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EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN CANADIAN POLICE FORCES

A Reno= of Research conducted for and with the support of the Office of Solicitor-General for Canada.

October 179

Dennis Forcese Deoartment of Sociology and Anthropology Carleton University Ottawa, Canada

HV ews expreseed iA this report are those of the author, and (b 7936 Solicitor-General of C:inada. .C7b ;essorily reflect the vicw3 of the F6 1979 c.2 Government Gouvernement 1+ of Canada du Canada MEMORANDUM NOTE DE SERVICE

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ TO ResPrch Projects Committee I> OUR FILE/NOTRE RÉFÉRENCE 62-6/5-189

YOUR FILE/VOTRE RÉFÉRENCE - Chief FROM Police Research DE Research Programs DATE Research & Statistics Division January 14, 1980

SUBJECT OBJET Management-Labour Relations in Canadian Policing - D. Forcese, Principal Investigator

Attached please find a copy of the final report submitted in respect to the above contract, together with a critique prepared by my former assistant, Dr. M. Lioy, and a copy of my letter to Dr. Forcese. am disappointed with the quality of this report, although I am confident that it can be edited and sharpened for publication in the Canadian Police College Journal. The report does contMn a lot of information which is not generally available, and although it did not meet our expectations, it is nevertheless a significant contribution to the literature. I will be recommending to appropriate Ministry officials that Dr. Forcese be gIven permission to publish the report. Dr. Forcese and Mb Martin, of the Canadian Police College, have discussed the idea of revising the report for publication in the Canadian Police College Journal.

Peter Engstad Attach. Solicitor General Solliciteur général Canada Canada 340 Laurier Ave. West Ottawa, Ontario KlA OP8 January 14, 1980 Our File: 62-6/5-189

Professor D. Forcese Department of Sociology and Anthropology Carleton University Ottawa, Onta rio K1S 5D6 Dear .Professor FOrcese: Re: Management-Labour Relations in Canadian Policing By this letter I accept your final report sdbmitted in fulfillment of our contract and have authorized the release of money owed to you. I regret to say that I am somewhat disappointed in the report and will not be recommending that it be published by this Ministry. (A detailed critique of the report has been appended for your information and consideration.) However, I will be recommending to appropriate Ministry officials that you be given authorization to publish the report or segments thereof yourself and I encourage you to discuss with M. Martin the question of publishing in the Canadian Police College'Journal. I anticipate that authorization to publish the report will be forthcoming in about six weeks. Meanwhile, I should be grateful if you would review and observe the contract publication clauses - 4.(1) to 4.(4). Thank you for submitting the report and for your patience in awaiting this reply. Sincerely,

Peter Engstad Chief Police Research Encl. cc: B. Taroque, Branch Administration S. Shuster, Planning & Liaison novernment Gouvernement of Canada du Canada MEMORANDUM NOTE DE SERVICE

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ

TO Chief

Police Research OUR FILE/NOTRE RÉFÉRENCE _J 62-6/5-189 r- YOUR FILE/VOTRE REFERENCE -- FROM Michèle Liqy DE DATE January 7, 1980

SUBJECT OBJET Review of the Final Report - "Employee- Management Relations in Canadian Police Forces"

This draft of the report shows some improvements. The bibliography is good; the report has been clearly typed (format and typing); and there are very few typing errors. However, there are still same problems with it and I doit that any changes short of a complete rewrite will make it good enough to be published.

General Comments 1. The quotes in section 3 are still too long and too numerous. 2. A section discussing the National Association and the provincial associations, their roles, their organization, etc., seems necessary. After finishing reading this report one may have a composite picture of police unions in Canada, but certainly not a comprehensive picture of police unionism in Canada. The postcript tries to do so but I feel that it should not be an afterthought; the points made in the postscript should be part of a section on the national picture. 3. In the same way, the role of the various police commissions is never clearlyexplained e nor is the relationships between the various associations within one force when appropriate (i.e., rank and file association and command officers association). 4. For same provinces, i.e., B.C. and Alberta, the only forces discussed are in the main cities. What about the other police forces? 5. The conclusion is not general enough and presents points which should have, but have not been, discussed in the text. 6. The sub-sections entitled "issues" in section 5, are not clearly organized. The issues should be identified clearly. Y. There is still an overall bias against unions in spite of a few "disclaimers" stating that unions are not bad (see for instance p. 149 and 153).

8. The "adversary" relationship is always characterized as "bad, negative, tension creating, etc." It is never acknowledged as a necessary basis for bargaining, which does not obligatorily lead to conflict (see p. 59).

9. Many statements are made without being substantiated (see in specific comments below for specific statements). 10. The author has not talked to any rank and file PCMP officers, only to command officers and Division Representatives (see list , section 2). This is still unclear in the text of section 6, where many statements are made which seem to be based on the feelings of rank and file officers. Further, although he mentions it, the author does emphasize the fact that if police unions did not exist the DSP,R system would not function at all; the DSRR needs the unions to have sorte - bargaining power. If only DSRR type system existed, no one would have any bargaining power. As a consequence of this, it is difficult to argue in favour of a DSER system. 11. A minor point, but one which needs to be considered before publication by the Solicitor General, is the sexist language used in the text, i.e., referring to police officers as "the men" or "policemen". 12. itbrds such as "ineptness" (p. 83), "odious (p. 93), and other loaded words should be deleted.

Specific Comments

- p. 6, The first footnote seems to contradict the statement made in the text where the author says "the Americans have been engaged in C. . •a the analysis of police unions." The footnote makes the point that this analysis is almost non-existent. The sentence in the text should be replaced. - p. 7-10, The section on history seems all right. It is not clear, however, what "successful strike action" means (p. 10). Does it mean that they obtained what they wanted? - p. 10-19, The section on present character of unions is too long and the quotes are too long. 3

- p. 19, The first statement in the section on police strikes should be backed pp by a reference. p. 25, The quote is too long and not really necessary. - p. 28-31, The overview of the Canadian situation is clearly done in point form; however, it is in this section that mention should be made of the CPA, the provincial organizations, their relationship (see above in general comments). - p. 32, Why is it significant that the police of the Maritimes have traditionally been the least well paid police in the country? - p. 32, last paragraph. "But also working conditions afiliation" This sentence is very awkward. - p. 33, The last sentence of the first paragraph should read " the Brotherhood was recognized...." A definition of tripartite arbitration should be provided in the text. Who is the third party? - p. 34, What is a "cooling-off period"? Is it a period of time which bas to elapse between the time the strike notice is issued and the time officers can effectively go on strike? We may know, but readers are not familiar with labour-management bargaining and would probably not know. It should be specified in the text. - p. 34, section on issues - CUPE should be sp■elled out - how can one start a new section with "not unrelated... III - this section is confusing, the issues should be identified clearly. -. p. 36, The statement made in the last paragraph is more "an issue" than an "implication". - p. 37, The statements made on this page are not in a logical order, i.e., who the parties are should be mentioned before discussing the representation of the Chief at the bargaining table. - p. 38, The statement made in the last paragraph is too general. TWo quotes (on the next page) are not enough to substantiate it. - p. 41, Section on issues - see general comments #6. - p. 42, "Ironically" is not the proper word, it should be deleted. - p. 43, The story of the Montreal problems is interesting but is too long. - p. 45, The statement that the MUC Brotherhood has "genuinely eroded management" should either be qualified or backed up by evidence. 4

- p. 47, The statement that one man arbitration is mom biased- needs to be substantiated. There has been research evidence to the contrary. In the sdbsections on issues, the author seems to contradict the statelentnade above that the unions were not militant. - p. 49, beginning of second paragraph -"... it has been suggested.. who suggested? - p. 50, top of page, The reason given by London and Kingston could be in a footnote. The sentence "Not all centres " (third sentence, first para.) does not make sense. - p. 51, The long footnote is not really necessary. - p. 52, end of first para., The argument is not very clear. - p. 53, middle of page, The statement to the effect that management has good reasons to believe that managment prerogatives have been eroded should be sdbstantiated. - p. 54, The statement made by the author . (second para.) that force morale has not deteriorated is not substantiated. In fact, if he had talked to rank and file officers from Toronto he would have came to a different conclusion. - p. 59-61, The subsection on "Legal and Organizational Bases" is toc long; it is repetitious, many of the points are repeated in the subsection on issues. - p. 62, second full para., The author seems to imply that it is because the Calgary Police is "cowboy like" that it is less stable. - p. 66, last para., Who appoints the Police Board? This is not clPr. - p. 68, second para., There is still a lot of bitterness in the Vancouver P.D. re team policing. I am not sure that I agree with this paragraph. The first sentence of the conclusion bas to be rephrased. - p. 69, The last sentence, first para. is not clear. It Should be specified in this comparison that the RCMP system will be discussed in the next section.

.../5 5

- p. 68-74, Overall the conclusion is too long, contains too many examples (a conclusion is supposed to summarize the issues, not give examples). Mbst of page 72 belongs, I feel, in the overview subsection (beginning of section 5). Finally, p. 72, the author states one point of view as if it %ms his conclusion. In fact, it is only one point of view. He himself states later that he subscribes to another point of view. - p. 74, first para. of overview, What is it based on? It should be clear that it is not based on rank and file's opinion (the author has not interviewed rank and file officers, see list in section 2). The footnote should be part of the conclusion. - p. 75, The author makes a statement on behalf of "Force members" but does not make clear that he bas not talked to rank and file officers. In the fifth point, the author talks on behalf of rank and file - haw can he? The sixth point is questionable. - p. 76, The statements made at the end of the first para. and in the second para. should be slibstantiated. Where the author speaks of "majority sentiment in the force" (last para.) he should sùbstantiate his statement or delete it. - p. 77, TO conduct an evaluation of police associations by interviewing only 39 people sens hardly a fnll-hearted proposition (last para.) - p. 78, beginning of second para, "Méanwhile" should be replaced by "prior to the establishment of this commission". - p. 79, Substantative statement in footnote. - p. 80-81, Where is "SS" division? Show "HQ" on map. - p. 82, The second para. needs to be replaced. - p. 84, first para., This statement needs to be substantiated. The first part of the second para. is not clear. The footnote rather contradicts the point on political neutrality. - p. 85, The first para, is, I feel, overly optimistic. 6

- p. 86, The first para. is biased. - p. 87, The first reoammendation is "unlikely" as the author admits. Then why make it? Further, it is not clear what the advantages would be. - p. 88, Mbst of the reccnuendations seem to assume that unions are heading for worse relationships with management. This assumption is not justified. - p. 90, last para., This is a very harsh comment on police commissions. It should be slibstantiated and toned down. - p. 91, The second para. is too sketchy and the point it contains should have been discussed erlier, e.g., in the overview of section 5. - p. 92, second para., See comment re p. 91. - p. 93, first para., last sentence, It is not cleAr what is not desirable. The suggestions for further research are not detailed enough and I am not sure what the recommended research would be. - p. 95, laSt sentence of second para., Militancy does not have to have negative side effects. A union can be militant without being aggressive. Typing Errors p. 35, in footnote; p. 40, 17th line and in second footnote; p. 41, 4th line of 2nd para.; p. 70, 7th line of 2nd para.; p. 75, 4th line from bottom; p. 79, 12th line fram top; p. 85, 3rd.line, 2nd para.; p. 86, esprit de corps does not have an accent.

Conclusion This report is not good. Probably a third rewrite would yield further comments but I am not sure it would be worthwhile because I can hardly imagine how it could be salvaged and be good enough to be published. If you have any comments, do not hesitate to contact me.

Michèle Lioy

Dictated by, but not seen by M. Lioy Acknowledgements

I am sincerely grateful to the numerous police officers in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the several municipal forces who cooperated with me in this work. Without exception they were friendly, generous and frank. Although my opinions in many matters differ from those of my respondents, I can seriously testify to my great respect for those with whom I talked and corresponded.

I realize that there are remarks and conclusions in the pages that follow for everyone to dislike, management and association alike. However, I hope that readers, and especially those who generously assisted my enquiries, judge this overall product .as an attempt at sound and objective analysis.

,...... ,-- -,,,,,,,,,...... ,..... 1.18RARY MINISÏRY 0/' THE '..jŒ ... ICI i , . CM

;mAn 2G 1985

- BIBLIOTHÈQUE MINISTREÈ DU 1 SOLLICITEUR GÉNÉRAL 1 e ABSTRACT

Employee organizations and their relations to management are described for major municipal police forces in all Canadian provinces. The Division Staff Relations Representative system of the ROMP is also considered, as an alternative to police unionism.

Employee-management relations in all police forces are found to be evolving in the direction of a greater employee role in organization decisions, and in affecting the political decisions governing policing. Some municipal police forces are found to have developed effective working relations with management, that avoid debilitating conflicts. Others, however, have institutionalized an adversary style that creates'constant tension and conflict, and periodic breakdown in quality police services. In contrast, the RCMP is developing in the DSRR system an alternative that to date has avoided confrontation, although still lacking the employee influence inherent in associations.

Recommendations are put for the future development of employee-management relations, with an emphasis upon mechanisms that bridge the adversary relations inherent in collective bargaining.

A comprehensive bibliography is included. SUMMARY D. Forcese Employee-Management Relations in Canadian Police Forces

The report offers an account of Canadian police employee organizations, and their relations to management. All provinces are considered, as are the Royal Canadian Mounted police. Comparative context is provided in an overview of American and British police labour relations. The American and British data are drawn from published literature. The Canadian data are from a survey of key informants in municipal police forces and the RCMP.

Any summary overview of American police employee organizations is necessarily imperfect. Most forces are organized, but many major forces are not. Many are affiliated, but most are not. The phenomenon of police employee organizations i well-established, but recognition conflicts still occur. Salary disputes remain of fundamental import, but ultimately may be less significant than the impact of employee organizations upon force management style and the quality of service to the public. Strikes, publicity aside, are relatively infrequent, and when they do occur, are as often a function of management or political intransigence and confrontation than a desired association tactic. Ultimately, it is most accurate to suggest that police associations in the United States are still an evolving phenomenon to which management and political authorities are gradually learning to accommodate.

The present finds British Police dramatically low on the occupational salary hierarchy. In May 1977, delegates to the Police Federation conference voted overwhelmingly "to demand the right to strike, even if it means appealing to the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg". The issue was low pay, and low salary 2 increases from the Labour Government. (The Toronto Globe and Mail, May 24, 1977). In May 1979, the newly elected Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, as one of its first acts, raised police salaries by 20% in response to police dissatisfaction and the growing militancy. As in the United States, and in Canada, the 1960's and 1970's in Britain have been marked by increased police dissatisfaction with their salaries and with job conditions. Their work is perceived as increasingly dangerous and underâppreciated. (Reiner, 1978:34). Since 1919, until recently, most British police had resisted the notion of unionization, and especially calls for industrial action. In 1975, for example, an attempt at the annual Federation conference to present a motion, not for industrial action itself, but a referendum on the issue, was defeated overwhelmingly. (Lewis, 1976:91). . But as previously remarked, by 1977, the Federation voted to demand the right to strike. The Federation has also been active, as in public newspaper advertisements, in promoting "law and order" campaigns, and in commenting on its salaries. But to date there has been no irreversible move to unionize, and presumably the monies of the Thatcher government will deter the militant tendencies and rein- force the reserve or opposition of British police to unionization. In a sense, like the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Canada, the British police are presently able to take advantage of the threat of unionization to win government concessions.

There are several general observations that seem valid descrip- tions of the overall Canadian situation. First, it must be noted that all major municipal forces and most Canadian forces in smaller communities, are effectively unionized. In the cities, whether called unions (as in Vancouver, for example) or as is more common, police associations, it is the case that collective bargaining is a well-established fact of police life. In smaller force character- istically police officers are represented by agents of the larger 3 urban associations, whether formally or informally. Provincial bodies, such as PANS (Police Association of Nova Scotia) will ensure that small local bodies receive expert advice and representation. Often, too, the association will employ legal advisers. In the cities, the associations affect not only the salary contract negotiations, but the day-to-day conduct of the force insofar as contract provisions concerning working conditions and rights of representation in disciplinary proceedings.

A second general observation is that most police associations have scant interest in strikes. Of course, in many jurisdictions strike action by police officers is illegal (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia are the nominal exceptions). Notable strikes have occurred in New Brunswick, Nova

Scotia and illegally in Quebec -- the most serious in Montreal. But most association representatives express a sincere repugnance

for strike action -- although they do also acknowledge that they can conceive of circumstances that might lead to police strikes.

Third, increasingly the associations and management are well- prepared in their bargaining. Chief officers and associations share information with their counterparts provincially and nationally, and *often they develop experts in the form of full-time personnel. Historically, the associations have been better informed and clearer in their bargaining positions than management. However, recently employee organizations seem to be losing this advantage, with the

"amateurs" more and more to be found in the .associations.

Fourth, it should be realized that in large proportion the

persons who now make up management -- that is, senior officers and chief constables -- have themselves been members of police associations. Often they have been active members, serving on 4 tha association executive, or even .with experience in collective bargaining on behalf of an association. Consequently, whatever their present frustrations, most can appreciate the benefits that have been won by the associations, and would like to be able to work with them.

Fifth, some management empathy aside, there is a clear mutual t frustration in most forces. Both the association and management express a basic suspicion of one another, and a sense of helplessness. There is a marked increase in adversary tone, as well as a sentiment that both parties are helpless to correct frequent hostilities. Management believes itself to be limited in its tasks, from deployment of manpower to a hiring and firing, by police employee organizations that tamper with all aspects of policing. For ttieir part, the associations continue to complain of arbitrary management decisions.

Sixth, whatever the governing legislation, details of which we shall not consider in this report, it is clear that each has in interpretation and application allowed police associations to bargain for benefits well beyond the economic, as management has complained in crying loss of management rights.

Seventh, police associations have undoubtedly benefited the rank-and-file officer, in salary, benefits, working conditions, and discipline and promotion procedures. In these respects, the unions have improved or "professionalized" the police services. What is pi.esently unclear is whether the associations will continue to do so now that the "catch-up" period has largely passed and the adversary style becomes institutionalized.

Eighth, there is an apparent increase in the aggressiveness of both associations and management. Management is seeking to regain 5

lost discretion, and associations.have stepped up demands for a greater role in organizational decision-making. Both seem also to have assumed a more aggressive posture vis-a-vis public policy- making. Especially, police associations are becoming "political" insofar as seeking to influence law enforcement policy, and in doing so, are challenging the public's conception of the neutrality of the police.

Last, from the standpoint of the public interest, unions have been of benefit in the sense of winning better police equipment, planning, and to a lesser degree, personnel. But increasingly police unions must be wary of a deterioration in police service. Obviously there is increased financial burden upon the public as police salaries and benefits improve. But it is not the financial costs that are apt to be objectionable, given reasonable collective bargaining. Rather, police service may suffer insofar as unions allow themselves to become preoccupied with their own interests, and if, as in the United States, they act to oppose attempted police innovations and reorganization. In addition, as police unions become involved in public controversy, a cost that will have to be born is a deterioration in public confidence and respect, and a consequent decline in the quality of police-community relations and cooperation.

With respect to the RCMP, the initial observation must be that there is presently slight interest in an association. This is not to suggest the absence of interest. However, generally the members believe that their system of "Div-Reps" (DSRR, or Division Staff Relations Representative) is a viable and attractive alternative to association or union.

Insofar as there is dissatisfaction in the Div-Rep" system, it tends to be found in areas where the RCMP is heavily engaged in urban policing. In particular, presently this refers to the Vancouver 6

metropolitan area, and to some degree, metropolitan Victoria. In the early 1970's there was marked union agitation also in Toronto, Ottawa, and Montreal, but that now seems to have dissipated, or at least, is no longer overt.

Third, it is believed.generally by Force members that the "Div- Rep" system works because of the dispersed character of the Force, where a union would not be suitable. Working throughout the country, often in isolated locations, in large and small units, and engaged in many kinds of policing, the costs and difficulties inherent in operating a representative union are seen to be prohibitive.

Fourth, Force members, including "Div-Reps", frankly acknowledge that the DSRR program has worked thus far because of the constant latent threats of union. That is, the ROMP rank-and-file members profit from advantages won by municipal associations. The Division Representative system exists, and to an extent works, because police associations exist.

Fifth, related to the unionization threat, the RCMP generally seem to enjoy more amicable employer-employee relations than do municipal forces. Both rank-and-file and management want the "Div- Rep" system to work. They share an attitude from suspicion to, more usually, hostility to the police union concept. They also share a sense of the RCMP as a unique police force that must be saved from what is perceived to be the destructive consequences of unionization.

of rank-and-file members in the "Div.-Rep" system are rather more a matter of common agreement or social contact rather than of formal legislation or collective agreement.

That common agreement, however, may in fact permit a larger measure of rank-and-file input than in many unionized police forces, especially those characterized by pronounced hostile association- management relations. The Division Representative system can be said to be still evolving. There seems to be scope for a genuine participatory decision-making in the RCMP, despite the traditional organizational outline with its persisting para-military character. In a sense, there seem presently to be more degrees of freedom for

« creative rank-and-file and management relations and organizational change in the RCMP than in many municipal forces who by and large are working with an adversary model in which neither side is willing to make significant concessions. As we have seen, some municipal forces have developed a participatory model. But the RCMP has created such a participatory system in toto, and has been gradually altering management style while fostering rank-and-file organizational input and responsibility. At the very worst, after little more than five years of operation, the DSRR must be viewed as a promising alternative to police unionism. CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION 1 II RESPONDENTS Z (i)List of intrviewees 2 (ii)List of mail responseS 4 III AMERICAN EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 6 (i)Introduction • 6 • (ii)History 7 • (iii)Present character . 10 (iv)Strikes 19 (v)Conclusions ' 22 Iv THE BRITISH CASE 23 (i) History 23 (ii) Present charaCter 25 (iii) Conclusions 27 V CANADIAN EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: • MUNICIPAL FORCES. 28

. (i) Overview 28 (ii) The Atlantic 31 (iii) Quebec 38 (iv) Ontario 46 cv)Manitoba and Saskatchewan 54 cvi)Alberta 59 cvii)British Columbia 63 (viii) Conclusions 68 VI CANADIAN LABOUR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: THE RCMP 74 (i)Overview 74 (ii)The Division Staff Relations Representative 76 VII CONCLUSIONS 85 (i)Comparative Summary: Association versus DSRR . 85 (ii)Recommendations • ' 87 (iii)Suggestions for further research 93 (iv)Postscript 94 VIII BIBLIOGRAPHY 98 I. Introduction

This report is an interpretive synthesis of published information and the views of more than fifty police officers in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and major municipal forces in Canada. The report includes responses to a mail questionnaire in addition to personal interviews. Also part of the report are the views of non- police officers, such as some city managers, police commissioners, and former policemen.

The objective of the report is to provide an overview of the state of labour relations in Canada's police forces. Given several hundred police forces in Canada, there is obviously some jeopardy in attempting to generalize. Moreover, legislation governing police varies from province to province, affecting labour relations in the municipal forces. Accordingly there are significant differences in police employee-management relations that are remarked in the text that follows. These variations in the character of police "unionism" relate to the distinctive provincial jurisdictions. However, although variations exist, one cannot fail to be impressed by some similarity in the experiences in urban police forces in Canada. The issues of conflict seem common to all jurisdictions, with the themes of income, pension, working conditions, management rights, reoccurring. But there is marked difference by province in the manner in which the issues are resolved. Collective bargaining is a common reality, but in some provincial jurisdictions it is a benign reality, and in others, stressful and disruptive.

Lastly, a major distinction that is emphasized in this report is that between the condition of municipal forces and the RCMP. Much of what follows may be viewed as a comparison of employer-employee relations in the municipal forces, characterized by unioni-like police associations, and the RCMP with its system of Division Representatives. II. Respondents

(i) List of Interviewees

All requests far interviews were granted.

Halifax J. Ross, Executive Director Police Association of Nova Scotia

Moncton G. Cohoon, Chief Moncton Police Department

Montreal M. Groulx, Lt. Labour Relations Board P. Jodoin, Directeur Guy Marcil, Executive Director The Quebec Federation of Policemen (former President, MUC Fraternite de Policers) M.J. Rondou, Directeur E. Sarrazin, Lt. Labour Relations Board

Ottawa J. Cyr Commissioner for Personnel City of Ottawa W. Glenn, President Ottawa Police Association A. Rice, Deputy Chief Ottawa Police Force J.P. Bradley, S./Sgt. former Div. Rep., RCMP R. Ostrum, Inspector RCMP 3

W. Spring, Inspector RCMP R.W. Taylor, S./gt. Div. Rep., RCMP R. Waller, Inspector RCMP

Toronto M. Connoly, President Metro Toronto Police Association J. Marks, Staff Supt. Metro Toronto Police Force

Calgary D. MacNeill, Inspector Calgary Police Department B. Sawyer, Chief Constable Calgary Police Department S. Shields, President Calgary Police Association T. Summers, Director Calgary Police Association

Edmonton N. Koch, President Edmonton Police Association R. Lunney, Chief Constable Edmonton Police Department A. Faith, S./Sgt. Div. Rep., RCMP A. McLeod, S./Sgt. Div. Rep., RCMP

Metro Vancouver J. Flaten, President Vancouver Policemen's Union R. Moffat, Deputy Director Burnaby Labour Relations Department 4

G. Mortimer, Chairman B.C. Police Commission R. Stewart, Deputy Chief Vancouver Police Department F. Hardy, Sgt. Div. Rep., RCMP H. Hodgson, Supt. & 0/ic. Richmond, RCMP R. Polkey former Asst. Commiss., RCMP

Metro Victoria P. Jamieson - President, Saanich Police Association; President, B.C. Federation of Police Officers; President, Canadian Police Association R. Peterson, Chief Constable Saanich Police Department R. Cromie, Cpl. Div. Rep., RCMP

(ii) List of Mail Responses

The majority of Chief Constables replied to the mail questionnaire. Only one Police Association replied to the mail questionnaire (Winnipeg). Replies were received from several police commissions.

Atlantic J.R. Browne, Chief Newfoundland Constabulary E. Langille, Deputy Chief Halifax Police Department J.F. Ross, Chief Saint John Police Department D. Saunders Charlottetown Police Department G. Smith • ' Director of Police Research and Statistics Nova Scotia Police Commission F. Volpe, Commissioner New Brunswick Police Commission

Quebec R. Gosselin, President La Commission de Police du Quebec J.-C. Vanhoutte, Directeur Service de Police La Ville de Quebec

Ontario R. Hamilton, Staff Supt. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Department C. Kunkle, A/Chief Waterloo Regional Police Department J. Williamson Windsor Police Department

Manitoba R.R. Paquin, Secretary Winnipeg Police Association N. Stewart, Chief Winnipeg Police Department

Saskatchewan J. Gibbon, Chief Saskatoon Police Department A. Huget, Chief Regina Police Department

Alberta G. Dawson, Personnel Director Alberta Solicitor-General R.B. d'Eterre, Asst. Deputy Minister Alberta Department of Labour - 6 -

III. American Employee-Management Relations

(i) Introduction

No interviews were conducted with representatives of American police forces. The analysis that follows is based upon the stitements of persons familiar with the American experience, and in large part, the published literature. It should be noted that where in Canada there is virtually no published information on police unionism, in the United States, in addition to papers, there are several books that provide both history and analyses, (Gammage and Sachs, 1972; Juris and Feuille, 1973; Levi, 1977). There also are handbooks or texts intended to provide a guide to effective collective bargaining and labour relations in police forces (Burpo and Irwin Jr., 1979; Maddox and Bopp, 1975). Thus unlike the Canadian experience,* the Americans have been engaged in the practice and the.analysis of police unions to a degree not yet contemplated in Canada. It may also be remarked that in the United Kingdom there is only a scant literature, in part reflecting the government central control of policing and the prohibition upon genuine collective bargaining (Reiner, 1978).**

*It is more than mildly curious that in the major published work available on Canadian policing, William and Nora Kelly's Policing in Canada (Toronto, Macmillan, 1976), there is no discussion or mention whatsoever of police unions, associations, or collective bargaining! One American author does complain however, that even American police scientists have paid insufficient attention to police unionism. More significantly, he observes that police science texts ignore the phenomenon. "An examination of fourteen police textbooks, manuals and guidebooks written within the last ten years turned up a meager five references to police unions, independent associations, or fraternal groups. With the exception of one text, no more than a paragraph was devoted to the activities or influence of such groups". (Halpern, 1974:2). **It may be noted that police unionism is a well-established and legitimated feature of Western Europe, and especially Sweden, with an hypothesized consequence of "liberal" police politics. (Berkley, 1969). With the police well-integrated into the larger labour movement, they do find themselves in conflict with colleagues. Recently, for example, police in Paris, France, were demonstrating in protest over increased street violence. When they attempted to march on police headquarters, they were stopped by uniformed police, and some fighting broke out. (The Montreal Gazette, June 22, 1979). In Canada, police versus police conflicts worry the RCMP, where at the order of provincial Attorneys-General, they may be sent intb communities experiencing police strikes. (The Montreal Gazette, August 30, 1979). 7

(ii) History

In the United States policemen have since the period 1890-1915 been organized in fraternal organizations, intended to provide welfare benefits and insurance, (Juris and Feuille, 1973:15). The fraternal groups provided a rudimentary organizational bases for early police militancy. For example, the police went on strike in Cincinnati in 1918 over a dismissal that in turn related to salary demands; they ultimately won salary increases. (Burpo, 1971:3). The landmark instance of police militancy was the Boston police strike of 1919. In fact, in Canada and the United Kingdom, 1918-1919 also marked significant events in police collective action. In Canada, of course, the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 included a police withdrawal of services. Earlier, in 1918 in Saint John, New Brunswick, 40 police officers went out on strike in an attempt to win affiliation with the American Federation of Labor (AF of L). (Grosman, 1975:118). Simi- larly, in England; 1919 marked police strikes in London, Liverpool and Birmingham. In the English-speaking democracies the years from 1918 to the early 1920's were a period of union organization and militancy generally, and the police were not immune. Another example is to be had from Australia. In 1923, police in Melbourne went on strike in protest over supervisory practices. The strike could be described as a "wildcat" rather than the action of an association, but it was widespread. Ultimately one third of the force of 636 men were dismissed. (Massingham, 1977:288). In each country a consequence of this period of early militancy was public sentiment and government legislative actions that effectively restrained police unionism, for about thirty years in the U.S.A., forty years in Canada, and to the present in the United Kingdom and Australia. (Gammage and Sachs, 1972; Reiner, 1975). In the United States, as late as 1958 the spectre of the Boston strike was being invoked by the International Association of Chiefs of Police in their opposition to police unions. (IACP, 1958; Juris and Feuille, 1974:17). 8

Leading up to the strike in Boston, the Boston Social Club, a policemen's fraternal organization, received an AF of L charter in 1919. The Commissioner ordered the men to give up the charter. When they refused, the Commissioner suspended 19 police unionists, and persisted in the suspension despite the intervention of the Mayor. On September 9, 1919, 1,134 policemen went out on strike. (Maddox, 1975:9-10). Immediate consequences of the strike were the recruitment of a volunteer police force, the deployment of the Army, and the dismissal of the striking policemen. Massachussets Governor, Calvin Coolidge, supported the firings and issued the popular declaration that police had no right to strike.* This intervention effectively curtailed an expanding police unionism that by 1919 had resulted in employee organizations in over 35 major urban forces. (Gammage and Sachs, 1972). After the Boston strike, the AF of L revoked charters of police locals, and other large city police forces that had been interested in unionism backed away from organizing. (Juris and Feuille, 1973:16).

The year 1919 did mark the founding, in Pittsburgh, of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), an organization that has persisted, albeit somewhat fragilely, to the present. The FOP nominally offers broad-ranging representation, with about 900 locals and 90,000 memberships. In inception in 1919, the FOP was intended to be an affiliation of urban social and fraternal police organizations rather than an employee organization for purposes of representation or bargaining. (Halpern, 1974:26). The FOP lodges today continue to decline to be called unions, but they have engaged in collective bargaining, and in withdrawals of service. More generally, though, existing side by side with other police associations or unions, the FOP seems to have attempted to maintain a more detached and "professional" stance, perhaps analogous, suggests Halpern, observing

*"There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, any time, anywhere" (quoted in Gammage and Sachs, 1972:43; Maddox, 1975:10). the Baltimore situation, to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (Halpern, 1974:26).*

In the late 1930's renewed efforts to organize American policemen became evident. In 1937 the.Portsmouth, Virginia Police Force became affiliated as a local of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Empleees (AFSCME), an affiliate now of the AFL-CIO. By 1947 there were 100 locals of the APSCME that included policemen, in whole or in part. (Gammage and Sachs, 1972:44-45). However, all police affiliates and members of the APSCME are bound by a no-strike provision. Moreover, there has been considerable resistance to such AFSCME organizing, with the police being forced to withdraw from affiliation in major cities such as Los Angeles, Chicago, St. Louis, among others. By 1970 the AFSCME was reported to represent approximately 10,000 police officers. In contrast to older organizations, such as the Fraternal Order of Police, the AFSCME could be determinedly union-like, and employed experienced organizers. But many locals collapsed in the face of resistance, and in the opinion of Juris and Feuille, "the AFSCME organizing efforts never did amount to a great deal". (Juris and Feuille, 1973: 17). By this time, too, there were other organizers.

The Teamsters (The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union) have since about 1960 organized several police departments, including the recently contentious New Orleans Police Department, engaged in a 1979 recognition and salary strike. Police are also represented by several other trade unions, including the Transport Workers Unions. (Gammage and Sachs, 1972:51).

*Similarly, the New York City Policemen's Benevolent Association effectively bargains for its members, and does engage in job action, such as the 1967 "sick-in" (Gammage and Sachs, 1972:54). Both the FOP lodges and the Benevolent Association have been determinedly non-affiliated with organized labour, and thereby despite their activism, have perhaps been more readily accepted by municipal governments (Gammage and Sachs, 1972:55). - 10 -

Most areas of the United States also have local or regional associations. For example, in California there are eleven police associations, including the Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC). (Gammage and Sachs, 1972:58). Founded in 1951 as an information center, since 1969 it has become an active bargaining agency for police, with successful strike action in Vallejo (1969) and Antioch (1970).

Generally, therefore, across the U.S.A., police collective bargaining is widespread, but not universal. (Gammage and Sachs, 1972:107).* Some major cities are still not organized (San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, San Diego, Seattle, Houston). The many associations, whatever their character and affiliations, maintain contacts through the International Brotherhood of Police Officers. Increasingly there is some increased move to affiliation.**

(iii) Present Character:

The great increase in police unions or union-like affiliation occurred in the 1950's and 1960's. To some degree promoting aggressive police unions in the 1960's was "knee jerk" management and political opposition. Much interest in the formation of unions and in union militancy in police forces, as in other occupations, can be

*A State by State resumê of organization and membership, and of the relevant State legislation (85-94), now ten years dated, is available in Gammage and Sachs (1972:73-84). **Another feature of American police forces, flot to be discussed here, are Black police officers associations. These co-exist with the larger association, with Black officers as members of both. Rather than engage in collective bargaining, they are intended to represent the Black officer within the police force, and were formed to combat internal racism. (See: Centre for Research on Criminal Justice, 1975: 70-73; also, Burpo and Irwin, 1974:10). Summarizing the range of police organizations that have been noted in the preceeding pages, we can quote the Centre for Research on Criminal Justice. "There are five main types of police organizations: (1) local associations; (2) FOP lodges; (3) national professional organizations; (4) union affiliated locals; (5) Black police associations". (65) -11 -

attributed to the struggle for recognition and legitimacy. Other relevant factors have been obviously poorer wages relative to other civic employees; a perception of public hostility; poor internal supervisory practices; and an increased proportion of young better educated police officers. Juris and Feuille reMark that they ft. . . found four general factors contributing to dissatisfaction (increased public hostility, law-and-order demands on the police, low pay, and poor personnel practices) and three factors contributing to the police willingness to engage in confrontation tactics (the demonstration effect of other public employee successes, the influx of young policemen, and group cohesion)". (Juris and Feuille, 1973: 19). They schematically represent their analysis as follows:

(Juris and Feuille, 1973, Figure 2-1:23) Factors Affecting Recent Police Propensity to Form Unions

External: External: Perceived Hostility toward Greater law low rewards in Internal: police; more and order relation to Poor managerial difficult job demands on increased personnel police difficulties practices

Increased dissatisfaction

Demonstration effects of confrontation tactics by other groups, including — Group cohesion other police

Young policemen willing to take overt action

Increased propensity or willingness to form unions and to take militant action. - 12 -

Militancy may also be deliberately promoted in order to mobilize apathetic members, and to generate a higher profile organization. In this regard, Halpern concludes that of all factors influencing militancy, the most fundamental is "the strength of the organization". (Halpern, 1974:94).

"Militant tactics stem from organizational weakness. Leaders of police employee organizations who have organized only a small percentage of eligible men, who do not bargain a contract, who do not represent men in department proceedings, and who do not enjoy dues checkoff privileges may be impelled to militant action ' in pursuit of more goals or as a substitute for their achievement". (Halpern, 1974:94).

Halpern's emphasis upon employee organization leadership is, though, probably a distortion. At least equally, if not more important, are the deliberate policies of slow and frustrating response by management and public officials in dealing with unwelcome police associations. One well-informed adviser to American police chiefs and civic authorities, in an address to a Canadian police audience, in fact suggested that management strategy should clearly be that of confrontation, including provoking strikes.* The implications or unstated premises seem to be that of either calling an association's bluff, perhaps expecting that the members are reluctant in the extreme to strike, or if they do strike, exploiting adverse public opinion to strengthen management bargaining and ultimately perhaps to win anti-strike legislation. Whether deliberately seeking such confrontation or not, it is correct to note that generally chief constables in the United States, and in Canada, have not usually been forceful or effective in representing their men before decision-making bodies responsible for salaries or benefits. Moreover, they have themselves

*Glen Murphy, addressing a joint session of the Workshop on Police Labour Relations and an Executive Development class, at the RCMP Police College, Ottawa, December 4, 1978. - 13-

been responsible for often petty and arbitrary discipline and promotion practices that so agitate policemen, and have accordingly promoted unionism and militancy.*

Alse of some significance in promoting growth of police employee Organizations, and their militancy, was the urban unrest of the 1960's, where police officers came to the view that they were ill-equipped, and ill-led. This, for example, was a bitter issue between the association and the police commissioner in Baltimore in 1968. (Halpern, 1974:17). The struggle through the 1960's for better support by way of equipment, and in some measure quality of recruits and training, has normally been viewed as attributable to outside pressure from citizen groups or influential bodies, such as The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967). However, as much or more, such improvements can be attributed to police employee organizations.**

Salaries, though, have been the most volatile and persisting issue. In the post-World War II period police incomes in the U.S.A. were increasingly and visibly allowed to fall behind that of other occupations, including other public service occupations. Invoking sentiments of sacred and essential service, and to some extent ex- plditing the ill-organized police employee, civic authorities were not responsive to police salary needs. Nor were they manifestly interested in standards of police recruiting, training or equipment -- at least not until the urban riots.of the 1960's. Increasingly,

*Looking at Canada, Grosman makes this point: "To compensate for the low morale and cynicism that is created by administrative adherence to unrealistic rules and regulations, rank-and-file police officers look more to support that acknowledges the realities of their working conditions. This contributes to an increase in police union activism". (Grosman, 1975:41). **This has certainly also been true of Canada, especially in the Atlantic provinces. - 14 -

therefore, police employee organizations came to be seen as necessary.* Burpo expresses this sentiment:

"The policeman cannot sit back and wait for just compensation to be conferred upon him. The machinery of governmental bureaucracy has traditionally been slow in responding to the policeman's economic and job needs. Only through organization into self-help groups has the policeman been able to achieve a modicum of financial and job improvement. Police employee organizations have in the past, and will in the future, be the vehicle that eliminates many of the policeman's job frustrations". (Burpo, 1971:XIV-XV).

Writing in the late 1960's, Burpo also optimistically suggests that police unions may improve the quality of policing.

"Police labor groups are the catalyst that sparks needed changes in the policeman's working environments. If these organizations are able to cause changes that reduce job frustrations, the implications will be far- reaching. The policeman will gain. The police profession will profit. Most important, the public, whom the policeman serves, will reap the benefits of being protected by competent, motivated men". (Burpo, 1971:XIV-XV).

*"Between 1939 and 1964, police wages ran an average of 18.4 Percent annually while the average wages of unionized factory workers increased almost twice as much. Police wages increased dramatically during the 1960's, in part because of the tight labor marked and also because the heightened level of class and race conflict increased the cities' willingness to pay. Between 1966 and 1971, the annual rate of increase of police wages exceeded both the rate of private industry and the consumer price index. The deteriorating fiscal base of large cities and the current economic crisis, however, set limits on the resources available to police, and in cities of more than 100,000 people, the average annual rate of increase in patrolmen's wages has•declined from 10.5 percent in 1968/69 to 5.5 percent in 1970/71. Even with their gains from the 1960's, the increases in police wages have lagged behind both those of Federal employees and local transit workers, and the police still earns less than many public and private sector skilled workers". (Centre for Research on Criminal Justice, 1977:65). - 15 -

Most observers would take issue with the suggestion that unionization and police professionalization are complementary. Broderick questions whether the two movements can "coexist harmoniously", (Broderick, 1977:187), while researchers such as Skolnick oppose police unions as contrary to improve police service and the public interest (Skolnick, 1979). Similarly, Juris and Feuille (1973) find that police employee organizations have by and large opposed management incentives related to professionalization, such as improved education and other recruiting changes.

While the struggle'for improved income, equipment, and training have been persisting factors of import, the question of police prestige is also fundamental in understanding the development and action of police employee organizations. Incomes and the sense that they are not respected by the public seen related to a sense of resentment and dissatisfaction with their work. This has translated into militancy over contracts, and an increased militancy regarding public policies affecting police, as in the opposition to racial and ethnic hetero- geneity, civilian personnel, the abolition of capital punishment, gun control, or civilian review boards.

"The police have reacted to their perceived disadvantages by behaving like a militant political movement. The basis for their transformation into an active political force lies in their belief that their working conditions have been made difficult by increasing permissiveness of society, a condition generally attributed to the predominance of liberal policies and politicians. Such attitudes are probably caused by the conservative views held by most policemen, linked to their social origins, occupational experiences, and the history of political influences over police practices". (Bent, 1974:79). - 16 -

As in other sectors of the labour force, such as with public servants, militancy is a specific attempt to create more effective bargaining to improve working conditions. As such, activities supported by unions go well beyond salaries and equipment, to include participation in public referenda, as in Philadelphia and New York City in opposition te Civilian Review Boards. (Bent, 1974:83-84). Or, as in New York City, and in Philadelphia, the Associations resisted a policy of compulsory lie detector tests,* where police officers are suspected of corruption. (Bent, 1974:85).

Thus, although salary issues are fundamental, of probably greater public and administrative consequence have been police association interventions in matters of working environments and policing policy or style. As we shall see to be true of the Canadian instance, police chiefs are sensitive to the restraints upon their freedom of action attributable to the influence of the associations. It may persuasively be argued that a police administrator intent upon reform is faced with the high probability of police association opposition. (Wilson, 1968:259-260; Halpern, 1974:18). In contrast, where the chief police administrator's style is to allow the organization to run along and avoid innovations, the relation between the association and the chief is almost collaborative. Halpern cites the example of the relationship between the Buffalo Policemen's Benevolent Association and the Commissioner as such an instance of "working friends". (Halpern, 1974:41). The association influence,

*This example of a management practice imposed upon policemen that would not be tolerated elsewhere, including in courts of law, high- lights the police employee's anxiety over internal investigation and discipline. Maddox summarizes the issue related to internal investigations: "Basically the primary issues of concern to police officers in this area are: (1) the conduct of interrogations, (2) the presump- tion of guilt (officers are often called upon to prove their innocence), (3) the unrestricted use of polygraphs, (4) the multiplicity of findings utilized to determine degrees of involvement rather than innocence or guilt, and (5) the absence of guidelines designed to limit investi- gative discretion". (Maddox, 1974:120-121). The issue of internal discipline is no less pertinent in Canada, as illustrated in a widely reported case in Ottawa, to be described later in the text. - 17 -

though, not only affects the chieD. s discretion, but that of political policy makers with jurisdiction over policing and ultimately the public insofar . as the nature and the quality of police service. For examples, one or two man patrol, team policing, civilian review, uniform dress, community and preventive policing, civilian employment, police auxiliaries, are illustrations of the range of issues that an association may choose to deter. It is also conceivable though, that an association may as much as management initiate innovations. In Canada for example, the 4-day week in the Montreal Urban Community, and a new programme allowing a wife to accompany her husband on a demonstration patrol shift, are measures that the Police Brotherhood promoted.

But although there are such quality of working condition examples of police association initiative, and other examples of association cooperation or at least acquiesence in management innovation, the American. record is one in Which associations have not developed reforms in the public interest. Rather, they have been intent upon member interests, and these often have been in conflict with the delivery of quality policing to the public. There are glaring examples of this conflict of interest from the United States. Halpern provides an illustrative resumé.

"In New York the Policemen's Benevolent Asso- ciation (PBA) led an extensive and successful campaign against that city's civilian review board. The PBA has also vocally opposed one- man patrol cars, a fourth platoon system, and the Knapp Commission. The patrolien's association in Boston successfully fought mandatory nametags, automobile and dress reforms, and the replacement of uniformed traffic officers by civilians. The Police Officers Association in San Francisco was instrumental in deflating the expenditures and effectiveness of that department's police-community relations unit. - 18 -

When Oakland's police chief instituted a due process police model, a family crisis intervention program, and extensive minority recruiting, the Oakland Police Officers Association sponsored a referendum in which a majority censured their chief and demanded that he retire within a year" fflalpern, 1974:1).

If it is correct that the dominant concern and impact of police association intervention in policy has been to—the disregard, though not necessarily to the detriment, of the public interest, there is some irony in the realization that association public relations generally appeal to the familiar theme of police vital service. More money, better equipment, whatever, are justified as necessary to good policing, that is, good police service to the public. Again Halpern's remarks seem apt.

"Police employee organizations, like other interest groups, contençi that their own welfare coincides with the public's best interests. Because police are thought to Provide a critical commodity -- public order and personal security -7 such claims by them may have a special legitimacy and persuasiveness. In that way police employee organizations may develop a bargaining advantage vis-a-vis other municipal agencies and interest groups in the competition for public funds". (Halpern, 1974:52).

Halpern in fact suggests that a major impetus to American police association militancy in the 1960's was increased public criticism of policing, and increased attempts to intervene. As previously noted, civilian review boards were a principal tariet of association political action, although also an instance in which the associations were effective fronts for police administrators who also opposed civilian review. (Halpern, 1974:59; 87).*

*Whether or not civilian review boards are an effective and desirable method by which to regulate police behavior, their significance . . . is that they symbolize a commitment to attempt to increase accountability and civilian participation in police work. Review boards once functioned in 5 large American cities, New York, Philadelphia, Minneapolis, Rochester, and York, Pennsylvania. None presently exist in those cities or elsewhere". (Halpern, 1974:5). - 19 -

Citing findings of the Law Enforcement Task Force of the Eisenhower Commission (Campbell et al., 1969:307), and of observers such as Skolnick (Skolnick, 1969:219; and Abbot et al., 1969:6), Halpern attributes the demise of civilian review to the aggressive opposition of police associations. (Halpern, 1974:5). Moreover, it is argued that such opposition is indicative of the general ideological quality of police intervention politically -- that is, conservatism.

"It has . . .been suggested that police conservatism is expressed in the associations, especially in their opposition to public reforms. For example PBA opposition to the N.Y.C. civilian review board, or in Hartford, opposition to gun control, or in Seattle, criticism of coroner's proceedings, have been put as illustrations of white police racism". (Abbot et al., 1969:6).

In defeating civilian review procedures, the associations have brought the issue in-house, and rather than enhancing police force control over its own affairs, the consequence has been to exacerbate in-force divisiveness. Internal discipline procedures, often rude and ruthless, are themselves a response to public complaint and pressure. Rather, therefore, than combat civilian agencies, the associations are now obliged to oppose their own police management, reinforcing the adversary tenor of association-management relations.

(iv) Strikes

In the United States, as elsewhere, it is the police strike that most concerns the public. Generally it is fair to say, especially of the United States, that there is a mutual lack of confidence and trust between the police and the public. Police complain of non- support, and feel isolated and alienated from the communities they serve. As previously remarked, much employee organization activity in the United States, especially in the 1960's, has occurred in the - 20 - I . context of such feelings of dissatisfaction. Bent, in a work published in 1974, wrote that:

"By 1968, it becaffie clear that police union activity was not solely directed at economic I . objectives, but involved social issues as well. In this connection, Sylvan Fox described in the New York Times how the police in New York City I . in 1968 had turned down the best economic contract ever offered policemen. Police Department officials interviewed for the article expressed the feelings of dissatisfaction prevailing in the Department. One official was quoted as saying, 'Policemen are feeling their muscle all over the country. They want to be special. They want status'. Another official stated, 'I think it's really a general frustration that the police are feeling toward the establishment. They feel they're not getting the kind of recognition and respect they're entitled to -- from either the community or the administration". (Bent, 1974:79).

The root causes of police discontent that may set the stage for job action are not, therefore, usually as simple as the immediate issue(s) at hand. Usually the catalytic issue will be contract dispute over salaries, but the probability of the dispute leading to a strike is dependent, we suggest, upon the degree of public and political support that the police believe themselves to have generally in the community. The less confident and amicable the police- community relations, the more probable is strike action.* In the United States, strikes have recently occurred in major American cities, and in instances, on a statewide basis, For examples, New York City, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Rochester, Birmingham, New Orleans, Albuquerque, Oklahoma City, and statewide in Hawaii, and the State Police in California and Alaska. (Ayres, R., 1977; Bopp et al., 1977; Juris and Feuille, 1973; The Montreal Gazette, February 19, 1979, June 11, 1979; The Toronto Globe and Mail, July 15, 1978, May 5, 1979).

*In Canada, I suggest that this is precisely the attitudinal situation that obtains in many Atlantic cities, such as Bathurst, and in Quebec, especially in Montreal. - 21 -

I. ' In such instances the confrontation has been allowed to build over an extended period of time.

Two recent police strikes in the United States that are well documented are to be found in Albuquerque (July, 1975), and in Oklahoma City (October 23, 1975). (Ayres, 1977). Consistent with previous situations, in both cities job dissatisfaction loomed large. In Albuquerque, police referred to "internal departmental tension that has developed because the men on the force perceived that no one cared about them or appreciated the work that they did. There were complaints that patrolmen had no voice in management and that no one would listen to them" (Ayres, 1977). In Oklahoma City, a university research team found that "poor supervisory practices were the basic cause for discontent among the police officers'. This discontent was expressed by officers complaining about the supervisors' . lack of concern for employees and their unwillingness to communicate with officers relative to the elements affecting the officer's job". (Ayres, 1977:27-28).

Although there were wage contract negotiations at issue in both instances, the context was of longstanding grievance over work setting. Further, in both cases, the catalyst for negotiation breakdowns and strike related to management -- including political authority -- recalcitance and unwillingness to grant the associations a role in job planning. In Albuquerque there were rumours of transfers and suspensions, and outright threats of firings by command officers. (Ayres, 1977:21). In Oklahoma City, similar threats of suspensions 1 provoked the walkouts, an escalation from earlier work slowdowns. (Ayres, 1977:28-28).*

*It is worth noting that in neither city was there public disorder or an outbreak of crime. In both cases, though, there were police on duty -- in Albuquerque supervisory and non-striking personnel, and in Oklahoma City, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol. In Albuquerque, the police seemed to have public support, in Oklahoma City, they seemed to lose prestige and respect. Of interest too, in the retro- spective analysis of events, city officials in Albuquerque suggested as a reason for the strike, police cynicism. "Because of their cynical nature, not wanting to trust anyone, it was, according to the city, difficult to bargain with them". (Ayres, 1977:23-27). -22.

II There are some obvious lessons to be taken from the cases described and other situations. Obvious is the observation that police unions will work.to and will achieve some participation in job control. The battles have been, and will continue to be, concerned with an alteration in traditional police management. When Command is unwilling to reach some accommodation, some alteration of their traditional prerogatives, collective action, whether work-to-rule, slowdowns, or strikes, are a possibility. The possibility becomes a probability when local politicians, media, and the public are hostile.

(v) Conclusions

Any summary overview of American police employee organizations is necessarily imperfect. Most forces are organized, but many major forces are flot. Many are affiliated, but most are not. The phenomenon of police employee organizations is well-established, but recognition conflicts still occur. Salary disputes remain of fundamental import, but ultimately may be less significant than the impact of employee organizations upon force management style and the quality of service to the public. Strikes, publicity aside, are relatively infrequent, and when they do occur, are as often a function of management or political intransigence and confrontation than a desired association tactic.* Ultimately, it is most accurate to suggest that police associations in the United States are still an evolving phenomenon to which management and political 1 authorities are gradually learning to accommodate.

*The inclination to strike can, however, be abused. For example, in March, 1979, police in Napa, California, called in sick, effecting a 12 hour walkout, to protest the release on bail of a man who had killed the Force's only police dog. (The Montreal Gazette, March 27, 1979). - 23 -

IV. The British Case

(i) History

The state of labour . relations in British policing is markedly different from both the United States and Canada in two important respects. First, there is not the multiplicity of jurisdiction in Britain that obtains in Canada and the United States. There is a uniform central legislative definition of the rights and limits of police associations. Second, the police have fewer rights to actively engage in collective bargaining, and generally have been much less militant.

In Britain, as in the U.S.A., there were early experiences in police unionism. An independent police union developed in the years of World War I (Reiner, 1978:19). Beginning with a London Association, the Metropolitan Police Union was founded in 1913, and by 1914 there were provincial branches and a National Union of Police and Prison Officers. The union was illegal, and consequently membership was secret. (Reiner, 1978:20).

After World War I the union established ties with the Labour Party and the Trade Councils, but failed to win government recognition. A test for the union came in August, 1918, when acting for both the City and the Metropolitan force t the union demanded recognition and salary increases. Also at issue was the demand for the reinstatement of a prominent union member who had been dismissed. The union ultimatum was ignored and at midnight of August 29, the strike began, and was "virtually total among both the Metropolitan and City of London Forces". (Reiner, 1978:22). Two days later, on August 31, a settlement was reached with the - 24-

Home Secretary, winning pay increases and a promise of a recognized It representative organization". The dismissed constable was also reinstated. Union membership rose dramatically as a consequence, enlisting 5/6 of the country's police by the end of the year. (Reiner, 1978:23).

Later in 1918 the government established a Representative Board in the Metropolitan Police, with annual election from all ranks below Chief Inspector. The union was still not recognized, but allowed to coexist. A broad electoral base, and the union's willingness to use the Representative Board, reinforced the union. The Commissioner and the Home Secretaty soon moved to a modified plan with representation on the Board by rank, thereby weakening the union's participation.

The crisis for the union, still not viewed as legitimate, came in 1919. Dissatisfied with the Representative Board, the union again called for a strike over the issue of union recognition. The strike was a dismal failure, in that few members in London or the provincial cities responded (the exception was Liverpool). Consequently the government brought down legislation to create a Police Federation. The Police Act of 1919 creating the Federation described a consultative mechanism rather than an organization with rights to collective bargaining.* Union membership was again pronounced illegal, and organizing for action was prohibited. (Reiner 1978:49). Rank-and-file employee representation was to be through a National Police Council, consisting of high ranking officers and Federation officials.

*One is reminded of the RCMP Division Staff Relations Representative System, insofar as there is a system of representation without clear rights to collective bargaining. - 25 -

I. (ii) Present Character

Today British police are governed by 1964 legislation, the 1 Police Act. All British police up to and including chief inspectors are mandatory members of the government-created Police Federation. (Reiner, 1978:49). The initially established National Police Council has been altered to include two Police advisory 1 Boards, one for Scotland and one for England and Wales, (Reiner, 1978:51-52). To the present this National Police Council is the basic official mechanism of police representation. The 1964 Police Act defined the Police Council of Great Britain as consisting of an "Official Side" and a "Staff Side". The rank-and-file representation, in the form of Federation representatives on the Council, is decidedly minority. Reiner outlines the components of the rather complex Council: "The Official Side consists of representatives -1 of the Home. Office (5), the Scottish Home Depart- ment (1), the County Councils Association (7), the Association of Municipal Corporations (7), 1 the Association of County Councils in Scotland (2), the Convention of Royal Burghs in Scotland (2), and the Association of Counties of Cities in Scotland (2), making a total of 26. The Staff 1 Side consists of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, 3 representatives of the Association of Chief Police Officers of England and Wales (ACP0), 3 representatives of the Superintendents' Association of England and Wales, 9 members of the Police Federation for England and Wales, 2 representatives of the Chief Constables (Scotland) Association, 1 member of the Association of Scottish Police Superintendents, 6 members of the Scottish Police Federation, and 2 extra members from the Superintendent's Associations and Police Federations of England and Wales and for Scotland, considered jointly. This makes a total of 27, of whom 6 are chief officers, 5 are superintendents, and sixteen represent the Federated ranks. (There are 5 constables, sergeants and inspectors respectively.plus a policewoman)". 1 (Reiner, 1978:51-52). - 26 -

Within the Council, consensus is to emerge regarding salary levels. In the case of failure to reach agreement, a three-man arbitration tribunal is called for, the members selected by the government. (Reiner, 1974:30).

Working within this frustrating framework, the Federation has functioned with increased asperity. In the context of police concern over public violence in the 1960's and 1970's, salary negotiations have been "conducted against a background of bad feelings amongst policemen". (Reiner, 1974:35). Talk of free association and of strikes have repeatedly surfaced. Moreover, the Federation has become increasingly active in policy-related matters, such as the issue of capital punishment and 'lenient' penal policy.* (Reiner, 1974:45-49). Addressing Parliament, a Federation spokesman made the rank-and-file British policeman's position, regarding capital punishment, and the Federation's role, perfectly clear. The argument was that restoration of capital punishment was intimately related to the working conditions and job safety of policemen, and that policemen were "convinced that the task of resisting violent crime, of combatting terror, and protecting the lives of their fellow citizens, including those of the police, would be less dangerous if the capital sentence were restored". (Lewis, 1976:262). At the annual conference of the British Police Federation in 1978, a call by the Federation Chairman for the reinstatement of the death penalty evoked "loud and sustained applause" from delegates. (The Toronto Globe and Mail, June, 1978).

The Federation, therefore, has gradually come to have a recognized bargaining and representative role. But it is bound to the complex setting of the Council, and barred from industrial action

*These two issues are, of course, prominent also in Canada. The Canadian Police Association has been actively lobbying for the reinstitution of the death penalty, while in Western Canada, especially in Edmonton, the Police Association(s) have been very critical of parole practices and the National Parole Board. - 27 -

II or acting in matters - of discipline. The Federation had depended until after World War II entirely upon a Home Office grant for its 11 funds.* It now can supplement with a voluntary subscription. But the monies can not be used "for supporting political candidates, contributing to trade unions or other outside bodies, or paying for the defence of members in civil, criminal or disciplinary proceedings . . ." (Reiner, 1978:30).

(iii) Conslusions

The present finds British police dramatically low on the occupational salary hierarchy. In May 1977, delegates to the Police Federation conference voted overwhelmingly "to demand the right to strike, even if it means appealing to the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg". The issue was low pay, and low salary -1 increases from the Labour Government. (The Toronto Globe and Mail, May 24, 1977). In May 1979, the newly elected Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, as one of its first acts, raised police salaries by 20% in response to police dissatisfaction and the growing militancy. As in the U.S.A., and in Canada, the 1960's and 1970's 1 in Britain have been marked by increased police dissatisfaction with their salaries and with job conditions. Their work is perceived as increasingly dangerous and underappreciated. (Reiner, 1978:34). Since 1919, until recently, most British police had resisted the notion of unionization, and especially calls for industrial action. In 1975 , for example, an attempt at the annual Federation confer- enc,e to present a motion, not for industrial action itself, but a referendum on the issue, was defeated overwhelmingly (Lewis, 1976: 91). But as previously remarked, by 1977, the Federation voted to demand the right to strike. The Federation has also been active,

*The grant again reminds one of the ROMP Divisional Representative System, wherein the Force funds the DSRR System. As in Britain, this inhibits Force members insofar as collective action to effect criminal justice polices. I

28 -

II as in publïc newspaper advertisements, in promoting "law and order" campaigns, and in commenting on its salaries. But to date there has been no irreversible move to unionize, and presumably the monies of the Thatcher government will deter the militant tendencies and rein- force the reserve or oppôsition of British police to unionization. In a sense, like the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Canada, the British police are presently able to take advantage of the threat of unionization to win government concessions.

V Canadian Employee-Management Relations: Municipal Forces

(i) Overview

There are several general observations that seem valid descrip- tions of the overall Canadian situation. First, it must be noted that all major municipal forces and most Canadian forces in smaller communities, are effectively unionized. In the cities, whether called unions (as in Vancouver, for example) or as is more common, police associations, it is the case that collective bargaining is a well-established fact of police life.* In smaller forces, character- istically police officers are represented by agents of the larger urban associations, whether formally or informally. Provincial bodies, such as PANS (Police Association of Nova Scotia) will ensure that small local bodies receive expert advice and representation. ()den, too, the association will employ legal advisers. In the cities, the associations affect not only the salary contract negotiations, but the day-to-day conduct of the force insofar as contract provisions concerning working conditions and rights of representation in disciplinary prodeedings.

*In some cities, such as Montreal; commissioned officers are included in the union, but in most forces, senior officers will be excluded or will have their own association. Such officer associations will not be discussed in this report; nor will we consider civilian personnel bargaining within the police forces. - 29 -

A secdnd general observation is that Most police associations have scant interest in strikes. Of course, in many jurisdictions strike action by police officers is illegal (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia are the nominal exceptions). Notable strikes have occurred in New. Brunswick, Nova Scotia and illegally in Quebec -- the most serious in Montreal. But most association representatives express a sincere repugnance for strike action -- although they do also acknowledge that they can conceive of circumstances that might lead to police strikes.

Third, increasingly the associations and management are well- prepared in their bargaining. Chief officers and associations share information with their counterparts provincially and nationally, and often they develop experts in the form of full-time personnel. Historically, the associations have been better informed and clearer in their bargaining positions than management. However, recently employee organizations seem to be losing this advantage, with the "amateurs" more and more to be found in the associations.

Fourth, it should be realized that in large proportion the persons who now make up management -- that is, senior officers and chief constables -- have themselves been members of police associations. Often they have been active members, serving on the association executive, or even with experience in collective bargaining on behalf of an association. Consequently, whatever their present frustrations, most can appreciate the benefits that have been won by the associations, and would like to be able to work with them.

Fifth, some management empathy aside, there is a clear mutual frustration in most forces. Both.the association and management express a basic suspicion of one another, and a sense of helplessness. 1

- 30 - I . There is a Marked increase in adversary tone, as well as a sentiment that both parties are helpless to correct frequent hostilities. Management believes itself to be limited in its tasks, from deployment of manpower to a hiring and firing, by police employee organizations that tamper with all aspects of policing. For their part, the associations continue to complain of arbitrary management decisions.

Sixth, whatever the governing legislation, details of which we shall not consider in this report, it is clear that each has in interpretation and application allowed police associations to bargain for benefits well beyond the economic, as management has complained in crying loss of management rights.

Seventh, police associations have undoubtedly benefited the rank-and-file officer, in salary, benefits, working conditions, and discipline and promotion procedures. In these respects, the unions have improved or "professionalized" the police services. What is presently unclear is whether the associations will continue to do so now that the "catch-up" period has largely passed and the adversary style becomes institutionalized.

Eighth, there is an apparent increase in the aggressiveness of both associations and management. Management is seeking to regain lost discretion, and associations have stepped up demands for a greater role in organizational decision-making. Both seem also to have assumed a more aggressive posture vis-a-vis public policy-making. Especially, police associations are becoming "political" insofar as seeking to influence law enforcement policy, and in doing so, are challenging the public's conception of the neutrality of the police.

Last, from the standpoint of the public interest, unions have been of benefit in the sense of winning better police equipment, -31 -

planning, ànd to a lesser degree, personnel. But increasingly police unions must be wary of a deterioration in police service. Obviously there is increased financial burden upon the public as police salaries and benefits improve. But it is not the financial costs that are apt to be objectionable, givén reasonable collective bargaining. Rather, police service may suffer insofar as unions allow themselves to become preoccupied with their own interests, and if, as in the United States, they act to oppose attempted police innovations and reorganization. In addition, as police unions become involved in public controversy, a cost that will have to be born is a deterioration in public confidence and respect, and a consequent decline in the quality of police-community relations and cooperation.

(ii) The Atlantic

Dealing with four provinces does, of course, obscure some of the particular features of policing in the Atlantic municipalities. But there are a number of generalizations and a regional character that seem pertinent. Rural and small town policing in the Atlantic provinces is in large part a contract responsibility of the RCMP.* However, there has been some shift to local forces, as well as a history of locally independent policing. For example, in Newfoundland, we find the Newfoundland Constabulary, the first "Canadian" police force, responsible for the City of St. John's. We also have in the Maritimes the first Canadian strike, in 1918, when forty Saint John, New Brunswick policemen walked out in an attempt to gain recognition of their affiliation with the American Federation of Labor. (Grosman, 1975:118). And in Sydney, Nova Scotia, Canada's first legal police strike occurred in 1971.

*The RCMP have found themselves in the position of possible "strike- breakers" in the Atlantic. Recently the possibility of simultaneous police strikes in New Glasgow, Amherst, and Truro, Nova Scotia, raised that possibility, and the apprehensive public comment of an RCMP chief superintendent. (The Montreal Gazatte, August 30, 1979). - 32 -

Legal'and Organizational Bases Looking at the pertinent legislation in the four atlantic provinces, we find as follows:

Newfoundland: Constabulary Act, 1979. No right to affiliate; no right to strike.

Nova Scotia: Police Act 1974, and the Trade Union Act, 1972. Right to affiliate; right to strike.

Prince Edward Island: Police Act, 1974; Labour Act, 1974. Right to affiliate; right to strike.

New Brunswick: Police Act, 1977; Industrial Relations Act, 1973; Public Service Labour Relations Act, 1973. Right to affiliate; right to strike.

Relative to other police forces in Canada, Atlantic forces are relatively small in number. They have been characterized by local recruitment of men and command-rank officers, and low educational requirements. Significantly they have traditionally been, in aggregate, the least well paid police in the country. Recent estimates place Atlantic forces an average of 28% lower than Ontario in salary (Jackson, 1979), and this despite significant improvements in the last decade. In addition, they have tended to be ill-equipped, and carelessly recruited and trained.

Wages have therefore been an issue, as have income-related characteristics, such as police "moonlighting". Working a second job is relatively common for Atlantic police officers, and, as we shall illustrate below in a Moncton example, may impede organizational changes in a force. But also working conditions, from issues of clothing, careers, training, autoMObiles, have prompted police in the Atlantic provinces to turn to employee organizations, and in - 33 -

particular . turn to the experience to be drawn upon in affiliation. Police unionization expanded enormously in the 1960's in the Atlantic provinces. For example, the Police Association of Nova Scotia (PANS) was founded in 1969. In Newfoundland, the first collective agreement for the Constabulary wae reached in 1972. In the formative stages of the Newfoundland employee organization -- The Police Brotherhood of the Newfoundland Constabulary -- there was marked resistance to granting recognition and the right to collective bargaining. In fact, there was a police withdrawal of service over the matter of recognition. Ultimately the chief retired, the Brotherhood recognized, and an agreement negotiated in 1972.

This drive to police rank-and-file representation has been the basic reason for improved salaries. In the Atlantic region, each province has some form of arbitration. In Prince Edward Island, in the case of impasse there is resort to a Department of Labour appointed conciliator. If conciliation fails, then binding arbitrarion is involved. In Prince Edward Island, there is a 3-man arbitration board, with a nominee from the union and from management, and a third party chairman appointed by the Minister of Labour. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia also have a system of conciliation, but no binding arbitration, while Newfoundland has no conciliation and tripartite binding (on the association only) arbitration. (Jackson, 1979:22).

Two striking features of police employee organizations in the Atlantic demand remark: affiliation and strikes. There are a significant number of affiliated police unions in the Atlantic, as in Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and especially in New Brunswick, where the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) is the bargaining agent. In three of the four Atlantic provinces, Newfoundland excepted, the police have the right to affiliate. In addition, in New Brunswick and in Nova Scotia, the police have the legal right to strike, subject - 34- to a "protection of the public" guarantee in New Brunswick and a 30-day "cooling off" period in Nova Scotia.

Issues Not unrelated, the Atlantic police employee organizations have been militant. Some police chiefs attribute the militance to CUPE, and the "outside" negotiators who are insensitive to the peculiar needs of policing. Certainly the CUPE negotiators have been well- prepared, experienced professionals, and thereby have enjoyed an advantage over local municipal management teams. A manifestation of Atlantic police militancy has been a willingness to threaten and to resort to job action,* sometimes in response to a contract issue, and on occasion, over the issue of affiliation. In August, 1977, fifty-six Sydney, Nova Scotia police walked out when a pay settlement recommended by a conciliator was turned down by City Council. This was Canada's first legal police strike (under 1969 legislation). (Grosman, 1975:119). Also in Sydney, Nova Scotia in February of 1976, city police, affiliated with CUPE, refused to cross the picket lines of a non-police CUPE group picketing City Hall. As a consequence, sixty-three police officers were suspended by the Chief on orders of the Mayor. (The Toronto Globe and Mail, February 24, 1976). Relating to their own job situations, in the City of Moncton, New Brunswick in 1978, the police threatened a work-to-rule campaign if the Chief proceded with a plan to implement team policing. Although association leaders had been fully appraised of the plan through its development, pressure from members, many fraid of the consequences of team policing for their part-time non-police jobs, spurred the opposition. In turn, the municipal response was to threaten dismissals. To date the impasse persists, with the matter in conciliation.

*In addition to the incidents remarked in the text, it should be noted that there have been other withdrawals of service in the Atlantic. In October, 1974, the Saint John, N.B., police walked out illegally over the firing .of 2 men. In April 1976, the Fredericton Police Force struck legally,over salary, only to have the increase that they did win rolled back by the Anti-Inflation Board. In 1977 the Bathurst police were out illegally over working conditions and inadequate training. - 35 -

Most recently, in July of 1979, a CUPE affiliate, the Bathurst, New Brunswick police went out on strike for six days.* During the strike vandals controlled the downtown of the city, and caused an estimated $100,000 damage. (The Montreal Gazette, July 14, 1979). The issue was a pay settlement that had - tentatively been reached in March, but which City Council began to back away from, and overtime compensation and rank structure. The police did return briefly to the job on two occasions during the six-day period to curb the disturbances, while throughout Council refused to call in the RCMP. The conflict resolution was a 3-year contract, calling for a constable's salary of the order of $20,000 by 1981 (The Montreal Gazette, July 14, 1979). The cost has been considerable public hostility directed to the police and to the City Council.**

To take a last example, we may note that it is not only the CUPE locals who are aggressive. The Police Association of Nova Scotia (PANS) representing major urban forces such as Halifax, also work for small police forces through the province. PANS maintains a full-time staff for negotiating. They have been very militant, and deliberately value the strike threat as a necessary tool in their bargaining. In Nova Scotia, the Westville Police Force found itself in 1978 without a contract since December, 1976. They walked out, in what was to become a strike of approximately sixteen weeks, the longest in Canadian history. (The Ottawa Citizen, September 30, 1978). Ultimately the contract was settled by jointly agreed compulsory arbitration.

*The Bathurst police also walked out in Summer 1977, objecting to poor training and working conditions. **While the Bathurst strike was underway, a contract dispute in Saint John, New Brunswick, brought strike threats from the CUPE organized force, when Council hesitated to . accept a condiliation report. (The Ottawa Journal, July 14, 1979). The strike was eventually averted on July 18, 1979. - 36 -

Implications PANS and CUPE provide the Atlantic forces with well-prepared experienced, and aggressive representation. In contrast, police command-rank personnel -- as is true across Canada -- believe that municipal officials tend . to be unprepared, and consequently the union is "stronger as each contract is drawn up". In Charlottetown, for example, as in almost every city where spokesmen were contacted, the view is that the unions or associations have been quicker off the mark, and now management is playing catch-up. Chief Saunders of the Charlottetown police quoted the statement of a Commission in a 1977 inquiry (Report of the Commission of Inquiry concerning the Charlottetown Police bepartment, May, 1977):

"It is obvious that those charged with the responsibility of negotiating this contract on behalf of the City were asleep at the switch while Union negotiators were right on the bit and Local 591 has consequently become a very powerful agency. Union officials cannot be faulted for this and it is now going to take some very prudent and careful negotiating on the part of the City to restore to it some of the powers which have been lost but which should properly be vested in the Police Committee and the Chief". (Correspondence, April 12, 1979).

I have no union confirmation of this Charlottetown assessment, but elsewhere in Canada it was apparent that if union and management did agree on anything, it was that the unions have been better informed and prepared. In Charlottetown, and in St. John's, the perceived union gains relate to management discretion. As elsewhere in the country, the specific example is the disposition of manpower, in this instance, the loss of "flexibility of hours". Chiefs in all the Atlantic provinces complained of the unions im- peding efficient shift assignment's. As in the well-known Toronto, - 37 -

Ontario, 2man patrol case, management in the Atlantic now believe that its disposition of personnel is no longer rational, and there- t . by no longer in the best interests of the community.

As suggested above,.therefore, a fundamental basis of the perceived, and real, union bargaining advantage has been in the nature of police collective bargaining. Related to the expertise of association representatives is the fact that union officers are at the table, police management is not. This point was put with references to Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. Although in some instances a union may suffer from a new and inexperienced bargaining team, more generally the union officers are themselves experienced, or can draw upon resource people, as from the larger CUPE organization or from PANS. A PANS spokesman, commenting upon recent Halifax negotiations • where the Chief was represented at the table, suggested that it is important that the Chief or a well-informed representative be present in order to have efficient bargaining, and a contract that the Chief can live with afterward. But most Chief Constables, and union members, believe it is natural and appropriate that union leaders bargain, but that a Chief must not, lest he lose objectivity and respect. Consequently, management is generally represented by city officials who may know or understand little about policing. Moreover, even where they are sensitive to the counsel of the Chief or his representative, they do tend to relate to different issues. That is, to be blunt, they are interested in the budget, and not command prerogatives. What they give up in the latter for savings in dollars affects the Chief and his officers directly but at first glance, not City Council. In fact, though, there are financial costs, as for examples, when overtime, shifts, one-man patrols, court-time, get into a collective agreement. • • • 1 - 38 -

In suM, Atlantic police employee associations have been effective in winning salary concessions, better equipment and some improved training. In their bargaining they have willingly resorted to militant tactics. However, they have been concerned with matters in addition . to salary, and increasingly they are looking at items such as supported education, career development and promotion. But salary income is the dominant concern. To date, they seem to have been more effectively prepared than management in their bargaining sessions. It is true of other areas of Canada as we shall discuss, but in the Atlantic the management sense of playing "catch-up", insofar as bargaining skills and information, is pervasive. So too is the harking back to lost "management rights", and the sense, on the part of management that they must be regained, and of the unions, that their participation in decision- making must be held and expanded.

(iii) Quebec

Police employee organizations in Quebec have the reputation as the most militant and powerful in Canada, and perhaps in North America. This is principally because of Montreal, rather than other centres. And Montreal, in the view of external observers and persons affiliated with the Quebec Federation, is the site of the most troubled labour-management relations.

The well-known Montreal police strike of 1969* has found its way into most American works on police unionism, generally as an example of the negative consequences of police employee organizations.

*The strike began on the morning of October 7, and continued until approximately 12:30 P.M. October.8, when the Force returned after back-to-work legislation was passed by the Quebec Assembly. Al- though legislated back to work, the Brotherhood won salary parity with Toronto, and the Police Director resigned. (Clark, 1969). - 39 -

For examplé, Juris and Feuille, in opening remarks in their book Police Unionism, write:

"The 1969 strike by police and firefighters in Montreal with its toll of looting and property destruction seemed to indicate that the doomsayers were if anything understanding the potential harm that could come from the police union movement". (Juris and Feuille, 1973:1).

In light of the extensive damages and consequent publicity, another American observer of police unions states that the Montreal strike was the first significant police strike since Boston in 1919. (Burpo, 1979:13-15). He remarks:

"The scorecard in terms of human and property damage was not encouraging. Two persons were killed as a result of strike-connected incidents, with forty-nine others being injured or Property losses from vandalism and looting exceeded one million dollars". (Burpo, 1979:15).

Damaging the strike may have been -- and it seems that the Brotherhood and the Force are still harvesting the damage -- in the sense of poor public relations. But it was successful in propelling the Montreal police into salary parity with Toronto, and ever since they have ranked among the top three police forces in the country in salary and benefits.

Legal and Organizational Bases Past militant tactics notwithstanding, in Quebec -- unlike five other Canadian provinces -- police do not have the legal right to strike. Nor do they have the right to affiliate. Governed by both the Labour Code (1964) and a « Police Act (1968), they have the - 40 -

right to collective bargaining, but not legally to job action. - Failing to reach contract agreement, they are subject to mediation, and finally binding triparte arbitration. But unlike all other provinces, collective agreements must, by law, be of a minimum 24-month duration, thereby exacerbating the pressure for a good contract at each bargaining session.

In Montreal and Quebec City, the Brotherhoods deal with a Security Council, consisting of city representatives and a provincial appointee. In the Montreal Urban Community, for example, the Council consists of seven members, including the provincial appointee, the Mayor of Montreal (guaranteed a place) and the remaining representatives from the other cities making up the • Urban Community. In the Montreal Urban Community (MUC), dealings between a large police force of about 5,000 men, and the political spokesmen of the several cities who are represented in the Security Council, create a rather unwieldy and at times incompatable collage of interests.* However, both parties, the Brotherhoods** and the Security Councils, have employed professional negotiators, as for example, the City Manager's role for the Security Council in Quebec City. The Police Directors do not participate directly.

*The several communities in the MUC (27-29 municipalities) do have diverging interests. One Brotherhood spokesman suggested that presently "the suburbs are now in control". With the police integration in the MUC, there has been a gradual reduction in neighborhood police stations, and the trend is expected to continue. In 1978, for example, VI seven west-end and lakeshore stations were merged into two". (The Montreal Gazette, June 16, 1979). Increasingly neighborhood resi- dents are complaining of deteriorating police service, and are considering hiring "security squads". (The Montreal Gazette, June 16, 1979). **Also confusing relations is the Inclusion of command-rank officers in the Brotherhoods. Presently, for example, believing themselves cut off from effective representation, the MUC senior officers are attempting to form their own association. - 41 -

Issues • • Acts of police union militancy in Quebec have ranged from slowdowns to walkouts, with some considerable success in bringing pressure upon political authorities. A recent example was the Quebec Provincial Police demand for round-the-clock 2-man patrols. Slowdowns, and some illegal walkouts, as for example in Drummondville, pressured the gbvernment into an agreement that called for compulsory night shift 2-man patrols, as well as 2-man patrols for other "special circumstances".* A consequence in terms of cost was the need to recruit 270 additional men. (The Montreal Star, April 6, 1977; The Ottawa Citizen, April 13, 1977). Equally effective was the Montreal Urban Community Police action to win a 4-day week. In effect, when management refused, police officers simply set up their own 4-day shift schedule. They ignored injunctions, and finally won agreement to implement, albeit on a trial basis, the 4-day shift. (The Toronto Globe and Mail, December 31, 1977, January 10, 1978).

In both Quebec City and in the Montreal Urban Community, management expressed the view that the unions were too busy intervening in command decisions that related to fundamental operations such as shifts of discipline. It was suggested, for example, that in consequence Quebec City police were experiencing declining morale and discipline. In particular line supervisors were reticent or handicapped in their control of the men. In both Quebec cities, the police unions were described by management spokesmen as too busily engaged in checking management, rather than in contributing to efficient policing. The union spokesmen; of course, see their role as necessary and positive. But they confirm the management

*The QPF Association has formally negotiated for its members since 1960. The Association cannot affiliate or strike, and in a dispute, , given the failure of mediation they are bound by compulsbry arbitration. Governing legislation is the 1968 Quebec Assembly legislation, "An Act Respecting the Quebec Police Force Syndical Plan". - 42 -

description of very active and intérventionist employee organizations. Ironically, it is probably the union interest in policing innovations (eg., psychological disability, 4-day shifts) as much as their actions in obstructing management policies that have generated tensions.

In particular, the Mohtreal Urban Community Police Brotherhood has constantly tested its strength in disputes with management. For several years, it has made a practice of openly intervening in force policies, with statements that publicly challenge or contradict management. For example, recently a spokesman for the Brotherhood, after a drowning at Man and His World, called for night patrols. (The Montreal Gazette, August 1, 1979). Or, to take another example, allied with citizen groups, the Brotherhood has pressured management for the reinstitution of a Youth Squad. (The Montreal Gazette, March 13, 1979).

Less successfully, the Policemen's Brotherhood went to the courts, all the while threatening job action, to block management plans to transfer 100 district detectives in CID to local stations, and disband the 30-man "night patrol" detective unit. (The Montreal Gazette, May 29, 1979). "At a news conference called by the Montreal Urban Community Police Brotherhood . . ., Union President, Gilles Masse, warned that the city would become 'the capital of organized crime in North America in two years' because of the changes and cuts planned in specialized squads". (rhe Montreal Gazette, May 22, 1979). A consequence has been negative editorial comment, as in the Montreal Gazette's statement in support of Henri-Paul Vignola, Director of the MUC Police. The editorial reminds the reader "that it's not the union, the MUC Policemen's Brotherhood, which runs the Police Department. It's the citizen members of the MUC Public Security Council, which ultimately is controlled by the Quebec government". -43-

Moreover, the editorial continues, •ecalling the 4-day week issue, "the union is a vigorous and cantankerous one". They should be consulted but not run the Department. (The Montreal Gazette, May 30, 1979). The Quebec Superior Court agreed and denied the Brotherhood's request for an injunction to block the decentralization, suggesting that the relationship of the decentralization to the collective agree-

It ment is a matter for a grievance committee, or an arbitrator, and not the court. (rhe Montreal Gazette, June 5, 1979). The Superior Court also refused to extend an earlier injunction requested by the Department to prevent a threatened slowdown. The court chastised the Director for not disàussing the issue with the Brotherhood, but also for not aggressively exercising his legitimate authority and ordering policemen not to engage in a slowdown. In his eight-page judgement, Mr. Justice Maurice Legace, criticizing Police Director Henri-Paul Vignola, remarked: "The Courts have always hesitated to substitute their authority for the authority designated by law to others". (The Montreal Gazette, June 9, 1979). Both the presiding judge and the Gazette's editorialist, revealed marked impatience with the MUC Police, chastising the Brotherhood for its interference in management of the force, and the Director for his lack of control.

Whether or not the editorialist is correct in describing the Brotherhood as "cranky", to suggest that they are powerful is certainly true. It is also clear in the above incident that, as union executives suggested to me, there is a lack of consultation by management, and a bitter alienation. The particular issue of detective decentralization lingers on. In August the front-page headline story in the Montreal English language morning newspaper highlighted a "1,000-case backlog" in Montreal, and went on to discuss the poor MUC Police clearance rate, and a slowdown in detective investigations. The poor clearance was the reason for management decentralization of detective branch, but the current - 44 -

"backlog" was attributed to the decentralization, which the Vice- President of the Policemen's Brotherhood said "simply isn't working", but which management claimed wasn't being given a chance by the men.* The newspaper report concluded with the advice given a complainant by a police officer: "The best thing to do is to hire a private detective". (The Montreal Gazette, August 19, 1979). Hard on the heels of the news report came an editorial desctibing the situation as "inexcusable". "Police supervisors blame detectives for taking it easy in protest against having been ordered recently to work shifts around the clock like uniformed police. The rank-and-file blame supervisors for disbanding various police specialty squads". (rhe Montreal Gazette, Editorial, August 11, 1979). The editiorial sketched an image of an incompetent police force, tangled in bickering, with the public caught in the middle between management and the union.

In Montreal, more than in any of the other forces visited, there seemed a sharp polarization within the force, and marked public dissatisfaction with labour-management relations. Spokesmen from the Labour Relations Department of the MUC suggested that they were working things out, and that there was effective communication. The Labour Relations Department exists to administer the collective agreement, and to head off difficulties. But it is a management unit, with full-time personnel who are members of the Brotherhood. Labour Relations Committee spokesmen spoke positively of labour- management relations. But union spokesmen sketched a picture of utter failure of communications, and a non-responsive management.

*A headline in the Montreal Gazette of September 8, 1979, screamed out the accusation: "Vignola raps police union for 'sabotaging' changes". The news report went on to quote the Director's charges that the Force was not doing its job because of union-management bickering, and a lack of communication. In turn, a Brotherhood spokesman remarked that they too wanted efficient policing, but were unable to deal with management. "There's absolutely no discussions. All we do is write letters to each other". (The Montreal Gazette, September 8, 1979). -45-

Implications • The Quebec unions have won enormous salary benefits over the years, and now enjoy the highest salaries in Canada, and probably the best pension benefits. The Montreal Urban Community Police Force have come to set the standard for salaries throughout Quebec,* and even nationally, along with Toronto and Vancouver.

The Montreal Urban Community experience is effectively dissem- inated throughout the province through the offices of the Quebec Federation. The Federation employs a full-time Executive Director, who for the past seven years has been the former president of the Montreal Brotherhood, Guy Marcil -- the man who led the Brotherhood out on strike in 1969. Presently Mr. Marcil estimates that the Federation advises or negotiates for approximately 160 Quebec unions. They have also been rather innovative, periodically spon- soring research enquiries into matters such as the 4-day shift, or psychological disability, and then pressing aggressively for the implementation of changes. Usually thay have had, as a consequence of prior careful enquiry, the information to back up their proposals. To a considerable degree, therefore, the Montreal Urban Community Brotherhood have taken away management initiative, and more than elsewhere in Canada, have contested and genuinely eroded management control.

The MUC Brotherhood's gains have been great. More than any other union or association in Canada, the MUC Policemen's Brotherhood has set the pace and pioneered in successful initiatives in collective bargaining in Canada. They have translated their legally restricted organization into Canada's most militant and powerful police union. But the penalty has been a loss in public sympathy and a gulf between the rank-and-file and senior management.

*For example, in July 1979, the small Western Quebec force of Gatineau began a work-to-rule campaign in order to win salary increases that would bring them to parity with Montreal. (The Ottawa Journal, July 20, 1979). - 46 -

(iv) Ontario

Police associations in Ontario have been both more inhibited and less militant than in Quebec or the Maritimes. In particular the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) appear a model of non-contentious employee-management relations. Like the Quebec Provincial Police, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, they are largely a dispersed . rural force, and thereby suffer fewer of the alienating problems of urban policemen, and are more difficult to mobilize. They have had recognized rights, as an association, to bargain since 196 3, and are presently recognized under the Public Service Act of 1970. They can not affiliate or strike, and are subject to binding arbitration, as are the Ontario municipal forces. (Fisher and Starek, 1978:135-157). The OPP Association relations with its employer the provincial government, and its internal management have been generally pacific and trouble free. As in the RCMP, with respectable salaries and benefits, the only notable sore point that every now and then obtrudes, relates to transfers within the large Ontario hinterland that the force serves.*

Legal and Organizational Bases There are no instances of strike action in Ontario, and generally there is indication of an unwillingness to resort to extreme job action. The legislative prohibition aside, there seems some conscious and deliberate attempt to avoid the controversial example of Montreal. There have been slowdowns, as in Toronto in October of 1978 over an arbitration award on salary (Toronto Globe and Mail, October 5, 1978). But there have been no strikes. There have been aggressive police leaders in Ontario, such as Syd Brown, Former President of the Toronto Association. But membership support seems historically to have been restrained, and leadership non-militant.

*One such grievance was well publicized in 1978 when an OPP officer went to court to prevent his transfer, claiming that there had been no consultation and that the transfer was being used as a disciplinary action. (The Ottawa Citizen, August 5, 1978). - 47 -

However, Ontario police employee groups have been effective. Salaries have kept pace with Montreal, as the Toronto and Montreal forces have for years measured success against one another, and used one another's contracts benefits in negotiation. In addition to salary, in Toronto the association has also scored impressive gains in traditional management related sectors, as most notably, in obtaining in arbitration mandatory two-man patrols. In Ontario association gains seen to a significant degree to be a function not of job action, but of arbitration decisions. Governed by the Police Act (1979; amendment 1972) and not labour legislation, without the right to affiliate, and subject to one-man arbitration (after conciliation), arbitrator awards seem generally to have been to the advantage of Ontario associations. In part this maY have been a function of well-prepared association cases, with management caught in the position of being represented by persons not sufficiently familiar with policing. In part, too, it may have had to do with the character of single member arbitration, where discussions are perhaps rather more readily skewed in the direction of one party's well-prepared position than would be so with a tripartite board. Certainly the senior officers in Ontario forces, most particularly Toronto, seem to have lost confidence in arbitration while the association representatives seen now to welcome it.

Issues In Ontario as elsewhere the battle recently has been over administrative control -- matters such as shift, promotions, and discipline. Economic issues have not gone away, of course. Salary level is always a priority, and recently pension and early retirement have been important bargaining points, especially so as some of the positions traditionally held by older constables (eg., dispatching) are now going to civilian personnel. In Ottawa, for example, 1979 association elections returned a new president and slate of officers - 48 - who believed that matters such as pensions had not received adequate attention. Pension has now become the major issue in Ottawa Assoc- iation negotiations with the city. Contract talks have dragged on despite salary agreement over the matter of early pension, and now will likely go to arbitration. In the meanwhile the dispute has generated membership frustration, some rather creative protest (for example, wearing masks on duty), and considerable press coverage. (rhe Ottawa Journal, September el.8, 1979, September 21, 1979, September 24, 1979; Toronto Globe and Mail, September 22, 1979).

Also, in Ottawa, as in Toronto, procedures relating to disci : and dismissals seem to be of concern to association members. pline For example, an Ottawa constable who was urged to resign when charged with indecent assault -- before a completed investigation, charges or trial -- was noted by an association member as an example of management's zealous efforts to keep the force "clean", whatever the justice or injustice that individuals might suffer. Subsequent to the constable's resignation, he was acquitted in County Court. (rhe Ottawa Journal, June 6, 1979). In Toronto the Association and the Civil Liberties Association have forged an alliance with the objective of more rights for policemen under charge, including "independent investigators". (Toronto Globe and Mail, October 19, 1976). Whether management is in fact over-zealous or not, in Ottawa as in other forces in Ontario and elsewhere, association members are sensitive to the jeopardy of their jobs, and fear of "railroading", while for their part, management argues that because of the associations, they can't really get rid of "bad apples" any more.

Negotiations in Ontario are conducted between association* representatives and a Board of Police Commissioners (from three to five

*Major municipal forces in the province do not have senior officers as association members. Several, as Toronto, have senior officer associations. • • .!

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- "HE'S'À ">-'• ' ' .An'Ottawa policemen wearS a: grotesque ' ‘'contract- talks with city authorities. The mask while carrying out his patrol duties.: • .. men, who have been without a contract He was one bf several who, unable to ..since Jena areseeking a pay increase of I strike, Showed their frustration over Slow 7 per cent and early retirement benefits. - 49 - members). The Chief does not participate, but will usually have a Deputy Chief act as advisor to the Board. Negotiating for the Board will usually be a City Manager. In several Ontario cities both management and association attributed negotiation difficulties to the role of the Commission. Consisting of a City Mayor, and at least two provincial appointees Ca judge and usually a second lawyer), the.Commission is seen not only to be unfamiliar with policing, but otherwise too busy and uninterested. In fact, city managers seem clearly to be the key management actors, and are themselves critical of the inadequate input of the Commissions.

In Ontario, as in the Maritimes and in Quebec, it has been suggested that too many working . issues are brought to the table -- issues with which commissioners and city managers are not competent to deal. Matters relating to promotion, shift, discipline,. equipment, may not, for example belong at a collective bargaining session, particularly if management is not well-represented. In large part such items are brought to bargaining sessions simply for want of adequate internal organizational mechanisms for their resolution. Few Ontario forces seem to have established adequate means of ongoing liaison and problem-solving, such as a joint all purpose employee-management committee.* As a consequence, informal and formal grievances pile up, communication is handicapped, and bargaining becomes cluttered. Most Ontario Chiefs will insist that they and their Deputies maintain what the Acting Chief of the Waterloo Regional Police Department called an "open door policy". But however accessible or open, such seem not to serve the same function as alternative structures such as exist, for example, in Alberta, (to be discussed later in this report).

*The Windsor Police Department has attempted regular meetings with some reporèed success, and there may be other examples. For the ' most part, however, Departments have only formed limited special task force committees, such as for equipment. - SO -

It is, of course, difficult to generalize in a province the size of Ontario. Some large centres, such as Kingston and London, declined to participate in this study. Not all centres were visited for interviews, as contrasted to mail responses. It would seem accurate to suggest that there is considerable variability in the character of association-management relations in the province. For example, some cities, or regions, such as Hamilton-Wentworth, seem to have avoided serious confrontation. But although some relations may be less strained than others, police employees in Ontario do share points of view, such as association concerns regarding matters such as shifts, pensions, and management concern with protecting and recouping management rights.

The Toronto Association in a sense sets the tone because of sheer visibility. Recently the association has been regretting its visibility in the media capital of Canada, for it has been receiving bad press. Revelations of racist statements in the association journal have been well-publicized and have cost the association public support and highlighted long-expressed management sentiment to the effect that they have lost control over their men and cannot be accountable for statements such as those in the association magazine.

The item in question was an article in News and Views, the monthly publication of the Metro Toronto Police Association. A Staff Sergeant on the force wrote a crude anti-sexual polemic, (Tom Moclair, "The Homosexual Fad", March 1979) which induced criticism of Mayor John Sewell for condoning "acts of perversion". (The Montreal Gazette, March 21, 1979). The Chairman of the Police Commission, Philip Givens, threatened an investigation, but as the Acting Chief, Jack Ackroyd, remarked, in the absence of bigotry in his police work there is no provision in thé disc'ipline code ' ' -51-

of the force or the Police Act that would allow disciplining of the author. (The Montreal Gazette, March 22, 1979).*

Implications Ultimately condemnations by City Council and others may oblige the Association to "clean its own house" as the Sunday Star put it in a lead editorial (Sunday Star, March 25, 1979). But the News and Views articles brought home the visibility of police associations, and the fact that they may be taken by the public to represent the force. Traditionally, of course, management has been responsible for relations with the public, and for a force's public image. But as illustrated in the Toronto incident, without resorting to job actions a police association may seriously affect the force, bringing the entire organization and not just the employee group into disrepute.** Similarly, though, an association may also intervene

*Also bringing down criticism was a regular column by a retired policeman who over the previous months has apparently been com- 'menting upon ethnic minorities, women, homosexuals, and the Pope. (Sunday Star, April 8, 1979). The column by Ken Peglar, contained remarks as: "If you want a laugh, drive over to Glencairn and Bathurst and see the Jews in their Oldsmobiles. It's better than a Frank Sinatra special". Or "Now that they've elected a Polish Pope, we can look to lots of cooperation between the communists and the Vatican. They both have the saine ambition: World domination". (Ken Peglar, "Pensioners News" in News and Views, December 1979, p.I1). In a report that examined Toronto Police relations with minority groups, the Ontario Police Commission did not suggest any punitive intervention, but volunteered the view that the articles damaged public confidence in the police. They wrote that ". . . we . . . are of the opinion that whatever an officer's personal views may be concerning minority groups, he should avoid public expression of those views if to do so will admit or sound of prejudice, or cause concern in the general public as to the objectivity of the police force". (The Toronto Globe and Mail, July 28, 1979). **In Alberta, the entertainment extravaganzas of the Calgary Asso- ciation had a similar consequence, when the Association was publicly criticized for its high priced entertaines', and the monies lost in the venture. - 52 - publicly in order to bolster a force's image. Again a Toronto example illustrates the point. In the face of public and media criticism of the Toronto Police Force after a shooting, the Association answered charges of racism and bias with a major advertis'ement in the Toronto Star (September 13, 1979). The advertisement undoubtedly improved membership morale, but also made clear the Association role in Force public relations and reputation. Arising from the saine incident, the Association seized the initiative again on September 30, holding a mass meeting to which were invited the Chief of Police and the Metro Toronto Chairman. (Sunday Star, September 30, 1979). At the three-hour closed meeting, the Association voted unanimously to withdraw and oppose support for Toronto Mayor, John Sewell, on the grounds of his "inflammatory remarks" concerning the shooting incident. (The Ottawa Journal, October 1, 1979 5. We find, again, therefore, the Association rigorously representing its membership in a public issue, reminiscent of American association roles in matters such as civilian review. In doing so, they have intervened explicitly in politics.

The controversial comments found in News and Views and the Association advertisement are also illustrative of another development in police association role. Specifically, there is a growing inclination on the part of police associations to take on politicians and interest groups in Canada, in contrast with the traditional reserved "no comment" posture. Salaries and work-specific matters may remain paramount, but associations increasingly are acting as informed pressure groups, and pressing for policy changes. An Ontario example was the demand put by the Police Association of Ontario for the right to arrest and detain persons unable or unwilling to identify themselves. (The Toronto Globe and Mail, February 6, 1979). More prominently, the Ontario Police Association has also been forthright in its opposition to the abolition of capital punishment.. In effect,,for Canadian police associations, "management"

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is no longer just the Commission and senior officers, but increasingly also to be dealt with are legislators and the voting public.

The visibility of the Toronto Association affects the public view of policemen, and police unionism, everywhere in Canada, just as the Montreal Brotherhood does. The Toronto contracts also set the measure against which other settlements in Ontario and Canada are evaluated. Although there have been difficulties for those active in negotiating police contracts in the province, it also seems true that for many observers in other provinces, Ontario . offers a model for police labour relations. That is, internal frustrations and disputes aside, relations in Ontario have been pacific insofar as avoiding disruptions in police services, as well as any deterioration in the morale or sprit of Ontario police officers. Consequently, from the vantage point of the other provinces, management representatives in particular have cited Ontario as an example of a desirable system, one where strikes are prohibited, and binding arbitration invoked. Yet, from within Ontario, the system is criticized for these very features. As previously remarked, management is now wary of arbitration, and with good reason believes that the clear definition of management prerogatives in the Police Act has been eroded by poor arbitration awards. Professional negotiators too, such as city managers, are critical of "incompetent" arbitration awards. As well, police command-rank officers and professional negotiators criticize the role of the police commissions, consisting of "part-timers" who are ignorant of policing and, city mayors aside, not responsible to the Council and the electorate. An example would be a recent police commission decision in Kitchener-Waterloo, awarding full legal compensation to police officers on charge, irrespective of whether guilt is eventually established or not. (The Toronto Globe and Mail, July 14, 1979). Police Association spokesmen, for their part, complain not of the arbitrators, but they do object to the amateurs on commissions and especially to thelnterference of local -54- politicians, preferring to deal with professional negotiators, such as city managers, even where describing them as "hard-nosed". Also, although declaring opposition to the strike as a tactic, there is, as an Ottawa spokesman put it, some regret at not having "the hammer". ( rhe Ottawa Journal, August 14, 1979).

If there is a fair conclusion to be reached in an overview of Ontario, on the basis of the record it must be favourable. Dissatis- faction and flaws, as remarked above, are genuine. But policing in the province has not been disrupted, association members have been acquiring comparable or superior benefits to their peers in other provinces, and force morale seems not to have deteriorated. The adversary tone of employee-management relations is clearly a feature of Ontario forces, but unlike the Maritimes and Quebec, it has been a contained adversarial relationship.

ev) Manitoba and Saskatchewan

The two Prairie provinces both have legislation governing police employee organizations that reflects the attitudes of previous New Democratic Party governments. In both provinces, police strikes are a legal possibility. Yet, in contrast to the Atlantic provinces where that possibility has been realized, police employee organizations in Manitoba and Saskatchewan have generally avoided withdrawals of service. This may be attributable to the influence of the larger umbrella affiliations in the Atlantic, CUPE and PANS, in contrast to the more locally autonomous employee organizations of Manitoba and Saskatchewan.

Legal and Organizational Bases In Manitoba there has never been a police strike, and in Saskatchewan only one brief withdrawal of police services' in 1976. In Saskatchewan, governed by the Trade Union Act (1972), police -55- associations have the right to affiliate, and, if not otherwise pre- cluded by a "no strike" clause in an association constitution, the privilege to strike. In Manitoba, the Labour Relations Act (1970) allows police employee organizations the right of affiliation and of resort to strike: In both provinces also there is legal provision for mediation/consultation, but no binding arbitration. The exceptions are instances in Saskatchewan of no-strike association constitutions > in which binding arbitration is legally mandatory. Barring such an instance, only by joint agreement may arbitration boards be established. (Jackson, 1979:22).

In Manitoba association membership is up to the rank of Inspector. There is also a senior officers' association for the ranks of Inspec- tor, Staff Inspector; and Superintendent. Similarly, in Saskatchewan membership in the Association in major forces will be up to Staff Sergeant, with an Executive Officers' Association bargaining for Inspectors and Superintendents. In both provinces the Deputy Chiefs and Chiefs are not represented by an association, as is true in all provinces.

In negotiations in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, the Chief is usually not at the table, but Deputy Chiefs may be, and the Chief or Deputy will of course perform an advisory function. Management will be represented by municipal officers, usually from the personnel and legal departments of the cities. They act for and are responsible to the Police Commissions of the cities in Saskatchewan, and to City Councils in Manitoba.

Issues As in other provinces, the paramount issue has been wages. As elsewhere, however, other matters such as overtime and pensions have been of import. In Manitoba, although there have been no formal or explicit threats of strike action, wage bargaining has recently - 56 - resulted in veiled strike threats on at least two occasions. In Saskatchewan, as in Manitoba, wage disputes have also led to slowdowns, and to one brief strike. A recent example of the former occurred in Winnipeg in the period of March 2-6, while in 1976 in Regina, there was a 17-hour strike when a contract settlement was being argued over by the City Council and the Board of Police Commissioners.* In August, 1979; the Saskatoon police implemented a work-to-rule campaign, and subsequently gave overwhelming support to a strike vote, in order to pressure for a contract under negotiation since November 1978. (rhe Montreal Gazette, August 8, 1979; The Ottawa Journal, August 14, 1979). The key issues of promotion procedures and pensions were eventually resolved with a conciliator, averting a strike. çrhe Ottawa Journal, August 15, 1979).

During the course of police unionism in both provinces, both management and association agree that there have been significant benefits. For example, frOm the management point of view, one Chief Constable recognized that the association has afforded a useful communication medium within his force. Others remarked upon the associations' role in improving equipment. But management spokesmen also believe that the relationship is now out of balance with the associations having leverage that management lacks. "Management does not have equal bargaining power". One chief remarked that unremitting union demands for salary and increased time off have had the consequence of reducing manpower in order to remain within fiscal limits. The view of chiefs also was that the unions have encouraged a measure of mediocrity in the emphasis upon promotion seniority and the protection of offenders. Generally the ubiquit management complaint arose: the loss of "management rights".

*In 1974 the Regina Police Association removed the no - strike clause from their constitution. The strike occurred when City Council refused to accept an arbitration board hearing unequivocally granting the Commission the right to ratify contracts with the Association. ( - 57 -

Management in the two provinces complain as do their colleagues elsewhere of having lost some neces.sary management control. These losses are perceived not only to have occurred in contract bargaining, as in increased holidays, or as in Winnipeg, on the issue of 2-man cars, but also in the course of daily supervision. That is, in both Manitoba and Saskatchewan management have suggested that line supervisors (Sergeants and Staff Sergeants) who are themselves union members, are reluctant or at least ambivalent regarding discipline. Depending, as do most organizations, upon line supervision for the effective day-to-day conduct of tasks, senior management perceives efficiency to have suffered due to the compromised position vested in union membership on the part of supervisory personnel.

It seems also to be the case that management intensely dislikes the strike option, and would prefer binding arbitration as in Ontario and Alberta. But in Saskatoon the police association seems particularly to dislike the arbitration option. In light of the apparent benefits to the police associations, and negative consequences to management, of binding arbitration in Ontario, the Saskatchewan views are perhaps somewhat incongruous.

Both union and management spokesmen in the provinces commented upon some harmonious and constructive consequences of police unionism. For example, participation in working committees on equipment were cited. The Police Association spokesman from Winnipeg remarked upon the development of "participatory management". But some indications of harmony aside, there are obvious difficulties as contract negotiations drag on in Winnipeg and Saskatoon, pompting associations to consider or at least threaten strike action. For their part management apparently are frustrated by what they perceive to be the unions' indifference to the practical constraints upon police forces. The budget limitations that result in fewer personnel than management would wish, the responsibility to provide effective policing services, - 58 - are, in management's views, not considered by police employee organizations in their bargaining. Rather than be concerned about the efficient operation of the police force, the unions are perceived to be free to worry only about their narrow interests, whatever the larger organizational consequences. Thereby, collective bargaining in police forces, where the police force has in effect a monopoly on.its unique services, and the association the option of withdraw- ing such services, has placed management, in their own view at an extreme disadvantage. Chiefs believe themselves caught between the association and the public and its representatives.

Implications In part the management perception of insensitive police employee organizations may be attributable to ill-developed day-to-day liaison. Mechanisms of genuine collaboration or "participatory management" that would counter the adversary relationship are not convincingly evident in the forces in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. As in other forces, management will mention an "open-door" policy, suggesting that they are always there, provided employees take the initiative. Also there is some collaboration between management and association in committee memberships. Such joint committee efforts, in areas such as equipment, clothing, commendations, seem to be areas of successful labour- management relations. But they fall short of full working committees explicitly intended to deal with the range of routine labour relations problems. The exception seems to be in the city of Regina, where there is some practice of joint association/management consultation. Regular monthly meetings are held with the association executive, with the effect of eliminating "rumour and speculaticin in terms of management motives". As a consequence; there seems to be a more positive management view of police associations, where the association is seen as a

" communicative link", "sounding board", and a "vehicle for problem solving", with a potential for a "unified approach to individual - 59 -

and organizational objectives". This attitude is not so powerful as to eliminate some sense of adversary relationship, but it does stand as a more optimistic and constructive view of the beneficial potential of police employee organizations.

(vi) Alberta

A pronounced example of optimistic, creative, labour relations exists in Alberta. In Calgary and in Edmonton, the latter especially, there seems to be evolving an effective joint participatory style of association/management relations.

Legal and Organizational Bases - In Alberta, police are govérned by the Firefighters and Policemen Labour Relations Act (1970). They do not have the right to affiliate, nor to strike, and are subject to tripartite binding arbitration. Senior officers work within their own association, and bargain sepa- rately. The bargaining sessions will normally be met for management by city managers acting for the Police Commissions, and with the Chief and a Deputy acting purely in an advisory capacity.

The structure, then, is formally identical to Ontario's. How- ever, the adversary mode with its attendent negative sentiments seem much less pronounced. In part this is attributable to association patience, expressed in a Calgary spokesman's view that "we're not in a hurry". "If we don't get what we want this year, we'll get it next year". More significant is the definition of employee-management relations put by the Chief and independentliby the Association President in Edmonton. They point to a mutual recognition of the roles and role-playing that are features of collective bargaining, including an awareness of one another's interests and responsibilities. Recognizing the role-playing dimension, the ego involved, '"no backing down", "us vs. them", character of management/association relations - 60 - is moderated. Also, there is serious and effective effort to stick to major issues at the table, andto settle working issues in regular meetings of a "Consultation Committee". The meetings are a priority item for the Chief Constables in Edmonton and in Calgary, and may be recommended as measures that should be instituted in all police forces. ;Both thé association and management may bring forward agenda items, and the chairmanship of the committee rotates between management and association. It is understood in Edmonton that the Chief's presence at such meetings has his priority; attendance is not a sometimes or maybe thing. Thereby the committee has provided a medium not only for problem resolution, but also for the anticipation and short-circuiting of potential problems. It has also made possible constructive inputs; where both parties could try on ideas that might eventually be implemented. In effect, such a committee once institutionalized and known to be taken seriously provides a genuine measure of joint management-union decision-making. Unlike the oft encountered "open-door" policy, that puts the onus upon association representatives to approach a superior, such a committee allows effective ongoing communication and non-crisis management/association dealings. This contrasts to the petition-like character of an "open door" system, and helps break down the adversarial feature inherent in employee organization-management relations. Thereby the associations, particularly in Edmonton, have in the opinion of both management and association, made positive contributions to the efficiency of the force.

In Edmonton there have been effective and long-standing working relations between the two principal actors, the Association President, who has been in office for ten years, and the Chief of six years. They seem not to forget their respective roles in contesting interests, but do so in a familiar, almost collegial fashion. There is a willingness to distinguish the trivial issues from the important; and each tolerates the sometimes necessary posturing for members or public. -61.-

In contrast to Calgary where the Chief is attempting to effect constructive relations with the asso'ciation, in ELIonton good working relations are simply a reality. In no small part this is attributable to personalities, and to the fact that in Edmonton the association president has been in office for many years, whereas in Calgary there have been four presidents in the last several years. Where there is executive stability, as in Edmonton, the association president knows his job, and his members, and thereby the association is not always starting afresh with new and untutored personnel. In Edmonton the 1 association has in effect enjoyed the advantage of a full-time professional staff, as vested in the person of an energetic and informed association president of long standing.

-Issues • Although relations are relatively amicable and realistic, all problems have not dissipated. Management in the two Alberta cities do express some concern over deterioration in discretion, and the - associations do complain of working conditions. But in both Calgary and Edmonton there is a sense Of negotiated settlement to a joint objective -- to wit, effective policing. One is reminded of the objectives sought by Regina's Chief Constable, who remarked that "Of primary concern is the maintenance of a proper and acceptable balance between the needs, requirements and objectives of the Department and those requirements and obligations relative to Association contract". Such a "balance" seems imminent, and perhaps won, in Alberta. Manage- ment in the Alberta cities has been able to be innovative, with active association input and cooperation, as in the examples of Calgary's zone policing, or the recent introduction of a staff psychologist. Also illustrative of the cooperative style, in Edmonton the Chief and the association have both publicly complained of the flaws and the consequences of sentencing and parole policies. (The Ottawa Journal, April 16, 1979). Such a labour/management common front is formidable insofar as influencing the media, politicians, and the public. For - 62 - example, the Edmonton Police Commission responded by threatening a formal protest to the National Parole Board. (The Montreal Gazette, May 1, 1979).

Although there are important examples of creative collaboration in Calgary, as noted abo:ve, this "common front" is not so apparent as in Edmonton. In Calgary there have been instances where association activities have become publicly visible to the embarassment of the force. For example, as association members themselves concede, their entertainment nights and the financial losses incurred brought some discredit to the police among a public who found the activities in poor taste, especially for police officers. Also there had been a period, since corrected, during which the association style had been that of negotiation and comment in the page's of the local press, reminiscent of the MUC fashion. Also of note, distinguishing Calgary relations from those of Edmonton, internal discipline cases appear to be somewhat contentious, and of some concern to the association. They too have come to the attention of the public, as recently in the Chief's having to intervene over non-regulation holsters.

Generally, in contrasting the two Alberta-cities, there appears to be some merit in the comment of one association spokesman, who contrasted the flamboyant "cowboy"-like style of the city of Calgary and its police, to the sedate and low-key character of Edmonton and its police force. The latter seem to have permitted somewhat more stable and effective employee-management relations, although in neither city has there been serious prospect of a breakdown in relations.

The issues in Alberta seem not to differ from other Canadian cities. They merely seem to have been dealt with in a flexible and non-acrimonious fashion, one accepting of rather than still resisting the reality of police unionism. Wage settlements remain an ongoing concern, as will working conditions. But other issues have been - 63- neutralized. Recently, on a province-wide basis, largely due to the EdmontOn Association President, an attractive pension agreement was worked out that has the consequence of removing pension terms from collective bargaining. And in both cities, management has been working with the association on career and promotions criteria and planning.

Implications The two major Alberta cities seem, therefore, to be uniquely successful in having evolved effective labour/management styles. Although the cities and the police forces are distinctly different in many respects, and the Calgary relations somewhat more fragile and adversarial, they each have developed a viable mode of employer= employee relations. Undoubtedly, a shift in management or in association executive could disrupt the pattern of mutual trust and goodwill. But in the meanwhile, communications and joint consultation and decision-making have become normative. Such experience may serve to deter any future breakdown or disruptions'.

(vii) British Columbia

British Columbia seems to offer the national situation in micro- cosm. We find relations that bring to mind the Alberta examples, and also extremely negative polarized adversary relations.

Legal and Organizational Bases In British Columbia, governed by the Police Act and the Labor Code (1973), police may affiliate and they may strike. Because they are also subject to an Essential Services Continuation Act (1974- 75), it is conceded that an effective legal strike in B.C. would be unlikely in the extreme. A 40-day "cooling off" period is required, and the B.C. Labour Relations Board is empowered to order strike cessation. Arbitration is optional. - 64-

There has not been a strike, al:though in Vancouver there have been seriou's prospects of strike action. In 1969, for example, the union was close to strike'action when the Attorney General intervened and forced arbitration. (Grosman, 1975:118). Also, in 1974, a wage disagreement prompted a serious strike threat, and more recently a strike vote over perceived management tardiness in implementing 2-man patrols.*

Association composition varies by city, as does the nature of the relationships. In Vancouver, the association membership includes men up to Staff Sergeant, with a Staff Officer Association that bargains for senior officers. In contrast, in Saanich, because of a compli- cated issue relating to two instances of promotions, the association membership includes Inspectors, much to the dissatisfaction of•management. Also varying is the role of the Chief Constable in bargaining; in Vancouver the Commission is advised by a Deputy Chief who is not at the bargaining table, while in Saanich the Chief bargains.

Issues The city of Vancouver boasts the oldest certified Police Union in Canada. The Vancouver Policemen's Union was founded in 1912, and affiliated with the Trades and Labour Congress until 1965. Recently it has displayed a record of relatively amicable labour relations. Management and union, for example, have cooperated in the implementation of city-wide team policing, and in a twelve-hour shift. They are also experimenting with a four-day week, an agreement reached without the controversy of the Quebec instance. They also seem to agree upon the need for career development programmes and improved education for police officers, although the former is of some contention as the union has grown wary of promotion assessment procedures and is seeking an increased role in promotion boards. The union has gained a ten-week programme of instruction . fer promotional examinations.

*For management there is a problem in reconciling the manpower needs of two-man patrol and those of team policing. - 65-

This issue is illustrative of the stresses that do exist, as related to management and police board conceptions of professionalism and management rights on the one hand, and the union's function to protect its members.

This is also true oh the Island, in the City of Saanich. There, a pronounced adversary style has developed. Again, the issue is management control, with association spokesmen seeing a management policy vacuum that must be filled, and management seeing their function, such as determining shift deployment, interfered in by the union. The contestation is aggravated in Saanich by the local presence of the president of the provincial and national police associations, who also is president of the Saanich association. The present Chief Constable was instrumental 'earlier in his policing career in establishing the Saanich association as a bargaining group, founding the association in 1957, acting as its first president, and doing the bargaining. But he now believes that the original advantages of thé association have become distorted, and his force has become a trial ground for national police association measures. Moreover, there is the suggestion that the association has altered the community service orientation and activities of police officers. For his part, the association president, an articulate and aggressive proponent of association participation in force policy and direction, is persistent in efforts to gain advantages for his members. A -confrontation that still rankles occurred in 1978 when the Saanich police officers reported for duty in plain clothes, and not groomed, in protest of a breakdown in contract negotiations. (The Ottawa Citizen, May 13, 1978). In contrast to a damaging withdrawal of services this measure, however aggravating to management, does stand as a creative form of job action. As the association president put it, this four-day protest did not withdraw service, but "merely the image of service". - 66 --

British Columbia is a complex potpourri of policing jurisdictions. Major urban areas such as Metropolitan Vancouver and Metropolitan Victoria will be divided amongst municipal forces and RCMP detachments. The Vancouver force generally sets the model for the others -- including an influence upon the RCMP -- in the benefits won and the style of relations adopted. Vancouver contracts, along with those of Montreal and Toronto have in the last decade set the standard for other Canadian police forces. Historically the Vancouver force has enjoyed skilled association leaders, many of whom have eventually been promoted into management ranks. A prominent example is the former union president who now, as Deputy Chief, represents the force in contract negotiations and on-going liaison with the union. This in itself has afforded a bridge, a measure of empathy, although, as in Alberta, not to the elimination of clear role distinctions.

Several tangible measures have been implemented in the Vancouver force to maintain effective relations between management and association. There is a recently implemented department newsletter intended to improve information flow and to scuttle rumours. Also, as in Edmonton and Calgary, there is a joint labour-management committee that meets once a month. The agenda is jointly developed, the chairmanship is shared, while management provides support by way of a secretary.

Bargaining in British Columbia is between the Association Executive and representatives of a Police Board, advised by a Chief or Deputy. The Police Board is delegated full responsibility for reaching a contract, and may also intervene in grievances when they are not resolved internally by the Chief. In at least one instance in British Columbia, in Victoria, the City Council briefly balked at a Board negotiated contract, b-Lit. generally such political intervention has not been a feature of British Columbia negotiations. - 67 -

In Vancouver, for several years a professional negotiator from an area city labour relations department has acted for several cities, and has been responsible for negotiations with the police, as well as other public employee unions.* This development has fostered the police union view that they are receiving insufficient attention, with negotiations dragging on far longer than they should. Increas- ingly in the Vancouver area, management seem to have caught up with the association insofar as negotiating experience and preparedness, and in fact has now probably exceeded the traditional union advantages. As a consequence, there is some indication of management impatience with union negotiating, just as in other provinces, associations have been impatient with management clumsiness. The Vancouver association, as is true of others in the country, is aware .of some disadvantage inherent in a system wherein an elected executive, subject to frequent change,. is responsible for representing the membership daily and in bargaining. Consequently they do seriously contemplate some full-time staff in order to strengthen their position vis-a-vis a now very well-prepared management, with its professional negotiator and very experienced police advisor.

Implications Generally it seems that where an imbalance of preparednes, commitment, and skill, exists in favour of management or of the union, tension levels increase in a police force. Hence in Vancouver, the recent imbalance seems to have produced some deterioration in pre- viouslY smooth and expeditious contract bargaining, with resort to arbitration having become the usual rather than the exceptional course of action.

However, in any summary evaluation of British Columbia union- management relations, it seems fair to conclude that the system has

*There has been a Greater Vancouver Labour Relations Department since 1969. - 68 - worked effectively. Fisher and Starek demonstrate that the arbitration awards have offered working resolutions of disagreements. (Fisher and Starek, 1978). Arbitration awards have, of course, not always been equally pleasing to both parties, as for example a Saanich award allowing Inspectors to remain as association members to the chagrin of the Chief. But at least compulsory arbitration has prevented the interminable prolongation of disagreement, and the serious threat of strike.

Moreover, it must be observed that British Columbia police forces have been innovative and change-oriented, attempting measures such as improved police education, standardized promotional evaluation, team policing, 4-day weeks, and I2-hour shifts. Any one of these measures could have, and in fact has, been the occasion of crisis and serious conflict beIween management and union in other jurisdictions. That they have been jointly resolved in British Columbia forces suggests that the adversarial character of relations has been moderated. There is a measure of reciprocal role appreciation. For management's part, there has been a willingness to innovate and participate in measures to enhance the welfare of employees. On the other side, there has been a willingness by associations to consider police effectiveness as well as member interests. As a union spokesman remarked, collective bargaining has been of enormous benefit to police officers, but now too the union must "recapture sight of community objectives".

(viii) Conclusions

There is little doubt that among rank-and-file police officers in Canada the obvious issue remains very potent. That issue is salary income. Undoubtedly Canadian police have experienced enormous income gains over the last 20 years -- gains that both rank-and-file and command attribute to the associations. Increasingly, as salaries have improved, this income issue has also translated into related - 69 -

concern with overtime and pension benefits. There are other traditional matters that continue to worry members of Canadian police forces, such as disciplinary procedures, promotion procedures, equipment. But a fundamental concern of rank-and-file members is the intent that police salaries not fall behind those of other occupations.* For municipal negotiators considering the police budget and high proportion devoted to personnel, salary too is crucial, aimost an exclusive preoccupation, such that at times they are willing to trade off non-salary concessions of import to police management in exchange for savings on a salary package.

For management in police forces, who themselves benefit from an association's success in wage bargaining, the most cited issue is

" management rights". That is, many command-rank officers sincerely believe that their command discretion has been seriously eroded by the collective bargaining system.** They complain about restraints in personnel selection and disposition, and more vaguély, about an eroded freedom to shape a force, including obstacles to the introduction of innovations.*** *In the RCMP, as well as municipal forces, although there are repeated expressions of concern regarding administrative style, income improvements seem of greatest concern to members. Insofar as salaries have matched municipal levels, the Divisional Representative System is viewed as quite satisfactory. But several force members underscored the view that should the force in its dealings with Treasury Board ever fall behind municipal forces in the total salary/benefits package, then interest in an association would rapidly be generated. **In the RCMP, the DSRR system is seen as a mechanism whereby management may continue to command, without suffering the restraints that municipal administrators are perceived to suffer. ***Rather unsympathetically, one Canadian observer, Brian Grosman, has conceded the loss of management control. He remarks: "Police Chiefs have not played a leadership role in attempting to provide higher compensation for policemen, improved grievance procedures, and a consideration for the policeman's own interests and ideals in work assignments and his organizational life as a whole. Since management was not prepared to concern itself with these interests, so important to the rank-and-file, the need for police organization and unionization was to some extent based on the lack of management initiative in providing for these essential needs of the working policeman. Thus the present threat to management prerogatives was encouraged by short-sighted traditional police leadership". (Grosman, 1975:120). - 70 -

The police associations have obviously altered the role of management. But in most instances, a Chief and his Deputies have not been crippled, so much as obliged to tread with caution. As we have seen, management style has had to change, and a Chief has had to become less a commander than a manager, mediating between conflicting interests and objectives.*

With police management inhibited by the association, and having to redefine its role, there is some exacerbation of the traditional sense in which senior police administrators may become political pawns. Once the Chief is no longer master within his own organization, and may be passed over by the association in its collective bargaining and pressure group tactics, the frustration and sense of helplessness of senior administratirs is compounded enormously. Again, in most instances Chiefs have avoided being bypassed. But the threat, or as in Quebec the reality, of diminished authority and command of political channels, contributes to command frustration and the sense of lost management rights.** .

*Grosman writes: "Police Associations and police unionism play an important role in controlling the initiative of Chiefs of Police and limiting their power. The Chief of Police occupies the focal point between conflicting pressures: those applied by the city administration, and those emanating from the Police Brotherhood or Association. In the City of Montreal a succession of Police Chiefs have fallen as casualties of this crossfire. In the last twelve years there have been six different Police Directors". (Grosman, 1975:119). **"The Chief cannot, when faced with a politically militant Police Association, threaten, as does industrial management, to move the plant elsewhere and throw the militants out of work -- or even to close down the plant. All the Chief can do is appeal to the Board of Police Commissioners and the city administration to support him. Since the board and the city administration are political agencies, they look to their constitutents and often are more sensitive to the demands of one or two thousand policemen than to a Chief concerned about the integrity of his .role within the organization". (Grosman, 1975:123-124). - 71 -

• As several of our respondents remarked, dealing in a vital public serVice in a semi-monopoly situation, police unions have an inordinate degree of power, especially where strike action is a possibility. This has enabled police employee organizations to bargain for benefits and exert influence beyond that which might have been anticipated at . the outset of police unionism. As an American writer put it:

. . . bilateral collective bargaining with a political overlay have given the police union an inordinate amount of power relative to the city: not only may the union engage in bargaining, it may leverage its bargaining table power with political power or engage in political activity independent of collective bargaining to achieve goals denied them at the bargaining table. Further, the union may use political activity to affect issues which are not subject to determination through the collective bargaining process". (Juris and Feuille, 1973:177).

The administrative frustration is therefore both real and under- standable, just as is the association intent to eliminate practices of apparent arbitrary discipline and promotion and to imptove working conditions. Unfortunately, as politicians and/or police commissions and/or mediators and arbitrators, are called upon to resolve the conflicts, we too often find persons scantly familiar with policing making crucial and binding decisions. This is not unrelated to flexing of union muscle.

Another fundamental and related characteristic of Canadian police unionism is a more forthright public posture for the unions, altering the traditional management direction of public presentation of police force image. For example, the MUC Brotherhood now almost routinely seems to bring its differences with management into the pages of Montreal newspapers, publicly i-gUiiiiover interriàl'reorganization - 72 - of detective branch, or aligning itself with public interest groups seeking th è reestablishment of a Youth Squad. Of a rather different nature, in Edmonton, association spokesmen were openly critical, as was management, of parole procedures, and have pressured for a review. Nationally, the national Canadian Police Association was openly opposed to the Anti-Inflation Board practices of the Liberal Government, and even threatened strike action. (Winnipeg Free Press, January 21, 1977; Toronto Globe and Mail, January 20, 1977). More recently the national association and its local affiliates have been aggressive in pursuit of a referendum on capital punishment.

At the meetings of the Canadian Police Association in September 1978, in Quebec City, capital punishment was seen to be "the most important item on the agenda"; as stated by the president in his message to members. (Jamieson, 1978:16). A fund was established with a view to a contribution of "$4.00 per member per province to contribute to a national advertising campaign . . ." (Jamieson, 1978:16)* As of March 1979, the Canadian Police Association is reported to have raised $200,000 for the campaign. (The Toronto Globe and Mail, March 31, 1979). It should be noted that such an intervention has been met with some public suspicion and hostility, as contrary to the traditional police role of political neutrality, an issue that is apt to increase in import as the police association pursues policy changes. (See an editorial "Police Should be Neutral", The Montreal Gazette, April 12, 1979).

To conclude, the direct and effective expression of union power, therefore, is -seen in association actions - as political pressure groups as well as in actions that relate explicitly to the collective agreement. In municipal forces, as in the RCMP, command-rank officers

*"We continueto. urge that the matter of reinstatement of capital punishment be made the subject of a public referendum and that the Parliament of Canada abide by the decision of the referendum vote". (Jamieson, 1978:2). - 73 - do not really negotiate income-related issues. They must manage with what they aire given by municipal, provincial, or federal authorities. For them, the income issue is not of great import; what matters are any features of a collective agreement that inhibit their authority. Most have concluded that they have in fact lost significant control.

There is however, a more benign view. It is certainly unclear as to what extent command authority has in fact been limited by police associations, as opposed to simply obliging a gradual alteration in command tactics. There are dramatic examples of successful union intervention, such as the Montreal 4-day week, or the Toronto 2-man patrol decision. And it is generally conceded in municipal forces that command officers can no longer do exactly as they wish in matters of discipline. But some command-rank officers, and some union representatives, convincingly argue that management peroga- tives per se have not changed, but only the style of command. The rank-and-file now have input, a chief has to think twice, and perhaps negotiate a little. But the decision structure, the argument continues is fundamentally unaltered despite the benefits of some "democratic" checks and inputs. The police manager may have to be better prepared and engage in planning rather than a succession of ad hoc or idiosincratic decisions. But ultimately command decisions regarding major force policy, or specific policing instances, remains that of management,* albeit not without challenge. One management spokesman in the Maritimes expressed this view in suggesting that management rights have not changed in a "basic sense" but the mechanisms with regard to the exercising of these rights" have altered.

*An RCMP study group remarked in 1974 upon the perceived loss of management rights, but suggested that this loss seemed more to relate to less important routine than to crucial policing decisions. "Although in routine situations the flexibility of management may be restricted by the terms of the.contract, management prerogatives in crisis situations remain uninhibited". (Middleton, 1974:9). - 74 -

This is the view to which we subscribe. With police unionism, police ranleing officers can and should manage. But, they can no longer command.*

VI. Canadian Labour-Management Relations: The RCMP

(i) Overview

The initial observation must be that there is presently slight interest in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in an association. This is not to suggest the absence of interest. However, generally the members believe that their system of "Div'Reps" (DSRR, or Division Staff Relations Representative) is a viable and attractive alternative to association or union.

Insofar as there is dissatisfaction in the "Div-Rep" system, it tends to be found in areas where the RCMP is heavily engaged in urban policing. In particular, presently this refers to the Vancouver metropolitan area, and to some degree, metropolitan Victoria. In the early 1970's there was marked union agitation also in Toronto, Ottawa, and Montreal, but that now seems to have dissipated, or at least, is no longer overt.

*In this summary of relations in municipal forces, one non-finding is worth reporting. In contemplating this enquiry, it was expected that the increased numbers of civilian employees in Canadian police forces, with-their own bargaining interests, might affect police unions. We found no indication of such an influence. In one instance, in Ottawa, remark was made of some career shutdown for senior constables, with civilians now filling clerical roles. But there were no prominent indications of problems. Where union representatives have considered the implication of civilian employees, as in Edmonton, it is clearly understood that the police would not respect civilian picket lines. Elsewhere, as in Toronto, police union representatives will also bargain for civilian employees. .In general, therefore, clearly police unionism and police militancy in Canada is not a spillover from in-force civilian organizations, nor are sworn police officers manifestly in conflict with the civilian fellow workers. -75-

Third, it is believed generally by Force members that the "Div- Rep" systeM works because of the dispersed character of the Force, where a union would not be suitable. Working throughout the country, often in isolated locations, in large and small units, and engaged in many kinds of policing, the costs and difficulties inherent in operating a representatiVe union are seen to be prohibitive.

Fourth, Force members, including "Div-Reps", frankly acknowledge that the DSRR program has worked thus far because of the constant latent threat of union. That is, the RCMP rank-and-file members profit from advantages won by municipal associations. The Division Representative system exists, and to an extent works, because police associations exist.

Fifth, related to the unionization threat, the RCMP generally seems to eniormore amicable employer-employee relations . than do municipal forces. Both rank-and-file and management want the "Div- Rep" system to work. They share an attitude from suspicion to, more usually, hostility to the police union concept. They also share a sense of the RCMP as a unique police force that must be saved from what is perceived to be the destructive consequences of unionization.

Sixth, it is the case that command prerogatives -- or management rights -- are much more firmly intact in the RCMP than in municipal forces. Ultimately, what participatory benefits force members do have are attributable -- the threat of unionization aside -- to the good-will of management. That is, to put a crude analogy, the rights of rank-and-file members in the "Div-Rep" system are rather more a matter of common agreement or social contact rather than of formal legislation or collective agreement.

That common agreement, however', may in fact permit a larger measure of rank-and-file input than in many unionized police forces, - 76 - especially those characterized by pronounced hostile association- management 'relations. The Divisional Representative system can be said to be still evolving. There seems to be scope for a genuine participatory decision-making in the RCMP, despite the traditional organizational outline with its persisting para-military character. In a sense, there seem ptesently to be more degrees of freedom for creative rank-and-file and management relations and organizational change in the RCMP than in many municipal forces who by and large are working with an adversary model in which neither side is willing to make significant concessions. As we have seen, some municipal forces have developed a participatory model. But the ROMP has created such a participatory system in toto, and has been gradually altering management style while fostering rank-and-file organizational input and responsibility. At the very worst, after little more than five years of operation, the DSRR must be viewed as a promising alternative to police unionism.

(ii) The Division Staff Relations Representative

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police have effectively evaded and resisted the establishment of police unionism. Not only command- rank personnel have been opposed to an RCMP association, but in the most part, also the rank-and-file.

In the late 1960's, culminating around 197 5, there was a very pronounced movement to establish an association. tt was probably never a majority sentiment in the Force, but those who look back upon that controversial period suggest that sufficient support could have been mobilized. There were many bases of discontent, especially among personnel who work in the major urban areas; Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and Ottawa. Working contact with municipal policemen whose associations had been winning significant benefits underscored for RCMP members their lagging salaries and overtime benefits. - 77 -

Such contacts also cast into clear relief the traditional strict, and often àrbitrary control Cas in transfers) and discipline to which I . Force members were subject. More than other factors, it was probably the discipline issue around which member dissatisfaction crystallized. Certainly that was the issue that came to the Canadian public's attention when Maclean's Magazine published a very critical article by a former RCMP member. (Ramsay, 1972). The article suggested, as some continue to believe today, a management crisis in the Force, what one respondent described as "insensitive", "unreasonable", "autocratic" and "wasteful management".

It was in this context that pro-union sentiment came to a head, and the DSRR system was set in place. In 1972 a committee to form an association was formed in Montreal and Ottawa. Major "rallies" - in Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, Ottawa, and other smaller were held centers to consider the formation of an association. Attending the meetings were representatives of municipal police associations. For example, at the Ottawa Civic Centre, by invitation, were several municipal police association representatives, including Guy Marcil, who as Brotherhood President had led the Montreal police out on strike in 1969. These open considerations of an RCMP association were undertaken with the permission of the Solicitor-General, and with the tacit permission of the Commissioner.

Management, too, was conceding the possibility of association, and commissioned a "Study Group to Research and Report on Police Associations". The Study Group, headed by a Staff Sergeant, J.P. Middleton, were given the mandate of evaluation police associations in Canada and in the United States. Four two-man teams, at Force expense, were assigned to travel to Canadian and American centres, and interview management and union representatives. Approximately thirty-nine interviews were completed, and a report submitted to the Commissioner in 1974. (Middleton, 1974). Nine recommendations - 78-

were put. Suggestions that the Force train labour relations experts, create a Labour Relations Branch, develop and train bargaining experts to deal with Treasury Board, create programmes to improve leadership, and "develop and implement a philosophy and policy of participatory management at all levels" were agreed to by Commissioner Nadon. The recommendation that. the Force Undertake a comparative study of RCMP in contrast to unionized force management was not accepted by the Commissioner. Similarly, a recommended "outside" feasibility study of the implications of an association for the Force was not agreed, although the Commissioner consented to examine a "reputable Police Association (i.e., Metro Toronto)". The Commissioner also declined to undertake an outside study of "personnel management communications within the Force", but did suggest that the Force would be devoting attention to the matter of "communication".

Meanwhile, well before the establishment of the Study Group, as early as November 1972, Nadon's predecessor, Commissioner Heggitt, had met in Ottawa with delegates or representatives selected from each Division. Another meeting was held in 1973, in a follow-up attempt to find solutions to the internal problems that were prompt- ing consideration of association. Failure to achieve any manifest progress had promoted the interest in an employee organization, and the open meetings of 1974.

In general, during this unsettled period RCMP management was apparently ready to adjust in some degree. While the association movement was carrying on, and talked down at the rallies, a Division Staff Relations programme was being organized, and in 1974 implemented. In 1974 also, with the intervention of the Commissioner, 1 overtime benefits were improved, a 17-1/2% wage increase awarded, a Royal Commission of Enquiry (Marin Commission) established, and a 1918 Order-in-Council prohibiting association was repealed. (Hardy, 1979:13-14). - 79 -

The momentum for association was effectively shut down. The long-term management solution was to be the Division Staff Relations R . Representative program. A membership that had, in majority, probably dreaded association, was given a plausible alternative. The DSRR was accepted by Division representatives in May, 1974. (McDermid, 1974:26).

The DSRR is a formal elaboration of the system of representative consultation that Commissioner Higgett resorted to in 1972. As it now functions, representatives are elected by secret ballot from each Division, with as many as four from Division E in British Columbia, and two from Division K in Alberta.* The representatives serve a minimum term or two years, with a three year term possible, and the option of standing for re-election. Sub-representatives are also a feature of the system, elected by the members in a Division, and responsible to the Division representative. There is provision for the removal of a representative, with a . majority of sub-representatives initiating an election if they lose "confidence" in a representative, and the removal effected by a majority vote of the members. The representatives are released from other duties, and are provided all necessary facilities, such as office space, clerical assistance, transportation, at an estimated cost to the Force of 1 approximately $750,000. The representative is then responsible generally for the "problems, concerns and recommendations" of the Division members, dealing with commanding officers and ultimately the Commissioner. Twice annually the representatives and commanding officers meet jointly with the Commissioner in Ottawa, to assess the operation of the system, make any necessary improvements or modifications, and thrash out any residual problems.

*No exact figures are available, but it is probably correct to remark that RCMP member participation in the DSRR elections is far greater than membership participation in . Most municipal police association elections. Ballots in the RCMP, as in some municipal forces, are distributed with pay cheques.

1 - 80 - From: The RCMP Administration Manual

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The DSRR has had only little more than five years of operation. Any evaluation of its impact must necessarily be tentative and qualified. Most members seem to approve, others are cynical and critical. One former RCMP member described the system as merely a "crutch for management". Outsiders tend to hold the system in contempt. Most municipal police association activists see the DSRR as a sham, although some did volunteer an admiring appraisal, particularly noting the avoidance of bitter adversarial relations. Those who do not approve remark upon the powerlessness of the representatives, depending as they do upon. management good-will, and unable to engage in collective bargaining.

But'although the critical remarks have some substance, Division representatives do seem to have gradually worked up a significant input. The most telling objection, that the members lack the means to bargain for benefits, is literally valid. But there is clearly some measure of influence.

The Force salary, pension, insurance, holiday, health care, and other key benefits are negotiated with Treasury Board with reference to Force comparability with other major police departments.* The "Div-Reps" have no direct hand in these negotiations, but do monitor benefit levels, and provide input for the negotiations. Negotiations are the responsibility of the Pay Section of Compensation Branch, and the "Div-Reps" may, formally, only advise. (Hardy, 1979:20-21). Two "Div-Reps" will normally attend Pay Section meetings.

It may be argued that such participation is mere tokenism, and that it carries little weight. Yet, with salaries gauged against those of municipal forces, benefits have been satisfactory. In this

*Quebec Provincial Police; Ontario Provincial Police; Winnipeg Police Department; Calgary Police Department; Edmonton Police Department; Vancouver Police Department; Montreal Urban Police; Toronto Metro Police. (Hardy, 1979:22). 1 - 83-

fashion, with the constantly underlying threat of a dissatisfied membership still capable of resorting to association formation, the Force members have been getting much of what they want. As municipal union members put it, they have been, in a sense riding the back of the municipal associations. But in part this is to the credit of the Division Representatives who assiduously monitor municipal salaries, and in their meetings form a level of salary expectations for their members that is in turn represented to the Pay Section. The "Div-Reps", therefore are as effectively tuned into the network of police contracts as are the municipal employee organization officers, and are then able to have their salary expectations represented in negotiations by the "experts" of Compensation Branch.

The DSRR system also seems to have had some success in obviating the complaints regarding discipline and management ineptness. Access to Division commanding officers seem now to be well routinized, and the representatives are not only able to act when there are problems or grievances, but also to participate in the routine of management. Representatives will usually attend various working committee meetings, and may affect matters ranging from manpower disposition to promotion. As is no less true for municipal forces, the effectiveness of the representative varies with the qualities of the men involved, employee spokesmen and management. But the right of representatives to participate is recognized, and in 1979 was spelled out in a two page document released by the office of the Deputy Commissioner for Administration.

A lingering complaint that does come up is the failure within the force to develop a regional system. In part the objection relates to the persisting centralization of the Force, and the failure of Headquarters to appreciate local problems. Also, there is the view that local living conditions vary, and so too should compensation. - 84-

In particular, the Divisions working in urban 'areas are believed to be relativèly disadvantaged, in contrast to members serving in rural areas, especially in the Atlantic. (Hardy, 1979:23-26). But these objections seem not to be potent issues for the members at this time, nor do they appear to be in any way irresolvable or incompatible with an evolving DSRR system.'

Of no apparent concern to members presently, there is one feature of the DSRR that does promise increasingly to distinguish the RCMP system from that of municipal forces. Municipal employee organizations have been increasingly aggressive in attempts to influence local, provincial and federal governments. The most conspicuous example has been opposition to the abolition of capital punishment. As the national Canadian Police Association set up its "war chest" to fight for capital punishment, RCMP members, who undoubtedly also are retentionists, could not contribute funds in any organized and concerted way, as they pay no union dues. Individuals could, of course, make donations, and were invited to do so by the Canadian' Police Association. But the RCMP membership as an aggregate and organized body could not. Yet, for the time being, most members probably feel that they should not, subscribing to the traditional conception of police political neutrality.* There seemed to be agreement among RCMP members, including those who still harbour pro-association sentiments, that circumstances in the Force have changed for the better. It is clear to an observer that the physical and interpersonal accoutrements of a para-military

*Some Division Representatives argue that they do have access to political decision-makers, and thereby the means to influence policy. They suggest that generally they have some legitimate access to the Solicitor-General. An illustration that is put, albeit one that deals in an internal matter rather more than public policy, relates to the Division Representatives participation in the selection of the present Commissioner. They prepared and submitted a two page "Presentation to the Honourable Francis T. Fox, Solicitor-General of Canada", arguing the view that the Commissioner must be from 1 within the Force. -85-

organization and rank structure have not simply disappeared. But commanding'officers are having to learn to manage, and rank-and- I . file personnel are increasingly confident in the intervention of their representatives and Iess fearful that complaints will bring management reprisals. The fairest way to put it is to suggest that members' attitudes at all ranks have gradually been changing.* With the increased Force emphasis upon higher education for its members, changes will undoubtrely continue.

In general, therefore, although the DSRR may be characterized by its critics as analogous to a "company union", it may by its asvocates be described as a mode of "worker particiiiatory democracy". I It has largely pleased the Force membership, preserved the Force ésprit, and has done so at no inconvenience to the public.

VII CONCLUSIONS

(i) Comparative Summary: Associations 'versus DSRR

The Division Staff Relations Representative program of the RCMP and the associations or unions of Canadian municipal (and provincial) forces may be viewed as evolving to the same end. Each is developing a measure of employee participation in determining the well-being of working police officers, with respect to effecting administrative/ organizational amendments, and by dealing with external agencies responsible for wages and for legislation affecting the criminal justice system. In the main, the DSRR system may be proving more successful as measured against the criteria of internal harmony and the non-alienation of the public. The union system carries with it enormous benefits for members as in improved salaries and discipline practices. But in its adversary style, it also fosters cleavages

*Members are fond of saying that now when told to jump they still say "yes sir", but ask not "how high" but "why"? - 86-

within a police force, and vis-a-vis the public. The "we-they" relationship of policemen and their senior officers has had in many I . forces a deletorious effect upon morale and esprit. Not unrelated, it has had in several instances, as in some Atlantic forces, Montreal, and to a degree in Toronto, the effect of lessening public respect for the police. Especially where there has been a strike, police come to be viewed by the public as just another interest group, another grasping union, rather than the traditionally conceived impartial and "professional" public servants par excellence. In avoiding association thus far, the RCMP has been able to maintain much of its mystique, in internal morale and public standing.

It also seems that the RCMP have been able to maintain relative wage parity, and to achieve some of the benefits that in municipal forces have been won by associations. These include consultation on local and major police initiatives, and a moderation of what was undoubtedly at one time arbitrary discipline. There is a degree to which the effectivenes of a representative depends upon the good-will of a local commanding officer. But Headquarters support of the system is now well-established and does now seem to provide the representatives with an institutionalized role. This could, of course, be withdrawn, as it is not vested in contract or collective agreement. But as a countervailing reality, the threat of union would also be resurrected.

Both the DSRR and municipal unions, in addition to improving policing for employees, have also effected gains to the advantage of the public. For example, especially in the Maritimes and to a degree in all jurisdictions, better equipment has been won, of aid to the police officer, but also the public for whom policing services are provided. There are other similar benefits, as in some jurisdictions where the unions have pressed for . improved training and education for police officers. Also, both the DSRR and municipal employee - 87 - organizations have had the consequence of obliging better police planning. .It is true that management complains of and does find itself at times restrained, and its flexibility eroded. But it is not at all a destructive consequence to have police administrators obliged to plan, explain, and genuinely lead and manage rather than simply command. As the RCMP Study Group Report on Associations remarked in 1974, "It appears that negotiated contracts contribute significantly to management planning and decision-making". (Middleton, 1974:4).

(ii) Recommendations

While police unions and the DSRR do have like objectives and consequences, it is nonetheless difficult to see how the less threatening DSRR system could be implemented in municipal forces. One obstacle is the reality of divided jurisdiction in dealing for wages. If a national pay scale, or even a regional scale, could be developed for Canadian police, and be administered by some neutral or tripartite agency (government, police employee, citizen) or a system of regular salary adjustments "pegged" to other agreed Canadian occupations, then possibly salary as a divisive issue would be removed. That done, the other inputs of associations -- equipment, training, career development, work shifts, -- could also perhaps be standardized. Employee representatives would share in the relevant planning and implementation, and also continue to protect members, but in a joint participatory rather than an adversarial mode. However, such a rationalization of benefits and practices is unlikely in the extrede.

Municipal unions, then, are probably here to stay. They have been and still are necessary for police officers in gaining satisfactory wages and working conditions. But the associations, management, and association-management relations must evolve. In some sense, we can think in terms of a period of transition or adjustment. Urban police - 88 - forces are having to adjust to the new police employee militancy, but there is nd inherent reason for the adjustment to be impossible or odious. Even during the past two decades of police union growth in Canada negotiated settlements have been the norm, including Montreal. As initial attitudes of command hostility are moderated, styles and techniques of negotiation familiar to other occupations, may increasingly be employed with success. Thus, Fisher and Starek indicate that mediation and arbitration are an increasing feature of successful dispute resolution. Looking principally at Vancouver, they found that 1955 through 1976 saw most disputes referred to arbitration (1977:32), with no disruption in services.

There is nothing inherently disruptive about police unions. In Canada, our labour relations in all sectors have been characterized by resort to strike with more man hours lost than any other Western country. This is a reflection of labour and management hardline attitudes, but also, of a failure to develop institutionalized means of routine and/or compulsory negotiations. Adaptations to the reality are necessary if the continual development of police unionism in Canada is to be of a positive participatory decision-making mode, rather than a degeneration into union alienation from management and public.

To avoid crippling acrimony, the reality of municipal police unionization could be amended. Some possibilities come to mind.

1) "Professional" negotiating by all parties should be a feature of collective bargaining, so that contracts, or negotiating breakdowns, are not reached through ignorance or indifference and at a cost in police effectiveness. Presently, in all major associations, the association executive are released from duties during the course of contract negotiations. In some associations, in partiCular the larger ones such as Toronto, the association president is released from duties for his term of office. Certainly the latter procedure seems desirable, - 89 -

as a 'substitute or supplement to an association's employing full- time profeSsional staff (as do PANS), in order that preparations for contract negotiations, and day-to-day problem solving, not be handicapped by harried and ill-prepared association representatives. But the point cuts both ways; relationships also seem to suffer where management is represented by part-timers, such as politicians, and where the police managers have not prepared for or participated sufficiently in on-going relations or negotiations. Where a ranking officer has been allowed to devote some concentrated attention to association relations, the quality of such relations appear to decidedly improve, especially if that individual has himself in the past some active police union experience.

In the RCMP, in like manner continued attention should be devoted to the expertise of Pay Section, Compensation Branch. This might also include an enhanced role for Division Representatives and their Pay Committee in the preparation of bargaining positions that are taken to Treasury Board. Thereby the Force gains serious member input and experience as well as reducing the kind of patternalism . that delegation to Pay Branch connotes. -

2) Within municipal police forces, measures should be-implemented to ease the problems of daily employee-management relations, and to reduce the clutter of trivial issues that often are brought to the bargaining table. The most obvious such organizational device would be a joint employee-management committee. The committee would be attended by the Chief and his senior aides and the association representatives on a priority basis, meeting regularly at least monthly, with shared or rotating responsibility for agenda, chairmanship, and perhaps also support costs. There are sufficient existing examples to provide models. In Edmonton such a "consultation committee" has now been in place for several years; having initially been organized with the assistance of Labour Canada consultants. Such committees, - 90 - when given management priority, can serve to overcome the two-way information' lags and misunderstandings that are inherent in any hierarchical organization, especially those that are para-military in nature. Among the difficulties that can be moderated is the oft-noted role conflict experienced by non-commissioned supervisory personnel, torn between itnion and command obligations. Where there. is an approximate consensus on procedure and policy, such a conflict is at least moderated.

Within the RCMP regular sessions of the saine nature involving representatives and sub-representatives and senior officers should also be mandatory within a Division, and probably by sub-Division. As in municipal forces, where such consultation sessions are legitimated and routinized, there is the consequence of altering the petitioning style of member access to command, as well as providing the obvious opportunity to develop rapport, communication, and problem-solving.*

3) Responsibility for the quality of labour relations within police forces also rests with other public agencies. A police force may well find itself having resolved its internal relations, only to have the equilibrium destroyed by a maladroit external intervention. Ideally there should be skilled and experienced resource people developed by the public bodies who have a responsibility for policing, whether municipal, provincial, or federal. Some obvious examples come to mind. Foremost insofar as requiring reform are Police Commissions that consist of part-time appointees, generally operating in secrecy, representative most often of the legal profession, and not of local community interests, and with scant familiarity with or time to devote to the intricies of policing. As suggested in point one above, such

*Of the municipal forces that havé'successfully implemented such committees, three have as Chiefs former RCMP officers, who left the force to take up their present positions during the period of early 1970's when the so-called "management crisis" was perceived to exist. - 91 -

Commissions must rely, as is the increasing tendency, upon experts. Ideally toO, they should themselves become more open and represent- I . ative public bodies.

Surely, too, it is curious and unsatisfactory that Police Commissions assume both i-esponsibility for contracts and for final appeal in instances of discipline cases. Not only are such appel- lant functions probably flawed in the nature of Police Commission "amateurism", but also they do constitute a form of conflict of interest. Preferable would be the establishment within a given jurisdiction of an ombudsman who would assume responsibility for both police complaints and for public complaints about policing. Such an office would be desirable both for municipal forces and for the RCMP (as suggested in the Marin Commission Report and possibly to be implemented).

4) Closely related to the above point, there is need for an elaboration and improvement of mediation/conciliation and arbitration. Compulsory arbitration seems a potentially viable solution to bargaining difficulties,* particularly tripartite arbitration boards where all parties, union, management, and government, are represented. Perhaps too, final offer arbitration might be implemented, particularly failing settlement within certain time parameters. However, if arbitration is to work, there clearly seems some need to develop in all jurisdictions a pool of experienced and knowledgeable arbitrators, persons competent not only in

the law, but also •informed-as to the occupational and organizational character of .police forces. Such arbitrators must be seen not only to be responsible for gaining a settlement, but also for producing

It is by no means novel to suggest that compulsory arbitration can be made to work. Numerous American authors who have studied police unionism have put the suggestion. See as examples, Burpo, 1979; Gammage and Sachs, 1972; Wilson and McLaren, 1978; also, in Canada, Fisher and Starek, 1978. - 92 -

good policing and serving the public interest.* Such.a "professionalized" system should serve all parties, without inhibiting collective bargaining.**

5) When responsibility for a police force is directly that of city councils, as in Novi Scotia, the political decision-makers must be deterred from playing "show-down" bargaining with the unions. Ideally, as a minimum feature, councils, just as Commissions, should be aided by well-informed experts. But in addition, they should as elected representatives, be responsible to the public for the delivery and the quality of police services. For example, where strike provision exists, and if binding arbitration is not mandatory, a breakdown in bargaining must be equally attributable to management, and as such the elected officials should answer to an electorate. They should be deterred from pushing a confrontation, as should a public, by an economic and not a public safety penalty. Rather than allowing government, whether municipal, provincial, or federal, simply to stand back, or to "tough it out", provision could exist for high-cost police back-up, that is, temporary policing with a high surcharge. A community would thereby not be left without police service, but the service would not eliminate the power of

*One American commentator put it this way, "If arbitration is to be used more than it has been for new contract terms in public employment, there will have to be much more understanding of the criteria arbitrators use in setting wages and other basic conditions of employment. Usually accepted as relevant are: ability to pay; cost of living; wagés paid to comparable classifications within the same community; and the welfare of the public". (Overton, 1973:163-164). **As an American observer put it: "The argument advanced by labor and management that binding arbitration restricts freedom of bargaining is a subterfuge to avoid an imposed decision. Arbitration is always the last resort in a labor dispute. The employer and employee have ample opportunity to conclude an agreement by negotiation, and if that fails, some combination of mediation and fact-finding. If an agreement has not been reached at -this point, the parties have abused their bargaining freedom. When bargaining has been abused, there is a public interest, especially in the case of police and firemen, in bringing the dispute to a halt. Binding arbitratibn dictates the result". (Burpo, 1979:139). - 93 -

strike insofar as a strike would be economically penalizing. Thus, for example, if a provincial government were to call in provincial police or RCMP or even military units to a community, the political representatives of that community and ultimately of course, the tax- payer, should bear the cost. This is obviously a less desirable device than compulsory binding arbitration, but in the absence of - such provision, it could deter irresponsible political posturing.

(iii) Suggestions for Further Research

There are three basic approaches to further research that I would urge as followup to this enquiry and its tentative conclusions.

1) There must be some research, preferably national, that inves- tigates the role of political representativei, and their appointees, in police employee-management relations. This report has stressed that inept intervention by city councils, police commissions, appointed negotiators, or arbitrators, may seriously damage relations within a police force. This assertion should be explored, with some attention to the appropriate role of public representatives, and how they might be suitably prepared or trained to cope with the realities of modern police organizations, and police employee groups.

2) In any national overview of police labour relations, inevi- tably some of the important detail and subtleties are missed or lost. Some case study research is highly desirable. Specifically, there would be an advantage in a research project that intensly investi- gated contrasting situations of police employee-management relations, including the interaction with public representatives. For example, an in-depth and thorough study of the Edmonton Police Force, and of the Bathurst Police Force, would permit detailed examination of a successful adaptation to police unionism, and insofar as there has been a serious withdrawal of service, an unsuccessful instance. - 94 -

The two fortes - are not, of course, among the country's largest, but are therefore both better suited to extended and detailed inquiry, and more representative of Canadian municipal policing, than would be major forces such as Montreal, Toronto, or Vancouver. However, it is also worth noting that the more difficult case study of these three pace-setting forces would be of immense value, and also is to be recommended.

3) In the present work, there was no opportunity to discuss the operation of the RCMP Division Staff Relations Representative system with rank-and-file members. Representatives and command- rank officers were interviewed, and in a non-systematic fashion, some other members. These contacts suggested a very promising system. However, a logical research followup would be to sample members nationally, to elicit information as to their awareness and evaluation of the DSRR. In this way the extent to which the DSRR has in fact premeated and altered the Force might better be appraised.

(iv) Postscript

An emphasis in the preceding account -- emphasis of my respondents -- has been the clear-cut, often bitter adversarial character of relations in municipal forces. Observers of the RCMP, both municipal association spokesmen, management, and RCMp members themselves, suggested that the crowning advantage of the DSRR has been the avoidance of such a polarization. However, it may also be the case that in municipal forces the adversarial tenor may be transitory. No doubt some very bitter association-management situations exist. But there also exist police forces characterized by a marked harmony of outlook and. interest. And as mechanisms are developed for internal consultation, a style of genuine and pro- ductive participatory decision-making may emerge in police forces. - 95 -

Unlike most other occupational groups, policemen have been characterized by a s'trong solidarity and a relatively homogeneous ideological outlook. The management-employee affinity could eventually overcome the growing-pains of police unionism.*

In general, it is iMperative that means be devised and implemented that will dissipate the potential in police unionism for an alienation of the public and the police from one another. A striking advantage of the DSRR system is that the public is not witness to Force blemishes and bickering, nor held hostage when differences arise.

The police unions are increasingly aggressive, and willing to resort to job action. They are also clearly anxious to influence public policy, as for example, national effort to win a plebicite on capital punishment. With this union "muscle flexing", spokesmen for the public increasingly are concerned that unionization means a deterioration in public control over policing. At least management was nominally responsible to the public, but with management loss of control as in Montreal, or with strike action as in Bathurst, or racist public statements as in Toronto, police forces are perceived to be no longer responsive to the public interest. When this negative perception develops, it of course compounds police isolation and alienation from the community. Where the police have been respected, a militant, or tactless union may lose that respect. Where a force has not been well-regarded, police militancy exacerbates the relationship with

*The closing remarks in a monograph analyzing American police associations puts a similar point. "The adversarial nature of the relationship between police association and police department leaders is easily overemphasized because our experience to date, during the formative years of organization of American policemen, is unrepresentative . . Though administrators may presently resent and resist the loss of uni- lateral control over policy, in the long term they are likely to find employee organization leaders outspoken and forceful allies in fighting to retain departmental autonomy in accountability procedures and other policy making". (Halpern, 1974:103-104). - 96 - the public. Comments of citizens of Bathurst illustrate the problem, as they look back on the July 1979 police strike. One remarked that "the police should be ashamed to wear those uniforms". Another sum- med up the cost in community relations: "People in this city never had much respect for the police, and now it's going to be worse". (The Montreal .Gazette, July 14, 1979).

Ultimately it may be the case that the long-term persistence of police militancy will have less to do with direct management-employee relations, and more to do with the relations of police generally to a community and its political representatives. This already seems true of many American locations, and in some measure in the Atlantic and Quebec. That is, should a public lose confidence in and respect for a police force, whether as a consequence of police political interventions, poor efficiency, or previous militancy, then the probability of further union militancy increases. A vicious circle of public loss of respect, declining police.effectiveness, and militancy may set in. (Kronholm, 1972). The adversaries then becomes not police union and management, but police union and public. Consequently, it is imperative that police associations not only adopt discrete bargaining positions and tactics, but that they also move to increase their contributions to the quality of police service to the public. They have a responsibility to public service as well as does management, and it will have to be recognized if police unionism in Canada is to avoid acrimony and a deterioration in the quality of policing.

In closing, let it be clear that any negative or concerned remarks in the previous pages must not be taken as condemnation of police unionism. The foregoing analysis has been premised upon a desire for uninterrupted police service of high quality. Hence, the possibilities of the DSRR systemHas an "experimental" alternative to unionism were found to be . ieritorious. For the same reason, comment regarding the nature and the possible evolution of police - 97 - employee organizations have been put, not with - a view to crippling police employee organizations, but rather in a search for a combination of effective unionism for police officers and effective policing for the public.

Police unions have quite simply been invaluable for the working police officer. Enormous benefits have been won, and to date in Canada, with only few instances of public harm. But the obvious beneficial feature of police unionism must not be allowed to obscure the persistence of a police public-service orientation and the development of a police professionalism. Rather, union and management in a genuinely participatory decision-making structure could effectively collaborate to not only improve benefits and working conditions, but also to enhance our communities. Dennis Forcese BIBLIOGRAPHY

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HV Forcese, Dennis 7936 Employee-management .C75 relations in Canadian F6 Police Forces. 1979 c.2