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Central African Republic (CAR) Peacekeeping_4.qxd 1/14/07 2:29 PM Page 106 4.4 Central African Republic (CAR) After landmark elections in 2005, the UN UN in Central Africa (BONUCA), was estab- Secretary-General observed that for the first lished in February 2000 to help consolidate time in years, “the conditions for peacebuilding peace and promote security sector reform. are in place” in the Central African Republic However, President Patassé remained belea- (CAR). But these hopes receded in 2006, as post- guered by opposition inside and outside the election violence escalated into a full-scale rebel- army, becoming reliant on military aid from lion in the north, gruesomely entangled with the Libya and Congolese mercenaries for his own tensions between Chad and Sudan. Neither the survival. FOMUC was created in 2002 to sta- CAR military nor the Force Multinationale de bilize the government as it battled a growing la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de insurgency led by the former army chief of l’Afrique Centrale (FOMUC) was in a position staff, General François Bozizé. to restore order. A fragmented country once again FOMUC was established by the Central risked being a victim of the regional dynamics African Economic and Monetary Community involving its immediate neighbors. (CEMAC), with endorsement from the UN Decades of political instability in CAR Security Council. It is composed of troops reached a peak in 1996, when protests over from Gabon, Congo, and Chad, and is financed unpaid salaries triggered multiple mutinies by by France, the European Union, and CEMAC the armed forces against the elected govern- member states. Initially conceived as a 200- ment of President Ange-Félix Patassé. Fight- strong “observer” mission—later expanded to ing was fueled by regional and ethnic tensions, 380 troops—the force has a broad mandate to as Patassé’s supporters, mainly from the north monitor security in Bangui and along the Cha- and west of CAR, were pitted against the dian border, and to contribute to the transitional mainly southern elites dominant under the for- process. Until recently, its main operational mer president, General André Kolingba. The focus was Bangui, particularly to secure the conflict in the former French colony has also president’s residence and the national airport. been driven by the struggle to control the This assistance was not enough to prevent the lucrative timber and diamond industries. 2003 coup in which General Bozizé ousted Regional mediators brokered the Bangui Patassé; however, the force remained in place peace agreement in January 1997, which was under the new regime. Bozizé established the monitored first by an 800-strong African re- broad-based National Transition Council, gional force, the Inter-African Mission to Mon- restored constitutional rule, and was formally itor Implementation of the Bangui Agreements elected president in May 2005. (MISAB), and subsequently by the UN Mission Following the elections, it was hoped that in the Central African Republic (MINURCA). 2006 would mark a period of consolidation. The peacekeepers provided security in and FOMUC reduced its presence in Bangui in around Bangui, enabling the conduct of elec- order to help extend government authority tions that saw Patassé returned as president across the troubled northern provinces. On 30 in September 1999. But as MINURCA drew November 2005, Secretary-General Kofi down, security in CAR remained fragile. A Annan announced his intention to extend successor political mission, the Office of the BONUCA and to promote its head to “Special 106 Peacekeeping_4.qxd 1/14/07 2:29 PM Page 107 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC • 107 Representative.” While it seemed that condi- tions conducive to peacebuilding had been in Force Multinationale de la Communauté Économique place, with some progress made in building et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (FOMUC) state institutions, there has been a sharp deteri- • Authorization date 2 October 2002 (Libreville Summit) oration in the security situation. Escalating 21 March 2003 (Libreville Summit, violence in the northwest is attributed to at Amended) least four armed groups, all dedicated to over- • Start date December 2002 throwing the Bozizé government: the Union • Head of mission Brigadier-General Auguste Roger Bibaye des Forces Républicaines (UFR), the Armée Itandas (Gabon) • Budget $9.7 million (October 2005– pour la Restauration de la République et la September 2006) Démocratie (APRD), the Mouvement Patri- • Strength as of Troops: 380 tique pour la Restauration de la République 30 September 2006 Local civilian staff: 54 Centrafricaine (MPRC), and the Front Démoc- ratique du Peuple Centrafricaine (FPDC). On 29 January 2006, government and FOMUC clashes with armed rebels in the northern town of Paoua resulted in over twenty civilian Office of the UN in Central Africa (BONUCA) deaths. Fighting intensified in February and March, accompanied by accusations of human • Authorization date 10 February 2000 rights violations by government forces. A lull • Start date 15 February 2000 in March saw the launch of a “national dia- • SRSG and General Lamine Cissé (Senegal) head of office logue on peace and security,” but by June, • Budget $6.5 million (2006) according to UN estimates, 50,000 people had • Strength as of Military advisers: 5 been internally displaced, with a further 30 June 2006 Police advisers: 6 20,000 seeking refuge in Chad. International civilian staff: 25 Local civilian staff: 44 Internal conflict in the CAR has been UN volunteers: 3 fueled by rising tensions between Chad and Sudan. In April, armed men and military equipment were reportedly delivered by air to northeastern CAR. In response, the CAR gov- empting an untimely withdrawal of the mission. ernment closed its border with Sudan. The As 2006 drew to a close, fighting in the same month, forces hostile to the regime in north displaced an estimated quarter of a mil- N’djamena allegedly used the CAR as a base lion civilians, including refugees to neighbor- for attacks into Chad. On 26 June, rebels ing Chad and Cameroon, despite the unstable attacked a government camp at Gordil, near security situation in the former. This prompted the Chad border, clashing with the Chadian the UN to call for international action to re- contingent of FOMUC. President Bozizé, con- spond to what was quickly becoming a cerned about links between the CAR and Chad regional humanitarian crisis. Consequently, in rebel groups, called for international assistance November, the UN dispatched an assessment against “armed groups in the pay of foreign mission to the country (and Chad) with a view powers.” Separately, Annan warned Security to considering deployment o a multidimen- Council members that the CAR’s armed forces sional UN mission to both countries for the and FOMUC were not in a position to secure purpose of monitoring the border and possibly the territory. France then stepped up military protecting civilians. While FOMUC and support to the CAR’s armed forces, including BONUCA might have helped to prevent Cen- aerial patrols of the northern areas. The Euro- tral Africa from degenerating into total chaos, pean Commission’s recommendation to the EU the escalation of fighting in the north exposed for the continued funding of FOMUC until 30 the limits of both missions, and the need for June 2007, was a positive development, pre- greater international involvement. Peacekeeping_4.qxd 1/14/07 2:29 PM Page 108 108 • MISSION NOTES.
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