when it indicates fire. For it is not from any intention of making it a sign that it is so, but through attention to we come to know that fire is beneath, even when nothing but smoke can be seen. [ . . . ] Conventional signs, on the other hand, are those which living beings mutually exchange for the purpose of showing [ . . . ] the feelings of their , or their perceptions, or their thoughts. (397: 637 = II. 12) Augustine's definition already mentions the criterion of intentionality. Roger Bacon later considered this criterion to be the most fundamental one. His basic distinction was between natural and intentional signs (for his complete typological system, see Howell 1987).

1.1.2 Objections against Nature In modern semiotics, two kinds of objections have been raised against accepting the nature vs. convention dichotomy as fundamental in the typology of signs: (1) objections claiming that any kind of must be based on some degree of conventionality (Eco's position, for example). (2) objections out that the basic dichotomy is insufficient because icons and pictures, for example, are neither simply natural nor conventional. A solution to the latter objection is Peirce's indexicon symbol trichotomy. For a modern theory of natural signs, see Clarke (1987).

1.2 Symbol vs. Signal or Index The fundamental dichotomy established by medieval semiotics reappears in new theoretical contexts in some modern theories of semiotics.

1.2.1 Husserl Husserl (1890; 19001901: 269) drew a basic distinction between expressions (Ausdruck), which presuppose an intentional meaning endowing act (cf. Meaning 3.1.3), and indices (Anzeichen, translated as indication), where "we usually feel the connection" of the sign vehicle with the simultaneously or successively present object (Husserl 1900: 274).

1.2.2 Cassirer and Langer In Cassirer's of Symbolic Forms, the primary distinction is between signals (or signs; cf. 3.1) and symbols: "a signal is a part of the physical world of being; a symbol is a part of the world of meaning. Signals are 'operators'; symbols are 'designators.' Signals [ . . . ] have a sort of physical or substantial being; symbols have only a functional " (1944: 32). In Cassirer's tradition, Langer divides the realm of signs into those which indicate (signals, symptoms, natural signs) and those which represent (symbols, names, pictures, etc.) (1942: 3539, 5467).

1.3 Sebeok's Six Signs Sebeok establishes a typology comprising six species of signs (1976: 11747). His definitions are: 1.3.1 Signal When a sign token mechanically or conventionally triggers some reaction on the part of a receiver, it is said to function as a signal.

1.3.2 Symptom A symptom is a compulsive, automatic, nonarbitrary sign, such that the signifier is coupled with the signified in the manner of a natural link.

1.3.3 Icon A sign is said to be iconic when there is a topological similarity between a signifier and its denotata. 1.3.4 Index A sign is said to be indexic insofar as its signifier is contiguous with its signified, or is a sample of it.

1.3.5 Symbol A sign without either similarity or contiguity, but only with a conventional link between its signifier and its denotata, and with an intentional for its designatum, is called a symbol. 1.3.6 Name A sign which has an extensional class for its designatum is called a name.

2. Criteria and Typological Dimensions The typology of signs is multidimensional. Since the sign is not a class of objects, and one and the same signifier may have many semiotic functions, a single sign vehicle may be perceived from several perspectives as belonging to several classes of sign. As Peirce observed, "It is a nice problem to say to what class a given sign belongs; since all the circumstances of the case have to be considered" (§ 2.265). Various dimensions of the typology of signs have been discussed by Eco. A possible general framework for distinguishing typologies of signs is Morris's syntax semantics pragmatics trichotomy. However, the syntactic dimension will be extended to sign and related criteria, thus comprising not only the aspect of sign combination, but also the dimensions of structure and system.

2.1 Eco's Typological Dimensions Eco discusses ten semiotic criteria which underlie ten different typologies of signs (1973b: 3777). Among his typological dimensions are the following ones: (1) source and channel (cf. Communication 3.1.3), (2) semiotic specificity (signs with exclusively semiotic functions against those which also fulfil other functions), (3) replicability of the signifier (unique vs. repeatable, etc.), (4) degree of the sender's and receiver's intentionality, (5) receiver's behavior, (6) relation between signifier and signified, and (7) the "alleged" relation between signifier and . Below, dimensions (1) to (3) are discussed as signand coderelated, (4)(5) as semantic, and (6)(7) as pragmatic criteria. Having come to the conclusion that "there is a radical fallacy in the project of drawing up a typology of signs," Eco himself develops an elaborate multidimensional typology of sign production instead (1976: 217ff.). It distinguishes four modes of sign production: recognition (as with symptoms), ostension (samples, etc.), replica (signs taken from the repertoire of a code), and invention (of uncoded expressions).

2.2 Pragmatic Criteria Pragmatic criteria are related to the sender or to the receiver of a message. A first example of such a classification is Bühler's distinction between symptoms, which he defines as sender related, and signals, which are receiver related signs in his definition (cf. Function 3.1). In Morris's semiotic typology, several classes of signs are based on pragmatic criteria. For example, his prescriptor signifies an obligation, his valuator causes a "preferential behavior," and his pathic sign "gives satisfaction" to the interpreter (Morris 1946: 35968). Some of his criteria refer to both sender and receiver and to the whole situation of semiosis, for example, his distinction between univs. plurisituational and personal vs. interpersonal signs. Most traditional criteria of sign classification are sender related, in particular the divisions into natural vs. conventional or intentional signs and most definitions of the index and signal. For semiosis without a sender, see also Communication (2.1).

2.3 Semantic Criteria The most widely used typology based on the semantic criterion of the sign object relationship is Peirce's division of signs into icons, indices, and symbols. Morris classified several types of signs according to semantic criteria (1946: 35968). With respect to criteria of sense (cf. Meaning), he distinguished between vague and precise, ambiguous and unambiguous, or reliable and unreliable signs. With respect to criteria of reference, Morris distinguished between singular and general signs (one vs. many denotata), indicators, descriptors, namors (referring to locations in space or time), designators (referring to "characteristics" of objects), and further types of signs. A semantic typology from the history of semiotics is Wolff's distinction between signum demonstrativum, prognosticum, and rememorativum (referring to present, future, or past objects).

2.4 Sign and Code Related

Criteria Among the criteria related to the sign vehicle are those which classify signs according to the nature of their source (for example: organic or inorganic) or their channel (visual, acoustic, etc.). On the basis of other characteristics of the sign vehicle, Peirce distinguished between qualisigns, sinsigns (or tokens), and legisigns (or types). Eco adopts similar criteria in his dimension of replicability (cf. 2.1). According to their syntactic structure, signs have traditionally been classified into simple and compound or primitive and derivative signs (cf. History 3.4.1). The theory of provides a framework for a typology of signs from a systematic point of view. On this basis, Mulder & Hervey develop a typology distinguishing between simple signs, complex unarticulated signs, signs with two articulations, and signs with one articulation (with further subtypes) (1980: 176; cf. Hervey 1982: 199).

3. "Sign" as a Class of Sign In the Peircean and Morrissean tradition adopted in this handbook, the sign is the most general semiotic category, whose subtypes are symbols, indices, and others. However, this terminological convention has not always been accepted during the history of semiotics. There are many more restricted definitions of the term sign. Often the sign is opposed to the symbol, occasionally also to the index. When such restricted definitions are given, a general term for the category comprising all significant entities is usually missing.

3.1 Sign and Symbol Various traditions define signs as a class besides symbols or even as a class of symbols. Occasionally, the sign is also opposed to the index. 3.1.1 Sign as an Index or Signal In the tradition of Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, sign, sometimes used synonymously with signal, comprises natural and animal signs or similar types of indices as opposed to human symbols (cf. Sign 2.3 [10]). An author who also developed a theory of signs and symbols based on this terminological convention is Price (1953: 144: 97).

3.1.2 Arbitrary Signs vs. Motivated Symbols In the tradition of Saussurean terminology, Durand (1964: 15) and Todorov (1972: 27576) define signs as arbitrary in opposition to symbols, which are motivated. Wallis draws a distinction between signs and symbols which is partly similar to this tradition, partly also different from it. In his definition, signs represent either by convention or by resemblance, but in opposition to such conventional or iconic signs, symbols signify "on the basis of an analogy, often vague and difficult to grasp" (1975: 88). While both definitions oppose signs to the iconic of symbol, only Saussure and Todorov insist on arbitrariness as a characteristic of the sign in the narrower sense.

3.1.3 Hjelmslev's Definition of the Sign Hjelmslev (1943: 11314) opposed signs and symbols according to the criterion of double articulation (see Language 4.1): only signs have biplanar semiotic structure and are thus further structured into smaller figures of expression and of content. Symbols are elementary meaningful entities without this biplanar structure (see Symbol 2.3).

3.1.4 Signs as a Class of Symbols Similar to Hjelmslev, Malmberg defines signs as those semiotic entities which are produced intentionally and are based on a system of double articulation (1977: 21). But in contradistinction to Hjelmslev, Malmberg opposes the sign to a different concept of symbol. To him, symbol is the general term for any semiotic entity representing something else (see also Eco 1984b: 18). Signs are thus a class of symbols. Other authors who have adopted this terminology are discussed by Price (1953: 161ff.). 3.1.5 Context Free vs. Context Bound Signs In neurosemiotics, Pribram distinguishes between signs and symbols by defining signs as context free and symbols as context bound "signs" (1971: 305; see also Pesaresi 1981). Pribram's distinction has the following neurosemiotic relevance: To some considerable extent the parts of the brain involved in constructing "signs" are different from those involved in constructing "symbols." In man, however, a higher order relationship develops. Linguistic signs are used symbolically in propositional language and linguistic symbols are used significantly in thinking. (1971: 305308) Pribram's terminology is unusual. In the tradition of behaviorist semiotics, one finds an almost opposite definition (by R. M. Yerkes, quoted in Morris 1946: 99): "The sign sooner or later loses its meaning apart from its context; the symbol does not" (see also 3.2.1). 3.2 Sign and Index The term sign is occasionally opposed to index, but the index has also been defined as the general class which includes the sign.

3.2.1 Sign vs. Index Occasionally, signs are opposed to indices by authors who want to emphasize the fundamental between indication and signification or (for example, Savigny 1974: 1788). In these cases, there is no general term covering both types of semiotic phenomena. Indices and natural signs are simply excluded from semiotic consideration.

3.2.2 Sign as a Class of Index In the history of semiotics, there have been attempts to reduce symbols to indices. Alston interprets Locke's view of words as signs of (cf. Sign 2.3 [4]) as an example of this tradition (1967: 441). More recently, a definition of the sign as a class of index has been proposed by Prieto (1966; 1975b: 1516) and in the framework of the semiotics of Mulder & Hervey (1980: 177; earlier also in Semiotica 4 [1971]; see also Hervey 1982: 17879). These authors define index as the generic term for any entity which "conveys some outside itself." Prieto defines the index or indicator in terms of the aliquid pro aliquo relationship of the sign as follows: "A fact provides an indication and consequently constitutes an index when, from the observation of its belonging to a certain class, one can deduce the belonging of another fact to another given class" (1975b: 15). From these premises, Prieto distinguishes between intentional and no intentional indices, such as natural signs based on cause effect relations between sign vehicle and meaning. Indices, according to Mulder & Hervey, are subdivided into natural indices (symptoms or signaling devices) and arbitrary signa (1980: 177). The sign is then only one of two subclasses of signum (besides the symbol). Signs are "signa whose information value depends wholly on fixed conventions" (ibid.: 183). Examples of signs in this sense are written or spoken words and the elements of the Morse code. Symbols are "signa whose information value is not wholly determined by fixed conventions, but at least partly by separate definitions." Examples of symbols in this definition are variables in algebraic or the units of a secret code. This terminological proposal has also been adopted in anthropology by Leach (1976).

4. Signal, Index, and Symptom Signal, index, and symptom are three terms which are often taken as representing one category of sign, especially when opposed to symbol or to sign in one of its narrower definitions. Klaus enumerates signal, index, and symptom as synonyms (1963: 88). When these terms are differentiated as three classes of sign, the symptom is usually subsumed under the general class which Peirce defined as index. The signal, however, is sometimes not a class of sign at all, but only a term designating the sign vehicle.

4.1 Signal General criteria for the definition of the signal have been discussed by Schaff (1960: 16871), Resnikow (1964: 14377), Pazukhin (1972), and Sebeok (see 1.3). There are four main groups of criteria, which define the signal as a signifier, as a semiotic stimulus, as a type of index, or as a certain type of elementary sign. In a pluralistic definition, several of these criteria are combined.

4.1.1 A Pluralistic Definition Resnikow proposes a pluralistic definition of signal which combines several criteria which other authors take as single defining criteria of this species of sign. According to Resnikow, the signal is (1) an artificially created sign with a conventional meaning (2) which is intended to induce a certain behavior or modification of behavior; (3) They are created for future events and are precise in their assignments; (4) they are usually rather simple in their structure, but striking and easily remembered (1964: 177).

4.1.2 Signal as the Sign Vehicle To define signal as a technical term for the sign vehicle or signifier is common in (see also Sign 1.1.2). In Cherry's definition, the signal is "the physical embodiment of a message (an utterance, a transmission, an exhibition of sign events)" (1957: 308). In this definition, the signal is not a type of sign but only the token of a sign type (cf. Sign 1.2.3).

4.1.3 Signals as a Primitive Semiotic Stimulus Morris defined the signal as being semiotically more primitive than the symbol. A signal is "a sign that is not produced by its interpreter and not a substitute for some other sign with which it is synonymous" (1946: 366). (See Symbol 2.2 for further discussion.) In Sebeok's definition, the signal "mechanically or conventionally triggers some reaction on the part of the receiver" (1976: 121). This criterion of "mechanical triggering" permits inclusion of machines as senders and receivers of signals. Behaviorists have tended to take this view of the signal as a general principle of semiosis. Thus, Bloomfield defines language as a system of signals (1933: 162). From the point of view of genetic epistemology, Piaget defines signals (and indices) as semiogenetic precursors of arbitrary signs and symbols (1946: 68, 278). Signals and indices have the nature of a more primitive semiotic stimulus. They are signs whose signifiers are still undifferentiated from their signifieds. They are still "linked with the immediate action" (ibid.: 19) and are "merely certain aspects of the object or of the of action" (ibid.: 278). In linguistics, Benveniste is among those who adopt a definition of the signal as a primitive semiotic stimulus. In his view, there is an opposition between signals and symbols which allows one to explain the distinction between animal and human communication. In contradistinction to the anthroposemiotic symbol, Benveniste defines the signal as "a physical fact bound to another physical fact by a natural or conventional relationship" (1966: 24). While signals have only a sensory motor function, symbols have a representative function. Between the two "there is a threshold which only human beings have been able to cross" (ibid.). This very threshold is also central to Cassirer's distinction between signal and symbol. However, not every stimulus in a stimulus response sequence has been defined as a signal. Most semioticians postulate that only those stimuli to which the aliquid pro aliquo criterion of the sign applies should be called signals. Natural or causal stimuli which give rise to immediate responses should be excluded from the class of signals. Pazukhin therefore specifies that the signal is "a physical phenomenon which provokes reactions in mechanisms and organisms, without being the cause of these reactions" (1972: 41). 4.1.4 Signal As Intentional Index All of the definitions discussed in the preceding paragraph belong to the class of index in the sense of Peirce, but in Peircean semiotics, the category of index also comprises intentional indices in human communication. Two authors who define indices in such terms are Bühler (1933b) and Prieto (1966; 1975b). Bühler defines the signal as a receiver related sign, one in which the function of appeal dominates. A verbal sign is a signal "by of its appeal to the hearer, whose outer or inner behavior it directs just as other traffic signs do" (1933b: 164). This definition comes close tothe ordinary language usage of the term according to which a signal is "a sign with the communicative goal of pressing the hearer to perform, change or refrain from an action" (Schaff 1960: 169). According to Prieto, a signal is an instrument for the transmission of messages (1966: 13). Prieto defines the signal as an intentional index (in the general sense of sign; cf. 4.2) which is autonomous in being neither a mere fragment of a sign nor a whole group of signs (1975b: 17). Most traffic signs are signals in this sense. Signals are the foundation of Prieto's semiotics of communication. 4.1.5 Signal as an Elementary Unit of Communication Prieto's definition postulates that a signal is an elementary semiotic unit (neither compound nor part of a sign). This criterion of being an elementary unit of communication is also postulated in other definitions. Hjelmslev (1943: 137; 1975: 79) defined the signal as an indicator which admits no further analysis and belongs only to one plane of the semiotic (in contrast to a connotator, which belongs to two planes). Clarke defines signals as those signs of communicative intent which, unlike complete sentences, lack a subject predicate structure. Simple gestures, warning cries, a drawing, and single utterances are his examples of signals (1987: 90).

4.2 Index and Symptom Index and symptom are modern successors to the ancient class of natural signs. The general class of indices comprises those signs which many semioticians have described as being fundamentally opposed to the symbol, but Peirce and Morris have given a still more extended definition of this species of sign. For discussions of the index and the symptom as species of sign, see Resnikow (1964), Goudge (1965), Gale (1967), Sebeok (1976: 12434; 1984), and Lyons (1977: 105109). For the terminological aspects of differentiating between index, sign, and symbol, see 1.2. For index as a general synonym of sign, see 3.2.

4.2.1 Natural and No intentional Indices Resnikow defines the index as a natural sign based on a "natural link" between sign vehicle and referent (1964: 13839). As such, the index can be only observed, not reproduced. Eco divides the class of natural signs into symptoms and indices, distinguishing two kinds of the latter: traces and indices (1973b: 67). Both are based on a relation of contiguity, but traces are inferences from an assumed relation of causality to a nonactual contiguity with the referent, while indices are inferences from a relation of contiguity to causal dependence. In contrast to this tradition, Husserl defines indices (Anzeichen) as natural or artificial signs which are produced without intentionality (1900: 31).

4.2.2 Peirce's Index Peirce defined the index in opposition to symbols and icons asa category comprising not only natural, but also many conventional signs. A sign vehicle is an index if it is "really affected" (Peirce § 2.248) by its referential object. "The index is physically connected with its object; they make an organic pair, but the interpreting has nothing to do with this connection, except remarking it, after it is established" (§ 2.299). Other features of Peirce's index are (cf Goudge 1965: 5354): it focuses the interpreter's attention on the object; it involves the existence of the object as an individual entity; it asserts nothing, but shows the object. From these premises, Peirce included the following diverse phenomena in the class of indices (cf. ibid.): a weathercock, a yardstick, a photograph, a rap on the door, a pointing finger, an appellative cry, and the field of linguistic deixis, including proper names and possessive, relative, personal, and selective pronouns. For indexical expressions in language, see also BarHillel (1954) and later studies in the field of linguistic pragmatics. Lyons (1977: 106108), following Abercrombie (1967: 59), adopts the term index to designate stylistic features of language use ''which characterize the source of the signal as a particular individual" or member of a sociolinguistic group.

4.2.3 Morris's Identifior Morris did not adopt the term index, but his category of identifiors corresponds to Peirce's index (1946: 154, 362). But in contrast to Peirce, Morris restricted the class of identifiors to spatiotemporal deixis. Identifiors signify "locations in space and time (locata) and direct behavior toward a certain region of the environment." The identifior "has a genuine, though minimal, sign status; it is a preparatory stimulus influencing the orientation of behavior with respect to the location of something other than itself." Morris distinguished three kinds of identifiors: indicators, "which are no language signals," descriptors, which "describe a spatial or temporal location," and namors, which are "language symbols, and hence, substitute signs synonymous with other identifiors."

4.2.4 Symptoms The term symptom has its origins in the history of medical semiotics (cf. History 1.2.2, Bär 1982; 1988, Sebeok 1984, Schonauer 1986, Staiano 1986). In ordinary English, the term designates an outwardly observable sign of disease. In metaphorical usage, the word means 'a sign of a usually bad condition or event.' Bühler extended the sense of the term still further by defining all signs having an expressive function as symptoms (1934: 28). Elsewhere, Bühler defines this same species of sign "by reason of its dependence on the sender, whose interiority it expresses," as index (indicium) (1933b: 164). Peirce described symptoms as a type of index, distinguishing between the symptom as part of the general medical knowledge (and thus code) and the symptom of an individual patient: "The symptom itself is a legisign, a general type of a definite character. The occurrence in a particular case is a sinsign" (§ 8.335). Langer observes a "fine distinction between sign and symptom, in that the object signified by a symptom is the entire condition of which the symptom is a proper part; e.g., red spots are a symptom of measles, and 'measles' is the entire condition begetting and including the red spots" (1942: 58). An index, on the other hand, may refer only to a part of a total condition. Among those phenomena which are called symptoms in ordinary English, medical diagnostics differentiates between proper (cf. Barthes 1972: 3839, Sebeok 1984: 21315, Staiano 1986: 25). In this special sense, the symptom is only the mark of illness as observed by the patient ("subjectively"), while the mark of illness as observed in the physician's examination ("objectively") is called a sign.

Noth, W. (1995). Handbook of Semiotics. Indiana University Press Bloomington and Indianapolis. United States of America

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