New York Bridge the Gap Day One And

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NEW YORK BRIDGE THE GAP NSTITUTE

I DAY ONE AND TWO

Prepared in connection with a Continuing Legal Education course presented at New York County Lawyers’ Association, 14 Vesey Street, New York, NY scheduled for April 17th and April 24th, 2014

CLE Faculty:

Eric Engelhardt, CPA, CFP; Richard Grayson, Law Office of Richard Grayson; Dan Jordan, Director of Library Services, NYCLA; Kenneth Landau, Shayne, Dachs, Sauer & Dachs LLP; Hon. Gerald Lebovits, Acting Justice, Sup. Ct., NY County; George Santana, Bronx Criminal Ct.; Alfie Schloss, Senior Security Advisors; Beth Shapiro, Esq., retired from Shapiro, Beilly & Aronowitz

NYCLA

This course has been approved in accordance with the requirements of the New York State Continuing Legal Education Board for a maximum of 16 Transitional and Non-Transitional credit hours; 7 Professional Practice/Law Practice Management;. 6 Skills; 3 Ethics This program has been approved by the Board of Continuing Legal education of the Supreme Court of New Jersey for 16 hours of total CLE credits. Of these, 3 qualify as hours of credit for ethics/professionalism, and 4 qualify as hours of credit toward certification in civil trial law, criminal law, workers compensation law and/or matrimonial law. ACCREDITED PROVIDER STATUS: NYCLA’s CLE Institute is currently certified as an Accredited Provider of continuing legal education in the States of New York and New Jersey.

Information Regarding CLE Credits and Certification New York Bridge the Gap April 17th and April 24th, 2015; 9:00 AM to 4:30 PM

The New York State CLE Board Regulations require all accredited CLE providers to provide documentation that CLE course attendees are, in fact, present during the course. Please review the following NYCLA rules for MCLE credit allocation and certificate distribution.

i. You must sign-in and note the time of arrival to receive your course materials and receive MCLE credit. The time will be verified by the Program Assistant.

ii. You will receive your MCLE certificate as you exit the room at the end of the course. The certificates will bear your name and will be arranged in alphabetical order on the tables directly outside the auditorium.

iii. If you arrive after the course has begun, you must sign-in and note the time of your arrival. The time will be verified by the Program Assistant. If it has been determined that you will still receive educational value by attending a portion of the program, you will receive a pro-rated CLE certificate.

iv. Please note: We can only certify MCLE credit for the actual time you are in attendance. If you leave before the end of the course, you must sign-out and enter the time you are leaving. The time will be verified by the Program Assistant. Again, if it has been determined that you received educational value from attending a portion of the program, your CLE credits will be pro-rated and the certificate will be mailed to you within one week.

v. If you leave early and do not sign out, we will assume that you left at the midpoint of the course. If it has been determined that you received educational value from the portion of the program you attended, we will pro-rate the credits accordingly, unless you can provide verification of course completion. Your certificate will be mailed to you within one week.

Thank you for choosing NYCLA as your CLE provider!

New York County Lawyers’ Association Continuing Legal Education Institute 14 Vesey Street, New York, N.Y. 10007 • (212) 267-6646

New York Bridge the Gap April 17th and April 24th, 2015 9:00 AM – 4:30 PM

AGENDA

April 17th:

9:00 AM – 10:40 AM Avoiding Ethical Pitfalls Richard Grayson, Law Office of Richard Grayson NY CLE: 2 Ethics

10:50 AM - 12:30 PM The Application of the CPLR to Criminal Trial Proceedings George Santana, Bronx Criminal Court NY CLE: 2 Professional Practice

12:30 PM – 1:00 PM LUNCH

1:00 PM - 2:40 PM The Everyday Practice of Law Beth Shapiro NY CLE: 1 Law Practice Management; 1 Ethics

2:50 PM – 4:30 PM Effective and Persuasive Legal Writing Hon. Gerald Lebovits, Acting Justice, Sup. Ct., NY County NY CLE: 2 Skills

New York Bridge the Gap April 17th and April 24th, 2015 9:00 AM – 4:30 PM

AGENDA

April 24th:

9:00 AM – 10:40 AM How to Avoid and Protect against a Tax Audit Eric Engelhardt, CFA, CFP NY CLE: 2 Skills

10:50 AM – 12:30 PM Cost Effective Legal Research Dan Jordan, NYCLA NY CLE: 2 Skills

12:30 PM – 1:00 PM LUNCH

1:00 PM – 2:40 PM What You Must Know about Reverse Mortgages Alfie Schloss, Senior Security Advisors N YCLE: 2 Professional Practice

2:50 PM – 4:30 PM From Crash to Cash: Secrets of a Successful Tort Case Kenneth Landau, Shayne, Dachs, Sauer, & Dachs LLP NY CLE: 2 Professional Practice

The Application of the CPLR to Criminal Trial Proceedings George Santana, Bronx Criminal Court

George M. Santana: Mr. Santana is currently Law Clerk for Justice Carol Sharpe in Bronx Criminal Court. He earned a J.D. degree at CUNY School of Law at Queens College.

*** This section is current through 2014 released chapters 1-478 ***

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW PART ONE. GENERAL PROVISIONS TITLE A. SHORT TITLE, APPLICABILITY AND DEFINITIONS ARTICLE 1. SHORT TITLE, APPLICABILITY AND DEFINITIONS

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NY CLS CPL § 1.10 (2014)

§ 1.10. Applicability of chapter to actions and matter occurring before and after effective date

1. The provisions of this chapter apply exclusively to:

(a) All criminal actions and proceedings commenced upon or after the effective date thereof and all appeals and other post-judgment proceedings relating or attaching thereto; and

(b) All matters of criminal procedure prescribed in this chapter which do not constitute a part of any particular action or case, occurring upon or after such effective date.

2. The provisions of this chapter apply to (a) all criminal actions and proceedings commenced prior to the effective date thereof but still pending on such date, and (b) all appeals and other post-judgment proceedings commenced upon or after such effective date which relate or attach to criminal actions and proceedings commenced or concluded prior to such effective date; provided that, if application of such provisions in any particular case would not be feasible or would work injustice, the provisions of the code of criminal procedure apply thereto.

3. The provisions of this chapter do not impair or render ineffectual any proceedings or procedural matters which occurred prior to the effective date thereof.

*** This section is current through 2014 released chapters 1-478 ***

CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES ARTICLE 1. SHORT TITLE; APPLICABILITY AND DEFINITIONS

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NY CLS CPLR § 101 (2014)

§ 101. Short title; application

This chapter shall be known as the civil practice law and rules, and may be cited as "CPLR". The civil practice law and rules shall govern the procedure in civil judicial proceedings in all courts of the state and before all judges, except where the procedure is regulated by inconsistent statute. The civil practice law and rules shall succeed the civil practice act and rules of civil practice and shall be deemed substituted therefor throughout the statutes and rules of the state. Reference to a provision in the civil practice law and rules may, except when such provision is being enacted or amended, be made without indicating whether it is a rule or section. NEW YORK CONSOLIDATED LAW SERVICE Copyright © 2015 Matthew Bender, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis (TM) Group All rights reserved

*** This section is current through 2014 released chapters 1-478 ***

CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES ARTICLE 21. PAPERS

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NY CLS CPLR R 2106 (2014)

R 2106. Affirmation of truth of statement by attorney, physician, osteopath or dentist

[Until Jan 1, 2015, Rule 2106 reads as set out below] The statement of an attorney admitted to practice in the courts of the state, or of a physician, osteopath or dentist, authorized by law to practice in the state, who is not a party to an action, when subscribed and affirmed by him to be true under the penalties of perjury, may be served or filed in the action in lieu of and with the same force and effect as an affidavit.

[Eff Jan 1, 2015, Rule 2106 reads as set out below and it section heading reads as follows: "Affirmation of truth of statement [fig 1] ]

(a) The statement of an attorney admitted to practice in the courts of the state, or of a physician, osteopath or dentist, authorized by law to practice in the state, who is not a party to an action, when subscribed and affirmed by him to be true under the penalties of perjury, may be served or filed in the action in lieu of and with the same force and effect as an affidavit.

(b) [Added, L 2014] The statement of any person, when that person is physically located outside the geographic boundaries of the United States, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, subscribed and affirmed by that person to be true under the penalties of perjury, may be used in an action in lieu of and with the same force and effect as an affidavit. Such affirmation shall be in substantially the following form:

I affirm this [-----] day of [------] , [------] , under the penalties of perjury under the laws of New York, which may include a fine or imprisonment, that I am physically located outside the geographic boundaries of the United States, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, that the foregoing is true, and I understand that this document may be filed in an action or proceeding in a court of law.

*** This section is current through 2014 released chapters 1-478 ***

CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES ARTICLE 22. STAY, MOTIONS, ORDERS AND MANDATES

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NY CLS CPLR R 2221 (2014)

R 2221. Motion affecting prior order

(a) A motion for leave to renew or to reargue a prior motion, for leave to appeal from, or to stay, vacate or modify, an order shall be made, on notice, to the judge who signed the order, unless he or she is for any reason unable to hear it, except that:

1. if the order was made upon a default such motion may be made, on notice, to any judge of the court; and

2. if the order was made without notice such motion may be made, without notice, to the judge who signed it, or, on notice, to any other judge of the court.

(b) Rules of the chief administrator of the courts. The chief administrator may by rule exclude motions within a department, district or county from the operation of subdivision (a) of this rule.

(d) A motion for leave to reargue:

1. shall be identified specifically as such;

2. shall be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion, but shall not include any matters of fact not offered on the prior motion; and

3. shall be made within thirty days after service of a copy of the order determining the prior motion and written notice of its entry. This rule shall not apply to motions to reargue a decision made by the appellate division or the court of appeals.

(e) A motion for leave to renew:

1. shall be identified specifically as such;

2. shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination or shall demonstrate that there has been a change in the law that would change the prior determination; and

3. shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion.

(f) A combined motion for leave to reargue and leave to renew shall identify separately and support separately each item of relief sought. The court, in determining a combined motion for leave to reargue and leave to renew, shall decide each part of the motion as if it were separately made. If a motion for leave to reargue or leave to renew is granted, the court may adhere to the determination on the original motion or may alter that determination.

Legislative History:

History:

Add, L 1962, ch 308, § 1; amd, L 1986, ch 355, § 5, L 1999, ch 281, § 1, eff July 20, 1999.

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The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Winston Coaye, Appellant

[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL]

Court of Appeals of New York

68 N.Y.2d 857; 501 N.E.2d 18; 508 N.Y.S.2d 410; 1986 N.Y. LEXIS 20545

September 9, 1986, Argued October 14, 1986, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal, by permission of an der, which reinstated the jury verdict and vacated the Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals, from an order judgment of conviction. The court read N.Y. Crim. Proc. of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Law § 460.10 to require that an appeal from an order Second Judicial Department, entered April 29, 1985, modifying defendant's conviction had to be taken at the which (1) reversed, on the law, an order of the Supreme latest within 30 days after imposition of sentence. The Court (Sybil Hart Kooper, J.), entered in Kings County, order of the appellate division was modified by reversing setting aside so much of a jury verdict convicting him of what the court had reversed of the trial court's order and attempted murder in the first degree and reducing those reinstating the judgment of the supreme court. counts to attempted murder in the second degree, (2) vacated the judgment of conviction, (3) reinstated the OUTCOME: The order of the appellate division was judgment convicting defendant of attempted murder in modified by reversing so much of the order as reversed the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the the trial court's order and by reinstating the judgment of second degree and assault in the second degree, and (4) supreme court, and, except as so modified, the order of remitted the case to Criminal Term for imposition of the appellate division was affirmed. sentence in accordance with the verdict. LexisNexis(R) Headnotes People v Coaye, 110 AD2d 904, modified.

DISPOSITION: Order modified in accordance with the memorandum herein and, as so modified, affirmed. Criminal Law & Procedure > Postconviction Proceed-

ings > General Overview CASE SUMMARY: Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Procedures >

Time Limitations

[HN1] N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 460.10 must be read to PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant appealed the require that an appeal from the order modifying defend- order from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court ant's conviction be taken at the latest within thirty days in the Second Judicial Department, (New York), and after imposition of the sentence. sought reversal of that order because plaintiff state's appeal should not have been heard by the Appellate Divi- HEADNOTES sion pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 460.10. Crimes -- Appeal -- Time to Appeal OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted after a jury trial In a criminal prosecution wherein the trial court, of attempted murder in the first degree, criminal posses- upon defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 330.30, re- sion of a weapon, and assault. Upon defendant's motion, duced his attempted murder conviction from first to sec- pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 330.30, the trial ond degree and proceeded immediately to impose sen- court reduced the attempted murder conviction from first tence on August 22, 1983, from which judgment de- to second degree and imposed sentence. Defendant ap- fendant appealed, and where the People submitted an pealed, seeking a reversal of the appellate division's or- Page 2 68 N.Y.2d 857, *; 501 N.E.2d 18, **; 508 N.Y.S.2d 410, ***; 1986 N.Y. LEXIS 20545 order on November 3, 1983 modifying the verdict "pur- apparently unsigned, and the People the next day filed an suant to the Court's decision of August 22" and then ap- appeal from that order. The Appellate Division, having pealed from that order, the People's appeal to the Appel- consolidated the People's appeal with defendant's appeal, late Division should have been dismissed as untimely, reversed the order insofar as appealed from, vacated the since the People's time to appeal ran from August 22. judgment of conviction, reinstated the jury verdict, and Under these circumstances, CPL 460.10 must be read to remitted the case to Criminal Term for reimposition of require that an appeal from the order modifying defend- sentence in accordance with the verdict. Urging among ant's conviction be taken at the latest "within thirty days other grounds that the People's appeal should not have after imposition of the sentence" ( CPL 460.10 [1] [a]). been heard by the Appellate Division because it was Accordingly, the judgment of Supreme Court, insofar as taken more than 30 days from August 22, 1983, defend- it was reversed by the Appellate Division, should be re- ant seeks reversal of the Appellate Division order. instated. The narrow question is whether, in the particular

factual circumstances presented, the People's time to COUNSEL: Steven J. Hyman and Paul H. Levinson for appeal the trial court's modification of the conviction ran appellant. from August 22, the date it was announced and judgment

immediately rendered thereon, or from November 3, the Elizabeth Holtzman, District Attorney (Anthea H. Bruffee date the People submitted the written order. There is no and Barbara D. Underwood of counsel), for respondent. compelling answer in the CPL; it neither defines an "or-

der" nor unambiguously specifies the time for taking an JUDGES: Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Meyer, appeal from an order. * The People point to CPL 460.10 Simons, Kaye, Alexander and Hancock, Jr., concur; (1) (a) in support of their contention that [***411] the Judge Titone taking no part. time to appeal an order commences [**19] only upon

service or entry of that order. In the case of an oral or- OPINION der immediately followed by sentence and the entry of [*857] [**18] [***410] OPINION OF THE judgment, however, that contention produces an anoma- COURT ly: the order and sentence are subsumed in the judgment triggering defendant's time to appeal, [*859] yet the Memorandum. People's time to appeal from that same disposition would The order of the Appellate Division should be modi- be indefinitely enlarged until a written order were served fied by [*858] reversing so much of the order as re- or entered, with the appeals conceivably proceeding in- versed the trial court's order of November 3, 1983 and by dependent of each other. In the circumstances, [HN1] reinstating the judgment of Supreme Court, Kings CPL 460.10 must be read to require that an appeal from County, and, except as so modified, the order of the Ap- the order modifying defendant's conviction be taken at pellate Division should be affirmed. the latest "within thirty days after imposition of the sentence" ( CPL 460.10 [1] [a]). Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of attempted murder in the first degree, criminal possession * In this respect the CPL lacks the desired clar- of a weapon, and assault. Upon defendant's motion ity of the CPLR (compare, CPLR 2219, 5513, pursuant to CPL 330.30, on August 22, 1983, the trial with CPL 460.10). The statutory omission cre- court, in an order announced on the record, reduced the ates an ambiguity which is at the root of the pre- attempted murder conviction from first to second degree sent dispute, and should be addressed by the and proceeded immediately to impose sentence. Within Legislature. 30 days, defendant filed his notice of appeal from the judgment. On November 3, 1983, the People submitted We have considered defendant's remaining conten- an order modifying the verdict "pursuant to the Court's tions and conclude they are without merit. decision of August 22." The order was entered that day,

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The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Efrain Silva and David Silva, Respondents

[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL]

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department

122 A.D.2d 750; 506 N.Y.S.2d 55; 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 59277

August 28, 1986

CASE SUMMARY: Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Property Crimes > Burglary & Criminal Trespass > General Overview PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The state sought review [HN1] A van meets the statutory definition of a building of orders of the Supreme Court, New York County (New because it may be considered either an "enclosed motor York), setting aside jury verdicts convicting defendants truck" or a vehicle used for "carrying on business thereof attempted burglary in the third degree and dismissing in." the indictment. JUDGES: [**1] Concur -- Kupferman, J. P., Fein, OVERVIEW: The judgment of the trial court, setting Lynch, Milonas and Ellerin, JJ. aside jury verdicts convicting defendants of attempted burglary, was reversed and the matter was remanded for OPINION further proceedings. The convictions arose from defend- [*56] Orders of the Supreme Court, New York ants' attempts to burglarize a cargo van. The trial court County (Neco, J.), entered on July 11 and 12, 1984, re- set aside the convictions on the ground that the van did spectively, setting aside jury verdicts convicting defend- not fall within the definition of a "building," as set forth ants of attempted burglary in the third degree and dis- in N.Y. Penal Law § 140.00(2). Subsequent to this hold- missing the indictment, * unanimously reversed, on the ing, the New York Court of Appeals held that such a van law, the convictions for attempted burglary in the third met the statutory definition of a building because it may degree reinstated, and the matter remanded for further be considered either an enclosed motor truck or a vehicle proceedings. used for carrying on business therein. Defendants' contention that the within appeal was "procedurally flawed" * The court did not disturb the verdict convict- under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2220 was without merit, because the ing defendant Efrain Silva of possession of bur- civil rules had no application to criminal actions and glar's tools, for which he was sentenced to one proceedings. year's imprisonment. That conviction is not the

subject of these appeals. OUTCOME: The court reversed and reinstated the convictions for attempted burglary in the third degree, be- The convictions arose from defendants' attempts to cause the definition of "building" was subsequently held burglarize a 1981 Dodge van of approximately 1 1/2 to include the type of van that defendants attempted to tons' capacity, used to transport cargo to and from the burglarize. city's airports. The trial court set aside the convictions on the ground that the van did not fall within the defini- LexisNexis(R) Headnotes tion of a "building" set forth in Penal Law § 140.00 (2). The Court [**2] of Appeals has since held that such [HN1] a van "meets the statutory definition of a building because it may be considered either an 'inclosed motor Page 2 122 A.D.2d 750; 506 N.Y.S.2d 55, *; 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 59277, ** truck' or a vehicle used for 'carrying on business there- with copies of the orders. The claim has no validity as in'." ( People v Mincione, 66 NY2d 995, 997.) the CPLR has no application to criminal actions and proceedings (see, CPL 1.10). The People are not re- Defendants' motion to set aside the verdict was made quired to serve a written order as a prerequisite to appeal orally and the court ruled orally on the record. Defend- where the order has been entered on the record (see, ants claim the appeal is "procedurally flawed" under People v Price, 67 AD2d 990). CPLR 2220 because defendants' counsel was not served

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The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Curtis C. Holden, Also Known as Curtis Holder, Appellant.

756

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DE- PARTMENT

260 A.D.2d 233; 689 N.Y.S.2d 40; 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3972

April 15, 1999, Decided April 15, 1999, Entered

CASE SUMMARY: tim was about to use deadly force against him, and defendant's speedy trial motion was properly denied because the trial court was not required to grant the motion PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant appealed a summarily. judgment of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (New York), convicting him of assault in the first degree and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third de- COUNSEL: [***1] For Respondent: Lisa I. Cuevas. gree. For Defendant-Appellant: Susan J. Horwitz. OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree and criminal sale of a controlled substance in JUDGES: Concur--Sullivan, J. P., Rosenberger, Rubin, the third degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Saxe and Buckley, JJ. trial court erred by refusing defendant's request to charge the justification defense and by denying defendant's OPINION speedy trial motion. The court ruled that the justification [*233] [**40] Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx defense was not supported by any reasonable view of the County (Dominic Massaro, J., on speedy trial motions; evidence and that defendant had an opportunity to retreat Elbert Hinkson, J., at jury trial and sentence), rendered but instead chose to approach his victim. Further, the June 5, 1995, convicting defendant of assault in the first court held that there was no basis for the trial court to degree and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the grant defendant's speedy trial motion summarily. Also, third degree, and sentencing him, as a second violent the court rejected defendant's argument that certain peri- felony offender, to consecutive terms of 7 1/2 [*234] ods were includable in calculating the time period related to 15 years and 5 to 10 years, respectively, unanimously to his speedy trial motion because the prosecution de- affirmed. clared its readiness for trial, and there was nothing illusory about the statement of readiness. The court affirmed The court properly refused defendant's request to the judgment convicting defendant, concluding that any charge the justification defense since it was not support- discovery delay did not affect the prosecution's readiness ed by any reasonable view of the evidence (see, People v and was not unreasonable. Watts, 57 NY2d 299, 301), even when defendant's testimony is viewed in its most favorable light. Under such OUTCOME: Judgment convicting defendant was af- a view, even if defendant's claim that the first shot was firmed where the trial court did not err by refusing to fired by the victim (a police officer participating in an charge the justification defense because defendant pre- undercover drug operation) could be credited, defendant cipitated the gunfight by arming himself and displaying a nevertheless precipitated the gunfight by arming himself firearm before he had any reason to believe that his vic- and displaying a firearm before he had any reason to Page 2 260 A.D.2d 233, *; 689 N.Y.S.2d 40, **; 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3972, *** believe [***2] that his victim was about to use deadly further find that the discovery delay did not affect the force against him. [**41] Moreover, according to People's readiness and was not unreasonable in any defendant's testimony, he had an opportunity to retreat event. but instead chose to approach his victim (see, People v The period of December 18, 1993 to February 15, Matias, 235 AD2d 298, lv denied 89 NY2d 1038). 1994, the time during which the People were responding Defendant's speedy trial motion was properly de- to defendant's first speedy trial motion, was excludable. nied. Contrary to defendant's contention, there was no The time set forth in CPLR 2214 (b) for answering a basis for the court to grant his motion summarily. While motion was not applicable ( People v Silva, 122 AD2d the People's initial response did not specifically identify 750). The record reveals that the delay resulted from the all the exclusions upon which they relied, the People unavailability of minutes to be [*235] furnished by the explained that they were awaiting minutes, which had court reporters, who were not under the People's control ( been ordered, as well as the release of defendant's medi- People v Hueston, 171 AD2d 812, 813; see also, People cal records, to enable them to address each period. The v Foy, 249 AD2d 217, lv denied 92 NY2d 897). In any fact that the People failed to discuss each period specifi- event, even if we were to find that the [***4] delay in cally did not require the court to grant the motion sum- responding to the motion was inadequately explained, we marily ( People v Owens, 214 AD2d 480, lv denied 86 would find the delay was not so unreasonable as to re- NY2d 799). quire that any of the time be included (see, People v Davila, 257 AD2d 485). Turning to the merits of the motion, we find that two time periods are dispositive. We reject defendant's ar- When the aforesaid time periods are subtracted from gument that the period from October 28 to December 15, the total amount of time that defendant claims to be in- 1992 was includable on the grounds that the People's cludable, the remainder falls short of the 184 days in statement of readiness was illusory and that [***3] the which the People were required to be ready. Therefore, People unreasonably delayed their response to discovery we need not consider any other periods claimed by de- demands. The People declared their present readiness fendant to be includable. for trial on October 14th ( People v Delgado, 209 AD2d Concur--Sullivan, J. P., Rosenberger, Rubin, Saxe 218, 219, lv denied 84 NY2d 1030) and there was nothing and Buckley, JJ. illusory about such statement of readiness (see, People v Dushain, 247 AD2d 234, lv denied 91 NY2d 1007). We

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The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. William Crisp, Respondent.

2637

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DE- PARTMENT

268 A.D.2d 247; 700 N.Y.S.2d 693; 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 322

January 11, 2000, Decided January 11, 2000, Entered

COUNSEL: [*1] For Appellant: Alan Gadlin. motion, reinstating the indictment and remanding the matter for further proceedings, is adhered to. For Defendant-Respondent: Andrea G. Hirsch. In light of our decisions in People v Silva (122 AD2d

750) and People v Holden (260 AD2d 233, lv denied 93 JUDGES: Concur--Nardelli, J. P., Williams, Ellerin, NY2d 1003), we find defendant's arguments to be una- Rubin and Andrias, JJ. vailing with regard to the applicability of CPLR provi-

sions to this criminal proceeding. This is especially true OPINION in the absence of any express reference to the CPLR in Upon reargument, the determination of this Court, CPL 190.50 (5) and in view of the Court of Appeals' entered September 10, 1998, (246 AD2d 84) unanimous- practice of interpreting CPL provisions in accordance ly reversing the order of the Supreme Court, New York [*2] with the CPL's statutory scheme and without resort County (Herbert Adlerberg, J.), entered on or about Oc- to the CPLR (see, People v Coaye, 68 NY2d 857, tober 24, 1996, which granted defendant's motion to 858-859; n). dismiss the indictment, with leave to re-present, on the Concur--Nardelli, J. P., Williams, Ellerin, Rubin and ground that the People violated defendant's statutory Andrias, JJ. right to testify before the grand jury, and denying the

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The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Carol Elmer, Respondent. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kevin O. Cooper, Appellant.

No. 127, No. 128

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK

19 N.Y.3d 501; 973 N.E.2d 172; 950 N.Y.S.2d 77; 2012 N.Y. LEXIS 1838; 2012 NY Slip Op 5125

May 30, 2012, Argued June 27, 2012, Decided

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: On remand at, Appeal dismissed by People v Elmer, 98 AD3d 810, 950 NYS2d CASE SUMMARY: 282, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5982 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't, Aug. 23, 2012) PROCEDURAL POSTURE: In the first of two cases, PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal, in the first the People appealed from an oral decision that granted, above-entitled action, by permission of an Associate in part, defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judge of the Court of Appeals, from an order of the Ap- Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Depart- pellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judi- ment, dismissed the People's appeal. The People ap- cial Department, entered May 19, 2011. The Appellate pealed. In the second case, defendant sought review of an Division (1) dismissed the People's appeal from an oral oral order denying his motion to suppress evidence. The decision of the St. Lawrence County Court (Jerome J. Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Richards, J.), which had partially granted defendant's Department, affirmed. Defendant appealed. motion to dismiss the indictment, and (2) remitted the matter for further proceedings not inconsistent with its OVERVIEW: The issue was whether an appeal lay decision. from an oral order issued by a criminal court on a pre-trial matter. The appellate court found that CPL Appeal, in the second above-entitled action, by per- 450.20(1), 710.70(2), and other penal statutes, permitted mission of an Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals, appeals from an "order" without further restriction. It from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme followed, then, that a statute authorizing an appeal from Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, entered June an "order," as opposed to a "written order," was con- 10, 2011. The Appellate Division affirmed a judgment of strued to permit an appeal from either a written or oral the Monroe County Court (Alex R. Renzi, J.), which had order. It was sound policy to permit appeals from oral convicted defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of criminal orders so long as they were taken, in accordance with the possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. appropriate criminal statute, from an oral order that con- People v Cooper, 85 AD3d 1594, 926 NYS2d 777, 2011 clusively disposed of the case. The lower court erred in N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4797 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't, the first case by dismissing the appeal. The People were 2011), affirmed. entitled under CPL 450.20(1) to appellate review of the People v Elmer, 84 AD3d 1593, 922 NYS2d 663, 2011 trial court's oral decision dismissing certain counts of the N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4044 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't, indictment. In the second case, it was similarly error to 2011), reversed. conclude that defendant's appeal under CPL 710.70 (2)

was forfeited by the entry of his guilty plea simply be- DISPOSITION: For Case No. 127: Order reversed cause the oral order had not been issued in writing. Even and case remitted to the Appellate Division, Third De- though the suppression motion was decided orally, it is partment, for consideration of the merits of the appeal taken to that court. For Case No. 128: Order affirmed. Page 2 19 N.Y.3d 501, *; 973 N.E.2d 172, **; 950 N.Y.S.2d 77, ***; 2012 N.Y. LEXIS 1838 evident that it was an order finally denying a motion to [HN4] See CPL 710.70(2). suppress evidence.

OUTCOME: In the first case, the order of the interme- Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Appellate Ju- diate appellate court was reversed and the case was re- risdiction > General Overview mitted for consideration of the merits of the appeal taken Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability to that court. In the second case, the order of the inter- > General Overview mediate appellate court was affirmed. [HN5] CPL 450.20(1), 710.70(2), and other similar penal statutes, significantly, permit appeals from an "order" LexisNexis(R) Headnotes without further restriction. It logically follows, then, that a statute authorizing an appeal from an "order"-as opposed to a "written order"-should be construed to permit an appeal from either a written or oral order. Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Appellate Ju- risdiction > General Overview Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Appellate Ju- > General Overview risdiction > General Overview [HN1] An appeal does lie from an oral order of a crimi- Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability nal court that finally disposes of the pre-trial matter at > General Overview issue. [HN6] It is sound policy to permit appeals from oral orders so long as they are taken, in accordance with the appropriate governing criminal statute, from an oral or- Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Appellate Ju- der that conclusively disposes of the matter at issue. risdiction > General Overview Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > Presumptions > General Overview Criminal Law & Procedure > Guilty Pleas > Appeals Governments > Legislation > Interpretation Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Appellate Ju- [HN2] The legislature is presumed to be aware of the risdiction > General Overview distinction between the terms "order" and "written order" Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability and thus, absent an express definition, a broader view is > General Overview ascribed to its use of the unqualified phrase "order." [HN7] Although a guilty plea generally results in forfei- Where deemed necessary, the legislature has provided ture of the right to appellate review of any nonjurisdic- for a "written order" in certain provisions of both the tional defects in the proceedings, CPL 710.70(2) has Criminal Procedure Law and the Penal Law. CPL been recognized as a limited exception permitting appel- 195.30; Penal Law § 215.70. late review, notwithstanding the entry of a guilty plea. Moreover, the Court of Appeals of New York has coun- tenanced a forfeiture of this statutory right only where a Criminal Law & Procedure > Pretrial Motions & Pro- defendant pleaded guilty before the hearing on his sup- cedures > Dismissal pression motion, thereby foreclosing appellate review for Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Appellate Ju- lack of a sufficient factual record. risdiction > General Overview Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability HEADNOTES > General Overview [HN3] CPL 450.20(1) provides that the prosecution can Crimes -- Appeal -- Review of Oral Order Issued on Pretrial Matter -- Finality appeal from an order dismissing an accusatory instrument or a count thereof, entered pursuant to CPL 170.30, 1. An appeal lies from an oral order of a criminal 170.50, 210.20. court that finally disposes of the pretrial matter at issue, and a statute authorizing an appeal from an "order"--as opposed to a "written order"--should be construed to Criminal Law & Procedure > Pretrial Motions & Pro- permit an appeal from either a written or oral order (see cedures > Suppression of Evidence CPL 450.20 [1]; 710.70 [2]). The Legislature is pre- Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Appellate Ju- sumed to be aware of the distinction between the terms risdiction > General Overview "order" and "written order" and thus, absent an express Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability definition, a broader view is ascribed to its use of the > General Overview unqualified phrase "order." The Legislature, where Page 3 19 N.Y.3d 501, *; 973 N.E.2d 172, **; 950 N.Y.S.2d 77, ***; 2012 N.Y. LEXIS 1838 deemed necessary, has provided for a "written order" in entered upon a plea of guilty." Here, it was evident that certain provisions of both the Criminal Procedure Law the oral order denying defendant's suppression motion and the Penal Law. It is sound policy to permit appeals was "an order finally denying a motion to suppress evi- from oral orders so long as they are taken, in accordance dence." The suppression court issued its findings of fact with the appropriate governing criminal statute, from an on the record; found sufficient probable cause for the oral order that conclusively disposes of the matter at is- stop, arrest and search of defendant; denied the motion to sue. This provides a clear signal to the respective parties suppress; noted defendant's exception and immediately as to when the time to appeal certain orders commences, set the matter for a trial date. The issuance of a written mitigates potentially anomalous consequences, and re- order, a ministerial act, was not a pending judicial action flects and accommodates the common experience of that rendered the oral order nonfinal. criminal practice where courts may issue oral decisions, Crimes -- Appeal -- Scope of Review often on a multitude of matters, without engaging in the additional affirmative step of ensuring that every order is 4. Although the Appellate Division erred in con- reduced to writing. The failure to reduce an order to cluding that defendant's appeal pursuant to CPL 710.70 writing does not necessarily render an oral order infirm (2) from an oral order denying his suppression motion nor undermine its intended final authority. was forfeited by the entry of his guilty plea simply because the oral order had not been issued in writing, re- Crimes -- Appeal -- Review of Oral Order Dis- versal was not warranted because the Appellate Division missing Indictment Counts reached the merits and concurred with the trial court's 2. The Appellate Division erred in dismissing the determination that defendant's arrest was supported by People's appeal pursuant to CPL 450.20 (1) from an oral probable cause. Moreover, defendant's assertion that the decision by the trial court that granted, in part, defend- police lacked probable cause to effectuate an arrest and ant's motion to dismiss the indictment, on the ground that search presented a mixed question of law and fact be- the failure to obtain a written order precluded appellate yond the purview of the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction so review. An appeal lies from an oral order of a criminal long as there was record support for the lower courts' court that finally disposes of the pretrial matter at issue, determination. Here, there was sufficient record evidence and a statute authorizing an appeal from an "order"--as that the police possessed probable cause, foreclosing opposed to a "written order"--should be construed to further review. permit an appeal from either a written or oral order. Consequently, under CPL 450.20 (1), which provides COUNSEL: Nicole Duvé, District Attorney, Canton that the prosecution can appeal from "[a]n order dis- (Amanda N. Nissen of counsel), for appellant in the first missing an accusatory instrument or a count thereof," the above-entitled action. The Appellate Division erred in People were entitled to appellate review of the trial dismissing the People's appeal because an appeal court's oral decision dismissing certain counts of the in- properly lies from an oral order. (People v Silva, 122 dictment. AD2d 750, 506 NYS2d 55; People v Wallace, 220 AD2d 248, 632 NYS2d 94; People v Parker, 223 AD2d 179, Crimes -- Appeal -- Review of Oral Order Deny- 648 NYS2d 430; People v Ainsworth, 106 AD2d 357, 483 ing Suppression Motion NYS2d 287; People v Hetenyi, 277 App Div 310, 98 3. The Appellate Division erred in concluding that NYS2d 990, 301 NY 757, 95 NE2d 819; People v Holmes, defendant's appeal pursuant to CPL 710.70 (2) from an 206 AD2d 542, 615 NYS2d 52; People v Herrara, 173 oral order denying his suppression motion was forfeited AD2d 850, 571 NYS2d 63; People v Herne, 84 AD3d by the entry of his guilty plea simply because the oral 1589, 922 NYS2d 827; People v Price, 67 AD2d 990, 413 order had not been issued in writing. An appeal lies from NYS2d 423.) an oral order of a criminal court that finally disposes of the pretrial matter at issue, and a statute authorizing an Richard V. Manning, Parishville, for respondent in the appeal from an "order"--as opposed to a "written or- first above-entitled action. der"--should be construed to permit an appeal from either a written or oral order. It is sound policy to permit ap- Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Drew peals from oral orders so long as they are taken, in ac- R. DuBrin of counsel), for appellant in the second cordance with the appropriate governing criminal statute, above-entitled action. I. The County Court's determina- from an oral order that conclusively disposes of the mat- tion, made at the bench, is an order finally denying de- ter at issue. CPL 710.70 (2) provides that "[a]n order fendant's motion to suppress and, therefore, defendant finally denying a motion to suppress evidence may be did not forfeit his right to appellate review of his sup- reviewed upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of pression claim by pleading guilty. (People v Fernandez, conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment is 67 NY2d 686, 490 NE2d 838, 499 NYS2d 919; People v Page 4 19 N.Y.3d 501, *; 973 N.E.2d 172, **; 950 N.Y.S.2d 77, ***; 2012 N.Y. LEXIS 1838

Taylor, 65 NY2d 1, 478 NE2d 755, 489 NYS2d 152; Peo- 919; People v Hardy, 13 NY3d 805, 890 NYS2d 372; ple v Manini, 79 NY2d 561, 594 NE2d 563, 584 NYS2d People v Thomas, 53 NY2d 338, 424 NE2d 537, 441 282; Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 742 NE2d NYS2d 650; Burke v Crosson, 85 NY2d 10, 647 NE2d 98, 719 NYS2d 623; People v Coaye, 68 NY2d 857, 501 736, 623 NYS2d 524; People v Ventura, 139 AD2d 196, NE2d 18, 508 NYS2d 410; People v Kisina, 14 NY3d 531 NYS2d 526; People v Williams, 43 AD2d 884, 351 153, 924 NE2d 792, 897 NYS2d 684; Cohen v Lord, Day NYS2d 761, 36 NY2d 829, 331 NE2d 684, 370 NYS2d & Lord, 75 NY2d 95, 550 NE2d 410, 551 NYS2d 157; 904; People v Taylor, 65 NY2d 1, 478 NE2d 755, 489 Matter of Balter v Regan, 63 NY2d 630, 468 NE2d 688, NYS2d 152; People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 541 NE2d 479 NYS2d 506; People v Allman, 133 AD2d 638, 519 1022, 543 NYS2d 968.) III. Police had probable cause to NYS2d 747; People v Wallace, 220 AD2d 248, 632 arrest defendant. (People v Silvestry, 11 NY3d 902, 901 NYS2d 94.) II. The Appellate Division correctly held that NE2d 756, 873 NYS2d 263; People v Edwards, 14 NY3d defendant's waiver of the right to appeal is unenforceable 741, 925 NE2d 576, 898 NYS2d 538; People v Mizell, 72 because the record fails to demonstrate that it was NY2d 651, 532 NE2d 1249, 536 NYS2d 21; People v knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (People v Seaberg, Shulman, 6 NY3d 1, 843 NE2d 125, 809 NYS2d 485; 74 NY2d 1, 541 NE2d 1022, 543 NYS2d 968; People v People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 847 NE2d 1141, 814 Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733, 698 NE2d 46, 675 NYS2d 327; NYS2d 567; People v Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 429 People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 459 NE2d 170, 471 NYS2d NE2d 775, 445 NYS2d 97; People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 61; People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273, 604 NE2d 108, 590 417, 488 NE2d 451, 497 NYS2d 630.) NYS2d 46; People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 844 NE2d 1145, 811 NYS2d 623; People v Moissett, 76 NY2d 909, 564 JUDGES: Opinion by Judge Jones. Chief Judge Lipp- NE2d 653, 563 NYS2d 43; People v Kemp, 94 NY2d 831, man and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and 724 NE2d 754, 703 NYS2d 59; Jones v Barnes, 463 US Pigott concur. 745, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987; People v Louree, 8 NY3d 541, 869 NE2d 18, 838 NYS2d 18; People v OPINION BY: Jones Murray, 15 NY3d 725, 932 NE2d 877, 906 NYS2d 521.) III. As a matter of law, the police's observations of a OPINION grocery bag stuffed with cash sticking out of defendant's [***79] [*504] [**174] Jones, J. shorts and a small baggie with white residue in the van defendant was driving did not give police probable cause The common issue presented by these appeals is to arrest him for possession of cocaine. (People v Car- whether an appeal lies from an oral order issued by a rasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 429 NE2d 775, 445 NYS2d 97; criminal court on a [*505] pretrial matter. In People v People v Davis, 36 NY2d 280, 326 NE2d 818, 367 NYS2d Elmer, the People appealed pursuant to CPL 450.20 (1) 256; People v Oden, 36 NY2d 382, 329 NE2d 188, 368 from an oral decision by the trial court that granted, in NYS2d 508; People v McRay, 51 NY2d 594, 416 NE2d part, defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on 1015, 435 NYS2d 679; People v Wirchansky, 41 NY2d speedy trial grounds. In People v Cooper, defendant 130, 359 NE2d 666, 391 NYS2d 70; People v Dodt, 61 sought review pursuant to CPL 710.70 (2) of an oral or- NY2d 408, 462 NE2d 1159, 474 NYS2d 441; People v der denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in Edwards, 95 NY2d 486, 741 NE2d 876, 719 NYS2d 202; a search attendant to his arrest. In both cases, the Appel- People v Nieves, 67 NY2d 125, 492 NE2d 109, 501 late Division ruled adversely to the appellants, finding NYS2d 1; People v Concepcion, 17 NY3d 192, 953 NE2d that the failure to obtain a written order precluded appel- 779, 929 NYS2d 541; People v Muhammad, 17 NY3d late review. We conclude otherwise, holding that [HN1] 532, 959 NE2d 463, 935 NYS2d 526.) an appeal does lie from an oral order of a criminal court that finally disposes of the pretrial matter at issue. Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Geoffrey Kaeuper of counsel), for respondent in the second People v Carol Elmer above-entitled action. I. As part of the agreed-upon plea, defendant waived his right to appeal. (People v Ramos, 7 Defendant Carol Elmer was charged with 37 counts NY3d 737, 853 NE2d 222, 819 NYS2d 853; People v of overdriving, torturing and injuring an animal in viola- Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 961 NE2d 645, 938 NYS2d tion of Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 for the al- 254; People v Kemp, 94 NY2d 831, 724 NE2d 754, 703 leged failure to properly care for horses within her cus- NYS2d 59.) II. By pleading guilty without obtaining an tody. In a pretrial motion, defendant moved to controvert order finally denying his suppression motion, defendant the search warrant used to enter her premises and to sup- forfeited any suppression issues. (People v Konieczny, 2 press evidence. Although County Court ordered a sup- NY3d 569, 813 NE2d 626, 780 NYS2d 546; People v pression hearing, the matter was adjourned several times Fernandez, 67 NY2d 686, 490 NE2d 838, 499 NYS2d by the People due to the ostensible unavailability of a Page 5 19 N.Y.3d 501, *; 973 N.E.2d 172, **; 950 N.Y.S.2d 77, ***; 2012 N.Y. LEXIS 1838 witness. Consequently, defendant moved to dismiss the "Officer Masik had probable cause to indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds. stop the van initially for his observation of the vehicle and traffic violations of no tail County Court granted the motion in part, dismissing lamp and failure to signal a turn and based the first 22 counts of the indictment. Recounting the upon the information that he received procedural history of the matter, the court noted the dila- from the individual that everything tory efforts of the prosecution in procuring the witness, matched the description. When Officer remarking that "the People, by not being ready for a Masik observed the residue in the console hearing, delayed, actually made it impossible [for] the of the car he had probable cause to ask the scheduling of a trial, holding of a trial, and by not being defendant out of the car and subsequently ready for a suppression hearing concerning a search arrest him for possession of that residue ... warrant, they should be held with post-readiness delay so the Court is going to deny the defend- because it prevented the trial from going forward." The ant's motion to suppress any evidence on court orally ordered that "[t]he first 22 counts are dis- the People's direct case. Your exception is missed as defendant was denied her right to a speedy noted for the record." trial."

The Appellate Division dismissed the People's appeal and remitted the matter to County Court for the is- Ultimately, defendant pleaded guilty to criminal suance of a written order, concluding that no appeal lies possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. from the "County Court's oral ruling dismissing the first 22 counts of the indictment [as it] was never reduced to a On appeal from his judgment of conviction, defend- writing and was never entered" (84 AD3d 1593, 1593, ant sought review pursuant to CPL 710.70 (2) of the 922 NYS2d 663 [3d Dept 2011]). A Judge of this Court suppression court's denial of his motion to suppress. The granted the People leave to appeal (17 NY3d 903, 957 Appellate Division, however, concluded that defendant NE2d 1162, 933 NYS2d 658 [2011]). forfeited his statutory right of review because he had entered a guilty plea prior to the transcription of the oral [*506] People v Kevin Cooper order (85 AD3d 1594, 1595, 926 NYS2d 777 [4th Dept [*507] 2011]). In that court's view, section 710.70 (2) As a result of a vehicular stop, arrest and search that was inapplicable because it did not permit appellate re- uncovered narcotics, defendant Kevin Cooper was view of an oral bench decision denying a suppression charged with criminal possession of a controlled sub- motion. In the alternative, that court also addressed the stance in the third degree, criminal possession of a con- merits and concurred with the trial court's determination trolled substance in the fourth degree, bribery in the third that defendant's arrest was supported by probable cause. degree and certain traffic violations. A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal Acting on an anonymous tip that a van marked by a (17 NY3d 902, 957 NE2d 1161, 933 NYS2d 657 [2011]). light-colored stripe and driven by an individual wearing We now reverse in Elmer and affirm in Cooper. red shorts was transporting narcotics, the police stopped defendant's vehicle--which matched the descrip- Discussion tion--after observing that it lacked a rear license plate [1] The principal argument set forth by the appel- lamp and had made an unlawful right turn without the lants is that the term "order" encompasses both oral and appropriate signal. When the police approached the ve- written orders because the Legislature has expressly pro- hicle, they observed defendant dressed in red shorts and vided for a "written order" when specifically required. upon further inspection, in plain view, officers observed Accordingly, it is asserted that an appeal does lie from an a grocery bag "bulging with money" on defendant's per- oral "order." We agree. 1 son and "a little dime baggie [***80] [**175] with white residue" on the vehicle's console. As a result, de- 1 Our holding does not, in any way, abrogate fendant was arrested and an ensuing search recovered a the well settled rule that "[n]o appeal lies from a small portion of cocaine secreted in defendant's right determination made in a criminal proceeding un- sock. less specifically provided for by statute" (People Following a suppression hearing to preclude the re- v Pagan, 19 NY3d 368, 971 NE2d 347, 948 covered evidence, County Court denied defendant's mo- NYS2d 217 [2012] quoting People v Dunn, 4 tion to suppress. That court remarked and orally decided NY3d 495, 497, 829 NE2d 295, 796 NYS2d 331 that [2005]; People v Hernandez, 98 NY2d 8, 10, 770 NE2d 566, 743 NYS2d 778 [2002]). Page 6 19 N.Y.3d 501, *; 973 N.E.2d 172, **; 950 N.Y.S.2d 77, ***; 2012 N.Y. LEXIS 1838

[HN2] The Legislature is presumed to be aware of that the People's appeal should not have been entertained the distinction between the terms "order" and "written because it had been commenced well beyond the 30-day order" and thus, absent an express definition, we ascribe period following the oral order. In turn, the People re- a broader view to its use of the unqualified phrase "or- sponded that an appeal is only appropriately taken upon der." Where deemed necessary, the Legislature has pro- the entry of a written order. vided for a "written order" in certain provisions of both Under the factual circumstances of that case, where the Criminal Procedure Law and the Penal Law (see CPL the oral decision rendered on the motion was subsumed 195.30 [when a court approves waiver of an indictment, by the judgment of conviction by virtue of the pro- it must "execute a written order to that effect"]; Penal nouncement of the sentence immediately after, we held Law § 215.70 [a person is guilty of unlawful grand jury that the People should have appealed from the oral order disclosure unless the disclosure was made "upon written (68 NY2d at 858-859). Of primary concern was the po- order of the court"]; see also CPL 190.25 [4] [a]; CPL tential unfairness engendered by the directives of section 420.10 [6]; CPL 420.40 [5]; Penal Law § 85.05 [3] [b]). 460.10, namely, that a defendant has 30 days to appeal as By contrast, in Elmer, the People appeal under [HN3] of right from the judgment of conviction, whereas the CPL 450.20 (1) which provides that the prosecution can People could conceivably enlarge the time to appeal by appeal from "[a]n order dismissing an accusatory in- procuring a written order at a later date. Although Coaye strument or a count thereof, entered [***81] [**176] presented unique factual circumstances, it demonstrated pursuant to section 170.30, 170.50 or 210.20" (emphasis our willingness to sanction appeals from oral orders and added). Likewise, in Cooper, defendant relies upon CPL we now think [HN6] it is sound policy to permit such 710.70 (2) which provides that [HN4] "[a]n order finally appeals so long as they are taken, in accordance with the denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed appropriate governing criminal statute, from an oral or- upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction der that conclusively disposes of the matter at issue. 3 notwithstanding the fact that such judgment is entered This not only provides a clear signal to the respective upon a plea of guilty" (emphasis added). [HN5] These parties as [*509] to when the time to appeal certain two provisions, and other similar penal statutes, signifi- orders commences, but also [***82] [**177] mitigates cantly, permit appeals from an "order" without further potentially anomalous consequences, as illustrated by restriction. It logically follows, [*508] then, that a Coaye. Further, our holding reflects and accommodates statute authorizing an appeal from an "order"--as op- the common experience of criminal practice where courts posed to a "written order"--should be construed to permit may issue oral decisions, often on a multitude of matters, an appeal from either a written or oral order. 2 without engaging in the additional affirmative step of

ensuring that every order is reduced to writing. The fail- 2 The Civil Practice Law and Rules, unlike the ure to do so does not necessarily render an oral order Criminal Procedure Law, explicitly defines the infirm nor undermine its intended final authority. term "order" as written in nature, mandating that

an order determining a motion "shall be in writ- 3 We find no persuasive authority supporting a ing" or "shall be reduced to writing or otherwise series of Appellate Division cases that routinely recorded" (CPLR 2219 [a]). Moreover, a civil dismissed, or held in abeyance, appeals taken appeal as of right is to be taken within 30 days from oral orders (see People v Holmes, 206 AD2d from service of "a copy of the judgment or order 542, 615 NYS2d 52 [2d Dept 1994]; People v appealed from and written notice of its entry" Austin, 208 AD2d 990, 618 NYS2d 115 [3d Dept (CPLR 5513 [a]; see also CPLR 2220). 1994]; People v Herrara, 173 AD2d 850, 571 This Court previously held as much in People v Co- NYS2d 63 [2d Dept 1991]; cf. People v Wallace, aye (68 NY2d 857, 501 NE2d 18, 508 NYS2d 410 220 AD2d 248, 632 NYS2d 94 [1st Dept 1995]; [1986]). In that case, upon the defendant's motion, Su- People v Silva, 122 AD2d 750, 506 NYS2d 55 preme Court orally reduced an attempted murder convic- [1st Dept 1986]). tion to a lesser degree and then immediately pronounced [2] In light of the foregoing, the Appellate Division sentence, commencing the defendant's 30-day period to erred in People v Elmer by dismissing the appeal and appeal as of right from the judgment of conviction under remitting the matter to County Court. The People were CPL 460.10. While the defendant's appeal was pending, entitled under section 450.20 (1) to appellate review of the People obtained, some time thereafter, a written order the lower court's oral decision dismissing certain counts memorializing the oral decision and then appealed from of the indictment. the written order on a separate appellate track. The Ap- pellate Division ultimately consolidated the dual appeals [3] In People v Cooper, it was similarly error to and reversed, reinstating the jury's original conviction on conclude that defendant's appeal under section 710.70 (2) the attempted murder count. The defendant contended was forfeited by the entry of his guilty plea simply be- Page 7 19 N.Y.3d 501, *; 973 N.E.2d 172, **; 950 N.Y.S.2d 77, ***; 2012 N.Y. LEXIS 1838 cause the oral order had not been issued in writing. tion of the consequences of such waiver" (People v [HN7] Although a guilty plea "generally results in a for- Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 264, 961 NE2d 645, 938 NYS2d feiture of the right to appellate review of any nonjuris- 254 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; People v dictional defects in the proceedings," section 710.70 (2) Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256, 844 NE2d 1145, 811 NYS2d has been recognized as a limited exception permitting 623 [2006]). There was no "attempt by the court to as- appellate review, notwithstanding the entry of a guilty certain on the record an acknowledgment from defendant plea (People v Fernandez, 67 NY2d 686, 688, 490 NE2d that he had, in fact, signed the waiver or that, if he had, 838, 499 NYS2d 919 [1986]). Moreover, we have coun- he was aware of its contents" (People v DeSimone tenanced a forfeiture of this statutory right only where a [companion case to People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273, defendant pleaded guilty "before the hearing on his sup- 283, 604 NE2d 108, 590 NYS2d 46 (1992)]). Moreover, pression motion," thereby foreclosing appellate review defendant's assertion that the police lacked probable for lack of a sufficient factual record (67 NY2d at 688). cause to effectuate an arrest and search presents a mixed Here, even though the suppression motion was decided question of law and fact beyond the purview of this orally, it is evident that it was "an order finally denying a Court's jurisdiction so long as there is record support for motion to suppress evidence." The suppression court the lower courts' determination (see People v Bigelow, 66 issued its findings of fact on the record; found sufficient NY2d 417, 420, 488 NE2d 451, 497 NYS2d 630 [1985]; probable cause for the stop, arrest and search of defend- People v McRay, 51 NY2d 594, 601, [***83] 416 NE2d ant; denied the motion to suppress; noted defendant's 1015, [**178] 435 NYS2d 679 [1980]; People v Whar- exception and immediately set the matter for a trial date. ton, 46 NY2d 924, 925, 388 NE2d 341, 415 NYS2d 204 We reject the People's contention that the issuance of a [1979]). In this case, there is sufficient record evidence written order, a ministerial act, was a pending judicial that the police possessed probable cause, foreclosing action that rendered the oral order non-final (see People further review. v Allman, 133 AD2d 638, 639, 519 NYS2d 747 [2d Dept Accordingly, in People v Elmer, the order of the 1987] ["On this record, it cannot be stated that the hear- Appellate Division should be reversed and the case re- ing court's express denial of the defendant's omnibus mitted to the Appellate Division, Third Department, for [*510] motion does not constitute '(a)n order finally consideration of the merits of the appeal taken to that denying a motion to suppress evidence' "]). court. In People v Cooper, the order of the Appellate [4] However, with respect to People v Cooper, the Division should be affirmed. Appellate Division did reach the merits of the parties' Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, contentions and reversal is not warranted here. Contrary Read, Smith and Pigott concur. to the People's argument, despite defendant's execution of a written waiver of the right to appeal, he did not In People v Elmer: Order reversed, etc. knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily waive his right to appeal as the record fails to demonstrate a "full apprecia- In People v Cooper: Order affirmed.

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The Everyday Practice of Law Articles Engagement Letters Non Engagement The Art of Delegating Statement of Clients’ Rights / Statement of Clients’ Responsibilities Forms Misc. Intake Forms Termination of Engagement

Beth Shapiro, Esq., Shapiro, Beilly & Aronowitz, LLP

BETH SHAPIRO graduated from Hofstra University in 1980. She was admitted to the New York State Bar in 1980. Ms. Shapiro is a trial attorney specializing in defense litigation, including first party insurance claims. She has lectured on trial practice at the New York State Trial Lawyers Association and at Hofstra University, New York County Lawyers and NITA Program. Ms. Shapiro is a member of the Queens County Bar Association, past member of the Board of Managers Grievance Committee, and the Queens County Judicial Screening Committee. She is admitted to practice before the United States Court of Appeals for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Hon. Gerald Lebovits New York County Lawyers’ Association April 17, 2015

Justice William Brennan Why is Legal Writing So Difficult?

• No defense to poor legal writing. Why is Legal Writing So Difficult?

• Poor role models. Chief Judge Benjamin Nathan Cardozo

The Goal

• Know your audience. • Know the purpose of your document. • Twin pillars: (1) make the court want to rule for you and (2) make it easy for the court to rule for you. • Write for judges, not like judges. Why is Legal Writing So Difficult?

• Linguistic roots.

Why is Legal Writing So Difficult?

• Sociological roots. • As Bismark said: “If you like law or sausages . . . .”

Why is Legal Writing So Difficult?

• Language of the law. Why is Legal Writing So Difficult?

• History. Plain English

• Legalisms: Harder to quit than smoking. • What word can you remove? “I enclose herewith a copy of my brief.” “I enclose herewith a copy of my brief.” • Archaic expressions. • Foreign words (Latin, French, etc.). • Sesquipedality. • Count syllables. • Don’t write it if you wouldn’t say it (“prior to,” “said,” “such”). • But be formal: No clichés, colloquialisms, jargon, or contractions. • Write for an eighth grader. Plain English

• Undefined and excessive abbreviations and acronyms. • The Plaintiff demanded ten dollars ($10.00) in Small Claims Court. • The Defendant (the “Defendant”), Mr. Smith (“Mr. Smith”), filed a motion (the “Motion”). • Excessive uppercasing: “The Lawyer filed a Summary Judgment Motion in Court.”

Flesh-Kincaid on WordPerfect Readability statistics • Tools. • Grammatik. • Options. • Analysis. • Readability. Flesh-Kincaid on Word Readability statistics • Word 2003-2007: • Tools; Spelling and Grammar; Options; Show readability statistics. • Word 2010: • Click “Microsoft Office Button.” Then “Word Options.” Then “Proofing.” • Select “Check grammar with spelling.” • Under “When correcting grammar in Word,” select “Show readability statistics.” Select “OK.” Hit F7. CRARC Method

Conclusion on the issue. Rule, supported by authority. Application of law to fact. Rebuttal and refutation. Conclusion stating relief you seek.

Controversies Controversies: Serial Comma

• Yesterday, the New York City Police Department arrested five criminals three burglars and two robbers. How many criminals did the New York City Police Department arrest?

Controversies: Serial Comma

• Yesterday, the New York City Police Department arrested five criminals: three burglars and two robbers. How many criminals did the New York City Police Department arrest?

• = five Controversies: Serial Comma

• Yesterday, the New York City Police Department arrested five criminals, three burglars, and two robbers. How many criminals did the New York City Police Department arrest?

• = ten Controversies: Hyphens

• In my pocket are ten dollar bills. How much money do I have?

Controversies: Hyphens

• Small claims arbitrator. • Small-claims arbitrator.

• Real estate agent. • Real-estate agent.

• Criminal justice system. • Criminal-justice system. Controversies

• Prepositions. • Split infinitives. • That/Which. • Innie or Outie? • Beginning sentences with “And” or “But.” • The conjunctive adverb. • Sentences. • Paragraphs. • Footnotes and endnotes. Persuasive-Writing Style

• Write concretely: Show, don’t tell.

Benjamin Franklin King Solomon

Persuasive Writing

• Not law school. • Not law review. • Not moot court. • Not history. • Not mystery.

Persuasive-Writing Tips

• Understate. • Stress arguments, not citations. • Visuals: Photographs, bullets point, charts, CD-ROMs, photocopy cases. • Bold, italics, underlining, quotation marks, question marks (rhetorical questions), exclamation points, capitals. • Emphasize and de-emphasize with sentence structure and sentence length. • Adjectives, adverbs, nouns, verbs. • Punctuation. • Parentheticals. • Direct mail solicitations.

The Passive Voice

• Single Passive. • Double Passive. The Passive Voice President Richard M. Nixon E-Filing and E-Documents

• New York State Courts Electronic Filing System (NYSCEF). • Court requires PDFs due to the security needs of legal documents. • Tips: hyperlink, CD ROMs, enable skimming, omit needless words, make it simple, use lots of white space, put the most important content at the top left of the page. Myths About Legal Writing

• Start early. • Edit late. • Revise. • Knowing everything before you start. • Writer’s block. • Take breaks. • Write in a comfortable setting. Revision Tips

• Novices focus on words choice only. • Write for the reader, not yourself. • Write for the ear, not for the eye. • Improve macro-organization: each paragraph must develop one point only. • Improve your large and small-scale organization: order of paragraphs and sections. • Edit on hard copy, not on computer. • Read out loud, backward. • Use an editor. • Do C&S work-up. • Spell checker, grammar checker, Bluebook checker.

Ethics of Writing Persuasively

• Exaggeration. • Emotional writing. • Pinpoint citations. Smith v Jones, 99 AD3d 100, 101 (1st Dept 2011), lv denied 91 NY3d 103 (2012). Or (Smith v Jones, 99 AD3d 100, 101 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 91 NY3d 103 [2012]). • Cite what you use. Use what you cite. • Dealing with the Rambo adversary. Organization

• Say it once, all in one place. • Thesis paragraphs: the roadmap. • Topic and thesis sentences. • Use headings and subheadings. Citing

• Bluebook: Nineteenth edition. • Right for federal, multi-state, and international sources and for law-journal editors and readers. • Wrong for lawyers who write to or for New York State courts.

Citing

• ALWD. Citing

• Tanbook: 2012. OFFICIAL EDITION New York Law Reports Style Manual Prepared by the New York State Law Reporting Bureau. http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/new_st yman.htm

Citing

• Limit string citing to three cases except when you must document the sources necessary to understand authority or a split in authority. • Cite only to apply rules to facts or to distinguish. • Citing well makes you credible. • Use pinpoint citations. • Never cite headnotes or syllabuses.

Citing

• Signals: • No signal (direct support). • “Contra” (direct contradiction). • “Cf.” if your citation supports your proposition by analogy. • “See” if your citation supports your proposition indirectly or by inference. • “But see” if your citation contradicts your proposition indirectly or by inference. • “E.g.” if your citation gives one or more examples to support your proposition directly. • “Id.” and “see id.” as short-form citations that refer unambiguously to a single, immediately preceding citation. Quoting • “Quote me as saying I was misquoted.” Groucho Marx. • Block quotations. • Lead-ins. • Alterations [ ]. • Omissions . . . . • Quotes within quotes. • Copy-and-paste on WordPerfect: Copy, home page, edit, paste special, unformatted text. • Copy-and-paste on Word: Copy, home page, paste, paste special, unformatted text. • On WordPerfect: Home page, view, reveal codes. Clarity • More important than concision. • Give foundation: Introduce before you explain. • State the rule before the exception. • Give the exception only if relevant. • Raise the issue before answering. • Answer before explaining. • State the point before the details. • Write directly, not indirectly. • Don’t generalize. Modifiers • Keep your modifiers next to the words they modify. (“Don’t go to a lawyer with legal problems.”) • Don’t separate subject from predicate. • Squinting modifiers. Where does “only” go: “The prosecutor wanted to cross examine the defendant.” • Dangling modifiers: word or phrase that modifies the wrong phrase or describes something not in the sentence. The solution is to write in the active voice. Identify who is doing what to whom — subject, verb, object — and your modifiers won’t dangle. • Example: “Last night, I shot an elephant in my pajamas. How it got into my pajamas I’ll never know.” Document Design

• Follow court rules. • Word count and page limits. • White space. • Spacing between sentences and citations. • Single space or double space? • Right-ragged margins. • Font: Prefer Century to Times New Roman, Courier, or Calibri (11 point) (the default in Word). Document Design

• Use a reasonable font size: ▫ 12-point type is a minimum. ▫ 14-point type is required by many courts. • Margins (allow plenty of white space.) • Italicize case names. Red v Green OR Red v Green? • THIS SENTENCE IS DIFFICULT TO READ BECAUSE IT IS WRITTEN IN ALL CAPS. Adverbial Excesses

• Clearly. • Obviously. Cowardly Qualifiers

• Generally. • Usually. Concision and Succinctness • Line editing. • “There is,” “there are,” “there were,” “it is.” • Example: “There are three cases supporting the rule.” • Watch for doubles: “Advance planning.” • Don’t excessively define, qualify, or overchronical. • Make your citations speak to save space. • It’s more important to be precise than concise. • Miscue: “The ball was thrown by me to her.”

Precision and Concision • Fresh fish sold here today. • Fresh fish sold here today.

• Fresh fish sold here today.

• Fresh fish sold here today. Nominalizations

The fine was far in excess of. (The fine was excessive/far exceeded.) She has a tendency to. (She tends to.) I have knowledge that. (I know.) Defendant committed a violation of. (Defendant violated.) Nominalizations

The judge was of the belief that he would be affirmed. (The judge believed.) The intention of the parties was to reach an agreement. (The parties intended to agree.) The District Judge gave a description. (The District Judge described.) The Court Clerk has a preference for the submission of documents. (The Court Clerk prefers that documents be submitted.)

Nominalizations

The establishment of the discovery violation might be difficult.

Establishing the discovery violation will be difficult.

Plaintiff will have difficulty proving that defendant violated the court’s discovery order.

Metadiscourse • Writing about writing. • “Having studied the case carefully and giving due consideration to all the evidence, the court respectfully concludes that . . . .” • “Another aspect of the case that ought to be considered is that . . . .” • “In dissent I propose to argue that . . . .” • “In our opinion . . . .” • “It is hornbook law that . . . .” • “It is well settled that . . . .” • “It is the court’s conclusion that . . . .” • “The court recognizes that . . . .”

Gender Neutrality

• A gourmet likes her coffee black. Not: “A gourmet likes their coffee black.” • Make it plural: • “G0urmets like their coffee black.” • Or delete the antecedent: • “A gourmet likes black coffee.” • No “he or she,” “him or her,” “s/he,” or worse.

Vague Referents

• “It,” “they,” “him,” “her,” “them.” Write in the Positive

Fix the following: Do not write in the negative. (Write in the positive.) This argument is not without support in the cases. (This argument is supported by the cases.) (The cases support the argument.) We remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. (Consistent with this opinion.) Exceptions.

Mechanics

• Numbers, numerals, and figures: spell out zero to ninety-nine and use figures for 100 and above. • References: Give the pages at which the reference begins and ends, separated by an en dash (–) or hyphen (-). • Example: “(People v Wilson, 44 NY2d 224- 225).” Mechanics • Typographic symbols: ▫ Paragraph (¶) and section symbols (§). ▫ Double the section or paragraph symbols when referring to consecutive sections or paragraphs. • The ampersand symbol “&” (and). Do’s and Don’ts

Do’s: Don’ts

• Right tone. • Pomposity. • Get to the point fast. • Inconsistency. • Give context. • Attacks and rudeness. • Love simple • Redundancies. declarative sentences. • Respect deadlines. • Add visuals. Legal Method • Memorandum opinions. • Concurrences • Dissents. • Majority opinions. • Plurality opinions. • Decrees. • Orders. • Seriatim opinions. • Per curiam opinions. • En banc opinions. Grammar

• Use a possessive to avoid a fused participle. • “The client did not object to his trying the case.” Not “him trying the case.” • “I appreciate your filing the brief.” “Not “you filing the brief.” • Delete “by and the first pronoun.” • “The case was argued by Fred and she.” “Argued by her.” • “Bill went to court with Fred and I.” “Went with me.” • Run-on sentences. • “He wrote the brief, she argued in court.” • Comparisons: “The case is better.” • Superlatives: “[I]n order to form a more perfect union . . . .” • “A” vs. “The.” Punctuation

• Use a question mark at the end of a direct question and a period at the end of an indirect question. ▫ Direct: Judge X said, “I am deciding the case today.” ▫ Indirect: “Judge X said that he was deciding the case today.” • Use one period, not two, when the sentence ends in an abbreviation. Not: “Ms. Packman, J.D..” Punctuation

• Introductory comma: “After the microwave blew up Mary sued.” • Colons. They go after an independent clause or before a list on a separate line. • “The area codes he calls are: 212, 718, 917, and 347.” • Semicolons. They go between two closely related independent clauses. • Apostrophes. Write as you speak: “Lebovits’ book” or “Lebovits’s book”? • Em dashes. Tense

• Past is past: ▫ “The suspect ran [not runs] from the police.” • State current rules in the present tense. • State past facts with current rules in the subjunctive: ▫ “This court has held that . . . .” • State permanent, immutable truths (truths that never change) in dependent clauses in the present tense: ▫ “Albert Einstein proved that E equals mc².” • State permanent, immutable truths in independent clauses in the past tense: ▫ “Albany was where Chief Judge Kaye presided.” ▫ “He was a former judge.”

Elegant Variation

• There’s power and clarity in repetition. Use different words to mean different things. Don’t use different words for the same thing. • “The prosecutor wanted to indict the defendant. That’s why the Assistant District Attorney [the prosecutor] secured a grand jury true bill [indictment] against the suspect who was arraigned [the defendant].” Brief Writing

Cover

Brief: Questions Presented

• Weak method: The objective “whether” statement. • Good method: (1) “Under,” (2) “law,” (3) did” (or “may,” “should,” “will,” “can,” etc.), (4) “court” (“this court” or “the trial court” or “party,” (5) “issue,” (6) add a comma, (7) “given that” (8) add 2-3 facts (only facts, no conclusions) helpful to you (and unhelpful to your opponent). • Best method: The deep issue. Brief: Facts • The most important consideration: Theme. • All arguments can be reduced to “We win because . . . . ” • What follows “because ” is your theory. • A smart high-school student should understand it. • It should appeal to your emotions: It’s about right and wrong. • Include every important and helpful authority, fact, and issue that supports your theme or contradicts your adversary’s theme. • Write persuasively, not objectively. • Use only facts: No law or conclusions. • Organization: Halo effect. • Order of facts: Storytelling. (Chronologically? By issue? By witness?) Brief: Facts

• Start with something helpful to your client: The protagonist. • Use past tense. • Perspective: How to refer to clients and opponents. • How many facts? Less is more. (1) Eliminate irrelevant details. (2) Compare facts in Facts section to facts in Argument section. (3) Add “bad” facts. • Include record references. • End with procedure.

Brief: Argument • CRARC • Cite only as relevant. • Footnotes. • String citations. • Point headings and sub-point headings. • Set out the court’s jurisdiction, the burden of proof to be applied by the trial court, and the appellate standard of review. Brief: Conclusion

• Tell the court what you want. • Include a proposed order when permitted. Before Filing

• Check for compliance with certifications. • Include proof of service. • File papers timely • Courtesy copies. Rhetorical Devices

• Parallel structure. • Antithesis.

Conclusion – Questions?

Cost Effective Legal

Types of Legal Literature

Primary Source Material

Secondary Source Material

Finding Tools Types of Legal Literature Types of Legal Literature Formats for legal

Information

Formats of Legal information have changed through time. Some continue to have vibrancy, while some are now disused. A now disused format

Cuneiform Hammurabi’s Code For example, the 8th law of the Code reads: “If any one steal cattle or sheep, or an ass, or a pig or a goat, if it belonged to a god or to the court, the thief shall pay thirty fold; if they belonged to a freed man of the king he shall pay tenfold; if the thief has nothing with which to pay he shall be put to death.” Formats for legal Information Formats for legal Information Formats for legal Information

The Oral tradition: Formats for legal Information

The Oral Tradition continues: Formats for legal Information Hand written 13 Century Law, Iceland Formats for legal Information

Books Formats for legal Information

Microforms / Microcards Formats for legal Information

Modern alternate formats:

CDs Formats for legal Information

Online sources: costly

Formats for legal Information

Online sources ‐Not costly:

NYCLA Resources New York State Library P‐card Public Library Resources Free Legal Sites on the Internet New York County Lawyers’ Association Resources:

Westlaw Lexis Bloomberg Professional Cost: Your dues to the Association Training: Every month Limitations: Onsite only NYSL ‘P’ – Borrower’s Card

• Applying for a NYSL Borrower's Card • Individuals can request a New York State Library Borrower's card application or a New York State Resident Borrower's card application at the Circulation Desk located on the 7th floor of the New York State Library or over the phone by calling (518) 473‐7895 or by sending an email to [email protected]. • Please specify the type of NYSL Borrower's card that you are applying for: New York State Library ‘P’ (Privileged) Borrower’s Card

NYSL ‘P’ – Borrower’s Card

• Attorneys • Attorneys who are residents of New York State and are admitted to the New York bar are eligible to receive a NYS Library Borrower card. Applicants must complete a NYSL Attorney Borrower's application and present personal identification that includes their home address such as a current NYS Driver's license or a current photo‐identification card issued by the NYS Department of Motor Vehicles AND one of the following: • Letterhead from the individual's firm with his/her name on it, business card or NYS bar card, or • A listing in a current legal directory. NYSL ‘P’ – Borrower’s Card

• Loislaw ‐ Primary source material for NY and Federal, cases, statutes, regulations and some secondary source materials. • State Capital Universe – Annotated Statutes for 50 states • Congressional Universe – Annotated Federal Statutes • LegalTrac – Index to 1,800 legal periodical w/ 200 full text • IndexMaster – Index to 5,000 legal treatises

• Remote Access for NYSL P Card

Public Library Resources

New Yorkers can access information 24 hours a day, 7 days a week by logging on to NOVELny—the New York Online Virtual Electronic Library. A wide variety of resources − books, magazines, newspapers, research and reference sources and more are available with NO FEES 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Public Library Resources

• NOVELNY —a pilot project for the Statewide Internet Library —is an online library of literally hundreds of magazines, newspapers, maps, charts, research and reference books that are available to every New Yorker, free of charge. All you need is your public library card, New York driver license, or non‐driver ID. Students may also access the NOVELny databases through their school or academic library.

• NOVELny saves time on endless, frustrating searches. Providing comprehensive information, NOVELny is organized and has been judged to be accurate and fair.

• Across New York State, NOVELny gives communities online access to the full text of hundreds of journals, newspapers, and other references.

• Access information 24 hours a day, 7 days a week from your desktop by logging on to NOVELny—the New York Online Virtual Electronic Library.

Public Library Resources

• NOVELNY Resources by Subject: • Business & Finance • General Reference • Health & Medicine • Literature • Multi‐Subject • Newspapers Free sites on the Internet

Findlaw for Legal Professionals http://lp.findlaw.com/

Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute http://www.law.cornell.edu/

WashLaw‐ one of the nation's leading Internet legal research portals, http://www.washlaw.edu/

Google Scholar http://scholar.google.com http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/Decisions.htm

• The New York Slip Opinion Service provides access to recently released decisions prior to publication in the Official Reports, together with an electronic citation for each decision. Opinions selected for on‐line publication only are also available. (There is no access charge.)

• The New York Official Reports Service provides access to the text of all decisions published or abstracted in the Official Reports from January 1, 1993 through the latest Advance Sheet. The Official Reports Service Archive provides the text of landmark and other notable decisions published in the Official Reports prior to January 1, 1993. (There is no access charge.)

A Local site

The Center for New York City Law at New York Law School A library of decisions decided by New York City agencies Total decisions available: 65,069

http://www.nyls.edu/centers/harlan_scholar_centers/center_for_new_y ork_city_law/cityadmin_library

Or Google <“Center for NYC Law”> The Center for New York City Law at New York Law School

• GENERAL CITY AGENCIES • LAND USE AGENCIES • CHR (Comm. on Human Rights) • BSA (Board of Standards & Appeals) • COIB (Conflicts of Interest Board) • BORO PRESIDENTS (ULURP • DCA (Department of Consumer Affairs) Recommendations ) • DOI (Department of Investigation) • COUNCIL (City Council Land Use) • ECB (Environmental Control Board) • CPC (City Planning Comm.) • LAW DEPT. (Opinions of the Corporation • DOB (Department of Buildings) Counsel) • LANDMARKS (Landmarks Preservation • MAYOR (Mayor's Executive Orders) Comm.) • MOCS (Mayor's Office of Contract • LOFT (Loft Board) Services) • OATH (Office of Admin. Trials & Hearings ) • OCB (Office of Collective Bargaining) Board of Collective Bargaining Board of Certification • TAT (Tax Appeals Tribunal) • TLC (Taxi and Limo Commission) Hammurabi’s Code

See: http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/MESO/CODE.HTM Dan Jordan

Dan Jordan has held various Law Librarian positions since 1980. He is a 1980 graduate of the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law in Sacramento, California and a 1982 Masters in Library Science graduate from Pratt Institute in Brooklyn, New York. His BA is from Brooklyn College. Mr. Jordan has worked in legal academia for most of his career and also has experience working in law firm libraries. He has been the Director of Library Services at NYCLA since May 2008. He is a member of the California Bar.

Home Equity Conversion Mortgages (HECM) Their history, their new rules and their uses

Presented by Alfie Schloss NMLS ID 404064

WHAT IS A HECM? There are two types of Home Equity Conversion Mortgages. • HECM (Home Equity Conversion Mortgage) – Fixed and Adjustable Rates Insured by FHA/HUD • Proprietary “Jumbo” Reverse Mortgages* - Cash out only! (* Not currently available in New York but available in New Jersey and Connecticut)

• In all instances, borrowers must be 62** years of age at closing. Borrowers can access some of their home equity and never have to make repayments as long as they live in the home. Borrowers retain ownership of their home and there is no personal liability to repay the loan, beyond the lien on the property itself. The loan becomes due and payable when the last borrower permanently leaves the home. ***

(** It is possible to do a HECM loan for a couple when a spouse is younger than 62 years of age, however there will be less funds available and if the older borrower pre-deceases the younger, the younger surviving borrower will not receive funds or be able to access them. They will be able to continue to live in the property and do not have to make repayments.)

(*** When the last borrower dies the executor of the estate has 30 days to notify the servicer and let them know how they intend to proceed. They have 6 months to repay the loan or list the property for sale. Once listed for sale, the executor can request two 90 day extensions to extend the repayment period to a full year if needed).

WHAT IS A HECM?

• A Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM), also known as a reverse mortgage, is a loan that allows homeowners over the age of 62 * , to access some of their primary homes’ equity to use with no restrictions. A HECM is a true home equity loan requiring less documentation than a mortgage or HELOC. There is no requirement to make any repayment during the life of the loan, and there is no pre-payment penalty.

• Eligible properties are, owner occupied, 1-4 family homes, FHA Approved Condo's, PUD's and Manufactured Homes on owned land, (that meet FHA requirements.)

• Ineligible properties are Coops, Log Homes, Vacation Homes, Single-wide Manufactured Homes.

• Valuations are based on appraisal. For HECM loans the appraisals are done by FHA Appraisers.

(* It is possible to do a HECM loan for a couple when a spouse is younger than 62 years of age, however there will be less funds available and if the older borrower pre-deceases the younger, the younger surviving borrower will not receive funds or be able to access them. They will be able to continue to live in the property and do not have to make repayments.)

THE HISTORY OF HECM LOANS

It is believed that Reverse Mortgages began in the US in 1961 when the Deering Savings & Loan in Portland Maine made a loan for the widow of the local high school football coach.

From 1961 – 1989 there were a number of lenders who offered different types of reverse mortgage products. They were unregulated and as such there was abuse and scandal giving the product a reputation as a predatory loan. In 1985 FHA/HUD sponsored a conference on Home Equity Conversion and from 1986 – 1988 Congress passed legislation that paved the way for todays HECM program.

In 1989 HUD selected Fifty lenders by lottery to make the first FHA – Insured Home Equity Conversion Mortgages. In 1990, 157 Loans were made nationally.

To-date through Fiscal 2014 879,708 HECM’s have funded in the US.

THE HISTORY OF HECM LOANS The HECM Program was officially enacted in 1988 when President Ronald Reagan signed the National Housing Bill into law. Section 255 established the HECM demonstration program and it’s regulations. It was subsequently updated in 2008, 2009 and most recently in 2014. The first FHA-insured HECM reverse mortgage is closed on October 19 1988 by the James B. Nutter & Company of Kansas City, Missouri. The program became “Official” in 1998 when the HUD Appropriations Act funded the program.

Everything changed in 2008. FHA changed the rules on how HECM Loans could be structured, allowing for a fixed rate product where the borrower took a lump sum at closing rather than receiving money over time. Ginnie Mae, a government corporation within HUD, began securitizing fixed rate HECM’s, greatly increasing the incentive for lenders to focus on these products. Additionally, with the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market, there was an influx of these lenders becoming HECM originators, sensing easy targets in the senior citizen community. As a result between 2008 and 2012, 80% of all HECM loans originated were fixed rate cash out loans.

THE HISTORY OF HECM LOANS

The market shift had dramatic consequences for both borrowers and the FHA. By February of 2012, 10% of HECM borrowers faced a tax and insurance (T&I) default, which occurs when the borrower fails to keep current on property taxes and homeowner’s insurance, both of which are required in the terms of a HECM loan. The problem was overwhelmingly caused by the new fixed rate loans and unethical lending practices.

In 2013 and 2014, the FHA announced major changes to the HECM program which are widely believed to be positive for almost everyone. In April 2013, the fixed rate product was modified making it unpopular and virtually eliminating it. The effect was almost immediate – industry experts are reporting that originations are now over 90% adjustable rate.

THE HISTORY OF HECM LOANS Later in 2014, the FHA limited the up front lump sum payment to 60% of the principal limit in the first year*. Principal limits were also reduced across the board, further reducing lump sum initial payments.

While Fixed Rate Loans we’re not eliminated, they were made to be unwieldy and as such their use has dropped significantly and with it, so has FHA’s risk.

Effective April 27th 2015, the FHA begins requiring borrowers to undergo a financial assessment in obtaining a HECM loan. This assessment is designed to determine whether a borrower will be able to make T&I payments going forward and whether they will have sufficient residual income to afford to live in the home. The assessment looks at the borrowers income, expenses and credit history to determine whether they have shown a willingness to responsibly pay their debts especially their property taxes and homeowners insurance.

(* If mandatory obligations exceed 60% of Principal Limit, the loan can still be done, however the upfront mortgage insurance (IMIP) increases from .5% of Maximum Claim Amount to 2.5% making it very costly and appropriate for only the most needy borrowers. Again, FHA is trying to avoid having borrowers default)

How Does A HECM Work?

For Home Equity Conversion Mortgages the maximum claim amount is $625,500.00 or the appraised value of the home, whichever is less .

Based on the age of the youngest borrower, the homeowners can access a percentage of that value, with a larger percentage made available for older borrowers. The amount made available to borrowers is called the Principal Limit.

Borrowers can access available funds as monthly tax free* income, a growing line of credit, a lump sum (up to 60% of the Principal Limit available in Year 1) or a combination of all three options. (See sample loan comparisons)

There is no required monthly payment and there is no prepayment penalty. A HECM can be used in lieu of a regular mortgage and interest, when repaid, is tax deductible.

(* Check with a tax professional)

How Does A HECM Work?

The loan remains in force as long as one of the borrowers resides in the home. When the last borrower permanently leaves the home, the borrower, their estate (or POA) must contact the lender within 30 days and inform the lender of their intentions. There is an initial period of six months during which the loan must be repaid, settled, or refinanced. Two extensions of 90 days are permitted by HUD but must be requested.

Borrowers are obligated to pay real estate taxes on time, keep the home insured and maintain the property. Failure to do so could lead to foreclosure.

Borrowers can never owe more than the home, neither they or their estate have any personal liability.

Borrowers must attend a HECM Counseling session before they are eligible to apply.

Lenders are required to provide borrowers with a list of local and national independent counselors who offer the HECM counseling and may not steer borrowers to any specific counselor

How Does A HECM Work?

HECM’s can be done with homes in Life Estates and with Trusts but there are special requirements for those situations and the investor must approve the trust. With life estates, Remaindermen should be counseled and they must sign the security instruments at closing.

Funds from a HECM are not considered income so they do not affect eligibility for government programs that are income or asset sensitive.

With incapacitated homeowners, a HECM can be initiated by a durable power of attorney with a doctor's letter avowing that the borrower is incapacitated and that they had capacity when they signed the power of attorney. Loans can also be initiated by a court appointed guardian (With the court’s permission).

Popular uses for HECM Loans

• Pay off existing mortgage/other debt, create liquidity • Create a “standby” revolving cash reserve • Supplement income with a steady stream of tax free funds • Pay property taxes • Make home repairs or improvements • Pay for medical bills or in-home care • Buy a right-sized new home or a vacation home • Pay for travel • Estate Planning (Delay taking social security to age 70, etc.) • Help children and/or grandchildren • Improve ones’ quality of life

An Innovative use of a HECM

For retiring homeowners with significant holdings in IRA’s 401K’s or other deferred retirement accounts being required to take minimum distributions at age 70 ½ will create a significant tax bill eroding their investments and wealth. Consider that 62 year olds, planning to remain in their home, can begin converting their holdings to Roth IRA’s and use HECM proceeds to pay the income tax. The investments in the Roth will grow tax free, there will be no required distribution and the funds will pass to heirs tax free upon their death.

It’s definitely worth exploring with some of your clients.

HECM v/s HELOC?

• For borrowers seeking a line of credit why do a HECM versus a HELOC?

• HELOC’s or Home Equity Lines of Credit, require underwriting of borrower’s ability to repay.

• HELOC’s generally have a draw term of ten years during which only interest must be repaid each month. At maturity however, repayment of principal and interest are required.

• The lender can freeze the HELOC at their discretion without notice.

• HELOC’s can have pre-payment penalties. Feature HECM HELOC Monthly Payment NO YES Income/Credit Requirements NO YES Rescindable by Lender NO YES

Guaranteed Growth Rate YES NO

HECM LOC SAMPLE

Sample loan for illustration only. Rates change. Based on 67 year old borrower in NY with a $400,000 home. HECM “TENURE” SAMPLE

Sample loan for illustration only. Rates change. Based on 67 year old borrower in NY with a $400,000 home. HECM “TERM” SAMPLE

Sample loan for illustration only. Rates change. Based on 67 year old borrower in NY with a $400,000 home. HECM FIXED W/MORTGAGE PAYOFF SAMPLE HECM LIBOR W/MORTGAGE PAYOFF SAMPLE

Sample loan for illustration only. Rates change. Based on 67 year old borrower in NY with a $400,000 home. HECM for Purchase (H4P)

• Someone over the age of 62 can purchase a new home using a HECM for Purchase to finance the purchase.

• The home must be a principal residence and one cannot apply until there is an executed contract of sale and a certificate of occupancy.

• Borrower must occupy the property within 60 days of closing on the loan.

• Borrowers can retain one other property and must provide proof that the funds being used for the purchase are liquid and not borrowed. If they are retaining another residence they must document that they have sufficient income to maintain both homes and their income to debt ratio cannot exceed 43%.

• If borrowers have defaulted , had late payments or had a short sale on another mortgage they may be ineligible. This is considered on a case by case basis. H4P cannot be done with POA or Guardianship.

HECM FOR PURCHASE SAMPLE

Sample loan for illustration only. Rates change. Based on 67 year old borrower in NY purchasing a $700,000 home. HECM FOR PURCHASE SAMPLE

Sample loan for illustration only. Rates change. Based on 67 year old borrower in NY purchasing a $700,000 home. Changes Happening Now!

• Effective April 27 2015 there are new requirements from HUD a “Financial Assessment” requiring full documentation of a borrowers income, assets and expenses. Credit reports will be scrutinized by underwriters in order to determine whether a borrower has shown the willingness to pay and has the ability to pay, property charges and insurance going forward. The must also ascertain that a borrower will have sufficient residual income to afford to sustain themselves in the home. If a borrower is not determined to meet the new guidelines they may be required to have an escrowed set- aside for taxes and insurance called a LESA withheld and in some instances may be denied from being able to obtain the loan. Most borrowers will still be eligible. Monies set aside in the LESA will have growth similar to the unused funds in a HECM Line of Credit.

Questions?

Alfie Schloss NMLS #404064 Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Originator 914-275-3361 [email protected] www.usmortgage.com/alfie.schloss Amortization Schedule - Annual Projections

Borrower Name/Case Number: Sally and Steven Senior / Refinance: No Age of Youngest Borrower: 68 Initial Property Value: $400,000.00 Interest Rate (Expected / Initial): 5.020% / 3.698% Beg. Mortgage Balance: $12,269.45 Maximum Claim Amount: $400,000.00 Expected Appreciation: 4.000% Initial Principal Limit: $224,800.00 Initial Line Of Credit: $0.00 Initial Advance: $0.00 Monthly Payment: $5,085.04 Lien Payoffs with Reverse Mortgage: $0.00 Monthly Servicing Fee: $0.00 Financed Closing Costs: $12,269.45 Mortgage Insurance (MIP) 1.25%

NOTE: Actual interest charges and property value projections may vary from amounts shown. Available credit will be less than projected if funds withdrawn from line-of-credit.

Annual Totals End of Year Projections Yr Age SVC Cash MIP Rate Interest Loan Line Of Property Equity Fee Payment Balance Credit Value 1 68 $0 $61,020 $576 3.698% $1,705 $75,571 $0 $416,000 $339,979 2 69 $0 $61,020 $1,386 3.698% $4,100 $142,078 $0 $432,640 $290,112 3 70 $0 $61,020 $2,236 3.698% $6,616 $211,950 $0 $449,946 $237,545 4 71 $0 $55,935 $3,124 3.698% $9,243 $280,253 $0 $467,943 $187,240 5 72 $0 $0 $3,584 3.698% $10,602 $294,439 $0 $486,661 $191,772 6 73 $0 $0 $3,765 3.698% $11,139 $309,343 $0 $506,128 $196,335 7 74 $0 $0 $3,956 3.698% $11,703 $325,001 $0 $526,373 $200,921 8 75 $0 $0 $4,156 3.698% $12,295 $341,452 $0 $547,428 $205,525 9 76 $0 $0 $4,366 3.698% $12,917 $358,736 $0 $569,325 $210,139 10 77 $0 $0 $4,587 3.698% $13,571 $376,894 $0 $592,098 $214,754 11 78 $0 $0 $4,819 3.698% $14,258 $395,972 $0 $615,782 $219,360 12 79 $0 $0 $5,063 3.698% $14,980 $416,015 $0 $640,413 $223,948 13 80 $0 $0 $5,320 3.698% $15,738 $437,072 $0 $666,029 $228,507 14 81 $0 $0 $5,589 3.698% $16,535 $459,196 $0 $692,671 $233,025 15 82 $0 $0 $5,872 3.698% $17,372 $482,439 $0 $720,377 $237,488 16 83 $0 $0 $6,169 3.698% $18,251 $506,859 $0 $749,192 $241,883 17 84 $0 $0 $6,481 3.698% $19,175 $532,515 $0 $779,160 $246,195 18 85 $0 $0 $6,809 3.698% $20,145 $559,470 $0 $810,327 $250,406 19 86 $0 $0 $7,154 3.698% $21,165 $587,789 $0 $842,740 $254,500 20 87 $0 $0 $7,516 3.698% $22,236 $617,542 $0 $876,449 $258,457 21 88 $0 $0 $7,897 3.698% $23,362 $648,800 $0 $911,507 $262,257 22 89 $0 $0 $8,296 3.698% $24,544 $681,641 $0 $947,968 $265,876 23 90 $0 $0 $8,716 3.698% $25,787 $716,144 $0 $985,886 $269,292 24 91 $0 $0 $9,158 3.698% $27,092 $752,394 $0 $1,025,322 $272,478 25 92 $0 $0 $9,621 3.698% $28,463 $790,478 $0 $1,066,335 $275,406 26 93 $0 $0 $10,108 3.698% $29,904 $830,490 $0 $1,108,988 $278,048 28 95 $0 $0 $11,157 3.698% $33,008 $916,693 $0 $1,199,481 $282,338 30 97 $0 $0 $12,315 3.698% $36,434 $1,011,844 $0 $1,297,359 $285,065 32 99 $0 $0 $13,594 3.698% $40,216 $1,116,871 $0 $1,403,223 $285,903

Sally Senior Date

Steven Senior Date

Loan Officer Company NMLS #: 3901 Loan Officer NMLS #: 404064 Printed: 4/14/2015 2008-2015 ReverseVision, Inc. 1984,482 Page 1 of 1 AMORT / 0285 Amortization Schedule - Annual Projections

Borrower Name/Case Number: Sally and Steven Senior / Refinance: No Age of Youngest Borrower: 68 Initial Property Value: $700,000.00 Interest Rate (Expected / Initial): 4.990% / 4.990% Beg. Mortgage Balance: $351,531.00 Maximum Claim Amount: $625,500.00 Expected Appreciation: 4.000% Initial Principal Limit: $351,531.00 Initial Line Of Credit: $0.00 Cash Due From Borrower: $- 370,025.95 Monthly Payment: $0.00 Purchase Price: $700,000.00 Monthly Servicing Fee: $0.00 Financed Closing Costs: $21,556.95 Mortgage Insurance (MIP) 1.25%

NOTE: Actual interest charges and property value projections may vary from amounts shown. Available credit will be less than projected if funds withdrawn from line-of-credit.

Annual Totals End of Year Projections Yr Age SVC Cash MIP Rate Interest Loan Line Of Property Equity Fee Payment Balance Credit Value 1 68 $0 $0 $4,522 4.990% $18,052 $374,105 $0 $728,000 $353,445 2 69 $0 $0 $4,812 4.990% $19,211 $398,128 $0 $757,120 $358,542 3 70 $0 $0 $5,121 4.990% $20,445 $423,695 $0 $787,405 $363,260 4 71 $0 $0 $5,450 4.990% $21,758 $450,903 $0 $818,901 $367,548 5 72 $0 $0 $5,800 4.990% $23,155 $479,858 $0 $851,657 $371,349 6 73 $0 $0 $6,173 4.990% $24,642 $510,672 $0 $885,723 $374,601 7 74 $0 $0 $6,569 4.990% $26,224 $543,465 $0 $921,152 $377,237 8 75 $0 $0 $6,991 4.990% $27,908 $578,365 $0 $957,998 $379,184 9 76 $0 $0 $7,440 4.990% $29,700 $615,505 $0 $996,318 $380,363 10 77 $0 $0 $7,918 4.990% $31,608 $655,030 $0 $1,036,171 $380,691 11 78 $0 $0 $8,426 4.990% $33,637 $697,093 $0 $1,077,618 $380,074 12 79 $0 $0 $8,967 4.990% $35,797 $741,858 $0 $1,120,723 $378,415 13 80 $0 $0 $9,543 4.990% $38,096 $789,497 $0 $1,165,551 $375,604 14 81 $0 $0 $10,156 4.990% $40,542 $840,195 $0 $1,212,174 $371,528 15 82 $0 $0 $10,808 4.990% $43,146 $894,149 $0 $1,260,660 $366,061 16 83 $0 $0 $11,502 4.990% $45,917 $951,568 $0 $1,311,087 $359,069 17 84 $0 $0 $12,241 4.990% $48,865 $1,012,674 $0 $1,363,530 $350,407 18 85 $0 $0 $13,027 4.990% $52,003 $1,077,703 $0 $1,418,072 $339,918 19 86 $0 $0 $13,863 4.990% $55,342 $1,146,909 $0 $1,474,794 $327,435 20 87 $0 $0 $14,754 4.990% $58,896 $1,220,559 $0 $1,533,786 $312,777 21 88 $0 $0 $15,701 4.990% $62,678 $1,298,938 $0 $1,595,138 $295,749 22 89 $0 $0 $16,709 4.990% $66,703 $1,382,351 $0 $1,658,943 $276,142 23 90 $0 $0 $17,782 4.990% $70,987 $1,471,120 $0 $1,725,301 $253,731 24 91 $0 $0 $18,924 4.990% $75,545 $1,565,589 $0 $1,794,313 $228,274 25 92 $0 $0 $20,139 4.990% $80,396 $1,666,125 $0 $1,866,085 $199,510 26 93 $0 $0 $21,433 4.990% $85,559 $1,773,117 $0 $1,940,729 $167,162 28 95 $0 $0 $24,274 4.990% $96,900 $2,008,153 $0 $2,099,092 $90,489 30 97 $0 $0 $27,491 4.990% $109,745 $2,274,345 $0 $2,270,378 $0 32 99 $0 $0 $31,135 4.990% $124,293 $2,575,822 $0 $2,455,641 $0

Sally Senior Date

Steven Senior Date

Loan Officer Company NMLS #: 3901 Loan Officer NMLS #: 404064 Printed: 4/14/2015 2008-2015 ReverseVision, Inc. 1984,482 Page 1 of 1 AMORT / 0285 Reverse Mortgage Comparison Estimates For: Sally Senior Date Of Birth: 11/5/1947 Steven Senior Date Of Birth: 9/4/1943 From: Alfie Schloss, US Mortgage Corporation 123 Main St 201 Old Country Road, Suite 140, Melville, NY NEW CITY, NY 10956 11747 Closing Date: 5/19/2015 (estimate) Phone: 631-580-2600 102

PA Fixed 2014 Annual Libor PA MonthlyLibor PA Rates and Fees 2014 2014 Margin N/A 3.000% 3.000% Initial Interest Rate 4.990% 3.698% 3.179% Expected Interest Rate 4.990% 5.020% 5.020% Ongoing Mortgage Insurance Rate 1.25% 1.25% 1.25% Cap on Interest Rate 4.990% 8.698% 13.179% Initial Line of Credit Growth N/A 4.948% 4.429% Calculation Home Value $700,000.00 $700,000.00 $700,000.00 Maximum Claim Amount $625,500.00 $625,500.00 $625,500.00 Principal Limit $351,531.00 $351,531.00 $351,531.00 - IMIP $15,637.50 $15,637.50 $15,637.50 - Origination Fee $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 - Other Costs $5,919.45 $5,919.45 $5,919.45 + Credits $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 Remaining Principal Limit $329,974.05 $329,974.05 $329,974.05 - Purchase Price $700,000.00 $700,000.00 $700,000.00 - Repair Set Aside $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 - 1st Year Tax and Insurance Set Aside $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 Total Mandatory Obligations $351,531.00 $351,531.00 $351,531.00 % of Principal Limit 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% Initial Disbursement Limit $351,531.00 $351,531.00 $351,531.00 % of Principal Limit 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% - Additional Tax and Insurance Set Aside $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 Available Principal Limit -$370,025.95 -$370,025.95 -$370,025.95 Available Funds and Requested Payments Max Available Cash at Closing -$370,025.95 -$370,025.95 -$370,025.95 Cash Due From Borrower -$370,025.95 -$370,025.95 -$370,025.95 Total Line Of Credit N/A $0.00 $0.00 Line Of Credit Available 1st Year N/A $0.00 $0.00 Line Of Credit Available After 1st Year N/A $0.00 $0.00 Available Monthly Tenure Payment 1st Year N/A $0.00 $0.00 Monthly Payment 1st Year N/A $0.00 $0.00 Available Monthly Tenure Payment N/A $0.00 $0.00 Monthly Payment Request N/A $0.00 $0.00 Initial Loan Balance $351,531.00 $351,531.00 $351,531.00 Unavailable Principal Limit $0.00 $0.00 $0.00

The above numbers are calculated based upon the specified interest rates and the estimated closing date noted above. Changes in interest rates and/or changes in actual closing dates may cause the amounts available to be higher or lower than stated.

Loan Officer Company NMLS #: 3901 Loan Officer NMLS #: 404064 Printed: 4/14/2015 2008-2015 ReverseVision, Inc. 1984,482 Page 1 of 2 Compare / 0118 Sally Senior Date

Steven Senior Date

Loan Officer Company NMLS #: 3901 Loan Officer NMLS #: 404064 Printed: 4/14/2015 2008-2015 ReverseVision, Inc. 1984,482 Page 2 of 2 Compare / 0118 Amortization Schedule - Annual Projections

Borrower Name/Case Number: Sally and Steven Senior / Refinance: No Age of Youngest Borrower: 68 Initial Property Value: $400,000.00 Interest Rate (Expected / Initial): 4.990% / 4.990% Beg. Mortgage Balance: $224,800.00 Maximum Claim Amount: $400,000.00 Expected Appreciation: 4.000% Initial Principal Limit: $224,800.00 Initial Line Of Credit: $0.00 Initial Advance: $7,530.55 Monthly Payment: $0.00 Lien Payoffs with Reverse Mortgage: $200,000.00 Monthly Servicing Fee: $0.00 Financed Closing Costs: $17,269.45 Mortgage Insurance (MIP) 1.25%

NOTE: Actual interest charges and property value projections may vary from amounts shown. Available credit will be less than projected if funds withdrawn from line-of-credit.

Annual Totals End of Year Projections Yr Age SVC Cash MIP Rate Interest Loan Line Of Property Equity Fee Payment Balance Credit Value 1 68 $0 $0 $2,892 4.990% $11,544 $239,236 $0 $416,000 $176,314 2 69 $0 $0 $3,077 4.990% $12,285 $254,598 $0 $432,640 $177,592 3 70 $0 $0 $3,275 4.990% $13,074 $270,948 $0 $449,946 $178,548 4 71 $0 $0 $3,485 4.990% $13,914 $288,347 $0 $467,943 $179,146 5 72 $0 $0 $3,709 4.990% $14,807 $306,863 $0 $486,661 $179,348 6 73 $0 $0 $3,947 4.990% $15,758 $326,569 $0 $506,128 $179,109 7 74 $0 $0 $4,201 4.990% $16,770 $347,540 $0 $526,373 $178,383 8 75 $0 $0 $4,471 4.990% $17,847 $369,857 $0 $547,428 $177,120 9 76 $0 $0 $4,758 4.990% $18,993 $393,608 $0 $569,325 $175,267 10 77 $0 $0 $5,063 4.990% $20,213 $418,884 $0 $592,098 $172,764 11 78 $0 $0 $5,388 4.990% $21,511 $445,783 $0 $615,782 $169,548 12 79 $0 $0 $5,734 4.990% $22,892 $474,410 $0 $640,413 $165,553 13 80 $0 $0 $6,103 4.990% $24,362 $504,874 $0 $666,029 $160,705 14 81 $0 $0 $6,495 4.990% $25,926 $537,295 $0 $692,671 $154,925 15 82 $0 $0 $6,912 4.990% $27,591 $571,798 $0 $720,377 $148,129 16 83 $0 $0 $7,355 4.990% $29,363 $608,517 $0 $749,192 $140,226 17 84 $0 $0 $7,828 4.990% $31,249 $647,593 $0 $779,160 $131,117 18 85 $0 $0 $8,330 4.990% $33,255 $689,179 $0 $810,327 $120,698 19 86 $0 $0 $8,865 4.990% $35,391 $733,435 $0 $842,740 $108,855 20 87 $0 $0 $9,435 4.990% $37,663 $780,533 $0 $876,449 $95,466 21 88 $0 $0 $10,041 4.990% $40,082 $830,656 $0 $911,507 $80,401 22 89 $0 $0 $10,685 4.990% $42,656 $883,997 $0 $947,968 $63,520 23 90 $0 $0 $11,372 4.990% $45,395 $940,764 $0 $985,886 $44,672 24 91 $0 $0 $12,102 4.990% $48,310 $1,001,176 $0 $1,025,322 $23,695 25 92 $0 $0 $12,879 4.990% $51,413 $1,065,468 $0 $1,066,335 $417 26 93 $0 $0 $13,706 4.990% $54,714 $1,133,888 $0 $1,108,988 $0 28 95 $0 $0 $15,523 4.990% $61,967 $1,284,191 $0 $1,199,481 $0 30 97 $0 $0 $17,580 4.990% $70,181 $1,454,417 $0 $1,297,359 $0 32 99 $0 $0 $19,911 4.990% $79,484 $1,647,209 $0 $1,403,223 $0

Sally Senior Date

Steven Senior Date

Loan Officer Company NMLS #: 3901 Loan Officer NMLS #: 404064 Printed: 4/14/2015 2008-2015 ReverseVision, Inc. 1984,482 Page 1 of 1 AMORT / 0285 Amortization Schedule - Annual Projections

Borrower Name/Case Number: Sally and Steven Senior / Refinance: No Age of Youngest Borrower: 68 Initial Property Value: $400,000.00 Interest Rate (Expected / Initial): 5.020% / 3.698% Beg. Mortgage Balance: $217,269.45 Maximum Claim Amount: $400,000.00 Expected Appreciation: 4.000% Initial Principal Limit: $224,800.00 Initial Line Of Credit: $7,530.55 Initial Advance: $0.00 Monthly Payment: $0.00 Lien Payoffs with Reverse Mortgage: $200,000.00 Monthly Servicing Fee: $0.00 Financed Closing Costs: $17,269.45 Mortgage Insurance (MIP) 1.25%

NOTE: Actual interest charges and property value projections may vary from amounts shown. Available credit will be less than projected if funds withdrawn from line-of-credit.

Annual Totals End of Year Projections Yr Age SVC Cash MIP Rate Interest Loan Line Of Property Equity Fee Payment Balance Credit Value 1 68 $0 $0 $2,778 3.698% $8,219 $228,267 $7,912 $416,000 $187,283 2 69 $0 $0 $2,919 3.698% $8,635 $239,821 $8,312 $432,640 $192,369 3 70 $0 $0 $3,067 3.698% $9,073 $251,961 $8,733 $449,946 $197,535 4 71 $0 $0 $3,222 3.698% $9,532 $264,714 $9,175 $467,943 $202,779 5 72 $0 $0 $3,385 3.698% $10,014 $278,114 $9,639 $486,661 $208,098 6 73 $0 $0 $3,556 3.698% $10,521 $292,191 $10,127 $506,128 $213,487 7 74 $0 $0 $3,736 3.698% $11,054 $306,981 $10,640 $526,373 $218,942 8 75 $0 $0 $3,925 3.698% $11,613 $322,520 $11,179 $547,428 $224,458 9 76 $0 $0 $4,124 3.698% $12,201 $338,845 $11,744 $569,325 $230,030 10 77 $0 $0 $4,333 3.698% $12,819 $355,997 $12,339 $592,098 $235,651 11 78 $0 $0 $4,552 3.698% $13,467 $374,016 $12,963 $615,782 $241,315 12 79 $0 $0 $4,783 3.698% $14,149 $392,948 $13,620 $640,413 $247,015 13 80 $0 $0 $5,025 3.698% $14,865 $412,838 $14,309 $666,029 $252,741 14 81 $0 $0 $5,279 3.698% $15,618 $433,735 $15,033 $692,671 $258,485 15 82 $0 $0 $5,546 3.698% $16,408 $455,690 $15,794 $720,377 $264,238 16 83 $0 $0 $5,827 3.698% $17,239 $478,756 $16,594 $749,192 $269,987 17 84 $0 $0 $6,122 3.698% $18,111 $502,989 $17,434 $779,160 $275,721 18 85 $0 $0 $6,432 3.698% $19,028 $528,449 $18,316 $810,327 $281,427 19 86 $0 $0 $6,758 3.698% $19,991 $555,198 $19,243 $842,740 $287,091 20 87 $0 $0 $7,100 3.698% $21,003 $583,301 $20,217 $876,449 $292,698 21 88 $0 $0 $7,459 3.698% $22,066 $612,827 $21,241 $911,507 $298,231 22 89 $0 $0 $7,836 3.698% $23,183 $643,846 $22,316 $947,968 $303,671 23 90 $0 $0 $8,233 3.698% $24,357 $676,436 $23,445 $985,886 $309,000 24 91 $0 $0 $8,650 3.698% $25,590 $710,676 $24,632 $1,025,322 $314,196 25 92 $0 $0 $9,088 3.698% $26,885 $746,649 $25,879 $1,066,335 $319,236 26 93 $0 $0 $9,548 3.698% $28,246 $784,442 $27,189 $1,108,988 $324,095 28 95 $0 $0 $10,539 3.698% $31,178 $865,866 $30,011 $1,199,481 $333,166 30 97 $0 $0 $11,633 3.698% $34,414 $955,740 $33,126 $1,297,359 $341,169 32 99 $0 $0 $12,840 3.698% $37,986 $1,054,944 $36,564 $1,403,223 $347,830

Sally Senior Date

Steven Senior Date

Annual Libor PA MonthlyLibor PA PA Fixed 2014 Rates and Fees 2014 2014 Margin 3.000% 3.000% N/A Initial Interest Rate 3.698% 3.179% 4.990% Expected Interest Rate 5.020% 5.020% 4.990% Ongoing Mortgage Insurance Rate 1.25% 1.25% 1.25% Cap on Interest Rate 8.698% 13.179% 4.990% Initial Line of Credit Growth 4.948% 4.429% N/A Calculation Home Value $400,000.00 $400,000.00 $400,000.00 Maximum Claim Amount $400,000.00 $400,000.00 $400,000.00 Principal Limit $224,800.00 $224,800.00 $224,800.00 - IMIP $10,000.00 $10,000.00 $10,000.00 - Origination Fee $3,000.00 $3,000.00 $6,000.00 - Other Costs $4,269.45 $4,269.45 $4,269.45 + Credits $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 Remaining Principal Limit $207,530.55 $207,530.55 $204,530.55 - Liens and Mortgages $200,000.00 $200,000.00 $200,000.00 - Repair Set Aside $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 - 1st Year Tax and Insurance Set Aside $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 Total Mandatory Obligations $217,269.45 $217,269.45 $220,269.45 % of Principal Limit 96.66% 96.66% 97.99% Initial Disbursement Limit $224,800.00 $224,800.00 $224,800.00 % of Principal Limit 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% - Additional Tax and Insurance Set Aside $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 Available Principal Limit $7,530.55 $7,530.55 $4,530.55 Available Funds and Requested Payments Max Available Cash at Closing $7,530.55 $7,530.55 $4,530.55 Cash Request $0.00 $0.00 $4,530.55 Total Line Of Credit $7,530.55 $7,530.55 N/A Line Of Credit Available 1st Year $7,530.55 $7,530.55 N/A Line Of Credit Available After 1st Year $0.00 $0.00 N/A Available Monthly Tenure Payment 1st Year $45.26 $45.26 N/A Monthly Payment 1st Year $0.00 $0.00 N/A Available Monthly Tenure Payment $45.26 $45.26 N/A Monthly Payment Request $0.00 $0.00 N/A Initial Loan Balance $217,269.45 $217,269.45 $224,800.00 Unavailable Principal Limit $0.00 $0.00 $0.00

Loan Officer Company NMLS #: 3901 Loan Officer NMLS #: 404064 Printed: 4/14/2015 2008-2015 ReverseVision, Inc. 1984,482 Page 1 of 2 Compare / 0118 Sally Senior Date

Steven Senior Date

Loan Officer Company NMLS #: 3901 Loan Officer NMLS #: 404064 Printed: 4/14/2015 2008-2015 ReverseVision, Inc. 1984,482 Page 2 of 2 Compare / 0118 Amortization Schedule - Annual Projections

Borrower Name/Case Number: Sally and Steven Senior / Refinance: No Age of Youngest Borrower: 68 Initial Property Value: $400,000.00 Interest Rate (Expected / Initial): 5.020% / 3.698% Beg. Mortgage Balance: $12,269.45 Maximum Claim Amount: $400,000.00 Expected Appreciation: 4.000% Initial Principal Limit: $224,800.00 Initial Line Of Credit: $212,530.55 Initial Advance: $0.00 Monthly Payment: $0.00 Lien Payoffs with Reverse Mortgage: $0.00 Monthly Servicing Fee: $0.00 Financed Closing Costs: $12,269.45 Mortgage Insurance (MIP) 1.25%

NOTE: Actual interest charges and property value projections may vary from amounts shown. Available credit will be less than projected if funds withdrawn from line-of-credit.

Annual Totals End of Year Projections Yr Age SVC Cash MIP Rate Interest Loan Line Of Property Equity Fee Payment Balance Credit Value 1 68 $0 $0 $157 3.698% $464 $12,891 $223,288 $416,000 $402,659 2 69 $0 $0 $165 3.698% $488 $13,543 $234,591 $432,640 $418,647 3 70 $0 $0 $173 3.698% $512 $14,229 $246,465 $449,946 $435,267 4 71 $0 $0 $182 3.698% $538 $14,949 $258,941 $467,943 $452,545 5 72 $0 $0 $191 3.698% $566 $15,705 $272,048 $486,661 $470,506 6 73 $0 $0 $201 3.698% $594 $16,500 $285,818 $506,128 $489,177 7 74 $0 $0 $211 3.698% $624 $17,336 $300,285 $526,373 $508,587 8 75 $0 $0 $222 3.698% $656 $18,213 $315,485 $547,428 $528,765 9 76 $0 $0 $233 3.698% $689 $19,135 $331,454 $569,325 $549,740 10 77 $0 $0 $245 3.698% $724 $20,104 $348,232 $592,098 $571,544 11 78 $0 $0 $257 3.698% $761 $21,121 $365,859 $615,782 $594,211 12 79 $0 $0 $270 3.698% $799 $22,190 $384,377 $640,413 $617,773 13 80 $0 $0 $284 3.698% $839 $23,313 $403,834 $666,029 $642,266 14 81 $0 $0 $298 3.698% $882 $24,494 $424,275 $692,671 $667,727 15 82 $0 $0 $313 3.698% $927 $25,733 $445,751 $720,377 $694,194 16 83 $0 $0 $329 3.698% $973 $27,036 $468,314 $749,192 $721,707 17 84 $0 $0 $346 3.698% $1,023 $28,404 $492,018 $779,160 $750,306 18 85 $0 $0 $363 3.698% $1,075 $29,842 $516,923 $810,327 $780,034 19 86 $0 $0 $382 3.698% $1,129 $31,353 $543,089 $842,740 $810,937 20 87 $0 $0 $401 3.698% $1,186 $32,940 $570,579 $876,449 $843,060 21 88 $0 $0 $421 3.698% $1,246 $34,607 $599,460 $911,507 $876,450 22 89 $0 $0 $443 3.698% $1,309 $36,359 $629,803 $947,968 $911,159 23 90 $0 $0 $465 3.698% $1,375 $38,199 $661,683 $985,886 $947,237 24 91 $0 $0 $488 3.698% $1,445 $40,133 $695,175 $1,025,322 $984,739 25 92 $0 $0 $513 3.698% $1,518 $42,164 $730,364 $1,066,335 $1,023,720 26 93 $0 $0 $539 3.698% $1,595 $44,298 $767,333 $1,108,988 $1,064,240 28 95 $0 $0 $595 3.698% $1,761 $48,896 $846,980 $1,199,481 $1,150,135 30 97 $0 $0 $657 3.698% $1,943 $53,972 $934,895 $1,297,359 $1,242,937 32 99 $0 $0 $725 3.698% $2,145 $59,574 $1,031,934 $1,403,223 $1,343,200

Sally Senior Date

Steven Senior Date

Loan Officer Company NMLS #: 3901 Loan Officer NMLS #: 404064 Printed: 4/14/2015 2008-2015 ReverseVision, Inc. 1984,482 Page 1 of 1 AMORT / 0285 Amortization Schedule - Annual Projections

Borrower Name/Case Number: Sally and Steven Senior / Refinance: No Age of Youngest Borrower: 68 Initial Property Value: $400,000.00 Interest Rate (Expected / Initial): 5.020% / 3.698% Beg. Mortgage Balance: $12,269.45 Maximum Claim Amount: $400,000.00 Expected Appreciation: 4.000% Initial Principal Limit: $224,800.00 Initial Line Of Credit: $0.00 Initial Advance: $0.00 Monthly Payment: $1,277.37 Lien Payoffs with Reverse Mortgage: $0.00 Monthly Servicing Fee: $0.00 Financed Closing Costs: $12,269.45 Mortgage Insurance (MIP) 1.25%

NOTE: Actual interest charges and property value projections may vary from amounts shown. Available credit will be less than projected if funds withdrawn from line-of-credit.

Annual Totals End of Year Projections Yr Age SVC Cash MIP Rate Interest Loan Line Of Property Equity Fee Payment Balance Credit Value 1 68 $0 $15,328 $262 3.698% $776 $28,636 $0 $416,000 $386,914 2 69 $0 $15,328 $472 3.698% $1,395 $45,831 $0 $432,640 $386,359 3 70 $0 $15,328 $691 3.698% $2,046 $63,896 $0 $449,946 $385,599 4 71 $0 $15,328 $922 3.698% $2,729 $82,876 $0 $467,943 $384,617 5 72 $0 $15,328 $1,165 3.698% $3,447 $102,817 $0 $486,661 $383,394 6 73 $0 $15,328 $1,420 3.698% $4,201 $123,767 $0 $506,128 $381,911 7 74 $0 $15,328 $1,688 3.698% $4,994 $145,777 $0 $526,373 $380,146 8 75 $0 $15,328 $1,969 3.698% $5,827 $168,902 $0 $547,428 $378,076 9 76 $0 $15,328 $2,265 3.698% $6,701 $193,196 $0 $569,325 $375,678 10 77 $0 $15,328 $2,576 3.698% $7,620 $218,721 $0 $592,098 $372,927 11 78 $0 $15,328 $2,902 3.698% $8,586 $245,538 $0 $615,782 $369,794 12 79 $0 $15,328 $3,245 3.698% $9,600 $273,712 $0 $640,413 $366,251 13 80 $0 $15,328 $3,605 3.698% $10,666 $303,312 $0 $666,029 $362,267 14 81 $0 $15,328 $3,984 3.698% $11,786 $334,411 $0 $692,671 $357,810 15 82 $0 $15,328 $4,382 3.698% $12,963 $367,083 $0 $720,377 $352,844 16 83 $0 $15,328 $4,799 3.698% $14,199 $401,410 $0 $749,192 $347,333 17 84 $0 $15,328 $5,238 3.698% $15,497 $437,474 $0 $779,160 $341,236 18 85 $0 $15,328 $5,700 3.698% $16,861 $475,363 $0 $810,327 $334,513 19 86 $0 $15,328 $6,184 3.698% $18,295 $515,171 $0 $842,740 $327,119 20 87 $0 $15,328 $6,693 3.698% $19,801 $556,993 $0 $876,449 $319,006 21 88 $0 $15,328 $7,228 3.698% $21,383 $600,932 $0 $911,507 $310,125 22 89 $0 $15,328 $7,790 3.698% $23,045 $647,095 $0 $947,968 $300,422 23 90 $0 $15,328 $8,380 3.698% $24,792 $695,595 $0 $985,886 $289,841 24 91 $0 $15,328 $9,000 3.698% $26,626 $746,550 $0 $1,025,322 $278,321 25 92 $0 $15,328 $9,652 3.698% $28,554 $800,085 $0 $1,066,335 $265,800 26 93 $0 $15,328 $10,336 3.698% $30,579 $856,329 $0 $1,108,988 $252,209 28 95 $0 $15,328 $11,811 3.698% $34,942 $977,502 $0 $1,199,481 $221,530 30 97 $0 $15,328 $13,439 3.698% $39,758 $1,111,252 $0 $1,297,359 $185,657 32 99 $0 $15,328 $15,236 3.698% $45,074 $1,258,885 $0 $1,403,223 $143,888

Sally Senior Date

Steven Senior Date

Loan Officer Company NMLS #: 3901 Loan Officer NMLS #: 404064 Printed: 4/14/2015 2008-2015 ReverseVision, Inc. 1984,482 Page 1 of 1 AMORT / 0285 Corporate Headquarters: 3601 Hempstead Turnpike Levittown, NY 11756 Office: (516) 520-5700 Fax: (516) 520-9374 www.SeniorSecurity.com

______

ALFIE SCHLOSS Reverse Mortgage Loan Originator NMLS # 404064 UNITED NORTHERN MORTGAGE BANKERS, LTD dba SENIOR SECURITY ADVISORS NMLS # 7230 [email protected] Tel: 914-275-3361

Alfie Schloss has been a reverse mortgage loan originator since 2004, joining Senior Security Advisors in June 2014. Alfie previously originated reverse mortgages for Wells Fargo, MetLife and Associated Mortgage Bankers (now AAG). Alfie was drawn to the reverse mortgage industry after retiring from a successful twenty-eight year career in the visual effects, computer animation and film industry. To date, Alfie has helped over four hundred seniors access their home equity through a reverse mortgage. Alfie is currently licensed in New York and New Jersey, Connecticut and Pennsylvania.

“I enjoy working with seniors and helping them to enhance their quality of life. I take an interest in my customer’s lives and situations and try to be a resource that they can count on. I constantly seek out advanced training on subjects that can be helpful to my clients and to the needs of the communities that I serve.” I refer my clients to elder law attorneys for consultation on Wills, POA’s, Trusts and advanced directives.

“I feel that many seniors are often neglected or taken advantage of and I go out of my way to be protective and nurturing. I work tirelessly for my clients and will go to great ends to solve problems that may arise for them. I am always available as a resource to my clients, they all have my cell phone number and I happily respond to everyone’s calls, even years after we have completed our transaction.”

Alfie resides with his wife Cheryl in Rockland County, NY and travels extensively through the four state region, meeting with clients in their homes or at the offices of their trusted advisors.

“The best compliment I can receive is a referral from a trusted advisor.”

United Northern Mortgage Bankers Limited, DBAs: Senior Security Home Advantage, Senior Security Advisors, 3601 Hempstead Turnpike, Suite 300, Levittown, NY 11756 Licensed Mortgage Banker NYS Department of Financial Services NMLS # 7230 • AL Consumer Credit license #21761 • CO Mortgage Company Registration • CA DBO Finance Lenders Law license # 603K800 • CT Dept of Banking Mortgage Lender license #20372 • FL Dept of Financial Institutions Mortgage Lender license #MLD273 • GA Dept of Banking and Finance Mortgage Lenders license #39919 • MD Mortgage Lender license • MA Div of Banks and Loan Agencies Mortgage Lender & Mortgage Broker license #MC7230 • NJ Dept of Banking and Insurance Mortgage Lender license #L0046623 • NC Commissioner of Banks Mortgage Lender license #L140365 • PA Dept of Banking Mortgage Lender license #20887 • SC State Board of Financial Institutions • TN Mortgage Lender license #MLS7230 • TN Mortgage license #115610 • TX - SML Mortgage Banker Registration • WA Consumer Loan Company license #CL-7230 Direct Endorsed FHA Lender Corporate Headquarters: 3601 Hempstead Turnpike Levittown, NY 11756 Office: (516) 520-5700 Fax: (516) 520-9374 www.SeniorSecurity.com

Kenneth J. Landau is a partner in the Mineola law firm of Shayne, Dachs, Sauer & Dachs, LLP concentrating in the representation of plaintiffs in negligence, medical malpractice, and insurance matters. He is involved in the litigation of civil matters in the Courts of Long Island, New York City, and Westchester.

For over 20 years he has been the Host of the weekly radio program, “Law You Should Know” broadcast every Monday at 4:00 PM, Tuesday at 1:00 PM and Sunday at 7:00 AM on WHPC 90.3 FM radio on Long Island or voicestream over the internet at www.ncc.edu/whpc or free podcast at www.itunes.ncc.edu. He frequently lectures on attorney-client relations, marketing and a variety of topics concerning tort law and civil litigation and teaches courses in the Paralegal Studies Program at Briarcliffe College on Civil Litigation and Torts.

He is a past Dean of the Nassau Academy of Law, overseeing Continuing Legal Education Programs for the 6,000 members of the Bar Association of Nassau County. He has twice received the President’s Award for outstanding contributions to the Bar Association of Nassau County and is a Past President of the Jewish Lawyers Association of Nassau County and a recipient of their Neil T. Shayne Distinguished Service Award.

He is a graduate of State University of New York at Buffalo Law School, Herbert H. Lehman College of the City University of New York, and The Bronx High School of Science.

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