Department of Government Bachelor thesis paper in Political Science, 15 credits Fall 2016 Supervisor: Arda Gücler

Unrest as Incentive for Cooperation? The Diversionary Peace Theory, Turkish-Syrian Relations and the Kurdish Conflict

Linus Mattsson

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to investigate the link between internal and external conflict of states in the field of International Relations. More specifically, it is a critique of the Diversionary War theory, which argues that political leaders can instigate foreign conflict to divert the attention from domestic issues in order to secure their political positions. This paper will test an alternative approach to the Diversionary War theory called the Diversionary Peace theory, which inverts the logic of the original theory. It argues that leaders facing domestic strife have incentives to cooperate with other states in order to deal with the internal problems in a more cost effective way. Using process tracing methodology, the Diversionary Peace theory is applied to Turkey from 1984-1999, to understand how the Kurdish issue as a source of domestic conflict in Turkey affected the Turkish-Syrian relations. The Diversionary Peace Theory would assume that as the Kurdish conflict escalates at the domestic level, Turkey would be inclined to give concessions to Syria to deescalate conflict at the international level. This paper proves otherwise: as the domestic conflict escalates, relations actually deteriorate and cooperation becomes less likely. Therefore, it is both a critique of the Diversionary War theory and the Diversionary Peace theory. The main interpretation of the findings is that the theory is not applicable to those cases where the boundaries between domestic and international realms are too porous as in the case of the Kurdish politics. When the domestic conflict and international dispute is interlinked, as in this case, I argue that cooperation might not be possible. Future reseachers in the area are advised to pay attention to whether the domestic factor and the international factor are interlinked, how the level of domestic conflict affects foreign relations and the impact of domestic audience costs.

Keywords: Diversionary Peace theory, Diversionary War theory, international conflict, Turkey, Syria, Kurdish conflict, process-tracing.

2 Contents

1. Introduction...... 4 1.1 Outline...... 7

2. Background of the case...... 8

3. Theoretical framework...... 11 3.1 Diversionary War theory...... 11 3.2 The Critiques of Diversionary War theory...... 13 3.3 Diversionary Peace theory...... 15

4. Methodology...... 17 4.1 Operationalization...... 19 4.2 Material...... 20 4.3 Limitations of Research design and material...... 21

5. Investigation...... 21 5.1. Initial condiditons: 1984-86 – the Kurdish uprising...... 21 5.2 Period 1: 1991-93 – from guerilla warfare to open conflict...... 23 5.3 Period 2: 1994-96 – escalation of the conflict...... 25 5.4 Period 3: 1997-99 – height of the conflict...... 27 5.5 Discussion...... 29 5.6 Suggestion on further research ...... 31

6. Conclusion...... 33

7. References...... 34 7.1 Academic sources...... 34 7.2 Miscellaneous sources...... 36

3 1. Introduction

Why do states go to war? This has been a fundamental question in the field of international relations since its beginning. The outbreak of war has been explained through wide sets of theories, such as structural theories on power balance, alliances and polarity (Midlarsky, 1989:xvi), the reputation and status of a nation as a justification of war (Dafoe, Renshon and Huth, 2014:390), and the impact of public opinion on decision makers (Tomz, 2007:822).

One historically popular explanation to this question is that state leaders often create conflict in order to divert attention from domestic issues. This theory is called the Diversionary War theory (DWT). Its logic is that leaders facing domestic issues threatening their own position have incentives to seek foreign conflict, in order to draw attention from such domestic threats (Levy, 1989:259). Domestic problems can be defined as anything from protests and riots to armed uprisings and bad economic conditions, whereas foreign conflict would be defined as an escalation of conflict, threat of or actual use of violence.

The Diversionary war theory claims that an increased international conflict affects leaders and the people of the state in several ways. When a nation faces external threat, it is presumed, the group identity (.i.e. the national belonging) becomes stronger (Levy, 1989:261); in consequence, a foreign conflict would unite the people around its leader, and finally, state leaders who are confronted with a potential loss of their domestic power are incentivized to start a foreign conflict since they have nothing left to lose. If such a conflict increases their chance of staying in office, it would be worth initiating it (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:446).

The DWT explains breakout of many conflicts in history, from the Middle Ages to modern times, from this perspective. The most famous suggested cases are historical, like the Crimean War in 1852-1856 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 (Blainey, 1988:73,76), but it also includes more modern conflicts like the Vietnam War (Blainey, 1988:73) and the Falkland wars. While this theory is widely recognized and utilized by many historians, anthropologists and psychologists alike during the 20th century (Blainey 1988:74), it has also been the object of criticisms for a number of political scientists who point to the lack of actual evidence, the weak links between theoretical literature and functional empirical models and ambiguous results in most cases.

These critiques have identified a number of faults with the theory: although diversionary tactics do occur in a smaller group, they simply do not seem to manifest themselves at the state level (Levy, 1989:262). Having said that, studies on the use of force by the President of

4 the United States did find some evidence of a positive correlation between internal public discontent and foreign conflict. In times of economic woes, American presidents were found to be more likely to retort to foreign conflict (Ostrom & Job, 1986:548). However, this was also the case when the president had a high overall approval rate, which contradicts the idea of diversionary use of force. It turns out that leaders who face the risk of losing their office are actually less likely to engage in international conflict, regardless of regime type (Chiozza & Goeans, 2003:443). The conclusion is a simple one. Whatever one might expect to gain in popularity turns out to be not worth the risk since it is too costly.

As shown by the political science literature, state officials do not use diversionary tactics as frequently as claimed by the theory. However, the DWT is not entirely fruitless since its main logic can be utilized in a different, and possibly more productive manner once we start to question the assumption that increased conflict generates more manageable circumstances (Levy 1989:281). This is the assumption that I am interested in challenging, which is I think the main reason why the DWT's findings tended to contradict with its predictions. It might be more plausible to assume that when leaders face conflict, they do not think that increased conflict would make the situation less costly. If we start with this assumption, what we consider as the rational actions of political elites in times of domestic turmoil might turn out different.

One recent contribution to the field in the form of an alternative explanation claims that during times of internal conflict, threatened leaders tend not to seek foreign conflict. Quite the contrary, they try to deescalate international conflict so that they can invest their energy to focus on the domestic conflict (Fravel, 2005:49). Therefore, internal strife creates conditions for international cooperation. This is an outcome of the previous assumption where conflict is presumed to be too costly to be managed effectively and therefore domestically embattled state leaders have incentives to improve their foreign relations instead of worsening them. This allows the leaders to better allocate resources for dealing with the domestic issues much more effectively, instead of being tied up on two fronts at the same time. This inverted logic of the Diversionary War theory, developed by Fravel, is called the Diversionary Peace theory (Fravel, 2005:49).

This theory is an important contribution for several reasons. First, it uses the same mechanisms as traditional diversionary war theory literature, but reaches a significantly different conclusion: internal conflict creates incentives for cooperation. However, the Diversionary Peace theory is not a widely tested theory. It has been tested only by Fravel himself only in one specific case (i.e. modern day China). Finding additional cases where

5 state leaders choose to seek cooperation instead of confrontation in times of internal turmoil would contribute to a better understanding of the effect of domestic conflict on foreign policy.

Second, Fravels study is about a modern state, China, whereas most of the research on the subject previously have focused on historical cases. Also, China is an authoritarian state where the idea of diversionary tactics cannot have much salience since public opinion does not have the kind of importance that it would have in a democracy. For the DWT, democratic states are more prone to using diversionary tactics due to the publics ability to affect the tenure of the political elite through voting (Levy, 1989:277), which is not necessarily applicable to an authoritarian regime. That is why this new theory should be tested in democracies.

Third, I argue that the Diversionary Peace theory is not fully developed – partly due to the fact that it only has been tested once, but also due to the theoretical assumptions that it is making. Fravel does not offer any deeper explanations on the causal mechanism behind Chinas cooperative behavior. It is not entirely clear what he means by 'diversion' here. Diversion is definitely applicable when it comes to manipulating the attention of public opinion. But when it comes to cooperating with others and deescalating conflict at the international level to deal with domestic conflict, it is not clear how the logic of diversion operates. Whose opinion has been manipulated? Whose attention is at stake? Is it the public opinion or the attention of the state officials themselves? These questions are not clearly identified by Fravel.

This paper will test the Diversionary Peace theory by applying it in the context of the Republic of Turkey's policies towards Kurds between 1984-1999. Turkey is a democratic or quasi-democratic state (Freedom House) that is situated at the intersection of the East and West. Its domestic politics during the 20th century have seen protests, military coups and an armed Kurdish rebellion, providing the proper grounds for internal turmoil at several times. The foreign relations of Turkey are also suitable for the case, considering the fact that Turkeys relations with neighboring states have been strained since the inception of the modern state. Thus, I argue that the proper conditions for the diversionary use of force clearly have been there for Turkish leaders, but yet we have seen no major foreign conflicts during the time period specified. This paper will use the Kurdish conflict and the first Kurdish insurgency as the independent variable, and Turkish-Syrian relations as the dependent variable. The hypothesis is that as the domestic Kurdish conflict escalates, we will see increased cooperation between Turkey and Syria.

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Consequently, the research question is as follows: Q1: Does the Kurdish domestic conflict in Turkey lead to cooperation or concession in relation to Syria?

Regardless of whether our hypothesis is true, the results of this study will be of importance to the research field.

1.1 Outline

The paper is partitioned into six parts. Following this introduction, the first section will offer a brief background on the Kurdish issue in Turkey. The second part will cover the theoretical framework. Considering this is a theory testing paper, this section will be relatively extensive. First, I will account for The Diversionary War theory in detail, as this paper seeks to contribute to the criticism of it. Logically, one cannot seek to further develop a theory if the underlying mechanisms and logics of it are unaccounted for. The established criticism of the Diversionary War theory and its implications for my case will also be discussed.

Following this, I will present the Diversionary Peace theory in detail, as I base my hypothesis on Fravels idea of cooperation. Its logic and its implications for this paper will be fleshed out in detail. The fourth part will cover my methodological approach including operationalization, and my choice of material. Possible limitations of my research design and material will also be included.

Then I will move to my main investigation. Based upon the theory and methodology, I will test the Diversionary Peace Theory through the Turkish case. More specifically, I will see whether Turkey uses cooperation or concession towards Syria as the Kurdish domestic conflict increases. The time period will be divided into four sections, arranged in accordance to the nature of the conflict. Following the investigation, I will analyze my findings, and finish off with suggestions on further research. The final section will include my conclusion and the answer to the research question.

7 2. Background of the case (Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: 1984-1999)

Kurdish political struggle in Turkey has been a highly conflicting issue, including the presence of a long-lasting armed struggle. A large part of the struggle has of course been conducted in other areas, such as civil society and through peaceful political parties, but due to the conflict centered approach of this paper, I will mainly focus on the armed struggle and PKK.

Following the defeat and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I, the Ottoman Empire had become a highly divided entity. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) was the main international agreement that specified the terms of such, leaving but a small piece of central Anatolia to the Turkish people, and the rest of the land would be allocated to the European Powers. However, the treaty also specified the presence of an independent Kurdish nation, which would be located in today's northern Iraq and south-eastern Turkey (Zürcher, 2004:147).

The treaty of Sèvres was never realized since it was followed by the Turkish war of Independence, which resulted in the Treaty of Lausanne and established the current borders of contemporary Turkey. However, the “Kurdish question” did not go away, as it occupied the domestic politics in Turkey throughout the 20th century (Yavuz & Özcan, 2006:227).

During the following formation of the Turkish Republic in the 1920's, the main goal of the Kemalist leaders was to turn the remnants of a theocratic, multiethnic empire into a modern, secular, homogeneous nation state through a cultural revolution. Perhaps the most important goal was to create a new, Turkish identity. During Ottoman times, religion had been the determinant notion of identity. Now it was to be replaced by ethnicity, and in case of the Turkish Republic, the only ethnicity allowed would be that of the Turks (Oran, 2010:154). The ultimate consequence of this was the forced assimilation of minorities into the new state identity (Gürbey and Ibrahim, 2000:9).

With no common enemies left after the War of Independence, and the loss of common religious ground following the abolition of the caliphate, tensions grew between Kurds and Turks (Zürcher, 2004:170). The Kurdish population constituted 20-25% of the population and was now the largest minority group following the population exchange of the Greek inhabitants and the Armenian genocide. Although initially promised autonomy and linguistic rights in 1923, the Kemalist attempt to build a new national identity led to a number of repressions of the Kurdish culture and identity. Teaching Kurdish in schools and public use of the language were both outlawed, and in order to further destabilize the Kurdish

8 movement and enhance the Turkification of society, a large number of Kurdish citizens and landowners were forced away from south-eastern Turkey and had to resettle in the western parts (Gürbey and Ibrahim, 2000:9). In response, a Kurdish rebellion broke out in 1925, but was defeated both due to hard retaliation by the state and internal fighting (Zürcher, 2004:171). A total of 27 Kurdish revolts against the state and the reforms took place during the 1920's and 30's, but none can be claimed to have been successful (Gürbey & Ibrahim, 2000:9).

The Kurdish movement was rather inactive for a number of reasons during the 1940's and 1950's, while the 1960's saw a rise in Kurdish nationalism, albeit peaceful (Bozarslan, 2000:17). However, after the military coup in 1980, the suppression of Kurdish rights intensified as an effect of the heightened Turkish nationalism (Kalayciouglu, 2005:16-43). In response to this, a deepened Kurdish struggle for independence, autonomy and human rights was ignited.

In 1978, the Marxist-Leninist Worker's Party of Kurdistan or Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK) was founded by Abdullah Öcalan. PKK was not the first political Kurdish movement founded in the 1970's, but it was one of the more radical ones and the only one to adhere to political violence (Gürbey, 2000:78). In 1984, PKK announced a Kurdish uprising and begun its violent campaign directed both against Turkish governmental forces and Kurds not committed to the cause. Although most fighting took place in south-eastern Turkey, the violence occurred all over the country and affected the society as a whole.

PKK's violence has been orchestrated from both within and outside the country. Before the violence begun in 1984, Öcalan managed to flee the country and settled in Damascus. With the support of the Syrian government, he managed to set up training camps in the Beqaa valley. Furthermore, the Iran-Iraq war tied up the Iraqi military in the southern part of the country, giving the Kurdish forces a free haven to operate from in the northern parts of the country (Zürcher, 2004:316).

The conflict was at its height during the 1990's and ended with Öcalans arrest and a cease- fire in 1999. This is the specific period that will be studied in this paper, thus a more detailed background will follow. In response to the heightened actions of PKK, the government introduced a total of 18,000 village guards in 1985, who were armed and paid to counter the insurgency. However, the PKK was better armed and trained than the village guards, which explains the latter's harsh defeat. (Zürcher, 2004:317). Also, the armed forces lacked the equipment, tactics and coordination for countering guerilla warfare and for that reason PKK was initially fairly successful. 9 However, beginning in 1992, the army adapted and established permanent positions in the mountainous parts instead of operating out of garrisons (Nachmani, 2003:44). In order to further restrict PKK's movements and prevent them from operating from within Turkey, the army evacuated and destroyed a large number of villages – ranging up to 3000 at the end of 1996 (Zürcher, 2004:318). Operations also crossed the border: air-raids against PKK camps were conducted by the Turkish armed forces into northern Iraq and in 1995 Turkey instigated a massive ground operation into Iraq, involving more than 30,000 troops (Zürcher, 2004:319).

As Turkey gained the advantage of the conflict in the mid 1990's, PKK sent out signals that it was ready to initiate a political solution to the conflict. The Marxist-Leninist elements of the ideology were toned down and Öcalan set out to transform the party from a guerilla movement to a political actor (Gürbey, 2000:81). He started reaching out to the European governments and various organizations in Europe in order to gain international legitimacy for the Kurdish struggle. He also moderated the goals for PKK's cause: the call for independence of Kurdistan was transformed into a suggestion of a federation-based solution or partial autonomy within Turkey as well as the recognition of the Kurdish people, culture and language. Following this, PKK called for a unilateral cease-fire in 1993 (Gürbey and Ibrahim, 2000:11).

However, the Turkish state held firmly onto their Kemalist belief that a recognition of any identity other than the Turkish one would gradually lead into a total disintegration of the state, as had happened to the Ottoman empire a century before. Thus, the attempts by PKK on finding a peaceful solution were met by rejection from the Turkish state and continued warfare from the Turkish military, in effect ending the cease-fire (Gürbey and Ibrahim, 2000:11)

In October 1998, after pressure from Turkey, Syria forced Öcalan to leave his safe haven, which led him on a journey passing through Russia, Italy and Greece, before ending up in Kenya, where he was abducted by Turkish special forces in the beginning of 1999 and brought back to Turkey (Gunter, 2000:54). From this point on, Öcalan announced that PKK would seek a peaceful political solution to the conflict and violence would only be an option if a peaceful settlement would fail. On the 2nd of August 1999, Öcalan called out to PKK for an unconditional ending of the violence, a withdrawal of the forces from Turkish soil and the beginning of a political campaign. Thus, a cease-fire was agreed upon (Gürbey, 2000:83).

This relative period of peace lasted up until 2004, when PKK expressed that the government did not take their offer on negotiations seriously and did not cease their attacks on the 10 Kurdish forces. A second insurgency, more focused on urban warfare, bombings and avoiding direct confrontation lasted until 2012 (Jenkins 2007). A renewed cease-fire commenced in 2013 with simultaneous peace talks, but since 2015, the conflict is active again.

In summary, the conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish movement has had a tremendous effect on the society and politics. Approximately 37,000 people have been killed during the conflict, including fighters on both sides and innocent civilians. Up to 3,000,000 people have been internally displaced (Gunter, 2000:54). The south-eastern parts of Turkey have been heavily depopulated and poverty-struck. The attempts by the political elite throughout the 20th century to forcefully create a unified nation-state and a Turkish identity have instead created the opposite: a nation divided by identity and by conflict.

3. Theoretical framework

3.1 Diversionary War theory

First, let us look at the founding theory again. The Diversionary war theory, as previously explained, is claimed to be an explanation of the outbreak of war. The theory assumes that in times of domestic turmoil or discontent, leaders initiate conflict in the international arena in order to divert the citizens' attention away from the politically unpopular domestic situation, thus making sure they stay in office.

The breakout of a large number of conflicts in history, from the Middle Ages to modern times, has been explained in terms of diversionary use of force. The actions of Napoleon III have been interpreted as frequent uses of diversionary tactics: not only did the Emperor provoke the Crimean war (1852-1856) to “divert the eyes of Frenchmen from their own government's weaknesses” (Blainey, 1988:72), but also the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 has been interpreted in the same way. Perhaps the most well-known example is the Russo- Japanese war of 1904. The Russian Interior Minister at that time, Plehve, is cited in the memoirs of Count Witte, Minister of Finance, as saying “you are not familiar with Russia's internal situation. We need a little victorious war to stem the tide of revolution” (Blainey, 1988:76).

The theory has been widely supported and is a long-lived one, appearing long before the established scholarly field of International Relations. Historically, it has been a conventional wisdom on the outbreak of war, based upon a number of ad hoc observations rather than a well-established theoretical scientific hypothesis. As Morgan and Bickers put it: “virtually every war since 1800 has been attributed, at least in part, to efforts of state leaders to deal 11 with domestic problems” (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:27). However, throughout the years, this enigma has become widely researched by political scientists, resulting in a more developed theory.

What theoretical arguments do the advocates of the Diversionary War theory rely upon? In summary, the main mechanisms of the DWT have said to be three: The In-group/Out-group- hypothesis or Rally-Round-The-Flag-Effect, Scapegoating and Gambling for Resurrection (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). The first one, the In-group/Out-group theory, or conflict-cohesion theory, originates from the field of sociology and the two sociologists Simmel and Coser. It suggests that identities of a group, in this case national identities, become stronger in times of external threats – that the in-group identity becomes more united during conflicts with the out-group (Levy, 1989:261). The Rally-Round-The-Flag- Effect is a consequence of this. Not only does external pressure strengthen the group identities – in addition, it also leads to the group's unification around leader. The tenure of the leader should therefore be extended in times of external crisis (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). However, for the theory to be effective, there are some conditions that should be met: the group has to be fairly salient to begin with, has to already perceive itself as a group and also view the survival of the group as something worthwhile (Levy 1989:261). In addition, Simmel recognized that the outcome of conflict might be of importance: “[War] might either cause domestic quarrels to be forgotten, or might on the contrary aggravate them beyond reconciliation” (Levy, 1989:261).

The second mechanism, Scapegoating, means that leaders retort to war to shift the blame of failed policies onto the states enemies (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). This is a consequence of the first theory, implying that leaders are aware of the psychological effect external pressure has on national identity and, in turn, their own tenure. The third mechanism, Gambling for resurrection, stemming from rational choice literature, argues that state leaders who are confronted with a possible loss of power can afford starting a foreign conflict, since their risk of losing office is imminent. If creating a conflict increases their chance of staying in office even by a small percentage, it would be worth it (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:446).

Consequently, we should be able to observe the following patterns or mechanisms, according to the theory: When a domestic issue in a state threatens the legitimacy or political power of the ruling elite, said elite should a) be likely to use aggressive foreign policy behaviour as a tool to divert the attention of the public from the domestic issue, since a) the leaders are aware that the people will become more united or nationalistic under such external pressure,

12 b) the people will give more support to the leader leading to c), a return of the popular support of the political elite.

However, as already touched upon in the introduction, most of the research in support of the DWT have been either backed up by anecdotal evidence or lack quantitative evidence, which leads to both theoretical and empirical issues.

3.2 The Critiques of Diversionary War Theory

The Diversionary War theory has been heavily criticized throughout the years. Only few modern scholars working on the subject ultimately support the initial theory. The main critique against the DWT is that there are insignificant links between the theory and the empirical findings (Levy, 1989:282). The historical and theoretical literature strongly suggests that political leaders should use diversionary force to strengthen their own positions, while the empirical studies, often quantitative, have found little or no support for the relationship between domestic strife and foreign conflict. The reasons for this are, in summary, two: 1. There might be something wrong with the theory itself. 2. The methodology used (mostly statistical analysis of a large number of states) might not be the right one (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:28).

Regarding the theory, the idea that external enemies unite the group might not be as strong as initially thought. As Simmel himself explained, the in-group/out-group theory needs strict conditions to work – one of them is the in-group being fairly small. Thus, extrapolating the concept from small group psychological behaviour into a large, complex entity as modern day states might be difficult (Morgan and Bickers 1992:32).

Although commonly treated almost as a general law, some scholars have paid attention to under what circumstances diversionary tactics would be used. The level of internal conflict should matter for the use of diversionary tactics. If the level of internal conflict is too low, aggressive foreign policy should be an exaggerated tool to use. If the level of internal conflict instead is too high, it would not be wise to turn to diversionary tactics. Blainey noted that during open civil war, diversionary use of force is rare since states turn to deal with their internal issue first as a part of its rational calculations (Blainey, 1988:86). In conclusion, we should only be able to observe diversionary actions at the moderate levels of internal strife.

Another issue with the Diversionary War theory has to do with the assumptions that it makes regarding the management of conflict (or war). It presumes that war is something that can be easily managed. However, war requires a warring opponent who the state leaders cannot 13 control. The situation is very likely to get out of hand and therefore open conflict should probably be an unlikely goal for leaders who seek to divert the attention of the public. Thus, actions short of war, like escalation of threat of force should be observable (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:29). However, this has also been challenged. Rummel, conducting a study on the link between internal and external conflict upon 77 states between 1955-57 found that “foreign conflict behavior is generally completely unrelated to domestic conflict behavior” (Levy 1989:262).

These two facts about the variables give us some clue to why the quantitative studies that have been conducted might fail to produce any results in favor of the DWT. Large scale studies of the relationship between domestic strife and foreign conflict using correlation analysis and regressions all rely on the assumption that the relationship between the variables should be linear. The problem is that the theory does not imply that this is the case. Rather, the relationship should differ depending on the level of internal strife.

There are more clues as to why the large, statistical analyses have failed to produce any results. One reason could be that scholars mainly have focused on correlations rather than offering any explanations through causality. One such scholar is Blainey. In his observations, he finds support for the linkage between civil strife and foreign conflict, but not due to diversionary actions. Instead, a state torn by civil strife often end up in conflict because it is perceived as weakened, and thus easily become a target for other states seeking to exploit the shift in power balance (Blainey 1988:82).

It has also been argued that the direction of the relationship between internal and external conflict could be reversed. Foreign conflict could easily lead to internal turmoil and finally revolution at the home front, giving us internalization of external conflict rather than externalization of internal conflict (Levy, 1989:267). However, that this could happen would not per se be a problem for the theory – it is only problematic when the direction of the relationship is unaccounted for, given that there probably should be different casual mechanisms active during externalization and internalization of conflict, which would affect the results.

In summary, the biggest obstacle to the research is a common, cumulative theoretical framework. As Levy puts it: “Little attention is given to questions of under what kinds of conditions what kind of states resort to what kinds of external conflict in response to what kinds of threats to the security of political elites” (Levy, 1989:283).

14 3.3 Diversionary Peace Theory

The Diversionary Peace Theory, as put forward by Fravel is an alternative critical engagement with the Diversionary War Theory. In a case study on China and its territorial disputes, he finds that in times of internal turmoil or regime insecurity, China seeks compromises with foreign states, rather than confrontation (Fravel, 2005:47).

Internal or domestic turmoil is referred to as regime insecurity. Fravel specifically dwells on social discontent, such as protests and legitimacy crises, and ethnic violence or uprisings. His observations are that when China is in a state of regime insecurity, the state chooses not to escalate any of the territorial conflicts with the neighbouring states. Instead, China seeks cooperation, contrary to what the DWT predicts. Instead of diversion, good relations with foreign state is one key way to solve internal problems, in addition to domestic tools. This is connected to the theoretical concept of Omnibalancing (David, 1991:235), which explains that leaders of third-world countries would be inclined to cooperate with an adversary, if there is an enemy deemed as more threatening.

There are several ways leaders could benefit from cooperating with other states to deal with regime insecurity: they can gain direct assistance in dealing with the domestic threat, such as an external state denying rebel groups a harbor, as in Syria harboring Öcalan in our case, or they can improve border patrols. They can avoid a costly two-front war, and focus their resources on the domestic issues instead of the defense budget. Cooperation could also lead to an improvement of the regimes' international recognition, which would delegitimize any domestic contestors (Fravel, 2005:52).

According to Fravel, leaders have three strategy options in ongoing disputes: they can delay, i.e. maintain claims to the issue, escalate via threat or use of force, and finally cooperate by dropping claims or offering concessions (Fravel, 2005:52). The least costly alternative is the delaying strategy, whereas escalation is costly due to risk of ending up in a military defeat, and cooperation is costly since it can be perceived as weakness by domestic audiences and lead to a removal from office. However, his argument is that when facing regime insecurity, the cost of the cooperation strategy is significantly lowered, since whatever one might lose on domestic discontent is won through the assistance in dealing with the original threat (Fravel, 2005:53). This is especially true if the threat to the regime emerges in the form of a threat to territorial integrity, which would drastically enhance the incentives to offer concessions to the neighbouring countries to prevent them from aiding events such as uprisings (Fravel 2005:53).

15 This has clear implications for our case. When the armed Kurdish struggle for independence (i.e. a threat to territorial integrity) escalates, Turkey would have strong incentives to cooperate with or give concessions to Syria, an adjacent state that could serve as a base for the rebels. Fravel mainly studies behavior in territorial issues as the main independent variable. In this study, I will broaden this framework and include other contested foreign policy issues as well as long as there is a bargain situation for the two related states where concessions can be made.

Although he backs his claims by an empirical study, only some attempt is made by Fravel to theoreticize his findings. He claims it is a “counterintuitive argument about the effects of domestic conflict on foreign policy” (Fravel, 2005:49). He does elaborate on why states would chose to cooperate, but does not offer any deeper explanation of the intervening variables in action. However, we can draw some theoretical conclusions from Fravel's observations and thoughts. First, we assume that leaders are rational. They would, in times of a crisis, assess the problem, identify possible courses of action and then choose the alternative that is most effective. By assuming this, we can draw the conclusion that leaders do not engage in a new conflict simply because the conflict is not manageable. The logic of the DWT is that leaders can control new conflicts – otherwise they would not be able to initiate them in order to divert attention. For Fravel, in contrast, leaders choose to focus on what they can control, which leads to cooperation rather than war. Secondly, we can assume that conflict is costly. The resources of the state might be too scarce to manage two crises. Therefore, it is not rational to engage in a new, foreign conflict before the domestic one is solved.

In our case, we should therefore be able to observe a change in foreign policy following a period of domestic unrest in Turkey. When the Kurdish insurgency heightens, a more benign foreign policy should be adopted towards the neighboring states. Also, we can also conclude from Fravel's thesis that once the domestic conflict goes down, we should be able to observe a return to the previous foreign policy since the incentives for cooperation diminishes. But before we begin investigating the case, some potential issues have to be raised: what of the diversion so central to the DWT – will anything be diverted at all? Will we see any signs of the role domestic audiences play, since we now are testing the theory on a democratic state? Will cooperation follow the escalation of the conflict throughout the period, or are there different conditions for cooperation depending on the level of domestic conflict (as indicated by critiques of the DWT)? Will the fact that PKK not only acted out of Turkey, but out of neighboring states make a difference to Turkeys behavior? None of these questions are posed by Fravel, while I will take them into consideration during the investigation.

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4. Methodology

As previously touched upon, the large-scale quantitative studies on the relationship between internal and external conflict fail to produce any significant result due to the fact that the relation is not linear, but rather develops over time and in relation to each other. A qualitative, case-based test is to be preferred in order to test the Diversionary Peace theory. Therefore, the methodological approach of this paper will be qualitative, using a method called process tracing.

The process tracing method is an in-depth analysis of a single case without a control group, aiming to find the causal mechanism or process linking an effect or outcome (B) under investigation and the hypothesised cause (A) (Beach and Pedersen, 2013:11). Process tracing focuses on explaining causal mechanisms by studying the unfolding of events over time.

There are three different types of process tracing: theory-testing and theory-building, which are theory-centric process-tracing, and explaining-outcome, which is case-centric. Theory- centric process-tracing has a theoretical idea about the causal mechanisms as a starting-point and also expect to be able to generalize the results from the single case onto the larger population. Case-centric process-tracing does not rely on a theoretical framework, but simply study a case in order to find as many possible explanations for the outcome of one situation (Beach and Pedersen, 2013:12). Theory-testing will be the choice of method for this paper. It is used when we have a hypothesised causal mechanism (M) explaining the link between the effect (X) and an outcome (Y). A single-case is chosen where both X and Y are present, in this case that Turkey experience domestic conflict during the time period (X) and that it does not end up in any foreign conflicts (Y). We then set out to seek evidence for our hypothesised causal mechanism – that internal conflict leads to cooperation instead of external conflict.

However, process tracing as it has developed emphasises the importance of breaking down the causal mechanism into smaller parts, in order to be able to establish and test every step of the hypothesised mechanism. Process tracing does not view the causal mechanism as a single black box, but rather opens it up. Every step of our idea of the causal mechanism is drawn and called a part. Every part contains entities, which are nouns. It could be states, organizations, individuals. The entity of each part commits in activities, an action leading to the next part of the mechanism. The process is repeated until the hypothesised outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013:29). Each part of the mechanism should be insufficient on its own in order to produce the outcome, but all parts would be needed in order to confirm the existence of the causality. 17 Table 1: parts of the mechanism

If we apply this to the Diversionary Peace theory, a theoretical model of the hypothesised causal mechanism should be the following. Domestic conflict (X) erupt in a state. The political elite is experiencing a threat against its tenure and wish to deal with the problem. The elite has the possibility to escalate a foreign conflict or seek cooperation, but realises that conflict is costly and that it has limited resources. The elite seeks benign foreign policy behaviour in order to more effectively deal with the domestic problem. This leads to international cooperation (Y) . This is illustrated by the table below.

Table 2: predicted mechanism

Source: author's own, adapted from Beach and Pedersen

However, as mentioned by Beach and Pedersen, a theoretical conceptualization is to be seen as an ideal type description and might not always be easily applicable. Ideal would be to gain access to the decision makers minutes and thoughts, leading to their decision. However, this is in most cases hard, due to the fact that foreign policy decision takes place behind closed doors and information tend to be classified.

Now that we have established the causal mechanism, the next step is to operationalize the theoretical ideas of the mechanism by turning them into measurable manifestations that could appear in the case.

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4.1 Operationalization

The chosen timeline for this paper will be from the inception of the armed Kurdish struggle in 1984 to Öcalans capture and the following cease-fire in 1999.

The independent variable, domestic conflict, will be treated as number of casualties in the conflict between Kurdish separatists and the Turkish government. Using casualties might not account for all levels of the conflict, but it is on the other hand easy to observe. As in many conflicts, the view on casualties in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict differs depending on which side one asks. The data I will be using, taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, has a best estimate of the casualties based on scientific research of several sources. I consider this to be reliable enough for this paper.

Table 3: Casualties, Turkish state vs PKK, 1989-2000

Source: UCDP

The dependent variable, foreign policy, hypothesised as cooperation or concessions, will be translated into actions made by the Turkish government in relations to Syria. Studying all of Turkeys relations is not permitted in this paper, thus I will focus on only one. Turkish-Syria relations are suitable to study, since it is a neighbouring country, in accordance with Fravels case. Other neighbouring Middle Eastern states would not be suitable – Iran and Turkey has had an overall peaceful relation since 1639, thus giving us no proper ground for giving concessions. Iraq was, due to war and international intervention, not a unified state during the chosen time period and is therefore not suitable for our case. Furthermore, one of Turkeys few territorial disputes since the dawning of the modern state is with Syria, over the Hatay/Alexandretta region (the others being Iraq over Mosul and Greece over island and water territory). In addition, Turkey and Syria have also had disagreements over the distribution of water since the 1960's. This gives us two areas in which Turkey could offer concessions when the domestic conflict escalates.

19 Cooperation is of course a broad notion, and therefore has to be broken down into measurable parts. For my case, I will accept all kinds of exchange on an official level as foreign policy behavior: statements issued by the political elite (which at this time consists of the executive, the president, the foreign ministry and the military, which had a strong stance in Turkish politics since the 1980 military coup), agreements on common issues or interests, diplomatic relations and official state visits. Special attention will be given to the developments of the territorial issue of Hatay and the water issue in Turkish-Syrian relations, but I will also take the development of other issues into account.

More practically, the conflict will be broken down into relevant years according to number of casualties: In order to establish a point of reference, the first period described will be 1984- 86, the beginning of the Kurdish insurgency, and the relations between Turkey and Syria during that time. Next period to be studied is 1991-93, the first escalation of the conflict, when it developed from guerilla warfare into open war. According to the theory, we should be able to see a small increase in cooperation or concession following the escalation. The following period will be 1994-96, the first height of the conflict with casualties up to 4000, which should give good incentives for cooperation. The final period to be studied is 1997- 1999, the second height of the conflict, which ends with Öcalans arrest and a cease-fire. If we do not see any cooperation in this period, our hypothesis will not be true.

Each period studied will thus be broken down into two parts – the level of conflict (except for the casualties, some additional description of the conflict will be given), followed by the relation to Syria. It is hard to determine how much time should be allowed between an increase in conflict and a change in foreign policy, given that Fravel mentions nothing of it, but a reasonable assumption would be within a year, explaining the length of the chosen periods (of three years).

4.2 Material

The data material on the dependent variable will be taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, a research program aiming to establishing as objective information on conflicts as possible. Some additional information on the conflict will also be taken from the UCDP, as well as scientific literature.

The material on the Turkish-Syrian relations will mainly be taken from scientific literature on the study of Middle Eastern relations, secondary sources which in turn rely on newpapers and various reports. 20

4.3 Limitations of research design and material

The research design is limited by the choice of a single case study. Given the size and time limit, a larger study on several regional relations is not permitted. As in Fravels case, where he studies a large number of territorial disputes, this would have been better in order to secure a general pattern of cooperation. However, the choice of a qualitative approach is still favorable over larger regression-analyses for reasons mentioned earlier.

The material is also somewhat limited. I am restricted to secondary sources, due to language restrictions. It is hard to gain insight into the psychology of leaders just by accessing secondary sources – interviews would have been more suitable in that case. For just measuring cooperation level, the scientific literature should be sufficient. The material available, although mostly scientific, is biased. However, material on the Kurdish struggle, the water issue and Turkish-Syrian relations throughout the period is abundant, so enough data should be collectable.

5. Investigation

5.1 Initial conditions: 1984-86 – the Kurdish uprising

Let us begin by looking at the inception of the armed struggle, in order to establish a reference point. In 1984, the PKK launched its campaign of violence against Turkey. 15 August, the first PKK attack hit the cities of Eruh and Şemdinli, followed by harsh retribution from the Turkish Armed forces (Zurcher, 2003:327). In 1985, the concept of village guards was introduced as a counter-guerilla measure. Also, 1986 saw the first intrusion by Turkish troops into Iraq in the hunt of PKK fighters (Uppsala Conflict Data Program). Casualties throughout this period were at least 25 per year – a fairly low level, but still defined as an active conflict by the UCDP (minimum 25 battle-related deaths per year).

As this is early on in the domestic conflict and the level of casualties is fairly low, the leaders of Turkey should not have incentives for much cooperation or concessions in the external relations, judging by the theory. However, we will move on to establish the relations with Syria and the common disputes that could offer possibilities for future concessions.

The relations between the two states were somewhat strained in 1984, mainly due to two issues: The region of Hatay and water distribution issues. Hatay in its Turkish name, or

21 Alexandretta, is a region in south-eastern Turkey, bordering to Syria. Although initially part of the French mandate following World War I, following Turkish claims that most of Hatays population were ethnic turks, it was granted to Turkey in 1939 by the French, hoping that this would deter Turkey from joining World War II on the Axis side (Olson, 2000:122). However, Syria never accepted this loss of territory, and continued to display Hatay as a part of Syria in maps (Oktav, 2003:98), but did not make any official claims to the region.

The water issue circled around the distribution of the river Euprathes, emerging in Turkish territory and flowing into Syrian. In 1983, Turkey begun constructing the South Anatolia Project, or GAP (in turkish Günu Dogu Projesi), which consisted of a number of dams and irrigations projects in order to stimulate economic development in the underdeveloped southeastern parts of the country (Olson, 2000:122). GAP mainly affected the Euphrates, which after flowing through Turkey make up about 86% percent of Syrias water resource (Carkoglu and Eder, 2001:52). Since the Syrian economy was largely based on an agricultural production due to falling oil prices and the country was facing a population growth, Syria was worried of the Turkish control of the water supply into Syria (Oktav, 2003:114). The views upon the rivers differed: Turkey argued that the rivers were cross-border or transboundary, and that each country owned the sovereign rights to the parts of the rivers occupying each territory. Syria argued that the rivers were international waterways, and that everyone had a right to its share (Oran, 2010:609).

Before moving on to the next period, one observation is important to account for in the early years of the Kurdish conflict. In 1987, Turkey signed the temporal Protocol of Economic Cooperation, in which it granted a water flow of minimum 500 cubic meters of water per second in response to the Syrian worries. (Oktav, 2003:115) This was followed by a second protocol, in which Syria ensured an end to its support of the PKK (Carkoglu and Eder, 2001:67). Thus, in this first period, we find evidence of the mechanism that the Diversionary Peace theory predicts: within three years from the first PKK attack, concessions were given in a dispute with a neighbouring state, more precisely, in exchange for support of the domestic issue, an example mentioned by Fravel. Nevertheless, it is far too early to draw the conclusion that the Diversionary Peace theory is valid. Even though this is valuable to the theory, it is necessary to observe how the relations develop throughout the case as the conflict escalates. If no further concessions are given, Fravels assumption might not be as general as he claims. However, this could be one indication that at low levels of domestic conflict, the theory seems to be right.

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5.2 Period 1: 1991-93 – from guerilla warfare to open conflict

In this next period, we see an increase in the domestic conflict, mostly due to the outcome of the Gulf war. Following the war, a large number of Kurdish refugees, estimated up to 700,000 fled towards nothern Turkey (Nachmani, 2003:34). The Turkish leaders, afraid of what might happen to the domestic Kurdish struggle if a massive amount of potential recruits for the PKK entered the country, closed the borders, to international dismay (Zürcher, 2003:328). A suggestion soon emerged from Turkey, and spread via British leaders to the US, that the Kurdish refugees instead of fleeing to Turkey should be able to live free in Northern Iraq. Thus, an international force was set up to establish a safe-zone in Northern Iraq, hindering Saddams forces to attack the Kurds (Olson, 2001:14).

It took not long for PKK to exploit this. Ironically, the attempt of Turkey to keep the Kurdish struggle out of its own territory instead gave PKK a free haven to operate from (Nachmani, 2003:34). Following this, Turkey made a number of armed intrusions into northern Iraq in an attempt to destroy the PKK forces: in 1991, it conducted air raids against PKK camps, and in 1992, the first major ground operation was conducted, containing up to 20,000 soldiers (Uppsala Conflict Data Program). During 1993, a brief cease-fire was declared by PKK, but lasted only two months (Gürbey and Ibrahim, 2000:199). Casualties for this period range from about 300 in 1991 to about 2100 in 1993 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program).

The theory expects that as the domestic conflict increases and also spreads to the neighbouring states, cooperation or concessions on disputed issues should increase. We should thus expect Turkey to give some concessions in the Hatay or water issue following the escalation. Following the Gulf war, we do see increased cooperation in the relations, but not in the way predicted by Fravel:

First, Turkey and Syria were on the same side during the Gulf war, albeit only on the same side of an allied coalition which included a large number of states in the region (Olson, 2000:123). Second, following talks where Turkey laid forward evidence of PKK and Syrias close ties, the two parts agreed to sign a security protocol in April 1992 (Oran, 2010: 860). A envoy consisting of Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin, Interior Minister Ismet Sezgin and Gendarmerie Commander Esref Bitlis travelled to Syria to negotiate what became “the most important protocol ever signed with Syria”, according to Sezgin (Olson, 2000:123). The contents of the protocol were the following:

23 1. Turkey and Syria would agree to “anti-terrorist” cooperation, thus preventing terrorist activities against each other and terrorists crossing from one country to the other. 2. No permission would be given to an “outlawed party” to cross, organize, train or make propaganda in either state, and captured members of the outlawed organization would be exchanged. 3. Any information regarding outlawed organizations would be exchanged. 4. Each country would undertake measures to prevent infiltration and smuggling on their borders. 5. Each country would undertake measures to avoid unnecessary armed incidents on their borders, which would be secured by regular meeting by security officials. 6. The Syrians declared the PKK an outlawed organization in Syria and PKK members apprehended would be delivered to the respective judicial authorities (Olson, 2000:124).

Following this, both Syrian and Turkish officials expressed their appreciation of the protocol in media – to the Turkish delight, for the first time PKK was labeled a terrorist organization (Olson, 2000: 124). In response, Cetin assured that if Syria held its part of the security agreement, Turkey would fulfill its obligations regarding the Euphrates (Oran, 2010: 860). In 1993, a new security agreement was signed, the first written document where PKK was described as a terrorist organization by Syria, followed by ensurance that Öcalan was not in Syria and that PKK activities were forbidden on its territory.

The security protocols show that to some extent, Fravels assumption about cooperation is true: an increase in the Kurdish conflict do lead to an increase in cooperation with Syria. However, not in the way predicted by the theory – the cooperation increased on the domestic conflict, or more specifically Syrias involvement in it. Also, Fravel make the assumption that cooperation goes through concessions, but as we see, cooperation can also be the result of coercion or pressure. Syria signed the protocol after Turkey laid out evidence of the support to the PKK, not because of any concessions offered. The findings get even more interesting as we observe the water issue, where we should see Turkish concessions as the conflict increases:

Following the signing of the security protocols, a request of renewal of the water talks were done by Syria, but Turkey declined, referring to the lack of “atmosphere of cooperation” on the terror issue (Oran, 2010: 861). In 1990, Turkey decreased the flow of the Euphrates in order to fill the Atatürk dam, followed by harsh Syrian protests (Süer, 2011:114). Turkey, on its side, referred to the fact that Syria was not upholding its promises in the 1987 Security accord, and was thus not bound to hold its promises regarding water distribution (Carkoglu

24 and Eder, 2001:67). In 1992, Turkey commenced the construction of yet another major dam in Birecik, to major protests from Syria (Carkoglu, Eder: 2001:235). In 1993, joint water talks were held, where the two countries agreed to resolve the issue before the end of the year (Carkoglu, Eder: 2001:246). During the talks, Turkey insisted that the river Orontes, flowing from Syrian territory into Hatay, should be included in the discussion. Syria refused, since regulations of the water distribution of Orontes, situated in Hatay, would equal a Syrian recognition of Hatay as Turkish territory (Daody, 2013:137). In 1993, the joint talks on the water issue, held regularly since 1983, was suspended. (Kibaroglu, 2013:148).

Contrary to what the theory predicts, Turkey offers no concessions in the water issue, despite an escalation of domestic conflict. At this moderate level of conflict Turkey instead escalates the water issue, by decreasing the flow of the Euphrates and building a new dam. The inclusion of water ways in Hatay could also be seen as an escalation of the territorial issue, as Turkey is indirectly trying to force Syria to recognize Hatay as Turkish territory. One interpretation could be that economic conflict is more manageable that armed conflict, which would explain why Turkey withholds the water claims but seek Syrias cooperation in the PKK issue.

5.3 Period 2: 1994-96 – escalation of the conflict

In this period of time, PKK and the Turkish army engage in an open conflict. In 1995, Turkey launched Operation Steel, a 50,000 man intrusion into Iraq in the hunt of PKK fighters (Uppsala Conflict Data Program). In the summer 1995, Turkish intelligence became aware of that PKK was acting out of Hatay, which was confirmed by the commander of PKK's armed wing ARGK. Following this, village guards were also introduced in the Hatay region (Olson, 2000:127). In 1996, PKK begin to use suicide bombers (Gürbey and Ibrahim, 2000:201). Casulties during these years range from ca 3100 in 1995 – ca 4000 in 1994 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program).

The high level of casualties and the fact that PKK conducted operations in a new region that was disputed territory equals a serious escalation of the conflict. Under these conditions, the theory predicts that Turkey would have strong incentives to cooperate. As we will see, this is unfortunately not the case.

In august 1994, a summit conference was held in Damascus, where the foreign ministers of Turkey, Syria and Iran met. During the conference, which focused on the situation in Northern Iraq, both the water issue and Hatay were discussed. The Turks expressed that no

25 concessions would be given in the Euphrates issue until they received an assuring message from Syria that the support of PKK activities would end. Furthermore, Turkey once again raised the water issue of the Orontes river, flowing through Syria into Hatay. In consequence, the Syrian vow for a return of Hatay was also raised. The Turks did not offer any concessions in this area either, but insisted upon solving more urgent matters first (Olson, 2000:126). Once again, Turkey used a delaying or escalating strategy as a response to an increase in the domestic conflict.

As of this time period, we might have found the answer to why Fravels prediction fails to show in this case: the water issue was now officially linked to the PKK threat by Turkish officials, who earlier had tried to separate the two issues. In response to the PKK actions in Hatay revealed in 1995, which in Turkish eyes demonstrated that Syria had failed to uphold its promises in the security agreements, Turkey refused to participate in meetings on both security and water (Oran, 2010: 862). In 1995, the Turkish foreign minister Deniz Baykal stated: “Syria might think that the hand that is washed with blood can be washed with greater amounts of water. But Turkey will never agree to bargain with water against the use of terror” (Oran, 2010:605). In February 1995, prime minister Ciller of Turkey announced that Turkey was prepared to cooperate with Syria on the Euphrates, ensuring a flow of 500 million cubic meters per second, on the condition that Syria would stop sheltering and aiding the PKK (Olson, 2000:126). In 1996, Syria again protested heavily against the construction of the Birecik dam, demanding that Turkey end their policy of dam building in the region (Carkoglu, Eder, 2001:246). Yet again, no concessions were given, and the theory does not seem to hold.

One key assumption that Fravel makes is that the domestic conflict and the foreign disputes are two separable notions, and that concessions can be given in one are as a remedy to the other since they are unrelated. This is clearly not the case in this study. Both states officially and in actions show that the water issue is now linked to the PKK issue. The logical assumption is that a concession in the “foreign” issue, i.e. giving water to Syria, would equal a concession in the “domestic” issue, i.e. submitting to the PKK. This brings us back to a notion central to the Diversionary War theory, but not discussed by Fravel: domestic audience cost. Although the linkage between conflict and tenure is central to the DWT, Fravel mentions very little of it. He says that concession could lead to a domestic audience cost, but not in times of domestic conflict. However, we have reason to believe that this might be the case. It would be worth to include the impact of domestic audience in the future development of the Diversionary Peace theory. Due to limitations of this paper, there is not room to elaborate much on this, but one reasonable assumption would be that given that the war 26 against PKK was the largest threat to Turkish security, any concessions in this area would have been perceived as a weakened Turkish leadership and would probably lead to political punishment. Domestic audience cost could thus hinder leaders from giving concessions, if the foreign dispute is viewed as too important.

5.4 Period 3: 1997-99 – height of the conflict

The final period of the conflict studied in this paper is the bloodiest: Casualties range from the highest annual death toll in the conflict, ca 4200 in 1997, to a fairly lower level of ca 1400 in 1999 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program). In 1997, Turkey conducted two major ground and air operations into northern Iraq, Operation Hammer and Operation Dawn, consisting of 35- 50,000 and 25,000 troops respectively (Gürbey and Ibrahim, 2000:202). In April 1998, Operation Murat, the largest Turkish military operation in modern times involving ca 40,000 troops, takes place in south-eastern Turkey (Gürbey and Ibrahim, 2000:204). 15 February 1999, Öcalan was caught and sent to Turkey, which caused violent Kurdish protests throughout Turkey (Gürbey and Ibrahim, 2000:205). Although the Diversionary Peace theory expects cooperation, from what we have seen in the previous period, we could assume by now that as long as the domestic conflict escalates due to Syrias involvement, no concessions will be given.

In fact, although the Diversionary Peace theory did receive some support in the beginning of the conflict, the last period rules out the theory completely. In 1997, Turkey escalates the Hatay issue. Ankara sent out its Prime Minister Yilmaz to celebrate the anniversary of the Turkish annexation of Hatay in 1939, and during his visit, he held a speech in which he accused Syria of hosting bandits, and stated that Turkey would not offer any concessions on the Euphrates issue given the circumstances (Olson, 2001:108). Official talks on the water issue are not conducted at all during this period.

Throughout 1998, the relations between Turkey and Syria deteriorated fast. In late September, Prime Minister Yilmaz warned Syria that it would “suffer severe consequences for its support of the PKK terrorists” (Olson, 2001:110). On October 1st several important events occurred: Yilmaz stated in front of the Turkish parliament that “I declare once more to the world that we have the right to retaliate against Syria” (Olson, 2001:111). The Chief of the General staff Kivrikoglu called the situation an “undeclared war between Turkey and Syria” (Olson, 2001:111), and finally, Turkey gathered a large number of troops, up to 10,000 on the border between the two countries (Oktav, 2003:106). They were accompanied by armoured vehicle convoys and low border flights by Turkish military airplanes (Oktav, 2001:144). Syria 27 answered the threat, scrambling troops and Scud missiles close to the border (Oktav, 2001:145). Five days later Yilmaz once again demanded that Syria extradited Öcalan and that it was “the headquarters of terrorism in the Middle East” (Olson, 2001:111). On October 8th , a detailed list was announced over Syrias support to the PKK. One of the points insinuated that it was Syria who had ordered PKK to begin its attacks in Hatay in 1995 (Olson, 2001:112). The response from Syria remained the same as throughout the 90's: Öcalan did not reside on Syrian territory, and no support was given to the PKK. From this point on, as we see no concessions in the issue areas and no will to cooperate in any other area, adding the fact that Turkey is threatening war with Syria both in rhetorically and with troop movements, it is clear that the Diversionary Peace theory does not hold.

On October 10th, reports in the Turkish press came of a number of explosions in the border area, which remains unexplained (Olson, 2001:114). Following this tension Turkey and Syria agreed to meet in order to solve the situation. The talks were held in the Hatay region 18-20th of October, and were ended with a joint security agreement, the Adana Accord, on October 21st (Olson, 2001:114). To a large extent, it was a reprisal of the '92 Security protocol – the difference was that Syria held its promises. The Turkish side seemed satisfied: on the same day that the agreement was announced, the official response was “this ends the crisis and starts the dialogue” (Olson, 2001:115).

This period of the conflict, with no mention of the water issue, an escalation of Hatay and the two states on the brink of war is the ultimate test of the Diversionary Peace theory: we can conclude that its predictions are not applicable on our case, despite the proper initial conditions. Yet again, the relations were not dominated by the predicted disputes, but by Syrias involvement in the Kurdish conflict. What initially was thought to be a solely domestic conflict is clearly something more: an intertwined conflict, affecting both Turkeys domestic situation and its foreign relations with Syria, which eventually lead to a threat of war. The interlinkage clearly prevented cooperation: Turkey would not give concessions as long as Syria hosted the PKK, and Syria would not stop supporting the PKK until Turkey gave concessions. Turkey on its side would not have been permitted to give concessions in the water area, as this might have been interpreted as concessions to PKK, a logic which is shown in the statements by Turkish officials. I will elaborate more on this in the next section. Why Turkey eventually did threat Syria with war, or why it did not do it in an earlier stage is not possible to explain given the theoretical framework – we can only conclude that the outcome of the study is the opposite of what the Diversionary Peace theory predicts.

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5.5 Discussion

The most important conclusion to draw following the investigation is the following: despite all the prerequisities set out by Fravel being present in this case (domestic conflict, preferably near a border region, disputed international issues that can be negotiated in order to avoid the neighboring state becoming a base of operations for the domestic threat), the Diversionary Peace theory fail to explain Turkeys general behavior in this case. Even taking the initial concessions in the water dispute and the security agreements into account, the final outcome of the Turkish-Syrian relations in the 1990's proves that the theory is not valid in our case. This does not prove that the Diversionary Peace theory is completely wrong, but it does show that Fravel assumes a general theory that does not hold in all cases. I will briefly discuss what I consider to be the assumptions of Fravels theory that is in need of development or correction, considering my findings.

Perhaps the most decisive reason why the Diversionary Peace theory does not hold in this case is the key assumption of the separability of the domestic conflict and the foreign issue. Fravel's theory implies that the domestic issue is completely unrelated to the foreign, and concessions given in the foreign issue can thus be used as a remedy against the domestic one. As showed in this study, the foreign issues and the Kurdish conflict cannot be treated separately, since the domestic conflict became internationalized, or intertwined. As previously mentioned, the consequence of this is a deadlock for Turkey: if it would have given concessions in the foreign issue, that would have equaled a concession in the domestic one as well, something that Turkey did not want. This lets us return to the Diversionary War theorys assumption on the link between foreign conflict and domestic audience costs. Fravel does not have to account for this, since he studies an authoritarian state. In the case of Turkey though, the leaders have to balance their decisions based on the constraints of the democratic system. Although no general conclusion will be drawn, domestic costs should be taken into account by further scholarly work on the subject, as well as the impact of regime type.

Related to this is Fravels assumption that maintaining claims in foreign disputes during internal conflict would be too costly. However, in this case, the Kurdish conflict was perceived by Turkey as the main threat to national stability, overshadowing any other issue. The cost of the Kurdish conflict was arguably so high that an international conflict could be afforded if it would lead to a decrease in the domestic conflict. The assumption that international conflict is costly is probably not general: it depends on the nature of the domestic conflict, as well as the nature of the issue area. 29 Another aspect that has been dealt with by critiques of the Diversionary War theory can also be applied on Fravels theory: the linearity of the correlation should be considered. In this study, I have found that the only concession given by Turkey in the water area was in the beginning of the conflict, followed by a security protocol signed by Syria. So far, the logic of the Diversionary Peace theory works. However, as the conflict escalates, no further concessions were given. Thus, we can draw the conclusion that the relation is not linear. I will not attempt to generalize this, as it is not permitted from this small study, but it is worthwhile to note for future studies that different levels of domestic conflict might lead to different foreign policy behavior.

One limitation of this study lies in the choice of a single-case. Due to the reasons stated above, cooperation was not possible with Syria. However, given the chance to study how other regional relations developed during the same time period, would we observe a different result? Unfortunately for the Diversionary Peace theory, the general pattern is that the other regional relations also deteriate as the Kurdish conflict escalates (see table 4), although no other state ends up close to war with Turkey. This was mostly due to the fact that more countries were involved in the Kurdish conflict than just Syria. Northern Iraq was one base of PKK operations, and although Bagdhad did not control northern Iraq, it did not appriciate Turkeys intrusions into what it considers its territory. Iran used the Kurdish card against Turkey in a way similar of Syria, but not to the same extent. Greece were also accused of supporting PKK. However, Turkey did improve relations with one other regional power: Israel. The two states formed a military agreement or a de facto military alliance in 96, which has been explained by scholars as a Turkish attempt to cooperate against the PKK threat (Robins 2003:260). Fravel specifically predicts that cooperation should increase with neighbouring states, but if cooperation is difficult, as in our case, the embattled state leaders could look to other states for aid. A better prediction of which kind of relations should be improved is thus needed for the theory to hold.

Finally, the findings of this study allows us to return to the original theory: facing domestic conflict, Turkey actually turned to actions short of war against Syria. Was this rather a case of Diversionary War? Some scholars would argue it was. Olson mentions that Turkey was in need of distraction following the Susurluk and Telekulak scandals, revealing deep-ties between extreme nationalists, organized crime groups and the government (Olson, 2001:116,199). Although unlikely, establishing whether the 1998 crisis instead was a case of war to divert the attention from the domestic scandals has to be the item of a future study. However, returning to the Kurdish conflict as the domestic variable, I argue that based upon my findings, the Diversionary war theory does explain the outcome. There is sufficient 30 evidence that the Turkish leaders' conviction that a capture of Öcalan would mean the end of the conflict with PKK was a strong incentive on its own for threatening Syria. As previously mentioned, the decision to threaten Syria with war was more likely a rational decision based on the expectation that this would end the domestic conflict and that it would be worth the cost, not that it would divert the attention of the domestic audience. Also, taking into consideration that PKK has been launching their operations from outside of Turkey, the domestic conflict was seen as partially “foreign” by the Turkish public. The perception of an already existing foreign threat should thus render diversionary tactics unnecessary. Yet again, the interlinkage between the domestic conflict and the international relations remain the main explanation to why the both diversionary theories cannot account for the outcome in this case.

To summarize, the research on the Diversionary Peace theory is clearly not finished. Too many questions remain unanswered by Fravel. To end this section, one could paraphrase Levy's critique of the DWT on page 14: Little attention is given to questions of under what kinds of conditions what kinds of states resort to what kinds of external cooperation in response to what kinds of threats to the security of the political elites.

5.6 Suggestion on further research

Scholars conducting further research on the Diversionary Peace theory are advised to take the above stated notions into consideration: that is, whether the domestic conflict and the foreign dispute affect each other or can be treated as separate, at what level of domestic conflict leaders are inclined to seek cooperation and the impact of domestic audiences in different regime types.

If this study were to be conducted again, some elements of quantitative methodology would further strengthen the findings. A graph depicting number of casualties in relation to number of bilateral contacts of different kinds between Turkey and Syria, indicating concessions, delays or escalations, would perhaps be a more pedagogic presentation of the findings. However, the drawback of such a study would not change the bigger picture: Turkey and Syria would still have ended up on the brink of war. It would also be interesting to pick other domestic factors as the independent variable, such as the previously mentioned deep-state scandals, or to examine other territorial disputes, mainly the case of Greece.

31 Due to limitations, only one regional relation has been examined in this study. For scholars wishing to conduct studies on the development of several regional relations during the Kurdish struggle, a short, general introduction to the developments follow, based upon my findings during this study. In the following table, conflict and relational development are indicated. In the relation boxes, a plus indicates benign foreign behavior. A minus indicates a malign foreign behaviour.

Table 4: Overview of Kurdish conflict and changes in Turkish regional relations

Variables/ 1984 [...] 1992 1994 1997 1999 time

Level of Kurdish Announcement From guerilla First height, Second height, Öcalans capture, conflict of Kurdish war to open war, 3980 dead 4183 dead cease-fire, 1390 uprising, 25 dead 1518 dead dead

Relation w. Iran Neutral, fairly Improved Mixed, mostly Worsened Worsened positive improved - Iran protest - Turkey bombs + Neutrality in + Joint security + Gas pipeline Turkish targets in war protocol - Accusations of intrusions into northern Iran + Trade PKK support Iraq

Relation w. Iraq Neutral, fairly Worsened Worsened Worsened Worsened positive - Turkish - Turkish - Turkish - Turkish + Neutrality in intrusion (safe intrusion intrusion intrusion war zone) + Agree on - Water conflict Kurdish question + wish to + Trade and oil normalize relations

Relation w. Syria Strained Mixed, mostly Worsened Worsened Improved - Water conflict worsened - Turkey angered - (98) + Adana security - Hatay + Joint security over PKK Undeclared war, accord protocol support troop stand-off

Relation w. Israel Neutral Improved Improved Improved + Increased + Increased + (96) Military military military Alliance cooperation cooperation

Source: author's own

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6. Conclusion

In this paper, I have tested the Diversionary Peace theory in a case-study on how the Turkish- Syrian relations developed in correlation with the Kurdish domestic conflict in Turkey from 1984-1999. The hypothesis was that an escalation in domestic conflict would give incentives for cooperation in the external relation. This paper has proven otherwise: internal conflict correlated with delay or escalation in disputes areas and finally external conflict, opposite of what the Diversionary Peace theory predicts. However, this does not imply that my findings support the Diversionary War theory: I argue that there were other reasons leading to the brink of war. In summary, the outcome of this case does not align with the Diversionary peace theory due to several assumptions of the theory that cannot be treated as general.

In this paper, the domestic conflict and foreign issues turned out to be interlinked, thus hindering cooperation. No concessions on the foreign issues could be given, since these would have been interpreted as concessions on the domestic conflict as well, affecting the political tenure of the leaders. This would bring back the notion of domestic audience cost into the theory, which is left out by Fravel. In addition, this paper found some support for the Diversionary Peace theory at low levels of conflict, which could imply that the relation between domestic conflict and international cooperation is not linear. The findings of this case does not imply a final reformulation of the theory and is not intended to be generalized, but they implicate questions that need to be answered by future scholars interested in the subject.

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7. References

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35 Olson, Robert. Turkish and Syrian Relations Since the Gulf War: The Kurdish question and the Water Problem. In Ibrahim, Gürbey (eds). 2000. The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy, pp. 119-150. New York: St. Martin's Press.

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7.2 Miscellaneous sources

Freedom in the world – Turkey: 1999. Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/turkey. Obtained 2016-12-20.

Turkish Government – PKK. Additional information. Uppsala Conflict Database: http://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=781&entityType=4. Obtained 2016-12-20.

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