The Factors Behind Electoral Revolutions in the Postcommunist

CEU eTD Collection The Factors In The Postcommunist World In partialIn fulfillment ofthe requir Department ofPolitical Science Behind of Central European University

Master Supervisor: Robert Sata Budapest, Hungary Illia BrazhkoIllia Submitted to

of (2014)

Political By Electoral Revolutions

ements for the degree

Science

CEU eTD Collection eight are good other while significant, be to not appear factors derived theoretically two that shows countries b rigged, were countries both in elections The factors. these test to 2006 in Belarus in and 2004 in Ukraine an electoral revolution rigged make that factors ten suggests revolution electoral of matter phenomena: modernization, regime breakdown, and collective action subject theories. This framework the to related theories, three on based framework of factors of set a is there that is research the of assumption Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, Georgia, revolutions t address to attempt an is thesis This Abstract

outcomes. Myapproach outcomes. only antecedents antecedents t osqet rtss ee ucsfl ny n kan. oprn te two the Comparing Ukraine. in only successful were protests consequent ut in in some postcommunist countries .

Second, ISecond,

of successful in

identifying these factors is t is factors identifyingthese c , onduct

but not in not but

election e usin why question he electoral revolutions electoral

a comparative elections in caseofpresidential study s other ii

in a given postcommunist country conve country postcommunist given a in

. This

countries with a similar context. The main main The context. similar a with countries regime regime t wofold. First, I develop a theoretical theoretical Ia First, develop wofold. hat igd election rigged

in the are r are transition took place in esponsible for this variation variation this for esponsible postcommunist s lead to electoral electoral to lead

world. Serbia, Serbia, rt into into rt

CEU eTD Collection and Last gratitude to Er thoughtful interesting wo I Acknowledgements

a , but not less uld like to thank my supervisor my thank to like uld c onstant recommendations process ali Paiziev

encouragement important

f rtn a writing of , as ,

I want to I

e provided he annot imagine going through this journey without his friendship. f or me n

MA thank my parents for be Sata Robert , .

thesis. .

would I iii

I truly ,

for

also

g appreciate uiding me through me uiding

l k t sy vr special very a say to ike ing

true

continuous

example

a ,

challenging

strong supp sitne and assistance w r of ord ort b ut ,

CEU eTD Collection Bibliography Co Chapter 4.Findings Chapter 3. Case Studies Chapter the Theoretical 2. Building Framework Chapter Electoral Revolutions 1. Defining Introduction TableofContents 3.2. 2006Presidential Elections Belarus in 3.1. 2004Presidential Elections Ukraine in and theOrange Revolution 2.3. Collecti 2.2. Regime BreakdownTheory 2.1. ModernizationTheory nclusion

......

...... ve Action Theory

......

...... iv

......

56 53 46 38 28 28 21 14 11

9 6 1

CEU eTD Collection variation Such all. at elections fraudulent followed protests no states some in Moreover, choice. political their protect and mobilize to attempts ove to manage 2007) Eurasia and Europe Postcommunist and Communist in Change Democratic of electoral outcomes in their favor region postcommunist the separat a them phenomenon todescribe distinguish to scholars allowed cases these of similarity Striking respectively. after happened what to rathersimilar was above of events presented course vary, general maythe Even thoughdetails Ukraine. regi illiberal Kuchma’s 8%. by Yanukovych over victory Yushchenko’s showed and observers, international and local both of scrutiny intensified under held was It round. second the of run indivi million one to up thousands of attracted hundreds the follow to an gav which results, poll exit from considerably differed but 3%, by Yanukovych outgoing the by supported president) and leaderopposition Viktor (explicitly Yanukovych Viktor Minister Prime the between to due elections the in constitutional limits. Thus, the second participate round of to unable was and office in terms two served already ch highly a in 2004 November in held was Ukraine independent of history the in election presidential fourth The Introduction almost 11% lead. Many Ukrainians began to participate in mass demonstrations on the day day the on demonstrations mass in participate to began Ukrainians Many lead. 11% almost me was overthrown, as the opposition leader became the third president of independent independent of president third the became leader opposition the as overthrown, was me

rigged rthrow their illiberal governments this way, even though they made courageous made they though even way, this governments illiberal their rthrow

arged political atmosphere. The incumbent president Leonid Kuchma had had Kuchma Leonid president incumbent The atmosphere. political arged election

elections in Serbia, Georgia, and Kyr and Georgia, Serbia, in elections — s . More than thirty days thirty than More . hr icmet tradit incumbents where — (Bunce (Bunce and Wolchik, Bringing Down Dictators: The Diffusion an However, many electoralcountrie revolution. in people

Yushchenko. Yushchenko. The official count declared the victory of 1 electoral rave

of protests, which by different estimates different by which protests, of f cases of ionally are more able to manipulate manipulate to able more are ionally duals

was was characterized by contestation gyzsta

(Kuzio 2005) (Kuzio

n h pscmuit r postcommunist the in n in 2000, 2003, and 2005 and 2003, 2000, in n ,

resulted in the re the in resulted e Yushchenko Yushchenko e — did not did egion s in e -

CEU eTD Collection countries some why action where it otherwise would have not been likely. Since this approach incited alone does not and explain borders national through diffused confrontation of modes Revolutionary cases. the in happened that revolutions postcommunist electoral about thing remarkable a him, to According mob Beissinger not explain why electoral fraud in some countries did not lead to any demons elite’s while that is problem inevitable. is success until larger grow protests mass whether determine argues, he elites, of D’Anieri Approaches aimed problemhave toaddressthis I quiteshowbelow. been different, as will th predicted to failed analysts the that verdict the in unanimous scholars are they of and similar, seem that countries the in outcomes number of variation of puzzle the addressed A made. been have revolutions electoral postcommunist of success no that claim to however, unjust, be the causes of electoral revolutions exists. My research is an attempt to address this gap. It would re electoral in actors long their revolutions, electoral of ‘diffusion’ the countries, postcommunist the among especiallycommon is transition of type this why e.g. Existing literature on electoral revolutions conc to. dedicated is thesis this what is factors these Identifying revolution. electoral an to lead would suggests that there is a set of factors that determine whether rigged elections in a given country

elites in the electoral protests, building mainly on the protest theory. The pivotal actions of of actions pivotal The theory. protest the on mainly building protests, electoral the in elites ilization frames, repertoires, or modes of contention acrosscases”contention of frames,repertoires,modes ilization or (2006)

(2007)

region

seeks seeks to explain the variation in outcomes of fraudulent elections with the role

emphasizes the role of modularity, which refers to “the borrowing of of borrowing “the to refers which modularity, of role the emphasizes volutions etc. However, as of now no coherent theoretical framework of of framework theoretical coherent no now of as However, etc. volutions were more successful in following prior examples, Beissinger proposes a a proposes Beissinger examples, prior following in successful more were

is that prior examples prior that is

role may be well accountable for t for accountable well be may role efforts

to conceptualize the factors that contri that factors the conceptualize to

affec 2 entrates on various aspects of the phenomenon, -

term consequences, the role of international international of role the consequences, term ted the likelihood of success in success of likelihood the ted ese democratic breakthroughs. democratic ese he size of the protests, it does does it protests, the of size he (Beissinger 2007, 261) 2007, (Beissinger trations altogether.

subsequent bute to the to bute The The

. CEU eTD Collection p that lacked clarity on how various factors determine the occurrence and success of postelectoral relationships were based on a small number of cases and provided a list of explanatory variables important justification. revolutions electoral of and o importance the neglect to seek not does thesis This for electoral revolutions. specifically highlighted the importance of diffusional dyn study factors as well. Thus, McFaul’s conclusi antecedents of successful electoral revolutions, as unsuccessful cases could have featured these the outcome cannot of We hisinterest. besure the factors that way this he identified are variable, theone is, dependent that cases onthe study selectsthe isthathe and politi a electoral independent vote; falsified the about citizens inform to media independent enough capabilities; monitoring opposition; united a incumbent; unpopular an regime; autocratic arguably determine successful electoral which factors seven proposes he cases, Ukrainian and Georgian, Serbian, unite McFaul to revolution electoral of success the behind factors of set a conceptualize and identify to attempt Another revolutions. electoral democratic facilitate that conditions structural of set rotests. provide preliminary empirical splits among the regime’s coercive forces. However, the apparent problem with McFaul’s with problem apparent the However, forces. coercive regime’s the among splits

which must not bewhich not overlooked must belongs toBunce and Wolchik cal opposition capable of mobilizing large demonstrations to protests electoral fraud; fraud; electoral protests to demonstrations large mobilizing of capable opposition cal

(2005) since Formulating a theoretically justified account for electoral revolutions is especially ,

. Using the method of similarity to assemble the list of commonalities that commonalities of list the assemble to similarity of method the Using . a s

Kuhn ,

and (2010) iutnosy ak p xsig xlntos ih theoretical with explanations existing up back simultaneously revolutions.This set includes a semi

test

rus toe tde ta suh t etbih causal establish to sought that studies those argues, ing of ons are not as robust as they

a theoretically clear explanation of the phenomena 3

f previous research previous f amics and international donor support - autocratic rather than fully autocratic rather thanfully

(2006a, could have been. Another , but rather to propose propose to rather but , s that have achieved achieved that have s 2006b) , whohave s belongs belongs s strong -

CEU eTD Collection factors However, cases. of number I do not expect that to Us regime has been scrutinized well have not attracted much scholarly attention, protests in one to however, led, which elections, presidential t Belarus and Ukraine view, of point this From counterpart. negative clear a lack they but Kyrgyzstan), Georgia, (Serbia, Ukraine besides revolutions outcomes. of variation the explain c two compare to Belarus and Ukraine. These postcomm of studies case two scrutinizing to dedicated is chapter third The theothers.not in but countries some in happen revolutions electoral why explain that factors set a suggest can modernization. of those and non of theory as such science, political in theories existing of subject the into fall aspects its of many phenomenon, this of s the in presented are revolutions electoral of likelihood the affect to assumed factors The ways. different of in it define scholars as phenomenon revolutions, electoral the of definition precise a give to aimed is thesis the of chapter first The he two countries not only were just just two ing comparative case study study case comparative ing , , whereas further studies can use my findings to conduct a research based on more change and examples ,

and a full

ases my stability in the postcommunist world. inthe postcommunist stability . . Such a small number definitelyis not enough strong make to claims, and —

results results would necessarily hold their robustn a positive and a negative a and positive a - , scale electoral revolution in the other. Also, events in Belarus in 20

so this case study may be of additional value to the subject matter of

countries were this method allows me to preliminary check theoretically derived derived theoretically check preliminary to me allows method this Studying these theories through the prism of electoral revolutions electoral of prism the through theories these Studying as - similar similar in many respects, but also experienced obviously rigged democratic regimes’ breakdown, theories of collective action, action, collective of theories breakdown, regimes’ democratic one of the key the of one There are There

selected selected for a unlike the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine

certainly

4 different outcomes: unsuccessful postelectoral postelectoral unsuccessful outcomes: different

scientific scientific — in order to spot the differences that would would that differences the spot to order in

other other econd chapter. Despite the peculiarity the Despite chapter. econd

number number of

method constitute constitute successful examples of electoral electoral of examples successful s of the thesis, the of s ess

reason if a good pair of cas of pair good a

tested tested against a greater s . The main point is unist countries unist

limit myself myself limit cases es, as es, ,

that 06 : .

CEU eTD Collection summary pair this on based least (at successful revolutions electoral of variables explanatory meaningful be to appear factors derived theoretically differences between Ukraine and Belarus lead to different outcomes. Looking ahead, almost all The to signi use), I definition the to (according revolutions electoral of examples empirical few a only is there Also,

trace main ficance factorsof identified o it so I believe that Ibelieve

how the protests unfolded, how the protests

of the research of findings

s o psil t cnut full a conduct to possible not is of the thesis the of a qualitative

and a conclusion.

me this this way are look thod in thod

presented in the third chapter, whe chapter, third the in presented ing . Second,

beyond variables simple and this 5

thesis statistical of cases). of

comparative comparative

is preferable to preferable is

The last The test

and either prove or disprove disprove or prove either and qualitative part a

quantitative quantitative is dedicated to dedicated is superficial indexes

re I explain how the the how explain I re case study one

a short a allows First, . .

CEU eTD Collection game political the the (a) traits: common Conseque protests. mass for incumbents manipulate the is to) name A notable feature protest varied significantly identification. colored) (or Revolution) ( countries postcommunist The per se, electoral postcommunist pr mobilization; and (c effort (a) De proletarian revolutions and military coups Now China (1949) focus claimed of definition accurate an provide to difficult rather seems It Rose otests, demonstrations, and strikes strikes and demonstrations, otests, spite

, term

the list of events regarded as revolutionary includes mainly Revolution)

an to be examples of examples be to

‘ to change an existing political regime; (b) broad formal and informal mass mass informal and formal broad (b) regime; political existing an change to apparent variety of the of variety apparent lcoa rev electoral

(McFaul 2005, 5

eouin, s poiin fe ue a pcfc oo a ter symbol their as color specific a used often opposition as revolutions, (Goldstone 2001, 140) on the ‘great revolutions’ ‘great the on

These cases followed a followed cases These

fact that the political turning point point turning political the that fact present present in all

Chapter1. Ukraine , (i.e. (i.e. ) bring

opposition the electoral out free and free olution

ing t across thecountriesacross as his phenomena are numerous and diverse and numerous are phenomena his nt revolutionary events follow events revolutionary nt

- n 2004 in

6) about change through non electoral revolutions (and which the phenomenon itself owes its Serbia ’ . protests

fa Alternatively, events these are sometimes referred toascolor DefiningElectoral R is usually used to refer to events that happened in such such in happened that events to refer to used usually is

se de ir , but

patterns ploy (Goldstone 2001, 142) 2001, (Goldstone elections)

(

in surprisingly Orange come

must satisfymust requirements these the the scope of scholarly a s

to England (1640), France (1789), Russia (1917), and (1917), Russia (1789), France (1640), England 2000 extralegal means to ensure that the formal rules of of rules formal the that ensure to means extralegal

, certain key certain , violent and

in their favor, which beco 6

are Revolution) ( uloe Revolution Bulldozer

followed; (b followed; similar scenario, although the size of the the of size the although scenario, similar is

- relatively relatively peaceful regime transitions institutional institutional means

features hundreds n elec an

a similar pattern and share a set of of set a share and pattern similar a . ad ygztn n 05 (Tulip 2005 in Kyrgyzstan and ,

evolutions In order to be called be to order In

what ttention ttention has quickly expanded. )

incumbents and challengers challengers and incumbents in I particular, In tion. can be be can

of cases a revolution a . Early studies tend studies Early . me

as wellas ) found in all of them: of all in found Georgia , s

the

(Tilly 1993) , such as

de facto reason .

is ‘revolution’ , as events as ,

violence, in for easy easy for illiberal illiberal

, from , from ed 2003

to to .

CEU eTD Collection underdeveloped political cultur the to connected not present non current the of overthrowing a of definition the of requirements about meant to imply long case a Ukraine (e.g. results lasting long enjoyed prospective of the country was unclear in electoral revolution. as regarded be to transition a for time of period prolonged a over maintained be direction democratic more Second, essential. but optional not is elections First, political protest is an inherent feature all of electoral revolution inthedefinitionabovepoints nee direction” democratic more decidedly a o incumbents illiberal defeat to protests, political with combination in sometimes elections, use to citizens and by leaders opposition follows:“attempts goes thus as traitsto include these and the respective countries (d situatio c laim r their anointed successors; to bring liberal oppositions to power; and to shift their regimesin power; toshift to and oppositions tobringliberal anointedr their successors;

)

03 a b cle a eetrl eouin bcue their because revolution, electoral an called be can 2003 these electoral revolutions revolutions electoral these s

from the list of list the from to possess to t es temporal least at , ns ended without the massive use of violence by either the state or the opposition; and opposition; the or state the either by violence of use massive the without ended ns and and

Some Some scholars consequent a sovereign authority over the same territory; (c territory; same the over authority sovereign - term term consequences of these events

successful lcoa revolution electoral (McFaul (McFaul 2007, 50) fallbacks

argued hne n the in change

is an important feature of electoral revolutions, it does not need to to need not does it revolutions, electoral of feature important an is caused a caused e,

electoral revolutions. electoral

d clarification and rectification.clarification and d and - that

eortc eie by regime democratic to authoritarianism authoritarianism to

political

, for example, st

(Radnitz (Radnitz 2006)

ructural economic challengesructural economic significant significant

Bne n Wlhk 06, 284) 2006b, Wolchik and (Bunce .

state’s democratic performance, they satisfy the the satisfy they performance, democratic state’s

nd Kyrgyzstan), there is no reason to exclude to reason no is there Kyrgyzstan), nd A common definition of electoral revolutions seeks itself

revolution outlined above. outlined revolution 7

even though the consequent the though even

( o instance for boost it it is not clear whether . However, even though not all countries

could have happened due to due happened have could The use of the word ‘revolution’ is not is ‘revolution’ word the of use The (Tucker 2007, 536)

in the in anti - regime forces in such cases is is cases such in forces regime ,

consolidation of democracy in in democracy of consolidation imperfections of institutions, institutions, of imperfections

impact )

all of these revolutionary these of all ) s . , so combination its with

The fact of fact The events events in Kyrgyzst

. But h on .

regime shift in a in shift regime However, some some However, the aving brought the democratic democratic

successful successful reasons reasons their their an CEU eTD Collection regimessuccessors)and their democratic shift inamore direction. defeat to protests political with combination is revolution electoral an A 261) stol a following protest postelectoral for any reason, discontinue d protests, the If revolution. electoral an as regarded be can stages both passed successfully that protests. popular the of result a as overthrown actually is people go out to the streets to revolution be separate to useful it illiberal incumbents, irrespective of the Finally,

slightly modified , and cannotrecognized thus revolution. electoral be as an the definition of electoral revolution electoral of definition the . Empirically, t Empirically, en election in 1996 did not mana not did 1996 in election en

operational definition I definition operational .

For instance, Armenian opposition opposition Armenian instance, For we a uscesu attempt unsuccessful an tween wo stages of mass protests against electoral fraudelectoralagainst protests mass of stages wo a successful attempt by opposition and citizens to use electio use to citizens and opposition by attempt successful a uring the first stage, such defend the political ir

outcome. This outcome. approach seems rather vague, Iso find am going to use in this paper this use to in am going above seems to include even even include to seems above 8

choice they made; and ge to overthrow the overthrow to ge fraudulent

c ase can be referred to as an unsuccessful ,

n a successf a and In my understanding, o understanding, my In demonstrations incumbents

government

(2)

thus

ul case of electoral electoral of case ul when the incum

(or their anointed anointed their (or f 1 of exist attempts

goes as follows: as follows: goes 50, :

(Way 2005a, (Way2005a, (1) nly the nly 000

when the the when to defeat to

people

ns in ns bent bent case case

CEU eTD Collection freerating) the least 7 and of neighboring ‘Not Free’ Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan is 6.4 (1 represents the most fr 1 Tajikist n but Kyrgyzstan, in Azerbaijan; or Armenia in not but Georgia, in Belarus; or Russia happened have transformations electoral electoral for responsible that factors region postcommunist the in trajectories regime various as Just democracy of ‘island an be to (Bunce and Wolchik 2006a, 6) democratic consolidat of terms in worse performed generally have shifts electoral dramatic experienced not have development. revolutions Electoral rela and Belarus in regimes authoritarian highly from region, the in of outcomes variety a produced has decades last the of development Political itself. transformation variation the and transitions of outsets the at legacies h being from far as an official doctrine and started large in the late 1980s through I

t t is ‘Partly Free’ Kyrgyzstan received a score of 5 in in of5 score a received Kyrgyzstan ‘PartlyFree’ iey successful tively sometimes an orUzbekistan.

cause the differences in democratic performance democratic in differences the cause

Chapter2 argued that the states ountries that did not emerge as full as emerge not did that ountries omogenous.

consolidated

as a means of democr of means a as ion ion than the

the revolutions .

early 1990 The differences between the countries come from both structural structural both from come countries the between differences The Buildingthe

’ surrounded by dictators by surrounded ’ . Having Having experienced an electoral revolution, Kyrgyzstan ones

eorce in democracies of of the po

s well as scale scale transformations that s , that is, the period

the Freedom in the World 2014 index, while the average score score whileaverage index, the 2014 World the in Freedom the in went through successful post atization atization stcommunist otherwise similar countries: similar otherwise . Differences in these factors determine why why determine factors these in Differences . 9 Theoretical Framework

eta Europe Central - scale democracies in the early 1990s and 1990s early the in democracies scale played an important rol important an played hips of hips

region were similar in many respects in

when they abandoned communism

, there have there , hi poes f postcommunist of process their However,

other Central Asian countries Asian Central other suggest that there are there that suggest (Pop the the region is -

- electoral to be factors that factors be to lce 20, 908) 2007, Eleches kan,bt o in not but Ukraine, e in this political this in e Middle

breakdowns

obviously

Asia to to Asia certain certain seems ot in ot are are ee 1 . .

CEU eTD Collection theory media. the of role the is revolutions electoral expla inconsistent t protests. postelectoral successful to regards in theory action collective the with line in instance, for theories, movement are produce would they name a few. theories may include social movement closely most electoral revolut are There for electoral transformations. development economic theory modernization revolutions. electoral successful of causes the explaining to contribute can fall to likely are regimes authoritarian non of electoral revolutions by definition a fact some suggest exam complex, and factors that presumably influence the likelihood of the identify theoretically to order in createdbe to needs theories multiple on based framework overthrow, regime to lead elections rigged why explain can theory single existing No here are many directions within the school of social movements, so they can deliver rather rather deliver can they so movements, social of school the within directions many are here ples of collective action collective of ples , - democratic regimes. Thus, various theories that identify the conditions under whi under conditions the identify that theories various Thus, regimes. democratic which

obviously more than three theories that can be used to explain the phenomenon of phenomenon the explain to used be can that theories three than more obviously

While While they

eae t te ujc mte o eetrl revolutions. electoral of matter subject the to related

different can theories explain emphasizes media’s “ability to influence the salience of topics on the on topics of salience the influence to “ability media’s emphasizes ions. aoy atr, f tde i detail. in studied if factors, natory r that ors The The list above is not exhaustive, but I see these three , Third

which . From this point of view, certain economic factors may be responsible responsible be may factors economic certain view, of point this From . are identical to identical

c , definitely ause some light on the causes of causes the on light some

. seeks to explain political transformat political explain to seeks Therefore,

are highly c highly are lcoa fad to fraud electoral re examples of regime breakdown, in particular breakdown those that the theories the that those related to postelectoral protests, , revolutionary

theories theories

its omplex and ramified, but ramified, and omplex This factorThis 10

different aspects.

dealing with dealing an el , convert

agenda ectoral revolution. n biu fco bhn successful behind factor obvious An

can be explained with explained be can the

I - in phenomenon

setting act

to collective action problems action collective First, First,

ually used used ually as mobilizati mass ions through ions , and

Examples of alternative alternative of Examples electoral revolutions I believe that the factors

on the general level general the on

diffus theories This

can be shed by the the by shed be can suggest

phenomenon ion theories, to agenda

the prism of prism the

on. as being ed Second . Social . - setting public Also, Also,

so a a so

can can

the are go go ch ch is ,

CEU eTD Collection first was It democratization. i it Rather, se. pertheory a called barelybe can it that broad so theoryis modernization speaking, Strictly prerequisites of authoritarian of democratization states. st to allows feature This regimes. democratic more about bring and incumbents illiberal overthrow is explanation The first theory that can be applied to the phenomen 2.1 is likely a strongexplanatory tobe variableof theories multiple by supported be to out turns factor a If identical. even or similar be well may them other i Finally, general theframework. tobuild paradigms space derived be can that factors e whi theories transition regime impact can what to more significantly internat of role the with dealing in presented as theory, action collective agenda” xceed modernization theory. modernization . udy the phenomena through the prism of modernization theory, as it aims to identify the the identify to aims it as theory, modernization of prism the through phenomena the udy Modernization T

. as we as

s Also, my point is not to get into over overspecific details of narrow theories, but use but theories, narrow of details overspecific over into get to not is point my Also,

the scope of this thesis. It thesis. this of scope the (including the ones outline above) outline ones the (including (McCombs and Reynolds 2002, 1) 2002, Reynolds and (McCombs t should be noted that noted be should t s a paradigm, or a family of theories that unites most economic explanations to to explanations economic most unites that theories of family a or paradigm, a s ll as to ch . Just as the subjects of different theories may overlap, the factors suggested by by suggested factors the overlap, may theories different of subjects the as Just .

are

why some c in one way or another or way one in heory

Electoral protests in the postcommunist world explicitly sought to to sought explicitly world postcommunist the in protests Electoral is from other theories, and and theories, other from

ountries succeed in such democratic transitions while other do not introduced in a number of ways of number a in already

the three theories I use I theories three the ional seems suggested by suggested actors

by economic historians, who stated that countries in countries that stated who historians, economic by both one of one

, this factadditionallyincreases this , related to the to related .

But But in the process of process the in

11 successful unreasonable, as they would would they as unreasonable,

the next section next the the same factor same the .

a of electoral revolutions and regim The bottom line is that c that is line bottom The implausible implausible

are not completely isolated from each each from isolated completely not are

phenomenon electoral revolutions. e breakdown theory breakdown e

regime regime s can due . In the same way, theories theories way, same the In also be derive be also to t to of electoral revolutions revolutions electoral of change he lack he

our certainty that it it certaintythat our simply overing all other other all overing : external actors actors external :

would not add not would

provide some of time and time of suggest the the suggest d

from the the from

CEU eTD Collection modernization whole the undermine necessarily not factdoes this failed toprovide development of countriesthe postcommunist according to the Weste theory culture civil economy, transformations of divergence than rather dom been has presupp world that approaches postcommunist the in transitions regime on debate The regimesand tendtocollapse transit todemocracies develop and life political in groups new of participation active to lead processes manufacturing and labor in Changes way. command structure social its and government of form more ‘mature’ mo societies as that argue adherents his and Lipset economically. develop they as democratic stay and democratic (Lipset 1963, 41) closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate development economic of These ideas (Clark 2008) small agricultural sector, large service and industrial sectors, with nations mature become anddevelopeventually to expected were They societies. Western mid the in America Latin and Africa, Asia, Bokr 05 504) 2005, (Blokker were introduced to political science by Lipset. As he puts it, “all the various as .

type

hog te rs o social of prism the through an for explanation . Classic modernization theory claims that societies are more likely to become s ve from from ve

of of government as well. Dic in traditional, in

becomes more sophisticated, it it sophisticated, more becomes sos strong a shows ) ose convergence of post of convergence ose — the .

nutilzto, urban industrialization, The existing traditional

poor lsi convergence classic

the variation of political outcomes inthe region. However,

and ill and difference eto ii societ civil of ment connection state - 20 12 th

- tatorship tatorship may be an appropriate developed

to being more modern, modern, more being to n eooi cags ( changes economic and century were primitive versions of versions primitive were century communist countries with Western E Western with countries communist

s (Przeworski, et al. 2000, 88) (Przeworski, etal. 2000, . Such teleological view of political political of view teleological Such .

zto, elh n education and wealth ization, with assumptions of the modernization modernization the of assumptions with can no longer be run in an authoritarian an in run be longer no can hypothesis

societies, but as a countrya as but societies, and .Frtee reasons, these For y. b ig share of urban population paradigm

rmsd rltvl fast relatively a promised rn example they tend they e.g. liberal market market liberal e.g. , but rather but ,

an , but obviously of democracy” .

d d sustainable to change to to change to

developed developed dictatorial dictatorial ntd by inated — develops develops signals are so so are urope, pects pects

CEU eTD Collection directly an of rule the need be, oppose elites privatized their state enterprises privatization second The parityadjusted),expectancy, life oneducation. and public spending corruption socio which of development, level the of factor the by represented are variables such thesis, this of etc. society civil developed people, educated of rate explained: it stands for relatively high level protests than the citizens of less developed states. The notion of structural conditions should be government, considered by regime breakdown ( conditions theory modernization of Iidentify haverelatively also interm performed well East and Central (Balkans, economically developing in succeeded relatively postcommunist models and explanation framework. establishing for need a . These groups are expected to defend their their defend to expected are groups These . participating in the political in game participating

two main factors that explain successful electoral revolutions electoral successful explain that factors main two

level which should not be confused with confused be not should which For the purposes of this this of purposes the For Cutis ht ae aae t bid eaiey re akt economies market free relatively build to managed have that Countries . factor illiberal

region do go in accord with the modernization theory: those countries that have , urban population share, gross national income per capita (purchasing power power (purchasing capita per income national gross share, population urban , respective authoritarian that

can be estim be can a more precise more a

incumbent s . First, citizens of a country with favorable structural socio structural favorable with country a of citizens First, .

is based on the paradigm. Ultimately, general political tendencies of the

motn t consider to important

have consequently experienced the emergence of new business ated using using ated

include funding the opposition, the funding include work, causal explanation causal

governments .

there is no need no is there of urbanization and economic development, a high

of such

13 theory democratic

short

indexes economic s h dge o mre liberalization market of degree the is , as predicted by Lipset. by predicted as , ) ) are more likely to engage in postelectoral - . run economic performan economic run The way

and developing a more sophisticated sophisticated more a developing and

as consolidation in examining in

interest in the first place, and, if and, place, first the in interest the the s business elites can undermine Human Development Human

invest

from the point of view of point the from .

ing into NGOs, into ing the whole variety of of variety whole the

- For the purposes the For Central Europe) Europe) Central ce of a specific specific a of ce - - economic economic economic

index

and and and and ,

CEU eTD Collection to Many studies on havetransitions be not consider theories non of theories of which is already mentioned mode theoretical branch in political science separate from the should It details. and explanations causal and patterns general on concentrate to going theoretical framework would obviously excee regime of plenty elec authoritarian of breakdown the on framework theoretical a manipulative (i.e. non feature important An 2 have political regimes in order to defend their interests are expected to be found in the countries that of degree is factor exp to is it likely more t is factor first The others. the in not but region the of states some in succeed and happen protests sum In .2. .2. empirically he level of socio of levelhe toral revolutions toral

Regime B relatively free economic conditions relativelyfree economic s’

, modernization theory can suggest two factors two suggest can theory modernization , . Th .

separate transitions also e former e

what hold their - e oe that noted be d reakdown emocratic regimes emocratic

kinds of kinds studies privatization and privatization - economic development: economic . .

tend to focus on focus to tend o The literature on regime on literature The osdrn al f hm n re t bid com a build to order in them of all Considering f e f - erience an electoral revolution as a result of voting fraud. voting of result a as revolution electoral an erience democratic) government and establish a new regime. Thus, robustness lectoral revolutions is that they are successful attempts to overthrow to attempts successful are they that is revolutions lectoral

on the subject, each subject, the on regimesafterwards emerge

Theory hois of theories

en made, but few generalizing explanations have been able across ’ rnization rnization theory market liberalization. liberalization. market

breakdown are only partially related to related partially only are breakdown reasons

and privately enterprises owned a breakdown breakdown

range of I expect that Iexpect d the scope and the limit of this thesis 14 s’ why concrete governments fall, and usually do do usually and fall, governments concrete why focus

breakdown is breakdown )

. Even though their subjects may overlap, ing many .

family of of authoritarian regimes regimes authoritarian of

that might explain why postelectoral postelectoral why explain might that on the more developed a country is, the is, countrya developed more the Business

different cases. The reason for that,

a different aspect different a governments broad democratization

elites capable of opposing opposing of capable elites

and leave out overspecific overspecific out leave .

versatile plete and complex complex and plete a b appl be can

democratization of

theories (one authoritarian

osiue a constitute . Thus, I am The second second The . The . the existing re is re e to ied

CEU eTD Collection example ofthistype ofauthoritarianism ve system the makes which and rival faction continue to cooperate as long as they have an access controls leader allies. and relatives, friends,of network power of the to, access which one former The types: account into taken be should absent relev a masses, as There are authoritarianism.based onvarious types of framework which seeks to explain the causes of implication in democracy from differ they as much as just other each from politica as

the peculiarities of peculiarities the Remmer

government, the nat n fr h pscmuit world; postcommunist the for ant , butbecause somuch power

personal r, tutr, n bhvo o atoiain eie hv important have regimes authoritarian of behavior and structure, ure, is that the individual leader is the is leader individual the that is here. l outcomes the , n actor who de facto forms the executive branch etc branch executive the forms facto de who actor n

different closeness to closeness a dictator a s

coalition

argues Therefore on

and

the causes and the process of the of process the and causes the is a diverse type of non of type diverse a is

(Remmer 1986,64 (Remmer that is , approaches toclassifying regimes, authoritarian which

neopatrimonial neopatrimonial

military, and the rulin usually -

building building agenda, distributing rewards to promote loyalty. Both the clique , and support from the leader the from support and , decision ,

only those only variations within the within variations

ry stable ry surrounds himself with a personalist clique, often formed from formed often clique, personalist a with himself surrounds

and included into the framework the into included and - making process, regime’s relation with relation regime’s process, making

is dictatorships kinds of authoritarianism of kinds

(Geddes 1999, 17 1999, (Geddes concentrated inthe hands ofone individual, he generally - 68)

Some factions may form around potential rivals to theto rivals potential aroundmayform factions Some (Matsuzato 2004, single ay types many - g party ( . In fact, various kinds of authoritarianism can differ differ can authoritarianism of Infact, various kinds . democratic systems, the distinguishing character of of character distinguishing the systems, democratic

source of authority, and that power depends on on powerdepends that and authority, sourceof non

as long as it ir forms of authoritarianism of forms

fall. democratic (Huntington 1991) (Huntington , e.g. - From this point of view, of point this From 18)

Bennett 2011) military . Belarus under Lukashenka under Belarus .

(Geddes 1999, 6) 1999, (Geddes exists).

. that . However, n However, regime I will consider will I can be found be can

to the benefits distribution dictatorship, During and after a seizure s’

. the opposition and the and opposition the

The leader dominates dominates leader The . breakdow

can use ot all typologiesare all ot produce different produce . Dissimilarities . two

in the region region the in

are a theoretical a

such factors n should be

systematic theoretical theoretical

virtually virtually

is an an is a ,

CEU eTD Collection constitutional argues, neopatrimonial classic a than more much authoritarianism Kuchma Ukraineunder than other matters on relies highlight to N Dagiev 2013) character neopatrimonial strong a with regime of example an as serve Asia, Central in common particularly is Neopatrimonialism legitimacy of source and authority of form law neopatrimonialism impersonal or ideology through maintenance of state authority through an extensive network of personal patronage, rather than type second The engageriskycoup, ina dictator, the eliminate enough strong seem competitors regime’s If view. of point this strength appears ofthe tobe opposition a breakdown The power. his on depends directly life very the of interests the with coincide normally interests their to the stability of the regime can come from the m of authoritarianism. Aside from the death of the dictator and foreign intervention, the only threat p of nature such Given eopatrimonial authoritarianism authoritarianism eopatrimonial

even

from some

powers, mrcn president American

the — distinctive traits of the former the of traits distinctive

emerged as a n above is when the elites have elites the when is above oarmna dictatorship eopatrimonial

ersonal dictatorships ersonal some members of members some but also build their build also but

for examplefor was surelywas simply legal simply fusion largely s not in exchange for more newfor under benefits regime.in exchange the

n re t b effective be to order in

a pure personal dic personal pure a of

overlaps - the clique may decide to decide may clique the meaningful rational does not make him a neopatrimonial ruler. neopatrimonial a him make not does rational modern modern institutions and patrimonialism

, they tend to be one of the most long most the of one be to tend they , w paau uigproa eain,te, and ties, relations, personal using apparatus own Sye 19, 379) 1992, (Snyder 16 only condition that may thus lead to regime to lead thus may that condition only

Pthr Mrn n Jhso 20, 126) 2009, Johnston and Moran (Pitcher,

concept embers of the elite — with personal dictator personal with

a strong incentive to defect to incentive strong a is

factor

c aatrzd y a by haracterized . tatorship, but resembled this type of of type this resembled but tatorship, First, t First, incumbent

for aregime’s predicting fall e.g. regime

Tajikistan under Rahmon can can Rahmon under Tajikistan he cannot support the opposition the support to be able to successfully successfully to able be to

. The .

fact (Geddes 1999) For that matter, that For , as their as , ship,

that

rely (Nourzhanov 2005, 2005, (Nourzhanov

chief executive's executive's chief phenomenon so it is im is it so a political leader leader political a

merely well

the ruler. The The ruler. the - — lasting type lasting . . However, - traditional being and and being

as Roth Roth as portant n his on

from from

and of of ’s ’s s .

CEU eTD Collection the predict their career paths and to communicate discontent with one another, the degree to which “T autonomy of the armed forces: t factor first The powers to ruler the of relationship relationsh the breakdown: of likelihood the and mode the affect that relationships critical three identifies He authoritarianism. neopatrimonial from Snyder investments and kleptocracy needs. political pri and public the between 458) 1994, Walle de Van and (Bratton in exist networks. clientelist own their create to possibility the benefits personal government, regimes ill the through Two other distinctive features of neopatrimonialism are clientelism and necessarily pre in embedded being frameworks institutional modern with politics, regime. loyalty he control of the armed forces over the supply the over forces armed the of control he officer corps is divided along ethnic lines, and the dictator’s capacity to purge elements of of elements purge to capacity dictator’s the and lines, ethnic along divided is corps officer

. (1992) Rt 16, 198) 1968, (Roth derive authority ofpersonal from their theto provision benefits eptioils i caatrzd y h dmnne of dominance the by characterized is Neopatrimonialism the form of public resources distributed distributed resources public of form the

o sae resources state f

egitimate use of state resources state of use egitimate sent in personal dic sent personal in provides an excellent framework for explaining the peculiarities of transitions of peculiarities the explaining for framework excellent an provides

affecting the affecting sustainable economic growth hrfr, eptioil tts can states neopatrimonial Therefore, .

hs etil de nt ae h Uie Sae a neopatrimonial a States United the make not does certainly This domestic elites; domestic vate vate

transition is the is transition can he he le ed t crnc iaca cie ad eue popcs f prospects reduced and crises financial chronic to leads treasuries tatorships. take the form of form the take ss autonomous is the military, the more stable is the regime. .

Finally, Finally, ,

and the relationship of dom of relationship the and

rirrl uig h sae budget state the using arbitrarily

(Ishikawa 2008,10) degree to which the ruler has undermined the undermined has ruler the which to degree (Ishikawa 2008) (Ishikawa

of n jobs hog lcne, contracts, licenses, through eopatrimonial leaders leaders eopatrimonial their their

not At the lower levels, the benefits may benefits the levels, lower the At , control over monopolistic rents, and and rents, monopolistic over control , ip of the ruler ruler the of ip matériel develo . The rulers The . to p , the ability of officers to to officers of ability the ,

them. This feature is not is feature This them. effectively patronage patronage political legitimization estic actors to foreign foreign to actors estic the o h military; the to

hardly clients. Within the clients. Within of neopatrimonial neopatrimonial

o their for ;

projects networks

as distinguish distinguish

constant constant

own own

etc.

the the or in in

CEU eTD Collection regimes too, as, mixing authoritarian and democratic features, they can have different prospects democracies neither are they as authoritarianism, totalitarianism). In particular, it is often argued that typologies addition In bemust included themodel. into region (which ofinterest isthemainpoint ofmy sothe peculiarities thesis), of their transitions postcommunist the in particularly widespread are rulership personal and neopatrimonialism clear theoretical one 9) 1999, (Geddes can that changes through go regimes authoritarian many Moreover, necessarily dictatorship neopatrimonial and rulership Personal surviving capacity opposition the foreign political game and affecting the likelihood of breakdown is to put pressure on the regime. 384) encourage growth anddiscontent of patronage from elites exclude that dictatorships neopatrimonial regimes Such moderateopposition. and radical both of growth the inhibit can factions elite effectivelycoopt dictator autonomy military questions he loyalty whose forces armed the .

Finally, the third actors actors have leveragelimited over the theirdictator, influence is restricted to supporting excludes ,

mutually exclusive, as some countries may have features of features have may countries some as exclusive, mutually o subtypes to which , consequently, tend to be relatively stable and long and stable relatively be to tend consequently, , . The degree to which to degree The . . Thus, it is it Thus, .

elites from political and economic perks. Neopatrimonial regimes that that regimes Neopatrimonial perks. economic and political from elites (Snyder 1992, 384 (Snyder Sye 19, 380 1992, (Snyder etr more feature

- factor factor is u category cut

f authoritarianism, of sometimes the role of foreign powers ,

o full nor options the

they support support they - Hnigo 19, 581) 1991, (Huntington 385) - opposition, and are rather unstable 382)

impossible to identify a regime as fitting neatly into into neatly fitting as regime a identify to impossible -

scale autocracies. It is important to consider such such consider to important is It autocracies. scale .

hn ipe rcooos aibe (democracy, variable trichotomous simple than ” are indicators that can help assess the degree of degree the assess help can that indicators are ” .

s 18 h scn fco is factor second The ome scholars prefer extended extended prefer scholars ome

regime’s are .

The The first way of influencing domestic

similar similar

competitors can strongly affect strongly can competitors .

or Howev eie types regime

- limit it to a narrow clique clique narrow a to it limit

lived. On the other hand, hand, other the On lived.

many regimes ar h degree the affect their classification classification their affect both er, the features of of features the er, (Snyder 1992, 383

political simultaneously.

o which to and

e hybrid, are regime regime When When

not not the the its -

CEU eTD Collection anti in framed of strength the is Way, to according competitiveness, regime power. in stay to measure antidemocratic undertake to likely more are t incumbents as democratize, to pressure international 236) 2005a, (Way elites, who are to reduce elite defection, while “the absence or weakness if these increases opportunism among well authoritarianism is always endangered by elite d competition. political of degree higher a to contribute can contestation competitiveness regime facilitate and consolidation trajectories. political future their certainextent a to and them classifying of factor a as serve can regimeshybrid of parliamentaryopposition” Diamond peculiar some feature also regimes Hybrid of lack and democratic history law, of rule weak society, continue civic weak as incumbents, traits regime old such of share dominance region postcommunist the in regimes hybrid general, In rules their during Milošević and Ukraine under Leonid Kuchma (both democracies. functioning well establish to managed not have countries where world, postcommunist the in common of forms pure than breakdown for - established patron established

(2002)

- more more likely to change sides when they perceive the incumbent to be vulnerable” incumbent terms. incumbent “h dfnn faue f opttv atoiain eie i significant is regimes authoritarian competitive of feature defining “the , ) as examples of competitive authoritarianism competitive of examples as )

(Way 2005a, 231) (Way Scn, uhrtra regime authoritarian Second, . - client relationships, or large quasi large or relationships, client

Levitsky and Way recognize Way and Levitsky (Diamond 2002, 29) 2002, (Diamond Groups that are able to frame regime opposition in national in opposition regime frame to able are that Groups Way

authoritarianism. More authoritarianism. , but (2005a)

still ities in in ities 19

have some kindofpolitical competition. . isunity. Such organizations as “political parties,

The feature that defines the very phenomenon very phenomenon Thethe defines featurethat

dniis atr ta u that factors identifies

countries

regards in the postcommunist region. postcommunist the in s’ hat enjoy the absence of such pressure pressure such of absence the enjoy hat

, for example, Serbia under Slobodan Slobodan under Serbia example, for , surviving - over, hybrid regime hybrid over, familial networks” have been used used been have networks” familial

o their to experienced electoral revolutions a

national identity, which can be be can which identity, national (Levitsky and Way 2002, 52) 2002, Way and (Levitsky capacity is affected by by affected is capacity transition

of consolidation The drie autocratic ndermine The third source of of source third The . s

codn to According are also are determining First,

very very elite elite d - .

CEU eTD Collection and dictator Foreign forces. coercive regime’s of autonomy is factor (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 19) consequence identified. and dictatorships of Therefore duedoes toeconomiccontribute not tothe decline supporters in order to survive in power citizens ordinary of d government of changes unscheduled with associated been always have fall. likelyto during economic declines any regime (democratic, any type of authoritarian, or hybrid) is more du (1999) Kaufman prosperity” relative of periods during collapse to seem not do regimes “authoritarian that conclusion a to comes Bermeo Whitehead) and Schmitter, its increase likelihood. does it but breakdown, for condition sufficient a itself by not is performance performance. economic is breakdown that factor a Finally, support. terms ictatorships are no exception. Authoritarian governments may be insulated from the distress distress the from insulated be may governments Authoritarian exception. no are ictatorships ring the times of economic decline.

that

finds statistical evidence that all types of authoritarian regimes are more vulnerable vulnerable more are regimes authoritarian of types all that evidence statistical finds

(1995) have The first is theories of regime breakdown suggest a number of factors that facilitate instability instability facilitate that factors of number a suggest breakdown regime of theories After reviewing existing research on r on research existing reviewing After support for the opposition the for support — Inflation, unemployment, declines in rates of growth of rates in Inflation,unemployment,declines

direct or indirect broad broad resonance in the society

also

to some extent some to can elite disunity/defection

mhsz te oe f cnmc rss n eie transitions. regime in crisis economic of role the emphasize s eonzd to recognized is

explain —

their fall. their of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself” , but they but , . . The second fact

In other words (Geddes 1999, 4) ,

can also contribute to regime collapse. The fifth factor factor fifth The collapse. regime to contribute also can

affect the likelihood of all authoritarian regimes’ regimes’ authoritarian all of likelihood the affect Dix

Summarizing :

still still “ 20 normally normally have an easier time mobilizing popular t here is no transition whose beginning is not the

(1982) egime change (in particular, by O’Donnell, O’Donnell, by particular, (in change egime must deliver benefits to their own group of group own their to benefits deliver must longevity rules ofauthoritarian either. , s ors is the strength of opposition. Th cholars

. Lack of support from ordinary citizens influence, in forms forms in influence, cnwegs ht or economic poor that acknowledges Bre 19, 367) 1990, (Bermeo all of the of all seem or personal income seem to to seemincome personal or

unanimous in arguing that above, six of Dx 1982) (Dix

pressure on the the on pressure . factors can be be can factors

Haggard and and Haggard Geddes e third .

And And

CEU eTD Collection on depends low. is goal the attaining benefit uncertain is decreased of the likelihood good, common a enjoyproduceand effortsto citizens of number large a of participation require movements such by sought goods are public The problem. same revolutions the follow of) electoral examples (which movements Social attained. be to it allow not does goal of individual incentives to participate in actions necessary to cooperate and achieve the com lack the but cooperation, certain frombenefit would group a which in situation characterizesa revolutions and movements social study as Olson and Schelling. Further, such scholars as Chong and Kuran have applied the concept to scholars such by science political to introduced was problem action collective of concept The and themtothe subject link matter is broad is action problem) action collective the overcome elections rigged to response a as regimes illiberal on pressure put to people enough explanation some provide can which theories, certain E 2. which stability isarguedofpolitical all regimes. types toundermine of fact sixth the Finally, mobilization. easy relatively for way na existenceof is lectoral revolution is 3. 3. to identify the general factors that can explain Co common objective common llective A

three (Chong 1991) and d and tional identity, tional from cooperation, and a belief that likelihood of the group successfully successfully group the of likelihood that belief a and cooperation, from factors ction eveloped;

: action taken together by a group of people whose goal Theory

. Thus, this Thus, . . Therefore, s Therefore, cost Such problem occurs due to high cost of participating in the action, examining it examining f participation, of different from the personal cult of the leader, the of cultpersonal the fromdifferent

social movements, in particular in movements, social

phenomenon falls into the subject of collective action action collective of subject the into falls phenomenon olving a collective action problem problem action collective a olving

(Tucker 2007) (Tucker wie tes i not. did others while , . When individuals are unable to unable are individuals When .

all 21

overcoming overcoming general collective action problems exceedsof scopethe of why some countries were able to mobilize to able were countries some why of

expected . In general, c general, In . eeis of benefits or is poor economic performance, economic poor is or a collectiveaction

h literat The

this , ollective action problem problem action ollective

postelecto

attaining

thesis.Thus, for any movement movement any for ur

which paves the the paveswhich coordinate their their coordinate o collective on e

is to achieve ral protests. h ga, an goal, the taking place taking

(that is, to is, (that

my goal mon mon

d a ,

CEU eTD Collection in participate to (i.e. understand that even electoral manipulations that the regime success of likelihood perceived the Finally, individual’s decision. can be taken as a cost to defend peoplerespect, as that vulnerablein more protests. In turn, regimes that are less violent and do not usually use force against protestors are of cost the find may they character, repressive imprisonment arrests, participation of costThe opposition. not do and if united, not is budget transparent have corruption, fight law, of rule promote but people), the by restrained the The for thesubject meaningful factors the into translated be to need factors general these revolutions, electoral to success of likelihood perceived illiberal regime (as all citizens would benefit from getting rid of the governmentofthe rid from benefit getting would citizens all (asregimeilliberal

good the common

want benefits benefits possible their rule

o ik n egg i pltcl rtss o te ae of sake the for protests political in engage and risk to rs, the likelihood of solving the collective action action collective the solving of likelihood the rs, goal sought by protests following fraudulent elections is elections fraudulent following protests by sought goal

and even and matter political political

of attaining the goal the attaining of poet movement protest a repressions a re

of of of

choice

electoralrevolutions. - participation in collective action the competitors in political demonstrations varies from variesdemonstrations political in run of loss of life. of loss

. Thus, regime also (

e.g. elections under increased scrutiny would (Tucker 2007, 540) 2007, (Tucker

establi

loss of job because of of because job of loss of the regime the of are uncertain) are . engaged in u if But

If the citizens are aware of aware are citizens the If in such regimesin shing a new democratic regime (which (which regime democratic new a shing

propensity propensity to use violence against demonstrations

22 of the

participation too high to engage in electoral electoral in engage to high too participation . If manipulations were

the eie sd ao eetrl fraud electoral major used regime are not viewed by people as strong as people by viewed not are . , they obviously they ,

In order to apply collective action theory theory action collective apply to order In

rtss eed o te mag the on depends protests

(postelectoral protest)

are more likely to likelyto aremore policies certain is

one’s low have the .

In other words, people people words, other In oiia preferences) political not only not etc.). etc.). ere loss of time, to time, of loss ere not ek and weak marginal regime’s violent and violent regime’s little chan take If

, affecting each to the opposition opposition the

overthrowing overthrowing

ge the to the streetsthe to no incen no

and citizens is hoped to hoped is unpopular unpopular that nitude of of nitude

leaders leaders

results that

is tive not

an an is ,

CEU eTD Collection therefore serve as a perfect moment for collective anti Fraudulent election can change an individual’s calculus participating costs the as overthrown, be to regime illiberal an for condition sufficient regime the against grievances strong that is arguments His fraud. electoral following streetsthe to go to why choose people question specificallythe framework to collectiveaction postele the occurrence toexplain scholars it of used have The collective action premise of electoral revolutions has been studied relatively well, as some and well. as crucial events such of coverage objective an in ignoring the protests has protests existing of awareness individuals’ on depends regime. the with dissatisfaction popular of incr and information transmit quickly to used be can newspapers and television, to the people. frau of magnitude of successful outcome of the protests. started) of extent the on information that note to important is It game scale manipulation the influenced have to suspected

started, the regime is interested is regime the started, access .

. What affect What . ible in demonstrations are usually high, and the chances of success are very uncertain.

iming iming to reach a large audience From th From

the public. d, but d,

helps people to solve collective , or u s

their individual their

is point of view, of point is also the also nderstating

the

citizens citizens

fraud ability of ability final

in putting the the putting in the number o

From From this point of view,

choice outcome, the situation changes radically changes situation the outcome, and in authoritarian regimes usually usually regimes authoritarian in

and bringing up bringing and media sources need to be available to available be to need sources media

mass the A

successful outcome of postelectoral protests postelectoral of outcome successful whether to engage or not or engage to whether

23 ( scope including including

media to media f s media participants

action problem

of - governmental movement. Fearon . Once anti Once . whether to engage in mobilization, and existing ctoral Tucker protests.

citizens from different regions) - expose and expose under to - date information to the people the to information date

what matter . The role of independent media

mobilization censorshi -

governmental by raising the stakes of the transfer this information information this transfer is perceived likelihood likelihood perceived is p, either completely either p, s have

is not only the real

(if it has already has it (if associated with with associated . Exp .

(2007) opposition the ease the scope scope the ease

no mobilization

licit large licit

objective objective are not a a not are

applies (2011)

radio, radio, also also

is -

CEU eTD Collection that has to likely not are the overthrow to could have happened during regular times as well, but they were not able to grow large enough point of each of these revolutionary breakdown is injustice perceived because to framework a as applied be can theory deprivation Relative injustice perceived to response is in idea rebel basic people Its straightforward: revolutions. electoral explaining to one closest the be to appears theory From all the theories and schools of s incumbent themore is, required fraud is a needed tosecureresult. elections incumbent’s popular supporthas direct implication onthemagnitude of fraud: the lesspopular anti the of outcome successful to contribute and problems coordination overcome to leaders opposition help that factors as protesting point accrued” it which from distribution the about knowledge their other each aboutbeliefs their on based actions their ab individually learns process games with imperfect information, he shows that “if each opposition leader through the election coordination to approach games’ ‘global the on Drawing protests. postelectoral during leaders Kuhn rights, whichhelps themovercomecoordinat the their on infringes ruler the that voters the to signal public a as serves manipulation massive exp because protests successful in result to likely are elections fraudulent that argues s

(2010) out to such factors as incumbent’s unpopularity, lows costs and high benefits of of benefits high and costs lows unpopularity, incumbent’s as factors such to out

an effect flag onsocietyred tothat on a similar ofa bull.

uses the framework of collective action to e to action collective of framework the uses

differ much, so much, differ regime . Structural conditions during conditions Structural . out the incumbent's popular support popular incumbent's the out indeed

apparently ocial movement and collective action, relative deprivation one of their defining features. defining their of one

it is the sense of large of sense the is it - 24 go s is

vernment campaign. Ultimately, the level of of level the Ultimately, campaign. vernment ion problem. ion

rigged elections. ’ s best response given their own belief and and belief own their given response best s normal times and the times of times the and times normal xplain the action of the opposition opposition the of action the xplain

(Kuhn 2010, 6) 2010, (Kuhn studying studying

A Kadras 97 202) 1997, (Klandermans - they are able to coordinate to able are they sc

nti In particular, the particular, In ale voting manipulation voting ale - governmental protests electoral revolutions electoral

. His study also also study His .

election osure of of osure starting s .

CEU eTD Collection revolutions. electoral of likelihood the facilitating factors the understanding to contribute can arguably, broad preliminary a make To increase thescopepopular of thepeople more factorexpected tobe tohelp is factor is increase protests popular with up end to likely more are rigged massively been have that revolutionary events. consequently and costs, the are higher the participation. of cost possible the affects violence,which solved. be to is problem action collective goal. common the achievingof popula help the citizens the sum, In theory the from derived the successful overcoming be fraud the should power to come would actors political different that believe people when manipulation, major of cases In be. to tend they deprived more electoral of case the t is revolutions in action collective of cause a as injustice perceived of degree The

antd o fad as fraud of magnitude

blocks

rity of opposition, as opposed to that of the incumbent, represents the perceived benefit benefit perceived the represents incumbent, the of that to opposed as opposition, of rity as well oppositi both citizen

above above So : . modernization, regime breakdown, and collec breakdown,regimeand modernization,

he magnitude of fraud. The more peoplemorehefraud.The magnitudeof me

on’s access to popular overcome their

general collective action concept, goes concept, action collective general presented presented of the suggested the of s

’ The The third factor is the magnit

sense of injustice of of summary the collective action problem increase

theories of collective action point to the same set of f of set same the to point action collective of theories mobilization. factor accounting for size differences of electoral protests, as as protests, electoral of differences size for accounting factor

The more popular moreThe coordination ,

the explanat

theo media

and perceived benefit of attaining the goal retical framework presented above consists of three of consists above presented framework retical

h scn fco i regime’s is factor second The

, which can problems. problems. This set includes four factors. First, ory factors ory in engage to willing be will people fewer the 25

informed better and

and strong and ude of voting result manipulation.

feel that their vote has been stolen beenhas vote their feelthat

expose fraud to

The more dangerous participation is, participation dangerous moreThe appear similar, which increases our our increases which similar, appear in line with the with line in tive action tive

is the opposition, the more likely more the opposition, the is s

dramatically. Therefore, using

corrected, the lik the corrected,

coordinated

theories a

large audience relative d relative propensity to use use to propensity . Each of these Eachof . , which would would , which ,

because they they because . The fourth actors that actors elihood of elihood eprivation eprivation Elections .

This , the , the a ,

CEU eTD Collection These factors be can grouped formed: investigation, theoretical on Based mergedas a into well. singleone be can violence use to propensity its and autonomy forces’ coercive regime’s of factors the ones that depend completely on the ruler tend to be used more law autonomous theories action andregime breakdown) postcommunist variable robust be can factors these that certainty 1. 10. 9. 8. 7. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1.

foreign influence; strength and disunity/defectionregime’s of the elite; degree of level ofsocio privatization andprivatization market regime’s liberalization, short socio access to magnitude of fraud; regime’s violence; propensity touse poor short strong national identity;

- cnmc odtos lvl f socio of (level conditions economic )

region

- are similar, so they can be merged into one single factor. In the same way, way, same the In factor. single one into merged be can they so similar, are independent media mass enforcing bodies are usually are less violen less are usually are bodies enforcing privatization and and privatization - term performance economic ofthe regime; popul - economic development;economic .

T the factor of opposition’s level of support level of opposition’s factor of the

he arity

factor of factor

into severalinto c

of the opposition; of

market liberalization;

a li a the opposition the st of ten of st .

ategories:

factors

for explaining electoral revolutions in the in revolutions electoral explaining for

’s

- strength related to related economic development, degree of of degree development, economic

t towards to citizens, whereas the whereas citizens, to towards t against the demonstrations. Thus, -

term economic performance); (derived from the from (derived

electoral revolutions can be be can revolutions electoral (derived f (derived rom the collective rom the the ories of of ories

CEU eTD Collection the how understand to order in categories, these presence/absence ofthe to according scrutinized be will one in change variable (rigged elections) Belarus. fact theoretical these test to is step next The factorsIexpect to that additional unites group last the Finally, category. separate a forms it so revolutions, electoral illi category second likelihood of successful electoral revolution, but they are still closely related to each other. The inverse others the while socio(e.g. proportional becategory amay factorswithin the of Some ea rgm. antd o fraud of Magnitude regime. beral 4. 3. 2.

additional factors ( magnitude of fraud; thestrength andpopularityopposition); of violence, use to propensity elites, regime’s of (disunity/defection character regime’s

As it was mentioned above, I selected t selected I above, mentioned was it As ,

and unsuccessful protests in the other. In the In other. the in protests unsuccessful and — eies character regime’s

explain successelectoralexplain revolutions ofas ten , which produced access to access y rprinl eg short (e.g. proportional ly

factors influenced media, national identity, foreign influence). — at

consists of the factors that define the nature of the the of nature the define that factors the of consists elections elections

different different ors against the empirical the against ors

27 the

prospectsrevolution electoral ofan o extreme cases with a similar independent similar a with cases extreme o is outcomes:

defining feature of the very concept of of concept very the of feature defining - em cnmc efrac) o the to performance) economic term chapter

electoral revolution and regime well

- below . economic development) economic

examples ,

the two countries two the

: Ukraine and and Ukraine : .

CEU eTD Collection 2 Development Programme 2005) Kazakhstan) and Peru above just and countries to the Human Developme education was Ukraine to the crisis of 1990s. socio country’s the though even was Ukraine 2004, In raw metals and materials into manufactured goods 328) distortions Europe economic independence of decade M with connections through country’s revolution e start to needs One 3

Here and further World Bank data is used, if not isifused, Bankdata furtherWorld and Here .1. .1. any small economic units and large and units economic small any . 2004 P 2004

Their .

: u : a eco depressing A

osqet eeomn. uig h frt er o independence, of years first the During development. consequent

niomn lne ta in than longer environment rban population population rban of the economic system number of emerging of number with economic residential

equal to

h Sve Union Soviet the fell ow

Some Some conventional indexes can

activity aiig kan’ socio Ukraine’s xamining

still 5.3

nomic and social

(Sutela 2012, 4) 2012, (Sutela Soviet nt Inde Elections in Ukraine Ukraine Elections in theand %

constituted states, European Central even and Western developed behind far

of GDP

Chapter3 was based on a simple formula of converting cheap energy and and energy cheap converting of formula simple a on based was

. - x, Ukraine ranked 78 in the world

industrial partners industrial business economic conditions had certainly improved when compared when improved certainly had conditions economic In 2004, Ukraine ,

reaping radw i 1991, in breakdown ; life expectancy at birth was equal to 68 years. According -

scale Soviet industries were privatized were industries Soviet scale 68% ay te post other many - specified otherwise specified , but s but , elites situation enormous enormous benefits from rent seeking .

of the whole population whole the of CaseS 28

with a score of 0.766 of score a with (i.e.

tate regulat tate -

cnmc odtos t h outset the at conditions economic shared (Sutela 2012,5) , , hyperinflation, ,

characterized by oligarchs

provide provide an understanding of tudies com

the

hc hd strong a had which

ion and o and ion Orange Revolution uit countries munist 122 )

figured out how to exploit the the exploit to how out figured

(far (far below Central European

. place (

and

the 2 wnership dominated the dominated wnership in 2003 in ; public expenditure on expenditure public ; economic stagnation economic breakup out

of 144 countries

(United Nations Nations (United

f East of during the first first the during

impact (Åslund 2005, Ukraine went went Ukraine

of integrated of integrated

the status of

Central Central on f the of

the ) .

CEU eTD Collection 4 3 son Kuchma’s Medvedchuk. Viktor and Zinchenko Oleksandr networks, which had about 50% of market share, were under control of the close to the president oligarch media: mass was tools such of One support. political mobilize to Kuchma helped oligarchs resources, state to access for exchange in 2000s, early and 1990s late the In export. the of the parliament in were founders deputies of 3,954 businesses, 450 con of 386 that reported was it 2000, In power. in stay his during support term. second re was and 1994, in Ukraine of president the became Kuchma Leonid extraordinary economicupswing purchasin on based capita well. as recovery impressive an made Agriculture 2004. and 2003 42 by surged exports machine and processing, food production, 12.1% 9 preceding years five last the during boost economic significant of time the at place short regime’s of Speaking Finally,Index score country ofEconomic got a the of53.7 Freedom inthe with

Index of Economic Freedom data Freedom IndexofEconomic data International Transparency % .

T Bolivia, Kyrgyzstan, Sudan, and Niger and Sudan, Kyrgyzstan, Bolivia, he country was the fastest growing economy in Europe in economygrowing fastest the was country he Ti economic This . Viktor - controlled televisio controlled

In regards to the character of the regime, Kuchma heavily relied on oligarchic oligarchic on relied heavily Kuchma regime, the of character the to regards In Yushchenko's cabinet service cabinet Yushchenko's % . Gross investment in fixed assets increased by more than 30 than more by increased assets fixed in investment Gross .

improvement g power parity power g -

term economic performance, t performance, economic term

n networks and newspapers and networks n revolution the

when the Orange Revolution took placewhen took Revolution theOrange

was primarily driven by industry, notably by steel steel by notably industry, by driven primarily was

a eul to equal was , Ukraine ,

in 1999 in ulig I ws lo export also was It building. ,

29 according to the Corruption Perception Index Perception Corruption the to according

. trolling trolling 25% of the country’s import and 10% Ukraine’s economy finally started to grow grow to started finally economy Ukraine’s ’s GDP has risen by an an by risen has GDP ’s - 2001

$6,000. (Way 2005b, 136) 2005b, (Way he Orange Orange he , with the rate of 5.9 of rate the with ,

in 2004 in - in

- In sum In

la In 2004, Ukraine’s GNI per per GNIUkraine’s In2004, w, Viktor Pinchuk, owned owned Pinchuk, Viktor w, Revol , with , - elected in 1999 to his to 1999 in elected , Ukraine enjoyed an enjoyed Ukraine ,

(Åslund 2005,329) (Åslund - 4 rvn a i 2004 in as driven, . ution actually took took actually ution

. Two major news news major Two . the growth rate of of rate growth the annual avera annual %

in 2000. in % in both in ge of of ge For For 3 . .

CEU eTD Collection Akhmetov Rinat as individuals such included which clan, oligarchic based 2004 interest economic Kuchma’s crucialmost moment. puppets his not oligarchs and the members of the parliament, despite being heavy influenced by Kuchma, were multiple preferred but elites), business ( o on rely not did he Moreover, failed. 2002 in one create to attempt pro Kuc 2005) (Åslund politician who had skillfully run the Central Bank for seven years, to the post of prime minister” Yushchenko, promote to together “came possessions, 2000) r 8) 2005, (McFaul economic Ukraine’s of all rally to managed never Kuchma b However, control ensure to elites’ key loyalty programs news the of content the over censorship widespread direct establish to Kuchma allowed This three other big television channels, togethe r 1990s late the in eserves egional affiliations have played an important role in the relationship between Ukrainian Ukrainian between relationship the in role important an played have affiliations egional - presidential political party (which could serve a serve could (which party political presidential hma’s will, caring solely about their financial interests. presidential elections presidential , local oligarchs, seeking to restore the country’s creditworthiness and secure their their secure and creditworthiness country’s the restore to seeking oligarchs, local , competing

(Way 2005b, 132) 2005b, (Way reservoir of reservoir ig semi a eing .

and enjoyed some degree of arbitrariness. As a result, they failed they result, a As arbitrariness. of degree some enjoyed and T . When Ukraine was on the verge of external default with minimal external minimal with default external of verge the on was Ukraine When .

his fact demonstrates that they were capable of acting independently of of independently acting of capable were they that demonstrates fact his (Way 2005b, 136) 2005b, (Way

groups

elite - autocratic

(Åslund, Why Has Ukraine Failed to Achieve Economic Growth? Growth? Economic Achieve to Failed Ukraine Has Why (Åslund, —

(Bunce, McFaul and Stoner and McFaul (Bunce, support was blurry and vague, and was based solely on short on solely based was and vague, and blurry was support . Also, Kuchma’s team used blackmail as a mechanism of state of mechanism a as blackmail used team Kuchma’s Also, . was the ‘godfather’ of one particular regional faction regional particular one of ‘godfather’ the was o distribute to

president (Darden 2001) . But But . r representing another 15 to 25% Yanukovych

Bne MFu ad Stoner and McFaul (Bunce, ces o cnmc n pltcl eore to resources political and economic to access 30

s a s -

— Weiss 2010, 237) 2010, Weiss means of elite subordination) elite of means the only credible senior economic economic senior credible only the Kuchma’s tapped successor for the the for successor tapped Kuchma’s Also, Kuchma

and political and ne single oligarchic clan clan oligarchic single ne

elites behind his rule his behind elites did did not have a strong . -

of the news market. In es 21, 191) 2010, Weiss

(Ukraine’s richest (Ukraine’s other words, other —

him in the in him Donetsk

and an an and - term term

the the - ,

CEU eTD Collection election presidential Having provided some picture of Ukraine violent character theKuchma’s regime p ofgoodfor was and the people clashes were convicted and imprisoned participan active Nineteen time. days few a in released were them of most but first, at charged were protestors 300 Around injured. were individuals of dozens and happened, police no was and month believed to be involved 2000 in murdered brutally and kidnapped Gongadze Georgiy with scandal the between clashes serious first states. Asian Central and Belarus, especially compared to character repressive to regards In 2004 Presidential Elections2005) and theOrange Revolution television ERA on netwo me was brought beginning 151) elections] to began thus influence for group Donetsk with competed had but Kuchma supported long had who elites man) . ,

Some of Some r Andriy Klyuyev, Borys Kolesnikov, Kolesnikov, Borys Klyuyev, Andriy k ;

Andriy Derkach also openly supported Yushchenko by provi by Yushchenko supported openly also Derkach Andriy , supplying him with resources that would prove critical to hi to critical prove would that resources with him supplying ,

of his presidential campaign

support Yushchenko support at that time these dia coverage dia

n and - violent up to up violent

oligarchs, like Petro Poroshenko, supported Yushchenko from the from Yushchenko supported Poroshenko, Petro like oligarchs, itself

his his counterparts in some (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 119) , and The .

: radio channels radio Poroshenko was

police and demonstrators. demonstrators. and police its apin was campaign T —

rather the exception, not the rule.

he factor [Yanukovych’s future opponent at the 2004 presidential presidential 2004 the at opponent future [Yanukovych’s

Uriin orait f Geor of journalist Ukrainian a last day, when a few clashes between protesters and riot riot and protesters between clashes few a when day, last

. Among the . This 2001 ’s conditions

some other postcommunist countries, suc ,

— controlled a small opposition small a controlled and

uhas rule Kuchma’s

(Kuzio, From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s Yushchenko: to Kuchma From (Kuzio, ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ campaign campaign Kuchma’ without ‘Ukraine a scandal in which the which in scandal a was the most violent 31 Yuriy Ivanyushchenko Yuriy

eovn mil aon the around mainly revolving crucial

at that time, let me now turn to the 2004 . ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ rospects of popular mobilization. popular rospects of resources that

a never was It .

was struggle triggered

Thus, such generally non president was reasonably was president in origin gian .

ding him with air time air with him ding

s victory” s As Hale As ecie as perceived - their oriented oriented

between the regime

business group the note

contestation (Hale 2005, 2005, (Hale , 5 h as Russia, brought the brought

lasted lasted four th who was was who infamous infamous

s Channel ts of the the of ts , “some “some , violent, very very

s -

CEU eTD Collection and continuation of Kuchma’s favor campaign manipulate the election results to lay the groundwork for future cooperation forces security and military, intelligence, police, the with contact initiated also staff campaign secon the in Yushchenko support to agreed but round, first the in president support to agreed bloc Tym mobilization. future for important very was and people the to signal strong a sent fact This members chief), campaign Yushchenko’s became later (who Bezsmertnyi Roman Poroshenko, Petro mentioned already Lutsenko, politic popular and experienced Besides Yushchenko, people in the from support enjoyed Yushchenko whereas Ukraine, of regions Southern and Eastern countries European Western 30) Yushchenko 2005, Revolution Orange the and Elections Kuchma president Yushchenko. Viktor leader b et en w mi cniae: then candidates: main two ween oshenko agreed not agreed oshenko

change as a course,

the

the opposition the itself was also planned wisely planned also was itself to name but a few. The coalition also consisted of , in turn, in , West andCenterWest country. of the Yuri (Kuzio, From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Presidential 2004 Ukraine’s Yushchenko: to Kuchma From (Kuzio,

the the was positioned as a pro a as positioned was y his

Yekhanurov, to camp and opposition opposition that would later lead the Orange Revolution included such

presidential The former was was former The participate in the elections the in participate . Yanukovych’s electorate Yanukovych’s . Yushchenko portrayed the election as a choic

(Bunce (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 122 status quo, were ians as ians - united P

rime and Yulia Tymoshenko, Yulia campaign. Ol campaign. . Polls showed that around 70 around that showed Polls represented ,

ntly Kinakh. Anatoliy

, M both and

should should the regime try, as was widely expected, 32 - nse Vko Ynkvc ad h oppos the and Yanukovych Viktor inister Western candidate, supported by the U.S. and U.S. the by supported candidate, Western

capable openly anointed openly eksander Moroz ( Moroz eksander

and explicitly supported by Russia. Russia. by supported explicitly and

in Yushchenko’s favor Yushchenko’s in consisted mainly of the citizens from citizens the of mainly consisted Yanukovych of

Oleksander Zinchenko, Oleksander influential negotiating - n diin o being to addition In 125) as an heir heir an as . The The o

% (Kuzio 2005,30) businessmen, including Socialist Party Socialist

and act and

of Ukrainians of pposition’s pposition’s electoral e between a change by the incumbe the by d. Yushchenko’s d. , and her and , ing

numerous as a team. team. a as and and )

ran for for ran . would would whole Yuriy Yuriy

ition ition nt nt to , ,

CEU eTD Collection process” election democratic genuine a conduct to will of lack a “displayed Th andprisons, hospitals, military candidacy ofYanukovych. tosupportthe bases) harassed poorly done had Yanukovych where the of round first the After were forced to comply receiv station polling workers were paid cash depending on how high Yanukovych’s result in their station was: “every supporters. his with Commission resource administrative use to elections 2004 Bunce and iswhereAnd this votes sha Presidential Elections and the Orange 2005, Revolution 32) fraud other and this camouflage increased term maximum Commission Election Central The manipulation moderate result: needed the securing of options two prepared and planned regime the argues, to seems While es re of Yanukovych was 39.26 was Yanukovych of re ae ny fw way few a only are e

in the first round, so the second round of contestation between the two leaders was held. held. wasleaders two betweenthe contestation of round second the so round, first the in Kuchma was unable to participate in the elections due elections the in participate to unable was Kuchma

had s well. as

Yanukovych Wolchik

done done and blatant blatant and .

Yanukovych

loe b te a. uig hs time this During law. the by allowed

the o isac, h rgm pesrd eti ctgre o citi of categories certain pressured regime the instance, For everything to everything

(2011, (2011, 121) ed roughly US$5,000 in the election’s first round” first election’s the in US$5,000 roughly ed regime fell tofull regime

with with government directives out ’s electoral vote

s el had planned to win win to planned had

ection, n hc, as which, in s

conclude that count %

ensure o f to

. No candidate managed to obtain the necessary the obtain to managed candidate No . fraud. The first first The fraud. (Kuzio, From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s 2004 2004 Ukraine’s Yushchenko: to Kuchma From (Kuzio, Way lingered

fourteen alsify the vote. vote. the alsify .

Wy 05, 135) 2005b, (Way -

A scale fraud. electoral

the victory of of victory the also

slig

the ten days before declaring the the declaring before days ten

t t Yush ht rsns vdne that evidence presents he regime had well district

at least at OSCE OSCE one -

harassment and was used in the first round of elections. elections. of round first the in used was level state level his ally his uha akd h Cnrl Election Central the packed Kuchma hnos itr ws ‘permitted’ was victory chenko’s by , they decreased decreased they , report . Individual voters were bribed and and bribed were voters Individual : he received 39.9% 3% 3%

to constitutio to

Yanukovych. in the second round, intending intending round, second the in concludes, Kuchma’s regime regime Kuchma’s concludes, - officials were fired in areas areas in fired were officials elaborated elaborated plans to steal the

fear of losing their local

(2005b, 136) (2005b, Yushchenko nal constraints, he he constraints, nal

ia results final As Kuzio Kuzio As polling polling

(OSCE/ODIHR (OSCE/ODIHR , while the vote

zens (e.g. in in (e.g. zens half of the the of half station . (2005) ’s and and ’s Some Some —

job

the the to to s’ s. s.

CEU eTD Collection Yushchenko: Presidential Elections Ukraine’s and 2004 theOrange 2005,41) Revolution responde announced. were round second the P res official the from dramatically this to access day election the of evening the in announced were they Instead, Commission. Election Central the manyelections, the steal to regime the Anticipating gets away withmanipulation. stakes ofthe prot became a winner in an unfair manner, which has a lot to do with the feeling of deprivation. The overcome their collective action problems. They sensed that Yanukovych stole their choice and revolution phenomena large explicit of factor The would have second clearly wonthe round manipulation number these competition, in resulted efforts authorities’ 42) 2005, Revolution Orange the and Elections Presidential 2004 favor Yanukovych’s in falsified been has Voters’ calculated that 2.8 Yanukovych 2004) eople started to gather on the Independence Square in Kyiv even before the official results of of theofficial results Kyiv before even Independence in Square the on eople togather started .

on fe te election the after Soon d

obtained directly influenced the opposition leaders’ call to challenge election results election challenge to call leaders’ opposition independent ests thus wereests thus clear and either high: people defend their choice, orthe regime

— 49.42%, Yushchenko 49.42%, was wallUk present in

million million votes

data. - s scale manipulation scale

no more that more no seem ) s ults, which ults,

The exit polls gave polls exit The day

elect Hundreds of thousands thousands of Hundreds oe than more ,

(around 9.3% h Cnrl lcin omsin announced Commission Election Central the ions and become and become

(Kuzio, From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s Ukraine’s Yushchenko: to Kuchma From (Kuzio, 10 — triggered the feeling of feeling the triggered

results 34 . % 46.69% of the votes the of 46.69% ( raine, which was a factor that helped people to to helped factorpeople that raine, which a was —

It is important that they did, in fact, have an have fact, in did, they that important is It

vote theft. Given that it was a was it that Given theft. vote one of the decisive feature of the electoral electoral the of feature decisive the of one infcn. h bto ln i that is line bottom The significant. Ukrainian citizens Ukrainian : had the fraud not been used, Yushchenko

of the total numbers of those who voted) the Yushchenko

oe rsfl to trustful more president upwards to a million individuals million a to upwards . Way .

(Kuzio, From Kuchma to to Kuchma From (Kuzio,

an 8% an The NGO ‘Committee of ‘Committee NGO The injustice and deprivation. deprivation. and injustice

ignored calculations of calculations ignored (2005b)

lead xt polls exits

neck

estimates that estimates and - and different different data ’ - . neck

that that the the ,

CEU eTD Collection beforehand, which impossible forces coercive the of 40) 2005, Revolution Orange the and Elections Presidential 2004 defectors” numerous the of some just were “Local governments, televisi time, happened. this of none but inaugurated, be to supposed was Yanukovych and results On the fifth day after the runoff, g elections”. the in voices their stolen had believed, many as who, authorities, the by assaulted personally personal being of feelings their their last, not and, destinies […] their for choice complex the in forengagement individuals many of feelings emotional widespread “the was activism (Kuzio 2010, 292) nationalism” its of strength the to due possible proved Revolution Orange the in mobilization to Ukrai identityhelped obviously [ how to opposed as Ukrainian, as Ukraine see to wanted protestors] “[the that says who activists, Revolution Pogrebynsky consciousness. political and proactive their position to contributed regions, Central and Western the in especially Ukrainians, presiden the of behind factor important an also was revolutions, e succe explain can that factors additional to Turning

relatively rapid and and rapid relatively many

. state institutions and key officials key and institutions state The xistence of a strong national identity, different from the personal cult of the leader, Kcm nvr ely xse. eod te eln o ntoa aflain of affiliation national of feeling the Second, existed. really never Kuchma t

some . poiin leaders opposition

indeed indeed Stepanenko widespread other citizens] wanted to see it as an appendage of Russia”. National Russia”. of appendage an as it see to wanted citizens] other made helped toavoid aviolent on channels, [Ministry ofInternal Affairs], and military personnel

the option of a violent violent a of option the (2006, 575) nians to overcome their coordination problemcoordinationovercometheir to nians overnmental news

popular mobilization. As Kuzio concludes, “[c]ivil society “[c]ivil concludes, Kuzio As mobilization. popular the massive the had

adds that one of the primary reasons of such public (Kuzio, From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s Ukraine’s Yushchenko: to Kuchma From (Kuzio, ae otcs ih h law the with contacts made 35

already defected and took and defected already

post papers were supposed to publish the official scenario ss and failure of postcommunist electoral postcommunist of failure and ss - electoral protests in 2004. First, the cult the First, 2004. in protests electoral 20, 113) (2005, crackdown

(McFaul 2005,15) (McFaul . Th .

fvrd y Yanukovych by favored , ie on cites e defection or neutrality neutrality or defection e

Yushchenko’s side. side. Yushchenko’s - enforcing organs organs enforcing e ,

and of the Orange Orange the of .

contributed

By that that By ,

CEU eTD Collection 5 thepeacefulsignalized ofRevolution. theOrangeconclusion Square Independence legendary the on place took Yushchenko − res the to Yushchenko and Yanukovych intensified a ordered manipulation scale On the 13 Index i regime the to compared contestation political of also had information information While ERA Channel did not support Yushchenko out” came results official false the after Kyiv downtown in protests the of was available in many cities throughout Ukraine and “began running round opposition continued to have access to media broadcasting. regime’ played a crucial role of Yushchenko’s victory might not have been possible without the i

Reporters Without Borders data Without Borders Reporters .7 t Yanukovych to 5.27% n 2004 s informal control over control informal s

access to a popular newspaper Silski ults of the second round, this this round, second the of ults th rerun

day of the protest

uevso of supervision to a much larger audience that the was du 5 )

, but it couldnot , butit ig h cus o eet. ot motnl, R ws able was ERA importantly, Most events. of course the ring of t of

the winner of the s he second round second he ,

t a ipsil to impossible was it exposing exposing the fraud and updating the citizens on the latest events. Despite

. (no wonder Ukraine was placed on the 138 the on placed was Ukraine wonder (no

w wes later weeks Two Wy 2005b) (Way

s international , the Supreme Court of Ukraine finally

obtained almost all the major television networks and newspapers, the the newspapers, and networks television major the all almost have 2004 (also known as the ‘third round’) ‘third the as known (also be 51.99% and 44.20% en represented a change by +5.39% to Yushchenko and and Yushchenko to +5.39% by change a represented presidential presidential election .

In sum, sum, In silenced n local and , determine

h Cnrl lcin omsin declared Commission Election Central the Visti and 5 36 th

Channel did as blatantly .

poiin was opposition n rn of front in

h rsls f h elections. the of results the dominated the Internet as another arena observers. The results results The observers. O of the vote , it s

pposition (Hale 2005, 153) . Official inauguration did provide ndependent

huad o pol, which people, of thousands declared th certainly

- , which , Freedom Press in place respectively. Compared controlled

(McFaul 2005, 13) 2005, (McFaul relatively objective the mass media, which

that due to

. The opposition - was held under under held was c disadvantaged disadvantaged lock coverage hwd that showed

5th to T ceremon

he court court he Channel transmit transmit

large

that y - .

CEU eTD Collection 6 Europe” with line in laws and life that “Ukraine is building structures. Even Yanukovych, then supranational Western into integration for course their declared repeatedly had independence protests which is believed to be one of the most important factors behind the 2005) (Kuzio counterbalance have could and accountable, and transparent not was However election missions, monitoring and funding the independent mass media in exposing the fraud, e.g. through assisting with parallel vote calculation, running international for instance, resources, but also in the form of ideas and it Western aid throughout the years vote” presidential 2004 the to up leading years two the in Ukraine in government U.S. o influence external actual for his position told US conspiracies. democratic T

http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06KYIV4187.html he not

loser, loser, Viktor Yanukovych to

Ambassador William Taylor that (McFaul 2007) (McFaul , eoe fl dictatorship. full a become Russia Russia gave Yanukovych far more money than t breakthroughs

contributed to his As reveal . Also . ” 6 .

reportedly Similar Similar claims were , the West played no role in facilitating the splits in the coercive forces, coercive the in splits the facilitating in role no played West the , ed by i ed WikiLeaks, .

It is important to note tha note to important is It a state that is based on European values and will ensure it conducts its

n the Orange Revolution Orange the n n Serb in

“spent more than $18 million in electioninmillion $18 than more“spent

, domestic unpopularity.

always believed supported

a Goga ad Arab and Georgia, ia, - (Kuzio 2005, 30) 2005, (Kuzio prime minister of Ukraine, told Washington Times in 2004

Foreign also

n November 2006 declarations.

resident resident Yushchenko generally accepted in Russia

secure political 37

aid that that Ukrainian

t Ukraine’s officials since the first years of years first the since officials Ukraine’s t

, however, , xse nt ny n h fr o financial of form the in only not existed . Using regime’s declarations and formal formal and declarations regime’s Using . External

Western criticism of Kuchma’s regime he U.S. did. This funding, moreo countries competition in Ukraine and

then

events of 2004 as well as is sources also played a direct role

“ not that simple to assess. to simple that not - is obligated to Prime

peaceful peaceful conclusion of the were - related assistanceefforts related d

(McFaul 2007) (McFaul

the Western influence Western the (Kuzio (Kuzio 2005, 40) M

MFu 20, 48) 2007, (McFaul products of foreign foreign of products inister Yanukovych

the Americans .

similar similar helped helped . The The ver, ver, , .

CEU eTD Collection years. public population; was education Belarusian on spending whole the of 72% constituted population urban 2004 the indexes), use I so 2005, March in held was campaign (the election presidential infamous socio of level Belarus’ compare to help can indexes following The improved. definitely had situation the 2005, By Nations Development 2013) Programme m financial and management skills did not marketing allow Belarus to become of a successful member absence of the world economic and products local the of competitiveness weak with raw materials and energy resources (which the of deterioration w republics. The first decade of independence was characterized by significant economic distress, Overall, of the twelve republics of the Commonwealth of Independ richest the was it thougheven USSR, the of fall afterthe crisis economic deep afaced Belarus that time regime revolutionary a to lead not did elections presidential fraudulent Ukraine, of case the in Unlike 3 the o of favor in balance the tipped additionally have might They crucial. not were but Revolution, McFaul lever a had West the values, democratic to adherence .2. .2. hich included hich arket. In 2000, as many a many as 2000, In arket. 2006 Presidential2006 in Elections pposition, but it is difficult is butit pposition, to eau soe 0.804 scored Belarus change in Belarus in 2006. Letme 2006. in Belarus in change

Belarus’ socio Belarus’ , (2007)

and what impact they onthefinal had outcome.

hyperinflation concludes that external factors were indeed important for the Orange Orange the for important indeed were factors external that concludes

balance of payments of balance - - economic de economic economic conditions in 1990s were similar to those of other ex other of those to similar were 1990s in conditions economic s 41.9% s

equal to 5.9% of GDP; life exp life GDP; of 5.9% to equal in the Human Development Index and ranked ranked and Index Development Human the in , a decline in trade with trade in decline a , argue that

of Belarusians were living below the poverty line poverty the below living were Belarusians of velopment with that of Ukraine. In the year preceding the preceding year the In Ukraine. of that with velopment . Belarus

(World Bank 2007) Bank (World

exam were the basis of the country’s economy) combined

their role wastheir 38

ine

what were the conditions of the country at at country the of conditions the were what the former Soviet republics Soviet former the g oe Uries oetc politics. domestic Ukraine’s over age

ent States (CIS)

decisive. ectancy at birth was equal to 69 to equal was birth at ectancy . The rapid growth in prices for prices in growth rapid The .

(World (World Bank 1997) 64

n h world the in , a , nd overall overall nd

(United (United - Soviet Soviet .

CEU eTD Collection 8 7 countries postcommunist elections presidential 2005 in Development, and Reconstruction for Bank European the state as 2014) State of and alarge conduct didnot acreate necessary mark to basic economic reforms notinitiate base, butdid break the Following definitelycontributedLukashenka tothe popularity of ec unprecedented of situation the in held were elections presidential PPP 2005, In year. a was mainly a result of 7.4 of rate average an at grew GDP The growth. economic dynamic and steady showed finally Belarus 2006, and 2001 of years argua capitalism’, ‘wild considered he what to opposed as socialism’, ‘market of path the on country the launched Lukashenka Alyaksandr 1994, in Belarus of president only) the far so (and first the as elected being After democratization. so, Freedom Economic of according to the Corruption Perception Index 2007) Programme Development Nations (United

Index of Economic Freedom data Freedom IndexofEconomic data International Transparency

codn t te oenzto prdg, hud ae a be had have should paradigm, modernization the to according - owned companiowned . In 2006, most of the Belarusian economy remained under government control, government under remained economy Belarusian the of most 2006, In .

- - up of the USSR, Belarus retained a relatively well relatively a retained Belarus USSR, the of up — adjusted GNI per capita of Belarus was equal to $9,680. In sum, 2006 sum, In $9,680. to equal was Belarus of capita per GNI adjusted 8 industrial industrial sector .

es accounted for at least 75% of GDP of 75% leastaccounted atfor es the private sector share in Belarus GNI was the lowest of all the the all of lowest the was GNI Belarus in share sector private the As we can see, Belarus was even ahead of Ukraine in many respects, many in Ukraine of ahead even was Belarus see, can we As

(Freedom House 2006) House (Freedom -

scale privatization of its state ofscale privatization its

bly chosen by Russia by chosen bly % , ’s performance and reached a maximum of maximum a reached and 7 . Finally, 39

. Under such conditions, real business elites elites business real conditions, such Under . . It , which

’s lo akd 0 ot f 5 cou 157 of out 107 ranked also Belarus

regime.

- (Global Tenders 2012) Tenders (Global owned enterprises owned on average grew more than 8.7%

(Naūrodski2007)

got a score of 46.7 in the Index

9.9% — onomic progress, which which progress, onomic the year preceding the the preceding year the - in 2006. This gr This 2006. in developed industrial industrial developed tte et

(U.S. Department - prospects r based economy, economy, based . Accordingto . . Between the Between . ntries ntries o wth f or

CEU eTD Collection always contributed to coordination signal to the society. Overall, factional splits within the opposition movement have stronger much a sent have could result aggregated their candidate, one just on agreed leaders Social (Belarusian Kazulin Alyaksandr Democratic Party and Party), Democratic (Liberal Gaidukevich votes tobe dispersed. Democratic AlyaksandrMilinkievich (United ofBelarus), Forces Sergei not did Moreover, t persecution, arrest, andimprisonment anti and journalists, independent leaders, charges controversial o leader Seviarynec, Pavel Social Belarusian the of chairmen Statkievich, Mikalaj Siarhiej Skrabets, leader of the previous parliamentary opposition of the convocation,previous minist government former Marynich, Mikhail includes This arena. political national the from eliminated effectively were leaders opposition Moreover, Lukashenka used all available means to prepare for the electoral race. In 2005, many inthe up opposition 2012) profits own their the of behalf on enterprises some run They politics. national the in influence managed put to these elites completely under personal control, the to wherepoint they have no dif as completely areof named),but individuals be can Shakucin Alexander andCzyzhYury Peftiev, Uladzimir (such Belarus in exist still ‘oligarchs’ Certain emerge. to chance little had eet id hn hi Rsin n Uriin oneprs Lukashenka counterparts. Ukrainian and Russian their than kind ferent . Thus, Belarusian business elites clearly lacked incentives to defect and try to support the

agree on a single candidate. Such disunity of the oppo the of disunity Such candidate. single a on agree hose few opposition leaders that managed to participate in the , but are just replaceable managers, rather than independent actors independent than rather managers, replaceable just are but , ) obtained 6.2%, 3.5%, and 2.3% coming 2006elections.

the the weakness and disarray of democratic forces in the country Fedm os 2006) House (Freedom f the Young Front movement, who were arrested on highly highly on arrested were who movement, Front Young the f

(Freedom House(Freedom 2007) -

oenet ciit wo et hog ar through went who activists government 40 Ti i ol a io fato o ohr civil other of fraction minor a only is This . er and a potential candidate for presidency, presidency, for candidate potential a and er

of the vote respectively. Had the opposition - Democrat Party Narodnaya Gromada, Gromada, Narodnaya Party Democrat .

sition caused anti caused sition presidential elections

regime ’s

- Lukashenka regime has has regime

(Polity IV (Polity IV

(Bohdan (Bohdan

and for and bitrary bitrary CEU eTD Collection Lukashenka that demonstrate clearly terrorism of charges face could protesters peaceful violent a preparing of opposition the accusing by intimidation (Sector 2006) anticipated highly was crackdown brutal a Overall, president”. the behind stands government o quite are services security the because overcome, to obstacles […] many are “there that said Studies, International and Strategic for Center the at fellow senior a Mendelson, Sarah elections, 2006 follow to demonstrations the of beating leaders opposition of democratic instances documented continuously groups rights human 2006, of As (Freedom House 2007) public demonstrations did happen, police would typicall fromauthorization local authorities,who usuallypermissions.When withheld or revoked such security forces had been trained specifically to stop street demonstrations. Any protests required police new of Introduction president. the from Law on Interior Troops allowed for the discretionary use of firearms against protestors on orders purge and agencies enforcement law boosted Lukashenka 2005, In years. the throughout hardline increasingly grew rule repressive and dictatorial His apparatus. coercive Belarusian entire the subordinate services security country’s Europe 2006. in LukashenkaWhen came to power in 1994, he already close had links of Speaking of thewas opposition a 2010) .

What is most important for the future postelectoral protests, the weakness and disunity and weakness the protests, postelectoral future the for important most is What the regime’scharacter,the Belarus . In the d their ranks of potential dissenters. Newly introduced amendments to the to amendments introduced Newly dissenters. potential of ranks their d

weeks before the election, Belarusian security agencies . apparentn

Fedm os 2006) House (Freedom

problem formobili problem popular ’s

r egime would not refrain from using violence. Under violence. using from refrain not would egime au, n w dnt nw a] ht ere the degree what [at] know don't we and paque,

was by far the most repressive and violent state instate repressiveviolent and most the far bywas 41

atc wr as a indicator an also were tactics , which later might have helped him to to him helped have might later which ,

Fedm os 2007) House (Freedom y break them up and arrest participants . Commenting on the possibility of of possibility the on Commenting zation. coup

and warning that even even that warning and

created a c . All these facts facts these All .

ht t that with he he loud of state

the the

CEU eTD Collection Western by recognized were 2001 in elections presidential previous The will. popular of The 2006 e during the toestimate. elections difficult is 2006) (OSCE/ODIHR observation persons; of half unauthorized Almost protocols. results of with tampering presence and complaints of procedure; handling inappropriate official the of disregards as violations whi count, vote identical seemingly stations; the during worse even got situation The voting. multiple of signs polling and lists voter on signatures inside people unauthorized voting; group voters; Observation Election OSCE/ODIHR the by noted shortcomings Serious rigged. indeed were elections presidential the that doubt gover to response a were demonstrations These broke upthedemonst earlypolice On elections.Thursdaymorning the follow dayfourthto squarebythe the around people on Monday, around 3,000 on Tuesday. Only about 200 protesters remained concentrated demonstrations revolutions. color other of tradition the follow to color, blue the to reference somet wereevents These estimates outcome. election the with dissatisfaction independe of protest public biggest the caused still elections fraudulent 2006 the this, Notwithstanding any in participating from discouragement demonstrations. serious faced citizens the conditions, such

(Myers and Chivers 2006) Chivers and (Myers t eau. s on s h pls lsd pol wn t te tet saig their stating streets the to went people closed, polls the as soon As Belarus. nt lections lections were by far not the first example of Lukashenka’s large

reports assessed the transparency of the tabulation as either ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ ‘very or ‘bad’ either as tabulation the of transparency the assessed reports

in Belarus Belarus in ch often lacked even minimum transparency. Observers documented such such documented Observers transparency. minimum even lacked often ch ration and arrestedration participants. remaining . However, the objective magnitude of electoral fraud that took place place took that fraud electoral of magnitude objective the However, . imes named the Jeans Revolution, wheret Revolution, the Jeans named imes quickly dw quickly ,

Mission included violations of vote secrecy; pressure on on pressure secrecy; vote of violations included Mission gathered on Octobe on gathered indled. Each evening saw a smaller gathering smaller a saw evening Each indled.

Around 42

nmental voting manipulation, as manipulation, voting nmental

10,000 r Square in Minsk on Sunday night. night. Sunday on Minsk in Square r individuals

he word 'jeans' was used in in 'jeans'usedword washe ,

codn t various to according - scale manipulation However, the the However,

there is no no is there — 5,000 5,000

CEU eTD Collection 9 criticized newspapers deliver to refused service postal The opinions. alternative and news deliver Lukashenka Index Freedom Press 2005 their in countries) 167 of world the the of one as Belarus named Journalists Protect to Committee the 2006, In regime. the on pressure put would that protest a run to citizens the coordinate It is not less important that the opposition did not have media resources to expose the fraud and and coulda thus havebarrier fora prot been more numerous people, many discouraged probably (84.4%) Lukashenka and (6.2%) Milinkievich candidate probably quite significant. However, the huge gap between the official results of the opposition of violations scale reported by international observers, electoral manipulation at the 2006 e the and above, demonstrated as referendums, and elections previous manipulate impossi it makes which allowed, were polls independent no that is elections 2006 with problem The that onlya gave answerat positive voters 54.4% ofthe plebiscite conductedthe officialpoll byGallup an exit results, The supported voters the for run to Lukashenkaallowed that initiative of government’s 86% that stated Commission Election Central The referendum. occurre manipulation Similar respectively. Hancharyk and Lukashenka However, 15%. independent nongovernmental exit polls reported strikingly different only figures: 47% and 41% for Hancharyk Uladzimir leader opposition the while vote, the of 75% Lukashenk results, official to According well. as fair nor free neither as observers

Reporters ble toevaluate the magnitudeof fraud.Lukashenka’s However, based on propensity to

Without Borders data Without Borders the government; the state distribution agency distribution state the government; the (Mahoney 2006) (Mahoney s eie ae t ery mosbe o idpnet n opsto mda to media opposition and independent for impossible nearly it made regime ’s

. Reporters Without Borders placed Belarus on the 152 the on Belarus placed Borders Without Reporters .

9 . In the months surrounding the election, the surrounding months the In . made it illegal to illegal it made Organization/Baltic Surveysreported his est.

third term in 2006. Contrary to Contraryto 2006. in term third ten most censored countries in in countries censored most ten

(Freedom House 2006)

drn te 2004 the during d sell such p such lections was nd a received received a place (out (out place apers on on apers that that .

CEU eTD Collection 10 collecti Soviet on based is and language, as such features, ethnic Belarusian discarded it instance, for ways: many in peculiar is identity national This Ideology corneras stone. thestate’s of part indispensable in life political Belarusian an became officially mobilization This 1994. authoritarian of since process consolidation the to with hand in hand went mobilization national Belarusian pro in solely formed was and policies se per leader the of cult a not is It Lukashenka. ide strong national identity that could exist separately from the incumbent’s personal cult. National mobilize to society Belarusian the for difficult it made that factor Another Internetashad 2%of regular thepopulation few as that suggested estimates other while web, wide world the to access had population the used Internet then: Internationalthe Telecommunications Union reported that less than 10% of control of the State Center on Information Security. Moreover, not man TheInternet impact of asa media was tool also very As of2006,web limited. were sites under views, opposition as situation, difficult more Belarusian national eventelevision was completely under control of the state and did not provide for in was media Broadcasting newspapers. independent wor 2007) Protect Journalists pressure government under them print to refused houses printing newsstands;

although he is often referred to as Father to referred he isoften although ology does, however, exist in the country, but it is strongly fused with the person of of person the with fused strongly is it but country, the in exist however, does, ology s Blrsa’ n ‘national’ and ‘Belarusian’ ds and all FM . A2005

March 2003, when the president formally recognized the National the recognized formally president the when 2003, March

radio were stations censored

presidential decree banned private media from media private decree banned presidential

—

in their titles, which strongly affected three prominent prominent three affected strongly which titles, their in ‘Batska’ of the nation the ‘Batska’of - uahna em. Leshchenko terms. Lukashenka access 44 10

, but resulted from the president’s intentional president’s the from resulted but ,

(Freedom House 2006)

vist principles applied to Belarusian to applied principles vist (Freedom House 2006) (Freedom House y Belarusian could have (2008) .

is the absence of a a of absence the

(Committee to to (Committee including

. oie that notices

the the CEU eTD Collection the of eyes population. the in opposition the delegitimize further to Lukashenka allowed and results country’s democratic opposition forces. Such attempts, however, did not lead to any meaningful another means ofinfluencingthe political game inBelarus, particular in th find to attempted organization and states Western policy. domestic Belarusian on leverage engagement “no Martynau, Syarhei Belarus of Minister Foreign the of words the In requirements. democratic 2008) (Leshchenko model Belarusianof jealousand factintolerant in wasWest the that argued once Lukashenka uniqueness. and sovereignty country’s the to threat a is it as agenda, Belarus of years part a not first is integration his European that declared Since always Lukashenka framework. presidency, developmental European the of out opt to country (2008) of cracking at the 2006 elections is its disenga Lukashenka why anotherreason Yet protest national simple in terms thatcould have resonance broad in o Belarus conditions, such Under state. the by cultivated that participating in anti of defending the state from a during the Second World War, where partisans are portrayed as people who make a noble effort national sovereignty and statehood. The founding myth relies primarily on the partisan struggle , the Belarusian president conducted foreign policy in such a way that it enabled the enabled it that way a such in policy foreign conducted president Belarusian the ,

— o influe no . International isolation allowed him to completely disregard Western Western disregard completely to him allowed isolation International . - Lukashenka protests would be contrary to the national Belarus nce” n external aggressor

Mryo 2002) (Martynov ’s

regime has been so stable and did not show even a sign sign aeven show not did and stable so been has regime

gement gement with the West. According to Leshchenko 45

(Leshchenko (Leshchenko 2008, 1420) . The West, therefore, lost any effective effective any lost therefore, West, The . pposition had hard times framing a a framing times hard had pposition

the

of economic developmenteconomic of

society. ough supportingthe . . The bottom line is

identity of of ’

CEU eTD Collection to regime overthrow insome performance. countries the that Belarus, with 9.9% growth rate in 2006, did not drag much behind. with Europe in economy growing fastest the was Ukraine 2004, in the mids elections regime’s of Speaking advancedare countries mor respects very similar positions. In leve and expectancy, life education, on expenditure Development Human as development of process 90s; the in economies their fix to trying times hard had quite similar. Both countries faced a severe economic crisis after the collapse of the USSR; both be significant. th from start me Let case, electoralan theother. unsuccessful and in protest factors that accounts for the variation of their outcomes: a successful electoral revolution in one in considerably differed part theoretical the in identified factors The 2006. and 2004 in elections presidential Belaru and Ukraine .

, Therefore, my expectation based on modernization theory that socio that theory modernization on based expectation my Therefore, the citizens of

t of a remarkable economic progress tbe cnmc rwh n 2001. in growth economic stable

Thus, this Thus,

In terms of the level of socio the two postcommunist countries, and countries, postcommunist two the e factors that, at least based on based least at that, factors e ee ey similar very were s were in different conditions at the outset of of outset the at conditions different in were s

cnmc performance economic Ukraine and Belarus factors

fact e elexperience likelyan to

, postcommunist

Belarus was even

do Chapter4 es

not seem to seem not

n em o ter eie’ short regimes’ their of terms in In - economic development, Ukraine and Belarus were e, hr o ubn ouain governmental population, urban of share dex,

countries had little to complaint about.

46 n em o sc idctr o socio of indicators such of terms In . , and there were no signs of possible decline.

slightly

Findings specifically be able be

these two case studies, did not turn not did studies, case two these l of corruption the two countries were in were countries two the corruption of l ectoral revolution was not met. ectoral not revolution was

but not inth but not I argue that it is the difference in difference the is it that argue I

ahead of its southern neighbor explain why explain and both and

t h tm of time the at All of this

e others. the growth rate of 12.1%. 12.1%. of rate growth the finally electoral fraud converts converts fraud electoral respective

Both Both countries

managed to start a a start to managed

allows

- the term economic economic term - economically

presidential presidential

to conclude - fraudulent fraudulent economic

in some

out to out these these were In

CEU eTD Collection Yushch support and defect to chose them of many interest, business indep elite political of became of the country’s the factor of theory. concerning Ukraine and Belarus were two completely different cases. The former was much more advanced socio of level the Besides Ukraine. didin it shortcomings and were people few very Thus, audience. large a to accessible gove the of critical censorship. media bysevere backed was Kuchma’s,it with do following consequently Lukashenk Georgiy why a wrong, relativelysecure are performancethey t when assume breakdown regime of theories The

regime’s popularity is not based solely on its e Ukrainian endently of his will. When they realized that Yanukovych’s presidency could harm their their harm could presidency Yanukovych’s that realized they When will. his of endently it it seems that

The d e prom al economically badly perform hey prominent figures prominent the presence of other of presence the Gongadze a

’s akt ieaiain n privatization and liberalization market unity/defection unity/defection of regime’ egree ofmarket andegree liberalization privatization

eie a n ls repressive, less no was regime society became society large

were not completely subordinated to Kuchma, and were capable of acting acting of capable were and Kuchma, to subordinated completely not were , and so the overall popularity of the regime did not suffer as significantl as suffer not did regimethe of popularityoverall the so and , ’s murder ’s rnment was very limited very was rnment the reason why Ukrainian case does not go in accord with econ Kuchma omic enterprises, w

in the domestic political game. political domestic the in - cnmc eeomn ad short and development economic

was

factors

so ’s ex ’s perhaps dissatisfi . ample. The reason The ample. . While . s political elites. While Lukashenka While

the most prominent most the ,

ed with Kuchma’ with ed that authoritarian regimes are are regimes authoritarian that

hra drn te ie o go economic good of times the during whereas hich hich were privatized

in Belarus in 2005 in Belarus in 47 just conomic conomic performance. There

and thus should should thus and

two case studies cannot casestudies two — the The number of media sources that were were sourcesthat media of numberThe Ukraine’s oligarchs why

’s f The actor derived from modernization modernization from derived actor

actually

regime was regime turned out

s it did not, in my opinion, opinion, my in not, did it se

rule of them of - term economic performance, performance, economic term

, and existing one existing and , oligarchs during ae en noua too, unpopular been have case the and ,

aware of aware enko, as it was indeed indeed was it as enko,

. to beclosely relatedto

One might argue that argue might One the more more prove this assertion assertion this prove and other members members other and emerged as more were other reasons 19

the regime’s 90s, and repressive

theory is likely to fall fall to likely of s

journalist journalist were not were

owners owners further further crimes has to to has than than y as yas that

CEU eTD Collection wisely andreasons one was ofthe surviving capacity why theregime’s undermined. was First, pose to Even though confidence action problem conditions, such Under dispersed. ca which candidate, single a on agree not did and selfishly acted it to threat elections 2006 presidential race. protests showed theory A important for understanding a liberalization privatization/market coopt to manage they as long as safe are of) example an is Belarus (which dictatorships personal that states which no opposition, on dependent completely managers, appointed than Lukashenka more no fact, in are, Belarus in that few Those Belarus coverage theory the by suggested

factor is the strength , in turn, did not privatize its enterprises, so economic elites had little chance to emerge. as , enough hs atr o e ey infcn fr h otoe f h pscmuit electoral postcommunist the of outcome the for significant very be to factor this

that was derived derived was that for it, and even to evenfor and it, s continuity s

in s administration ’s i around lliberal regimes in Ukraine and Belarus faced different challenges during the the during challenges different faced Belarus and Ukraine in regimes lliberal

the people, who thus were not willing to engage in risky protests in their behalf. behalf. their in protests risky in engage to willing not were thus who people, the r ,

to join the protests

do probably Lukashenka pressure on the regime. the on pressure The The op exist are very different from their Ukrainian counte Ukrainian their from different very are exist

10 and and popularity . Those opposition leaders that managed to participate in the elections the in participate to managed that leaders opposition Those . and ,000 ,000 individuals participated in the demonstrations, this was not enough . position position in Belarus was disunited and weak. During the years preceding

even Such individuals Such from keep their elites under control. under elites their keep ok direct part the in

’s the success revolutions. electoral of A a eut te nihr ee aal o spotn the supporting of capable were neither they result, a As .

wanted to wanted regime persecuted and arrested many individuals that posed a posed that individuals many arrested and persecuted regime

both . The weakness of opposition candi many of the op

d iuiydfcin f eies lts indeed elites regime’s of disunity/defection nd theories of regime breakdown regime of theories

In turn, the turn, In defect citizens citizens

backed the opposition financially, opposition the backed position 48 . postelectoral protest

This goes in a p a in goes This had no incentive no had . opposition in opposition The case studies of Ukraine and Belarus

Thus, a Thus,

erfect accord with the theory, theory, the with accord erfect u s we can see can we s

sed anti sed

to . Ukraine acted much more more much acted Ukraine

dates did not inspire much and the collective action action collective the and overcome the collective the overcome rparts. Big businessmen Big rparts. - regime votes to be be to votes regime

pro , the factor the , vided media media vided s are

of of

CEU eTD Collection to media no is there If protest. a in participating individuals of thousands of hundreds on pressure put can that elites economic of members or leaders opposition the not is it Ultimately, theory. action collective the from factor Another suchprotests cracks andthe lead there But of people inaprotest. wa would participate not factors to unleash. Lukashenka’s regime did, in fact, have some cracks, otherwise ten thousand him. explicitly winner, supporting possible inarisky of campaign they otherwise wouldnotengage regime. the defect to decision elite’s in role key facilitated opponent strong a facing not w Yanukovych popular, less significantly been had he If support. popular Yushchenko’s of level the is place theoretically. wer these that argue to further even rule. Kuchma’s of fall the in role important played As predicted by the theory of regime breakdown, elite T business mentioned already assured problem action collective lower than in for thepeople was them for participation of cost perceived the result, a As victory. final the in confidence opposit the Second, counterparts. hisBelarusian supportthan public of degree higher aYushchenkoenjoyed much herefore, t In Belarus, w InBelarus, some hey The reason why Kuchma’s regime had to engage in large in engage to had regime Kuchma’s why reason The ould have won even free even won have ould which played a crucial role is role crucial a played which

had a strong incentive a strong had other factors behind the success of the revolution. Strong opposition play opposition Strong revolution. the of success the behind factors other e do not see not do e ion camp included many prominent prominent many included camp ion

of joining the protests the joining of

Belarus, and uptoamillion

. liaey te tegh n pplrt o te opposition the of popularity and strength the Ultimately, ). such to asuccessful conclusion.

strong and decisive opposit decisive and strong elites e to support theopposition to support

the most most the and fair and

the regime up to the point where it collapses, but but collapses, it where point the to up regime the that defection, that an access to access an 49

elections (as Kuchma (as elections The elites truly perceived Yushchenko as a a as Yushchenko perceived truly elites The The o The crucial

Based on the two case studies, case two the on Based s’

defection

verall strength of the opposition also also opposition the of strength verall Ukrainians successfully overcame t s no strong opposition to make to s nostrong opposition

politicians independent mass media, as derived as media, mass independent factor in fact in

, which ion, which did not allow other other allow not did which ion, s and strength of the opposition , was ,

out of the ten I identified identified I ten the of out , who increased people’s people’s increased who ,

- they did eventually a reasonable decision. decision. reasonable a did in 1994 and 1999 and 1994 in did scale fraud in the first first the in fraud scale I would I inform inform

use of use of ed a ed .

go he he ,

CEU eTD Collection w obtained have could Lukashenka fair, and free been had indirectthatifelection wereallowed,polls evidence but suggests the race; existnot Belarus in vo cases both in that conclude can we observers, international results, poll exist on based but, some countries but character as other The media toeffectively re undermine is no strong and popular opposition important masses. the coordinate station radio some as well as channels television silenced been have not could it but regime, the to compared disadvantaged also Ukrainewas in opposition the doubt, any Beyond of deprivation and injustice, ass opposition did not have enough media sources to expose the fraud and tri line isthatthe The copies.newspaperseither bottom circulated wereinverylimited banned or could and masses n the was Internet to regime; accessible the of control strict under was media broadcasting All people. transmitting of mechanisms limited very had opposition Belarusian e identity and hich ting falsification ting gather these people, all other factors (international influence, magnitude of fraud, national national fraud, of influence,magnitude (international factors other all people, gatherthese theory of theory

real alternative to the incumbent

would have led to the second round and could have produced a different result.

tc.) are in vain. vain. in are tc.) factor behind the electoral revolution electoral the behind factor

collective

factor

. InUkraine . not in the others.

e, e Yet, action also points also action that could explain why The reason why similar fraud led to different outcomes is that that is outcomes different to led fraud similar why reason The .

Ultimately, t e tog acs t te ei sucs a obviously was sources media the to access though ven exit polls testified that Yushchenko was a legitimate winner of of winner legitimate a Yushchenkowas that testified polls exit ociated with stolen elections. with stolen ociated regime’s regime’s gime’s stability andgime’s stability produce change. political

The objective magnitude of fraud is not easy to determine, the way it was in Belarus in was it way the .

Only a strong and united opposition can use independent not

previous propensity to manipulate, and reports of of reports and manipulate, to propensity previous serve to here is not much use isnot here

50 the magnitude of fraud of magnitude the , I believe I ,

electoral fraud as s

and print media to expose the fraud and and fraud the expose to media print and a tool of communication; independent independent communication; of tool a

less than 50% of the vote the of 50% than less media’s

incumbents . Yushchenko’s te Yushchenko’s .

converts converts into regime change

independent media if role

and regime’s repressive repressive regime’s and this

gger gger the popular sense still

engaged in ma in engaged nomto t the to information inferior

am used two two used am

— However, to that of that to a result result a

there there ssive ssive an an in in ot CEU eTD Collection Belarusians. were constructed turn, In regions. different in lived and languages different spoke that backgrounds, other and religious occupations, classes, different from entire citizens examples good be to appear Belarus and Ukraine in protests pop consciousness This differen major Another on theregime. of participation. This anticipated highly was protest with possible a of crackdown ‘men of defection of option the excluded which control, his under completely was apparatus coercive the Moreover, demonstrations. against force he them. against used be to going not wasforce that people assuredthe neutral or support their enlisted and forces coercive with negotiate to the perceived and Lukashenka’sand Kuchma’s regime why electoral major manipulati reason the is This figures. the to access an have not did Ukraine, in unlike Belarus, in people ld in a in ld ular supportthanthe their

not able to frame a protest in anti in protest a frame to able not theoretical society. By appealing to them, the opposition managed to of repressive character repressive completely

Ukraine had a set of common values and symbols that resonat that symbols and values common of set a had Ukraine so as to not allow anti allow not to as so

cost of participation in the protests was rather low. Also, the opposition managed

that that factor exists

possibly prevented different pooe by proposed , c

e between the two countries has countries two the between e ones independently of the incumbent s

with weak orincumbent . People in Ukraine were not used to clashes with police, and so andpolice, with clashes to used not were Ukraine in People . on did not leadon didnot tolarge inBelarus 2006. in protests atmosphere. - Lukashenka s

differed considerablywith - Way, Lukashenka terms that would be understandable to all to understandable be would that terms Lukashenka

many people Lukashenka suggests that countries with a strong national national strong a with countries that suggests 51 movements

- from the national ideology in Belarus was was Belarus in ideology national the oriented national Postelectoral identity. , which dramatically increased the cost cost the increased dramatically which , ’s

normally have easier time mobilizing

to do with do to regime had a long long a had regime . taking

As a result, the opposition leaders opposition the result, a As

gather a great number of people to illustrate this assertion. this illustrate to

regards theuse ofviolence to

to the streets

us. Overall, guns’. Election

the ity ir , which additionally additionally which ,

national identities national ed throughout the the throughout ed s in record of usin of record

to Belarus wereBelarus

put pressure

a violent violent a The The g . CEU eTD Collection factorexplaining successofelectoral of revolutions. and Belarus differe exposing the fraud, funded the opposition and independent mass media. Thus, the way Ukraine Ukraine in competition on pressure put to values democratic to completely different. was Ukraine in situation The forces. opposition Belarusian help to manage not did also actors to completely Western disregard democratic requirements. that clear it made Lukashenka externalcountries degree influence. different of Belarus, experienced twoa as the Thisassertion Ukr wascomparativeopposition. supported indeed bycase of the study the supporting or incumbent, the on pressure putting by either stability, regime’s undermining Finally, regime br eakdown eakdown theory suggested that foreign actors European integr European d in this respect allows to conclude that foreign influence is also an important The West used West Kuchma’s The Yanukovych’s andadherence and declarations

throughout the years, assisted with parallel vote calculations and and calculations vote parallel with assisted years, the throughout ation was not a part of Belarus’ agenda, which allowed him him allowed which agenda, Belarus’ of part a not was ation

the regime. External sources also supported political supported also sources External regime. the 52

Du e to regime’s closeness, e could

play an important role in

aine and aine and xternal xternal CEU eTD Collection whereas theprotests Belarus in failed experience Ukraine as example, negative a and positive in Ukraine in elections reason this For Next mass media. of magnitude violence; use to propensity regime’s regime; short poor identity; national strong influence; foreign liberalization; disunity/defection of the regime’s elite; strength and popularity of the opposition; similar otherwise in outcomes different for accountable be could which factors ten suggested theories pr postelectoral of conclusion successful and occurrence determine factors different how of explanation clear collective action theory. relevant My approach to addressing this puzzle was twofold. First, I selected three theories that are bemust other variables overthrow. Given that the place alt manipulation electoral followed protest no many in place postcommunist states, but not all taken of them experienced an electoral revolution. In some has manipulation vote However, countries. these in regimes protests in S the of beginning a was It elections. stolen is revolution electoral an of feature defining The Conclusion ,

but were not successful; I wanted wanted to check contexts

to the subject matter of electoral of matter subject the to erbia, G

otests. I ,

lvl f socio of level :

took the second step and conducted a case study of rigged presidential presidential rigged of study case a conducted and step second the took eorgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan S

that s

crutinized through the prism of successful postelectoral protests, the the protests, postelectoral successful of prism the through crutinized 2004 and in Belarus in 2006. This pair of countries features both a a both features countries of pair This 2006. in Belarus in and 2004 I believe ignificance of these defining

explain and only in a few - cnmc eeomn; ere f rvtzto and privatization of degree development; economic that aonly feature such

to bring about change about to bring variation o variation

(rigged (rigged el revolutions: modernization, regime breakdown, and and breakdown, regime modernization, revolutions:

ten theor 53 countries countries did ogether;

factors y - ection) in these countries was similar, there f the based ,

that , which

- n other in outcomes.

term economic performance of the the of performance economic term further

framework d .

electoral fraud convert into regime

fraud; and ac and fraud; full a

could

s lead to breakdown of illiberal ,

- otlcoa protest postelectoral

cl eetrl revolution electoral scale be done

can provide a coherent a cess to independent independent to cess

only empirically.

of of the

market

other most most took m , ,

CEU eTD Collection (e.g. research previous t believe that though Even provide a more clear picture of the causes o could framework theoretical sophisticated more A consideration. into them take well could the factors they would produce are the same as the three theories revolutionary, agenda theories Alternative protests. postelectoral successful of factors the derive to used I theories of number small a is thesis the of limitation Another robustness tested if alarger against of number cases analysis thorough more a conduct of constraint the Ultimately, world. real the cases empirical against factors derived theoretically test peremptory conclusions. However, The explanatory variables appear however, factors, eight other The others. the in not but countries economic performance failed to explain why rigged elections lead to regime breakdown is some socio respects) some in Ukraine of ahead slightly even my expectati development be to proportional expected I particular, In revolutions. electoral of antecedents t Comparing he explan

co - cnmc development economic mparative atory factors atory the on

ee ae soe ta n that showed cases hese ute rsac could research further

s preliminary

were not mer. T

case

- of successfulof postelectoral protests

setting, setting, and diffusion theories, to name a few.

study I identified were based on theoretical investigation, theoretical on based were identified I by McFaul, D’Anieri, Beissinger) D’Anieri, McFaul, findings I conducted is obviously not sufficient basis to make final and and final make to basis sufficient not obviously is conducted I

a nt motn. n h sm wy rgm’ short regime’s way, same the In important. not was to the likelihood ofto the likelihood electoral he two countries were very similar in this respect n Id o xet yrsls o eesrl od their hold necessarily to results my expect not do I and , it it did

I obtained

well t all ot indeed address f f electoral revolutions in the world.postcommunist 54 pc ad et o te hss did thesis the of depth and space

are important and contributive to the field f the of serve the purpose. It allowed

, which allow which ,

hs and this .

hoeia fcos r, n at strong fact, in are, factors theoretical , .

and demonstrate and

that lacked theoretical foundation. foundation. theoretical lacked that

may include social movement, movement, social include may

so revolution in a givencountry,revolution a in but e iiain o ti thesis, this of limitations me s to s

the the actually used conclude that t that conclude Even ee o socio of level

ed though how they matter in in matter they how

unlike most of the of most unlike

me to be meaningful be to , future research to preliminary

(Belarus (Belarus was I believe that o alw to allow not he - economic

factor . - First, t erm erm

of of

CEU eTD Collection scientificallypredict use be preliminary testing can well be used for the researchfuture relevance in understanding electoral revolut investigatio empirical to submitted also were obtained I results Theoretical d not only to retrospectively to only not d

the likelihood of electoral revolution in a ofelectoralin given revolution the likelihood

explain ions in the postcommunist world, and r

success of past of success 55

Finally, Finally, the factors I identified can postelectoral postcommunist postcommunist

protest n to test their their test to n s esults of , but a but , country. lso to lso this

CEU eTD Collection 2013. Dagikhudo. Dagiev, 2007. Journalists. Protect to Committee Democracy." of Determinants Economic "The 2008. R. William Clark, 1991. Dennis. Chong, Stoner Kathryn and McFaul, Michael Valerie, Bunce, of Diffusion The Dictators: Down "Bringing 2007. Wolchik. Sharon and Valerie, Bunce, Electoral "I and 2006b. Wolchik. L Sharon and J, Valerie Bunce, Conditions "Favorable 2006a. Wolchik. L Sharon and J, Valerie Bunce, 2011. Wolchik. L Sharon and J, Valerie Bunce, Political and Regimes "Neopatrimonial 1994. Walle. de Van Nicolas and Michael, Bratton, 2012. Siarhei. Bohdan, Blokker, Bermeo, Regime Nancy. Change." 1990."Rethinking Bennett, Brian. 2011. The Phenomena: Political Modular in Example and "Structure 2007. R. Mark Beissinger, Åslund, Anders. 2000. "Why Has Ukraine Failed to Achieve Revolution." Economic Growth?" Orange the after Ukraine of Policy Economic "The 2005. Anders. Åslund, Bibliography Revolutions." Postcommunist Countries. Transitions Africa." in http://belarusdigest.com/s Europe." Hurst and Company. 259 Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revol 255 Agend Unfinished The Ukraine: in Reform GeographyEconomicsEurasian and cesd a 3, 04 https://cpj.org/2007/02/attacks Change inTajikistanPolitical andUzbekistan. 2014. 30, belarus.php. May Accessed Comparative Politic of Chicago Press. Press. World. Postcommunist the in Authoritarianism Democratic and PostcommunistEurope inCommunist and Change Electoral Revolutions."

al 20. "Post 2005. Paul. - - 276. M. E.Sharpe.277. Armonk, NY:

European Journal of Social Theory, of European Journal

Journal ofDemocracy The Last Dictatorship in Europe: Belarus under Lukashenko. Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Rights Civil the and Action Collective Are There Any Oligarchs In Belarus? In Oligarchs AnyThere Are

- s

eie rniin n eta Ai: ttns, ainls and Nationalism Stateness, Asia: Central in Transition Regime Communist Modernization, Transition Studies, and Diversity in in Diversity and Studies, Transition Modernization, Communist , by Clark W, Golder, by ClarkGolder Matt W, Sona.CQPress. and World Politics Communist andPost Communist tory/are

New York:University Cambridge Press. - there tak o te rs 20: Belarus. 2006: Press the on Attacks

17 (4): 5 17 (4): 46 (5): 327

46 (4): 453 56 - any

a - , by Anders Åslund and Georges de Ménil, de Georges and Åslund Anders by , nternational Diffusion and Postcommunist and Diffusion nternational oligarchs -

Communist Studies - 8 (4): 503 Comparative Politics Comparative 18.

New York:New Routledge. eetn Authoritarian Defeating - utions." utions." – 353.

489. abig: abig University Cambridge Cambridge: - -

es. 2010. Weiss.

May 1. Accessed May 29, 2014. 2014. 29, May Accessed May1. belarus

- 525. Perspectives on Politics

- 9069.

283

Chicago: Unive Chicago: -

Eurasia." on

22 (3): 359

- Democracy and and Democracy 304. In

- the Principles of of Principles

In -

February 5. 5. February

press edr in Leaders London: C.

Economic Economic - - 377.

2006 5 (2): rsity rsity

- CEU eTD Collection Regime Lukashenka the of Basis the and Ideology National "The 2008. Natalia. Leshchenko, "Nationalism, 2010. Taras. Kuzio, Kuzio, Taras. 2005. "From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and Kuhn, Patrick. 2010. "Fraud, Coordination Problems, and Successf Klandermans, 1997. Bert. Ishikawa, Shigeru. 2008. "Comparison of African and Asian Development Models: For Mutual Democratize." Countries "How 1991. P. Samuel Huntington, Post in Revolution and Autocracy Democracy, Cycles: "Regime 2005. E. Henry Hale, 1995. Kaufman. R Robert and Stephan, Haggard, Theory." Revolutionary of Generation Fourth a "Toward 2001. A. Jack Goldstone, 2012. Tenders. Global Theoretic Game a of Test Empirical Breakdown: "Authoritarian 1999. Barbara. Geddes, — 2006. House. Freedom Fearon, James D. 2011. "Self Dix, Robert H. 1982. "The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes." Regimes." Hybrid About "Thinking 2002. Larry. Diamond, Kuchma." under Ukraine Domination: State of Tool a as "Blackmail 2001. A. Keith Darden, D'A 2007. . nieri, Paul. 2006. "Explaining the Success and Failure of Post of Failure and Success the "Explaining 2006. Paul. nieri, Eurasia." Transitions. Review Science Political of http://www.globaltenders.com/ Argument." http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom (4): 1661 35 (4): 554 35. East EuropeanConstitutiona andPost Communist ac. cesd a 5 2014. 5, in Belarus." Orange Revolution." May the Orange Revolution." ElectoralCompetitive Autocracies." Accessed http://www.fasid.or.jp//_files/e_publication_discussion/1/DP_14_E.pdf. March. Kingdom." United the and Japan Between Policies Development International of Understanding (4):

579 - 616. reo Hue 07 report. 2007 House Freedom - World Politics 1708. -

Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development (FASID Development International on Studies Advanced for Foundation 573.

Europe Princeton: Pri

The Social Psychologyof Protest. - Asia Studies Asia - reo Hue 06 report. 2006 House Freedom - Communist andPost Communist Communist Studies En

cnm o Belarus. of Economy 58 (1): 133 forcing Democracy." Problems Post of nceton University Press.

4: 139 Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine: Understanding the the Understanding Ukraine: in Society Civil and Identity l Review economy

60 - 187. -

(8): 1419 165.

10 (2 57

belarus.htm.

39 (3): 331 - - Communist Studies Communist Communism - 3): 67 - - - The Quarterly Journal of Economics world/2007/belarus. world/2006. h Pltcl cnm o Democratic of Economy Political The 1433.

71.

cesd a 3, 20 30, May Accessed

Journal of Democracy of Journal Oxford: Publishers. Blackwell 350.

cesd ue , 2014. 7, June Accessed Political Science Quarterly Science Political

52 (2): 29 Accessed May 30, 2014. 2014. 30, May Accessed

ul Post Western Political Quarterly - Communist Revolutions." Communist

43 (3): 285 - – Electoral Protests on

44.

- 296.

13 (2): 21 (2): 13

Annual Annual - Soviet

106 106 126

14. ). -

CEU eTD Collection Revolutsii." 'Oranzhevoy' k Shla Ukraina "Kak 2005. Mikhail. Pogrebynsky, and Patrimonialism "Rethinking 2009. Johnston. Michael and Moran, H Mary Anne, Pitcher, — Final 2006: March 19 Election, Presidential "Belarus, 2006. OSCE/ODIHR. O in Politics Warlord Barons? Robber or Nation the of "Saviours 2005. Kirill. Nourzhanov, Belarus." in Entreprises Medium and Small of Potential "The 2007. Sierž. Naūrodski, 2006. Chivers. J Christopher and L, Steven Myers, Orange the on Influences External Democracy: Imports "Ukraine 2007. Michael. McFaul, McFaul, Michael. 2005."Transitions from Postcommunism." Maxwell, McCombs, Lukashenka The Politics: Clan of Ocean an in Island Populist "A 2004. Kimitaka. Matsuzato, Start." Fresh afor Time Belarus:and"The EU 2002. Martynov, Sergei. 2006. Rob. Mahoney, Lipset, Seymour M. 1963. of Rise The Democracy: Without "Elections 2002. Way. A Lucan and Steven, Levitsky, 'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C Schmitter. 1986. Schmitter. C Philippe and Guillermo, 'Donnell, . 2004. "Ukraine, Presidential Election, Second Round, 21 November 2004: Preliminary Preliminary 2004: November 21 Round, Second Election, Presidential "Ukraine, 2004. . etr o Sca ad cnmc Research. Economic Brief_Sierz_website_0.pdf. and Social http://www.case for Center =all&_r=0. Vote. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/20/international/europe/20belarus.html?pagewanted Presidential Revolution." 19. Lawrence Associates. Erlbaum World." Regime as an among Exception CIS Countries." &Between Moscow Brussel http://cpj.org/2006/05/charting Competetive Authoritarianism." cesd a 2, 2014. 29, May Optima. Dokumenty Khronika, Versii, Revolutsiya. Neop http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/16565?download=true. Accessed Stateme http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/belarus/19395?download=true. Human and Rights. Office forDemocraticInstitutions Democracies. University Press. Uncertain about Conclusions Tentative Tajikistan."

atrimonialism inAfrica."atrimonialism

nt."

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Central AsianSurveyCentral ei E Media International Security and Amy Reynolds. 2002. "News Influence On Our Pictures of The The of Pictures Our On Influence "News 2002. Reynolds. Amy and The world's most censored countries. censored most world's The -

research.eu/sites/default/files/publications/16005024_E Political Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. ﬀ

ect s b Jnig Byn ad of ilan 1 Zillmann, Dolf and Bryant Jennings by ,

ac 2. A 20. March s , byLondon: KoganLewis. Page. Ann -

African Studies Review the Journal ofDemocracy

24 (2): 109 24 (2): -

planets 32 (2): 45 58

- . 10 , by Mikhail Pogrebynsky, 106 Pogrebynsky, Mikhail by , - - - 130. 83. deepest rtses hre ru i Belarus in Fraud Charge Protesters Europe Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Rule: Authoritarian from Transitions

ccessed May 25, 2004. 2004. 25, May ccessed

pi. Acce April.

May 4. Accessed May 31, 2014. 2014. 31, May Accessed 4. May

Journal ofDemocracy June 7.Accessed June 30, 2006. May 52 (1): 125 information

13 (2): 51 13 (2): - Asia Studies

atmr: on Hopkins Johns Baltimore:

Garden City: Doubled

In - - sd 2, 2014. 29, 5 ssed 65. - 156. The EU &EU BelarThe

voids.php.

56 (2): 235 56 (2):

Report."

- - November 22. 16. Mahwah: Mahwah: 16. Oranzhevaya Oranzhevaya - 118. Kyiv: Kyiv: 118.

16 (3): 5

CASE CASE OSCE - 261. us: us: ay. - -

CEU eTD Collection Buildi State "Authoritarian 2005a. A. Lucan Way, — — 2005." DevelopmentReport "Human 2005. Programme. Development Nations United U.S. Department of State. 2014. Post and Problems, Action Collective Fraud, Electoral "Enough! 2007. A. Joshua Tucker, Tilly, Charles 1991." Since Economy Ukraine's Underachiever: "The 2012. Pekka. Sutela, Dictatorships." Neopatrimonial Stepanenko, Victor. 2006. "Civil Society in Post from Transitions "Explaining 1992. Richard. Snyder, 2006. Charlotte. Sector, 1968. Guenter. Roth, Democracy." "Exclusionary 1986. L. Karen Remmer, Happene Really "What 2006. Scott. Radnitz, 2000. Limongi. Fernando and Cheibub, A Jose Alvarez, E Michael Adam, Przeworski, Pop Polity IV. . 2013. "Status of Achieving the 2007/2008." Report Development "Human 2007. . - Eleches, Grigore. 2007. "Historical Legacies and Post and Legacies "Historical 2007. Grigore. Eleches, nomn fr nentoa Peace. International for http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ukraine_economy.pdf. Endowment of Corrupted Sociality?" Comparative Politics 30, 2014.http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id= States." Development 132 1990. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well Journal ofPolitics http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Belarus2010.pdf. June 8, 2014. 2014. 8, TheCompetitiveness Wave." in Fourth english.pdf. Programme. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/belarus/docs/National Development Nations http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/268/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf. June Reports. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/de Development http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5371.htm. Communist Colored Revolutions." 2010. "Polity - 146.

. 1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. World Politics

European Revolutions:European 1492 20 (4): 64 "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire and Patrimonialism, Rulership, "Personal

IV Country Report 2010: Belarus." Belarusians Wear Jeans in Silent Protest. Silent in Jeans Wear Belarusians

69 (4): 908

24 (4): 379

20 (2): 194 - 85. U.S. East Eu

fault/files/reports/266/hdr05_complete.pdf. MDGs. National Report of the Republic of Belarus."

Relations With Belarus. -

9 26. ropean andSocieties Politics - 399. - 206. Perspectives onPolitics

d in Kyrgyzstan?" in d

Accessed June 7, 2014. 2014. 7, June Accessed

World Politics -

Soviet Ukraine: Civic Ethos in the Framework July 2013. Accessed May 29, 2014. 2014. 29, May Accessed 2013. July - 1992. Human Development Reports. Development Human

Studies In Comparative International Comparative In Studies

Oxford: Blackwell. ng And The Sources of Regime Regime of Sources The And ng - cesd a 2, 2014. 25, May Accessed Polity Communist Regime Change." Regime Communist

February. Accessed June 1, 2014.

57 (2): 231 1502762. - Journal of Democracy of Journal MDGs

IV.

January 13. Accessed May May Accessed 13. January 5 (3): 535 - Being in the World, 1950

Accessed Accessed May 30, 2014. 20 (4): 571 - report -

Building in the New the in Building - 161.

551. -

2010 - 597.

Accessed Accessed Carnegie Carnegie

Human Human 17 (2): (2): 17 United United

The The - - CEU eTD Collection — Bank.1997. World Authoritarianism." Failed Kuchma's Revolution: Orange "Ukraine's 2005b. A. Lucan Way, 20. Pyet ad euiis laac ad eteet ytm i te eulc of Republic the in systems settlement and clearance securities and "Payments 2007. . df. belarus20080908005115/Rendered/PDF/452180WP0Box3310securities01PUBLIC1.p clearance http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/01/9827579/paym Belarus." Bank. Journal ofDemocracy

- settlement Belarus: Prices, h Wrd Bank. World The - systems

16 (2): 131 16

Markets, EnterpriseReform. and - - 145. 60

Accessed 5 29, 2014. 2014. 29, 5 Accessed

Washington: The WorldWashington: ents - securities -