Written Evidence Submitted by Biodiplomacy (BLI0027)

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Written Evidence Submitted by Biodiplomacy (BLI0027) Written evidence submitted by BioDiplomacy (BLI0027) Introductory BioDiplomacy is an informal network on environmental and human rights issues established by Iain Orr following his retirement from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office in 2002 (on reaching the then retirement age of 60 for senior members of the Diplomatic Service). Over half of his career was spent dealing with China (UK Embassy Beijing, Deputy Political Adviser Hong Kong, three postings to the FCO’s Far Eastern Department, UK Consul-General in Shanghai 1987-90). In all his postings, overseas or in London, he has worked on environmental issues . These included helping to establish the Hong Kong branch of WWF and negotiating - within Whitehall and with the overseas territories - the Environmental Charters between the UK and its overseas territories signed in 2001 in implementation of a major recommendation of the 1999 White Paper Partnership for Progress and Prosperity – Britain and the Overseas Territories (Cm 4264). Environmental Diplomacy – Guiding Principles 1. This submission follows the questions precisely as listed in the FAC's Call for Evidence. The comments on each should, however, be regarded as dealing with the mechanics rather than the guiding principles of Environmental Diplomacy. The environmental and related human rights policies that the FCO should be promoting in its diplomacy need to be underwritten by the UK as a whole. That is, not just government departments and agencies all working in harmony, but also support, in principle, from other political parties; and drawing on the skills and values of commercial companies, charities, NGOs and the scientific community. These are not simply part of the UK's civil society. They have links across the world, as indeed, do politicians (though their bedrock relationships are with their electorate and with other UK parliamentarians). Climate change and pandemic viruses are global threats to health and security. At last we are realising the need for both global and national solutions. The effective levels for implementing often need to be local: cities, regions and ecosystems, not just current man-made national boundaries. 2. These solutions need to be cooperative and often outlandishly novel. This is precisely NOT a question of finding the most cost-effective way of "returning to normal life". The problems we face were caused by inadequate responses at many levels - above all, that of the human imagination. As Einstein said: "We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them." That analysis needs, however, to be deployed in the service of an overarching vision. The Orkney writer Edwin Muir's nightmare experience of the inhuman world of 1930s industrial depression Glasgow is reflected by lines packed with power and resolve in his post-apocalyptic poem "The Horses": "..... we would not let it bring That bad old world that swallowed its children quick At one great gulp. We would not have it again." 3. The world of the late 20th and early 21st centuries has seen too much unfairness and collective and individual selfishness; too much undervaluing of those who provide our daily bread and other essentials for life and health; too much environmental degradation; and too little ability to share this Earth with other forms of life. It is not for the FCO to articulate this vision of a better world. But unless their work is informed by a generational vision of better ways of living together, neither UK nor other diplomats will be operating from a moral framework within which Environmental Diplomacy can develop as a core negotiating skill. 4. How diplomacy enters into the management of environmental resources and ecosystems within UK sovereign territory and surrounding waters* as well as the governance of such global commons as climate, open ocean and seabed resources is illustrated by the list at Annex A. Note that these include many aspects of the built environment, from providing funding for dams that can reduce the flows of water available to other downstream countries to the various forms of pollution associated with different forms of transport and the generation of electrical energy and other sources of power used to exploit and recycle natural resources. *(including the extensive EEZs of the UK’s overseas territories) Does Environmental Diplomacy involve the UK’s Overseas Territories (UKOTs) and the Crown Dependencies (CDs)? 5. Yes. The UKOTs are of far greater significance than the metropolitan UK for their biodiversity, variety of ecosystems, the extent of their EEZs and their vulnerability to global warming. Much of the evidence of anthropogenic climate change and the risks of depleting the ozone layer have come from research carried out in British Antarctic Territory. 6. Now to the specific questions in the Committee’s Call for Evidence. What should the FCO’s environmental diplomacy strategy look like? 7. It should be developed together with other departments, the scientific community, companies, and civil society (especially environmental and human rights NGOs and experts in international and comparative law). The FCO should resist pressures to agree a “government line” with BEIS, Defra, DfID, Transport and the Treasury before starting to talk to outside bodies who embody much collective experience and wisdom that the FCO and other departments need to draw on in developing an effective UK environmental diplomacy strategy. It was notable that in preparing for the seminal Rio Earth Summit in 1992 the UK was one of the leading countries (New Zealand was another) to involve civil society and NGOs in preparing national positions for the summit; and as members of the official UK delegation. How effective is the FCO's current approach to environmental diplomacy? 8. Patchy. That is probably generous but the FCO has had to cope with reductions in its budget and human resources at a time when the additional stresses have been added of coping with Brexit, the unpredictability of the USA’s environmental and other policies, Covid-19 and how the UK has responded to it. Many ministerial changes have left current FCO ministers unwilling to risk articulating messages that might dent the Prime Minister’s boundless optimism. 9. Rather like the UK’s difficulty in adjusting to its post-imperial role in the world, the FCO has not yet realised that many environmental issues require a new conception of diplomacy – we are often no longer squabbling over what share of the cake we should have but working with others to preserve the sources of flour and eggs from which to make cakes for future generations. Does the UK use all available tools (sanctions, tariffs, trade negotiations, UN activity) to promote its objectives in this area? How does it ensure lasting and concrete achievements in this area? 10. The UK has, again, a patchy record in managing to reconcile different departmental priorities; and then to deploy these and other available tools in support of an overall coherent strategy. The most glaring examples are: continuing subsidies of the oil industry; overruling local objections to exploratory fracking; DfID supporting environmental health programmes in developing countries (clean water, vaccinations) but forcing the NHS to recruit trained consultants, doctors, nurses and orderlies from developing countries because of poor investment in recruiting and training UK staff. How does the FCO work with departments such as BEIS and Defra on this issue? 11. Being now retired, I do not have direct experience of FCO working with BEIS. However, in a long association with people working to protect the terrestrial and marine biodiversity of the UKOTs and CDs, I have been aware that pressure on FCO and Defra resources have made both departments reduce their staff and try to wriggle out of their responsibilities. There is a long trail of FCO replies to PQs on the lines of “...is a matter for Defra” or “...responsibility for the environment has been devolved to the Overseas Territories”. In reality, some of the most environmentally important territories have either no, or very few, permanent residents, such as: South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, British Indian Ocean Territory, the Pitcairn Islands, Tristan da Cunha and Ascension Island. 12. Such replies misrepresent the UK’s internal model of devolution to the governments/ assemblies of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland of many legislative, regulatory and budgetary powers as being the model for governance of the UKOTs. No budgets are “devolved” to the UKOTs. A few, for good reasons, require budgetary support from HMG (which comes under a specific clause in the International Development Bill of 2002). The pattern in the overseas territories is that HMG exercises specific reserved powers - for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Public Order. The FCO sometimes conveniently forgets that in 2001 a series of Environment Charters were negotiated between the territories and HMG. These spell out the many areas, in which HMG (often through the FCO’s Overseas Territories Department, Defra and DfID) has an active interest in the good governance of the rich ecosystems in the territories. Does it have sufficient expertise in this area? 13 Not at present. This is partly because work pressures in London mean that there is not enough time for desk officers to meet environmental scientists other than those working for Defra and its agencies (such as JNCC), and to meet NGOs before HMG’s policies are set for COPs and other meetings of MEAs. More staff exchanges with commercial companies, NGOs and universities are one way in which UK diplomats can enhance their experience while also helping to make other organizations appreciate the role of diplomatic skills (negotiations, lobbying other governments, developing a wide range of contacts) in making the best use of their expert knowledge. How do the UK’s environmental & decarbonisation goals interact with other diplomatic priorities, such as the pursuit of new trade deals? 14.
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