Social exchange reasoning engages TOM 1 Theory of mind broad and narrow: Reasoning about social exchange engages TOM areas, precautionary reasoning does not Elsa Ermer1,2, Scott A. Guerin1, Leda Cosmides1,2, John Tooby2, Michael B. Miller1 1. Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara 2. Center for Evolutionary Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara Short Title: Social exchange reasoning engages TOM Social Neuroscience, 1, 196-219. Special Issue on Neural Correlates of Theory of Mind Rebecca Saxe and Simon Baron-Cohen, Issue editors Corresponding author: Elsa Ermer Department of Psychology University of California Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9660
[email protected], Phone: 805-452-4988 Fax: 805-965-1163 Keywords: Theory of Mind, Social exchange, Deontic reasoning, Cheater detection, Neuroimaging Social exchange reasoning engages TOM 2 Abstract Baron-Cohen (1995) proposed that the theory of mind (TOM) inference system evolved to promote strategic social interaction. Social exchange—a form of cooperation for mutual benefit—involves strategic social interaction and requires TOM inferences about the contents of other individual’s mental states, especially their desires, goals, and intentions. There are behavioral and neuropsychological dissociations between reasoning about social exchange and reasoning about equivalent problems tapping other, more general, content domains. It has therefore been proposed that social exchange behavior is regulated by social contract algorithms: a domain-specific inference system that is functionally specialized for reasoning about social exchange. We report an fMRI study using the Wason selection task that provides further support for this hypothesis. Precautionary rules share so many properties with social exchange rules— they are conditional, deontic, and involve subjective utilities—that most reasoning theories claim they are processed by the same neurocomputational machinery.