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Crashed short, Southern Airways, Inc., Douglas DC-9-5, N92S, Gulfport, Mississippi, February 17, 1971 Micro-summary: This DC-9 crashed on short final to runway 13 at Gulfport. Event Date: 1971-02-17 at 0809 CST Investigative Body: National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), USA Investigative Body's Web Site: http://www.ntsb.gov/ Cautions: 1. Accident reports can be and sometimes are revised. Be sure to consult the investigative agency for the latest version before basing anything significant on content (e.g., thesis, research, etc). 2. Readers are advised that each report is a glimpse of events at specific points in time. While broad themes permeate the causal events leading up to crashes, and we can learn from those, the specific regulatory and technological environments can and do change. Your company's flight operations manual is the final authority as to the safe operation of your aircraft! 3. Reports may or may not represent reality. Many many non-scientific factors go into an investigation, including the magnitude of the event, the experience of the investigator, the political climate, relationship with the regulatory authority, technological and recovery capabilities, etc. It is recommended that the reader review all reports analytically. Even a "bad" report can be a very useful launching point for learning. 4. Contact us before reproducing or redistributing a report from this anthology. Individual countries have very differing views on copyright! We can advise you on the steps to follow. Aircraft Accident Reports on DVD, Copyright © 2006 by Flight Simulation Systems, LLC All rights reserved. www.fss.aero SOUTHERN AIRWAYS. INC. DOUGLAS DC-9-15. N92S GULFPORT. MISSISSIPPI FEBRUARY 17,1971 TABLE OF CONTENTS Synopsis .................................... 1 Investigation .................................. 2 Analysis .................................... 6 ProbabkCuue ................................ 7 Recommendations . .'. 8 Attachments ............................... 9 Fde No. 1-0003 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. 20591 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT Adopted: September 1,1971 SOUTHERN AIRWAYS, INC. DOUGLAS DC-9-15. N92S GULFPORT, MISSISSIPPI FEBRUARY 17,1971 SYNOPSIS the aircraft descended below the minimum descent altitude before the crew acquired visual On February 17, 1971, at appximatdy contact with the runway environment. 0809, Southern Airways, Inc., Flight 41, a As a result of this investigation, the Board scheduled air carrier passenger and caigo flight, recommends that the Federal Aviation Adminiis- struck an electric transmission line static cable mtion: during a VOR/DME approach to Runway 13 at 1. Develop a ground proximity warning the Gulfport, Mississippi, Municipal Airport. A system for use in the approach and landing snadd go-around was accompW and %he pluses of operation which will warn flight- d was landaI at Gulfport without fnrtha crews of excessive fates of descent. incident. There were seven passengers (five unwanted/ivertent descent below Mini- revenue, two nonrevenue) and a crew of (our mum kentAltitudes, or descent through aboard. One passenger received a scratched hand Decision Height. It would be desirable if from flying glass. The aircraft received sobscan- die equipment now installed could meet rial damage to die left main landing gear, left this need: and wing leading edge, and left fuselage. The left 2. Develop and implement appropriate opera- engine sustained foreign object ingestion tional procedures to provide this type of damige. There was no file. warning to flightcrcws for use during the A special weather observation made at the approach and landing phase of flight. Gulfport Municipal Airpot at 0805 showed a The Board also recommends that the FAA: partial obsc~tionwith visibility threequarters 3. Compkte the necessary action to commis- of a mile in fog. The wind was from 040- at 6 sion the 1LS equipment at Gulfpon since it knots. has been installed for approximately 1 The National Transportation Safety Board year. determines that the probable cause of this acci- During the investigation, the Board recom- dent was inadequate monitoring of the ap mended that the Federal Aviation Admiinistra- proach. The captain was preoccupied with the don take steps to preclude issuance of approach pr&dilgch&~the6naI~ charts prior to commissioning of the pertinent and the first officer, who was flying the aircraft. na"Iptional equipment. The FAA replied that was devoting his attention to an attempt to they were examining several ways to improve establish visual contact with the runway in low the correlation of the procedural effective date visibility. These activities resulted in an unpmp with the facility commissioning date. (See alyexecuted VOIUDME approach during which Attachment 3.) INVESTIGATION approach." Approach Control answered, "Southern 41 that's correct, report inlcrcep Southern Airways Flight 41/17 originated at a mile arc." The Wit requoted die Go]! Moisant Airport, New Orleans, Louisiana, with pore weather and was supplied the following: seven passengers and a crew of four including "Weather is sky partially obscured, visibility two stewardesses on board. It departed from the onequarter mile with fog and that visibility ptsscnga gate at 0745,' on schedule, and took appeals to be lifting some now. Temperature 54, off at 0751 for Gulfport, Mississippi. The first dew point 53." officer was operating the controls and occupying A short time later, the crew advised the con- the right-side pilot seat. According to the flight troller that they requited at least a half mile plan, the Moit-Gulfpon segment was a &is- before they could commence an approach. At 2 tance of 67 miles: estimated time en route was minutes plus 30 seconds, Gulfport Approach 21 minutes. The en route altitude was 11,000 Control advised Flight 41, "Visibility is three- fat m.s.1. via Victor Airway 20. The flight was quarters of a mile, just came out." This was conducted on an IFR flight plan, but both pilots acknowledged. stated that they maintained ground contact The CVR transcript shows that most of the v+y at all times and did not encounter any period between about 0804 and 2 minutes plus insuurncnt weather en route. As Flight 41 30 seconds, when the amended visibility was neared Gulf-, the crew was cleared to de- supplied, was being used to refer to the captain's scend to 4,000 feet mJ. and to contact Gulf- {light manual for visibility minimum data for a port Approach Control 15 miles out. local condition. The crew determined chat the Attempts to establish an exact time base for approach could be made with one-half mile die events leading to this accident were not visibility. During this period, the flight inter- successful. The type of recording equipment cepted (be 7-mile arc and proceeded on it installed at die Gulfport towa involved two toward the final approach path. At 3 minutes tapes, oas recorded time and the other recorded plus 28 seconds. Flight 41 reported that it was 5 radio transmissions* While these could be corre- miles out, but part of the meisage was blocked. lated to an accuracy of only i 30 seconds, the The call was repeated, was acknowledged by communication cape and the cockpit voice Approach Control, and the flight was instructed recorder (CVR)record were easily correlated by to contact the Gulfpon Tower on 121.3 MHz. use of sit tnffic control tmisnussiom recorded Upon reporting that it was 4 miles out on final on both tapes. All times after the initial contact approach to the towa, (be flight was cleared to between Flight 41 and Gulfport Approach land. The tower controller stated he saw a DC-9 ControVTower are expressed in minutes and airaaft northwest of the field at that time but seconds after die initial cdup which occuired at lost sight of it shortly thereafter. i 0804 30 seconds. There were no co~unica&ns hen 41 to Gulfport Flight reported Approach Southern Flight 41 and die control tower from Control when it was 15 miles west at 4,000 feet 4 minutes plus 14 seconds until 6 minutes plus about 0804 and was cleared to continue descent seconds. minutes VOR Run- 15 At 4 pins 46 seconds, the to 1,800 feet for ". .. a straight-in captain told the first officer, 'Tom you're cheat- way 13 approach." The wind was reported to be ing, you got full flaps." The flaps woe retracted 020Â at 4 knots, and the altimeter setting was to 30- by the first officer. At 5 minutes plus 12 30.29 inches. Flight 41 replied, "3029 down to seconds, die captain aid, "Bring it back up 1,800 feet, straight-in to Runway 13, VOR you're one hundred fifty feet-. Don't want to hit that tower over there." According to the crew, the first officer then added power and rotated the nose upward. The CVR. recorded sounds of impact at 5 The flightcrew was certificated and qualified minutes plus 21 seconds. The tower controller in accordance with existing FAA and company stated that he next observed the aircraft as it regulations. (See Attachment 2.) was over the threshold end of Runway 13 and it The aircraft was certificated and maintained appeared to be executing a missed approach. He in accordance with applicable regulations and observed the aircraft begin a right turn at about the FAA-approved company progressive main- midfield and advised the crew, "Southern 41 tenance schedule. There were no carryover items tower, contact Approach now.** Southern 41 affecting airworthiness. The L~crattwas loaded replied, "41 would like to land on 31." The within allowable weight and center of gravity flight was then cleared for a contact approach to limits, and was fueled to 17,000 pounds of jet remain within 3 miles of Gulfport. This ex- fuel at New Orleans. change occurred between 6 phis 15 and 6 phis Surface weather observations were made by 36 seconds.

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