United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) - Incidents Reports

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items-in-Peace-keeping operations - India/Pakistan - United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) - incidents reports

Date Created 16/08/1965

Record Type Archival Item

Container S-0863-0004: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant: India/Pakistan

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN Srina gar-Kashmi r

SECRET me 323-57 16 August 1965

To * Dr. Ralph J. Bunche Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs United Nations Eqs., New York. DETAILED REPORT ON J£fMJ AND KASHMIR INCIDENTS FECK 5 AUGUST 1965

1. This report which was mentioned in the last paragraph of my UJSMOG 423, details the serious incidents which occurred in KASHMIR since the 5th August 65 and which have been reported to you in my UNMOG 413 and subsequent messages. 2. The events are reported in a chronological order and cover only the important incidents which have been officially brought to the attention of this mission and investigated by Observers. This report could not have been prepared earlier because of the following factors :- a. Incidents were not always reported immediately to the Military Observers; on some occasions they were reported 4 days later only. b. Difficulties in reaching the scenes of the incidents because of continuous firing in the areas concerned. c. Difficulties in receiving the written reports from the Observers because the roads and tracks were still closed for security reasons. 3. Before reviewing the events, I wish to comment on the general situation which prevailed before this outbreak of violence. Since the serious incidents which occurred in KARGIL Sector at the end of May and at the beginning of June 65 and the Rann of Sitch Agreement, the situation all along the GFL and the border had calmed down and it was hoped that the number of incidents would continue to decrease as it has been reported to you in my reports Nos. 352, 353 and 354. UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

- 2 - 4. On 5 July 65, I received a complaint from Indian Army EQ, Hew Delhi, that additional troops had "been inducted by Pakistan into KASHMIR. Military Observers visited the areas concerned on several occasions and reported that they had not detected any forces in excess of the forces normally stationed in their areas of responsibility. Routine reliefs in the line had taken place on both sides. However, Observers had repeatedly noted considerable strengthening of defences on both sides. As late as 6 August 65, I received SBOBET information from one of my Teams that a convoy of 19 vehicles bringing armed civilians had been seen in SAWALAKOT Sector on 24 July 65.

5. SEgCTBHOB OP EVENTS

a. The first serious incident was reported by local commander to GALUTHI UKFO Team on 6 August 65. The initial complaint alleged that a serious clash had taken place on 5 August 65 near DEABBOT Village which is located 8000 yards on the Indian side of the CFL near an Indian Brigade HQ. The investigating Observers reached the scene a few hours after the incident and were shown :- - 3 dead Indian soldiers. - 2 dead persons dressed in blue clothes. - A large quantity of arms, ammunition, medicine and personal equipment (See Annex "A°)» They were informed that an Indian patrol clashed with an estimated group of 70 to 80 infiltrators. The Indian patrol was fired upon by 5 MG, together with 2M mortars and small arms.

b. The second serious incident was reported by the local commander to BARATOLLA Team on 7 August 65. The complaint alleged that a large number of infiltrators had moved into GULKARG Sector as far as 16,000 yards on Indian side of CFL on night 5/6 August. When MILOBS investigated, they were advised that an Indian patrol surprised the intruders who started firing and then withdrew, leaving a large quantity of material behind consisting of 4 .303 rifles, 3 machine carbines (sten), 9 spare IMG barrel Sj 30 hand-grenades, .303 ammunition, detonator, explosive charges, clothing, rations, first aid bags and many other miscellaneous items. The weapons had their markings scratched off.

c. The next incidents of infiltrations and firing were reported by the local commander to BASAMDLLA Team on 8 August 65. The complaints alleged that large scale infiltrations and firings occurred during the night 7/8 August as follows :- UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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Attack on guarded bridge 12 miles on Indian side. Attacks on four other bridges respectively 6, 7> 12 and 17 miles on Indian side. The latter two being in the northern areas of BASAMU1LA Sector. (3) Attacks on a battalion and a company HQ respectively 14 and 10 miles on Indian side. (4) Attacks on 6 pickets respectively 2, 3> 3» 6, 6 and 7 miles on Indian side.

Investigation of sub-sub para c. (l) above disclosed that :-

(a) 11 Indian soldiers were killed, 4 Indian soldiers wounded, 1 Indian policeman wounded, 1 civilian (believed to have been guide for raiders) killed, one soldier wounded and captured (not interviewed by MILOBS) and one raider captured and personally interviewed, in camera, by MILOBS.

This prisoner stated that he was a soldier of the 16 AK Inf. BIT which had formed the bulk of the raiding party estimated by him at 300 soldiers led by the M 2 i/c and 100 "MJJAHIDS". He said their task' was to infiltrate deeply, blow up bridges and attack ammunition dumps and formation HQs. He gave the correct names of officers and PAIC posts to MILOB who believed his statement.

(b) Damaged section of Bailey bridge, unexploded demolition charges, length of fuse wire and cartridge cases etc. were seen.

The investigations of sub-sub paras c. (2), (3) and (4) disclosed that the incidents took place as alleged. The total casualties seen were 2 Indian soldiers killed and 8 Indian soldiers wounded. Damaged bridges, blood stains, bullet and grenade marks on wall and on a 3-"ton truck, 17 SM carbine magazines and 5 LMG magazines, 9 mm and .303 cartridge cases, 2" mortar tail fins, 2 hand-grenades and tail section of 83 mm rockets were seen also.

d. In GALUTHI Sector the following complaints were received by the TJNFO Team on 8 August 65. Six attacks with small arms and explosives on two BU HQs and 8 pickets from 3 to 6 miles on Indian side.

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The investigations were carried out on all cases on 8 August and the MILOBS were shown one wounded Indian soldier and 4 killed raiders. The abandoned material seen by the Observers is listed at Annex "B".

e. In the Southern area of KASHMIR, in the JAMMU Sector, the Observers were informed on night 7/8 August that two serious attacks had taken place on two BH HQs, one in the CHAMB area (2 miles on Indian side) and the other at JAURIM (6 miles on the Indian side).

The Observers proceeded to the scene of both incidents on the morning of 8 August and reported their findings to this HQ on the same day. They saw 5 dead Indian soldiers and 5 wounded Indian soldiers, 2 burned trucks, 2 burned tents and 3 trucks destroyed by MG fire. All empty shell cases and live grenades lying around the area had no manufacturing marks on them. They also saw live 2" mortar bombs, 83 mm rockets and live MEHGA grenades.

f. During the night 8/9 August, the Observers stationed in GALUTEI at an Indian Brigade HQ,. reported some firing towards their location.

g. On the morning of 8 August 65j three complaints relating to infiltrations and attacks on one K>L dump, one BH HQ and two pickets were reported to the 3STAUSEERA Team.

All the investigations were carried out on the same day and the Observers reported the following factual evidence :-

(1) At the POL dump, they saw 400 empty cartridge oases with no markings, one live 83 mm rocket, 4 tails of exploded 83 mm rockets and bullet marks all over the POL dump.

(2) At the BU HQ, they saw one rocket crater, one 83 mm rocket tail, one live 2" mortar bomb and a nearby road blasted with explosives.

(3) All the attacks on the pickets were confirmed by a lot of evidences abandoned on the scene of the incident such as 2" mortar bomb craters, 5 rocket tails, 4 live 2" mortar bombs, empty containers for 2" mortar bombs, 83 nun rockets and rifle grenades.

h. In the remote and mountainous Northern area, KARGIL Team investigated on 10 and 11 August three complaints received by them on those datesj two of them related to attacks on bridges located on the main road SEIKAGAE-ZARGIL-LEH and one related to an attack on an Indian picket. UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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The results of their findings revealed the folio-wing :_ (1) The first attack on one of the "bridges (6 miles on the Indian side) commenced at 0030 hrs. on the morning of 10 August. One Indian soldier was killed and three wounded. Two main bridge supports were damaged "by explosion. Many empty cartridge cases were found around the area together with a rucksack with miscellaneous personal items left in it. (2) The second attack on a "bridge (8 miles on the Indian side of the CFL and 14 miles SW of KARGIL) occurred also on 10 August at 0330 hrs. 2 Indian policemen were killed and 2 Indian soldiers wounded. A quantity of high explosives (plastic), approximately 300 rounds of .30 Browning ammunition and damaged "bridge supports were seen by the MILQBS. (3) In the attack of the picket which is located near the CFL, MILOBS confirmed that the attack was carried out "by approximately two platoons who overran the picket and then attacked another one nearby. One dead PAK soldier, two dead Indian soldiers and a wounded civilian porter were seen.

6. I propose to end the first serial of this running detailed report here as I feel that speed is of the essence in forwarding confirmed information. I shall "be sending further instalments of this report regularly and as speedily as I possibly can so as to give you an eventual complete picture which may influence any remedial action contemplated.

R.H. Chief Military Observer UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

ANNEX "A"

LIST OF MATERIAL SBEEf BY MILOBS AT DHABBOT ON 6 AUGUST 1965

1. LMG 3 2. LMG Bren Magazine 32 3. Rifle No 1 Mk III 1 4. Sten Magazine 48 5. Sten filler 9 6. Bomb Rocket 83 mm HB-80 13 7. Carts .303 CTN 6710 8. Carts 303 BDR 645 9. Carts 9 mm Carbine MkFK" 2996 10. Carts 9 mm Carbine Mk-less 4605 11. Explosive Pakts Long 10 12. Wire Cutter 2 13. Detonator Box 4 Second 55 14. Mines AP 2 15. Tap ensulation 3 16. Detonator 200 17. Pall Switch 10 18. Time Pencil 28 19- Rubber cap pkts 2 20. Trip Wire Pkts 2 21. Safety Fuze Reel Bundles 3 22. Hand Gren HE 36, 1957 3 23. M n n H !958 55 24. » ti n H !959 40 25- II II II II QO gQ 11 Total 175 26. H II II II 1^61 16 27. H II II II 1262 24 28. II tl II II 1^64 3 29. " " " " without year 23 30. Binocular - HANSIKAR & ALEXIS Pris No 83152 1 UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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31. Detonator Lot 1 POP 4/65 Green 9 Red 8 Total 22 White 5 32. 29 33. Hate 2 34. Cap water proof 38 35. Jersey P/0 29 36. Blankets 9 37. Socks, pairs 29 38. Towel, hand 17 39. Baikal ava 35 40. Water "bottle 40 41. Mess tin 21 42. Cooking utensil, small 2 43. Field dressing 39 44. House wife 20 45- Small paok go 46. Civilian pattern pack 29 47. Jacket, khaki 6 48. Med bag 3 49. Milk dry Few Bags 50. Other articles Civ Clothing etc. 51. Big pack 28 UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

.Annex "BM

List of Material seen "by. Military Observers stationing in NAUSHERA

1. WEAPONS AND AMUNITIOM N 2,000 (approx) rounds 9sao. cartridges. 1,000 ( n ) rounds 303 55 36 Grenades 78 Detonators for 36 Gren. 1 Rocket launcher "BLINDICIDE" (Belgium) 3 BLINDICIDE bombs 26 LMG magazines 4 Sten 'magazines 1 LMG spare barrel 30 Detonators for explosives 1 Pistol signal 34 Very light cartridges 4_2_ Cartridges 12 bore Spare parts for IMG 14 AP plastic mines (type US Mk1). _8_3 ft Fuze wire Packs of GUN powder

2. EQUIBIENT 1 Compass prismatic 3 Wire cutters 67 Rucksacks containing: rations, first aid kits, water bottles, mess tins and utensils, etc. 44 Plastic raincoats transformable into tents (individual).

3. CLOTHING 7 Blankets 25 Jerseys (heavy) 15 prs. Woolen socks 38 Cap comforter (winter type with earcovers) 34 Towel s

RMARKSI a* Most of the clothing and the equipment was brand new. b. Also found ONE map case and TWO complete maps of the area GALUTEE and NAUSHERA Sector from PAK side to SRINAGAR included. Also found "Posters" and "Leaflets" in KASHMIRI language but in URDU writing, calling the people of KASHMIR to the YAHAD or HOLY war. It was said to be printed in SEDTAGAR. UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN Sri na gar-Ka shmi r

SECRET 323-57 18 August 1965

To : Dr. Ralph J. Bunche Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs United Nations Hqs. , New York.

DETAILED REPORT ON JAMMU AND KASHMIR INCIDENTS FROM 10 AUGUST 1965.

1. This is Part II of my letter 323-57 dated 16 August 1965.

2. A further operation took place as follows

On 10 August 1965 it was reported to the PUNCH Team that PAK troops of approximately 1 BN had attacked an Indian picket 14 miles North East of PUNCH. The Military Ob servers 'could not reach the area as the tracks had been closed "by local commander for security reasons. On 11 August it was reported that the attacking force consisted of 3 Battalions. It was also reported that this force had moved 14,000 yards South and taken the town of MANDI. Wounded Indian soldiers who had been evacuated to PUNCH from the attacked picket were interviewed and stated that on the evening of 7 August, they had seen some movement North East and South West of the picket. Later on during the night, the picket was fired on by MMG, rockets and mortars and two assaults were made from the East. When the casualties were evacuated they were fired upon from high ground on both sides. The attackers wore grey/black jackets and light coloured trousers. On 11 August, the Observers also interrogated 2 wounded Army porters who said that their party had been ambushed 9000 yards on the Indian side of the CFL in the area of MANDI. Military Observers were advised on 12 August that the Indians had re- taken MANDI. The Observers visited this town and saw that it had been destroyed. The bridge and two buildings are the only things left standing as a result of fire caused by Indian artillery shelling prior to the re-capture of MANDI. All women, children and most of the men have been evacuated by the original attackers. The latest information relating to this area is that the most Northern Indian picket fell to the attackers on 15 August. The Indian casualties are believed to be 9 dead and 4 wounded.

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b. Baring the above mentioned incidents which took place North of HJNCH, it was reported by civilians that another force of approximately 100 infiltrators had been seen 12 miles South- East of HUTCH moving North West towards HUTCH. Farther North, this party split into three groups and attacked three separate pickets located in the rear of Indian troops and fired on the town of HJNCH during the night 12/13 August. The Observers in HJNCH heard the firing themselves. They reported that the attackers had been repulsed on the morning of 13 August.

c. The latest report on the above mentioned incidents (paras 2 a. and 2 b. above), was received verbally on 17 August from an Observer who came directly from HJITCH, He stated that the estimated strength of attackers North of MANDI was approximately 1000, those South East of 3OTCH approximately one BH. Indian troops are now attempting to re-capture the Indian picket 14 miles North East of HJISTCH and destroy the South-Eastern group. Harass- ing artillery is being fired by both sides. 3. At 1600'hrs. on 13 August, Military Observers at BARAMULA received information from local commander that Indian troops at NAUGAM (Indian picket 12 miles on Indian side of GPL) had been attacked during the morning and that a convoy evacuating the Indian casualties (believed to be high) from the Indian picket had been ambushed on its way to the rear. The Indian local commander requested the UN Good Offices to recover three wounded and stated that the raiders were still in the area. Within half an hour of receiving this information, two Observers from BARAMULA Station proceeded to HMD WAHA (15 miles North of BARATOLA on the way to the attacked picket) and thence along tracks leading to NAUGAM. The ambushed and deserted convoy was reached 8 miles further; two trucks had been badly damaged by small arms fire and blood stains were seen on the road. On searching the area^ the Observers found a wounded Indian soldier nearby. The wounded soldier was put in the jeep and the Military Observers continued towards NAUGAM. Rifle shots were fired close by and LMG/rifle fire could be heard from the immediate front and from the forest above the Indian picket. It appeared that the Indian troops oaught in the ambush managed to return to their post, and that the raiders were still attacking. The Observers could not approach the picket and had to return to BARAMOLA. The Indian wounded soldier who had been taken back to BARAHULA stated that up to the time of the ambush, Indian casualties were : 10 dead, 23 wounded and 75 horses killed. There were also 12 raiders dead near the picket. The following day the casualties were evacuated by helicopters. UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

-3- Military Observers have attempted repeatedly to reach KAUGAM to complete the investigation of this serious incident, "but have been unable to do so because of continuous firing in this hilly area. 4« The latest Observers' report on the above incident was received on 17 August. Military Observers stated that they had interviewed on 16 August, 21 of the 23 wounded. Amongst them was the Second-in-Command of the Battalion concerned. All the statements made corroborated each other. The gist of these statements was that at 0700 hrs. on 13 August, the picket MtJGAM had been attacked simultaneously from two flanks by PAK troops estimated at about 40 men. Several of the Indian soldiers were having breakfast and most of the bunkers were unoccupied. Pakistan troops were dressed in civilian clothes. They used rifles, IMG, MMG, hand-grenades and possibly 2" mortars. This attack resulted in 6 Indian soldiers killed and 16 wounded. 12 PAK soldiers were also killed. After the attack, the wounded soldiers were loaded on trucks and jeeps for evacuation. The convoy started at about 1130 hrs. from the picket and it was ambushed half an hour later by an estimated 15 men. This ambush resulted in a further 4 soldiers killed, 7 wounded and 2 vehicles destroyed. One of the Indian jeeps managed to escape and return to the picket from where a new escort and vehicle returned to the scene of the ambush and managed to bring back to the picket all personnel dead or alive. On 14 August the wounded were evacuated by helicopter to hospitals nearby. The area of NATJGAM is still not clear of raiders and local command are unable to provide escorts to permit Military Observers to go there. Local command further state that they may vacate this post for the time being, but that as soon as the area is cleared they will inform the Observers1 Team who may then view the damaged post. The evidence picked up by Observers on 13 August together with the evidence collected by interrogation of wounded Indians clearly indidate that the attacks took place as alleged. Moreover, the professional way in which the picket was attacked and the convoy ambushed establishes that they were carried out by well-trained raiders. 5. Other incidents will be narrated in my next letter.

H.H. Mmmoj Lieut-General Chief Military Observer UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN Sri na gar - Kashmir

SECRET File 323-57 \o 20 August 1965 •V To s Dr. Ralph J. Bunche Under-Seeretary for Special Political Affairs United Nations Eqs., New York. DETAILED REPORT OH JAMMU AND KASHMIR INCIDENTS PROM 12 AUGUST 1965.

1. This is Part III of my letter 323-57 dated 16 August 1965. 2. On 12 August 65, at 0100 and 0230 hrs., Military Observers stationed in GALUTHI observed through "binoculars, mortar and grenade explosions and LMG fire directed at two bridges located 1-g- miles South of their location and 4 miles on Indian side of CFL on the main road PU1TCH _ GALUTHI _ JMMU. These two bridges had been attacked on a previous occasion on the night 8/9 August 65. 3. On 14 August UEPO Team BARAMUL&A was advised by the local commander that URI area (7 miles from the GEL) was shelled by artillery located in CHAKOTI area (12 miles on Pakistan side). The Indian commander stated that if the shelling did not stop he would retaliate in the same area using similar weapons. The Pakistan Chief of General Staff, and TJEFO Team, DOMEL (on Pakistan side) were immediately informed of this action by PAK troops. UTTFQ Team - DOMEL confirmed that the firing was taking place as alleged and that the local commander at DOMEL had informed them that he had no intention of stopping his guns from firing. The reply from the Chief of the General Staff, Pakistan, intimated that since Indian artillery had been shelling the Pakistan side all along the /C]?L since early August they intended to carry out retaliatory fire.^ 4. a. A report was received by the JAMMU Team on 14 August concerning large intrusions across the CFL in CHAMB area. The report

allegation that complaints of Indian artillery fire had been lodged was checked and it was found that only KOTLI Team had received 21 complaints relating to artillery shelling for the period 9-12 August; however Only one of these complaints could be substantiated by physical evidence.) Later on the same day a report was received by the- DOMEL Team that Indian troops were shelling CHAKOTI area. The Indian-local commander admitted to BARAMULA Team that they had returned the fire. UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

- 2 - intimated that the intruders were in physical occupation of 3 areas up to one mile on the Indian side of the CFL. The following day, the JAMMU Team was informed that artillery and heavy mortar fire had teen directed at all their positions in the "JAMMU/BHBEBBE Sector of the CFL. At least 500 rounds were alleged to have "been fired at each picket and at least $0 Indian soldiers had "been wounded and killed by this fire. Civilians living in that area moved backward towards JAUBIAU (14 miles on Indian side of CFL and 10 miles from the border). So far, no civilian casualties have been reported. It was also reported that the areas occupied by the infiltrators were being reinforced and further attacks on the Indian pickets were expected. Upon receipt of this information, I requested the Chief of the General Staff, Pakistan, to order cessation of firing and immediate withdrawal of guns and heavy mortars. b. On 16 August, local commander in JAMMU advised that nine Indian pickets had been captured on 15/16 August. Both JAMMU and BHUBEK Teams were requested to endeavour to investigate these reports and clarify the situation. Both Teams attempted to reach the areas concerned, but could not proceed forward owing to roads and tracks being subjected to continuous fire. I requested once more from the Chief of the General Staff, Pakistan, to urgently inform me as to what action had been taken to cease artillery firing on CHAMB Sector and to withdraw his guns and mortars. In his answer, the CGS, Pakistan, made reference to his previous cable relating to their retaliation to continuous Indian shelling along the CFL during which time the Pakistan guns had remained inactive. On 17 August it was reported by the JAMLIU Team that the infiltrators were still occupying the Indian pickets and that their action was being supported by artillery and heavy mortars. As fighting was still going on Observers' investigations were not possible. My reply to the COS Pakistan message mentioned above stated that all these matters are violations and are now in the hands of Secretary-General. Fashion or custom of retaliating for each others violations is not only wrong in principle but definitely unhelpful towards getting any cease fire errors adjusted. Each individual action must be the entire responsibility of the doer and

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- 3 - •mill "be considered on its merits and on facts of the case. I went on to say that retaliatory fire cannot "be justified under conditions of cease fire, especially so when in entirely different sector and time. There is no question of self defence involved. c. On 18 August, Pakistan local commander at BHIMBER reported that Indian troops of approximately 1 battalion strength had crossed the CFL on the night 16/17 August and attacked three Pakistan pickets supported "by medium and field artillery. They advised that the attack was repulsed and that the Indians left behind 13 wounded prisoners and some dead. BEEMBER Team advised that their local command had informed them that they would permit the Team to investigate this case only when they were ready to do so.

Another message from local command received the same day advised that Indian had resorted to artillery fire between the 12th and 15th of August. Ho explanation was given to BHIMBER Team as to the delay in submitting their information. Both Teams at JjffiMU and BHIMBER are still hampered in their investigations of these complaints. d. Our investigation carried out by JAMMU Team on 15 and 17 August at one hospital in JAMMU disclosed that a total of J6 Indian soldiers wounded in the CHAMB area incident were in that hospital and that 62 of them 'had been seen by the Military Observers.

5. In the Northern Sector - GAFGAM Team on the PAK side, opposite KARGIL, reported on 15 August that Indian troops re-occupied the pickets "KURU, LEILA and MAJUMJU" on Point 13620 and ridge to the East as well as the old Pakistan "MORTAR" picket nearby. This was confirmed by KARGIL Team on investigating the same day and they were advised that the KARGIL commander intended to take whatever steps he thought necessary in view of the previous Pakistan agressions in his area. At the same time, GAHGAM Team advised that Indian troops had fired with 120 mm mortars on the afternoon of 14 August, across the CFL North of the SEIIGO River in DALUMTG area. This was confirmed by KARGIL Team. The latest complaint received by KARGIL Team relates to an attack on a bridge near the ZOJILA PASS on the SRIHAGAR - LEH Road (l6 miles on Indian side of CFL). This complaint is being investigated.

6. In SRIMAGAR many firing incidents have taken place in and around the city and South of the JHELIM River almost every night since the beginning of this outbreak of violence. However, this mission has only received six complaints and these, only after prolonged requests for their submission.

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In fact two complaints were received five days after the incidents occurred. Five complaints have been investigated and it would appear that in most cases, Indian security forces have been firing indiscrimately with little provocation. The investigating Observer saw 2 Indian soldiers killed in MAGA! (10 miles West South West of SHIWAGAR) and one policeman wounded in SRIHAGAR itself out of a total of 9 casualties (8 killed and 1 wounded) reported by the Indians. On 16 August 65, this HQ, was informed by KOTLI Team that on 2 July they had seen a new AZAD KASHMIR Battalion in their area together with approximately another battalion of "RAZAKARS" (Armed Civilians). They also reported having seen several groups of civilians with rifles receiving military instructions from army personnel. This information had been received much earlier by our Liaison Team in RAWALIODI and it had "been collated there. This HQ, has been advised by 3 of our Teams on the FAK side (RAWALAKOT, BHBSBER and HOMEL) of movement restrictions of Military Observers in the forward areas. In RAWALAKOT, an Observer was forcibly stopped from proceeding towards a newly occupied artillery position which he had detected. In BHH1BER, a similar incident occurred when an Observer found two new occupied artillery positions and at the present, Military Observers can only go to investigate serious incidents at the discretion of the local commanders. In DOM3L the same restriction is imposed to Observers and the local commander stated that he is prepared to physically stop any forward movement of Military Observers. Local commanders keep invoking the excuse of Observers' personal safety and in so doing, hinder their movements outside of the Teams' stations. I protested about this situation with the COS, Pakistan, but as of 20 August, only one Team - BHTMiRER - had been authorized freedom of movement.

Further incidents will be narrated in my next letter.

R. H. Hfimmo, Meut-General Chief Military Observer UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN Srina gar-Ka shmi r SECRET Pile 323-57 23 August 1965

To : Dr. Ralph J. Bunche Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs United Nations Hqs., Hew York. DETAILED REPORT ON J.MMU AND KASHMIR INCIDENTS FROM 18 AUGUST 1965.

1. This is Part IV of my letter 323-57 dated 16 August 1965. 2. On 18 August 65» J-ffifflU Team was informed that on 15 August, an armed gang or party entered the village RAIFUR (15 miles South of JAMMU and 5 miles on the Indian side of the Border) and killed 11 civilians and wounded 4 others. They also set fire to 6 houses. The investigation was carried out on the 18th and Military Observers interviewed the wounded at the JAMMU hospital. Witnesses stated that all the killed and wounded civilians were sleeping outside their shops when the attack occurred at 2310 hrs. on 15 August. The attackers fired with rifles and sten guns, then threw bottles with gasoline into the houses and on the dead civilians and set fire to them. The Observers visited the area and saw 8 burned houses and bullet marks in the walls of the houses. I was not able to decide, on the evidence produced, that the attackers were troops from the Pakistan side of the border.

3. On 19 August, PUNCH Team reported that field artillery had commenced firing at the nearby PUICH airfield and hospital at 1030 hrs. They subsequently reported that the firing continued at a rate of one round every 2 minutes until 1150 hrs. This resulted in 8 craters on the airfield and a hit on the operating room of the hospital. The firing was resumed again at 1205 hrs., and I sent a message to the COS, Pakistan Army, stating that I was sure he would deprecate in strongest terms the shelling of PUNCH airfield and hospital as witnessed by UN Observers and which still continued. Also that he would halt this shelling immediately. The reply from the COS, PAK Army, stated that the Indians were using light/fighter aircraft at PUNCH airfield with the obvious intention of directing medium artillery fire on the former's positions. This had forced their own side to take limited action against the airfield. Engagement of the hospital was purely acciden- tal. He requested me to stop Indian military aircraft from using

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HJHCH airfield and also the Indian artillery fire. He added that in the meantime, he was instructing local commanders to stop their own artillery fire if the Indians complied with the above. A copy of this signal was sent to the Indian commander of the XV Corps.

At 1810 hrs., HJUCH local command requested that UET Good Offices be used to evacuate wounded personnel "by air from HJHCE airfield. Two minutes after receiving this request HJHCH Team advised that field artillery fire was resumed on PUNCH hospital which was "badly damaged. I then informed the COS, Pakistan, of the fact that the light aircraft at HINGE airfield was for the purpose of evacuating casualties and that "Ul Observer had stated that shelling was renewed at 1812 hrs. on the hospital. At 1900 hrs., on the same day the Observers at HJNCE reported that the aircraft was "now unserviceable" and as no further information could be transmitted by the PUNCH Team for security reasons, it was assumed by this EQ that the aircraft had been damaged by the artillery fire.

In the morning of 20 August, the TTU Liaison Officer at RAWALPINDI and the Observers at PUNCH made arrangements between both local commanders for the evacuation by air of the wounded under UN supervision.

4« On 18 August, NAUSHERA Team was advised that Pakistan medium artillery fire had commenced at 1100 hrs. that day on the B3RI PATTAH" bridge and on apicket (3^ miles on the Indian side). It was also reported that the bridge had been destroyed.

5. On 18 August, DGMEL Team received a complaint that Indian troops had fired both field and medium artillery from URI towards CHAKOTI on the night 15/16 August and that they had also shelled the UAUSERI area with field artillery and mortars on 15 and 16 August. To date DOMEL Team has been unable to carry out the investigations as movement of UU Observers have been restricted in spite of the re-assurance from the COS, Pakistan, that the restriction of movement of Military Observers had been lifted on 19 August.

6. On 17 and 18 August BARAMBLA Team interviewed three prisoners who had been allegedly captured 5fr miles on Indian side of CM, by an Indian ambush patrol on 16 August. The report of the Observers is reported verbatim :-

"These prisoners were interviewed at BARAMULA on 17 and 18 August. They were questioned separately, with an Indian officer nearby to assist with translation. .All were dressed alike, in green "selwa" and chemise, and green jungle boots. UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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(a) The two prisoners seen on 17 August gave their names, etc. as follows »- 142709 Sepoy (MUJAETD) MOHAMMAD KHAN _ attached to 6 AK Regt. 142086 Sepoy (MUJAEID) MOHAMMAD AYDB - attached to 6 AK Eegt. They had been recruited about, two months ago, and trained for six weeks at MAIG BAJRI (near MUZ AFF ARAB AD). Their company was comprised of "MUJAEIDS" and troops from 6 AK. Their Company Commander was named Captain FAFOOQ. They had crossed the CFL early in August and had hidden in the forest until 6 August. They had then been surprised by Indian troops and had scattered. They later joined up with some more raiders, but after some clashes with Indian patrols, they became frightened and ran away. They had surrendered to some Indian soldiers on the morning of 16 August. They identified a rifle and SMC, produced by Indians as evidence, as their personal weapons. (b) The prisoner seen on 18 August said that he was a regular soldier from 9 AK Regt. His name : 2458 Sepoy BAHADUR ALL He said that he had been stationed at SHIMKARI (lear MUZAFFARABAD) until about six weeks ago, when together with others from his unit he had been selected for some special training. When trained, his group was known as "B Company", and consisted of soldiers from 9 AK, "MUJAHIDS" and a section of Special Service Group soldiers from the PARA BALUCH Regt. B Company crossed the CFL about 1 August and hid in the forest until 6 August when they were fired on by Indian artillery. They got disorganized and did not take part in any raids. A few days ago the prisoner met up with some other stragglers from his unit. They were attempting to recross the CFL to get back to PAK side when he was captured by Indians. He said that his group's task had been : to cut telephone lines, to raid small military posts, and to raid police stations. He was carrying a rifle, and part of a wireless set (produced as evidence). The wireless was a military set (American AHGRC 9) powered by a hand generator. The prisoner was not told how long he could expect to stay across the CFL, but he had started off with 8 days rations.

Further incidents will be narrated in the next.instalment of this letter.

ne ral Chief Military Observer *

UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN Srinagar-Kashmir

SECRET

File 323-57 26 August 1965

To s Dr. Ralph J. Bunche Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs United Nations Hq_s., New York. DETAILED REPORT ON JJSMJ AND KASHMIR INCIDENTS FROM 17 AUGUST 1965

1. This is Part V of my letter 323-57 dated 16 August 1965. 2. With reference to the incident described in para 4 of Part III of the same letter, I hereby submit the latest situation report received from BEIMBER and JMffiJ Teams %- a. BHIMBER Team experienced some difficulty in moving throughout its area of responsibility at the start of the recent disturbances, but a signal from UM10GIP HQ addressed to COS (Pakistan) seems to have had the desired effect? furthermore, it was possible for the first time to converse with the Local Commander who stated that his forward positions were being shelled continually by Mortars, Field and Medium guns along the whole front of the BHIMBER/JAMMTJ Sectors and that he was suffering casualties (No numbers given, local MDS visited and confirmed this). His forward troops were reporting heavy INDIAN reinforcements in both men and material, including tanks and in view of this, he had to deploy to meet this threat. (My Team visited a forward Battalion HQ following this interview and confirmed the statement that a build up was taking place in this sector)

b. On being shown a marked map of the reported INDIAN positions captured by Pakistani troops and also areas subjected to both Medium and Field artillery shelling, the local commander denied that such was the case, hedged on the shelling issue but admitted deploying both Medium and Field artillery in his Sector. No attempt was made to hide the fact that at his HQ, were a number of artillery Air OP pilots.

.... /2 UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

- 2 - c. Following this discussion, both members of my Team were allowed to see 13 Indian prisoners (8 J&K Militia) and a quantity of captured Indian equipment; the Team then moved forward to a "battalion HQ in order to investigate the alleged Indian cease fire violations that Indian troops crossed the CFL and attacked Pakistani positions at 4370, 4372 and 4574- The commanding officer of this battalion HQ, was most anxious to have the two tOST jeeps move along the CFL and view areas subjected to reported Indian artillery fire and also inspect damage. The information concerning the alleged attack, mentioned above, seemed a secondary . issue. The Team did not move as was suggested for two reasons •

(i) No clearance had been obtained from the Indian side because it is no longer possible. (ii) Any movement of UN jeeps at this time can only result in both sides taking advantage and making adjustments.

d. While discussing the general situation, all sorts of wild claims were made concerning Indian shelling intentions, etc., though none of them had been presented in writing to my Team. Mb Indian shelling was heard while forward at this battalion HQ. e. It is the opinion of the BEIMBBR Team that : (i) Indian complaint concerning the loss of their eight forward positions cannot be verified from this side. (Though Pakistanis are most anrious to prove their point by firing, in the presence of an Observer, a burst of MG at the positions to show that they are not occupying)

(ii) Pakistani complaint about Indian attacks on their positions could not be verified as all the evidence had been withdrawn from the areas concerned and a delay of 24 hours imposed on the Observers before permission was finally granted to conduct an investigation which in the end appeared to be stage managed by local command.

f. The JJ5MMU Team has been informed by his local commander that Indian troops had recaptured 7 of their pickets facing BKEMBER CFL and that they were trying to re-capture two more which were held by approximately one battalion of infiltrators. UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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^ 3. On 17 August, a report from KOTLI Team received "by this EQ, disclosed that on 12 August, Indian troops had fired 3.7" Howitzer artillery in the MMBHAR area (l mile on the Pakistan side of CPL) and damaged a "bridge. 4. On 19 August, KARGIL Team were advised that PAK troops had attacked a battalion HQ and an adjacent road construction camp on the night 18/19 August. Two road construction workers had been killed and two wounded. The investigating Observers confirmed that an attack was carried out at the above mentioned places. They saw the casualties and the equipment left behind by the intruders. 5- On 24 August 65, the BARAMULA Team was informed by his Indian local command that 21 intruders had been killed in the CHOR PANJAL Pass (l30l6 feet high and 6 miles on the Indian side of the CFL). Upon investigation at the Pass, the Team actually saw 9 bodies dressed in green "Selwa" shirts and "Kamiz" trousers. The clothing and general appearance of .the dead bodies led the Observers to conclude that they were the bodies of Pakistan Azad Kashmir soldiers. The Indians in the CHOR PANJAL Pass stated that they had deliberately arranged an ambush to capture intruders on their way from and to the Pakistan side of the CFLj in this instance, it appeared that the intruders were on their way back to the Pakistan side towards the RAWALAKOT Sector. 6. On 20 August.at 1030 hrs., BHIMBER Team was advised by Pakistan local command of the shelling of the Pakistan Village of MELU close to the junction of the CTL and the Border. The investigating Observers confirmed the allegation.

7« On 16 August, GALUTHI Team received a complaint that a convoy of Indian vehicles, civil buses and a UU jeep were fired upon with 2" mortars, rocket launchers and small arms on the main road from HJUCH to GALUTHI. The investigating Observers saw 8 Indian soldiers killed, 7 wounded and 3 vehicles destroyed by bullets and grenades. The UN jeep which was proceeding from PUNCH to GALUTHI with SDS was displaying blue and white flags and was hit by two bullets. 8. Further incidents will be narrated at a later date.

(J.H.J. GAUTHIER) Colonel Chief Operations Officer flu.

UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN Srinagar-Kashmir

S 3 C R S T File 323-57 1 September 1965

To : Dr. Ralph J. Bunche Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs United Nations Hqs., New York.

DETAILED REPORT 01 JAMMU AND KASHMIR INCIDENTS FROM 22 AUGUST 1965

1. This is Part VI of my letter 323-57 dated 16 August 1965.

2. On 24 August 65, BHIMBER Team was advised by Pakistan local command of the shelling of the Pakistan Village of AWAN located 1000 yards South of the Border "between Pakistan and Kashmir and 5 miles West of the CFL in the BEEMBBR Sector. As a result civilians were killed and wounded. The Military Observers who carried out the investigation confirmed the allegation.

3. On 25 August 65, DOMBL Team was advised by Pakistan local command that Indian troops launched a Battalion attack during the night 24/25 August in the NAUSERI area and captured two Pakistani forward positions. The attack was preceded by artillery shelling which lasted 4 or 5 hours.

The investigating Observer was advised by the local Battalion commander in the area that the attackers were estimated to be approximately 400 men and that the Indians had occupied the two forward Pakistan positions in the morning of 25 August with one company in each location. The Military Observer was also informed that approximately 50 personnel were missing and the only known survivors were 4 men, all in hospital. The Observer was unable to physically verify the Indian occupation of these positions during his visit to the Battalion HQ.

The Indian local commander confirmed to the Military Observers in BARAMULA that they had occupied these positions following an attack by Pakistan troops on the night of 24 August. Indian troops had counter- attacked and occupied the positions capturing mortars and MMGs. The Indian local commander also confirmed that 32 PAK soldiers had been killed and 6 who were captured during this action, wounded. The following day, the Pakistan local command complained that a third PAK position had been occupied in this area by Indian troops. This was confirmed by the Indian local command at BARAMULA. UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN - 2 -

4. On 26 August, BARBIULA Team also reported that a Pakistani complaint alleging that Indian troops had crossed the CPL in a second place in the TANGDHAR/MCJSERI Sector and had occupied a ridge 3 miles Sast of the first crossing place, as stated in para 2 above, had been confirmed by the Indian local commander himself. As soon as the occupation by Indian troops of Pakistan positions in this sector was confirmed, I sent a message to the Vice Chief of Army Staff, Indian Army, which read .as follows s

"I am told by my Observers at BARAMULA that the Indian local Commander has confirmed to them that pickets in the TMGDHAR/NAUS3RI Sector on the Pakistan side of the CFL have not only been captured by your troops, but that they are consolidating there with no . intention of withdrawing. It is needless to tell you that such •••actions are in dire contravention of the Karachi Agreement and of a nature to render our efforts to rectify the present situation much more difficult. Therefore, I urge you to take immediate steps for the withdrawal of your troops to your side of the CPL and would appreciate your early confirmation that this has been done."

The VCOAS, Indian Army, replied on 27 August that these posts have been established to stop heavy infiltration of PAK personnel which must be within our knowledge. This off-handed answer was reported to you in para 1 of my UNMOG 488. On 30 August, local command DOMEL reported that a fourth PAK position had been occupied by Indian troops in the same area. This has not been confirmed yet by Military Observers nor by'.Iridian local commander.

5. On 26 August 65, the Military Observers stationed in PJNCE reported that Pakistan troops had shelled PUNCH town that same day for half an hour starting at 1000 hrs. A few shells hit the building occupied by UN Observers. No casualties were reported. I informed the Chief of General Staff, Pakistan, that such actions were hampering my effort to rectify the present situation and requested him to issue orders to stop the shelling.

6. On 22 August 65, GALUTHI Team was informed that infiltrators fired and ambushed a convoy on the GALUTHI/POTGE Road (8 miles on the Indian side of the CFL) on the morning of 21 August. The investigation was carried out immediately and the Observers saw 9 dead Indian soldiers, 16 wounded Indian soldiers and 12 damaged vehicles. They also saw two dead men dressed in black clothes with khaki magazine waistcoats together with one rocket launcher and a rifle. No significant markings were seen on the captured weapons. UNITED NATIONS .MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN - 3 - 7. On the 26th of August RAWALAKOT Team received a complaint that Indian troops had-fired across the CFL with artillery in the UEI Sector and in the Northern area of the BEDORI BULGE. The following day, more complaints relating to heavy Indian artillery fire across the CFL on Pakistani pickets in the same area were received "by the RAWALAKOT Team. At the same time they were advised "by their local command that Indian troops had also fired from PUNCH area across the CFL towards Pakistani pickets located in the Southern area of the BEDORI BULGE. The artillery fire was heard by the Military Observers stationed in PUNCH.

8. On 28 August, the Chief of General Staff, Pakistan, advised me through the Liaison Officer, Rawalpindi, that Indians had crossed the CFL in strength and were attacking "AZAI> KASHMIR" territory between URI and PUNCH from North, South and East. The-attacks, supported by artillery and"'well coordinated were still in progress. My reply to the COS, Pakistan, stated that I would take steps to rectify this situation after verification. BARAMULA, PUNCH and RAWALAKOT Teams were then instructed to investigate this complaint immediately. PUNCH Team reported that from the South of the BEEORI BULGE there had been limited Indian artillery fire from PUNCH area across the CFL and that there had been some limited Indian patrol actions near and on the Indian side of the CFL. BARAMULA Team reported that they had been advised by the Indian local command that from the North of the BULGE, Indian troops crossed the CFL and were approximately 2 miles on the Pakistan side on both sides of the URI/PUNCH Road. RAWALAKOT Team reported that their Pakistan local command had complained that the Indian troops had reached the HAJI PIR Pass, 5 miles on the Pakistan side. On 29 August, BARAMULA Team reported that their local command had confirmed that Indian troops had reached the HAJI PIR Pass and that they were deployed on a front of approximately 10 miles. RAWALAKOT Team also confirmed that an Indian mountain brigade had been deployed in the GULMARG area. After verification of these serious complaints which were forwarded to you, I sent the following message to the Vice Chief of Army Staff, Indian Army :

"I am informed by my UNFO Team BARAMULA that local command has confirmed that Indian troops have crossed the CFL in URI Sector, have reached the HAJI PIR Pass 5 miles on the Pakistan side of the CFL on the URI/PUNCH Road and are deployed on a front of approximately 10 miles. This action of Indian troops is in flagrant violation of the Cease Fire Agreement and any excuse which attempted to justify this move by suggesting that it was taken to stop infiltration could not repeat not be entertained. Therefore urge you to take immediate steps for the withdrawal of your troops to your side of the CFL and would appreciate your early confirmation that this has been done.11 UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN _ 4 _

I do not propose to send any further parts to this written report, unless, of course, the offensive actions and physical occupation of Pakistan territory "by Indian troops are invoked lay-Pakistan as an excuse for similar retaliatory measures. If no offensive reaction is initiated, the tenor of my next letter will "be devoted to a summary of conclusions for the whole operation.

(J.H.J. GAUTHIER) Colonel Chief Operations Officer UMCOGIP 3

UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN Sri nagar-Ka shmi r

SECRET

File 323-57 6 September

To : Dr. Ralph J. Bunche Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs United Nations Hgs., New York.

DETAILED REPORT ON JAMMU & KASHMIR INCIDENTS FROM 1 SEPTEMBER 1965

1. This is Part VII of my letter 323-57 dated 16 August 1965.

2. Notwithstanding para 9 of Part VI of my letter 323-57 of 1 September, I have decided to submit prior to my conclusions, a further report yet, dealing exclusively with the serious events that have taken place in the JAMMU/BHIMBER Sector of the CFL.

3. After the serious incidents which occurred in the CHHAMB Sector between 14 and 17 August and which were reported in para 4 of Part III of my report dated 20 August 65, it was hoped that this Sector would remain quiet. However on 1 September, JAMMU Team received an Indian complaint alleging that Pakistan artillery had started intensive shelling on 1 September at 0400 hrs. on five Indian pickets located in CHHAMB Sector near the junction of the CFL and the Border. A second Indian complaint received a few hours later stated that the Pakistan artillery fire was still going on and that one and a half tank squadrons had crossed the CFL and had attacked a picket located 2 miles on the Indian side of the CFL. A third India