© 2009 Sarah S. Milburn ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
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© 2009 Sarah S. Milburn ALL RIGHTS RESERVED POWER, PATRONAGE AND “PRÉSENCE”: HOW FRANCE PRESERVED ITS INFLUENCE IN THE FORMER AFRIQUE ÉQUATORIALE FRANÇAISE, 1960-1995 By SARAH STAFFORD MILBURN A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-New Brunswick Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in Political Science written under the direction of Edward Rhodes and approved by _________________________________ Edward Rhodes _________________________________ Roy Licklider _________________________________ R. Daniel Kelemen _________________________________ Allen M. Howard New Brunswick, New Jersey May 2009 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Power, Patronage and “Présence”: How France Preserved its Influence in the Former Afrique Équatoriale Française, 1960-1995 by SARAH STAFFORD MILBURN Dissertation Director: Dr. Edward Rhodes Calls for imperial control of the disorganized periphery are still heard from major powers, and even from smaller states under threat. France has maintained an unmatched level of postcolonial control in many of its former sub- Saharan African colonies since their independence in 1960, demonstrating a masterful combination of military and economic power, for which long-cultivated political and cultural influences have been as important as force projection and financial support. Four dimensions of French “présence” are examined (military, political, economic, and cultural), requiring a historical understanding of the inherently unequal power relationships between France and its African clients. This dissertation provides comparative analysis of France’s relationships with four former colonies: Gabon, Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, and Chad. These countries of the former French Equatorial Africa are interesting because, although less prosperous, stable and politically connected to France than West Africa, and less strategically important than North Africa, they were ii valuable enough to receive consistent attention from the Elysée, military bases, intervention troops, the Franc Zone’s bank, and a large contingent of French military, intelligence, financial, and administrative personnel. This quasi-feudal pattern of patronage poses ethical and political dilemmas for a proud European power that sees itself as the womb of democracy. Gaullist political philosophy articulated clear goals of preponderant power and cultural greatness, which bore direct relation to the postcolonial continuity of French policy. In spite of accusations of neocolonialism and imperialism over the past four decades, France’s interventions in its chasse gardée have rarely been called breaches of sovereignty because they were covered since independence by extensive military and economic cooperation agreements. “Patronage” refers to protection and support, but one’s patron can demand services in return that can be either reasonable or exploitative. In French, the word “patron” means “boss,” but can also mean “pattern.” France’s intention was to shape these nations as well as to rule them. If France could no longer rule Africa in the ancient imperial manner of subsuming whole peoples under its own sovereignty, it remained able to exert enough control to keep its sub-Saharan clients in a condition of useful dependency. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation could not have been completed without the support of my faithful legion of friends and family, of whom I have room to name only a few. My wonderful colleagues in the country specialist program of Amnesty International USA and my dear coworkers at Princeton Molbio have gone well beyond collegial generosity in their tolerance of my occasional peculiarities and lapses of duty during these years of study. I am very grateful for the patience of the Rutgers political science department, and for the careful reading, excellent questions and time given to my dissertation defense by my examining committee. Two members of this department must be named (or perhaps blamed), and then thanked profusely: my longtime advisor and friend Barbara Lewis, for her understanding of francophone Africa and her unfailing encouragement, and my dissertation director Ed Rhodes, for a combination of toughness, kindness and wisdom rare in mentors. To my sister Anne, and my other close family and friends, thank you for your steadfast refusal to let me lose faith in myself or this project. I particularly thank my offspring, Emma and Merlin, who went offline with grace when I needed to write, ignored multiple dire lapses in household management, fed the cats (and me), and made me laugh through my pains. Finally, I honor my amazing parents, the Drs. Richard H. Milburn and Nancy S. Milburn. I dedicate this dissertation to them, with love and admiration. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract of the Dissertation . ii Acknowledgements . iv Table of Contents . v List of Tables . vii CHAPTER 1. Introduction . 1 CHAPTER 2. What France Wanted . 25 CHAPTER 3. How France Set the Scene During the Colonial Period for Getting What it Wanted at Independence . 47 CHAPTER 4. The Composition of the French Military, Political, Economic and Cultural Presence in Equatorial Africa Since 1960 . 132 CHAPTER 5. France’s Successes and Failures in Afrique Équatoriale (Case Studies) . 203 Case I: Gabon . 203 Case II: Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). 239 Case III: Central African Republic . 265 Case IV: Chad . 295 Comparisons Among the Four Central African Cases . 342 CHAPTER 6. Conclusions, and the Challenges for France In the 1990s and Beyond . 369 Appendices . 421 v Endnotes . 426 Acknowledgement of Previous Publications . 450 Bibliography . 451 Curriculum Vita . 457 vi LIST OF TABLES Table 1: African Defense Forces in 1967 . 142 Table 2: Sizes of Selected African Armed Forces in 1983 . 143 Table 3: 1994 Armed Forces and Military Expenditure . 144 Table 4: African Officers Trained in France . 149 Table 5: Numbers of French Military Advisers in Central Africa in the 1980s . 178 Appendix I: Arms transfers during the period 1960-1969 . 421 Appendix II: Arms transfers during the period 1970-1989 . 423 vii 1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION Great powers faced a dilemma both during and after the Cold War in their relationships with newly independent nations, which can be clearly illustrated in the context of France’s relationship with its former sub-Saharan African colonies. How might the leaders of these powers (e.g. USA, France, Britain, USSR, China) make decisions that would maintain and enhance their country’s influence and control in peripheral regions of the world, and not be accused of neocolonialism, or even imperialism? After several decades of seeing academic inquiry into imperialistic enterprise sidelined into area studies, critical theory and political theory, the study of empire and imperialism has once again become of interest to mainstream international relations and security studies. It has always been important to understand the formal and informal mechanisms of control by a major power metropole over nations peripheral to the international power structure, and how these are created, maintained, and exploited. It is particularly important to explore the reasons for these mechanisms now that the bipolar Cold War situation has ended, state failure is a constant possibility, and state sovereignty in the periphery is less sacrosanct, either in theory or in practice. Calls for more imperial control of the disorganized periphery have been heard from some leaders and citizens of the major powers, and even occasionally from the small states neighboring states in chaos. 2 The United States of America, which France ‘s former foreign minister Hubert Védrine has referred to as a “hyperpower”1 or at least as a candidate for pride of place among the major powers with neo-imperialistic intentions, has become France’s rival in many parts of Africa where France’s hegemony had been unchallenged. As Védrine agrees, this new US dominance has not simply been a matter of “hard” military force as power is traditionally measured, but also along the “soft” dimensions of power: America’s ability to convince others of its value as a partner and attract people to its political sphere, its markets, and its culture. He says of “hard” and “soft”: “But these two types of power reinforce each other! This is what I mean when I talk about the Pentagon, the English language, Hollywood, CNN, the Internet, American culture, etc. Soft power, in any case, is not entirely new.”2 A French foreign minister is in an excellent position to make this point, since France’s dominance over its former African colonies since independence has used, with few exceptions, a masterfully well-integrated combination of both types of power. A commonly used definition of colonial imperialism is simply the expansion of empires by a dominating foreign power, using annexation of neighboring states or by conquering regions or states to bring them under imperial control. This is the relatively neutral definition of empire that leaves aside moral questions about taking the land and resources of others by force (which is theft), and the consequent destruction of local political autonomy and indigenous culture (which is political and spiritual alienation). Hard power can 3 do the first with sufficient force and organization, but to truly control a culture and a people as well as a land requires the softer powers of economic subsidies, trade, and the products of the dominant culture, including its language,