International Peacekeeping

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The Inter‐African mission to monitor the implementation of the agreements (MISAB)

Moussounga Itsouhou Mbadinga

To cite this article: Moussounga Itsouhou Mbadinga (2001) The Inter‐African mission to monitor the implementation of the Bangui agreements (MISAB), International Peacekeeping, 8:4, 21-37, DOI: 10.1080/13533310108413918 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533310108413918

Published online: 08 Nov 2007.

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Download by: [83.138.195.222] Date: 05 June 2017, At: 09:37 The Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB)

MOUSSOUNGA ITSOUHOU MBADINGA

The Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements is a peacekeeping operation independent of the United Nations. Its constitution, which was made possible by France, followed the request of the President of the to African Heads of State after the signature of the Bangui Agreements on 25 January 1997. However, the intensification of the crisis and the inadequacy of the legal framework of MISAB's intervention required the issue to be placed by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to address the events which threatened regional peace and security in Central Africa. It was made, at the request of the Central African authorities and the leaders of MISAB, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter.

As in other continents where political crises and internal conflicts are numerous, Africa confronts fundamental problems. The handicaps caused by technological underdevelopment, the internal vulnerability of weak- rooted political regimes, and the fact that nations are deeply divided because of rival ethnic groups, account for the economic, political and cultural difficulties which underlie the constant political instability of the African continent.1 The continuous diplomatic activity of the 'pilgrims of peace' has never been so intense in the search for diplomatic solutions to the many crises and civil wars in Africa. Diplomatic activity for the resolution of African crises and conflicts has always been wide-ranging, including the need for an Inter-African Force which was discussed within the African regional structures.2 Many initiatives aimed at creating such a force have emerged in particular within the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and also within the South African Defence Force. Both strategic and geopolitical divergences in the constitution of an African peacekeeping force have delayed the realization of this initiative.3 Nevertheless, some of the objectives have been fulfilled, such as the creation of the Inter-African Peacekeeping Force in ,4 the

Moussounga Itsouhou Mbadinga is a post-doctoral fellow, Faculté des sciences juridiques, politiques et sociales, Tunis. International Peacekeeping, Vol.8, No.4, Winter 2001, pp.21-37 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON 22 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING Group of Neutral Military Observers (GOMN) of the OAU in Rwanda,5 and the Economic Community of West-African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in August 1990, in Liberia6 and in Sierra Leone.7 In 1996, the Central African Republic was confronted with a social, political and military crisis punctuated by three rebellions.8 The first crisis occurred on 18 April 1996, following a rebellion by soldiers claiming payment of three-months postponed salary, an improvement of their living conditions and the dismissal of the army chief of staff.9 One month later, on 18 May 1996, the same soldiers took part in a second rebellion, which according to rebels was caused by the governmental failure to carry out the agreements which had put an end to the first rebellion. They protested against being disarmed and against the allocation of the arms manufacturing plant at Camp Kasaï, the main barracks of the country, to the control of the presidential guard. They also wanted an amnesty law to be adopted, protecting them from any consecutive legal proceedings following the first rebellion. The third rebellion10 was caused by the President of the Republic's project to transfer troops stationed at Bangui to Bouar, and also by the attempt, on 15 November 1996, to summon Captain Anicet Saulet (one of the leaders of the preceding rebellions) on charges of stealing funds during the presidency of General Kolingba.

It was only after the start of the third rebellion that regional diplomatic initiatives increased. Thus, the former Prime Minister, Jean-Paul Ngoupandé, together with the political opposition, consulted the French officials during the Nineteenth Summit Meeting of the Heads of States and Governments of France and Africa held in Ouagadougou on 4-6 December 1996, about persuading the heads of African States to be involved in the search for a peaceful solution to the Central African crisis." Following an initiative of President Patassé of the Central African Republic, the Summit agreed that the Presidents of , , and Chad were to go to Bangui to negotiate a truce between the loyal forces and the rebels. A ceasefire was reached after intense negotiations. This mediation mission of the Heads of African States led to the creation of the International Monitoring Committee,12 which was established to implement the measures contained in the final communiqué of 8 December 1996 and to find a peaceful and permanent solution to the Central African crisis. A Conference of dialogue and concertation, which took place in Bangui on 11-16 January 1997, led to the signing of the Bangui Agreements13 on 25 January 1997 and to planning for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic: the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB). This article discusses the means by which the African states accomplished a peacekeeping operation to restore internal peace and MONITORING THE BANGUI AGREEMENTS 23 security in the Central African Republic (CAR). It analyses the political reasons for the constitution of this peacekeeping operation and the legal framework of MIS AB 's intervention in the Central African crisis in the light of the applicable rules governing the intervention by states to contain internal disorder and restore the rule of law of other states. In addition, I ask whether this intervention could be considered as an action by a regional organization under Article 52 of the United Nations Charter. Then, it should be possible to understand the relations between the political authorities of MISAB and the Security Council and the reasons why this peacekeeping operation was placed under Chapter VII of the Charter. I argue that MISAB's intervention was consistent with international law. The first section addresses the basis of the constitution of MISAB by analysing the role played by France and the consent given to the deployment of this force by the CAR Government and the rebels. Then follows a discussion of the legal and political means by which MISAB achieved its mandate, particularly in placing the relations between the leading authorities of MISAB and the Security Council under Chapter VIII of the Charter, and in authorizing MISAB's intervention under Chapter VII.

The Constitution of MISAB : A Peacekeeping Force without the United Nations To understand the extent of the consensual and contractual basis of MISAB, as well as its concept as a conflict resolution structure, it is necessary to analyse the diplomatic and military roles that were played by France in the constitution of this force and to keep in mind that the presence of this peacekeeping force in the CAR was founded on two complementary and inseparable elements: the Bangui Agreements and the consent of the Central African authorities to the constitution of this pacification force.

The New Defence Policy of France and the Central African Crisis It is surprising, first of all, that a peacekeeping force could be established in the CAR given the central position of this country in the French military thinking in Africa.14 In fact, since the publication of the Livre Blanc sur la Défense in 1994, French external interventions must conform to one of six hypotheses on the use of force, corresponding to six crisis scenarios.15 The disorders which appeared in the CAR corresponded to the fourth crisis scenario (in the Livre Blanc sur la Défense). This type of intervention is designed to prevent or put an end to regional conflicts of low intensity within the framework of the defence agreements that France has already signed or will be able to sign with other countries. The definition of the mission takes into account the re-establishment of the territorial integrity of 24 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING a friendly country, the need to put an end to a conflict, the protection of the local population and requirements to return to civil peace. It is obvious that the implementation of this intervention is discriminatory in so far as it depends on the relevance of a situation to the strategic interests of France.16 The French military presence in Africa rests on old legal bases, the defence and technical assistance agreements. France and the CAR are bound by a defence agreement of 1960 and also by a technical assistance agreement. These relationships have a new reality pertinence with the end of Cold War competition in Africa, the African conflicts have their own dynamism now, and this puts France in an exposed position. Moreover, its budgetary, military and psychological constraints impose a recasting of the form and objectives of Franco-African military cooperation.17 Thus, the French intervention in the CAR was made possible only by the African policy of France. French army reforms were followed by a change in the structure and nature of the French prepositioned forces in Africa and more particularly in Central Africa. On the one hand, the missions anticipated by the French forces no longer include interference in the internal affairs of a state in order to protect a political regime, of a kind undertaken in Congo-Brazzaville in 1997, for example. On the other hand, France does not want to intervene unilaterally any more.18 However, the events of Central Africa showed the anachronism and ambiguity of the defence agreements in the New World and African political contexts. The French military intervention in Central Africa proceeded in three phases.19 The first can be presented as a humanitarian operation aiming at the protection and evacuation of French nationals and foreigners. At the same time, the French Minister of cooperation, Jacques Godfrain, declared that France no longer wanted to be the guardian of Africa.20 Then, by increasing its troops in the CAR and resorting to offensive actions, the French government sought to modify the military situation by stopping the rebellion. Lastly, with regard to this new balance of power, General Thorette, who was controlling Operation Almandin 2, engaged in mediation to obtain, on 26 May 1996, the commitment of the rebels to return to their barracks and that of President Patassé to grant an amnesty and to form a government of national union. This ostentatious interference in the CAR's internal affairs and the embarrassment of the French government show well the inadequacy of Franco-African military cooperation compared with the economic situation.21 It was not difficult for France to gain the support of Heads of African States and their involvement in the constitution of the MIS AB. The kind of intervention required in the Central African Republic could also be necessary in other African states. Indeed, the fact that rebellions in their armed forces constituted a threat to their political stability had a determining role in their acceptance of the mission. MONITORING THE BANGUI AGREEMENTS 25 The Legal Bases for MISAB's Intervention At the beginning, no allusion was made to the legal basis of MISAB's action; though the implementation of such independent missions in the past was often justified by states as actions undertaken within the framework of the UN Charter or other sources of international law.22 Although it is the consent of the state which is necessary, it is only one abstract entity which cannot by itself give or refuse its consent for an intervention. In general, international law supposes that when a government exerts effective control over the territory and population of the state, the official authorities of this government have the exclusive authority to express the will of the state in international affairs.23 It is at the same time a practical and theoretical question. From a practical point of view, it is impossible to be unaware of the authority of a government having the effective control of the territory of the state which it is supposed to represent on the international level, whereas from a theoretical point of view, the effective control of the government is used as authorization for a degree of congruence between the government and the broad political community of the state which supports the claim of the government to represent the state as a whole.24 In fact, from a legal point of view, in the case of Central Africa, it should initially be understood that the government in power, although having

internal difficulties following the rebellions, controlled the political apparatus and all the state territory. In this case, the government had full authority to ask for external assistance, or even for a military intervention, to assist it in order to maintain the law and internal order and the control of the state.25 The government in power has the choice between various entities: the UN, regional organizations or individual states. Moreover, the International Court of Justice recognized in the Nicaragua v. United States Case that intervention is generally allowed at the request of a state.26 According to the general outline of the peacekeeping operations undertaken by the UN, the decision to create a peacekeeping force proceeds from the consent of the states concerned. For the MIS AB, the process was identical.27 It is indeed well established in international law that the armed forces of a state cannot enter or intervene in the territory of another state without its preliminary consent, whether supposed or proven.28 The consent given for MISAB's intervention was clear and it covered all the activities of this mission. Consistent with international law, an external power may intervene when invited to aid a government in quelling civil disorder and maintaining law and order.29 Moreover, no ambiguity weighs on the nature of the proper public authority to grant such a measure, since it emanates from the head of state. It was the government of the Central African Republic which requested that an inter-African monitoring mechanism 26 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING should be established. The Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements was created on 25 January 1997 at the request of Ange-Félix Patassé, the President of the Central African Republic, 'to help to restore peace and security in this country, and in particular to disarm the ex-rebels, the militia and all other unlawfully armed individuals'.30 We can find a particularity on the consent given in the Bangui Agreements instituting the MIS AB. Indeed, whilst the consent of the host state in the territory of which the action will proceed is essential for the legality even of the presence of the foreign troops dispatched for a mission of this kind, that of the rebels was also requested in order to allow a deployment of the MISAB without clashes and to avoid the use of force. This widened its legitimacy and in this respect the MISAB is similar to many peacekeeping operations of the UN.31 The resort to the consent of all the parties concerned with this monitoring operation is not a legal but a practical requirement. Indeed, it is only the consent of the host state, expressed by its government in power, which legally authorizes the action of a monitoring operation. The involvement of other parties in the negotiations and the final agreement in establishing the mission is a practical need in the sense that the force can certainly meet many problems in fulfilling its mandate without the cooperation of all the concerned parties.32 MISAB's intervention in the Central African Republic without the prior consent of all the parties of the crisis would have led it to get involved in the domestic affairs of the CAR, to compromise its impartiality, to turn it into a potential target of armed attacks by rebels, and to considerably reduce its operational capacity and its effectiveness.33 Thus, MISAB's intervention did not affect CAR political independence and the principle of internal self-determination, and could not be criticized for supporting the government in power against the will of an internal opposition and for constituting an inadmissible interference in the political matters of this state.34 Indeed, a distinction must be made between intervening in a civil war and intervening at the invitation of the sovereign to contain internal disorder and restore the rule of law. In international law, the latter is permissible and the former is not.35 The case of the CAR was not a situation of civil war but a series of rebellions which affected the authority of its government. Moreover, the latter was representative of the Central African people and profited from its support, in so far as it resulted from democratic elections by universal suffrage.36 The MISAB's composition did not cause any problem either. In theory, international organizations or the intervening states determine the composition of a peacekeeping force. For the MISAB forces, it was allotted MONITORING THE BANGUI AGREEMENTS 27 to President Bongo to organize consultations with the other Presidents of the International Mediation Committee in order to determine its composition. It was done in a short time following the date of the official request addressed by President Patassé (27 January 1997) and that of the MISAB intervention on the territory of the Central African Republic (8 February 1997). The mandate of the MISAB specified that the force should be composed initially of 600 men from six countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, and Togo.37 Its operational organization was structured as an operational staff headquarters with a broad composition38 that profited from the logistical and financial support from France and other backers.39 In a more concrete way, the African contingents were equipped by the 6th battalion of French marines during the transit of each detachment in Libreville (Gabon), then conveyed by air to Bangui. Lastly, a unit of command and logistics, composed of 100 men and stationed in Mpoko, came from Nantes to reinforce and support MISAB. Moreover, French elements worked with the MISAB so that the new force could benefit from French knowledge of the ground and be used as an interface with the 'Eléments français d'assistance opérationnelle (EFAO)'. MISAB was placed under the political authority of President El Hadj Omar Bongo of Gabon, but General Amani Toumani Touré of Mali, in his capacity as Chairman of the International Monitoring Committee supervising the implementation of the Bangui Agreements, had such authority delegated to him.40 The establishment of this Committee had avoided a proliferation of mediation efforts which could provide 'opportunities for the protagonists to divide the international community, or to play one effort off against another'.41 The force was commanded by a Gabonese General appointed by President Omar Bongo.42 The CAR government and the states participating in MISAB also signed an agreement on the status of this peacekeeping force.43 This status determined the various facets of their cooperation. As underlined by Christine Gray: This cooperation requirement can be seen as a necessary extension of the principle of consent. Based on the principle of effectiveness and good faith, consent should not be interpreted as a purely formal requirement. Given that host-state means that the host state agreed to the presence and mandate of [the force], consent by the host state also necessarily implies that it has undertaken to cooperate with those forces.44 The status of the MISAB envisaged inter alia enjoyment of diplomatic privileges and immunities in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1961 (Article 2); unrestricted freedom of movement in the territory of the 28 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING Central African Republic, without paying dues, fees, tolls or other charges for the use of airports or roads (Article 7); the right to import and export without tax, or other restriction, the materials required for the operation (Article 8); a freedom of communication (Article 9). Moreover, the government assisted MISAB in occupying and using at minimum expense the installations required for their operations (Article 10), while agreeing to bear the cost of damage caused to third parties by MISAB personnel during the operation (Article 11).

The Change of Legal Framework of MISAB's Intervention: The Use of the Charter Provisions Due to the deterioration of the political situation in Central African Republic, a letter was addressed to the United Nations Secretary-General by President Bongo on 7 July 1997,45 urging the Security Council to adopt a resolution placing the actions of MISAB under Chapter VII of the Charter and to approve the objectives defined by the mandate of MISAB authorizing its intervention. First, we will show that, legally, this collaboration between the political authorities of MISAB and the Security Council is based under Chapter VIII of the Charter.

Use of Chapter VIII of the Charter This process was very ambiguous. It is known that the Security Council is the principal body in charge of maintaining international peace and security within the UN system, and that the regional agreements and organizations also have this capacity under Chapter VIII of the Charter. According to Article 54 of the Charter, '[t]he Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security'. In the case of MISAB, supposing that it was a regional peacekeeping operation decided by a regional arrangement or agency, the prior authorization of the Security Council should have been necessary before any action on the Central African Republic. But, as recalled by the former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali: The Charter deliberately provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies, thus allowing useful flexibility for undertaking by a group of states to deal with a matter appropriate for regional action which also could contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such associations and entities could include treaty-based organizations, whether created before or after the founding of the United Nations, regional organizations for mutual MONITORING THE BANGUI AGREEMENTS 29 security and defence, organizations for general regional development or for co-operation on a particular economic topic or function, and groups created to deal with a specific political, economic or social issue of current concern.46 This definition and its examples are very broad. It is possible to consider the International Mediation Committee and the International Monitoring Committee to supervise the implementation of the Bangui Agreements as regional arrangements, consistent with Article 52 of the Charter. They are 'groups created to deal with a specific political' matter concerning the maintenance of peace and security in the Central African Republic. Thus, MIS AB 's intervention in the Central African Republic can be considered as an action under Chapter VIII of the Charter. The UN Security Council has been labelled 'the Jack-of-all-trades' of international security.47 This situation is caused by the many problems faced by peacekeeping operations which have become more complex and more difficult in the last few years. The 'risk of saturation',48 and the problem regarding methods of control available to the Security Council are clearly posed.49 Chapter VIII of the Charter facilitated the more intense participation of regional arrangements in order to maintain international peace and security. MIS AB 's action was in conformity with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter. The examples quoted by Boutros-Ghali in paragraph 62 of An Agenda for Peace, such as 'the Friends of the Secretary-General' in the case of El Salvador, are illustrative of a rich variety of options deriving from this concept. Thereafter, we can say that since the letter of President Bongo of 7 July 1997 was transmitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General, relations between the MISAB and the Security Council fell within the legal framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, and more precisely of its Article 54. Indeed, we cannot otherwise understand the resort to the Security Council, more than five months after the MISAB's creation and intervention. However, the efforts carried out by MISAB personnel to restore security in Bangui did not bring satisfaction. On the contrary, there was a persistent exacerbation of tensions. A report made by President Bongo showed the inadequacy of the political and legal dimensions of MISAB, and led to the reference to the Security Council in order to operate a change in the legal framework of the mission's intervention. Thus, it seems consistent with international practice that one can decide the constitution of a peacekeeping operation to restore the law and internal order of a state since the situation prevailing in it does not constitute a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. As MISAB's intervention was made with the consent of all the concerned parties, the 30 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING prior authorization of the Security Council was not required.50 It is certainly the most plausible interpretation of the Security Council's silence during this period. The resort to the Security Council as well as its response to President Bongo's request shows that whatever the body constituting a peacekeeping force outside the United Nations to restore peace and internal order, the authorization of the Security Council is a substantial formality whose achievement, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, is necessary in order to legalize and to legitimate the actions undertaken with regard to the employment or possible use of enforcement action as provided by Article 53, paragraph 1 of the Charter.

Use of Chapter VII of the Charter and Reactivation of the Peace Process The serious tensions which prevailed in Bangui, according to the terms of President Patassé's letter of 4 July 1997, were likely to affect regional stability and thus to have consequences for international peace and security. President Bongo was very precise in affirming that the situation had escaped the control of the CAR government, which was unable to make people respect law and order, and that the state of insecurity was threatening to extend throughout the country, with catastrophic consequences for the civil population as well as for regional stability.51 These are the reasons why they asked the Security Council to place 'the actions of MISAB within an appropriate political and legal framework'.52 The Security Council approved these requests by adopting Resolution 1125 (1997) of 6 August 1997 to support this African subregional initiative. As declared by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan: within the context of the United Nations primary responsibility for matters of international peace and security, providing support for regional and subregional initiatives in Africa is both necessary and desirable. Such support is necessary because the United Nations lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa. It is desirable because wherever possible the international community should strive to complement rather than supplant African efforts to resolve Africa's problems.53 In paragraph 3 of Resolution 1125 (1997), the Security Council agreed to act under Chapter VII of the Charter and authorized the member states taking part in MISAB and those which provided logistical support to ensure the security and the freedom of movement of their personnel. The request made by President Bongo, in response to the deteriorating political situation on the ground, could facilitate the achievement of MISAB's mandate. But the Security Council did not come to a conclusion explicitly about the means of fulfilling these objectives. How could the MISAB, and France which provided it with logistical support, ensure the security and the MONITORING THE BANGUI AGREEMENTS 31 freedom of movement of their personnel without resorting to the use of the armed forces? Was it realistic to believe that the achievement of its mission to restore peace and security would have been possible without this? Such an authorization for the use of force is implicit in Resolution 1125. Admittedly, it is only specified that it is the freedom of circulation which is covered by Chapter VII of the Charter, but the latter is indisociable from the mandate entrusted to MISAB. Without freedom of movement, the return to peace and security could not be possible. Placed under Chapter VII, the freedom of movement of the MISAB forces and its main logistical support was one of the means by which the objectives of the mandate of this peacekeeping force would be achieved. This resolution was a kind of catalyst, having permitted the supervision of the handover of the ex-rebels and militia weapons and the other unlawfully armed individuals.54 The resolution placed the actions of MISAB within an appropriate political and legal framework, and permitted the force to carry out the required operations, in a neutral and impartial way, to achieve the goals defined by its mandate. It made it possible for MISAB to reach the zones effectively controlled by the rebels, even against the will of the latter. For instance, MISAB ensured, with the agreement of the parties concerned, operations to maintain security in the districts of Bangui.55 It took part, after the signature of the ceasefire agreement of 2 July 1997, on the basis of consensus, in the mixed security patrols composed of the MISAB, loyal supporters and rebels.56 While keeping its neutrality and its impartiality, MISAB displayed a coercive character to serve, not the interests of the government in power, but the objectives of the Bangui Agreements.57 The new legal framework of MISAB made it possible to observe that the political tension was easing in Bangui and to support the resumption of security activities in all the sectors.58 The Security Council thus delegated to the mediator of the crisis, President Bongo, the leading political authority of the MISAB, authority to execute its powers. As in any delegation of its authority, the Security Council must ensure the control of the execution.59 Thus, in paragraph 6 of Resolution 1125, the Security Council invited the member states taking part in MISAB to present periodic reports via the UN Secretary-General, at least every two weeks. Six reports were addressed to the Secretary-General by Gen. Amadou Toumani Touré from 6 August to 27 October 1997.60 Out of the seven fundamental clauses of the Bangui Agreements, only three were eventually implemented: the installation of a government of national union in February 1997, with the participation of the representatives of the main parties of opposition and representatives associated with the ex-rebels; the promulgation, on 15 March 1997, of an amnesty law for the offences perpetrated during the third rebellion of November 1996; and the adoption, 32 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING on 31 October 1997, of a law envisaging the payment of pensions and other services with the former presidents of the Republic. In addition, the provisions of the Bangui Agreements relating to disarmament had not yet been entirely applied in spite of slow progress.61 It is for these reasons that the Security Council renewed the mandate of MISAB four times, by Resolutions 1136 of 6 November 1997, 1152 of 5 February 1998, 1155 of 16 March 1998, and 1159 of 27 March 1998. Nevertheless, the parties of the Central African crisis achieved considerable progress towards national reconciliation and the introduction of a durable stability in the Central African Republic.62 Indeed, with the mediation of the International Monitoring Committee, a national reconciliation conference was held in Bangui from 26 February to 5 March 1998. The participants - including political parties, trade unions, religious denominations, human rights, justice and democracy groups, and national organizations — adopted the National Reconciliation Pact.63 In this pact, the signatories undertook to practise good governance (Article 1); to launch a frontal attack on poverty (Article 2) and to work together to create the political, social and economic conditions necessary to prevent any violations of human rights (Article 6). Elections were recognized as the only legal means of access to government power and the use of weapons, and force was banned as a means of accessing government power (Article 2). A

Monitoring and Arbitration Committee to monitor the implementation of the undertakings was also established (Article 7). The Security Council recognized the significant progress made by the CAR government in the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and the National Reconciliation Pact, which were the foundations of peace and stability in the country. It strongly encouraged the government to build on the progress made by strengthening democratic institutions, broadening the scope of reconciliation and national unity and promoting economic recovery. However, even if the states participating in MISAB were willing to continue to assist the Central African Republic in consolidating peace, they did not have the capacity to do so alone, as France was preparing to withdraw all its troops and consequently its logistical support for MISAB by mid-April 1998. Therefore, the Security Council decided to put an end to the mandate of MISAB and to establish the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)64 by paragraph 9 of Resolution 1159 of 27 March 1998, with effect from 15 April 1998.

Conclusion It has been shown that MISAB's intervention outside the United Nations was due, first, to the change of France's military policy in which external MONITORING THE BANGUI AGREEMENTS 33 intervention had been strictly interpreted and, second, to the French government's desire to let African leaders settle their political crises by themselves. Consistent with international law and the doctrine of non- intervention, MIS AB 's action was valid as it was made at the prior request and consent of the national political authorities of the Central African Republic. Nothing could forbid the Central African government from requesting an external intervention to restore peace, public order and preserve its democratic institutions. Although it is possible for states to constitute a peacekeeping force outside the United Nations, it is necessary to obtain the UN Security Council's prior authorization to use coercive means during an operation. Relations between the Security Council and the states establishing a force can only be legitimized when they are placed under Chapter VIII of the Charter. MIS AB 's intervention revealed, once again, that the strengthening of African states' capacity to constitute, and to operate in, peacekeeping missions remains a key priority.65

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank Michael Pugh for his English language assistance.

NOTES

1. Charles Zorgbibe, La France, l'ONU et le maintien de la paix, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, Coll. Perspectives internationales, 1996, p.103. 2. See Eric Berman and Katie Sams, African Peacekeeping: Capacities and Culpabilities, Geneva: UNIDIR, 1999. 3. André Guichaoua, 'Les "nouvelles" politiques africaines de la France et des Etats-Unis vis- à-vis de l'Afrique centrale et orientale ("Afrique des Grands Lacs et République Démocratique du Congo")', Polis/Review Camerounaise de Science Politique, Vol.3, No.l, 1997, pp.39-63; Cathérine Atlan and Jérôme Lauseig, 'Les approches françaises et américaines du maintien de la paix en Afrique', Polis/Review Camerounaise de Science Politique, Vol.3, No.3, 1997, pp.80-102; Clara Pulido Escandel, 'Les nouvelles tensions France-Etats-Unis dans le pré carré africain', Polis/Review Camerounaise de Science Politique, Vol.4, No.2, 1997, pp. 103-12. 4. Jean-Claude Gautron, 'Remarques sur la Force interafricaine de maintien de la paix au Tchad', in L'Etat moderne: Horizon 2000. Aspects internes et externes. Mélanges offerts à P.F. Gonidec, Paris: Libraire Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1985, pp.481-92. 5. The Group of Neutral Military Observers (GOMNI and thereafter GOMN II) was created to supervise the respect of the ceasefire which came into effect in July 1992, between the Rwandan Armed Forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. 6. Kofi Oteng Kufor, 'The Legality of the Intervention in the Liberian War by the Economic Community of West African States', African Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol.5, No.3, 1993, pp.528-59; David Wippman, 'Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War', in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Restraint. Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993, pp.183-95; Antoine-Didier Mindua, 'Intervention armée de la CEDEAO au Liberia: 34 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

illégalité ou avancée juridique?', African Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol.7, No.1, 1995, pp.258-83; Binaifer Nowrojer, 'Joining Forces: United Nations and Regional Peacekeeping - Lessons from Liberia', Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol.8, Spring 1995, pp.129-51; Clément E. Adibe, 'The Liberian conflict and the ECOWAS-UN partnership', Third World Quarterly, Vol.18, No.3, 1997, pp.471-88. 7. Jeremy Lewitt, 'Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone', Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, Vol.12, No.2, Fall 1998, pp.333-75. 8. Dominique Bangoura, '1996: les carences politiques et les ambiguïtés militaires de la France en Centrafrique', in Observatoire permanent de la coopération française, Rapport 1997. La coopération judiciaire, l'observation internationale des élections, la coopération militaire, Paris: Editions Karthala, 1997, pp. 166-70. 9. The rebellion was caused by: the Régiment mixte d'intervention, the Regiment de défense opérationnelle du territoire, the Regiment de soutien, and the Escadron blindé d'intervention. On 19 April 1996, certain elements of the French troops that were based permanently at this period in the Central African Republic were spread around Bangui to ensure the safety of French and foreign nationals. See Le Monde, 21 April 1996. Confrontations between the rebels and troops of the presidential guard, the police force and the French Eléments d'assistance opérationnelle, caused approximately nine deaths and 40 civil and military casualties. The Central African Republic constituted the second French military base in Africa after Djibouti with more than 1,400 soldiers. 10. Jean-Paul Ngoupandé, Chronique de la crise centrafricaine: Le syndrome Barracuda, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997, pp.65-72. 11. Ibid., pp.78-82. 12. This Committee included the representatives of the Member States of the International Mediation Committee (Gabon, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad) and the consultant of the United Nations Development Programme in a diplomatic advising capacity. The International

Monitoring Committee to supervise the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and the MISAB were placed under the political authority of General Amani Toumani Touré, former President of the Republic of Mali, and personal representative of the interested heads of state. This Committee directed the action of the MISAB and directly received the political input of the heads of interested states and especially of the President of the Gabonese Republic, Chairman of the International Mediation Committee. It was the body of negotiation between the various concerned parties of the Central African crisis. Thus, the International Monitoring Committee, within the framework of its mandate, maintained constant relations with the various Central African authorities for the application of the various clauses of the Bangui Agreements and also with the international organizations and the foreign chancelleries based in Bangui, in order to obtain diplomatic, financial and material support. See UN doc. S/1997/652, 21 Aug. 1997, p.5, §11-12. 13. UN doc. S/1997/561, 22 July 1997, Appendix III, IV, V, and VI. In the Declaration issued by heads of state (Appendix III), the concerned parties took note of the Preliminary Agreement on a National Reconciliation Pact; embodied the solemn commitment to respect the constitutional legal order and to lend full support to all initiatives to promote the dialogue and national reconciliation and to maintain the International Monitoring Committee. The Declaration on the end of the rebellious action (Appendix IV), signed with the rebels, put an end to the rebellious action triggered on 15 November 1996; requested a halt to all forms of constraint on collective and individual freedoms; the release of all persons apprehended in the course of the rebellious action; the building of a monument to the memory of civilian and military victims of the three rebellions; and the maintenance of the International Monitoring Committee as well as the settlement of all future differences and disagreements by peaceful means. The provisions of the Preliminary Agreement on a National Reconciliation Pact (Appendix V) put forward the engagement of the parties 'in the higher interest of the Central African nation and of the African continent, to prevent, through dialogue and consensus- building, any return to armed confrontation' by resolving to respect constitutional legality and to safeguard the democratic process. The last is the General Report of the Committee on Consensus-building and Dialogue (Appendix VI) which the parties began to implement MONITORING THE BANGUI AGREEMENTS 35

under the supervision of the International Monitoring Committee. On the political and institutional level, the more prominent points of this report concern the formation of a real government of national union including all the political families and the civil society; the suspension of the judicial enforcement parliamentary audit and the granting of an amnesty to promote peace; the granting of a pension to former heads of state; the implementation of the acts promulgated resulting from the General Meeting on the National Defence and the effective enforcement of legal and regulatory texts and consensual acts. As national reconciliation measures, it was necessary for all to take into account the damages suffered by the population and allow just compensation, to hold a national reconciliation conference and to establish a system of government management based on the principles of good governance. 14. During the period when these rebellions occurred, the Central African Republic was playing a pivotal role in French military policy in Africa, articulated with Dakar, Libreville and Djibouti. The military design rested on two permanent bases (Bouar and Bangui) and a force of 1,400 men, often solicited for interventions in Central Africa (Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, Rwanda, Zaire) and elsewhere. 15. Scenario 1: regional conflict not involving the vital interests of France. Scenario 2: regional conflict involving the vital interests of France. Scenario 3: attack against French territorial integrity beyond the metropolis. Scenario 4: implementation of the bilateral defence agreements. Scenario 5: operations for the maintenance of peace and international law. Scenario 6: resurgence of a major threat against Western Europe. 16. Paul Ango Ela, 'La coopération militaire franco-africaine et la nouvelle donne des conflits en Afrique', Relations internationales et stratégiques, No.23, Autumn 1996, p. 184. 17. Fréderic Gulin, 'La présence militaire française en Afrique subsaharienne, ou la recherche d'un nouvel équilibre', Défense, No.76, July 1997, pp.66-7. 18. Pascal Chaigneau, 'Faut-il supprimer les accords de défense et les clauses secrètes?', L'Autre Afrique, No.25, 12-18 Nov. 1997, p.21.

19. See also Bangoura (n.8 above), pp.170-73. 20. Déclaration sur Europe 1, 20 mai 1996. 21. Ela (n.16 above), p.185. 22. Brian L. Zimbler, 'Peacekeeping Without the U.N.: The Multinational Force in Lebanon and International Law', Yale Journal of International Law, Vol.10, No. I, 1984, p.223 (n.7); Guy Feuer, 'La Force Arabe de sécurité au Liban', Annuaire Français de Droit International, Vol.22, 1976, pp.51-61. See generally Katia Boustany, Le conflit intraétatique au Liban: Problèmes de maintien de la paix, Brussels: Editions Bruylant, 1994, p.454. 23. Tom J. Farer, 'Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm', American Journal of International Law, Vol.84, 1990, p.510. 24. David Wippman, 'Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent', Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol.7, No.1, Fall 1996, p.212. 25. Louis Henkin, 'Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy', in Right v. Might: International Law and the Use of Force, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2nd edn 1991, p.63. 26. ICJ, Rec. 1986, §126. 27. See Letters No. 009/97 and No. 010/97 of 7 January 1997 of President Patassé. 28. Oscar Schachter, 'International Law: The Right of States to Use Armed Force', Michigan Law Review, Vol.82, 1984, p.1642; Christopher C. Joyner, 'The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion', American Journal of International Law, Vol.78, 1984, p.138; Anthony Chukwuka Ofodile, 'The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol.32, No.2, 1994, p.407. 29. Schachter (n.28 above), p.1642. 30. UN doc. S/1997/561, 22 July 1997, Annex. Letter dated 4 July 1997 from Mr. Ange-Felix Patassé, President of the Central African Republic, addressed to the Secretary-General, p.2. 31. Mohamed Bennouna, Le consentement à l'ingérence militaire dans les conflits internes, Paris: Libraire Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1974, pp.207-10. 32. Christine Gray, 'Host-State Consent and United Nations Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia', Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol.7, No.1, Fall 1996, pp.244-5. 33. See examples quoted by Zimbler (n.22 above); Eric Suy, 'Peace-keeping Operations', in 36 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

René-Jean Dupuy (ed.), A Handbook on International Organizations, 2nd edn, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998, pp.556-7. 34. Wippman (n.24 above), p.214. 35. Richard A. Falk, 'International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War', Yale Law Journal, Vol.75, 1966, p.1127; 'Resolution: The Principle of Non-intervention in Civil Wars', in Institut de Droit International. Annuaire, Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1975, p.547; Schachter (n.28 above), p. 1641; Oscar Schachter, 'In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force', University of Chicago Law Review, Vol.53, 1986, p. 136. 36. See Bennouna (n.31 above), pp.57-60. 37. MISAB had reached a size of 796 soldiers. S/1997/652, 21 Aug.1997, p.6, §17. 38. UN doc. S/1997/561, 22 July 1997, Appendix I. Mandate of the Inter-African force to monitor the implementation of the Bangui Agreements, art.4. 39. Ibid., art.5, 11. 40. Ibid., art.6. 41. The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. Secretary-General's Report to the United Nations Security Council, 16 April 1998, §22-23. 42. Ibid., art.9. 43. UN doc. S/1997/561, 22 July 1997, Appendix II. Status of the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements. 44. Gray (n.32 above), p.251. 45. UN doc., S/1997/543, 14 July 1997. Letter dated 7 July 1997, addressed to the Secretary- General by the President of Gabon. 46. See UN doc. A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, §61. 47. Serge Sur, 'Opinion: "The Jack of all Trades" of International Security', UNIDIR Newsletter,

No.24, Dec. 1993, p.3. 48. Ibid., p.4. 49. Victor-Yves Ghébali, 'La sécurité internationale à l'ère de l'après-guerre froide: le rôle des Nations Unies', German Yearbook of International Law, 1991, Vol.34, pp. 109-21; Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein, 'Action humanitaire et Chapitre VII. La redéfinition du mandat et des moyens d'action des Forces des Nations Unies', Annuaire Français de Droit International, Vol.39, 1993, pp.105-30; UN doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organization. Supplement to an agenda for peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, §37-38; Yves Daudet, 'Les opérations de maintien de la paix sont-elles toujours viables? (observations sur les conflits en ex-Yougoslavie)', in Mélanges offerts à Hubert Thierry: L'évolution du droit international, Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1998, pp.159-73; Charles-Philippe David, 'Le concept des casques blancs', in Charles-Philippe David, La consolidation de la paix. L'intervention internationale et le concept des casques blancs, Paris: L'Harmattan, Coll. Raoul-Dandurand, 1997, p.49. 50. Nikolai B. Krilov, 'International Peacekeeping and Enforcement Actions After the Cold War', in Lori F. Damrosch and David Scheffer (eds), Law and Force in the New International Order, Boulder, CO: American Society of International Law, 1991, p.99; Ofodile (n.28 above), p.412. 51. UN doc. S/1997/543, 14 July 1997. 52. S/1997/561, 22 July 1997, Annex, p.2. 53. UN doc. 'The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. Secretary-General's Report to the United Nations Security Council', 16 April 1998, §41. 54. S/1997/821, 27 Oct. 1997. Annex. Letter dated 23 October 1997 from the President of the Gabonese Republic, addressed to the President of the Security Council, p.2. 55. S/1997/652, 21 Aug. 1997, p.6, §18; S/1997/684, 4 Sept. 1997, p.11, §32. 56. Ibid., p.7, §22. MISAB corresponded to 'first generation' peacekeeping. See Victor-Yves Ghébali, 'Le développement des opérations de maintien de la paix de l'O.N.U. depuis la fin MONITORING THE BANGUI AGREEMENTS 37

de la guerre froide', Le Trimestre du monde, No.4, 1992, pp.67-85; Georges Abi-Saab, 'La deuxième génération des opérations de maintien de la paix. Quelques réflexions préliminaires', Le Trimestre du monde, No.4, 1992, pp.87-97; Edward J. Perkins, 'United Nations Peace-Keeping', Yale Journal of International Law, Vol.18, No.1, Winter 1993, pp.435-37; Marrack Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peace-keeping', International Affairs, Vol.69, No.3, July 1993, pp.451-64; Brigitte Stern, 'L'évolution du rôle des Nations Unies dans le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales', in International Law as a Language for International Relations: Proceedings of the United Nations Congress on Public International Law, New York, 13-17 March 1995, The Hague: Kluwer Law International/United Nations, 1996, pp.58-84. 57. S/ 25859, United Nations Peace-Keeping Operational Guiding Principles, 28 May 1993. 58. S/1997/840, 4 Nov. 1997. Annex. Letter dated 17 October 1997 from the President of the Central African Republic, addressed to the Secretary-General, p.2. 59. Yann Kerbrat, La référence au Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies dans les résolutions à caractère humanitaire du Conseil de Sécurité, Paris: Libraire Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1995, pp.74-5; Evelyne Lagrange, Les opérations de maintien de la paix et le chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, Paris: Editions Montchrestien, CEDIN Paris XIII, Perspectives internationales, No. 16, 1999, pp. 110-22. 60. S/1997/652, 21 Aug. 1997; S/1997/684, 4 Sept. 1997; S/1997/16, 16 Sept.1997; S/1997/759, 30 Sept. 1997; S/1997/795, 14 Oct. 1997; S/1997/828, 29 Oct. 1997. 61. S/1998/61, 23 Jan. 1998, pp.3-4, §10-12. 62. S/1998/221, 12 Mar. 1998, pp.4 and ff. 63. S/1998/219, 11 Mar. 1998, Appendix. 64. The initial mandate of this peacekeeping force was: (a) to assist in maintaining and enhancing the security and stability, including freedom of movement, in Bangui and the immediate vicinity of the city; (b) to assist the national security forces in maintaining law and order and in protecting key installations in Bangui; (c) to supervise, control storage and

monitor the final disposition of all weapons retrieved in the course of the disarmament exercise; (d) to ensure security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and the safety and security of the United Nations property; (e) to assist in coordination with other international efforts in a short-term police trainers' programme and in other capacity- building efforts of the national police, and to provide advice on the restructuring of the national police and special police forces; and (f) to provide advice and technical support to the national electoral bodies regarding the electoral code and plans for the conduct of the legislative elections scheduled for August/September 1998. MINURCA's mandate expired on 15 February 2000.