NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7 . Issue 11

Contents A Daunting Triangle: , the , and the ISIL Threat By Buddhika ‘Jay’ Jayamaha FEATURE ARTICLE 1 A Daunting Triangle: Turkey, the Kurds, and the ISIL Threat By Buddhika ‘Jay’ Jayamaha

Reports 5 The Battle for Kobani Comes to the Fore By Derek Henry Flood 9 Hizb Allah’s Lebanese Resistance Brigades By Chris Zambelis 12 Libya’s South: The Forgotten Frontier By Geoffrey Howard 16 The “Seventh Stage” of Terrorism in China By Sajjan M. Gohel 20 A Classical Analysis of the 2014 Israel- Conflict By Elad Popovich

CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

he rise of the Islamic State in nature of the situation, there are reasons and the Levant (ISIL) has to be hopeful. created an area where Turkish and Kurdish interests overlap: This article contextualizes what some Tboth parties are thoroughly alarmed at observers refer to as the “Byzantine” ISIL’s expansion. However, delicate and nature of changing Turkish-Kurdish sensitive cooperation against ISIL has relations in the fight against ISIL. For to take place in the broader context of example, the fact that Turkey gave About the CTC Sentinel the complicated and evolving Kurdish- permission to Iraqi peshmerga troops The Combating Terrorism Center is an Turkish relationship. While Turkey to cross into by way of Turkey, as independent educational and research develops its response to the ISIL threat saviors of Syrian Kurds, and that Turkey institution based in the Department of Social and the Syrian crisis, it is also managing is now training Kurdish peshmerga forces Sciences at the United States Military Academy, Kurdish relations as part of its effort to against ISIL,1 came as a surprise even West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses redefine the Turkish state and Turkish to some seasoned observers. However, the Center’s global network of scholars and national identity. On their side, the decisions such as these are best viewed practitioners to understand and confront Kurdish leaders — especially the as contingent outcomes rather than contemporary threats posed by terrorism and Regional Government (KRG) signals of a re-alignment, reflecting other forms of political violence. in Iraq — are compelled to deal with a complex and sometimes competing array of Kurdish organizational alliances and 1 Humeyra Pamuk, “Turkey Trains Kurdish Peshmerga The views expressed in this report are those of interests that cross international borders, Forces in Fight against Islamic State,” Reuters, November the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 22, 2014. Also see “Turkish Military to Train Peshmerga the Department of the Army, or any other agency while trying to deepen their relations Forces, Kurdish Official Says” Rudaw (Kurdish news of the U.S. Government. with Ankara. Despite the complicated channel), November 22, 2014.

1 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11 short- and medium-term tactical and However, there is no shortage of critics of the PKK’s armed wing then moved strategic decisions by Turkish and of this current status of Turkish- into the Qandil Mountains of Iraq, to Kurdish leaders. They can best be seen Kurdish relationships. On one hand, wage the fight with Turkey from behind through the prism of regional networks liberal critics of Turkish President the border. Other PKK of elites and rooted political rivalries. Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s administration elements moved to the Kurdish areas This article makes this claim through call attention to Turkey’s increasing of Syria, without overt, official Syrian a brief discussion of Turkish-Kurdish emphasis on Sunni Islamist precepts regime support.8 relations before ISIL, how the rise of at home and its neo-Ottoman muscle- ISIL affected this relationship, and how flexing abroad. The expansion of “The development of the relationship is evolving to meet the Kurdish rights, however welcome, is ISIL threat. aimed not at a liberal-pluralistic society, relationships with Kurdish they claim, but at creating a hierarchy military groups was the “The rise of ISIL and of citizenship with Kurds distinctly the as second-class citizens.5 On the other critical development that hand, conservative critics, invoking convinced the Turkish threatened this growing the founding principles of the secular rapprochement in Kurdish- Turkish state, resist both the Islamist leadership that Assad must redefinition of Turkish national identity go.” Turkish relations inside and the expansion of Kurdish rights. Turkey.” They nevertheless support, though grudgingly and with some suspicion, the “intermittent” cease-fires with the Kurdistan People’s Party (PKK). The transition of the Syrian protest movement into a fierce civil war in Dynamics of Turkish-Kurdish Relations Prior The Syrian Civil War, Rise of ISIL and the 2011 altered the Syrian regime’s tactical to ISIL Changing Nature of Turkish-Kurdish Relations calculations. Many in Ankara claim that the Syrian regime immediately Inside Turkey, Kurdish and Turkish The rise of ISIL and the Syrian civil war attempted to recruit the remnants of relations have improved dramatically in threatened this growing rapprochement PKK to fight on its behalf.9 The same the last decade under the leadership of in Kurdish-Turkish relations inside suspicion fell on the PKK’s Syrian the ruling Justice and Development Party Turkey. In the years prior to the PKK counterpart, the Democratic Union (AKP). Kurds can finally be Kurdish in cease-fire and the capture of its leader Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the Turkey: in the predominantly Kurdish Abdullah Ocalan, Assad’s Syrian regime People’s Protection Units (YPG). The towns, street vendors can sell Iraqi supported the secessionist PKK, by way development of relationships with Kurdistan flags and T-shirts adorned of Iran.6 Turkey persuaded Syria to end Kurdish militant groups, it is surmised, with Kurdish flags.2 Diaspora Kurds this longstanding relationship in return was the critical development that can cross the Turkish border without for Turkish economic assistance.7 Parts convinced the Turkish leadership that being subjected to the level of scrutiny Assad must go.10 by Turkish authorities they were in the 2291, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July past.3 As a result, Turkish Kurds have 23, 2014. The rise of ISIL complicates matters shown due appreciation at the ballot 5 Arda Gucler, Untimely Representation: Deliberation, Ur- for Turkey in two ways. First, Ankara box in support of AKP.4 gency and Democratic Theory, PhD Dissertation, North- believes that if the international western University. 2 Author observations and conversations in Diyarbakir, 6 Author interviews in Erbil, Iraq, October 2-4 and 11-14 York University Press, 2009). Turkey, October 16-17, 2014; and parts of eastern Tur- and November 27-28, 2014; in Suleimaniyah, Iraq, Oc- 8 The official borders are exceedingly porous. Numerous key, November 18-19, 2014. tober 4-10, 2014; in Diyarbarkir, Turkey, October 16-17, villages straddle the borders of Syria, Turkey, and Iraq, 3 Author interviews in Iraqi Kurdistan region with mul- 2014; in Ankara, Turkey, October 17-18 and November maintaining deep-rooted familial and economic ties. tiple Iraqi, Iranian and Syrian Kurdish people who have 13-18, 2014; and in , Turkey, October 18-21 and People cross the borders without official papers, with transited through Turkey, both legally and illegally, Oc- November 12-13 and 18-25, 2014. Also see Cengiz Candar, the complicity of local authorities. Countless Kurdish, tober 1-15, 2014. “Turkey Claims Iran Providing Logistical Support for Turkish, Iraqi, and Iranian people continue to travel to 4 Author interviews in Ankara, Turkey with party ac- PKK,” al-Monitor, December 20, 2012; Soner Cagaptay, and from Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran without a single tivists and members of the former Democratic Society “Syria and Turkey, the PKK Dimension,” Policywatch document. Author interviews and observations in Iraqi, Party, currently the Peace and , the lat- 1919, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Turkish and Syrian border towns, October 14-15, 2014. est incarnation of a Kurdish nationalist party with close April 5, 2012. 9 Author interviews in Erbil, Iraq with Kurdish officials, links to PKK, October 17-18 and November 13-18, 2014. 7 Author interviews with Turkish officials and Kurdish October 2-4 and October 11-14, 2014; in Sulaimaniya, Also see Kadri Gursel, “Turkey’s Kurds Key to Erdogan’s lawmakers, November 16-18, 2014. For a detailed account Iraq, October 4-10, 2014; in Ankara, Turkey with Kurd- Presidency Bid,” al-Monitor (and also in the Turkish of events leading up to the Adana Agreement of 1998 that ish and Turkish officials, October 17-18 and November daily Miliyet) June 10, 2014; Orhan Coskun and Gulsen ended official Syrian support for PKK, see F. Stephen Lar- 13-18, 2014; and in Diyarbarkir, Turkey, October 16-17, Solaker, “Turkey’s Kurdish Peace Process Key to Erdo- rabee and Ian O.Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of 2014. gan’s Presidential Hopes,” Reuters, April 3, 2014; Soner Uncertainty, (Center for Middle East Policy, Rand Corpo- 10 Author interviews in Ankara and Istanbul, Turkey Cagaptay and Ege Cansu Sacikara, “Turks in Europe ration, 2003); and Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK with Turkish and Kurdish officials, October 17-18 and 19- and Kurds in Turkey Could Elect Erdogan,” Policywatch and the Kurdish Struggle for Independence (New York: New 21, 2014, and November 13-18 and 19-25, 2014.

2 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11 community, and especially the United abound that those same PKK leaders Kurdish Tactical Cooperation with an Eye on States, had acted at the outset of the have sent word on the streets not to push the Future uprising in Syria to change the regime, things too far, for fear of empowering ISIL would not have found a foothold hardliners in Turkey who favor war The Kurdish leaders face challenges inside Syria. Turkey views ISIL as a against the Kurds.15 of their own. Their tactical decisions spillover of a Sunni-Shia civil war inside are shaped by their strategic goals Iraq, triggered by the slow collapse of In Iraq, officials of the KRG are focusing of deepening the existing Kurdish the Syrian state. Because of this, Turkey on the long term — that is, combating autonomy. The Kurdish struggle is therefore continues to view the solution the threat of ISIL while encouraging led by several organizations that have to ISIL as lying in Damascus — not in rapprochement between Turkey and overlapping and conflicting elite and Baghdad, as the United States insists.11 the Turkish Kurds — while delicately patronage networks across national managing the ongoing demonstrations boundaries. The PKK of Turkey is Second, ISIL’s deliberate targeting by Syrian and Iraqi based both in the prison cell of Ocalan of Kurds as “less than Muslims” has Kurds who demand swift action in and in the Qandil mountains of Iraq; it created a sudden coalescing of the support of the besieged Kurds in Syria, maintains close links with the Patriotic Kurdish diaspora and its varied armed including the town of Kobani. Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraqi groups against a common enemy.12 PKK Kurdistan and the YPG in Syria, but also affiliates in Syria and Turkey have “The Kurdish struggle with the Iranian state and previously managed to create a Kurdish safe haven with the Syrian regime. Indeed, inside Syria, around the Syrian Kurdish is led by several during the civil war between PUK and town of Qamishli, in a region where organizations that have Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the Syrian state has collapsed. These Iraqi Kurdistan in the mid-1990s, PKK developments, however, make Ankara overlapping and conflicting members fought side-by-side with PUK nervous. If PKK decides to pursue elite and patronage against the KDP, with Iranian support. secession once again, they would now On the other side, the Iraqi KDP had have more tactical and strategic depth, networks across national Turkish support in combating the PUK, with the advantage of a larger base in boundaries.” PKK, and Iran; Turkish soldiers even Syria with close proximity. Leaving no fought alongside the PDK peshmerga room for doubt, and perhaps allaying the inside Iraq. conservative remnants of the Turkish deep-state, Erdogan recently stated (in Although that civil war has ended, reference to siege of the town of Kobani) KRG officials, though they too wish around 1,500 Turkish soldiers still that “the PKK and (ISIL) are the same for stronger military action against remain in Iraq (including an M60T Tank for Turkey,” and that Turkey will “deal ISIL, appreciate the fact that the company), camped outside the Iraqi with them jointly.”13 YPG (supported by other armed Kurdish city of Dohuk and “protected” Kurdish groups) have effectively by Iraqi peshmerga units affiliated Erdogan’s comments, especially in created a Kurdish safe haven inside with KDP.17 This unlikely and little- the context of Turkey’s hesitancy northern Syria, centered on the town known alliance came in handy (as Iraqi to save the Syrian Kurdish town of of Qamishli and extending all the way Kurdish officials note privately) when Kobani, appeared to damage the fragile to the Iraqi border — and that they ISIL arrived, around 30 kilometers rapprochement between Turkey and its have accomplished this with the quiet outside Erbil. They claim that some of Kurds. The PKK leaders (echoed by their complicity of the Turkish authorities. jailed leader Ocalan) responded from Many informed Kurdish officials claim PKK and Turkish authorities, both parties keep testing their encampment in the mountains of that, despite the bluster, neither Turkey the limits of the cease-fire with deliberate skirmishes. See Iraq, warning that civil war will erupt nor PKK will easily break the ceasefire, for example, Jonathan Burch, “Killing of Fourth Turkish 14 in Turkey if Turkey fails to intervene. but will rather continue behind-the- Soldier in a Week Threatens Fragile Peace with Kurds,” 16 Behind the scenes, however, rumors scenes negotiations. Rudaw, October 30, 2014. On the other hand, Turkish and Kurdish officials clarify the seemingly fragile nature 11 Author interviews in Ankara, Turkey with Turkish 15 Author interviews with Kurdish activists in Diyar- of the cease-fire, and the repeated threats of both sides government officials, October 17-18 and November 13-18, barkir, Turkey, October 16-17, 2014; in Ankara, Turkey, taking turns to threaten to return to an all out war, as 2014. October 17-18 and November 13-18, 2014; and in Istan- “part of the game.” Skirmishes are part of the negotiat- 12 For the most recent public affirmation of this -real bul, Turkey, October 18-21 and November 12-13, 2014. ing dynamics where both sides try to be astute managers ity, see this YPG spokesman interview with the Kurd- 16 Author interviews with Kurdish Regional Govern- of political brinkmanship with calculated use of violence, ish news network: “Spirit of the times, Kurds united,” ment member of Kurdish Regional Government Parlia- without letting it get out of hand. Rudaw, November 18, 2014. ment, and officials from the KRG Directorate of Foreign 17 Peshmerga soldiers point out that they constitute the 13 “Edogan: PKK, ISIS Same for Turkey,”The Daily Sa- Relations, October 2014. Also, author interview in Is- perimeter defense of the Turkish enclaves inside Iraq, bah, 4 October 2014. tanbul, Turkey of a Turkish Parliamentary Committee and that there is a modus vivendi between the parties on 14 Jonathan Burch, “Turkey Inaction over Kobane member tasked with assessing the ongoing “Reconcili- the ground, despite their broader differences. Some of Threatens Fragile Peace Deal, Say Kurds,” Rudaw, Octo- ation Process,” as the peace process between PKK and the Kurdistan Regional Government Members of Parlia- ber 8, 2014; Jonathan Burch, “Kurdish Militants Warn of Turkey is referred to, November 19, 2014. The concept ment expressed the same sentiment. Author interviews ‘Violent Conflict’ if Turkish Police Given More Powers,” of the “cease-fire” here remains a very peculiar one. On in Erbil, Iraq, October 3 and 12, 2014; and in Dohuk, Iraq, Rudaw, October 16, 2014. the one hand, despite the ongoing negotiations between October 14-15, 2014.

3 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11 the Turkish soldiers assisted the Iraqi 90 percent of the Turkish trade and KRG and KDP.23 peshmerga in rescuing the Yazidis, with investments into Iraq flows to Iraqi the support of air strikes by Turkish Kurdistan, not to Baghdad.21 Iraqi The KRG in Iraq at this moment appears forces, and that the Turkish military Kurdistan is also slated to furnish some to be uniquely situated to get and to delivered much-needed ammunition to of Turkey’s energy needs, while Turkey manage Turkish support, while also the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga against will underwrite the revenue transfers playing a mediating role in broader ISIL, while Western leaders were still necessary to accommodate KRG oil and Kurdish affairs. Mazoud Barzani has deliberating the question.18 gas revenues. In return, the KRG goes to become the eminence grise of Kurdish great lengths to control PKK activities politics. It may indeed be a tribute to his KRG officials also emphasize that — just as it has assuaged the Syrian skillful management of transnational Turkish and KRG relations today run Kurdish leaders of YPG/PYD in the last relations and intra-Kurdish relations deeper than tactical military alliances, few weeks. that Turkey has decided to allow Iraqi as a direct result of policy decisions peshmerga to cross into Kobani. Iraqi by the KRG. After the US invasion in “The KRG in Iraq at this Kurdish officials are confident that 2003, the PUK and KDP put aside their the two sides will somehow navigate differences and concentrated on building moment appears to be a deepening rapprochement without the KRG, dividing tasks between them. uniquely situated to get unduly alarming the regional Kurdish The PUK, led by Jalal Talabani (then diaspora. Nevertheless, they worry the Iraqi president), took responsibility and to manage Turkish about the seemingly conflicting for maintaining a united front vis-a-vis support, while also playing objectives of Turkey and the United Baghdad, while the PDK leader Massoud States with regard to ISIL: is the Barzani, assisted by KRG Prime Minister a mediating role in broader proper military focus on Syria or Iraq? Nechirvan Barzani, actively worked to Kurdish affairs.” And it understands that a strategic deepen relations with Turkey, utilizing conciliation between Washington and PDK’s wartime networks with Turkish Ankara will again alter the dynamics of military and political leaders. KRG Kurdish-Turkish relations, for better or officials insist that with the ongoing for worse. instability and political dysfunction Thus, the broader, high-level political in Baghdad, they can rely more on cleavages do not always look the same Buddhika ‘Jay’ Jayamaha is a PhD Ankara than on Baghdad, and that any on the ground. This is not necessarily candidate at Northwestern University and chance of maintaining Iraqi Kurdish a cause for optimism, however, in view is currently conducting his dissertation autonomy (let alone ultimate Kurdish of the deep-seated differences between research in Iraq, Turkey, and Nepal. He independence) will have to come with the two sides. As KRG officials point previously served in the U.S. Army, and is Ankara’s blessing.19 out, Turkey is willing to support the a veteran of the 82nd Airborne Division. Kurds against ISIL, but only as the Today, Turkey remains the largest dominant regional power and on their trading partner of Iraqi Kurdistan, at own terms; the weaker parties carry 75 percent, with Iran a distant second, the burden of astutely maneuvering followed by the European Union at the relationships.22 The sudden public a minuscule level.20 Almost 85 to statement by the Turkish authorities that it will allow Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga 18 This story was initially discussed by peshmerga soldiers to cross into Kobani exemplifies troops as if it were a conspiracy theory that bordered on the tactical alliances that exist between the unbelievable, until President Barzani, on October 13, KRG and Turkish authorities. But it 2014, publicly affirmed the assistance, claiming that they is also important to note that, as soon (the Turkish authorities) “asked us not to make it pub- as the announcement was made, YPG lic.” Some KDP members, and peshmerga closer to KDP, mused publicly that they would rather are quick to point out that there is also a sizable Iranian have ammunition and supplies than the presence left over from the civil war in the “green zone,” support of peshmerga units allied with albeit in civilian clothes (that is, in PUK territory, espe- 23 Author interviews in Turkey with Kurdish activists, cially in Suleimaniyah), just as there are Turkish soldiers and with multiple Kurdish news sources inside Turkey, assisting KDP in the “yellow zone,” (i.e., KDP territory). 21 Bilateral relations have been almost non-existent be- October 18-19, 2014. The private musings by Kurdish 19 Author interviews in Erbil, Iraq with KRG officials, tween Ankara and Baghdad in the last ten years, as a re- activists on intra-Kurdish differences became public as October 11-13, 2014 and November 26, 2014. They also sult of former Prime Minister Maliki’s sectarian outlook many Kurdish and Turkish web-sites started publishing mention the joke in Iraqi Kurdistan, popularized by Ta- and his open displeasure with the Turkish involvement comments by YPG members. The depth of their distrust labani, when he referred to “our American friends and in Iraqi Kurdistan, along with the Turkish ruling party’s lies in the fact that the Kurdish Regional Government of Turkish brothers.” Friends can come and go, and they Islamist outlook. Although under the new administra- Iraq retains close ties to the Turkish government, while do; however one has no choice in one’s brother, but has tion in both Ankara and Baghdad there is now renewed the same government that allowed for Peshmerga to to deal with him as he comes. effort to improve relations. transit through Turkey views YPG as “terrorists” and a 20 Author interviews in Erbil, Iraq with KRG member of 22 Author interviews in Erbil, Iraq with KRG member of threat to Turkey. See, for example, “Syrian Kobani Offi- parliament and an official from the Directorate of Foreign parliament and an official from the Directorate of Foreign cial; We Need Weapons not Kurdish Peshmerga forces,” Relations, October 3 and 11, 2014. Relations, October 3 and 11, 2014. ekurd.net, October 21, 2014.

4 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11

The Battle for Kobani Kurds’ secular, democratic system with outmatched for much of the siege. its lingering Marxist-Lenist attributes While they employed agility and deep Comes to the Fore inherited from the Kurdistan Workers’ knowledge of local urban terrain, their Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê dearth of heavy weapons coupled with By Derek Henry Flood [PKK]) as flagrantly heretical from a lesser force numbers put them at a hardline salafist perspective.4 great disadvantage. ISIL had massed Following the mid-2012 withdrawal numerous tanks and a plethora of of most of the regime forces loyal to Though nowhere near as dramatic as “technical” fighting trucks around Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the rivalry between opposing jihadist Kobani’s perimeter to sustain the siege the Kurds of northern Syria formed fighting groups such as that between with overwhelming firepower, creating three distinct enclaves, or cantons, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL, or the conflict a battle of attrition. As international 1 hugging the Turkish border. The three between jihadist groups and moderate and local media congregated on the cantons, collectively known as Rojava groups in Syria, solidified Kurdish unity arid hills of the Turkish border village (meaning “west” in Kurdish), consist of has been difficult to achieve in Rojava’s Efrin, Kobani, and Jazira. They were cantons due to differences between the 2 “In the YPG, ISIL established in January 2014 and are PYD and a comparatively ideologically chiefly administered by the Democratic incoherent umbrella grouping called the encountered a strong- Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat Kurdish National Council (KNC), the willed if lesser- [PYD]). The primary security guarantors latter being more desirable to Turkey of the evolving Rojava political system and the Kurdistan Democratic Party equipped competitor, are the People’s Protection Units (KDP) in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel [YPG]) and in stark contrast to their female counterpart the Women’s The Kurdish element in the conflict in the disorganized and Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Syria garnered immense international demoralized Iraqi security Jinê [YPJ]), which has attracted intense interest in mid-September 2014 when attention from Western media. ISIL massed around the western, forces they had routed in southern and eastern approaches to the Mosul in June 2014.” The central goal of the Syrian Kurdish border town of Kobani, which abuts political model is to defend Kurdish rural districts of southern Turkey’s autonomy rather than confront either Sanliurfa Province. In the lead up to the remnants of the Assad regime, with the siege of Kobani, ISIL had overrun whom they have a tense détente in dozens of Kurdish inhabited villages of Mürsitpınar south of Suruç, ISIL 3 Jazira canton, or Islamist groups like during mid-September, 2014, gradually operators made sizeable efforts to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant shrinking the YPG-protected canton to hoist their infamous black banners on (ISIL) and Jabhat al-Nusra. But as we the urban settlement, all in plain view high points in and around Kobani to continue to see during the current battle of Turkish forces situated on the tense both intimidate the YPG and present a over Kobani, Syria’s Kurds have vowed border. show of force to far-reaching cameras to defend their regions with intense situated in the relative safety of Turkey. vigor when attacked by expansionist This article examines why the struggle However, somewhat unexpectedly, ISIL jihadis. for a once obscure border town has come was met in Kobani with a fierce opponent to be perceived as being of paramount rather than the swift victory its jihadist The ethno-political model of Rojava importance to local, regional, and bravado promised.5 In the YPG, ISIL is quite different from that of the international actors who believe they encountered a strong-willed if lesser- Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have a stake in the battle’s outcome. equipped competitor, in stark contrast in neighboring Iraq. The three distinct The varied interests of these numerous to the disorganized and demoralized regions controlled by Syrian Kurds stakeholders has led to a cacophony of Iraqi security forces they had routed are non-contiguous making them more divergent policies that have allowed the in Mosul in June 2014.6 The YPG, like vulnerable to military aggression by siege of Kobani, also known as Ayn al- the PKK from which it inherits many of advancing forces of ISIL, who see the Arab, to continue as of the time of this its traits, fights more for ideologically writing. imbued Kurdish nationalism, as 1 The exception to the total withdrawal of the Syrian opposed to the debilitated Iraqi or state is in the ethnically-mixed Jazira canton where parts YPG’s Military Capabilities and International Syrian militaries who receive meager of urban al-Hasakah City and Qamishli still have rem- Support pay and suffer an enfeebled command 7 nants of a regime presence. This sometimes tenuous co- and control structure. existence in Jazira is part of the charge by Islamist fight- YPG infantry units were clearly ers that the Kurds are in league with pro-Assad forces on 5 Roy Gutman, “Kobanê Kurds say Turkey Hasn’t Re- some level. 4 The PKK, and thus the PYD, have moved away sponded to Appeal for Help Against Islamic State,” Mc- 2 ‘Efrin Canton in Syrian Kurdistan Officially Declared from their original focus on hardline separatism and a Clatchy DC, October 3, 2014. Autonomy,” Firat News, January 29, 2014. centralized, command economy and towards the idea of 6 Patrick Cockburn, “Whose Side is Turkey on?” London 3 Jamie Dettmer , “VOA Reporter Involved in Standoff a more decentralized “confederation.” Carl Drott, “The Review of Books, November 6, 2014. Between Syrian Troops and Kurds,” Voice of America, Syrian Experiment with ‘Apoism’,” Carnegie Endow- 7 Ziad al-Sinjary, “Insurgents in Iraq overrun Mosul November 22, 2013. ment for International Peace, May 20, 2014. provincial government headquarters,” Reuters, June 9,

5 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11

The discrepancy in firepower between the on containing Kurdish resentment the much more palatable KRG peshmerga dueling belligerents was clearly audible on the border while running busy forces with whom it has a pragmatic and in some instances visible through patrols along the fence, the United understanding. military grade binoculars being carried States in turn greatly stepped up its by Kurdish onlookers in Turkey.8 As air campaign in an attempt to halt ISIL Throughout its deliberation about what ISIL units bore down on western Kobani from making further advancements to do regarding the fate of Kobani, in technicals hitting YPG positions into Kobani’s shattered center.11 This Turkish leadership insisted it sought to with heavy fire, hunkered-down YPG was a controversial move in the eyes avoid the city’s fall to ISIL, with Foreign fighters could often only answer with of Ankara which resolutely equates the Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stating, “We small arms fire while economizing their PYD with the PKK. But resupplying the are assisting peshmerga forces to cross finite ammunition stocks before the U.S. YPG by air was the only feasible way to into Kobani. We have no wish at all to military air-dropped crates full of war stem the city from falling to ISIL, as it see Kobani fall.”15 materiel supplied by the Erbil-based was locked in by Turkey from the north KRG on October 20, 2014.9 While not a and surrounded by ISIL to the south. ISIL Unrelenting lasting solution, the air drop helped to partially alleviate the YPG’s depleting Despite the increased U.S. air power, Despite the international attention stocks and also bolstered morale. however, the siege went on unabated. paid to Kobani, to include the air Turkish decision makers felt immense strikes, ISIL has proven unwilling to pressure from the international abandon the offensive. In fact, it is “Turkish decision makers community to take some form of decisive perhaps precisely this attention that action on this highly visible, festering drives ISIL not to withdraw. Rather felt immense pressure battle on their southern border, but than the bombing prompting a tactical from the international they were hesitant to do anything that retreat by ISIL units, they appear to might embolden Kurdish nationalist have doubled down in their quest for community to take some aspirations in any form. Rather than Kobani. As American air strikes rapidly form of decisive action on allow YPG or PKK fighters access to increased in and around Kobani, ISIL the Mürsitpınar border gate or send fighters ushered in reinforcements Kobani, but were hesitant in Turkish ground troops, as the siege from their reservoir of recruits in ar- to embolden Kurdish ground on, Ankara was forced to come Raqqa and Aleppo, and ramped up up with a third option. A more agreeable their employment of vehicle-borne nationalist aspirations.” choice for the government of Turkish suicide bombers.16 Unlike more remote President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was battles in places such as Deir ez-Zor to allow a select number of members and al-Hasakah Governorates, Kobani of the Free Syrian Army access to quickly became of global interest early In addition to deficiencies in their Kobani.12 The YPG were also aided by on in the siege in small part due to its weaponry, manpower for the Kurdish a small Arab FSA brigade called Fajr being accessible by media outlets from forces was also restricted. Turkish al-Hurriyah (Dawn of Freedom) which around the world who descended upon authorities refused to allow Turkish joined them in counterattacking ISIL Sanliurfa Province. ISIL has proven Kurds into Syria to repel the assault, nor inside Kobani.13 adept at using such media attention to did they allow Syrian Kurds who had demonstrate its capability and amplify previously evacuated from Syria into Ultimately, Ankara became amenable its narrative. Turkey to return home to defend their to a third way solution whereby Iraqi brethren. Turkey’s refusal to allow the Kurds, with whom Turkey have a strong In addition, ISIL’s desire to eliminate YPG to be aided or resupplied by nearby economic relationship, would be allowed the PYD and its YPG militia from sympathizers led to protests by Kurds to transit Turkey.14 This solution of Kobani is rooted in its ideology. ISIL which resulted in violent suppression by sorts for Erdogan’s government was not only views these entities as un- Turkish police in Mürsitpınar, who used twofold: it would serve to assuage the Islamic, but also conflates them with tear gas and powerful water cannons to international community, which was the Assad regime in Damascus. As the forcibly disperse YPG supporters.10 frustrated with Turkish inaction, while PYD’s agenda is more concerned with undermining the PKK by empowering communal self-preservation rather than While Turkish security forces focused overthrowing the government, jihadist 11 Author observations; and “Islamic State Crisis: US groups view this as proof that the PYD 2014; “US stresses refusal to arm Syrian rebels,” al-Akh- Intensifies Air Strikes in Kobanê,” BBC News, October is a tool of the Ba’athists. bar, August 3, 2012. 14, 2014. 8 Author observations, Mürsitpınar, Turkey, October 12 Alexander Whitcomb, “Joint Anti-ISIS Force Pushes Long before the emergence of the PYD as 10-15, 2014. West of Kobanê,” Rudaw, November 3, 2014. a serious Syrian Kurdish organization, 9 Fulya Ozerkan with Sara Hussein, “US Air Drops, 13 See: The Free Syrian Army’s Eastern Front Leader- Turkey Boost Kurd Battle Against Jihadists,” Agence ship YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/ 15 Stuart Williams, “Turkey shifts strategy to help Iraqi France-Presse, October 20, 2014. channel/UCZQmoYIpf0g2Ggpa2W1kOPw Kurdish fighters into Kobanê,” Agence France-Presse, 10 Constanze Letsch and Ian Traynor, “Kobani: Anger 14 Humeyra Pamuk and Raheem Salman, “Air strikes October 20, 2014. Grows as Turkey Stops Kurds from Aiding Militias in hit Kobani as Kurdish peshmerga prepare to enter,” Reu- 16 Author observation, Mürsitpınar, Turkey, October Syria,” Guardian, October 8, 2014. ters, October 31, 2014. 15, 2014.

6 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11 the Hafez al-Assad regime used the statements insisted their militia needed perennial conflict with the PKK, while Turkish PKK as a foreign policy wedge in weapons and ammunition rather than it also openly advocates for the toppling its conflict with Ankara over territorial more manpower, but when the far better of the Assad regime in Damascus. disputes, to include and armed peshmerga met their Syrian But if ISIL solidifies its hold on the water rights with regard to the damming Kurdish counterparts and agreed to play northern reaches of Aleppo and Raqqa of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. a supporting role, the YPG became less Governorates and turns out to no longer To this end, the Syrian government ambivalent about their participation in remain the rational actor that released had allowed the PKK and its leader the fight.21 the Turkish consulate hostages it had Abdullah Ocalan to base themselves captured in Mosul in June, Turkey may inside Syria in mid-1984.17 This both “The Erdogan government in fact be facing a far more ferocious overt and tacit support ended with the third threat from the jihadists like Adana Agreement, reached in 1998, sees the PKK as the ISIL to which it has turned a blind eye in which Hafez al-Assad agreed not to paramount threat to to their transiting its territory since allow the PKK and Ocalan safe haven in 2012.25 As Turkey’s approach to Kobani Syria.18 This history has been forgotten Turkish security, more has pragmatically, if slowly, adapted, by neither the Turkish government nor so than that posed by it allowed a second unit of 150 Iraqi ISIL, with the former considering both peshmerga to transit its territory to to be threats to Ankara’s interests and an enlarging ISIL and replace the exhausted deployment sent the latter asserting the two are colluding a resurgent Jabhat al- to defend the city in early November, to hinder the spread of their virulent indicating that Ankara was thus far brand of Islamism in Syria. Nusra.” satisfied with its strategic choice.26

An Asymmetrical Intervention

Despite ISIL’s determination, the YPG One key reason for the YPG’s original “Kurdish politics are has been able to hold off their advance skepticism of these forces was Turkey’s highly fragmented across with a combination of American air calculated support for them. In post- power and bold determination as it had 2003 Iraq, Ankara had developed a the boundaries of Turkey, been cut off from the outside world. The close realpolitik-based relationship Iraq, Syria, and Iran, but YPG had initially said that the limited with Massoud Barzani’s Erbil-based air strikes were having little impact on KDP,22 a group that is more patriarchal the plight of Kobani is ISIL, but as the air strikes increased and clan-based than the leftist PKK- fostering a new level of in number, approaching 150 by early influenced PYD. November,19 the YPG’s public tone transnational interaction became more enthusiastic. But a key The Erdogan government, like its more among competing remaining challenge appeared to be the secular nationalist predecessors, sees the lack of coordination in the targeting of PKK as the paramount threat to Turkish movements.” the bombardments. With the October 20 security, more so than that posed by an aerial weapons resupply, lack of precise enlarging ISIL and a resurgent Jabhat coordination appeared to continue when al-Nusra along its southern border with ISIL posted a video online of a trove of Idlib Governorate.23 Ankara seems to The Multilayered Significance of Kobani weapons and ammunition meant for the believe both the ISIL and Jabhat al- YPG that they had recovered.20 Nusra threats can be mitigated in the Kurds. The longer Kobani festers the near term with these jihadist groups more it may act as a centripetal force in Coordination was also a challenge with busy conveniently offsetting the the fissiparous Kurdish political sphere the long-awaited arrival of a finite empowerment of Kurdish nationalism between regional parties and militant number of Iraqi peshmerga troops from and militancy while simultaneously groups alike. Kurdish politics are highly Erbil. Before they formally arrived keeping the Assad regime at bay in fragmented across the boundaries of at Kobani’s northern entrance, YPG northern Syria.24 Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, but the Turkey’s leadership sees itself in plight of Kobani is fostering a new level

17 Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurd- of transnational interaction among ish Fight for Independence, (New York: New York Univer- 21 YPG Media Center press statement, November 2, competing movements. Barzani’s KDP sity Press, 2007), p.308. 2014. has historically been at odds with the 18 Bente Scheller, The Wisdom of Syria’s Waiting Game: 22 Jim Muir, “Islamic State Crisis: Syria Rebel Forces PYD and supportive of the less powerful Foreign Policy Under the Assads, (London: C. Hurst & Boost Kobanê Defence,” BBC News, October 29, 2014. Co,.2013), p.113. 23 “Jabhat al-Nusra Expands in Idlib as it Gains Control 25 Katherine Wilkens, “A Kurdish Alamo: Five Reasons 19 Elena Becatoros and Bassem Mroue, “Peshmerga on New Areas,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the Battle for Kobanê Matters,” Carnegie Endowment for Fighters Bring Weapons To Kobani, Prepare To Battle November 2, 2014. International Peace, October 10, 2014. ISIS,” Associated Press, November 1, 2014. 24 Ramzy Mardini, “The Islamic State Threat is Over- 26 Ugur Ergan, “New Peshmerga Group to Replace 20 Dan Lamothe, “U.S. Accidentally Delivered Weap- stated,” Washington Post, September 12, 2014 ; Author in- Troops in Kobane: Turkish Army,” Hurriyet Daily News, ons to the Islamic State by Airdrop, Militants say,” teractions with Turkish officers in Mürsitpınar, Turkey, December 2, 2014; “Second Peshmerga Group reaches Washington Post, October 21, 2014. October 11 and 15, 2014. Kobane,” , December 3, 2014.

7 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11

KNC, which is also considered a far and led by President Barzani, with stating only that Turkey sought to avoid more suitable alternative in Ankara. its recent history of mostly cordial a security vacuum in northern Syria that economic relations with Turkey, is thus would be taken up by “PKK terrorists,” A significant constituent within KNC fundamentally divided on its stance while advocating that Washington is the KDP-S, the Syrian branch of toward the PKK and therefore the PYD. take responsibility for training and the KDP. The KDP-S has far more Though dominated by the KDP, the KRG equipping the Free Syrian Army.37 amicable relations with Turkey while today is in fact a tripartite body that its interactions with the PYD are often includes the more PKK-friendly Gorran acrimonious. It has asserted that the Movement and former Iraqi President “Turkey’s priority appears PYD seeks to monopolize power in Jalal Talabani’s PUK. Rojava and is aligned with the Assad to remain maintaining regime.27 In late October 2014, Barzani The onslaught by ISIL in both Iraq and its policy of containment acted as an arbiter between the PYD Syria has disrupted the divided status and the KNC in negotiations aimed at quo by creating a common foe among of Kurdish autonomy uniting the Syrian Kurdish factions, often competing Kurdish groups. movements rather than partly in hope that a deal between them Thus Kobani could potentially lead would dilute the notion that the Kurds to a near-term paradigm shift with stemming the growth of chiefly administering Rojava were regard to Kurdish unity irrespective of jihadism in Syria.” deeply synonymous with the PKK.28 It existing schisms stemming from deeply is hoped this may garner more support entrenched ideologies, clan affliation from the West if the agreement reached and rivalry, and linguistic difference.33 in Dohuk29 can hold. However, though its brief presence in transit brought adulation from otherwise Conclusion The political realm in Iraqi Kurdistan irate Turkish Kurds,34 the deployment has been traditionally divided between of a small contingent of peshmerga from The siege of Kobani, now well into its the tribal-oriented KDP in its west and its KDP allies in Erbil has not been an third month at the time of the writing, the leftist-oriented Patriotic Union of immediate game changer. carries on unabated despite the aerial Kurdistan (PUK) in the east, which assistance from Operation Inherent has generally been more supportive Turkey. Despite Turkey’s recent shift Resolve and the additional yet finite of the PKK over the long term.30 The away from coup-prone militaristic non-YPG forces who have joined the Qandil range in Iraq’s Suleimaniyah nationalism toward political Islamism fight. Governorate on the KRG’s eastern under the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi frontier with Iran has been primarily (AKP) government of former Prime Turkey’s priority appears to remain ruld by the PUK31 and acts as a refuge for Minister-cum-President Erdogan, the maintaining its policy of containment PKK guerillas. Additionally, Qandeel stance toward the PKK remains largely of Kurdish autonomy movements rather serves as a rear base for the Iranian unchanged. Hence Erdogan refused to than stemming the growth of jihadism Kurdish movement the Partiya Jiyana distinguish between the PKK and PYD- in Syria. The fate of Kobani speaks Azad a Kurdistanê (PJAK),32 which YPG in his public statements. Rather he not only to the fate of Syrian Kurds’ confronts the Iranian Revolutionary continues to unequivocally term Syrian democratic experiment, but also to Guards Corps in cross-border raids. Kurdish YPG fighters a “terrorist Turkey’s difficult relations with its The KRG, headquartered in Erbil organization.”35 From Turkey’s own massive Kurdish minority, with perspective, the Rojava cantons which the Kobani issue has exacerbated 38 27 Deniz Serinci, “Mustafa Juma: Ac- of northern Syria are not merely a tensions and incited street protests. cepts Kurdish Rights,” Rudaw, July 22, 2014. laboratory for the PKK to spread Ocalan Despite an ongoing peace process 28 Isabel Coles, “Syrian Kurds Sign Power-Sharing Deal thought but also provide a geography between Ankara and the PKK that began to Draw More Support,” Reuters, October 23, 2014. from which the PKK itself can operate in March 2013, and as global criticism of 36 29 “Divided Syrian Kurds Reach Deal in Face of ISIS against the Turkish state. In a recent Turkish inaction on the siege of Kobani Threat,” Rudaw, October 22, 2014. television interview, Turkish Prime grew, Turkish warplanes pounded 30 Charles Recknagel, “Iraq: Fighting In North Spells Minister Ahmet Davutoglu did not PKK sites in Hakkari Province near the No End To PKK,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Janu- acknowledge the PYD or YPG by name, Iraq border on October 14, 2014, an act ary 17, 2001. that could potentially derail the peace 39 31 The PUK’s dominance in Suleimaniyah Governor- 33 “Peshmerga Deployment a Move for Kurdish Unity initiative. Ocalan declared from his ate has been diluted with the rise of the Gorran Move- and Kobanê’s Defenders,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, prison cell that if Kobani were to fall ment—a splinter group from the PUK led by Neshirwan October 30, 2014. to the jihadists, he would resolutely Mustafa. See: “KRG Elections: KDP Wins but Gorran 34 Fulya Ozerkan with Mohamad Ali Harissi, “Kurds Becomes the Second Force,” The Kurdistan Tribune, Sep- Cheer Reinforcements for Syria’s Kobanê,” Agence 37 “Turkey PM Ahmet Davutoglu: ‘We Will Help Coali- tember 21, 2013. France-Presse, October 29, 2014. tion Forces’,” BBC News, October 28, 2014. 32 Author observations at joint PKK-PJAK camp, Qan- 35 “Erdogan Opposes Arming PYD, Says it’s a Terrorist 38 “Thousands Protest in Turkey to Show Solidarity deel Mountains, Suleimaniyah Governorate, Iraq, Octo- Group like PKK,” Today’s Zaman, October 19, 2014. with Kobane Kurds,” Agence France-Presse, November ber 13, 2009; Michelle Moghtader, “Iran Guards Killed 36 Robert Lowe, Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds 2, 2014. in Armed Clashes near Iraq Border-Media,” Reuters, June in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (New 39 Dorian Jones, “Turkish Airstrikes on PKK Threaten 25, 2014. York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p.239. Peace Process,” Voice of America, October 14, 2014.

8 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11 call off the peace talks, thereby linking Hizb Allah’s Lebanese Popular Committees4 that preceded the the security of the Turkish state National Defense Force and members of with the threatened future of Syrian Resistance Brigades informal village defense groups made Kurdistan.40 up of resident volunteers (essentially By Chris Zambelis proxy militias with no formal partisan Though the PKK has not been delisted association with Hizb Allah), tends to as a terrorist organization by the Since 2012, Lebanese Hizb Allah has be overlooked.5 United States or the European Union, actively supported Syrian president the group’s rush to aid Kurdish Bashar al-Assad’s embattled Ba’athist 1 “Hizb Allah has provided communities under assault from ISIL government. Hizb Allah’s function in Syria and Iraq has improved its as a forward combat force operating military and other forms image internationally.41 Though the alongside the regular Syrian military PYD and PKK are undeniably affiliated and other irregular formations in of support to irregular 2 organizations, the Kobani crisis begs for Syria has drawn the most attention. militias in Lebanon nuanced differentiations on a granular Hizb Allah has distinguished itself in level by state actors concerning strategically important theaters such as composed of non-party themselves with the crisis if the siege is Syria’s wider Qalamoun region in the members, including non- to come to a timely conclusion leading to southwestern Rif Damashq Governorate the defeat and expulsion of ISIL forces. that sits adjacent to Lebanon’s Bekaa Shi’a Lebanese and units Valley along the Lebanese-Syrian associated with its guerilla 3 As the YPG and YPJ fight on, with border. Meanwhile, its function as both limited assistance on the ground by an enabler and facilitator of irregular auxiliary Saraya.” Iraqi peshmerga and a small number paramilitary detachments loyal to the of FSA fighters, Turkey may be forced government in Damascus, including the to prioritize among its enemies. Kobani has had a debilitating effect on Turkey’s Hizb Allah appears to have resorted to international standing and puts it at 1 For an earlier assessment of Hizb Allah’s role in the a similar strategy in Lebanon. There is 42 risk of further decline. Kobani being Syrian conflict, see Chris Zambelis, “Hizb Allah’s Role evidence that Hizb Allah has provided attacked on a daily basis by a dogged ISIL in the Syrian Uprising,” CTC Sentinel, 5:11-12 (2012): pp. military and other forms of support to has infuriated Turkey’s own Kurdish 14-17. For an estimate of Hizb Allah’s military activities irregular militias in Lebanon composed minority at a delicate juncture in the in Syria, see Jeffrey White, “Hizb Allah at War in Syria: of non-party members, including non- Ankara-PKK peace process. Finally, Forces, Operations, Effects and Implications,” CTC Shi’a Lebanese and units associated there are no firm indicators that ISIL Sentinel, 7:1 (2014): pp. 14-18. with its guerilla auxiliary Saraya will not set its sights on Turkey itself— 2 In addition to Hizb Allah, foreign actors such as Iran’s al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya (Lebanese 43 6 if it has not already —if it can solidify Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC- Resistance Brigades). Hizb Allah’s its control over the central sector of QF) and a constellation of Iraqi-based Shi’a militias and involvement in the Syrian conflict has northern Syria’s borderlands. volunteers, among others, have likewise proven their drawn the ire of its enemies in Lebanon. mettle as allies to the Ba’athist regime. At the same time, In particular, the emergence of al- Derek Henry Flood is an independent security the factors that have contributed to the Ba’athist re- Qa’ida’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra analyst with an emphasis on MENA, Central Asia gime’s staying power in the face of an increasingly mud- (Support Front) and the Islamic State in and South Asia. Mr. Flood is a contributor to IHS dled insurgency led by radical Sunni Islamist currents Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has raised Jane’s Intelligence Review, Terrorism and Security such as al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (Sup- concerns about their plans for Lebanon. Monitor and Islamic Affairs Analyst. He has port Front) and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant Radical Sunni Islamists have already been a guest commentator for BBC , BBC continue to be underestimated or disregarded outright. used Hizb Allah’s foray into Syria as Newshour, France 24, and al-Arabiya. Indeed, the Ba’athist regime continues to count on a a pretext to launch terrorist attacks largely unified and loyal military and security apparatus in Lebanon against locations where that managed to weather an initial purge of defectors in Hizb Allah draws significant support, the early stages of the conflict. For a discussion of the including Beirut’s southern suburbs of 7 many reasons behind the Ba’athist regime’s resilience, Dahiyeh. Parts of northern Lebanon see Bassam Haddad, “Syria’s Stalemate: The Limits of such as Tripoli and Arsal have also 40 “PKK Leader Threatens to End Peace Talks with Regime Resilience,” Middle East Policy Council, Volume become the scenes of regular clashes Turkey if ISIS Massacres Kurds,” al-Akhbar, October 2, 19, No. 1, Spring 2012. Also see Barbara Slavin, “CIA 2014. Director Brennan says Syria Army Remains Resilient,” 4 Nicholas A. Heras, “The Counter-Insurgency Role of 41 “Turkey’s Syria Role Risks Instability at Home, Isola- Al-Monitor, March 11, 2014; Joshua Landis, “Why Syria’s Syria’s ‘Popular Committees’,” Terrorism Monitor (Jame- tion Abroad,” International Institute for Strategic Stud- Assad Enters Geneva Talks in a Position of Strength,” stown Foundation), Volume 11, Issue 9, May 2, 2013. ies, October 2014. Al-Jazeera, January 23, 2014; Zoltan Barany, “Why Most 5 Bassam Mroue, “-backed Lebanese Shiites 42 Barcin Yinanc, “France Tells Turkey that Inaction Syrian Officers Remain Loyal to Assad,” Arab Center Fight in Syria,” Associated Press, April 14, 2013. in Kobane will be Costly for its Image,” Hurriyet Daily for Research and Policy Studies [Doha], June 17, 2013; 6 Hugh Macleod, “Lebanon’s Militant Hizballah Forg- News, October 14, 2014. and Barah Mikail, “Who Supports Assad?,” FRIDE ing New Ties,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 1, 43 Fevzi Kızılkoyun, “Suicide Vests, Bombs Seized in [Madrid], May 9, 2014. 2007. Turkey Amid ISIL Terror Alarm,” Hurriyet Daily News, 3 Racha Abi Haidar, “Heavy Casualties in Qalamoun,” 7 Laila Bassam, “Suicide bombing kills four in Hizbal- October 23, 2014. Al-Safir [Beirut], October 14, 2014. lah area of south Beirut,” Reuters, January 21, 2014.

9 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11 between radical Sunni Islamists and “Hizb Allah’s participation week after the death of his eighteen Lebanese military forces.8 Moreover, year-old son, Hadi, who died along with Hizb Allah positions in Lebanon draw in the conflict in Syria two fellow Hizb Allah members in a fire from Syria-based militants.9 A coupled with the clash with Israeli forces. The impetus recent threat issued by Jabhat al-Nusra behind the Saraya’s founding, according commander Abu Muhammed al-Julani deteroriating security to Nasrallah, was to respond to the against Hizb Allah further crystalizes climate in Lebanon has growing demands among Lebanese of Lebanese anxieties.10 Consequently, all backgrounds to contribute to the Lebanese Shi’a and Christians who have compelled it to expand its resistance to Israeli occupation.14 watched their co-religionists be targeted mobilization of auxiliary with increasing ferocity in Syria are A promotional video produced by Hizb reportedly stockpiling arms with Hizb paramilitary elements such Allah’s Al-Manar (The Beacon) media Allah’s assistance.11 In this context, a outlet that contains footage of purported sense of growing insecurity in Lebanon as the Saraya.” Saraya members engaged in training has, for many Lebanese – irrespective exercises and military operations of their confessional affiliation – highlights its appeal.15 Interviews with vindicated Hizb Allah’s claim that it purported Saraya members, including acts to protect Lebanon.12 the Saraya (Brigades) – in Lebanon. It self-identifying Christians, Sunnis, finds that Hizb Allah’s participation Shi’a, and Druze (along with self- This article will examine the role of in the conflict in Syria coupled with identifying “Lebanese”) underline the Hizb Allah’s Lebanese Resistance the deteriorating security climate in group’s multi-confessional nature Brigades – commonly referred to as Lebanon has compelled it to expand its and its unifying ethos derived from mobilization of auxiliary paramilitary a sense of Lebanese nationalism and

8 Hugh Naylor, “Fighting in Lebanon rages for 3rd day elements such as the Saraya. It also the determination to protect Lebanon 16 between military, Sunni militants,” Washington Post, shows that, in addition to bolstering from Israeli aggression. Ostensibly October 26, 2014. the Saraya, Hizb Allah appears to be acting as a paramilitary auxiliary of 9 BBC, “Hizballah repel al-Nusra attack on border,” devoting similar efforts to mobilize Hizb Allah, the Saraya’s existence October 5, 2014. other paramilitary forces ranging helped Hizb Allah display its Lebanese 10 Maruam Karouny, “Leader of Syria Qaeda Wing from independent, loosely organized nationalist and patriotic credentials to Threatens Strikes Against Hizballah in Lebanon,” formations to self-defense detachments go along with its prevailing religious Reuters, November 4, 2014. Al-Golani is quoted as say- affiliated with its political coalition and Shi’a Islamist pedigree from which ing: “The real war in Lebanon is yet to begin and what is allies within the March 8 bloc. it originated. The creation of the Saraya coming is (so) bitter that Hassan Nasrallah will bite his also reflected another example of Hizb fingers in remorse for what he has done to Sunnis.” Background Allah’s progression toward political 11 Bassem Mroue and Zeina Karam, “Some Christians expediency and pragmatism after its 17 arm as Mideast peril mounts,” Associated Press, Septem- Founded in November 1997, the formal entry into Lebanese politics. ber 5, 2014. Also see Nadine Elali, “Christian resistance Lebanese Brigades of Resistance to the brigades?,” NOW Lebanon [Beirut], September 25, [Israeli] Occupation, as the Saraya was 14 Blanford, Nicholas. Warriors of God: Inside Hizbal- 2014. originally known, were emblematic lah’s Thirty-Tear Struggle Against Israel. New York: 12 Al-Akhbar [Beirut], “Hizballah leader claims battles of Hizb Allah’s attempt to broaden its Random House, 2011, p. 196-97. would have reached Beirut if party had not intervened demographic appeal among a wider 15 Al-Manar’s feature on the Saraya, Saraya al- 13 in Syria,” August 15, 2014. A recent poll conducted by spectrum of the Lebanese body politic. Watan (Homeland Brigades), is available in three the Beirut Center for Research and Information found The Saraya, in essence, sought to enlist parts at the following links, Part 1:http://www. that two-thirds of Christians surveyed believe that Hizb non-party members, particularly non- youtube.com/watch?v=d-hG3NQmu1U (accessed Allah is defending Lebanon from the radical Islamist Shi’a Lebanese, to the cause of resisting November 2014); Part 2: http://www.youtube. currents that have by now become ubiquitous within the Israel’s occupation of Lebanon through com/watch?v=btXlzp6IMeg (accessed Novem- various Syrian opposition insurgent fronts. See Beirut armed resistance against Israeli ber 2014); and Part 3: http://www.youtube.com/ Center for Research and Information, “Two-Thirds forces and their South Lebanon Army watch?v=btXlzp6IMeg (accessed November 2014). of Christians: Hizballah Protects Lebanon,” October (SLA) proxy. The Saraya disavowed 16 According to a 1999 study that examined the Saraya’s 2014, available at: http://beirutcenter.net/Default. religious, political, ethnic, class, and demographic composition, 38 percent of its cadres were asp?ContentID=859&menuID=46 (accessed November tribal affiliations in favor of a shared Sunnis; 25 percent were Shi’a; 20 percent were Druze; 2014). commitment to Lebanon and its unity and 17 percent were Christians. See Naim Qassem. Hiz- On the other hand, Hizb Allah’s detractors led by mem- and national defense. The Saraya’s ballah: The Story from Within. London: Saqi, 2005. 123 bers of the March 14 coalition such as Future Movement ambitious goals are notable in light of 17 There is a wealth of literature that documents the leader Saad al-Hariri and Lebanese Forces leader Samir the inherent fissures that characterize progression of Hizb Allah’s ideology and discourse Gaegea see its active participation in the Syrian conflict Lebanese society. The timing of the over the years from various perspectives. This process, as imperiling Lebanon’s delicate stability and exacerbat- Saraya’s establishment is also notable. commonly referred to as its ‘Lebanonization’ or infitah ing an already disastrous situation in the Levant. See Hizb Allah Secretary General Hassan (opening), is reflective of Hizb Allah’s formal entry into Hussein Dakroub, “Hariri Slams Hizballah’s Explosive Nasrallah proclaimed its formation one participatory and electoral politics and its concomitant Message,” Daily Star [Beirut], October 9, 2014. Also see departure from a strict emphasis on Shi’a Islamist- Daily Star [Beirut], “Hizballah MP boasts victory over 13 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb. Hizballah: Politics and Religion. centric narratives and objectives for Lebanon in favor Nusra Front,” October 6, 2014. London: Pluto Press, 2002. 84. of broader themes that embody Lebanese and Arab

10 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11

At the same time, the Saraya’s capacity and elsewhere,21 and are publicly Popular Front for the Liberation of to organize and deploy independently recognized for their contributions to the Palestine-General Command (PFLP- has also allowed Hizb Allah to preserve resistance.22 GC),27 and Lebanese Communist Party the ideals it embodies through its (LCP),28 along with those deployed by Islamic Resistance military arm.18 This To be eligible for consideration for fellow Islamist movements such as the reassures ideological purists among its membership, aspiring Saraya volunteers Amal Movement and Palestinian Hamas, constituency who may be wary of the were required to meet two requirements: as well as Palestinian Islamist groups potential influence of non-Shi’a and non- first, they had to satisfy the physical and indigenous to Palestinian refugee camps Islamist actors on Hizb Allah’s purpose psychological qualifications required for in Lebanon.29 as an Islamic resistance movement. mobilization; and second, they had to be free of any links – direct or tangential – Sidon Flashpoint “The creation of the Saraya to Israel and its allies.23 While the second requirement may seem like an obvious A chain of events in Lebanon’s southern also reflected another prerequisite to gaining membership in city of Sidon in 2012 and 2013 brings the example of Hizb Allah’s the Saraya, it is nevertheless illustrative current role of the Saraya into sharper of Hizb Allah’s observance of rigorous relief. An important center of Sunni progression toward operational security protocols in light cultural and political life in southern political expediency and of the legacy of the Israeli occupation Lebanon, the port city has emerged as and the locally-born SLA and other a center of incendiary sectarianism pragmatism after its factions that acted as Israeli proxies. exacerbated by the conflict in Syria. The formal entry into Lebanese To connect with prospective recruits, 2012 call by hardline Sunni cleric Sheikh a telephone number was established to Ahmad al-Assir for Lebanese Sunnis politics.” field inquiries about how Lebanese can, to join the armed insurrection against according to Hizb Allah, fulfill their the Ba’athist regime under his Kataib “national obligation to resist foreign al-Muqawama al-Hurr (Free Resistance occupation.”24 Hizb Allah’s phones, Brigades), in response to Hizb Allah’s As an operational auxiliary of Hizb according to some accounts, “rang off entry into the conflict, would further Allah, Saraya cadres were provided the hook” with calls from prospective escalate tensions.30 Drawing from an paramilitary training and other forms recruits.25 extremist Salafist tradition that views of operationally relevant support. The Shi’ism as a form of heresy and apostasy, Saraya initiated military operations on Hizb Allah’s operational relationship al-Assir’s sermons lambasted Hizb March 14, 1998,19 and were credited with with the Saraya is illustrative of its Allah and Iran over their influence in scores of operations, including small tendency to forge operational ties with Lebanon and events in Syria. Followers unit ambushes, mortar attacks, and non-Islamist militias that subscribe of al-Assir and Lebanese military forces the deployment of landmines.20 Saraya to a host of different ideologies but engaged in armed clashes in and around units also engaged in surveillance, nevertheless act under the rubric of Sidon in 2012 and 2013. The clashes in reconnaissance, and intelligence resistance. This includes militants 2013 followed calls made by al-Assir operations. The Saraya boasts its own that promulgate secular, nationalist, demanding that Hizb Allah supporters, flag and emblem. Saraya members socialist, and leftist ideologies such as including active Saraya members, vacate also participate in and are otherwise the armed wings of the Lebanon-based two apartment buildings in Sidon.31 acknowledged in military parades and Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP),26 There is evidence that a Sidon-based other public events hosted by Hizb Saraya detachment, possibly supported Allah in locations such as Dahiyeh 21 Wael Taqi al-Din, “Lebanese Resistance Brigades… by regular Hizb Allah fighters, fought 32 Remains and Expands,” LebanonDebate.com [Beirut], al-Assir’s followers. nationalist discourses, as well as social justice and September 1, 2014. For video footage of Saraya anti-imperialism. For example, see Joseph Elie Alagha. cadres honoring the late Hizb Allah commander Imad “Primacy to Political Program.” The Shifts in Hizballah’s Mughniyeh, see “Radwan ya Radwan … Lebanese 27 Antoine Ghattas Saab, “PFLP-GC Steps Up Lebanese Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Brigades” is available at http://www.youtube.com/ Border Presence,” Daily Star [Beirut], October 30, 2014. Program. Leiden: Amsterdam University Press, 2006. watch?v=iz4dbtZK6LI (accessed November 2014). Also see Daily Star [Beirut], “PFLP-GC Military Buildup 149-189. Also see Amal Saad-Ghorayeb. Hizballah: 22 Al-Ahd [Beirut], “13th Anniversary of the Launch of Stokes Fears of Clashes,” November 25, 2014. Politics and Religion. London: Pluto Press, 2002. 78-87. the Lebanese Brigades for Resisting ‘Israeli’ Occupa- 28 Maria Abi-Habib, “Diverse Allies in Lebanon,” Also see Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh. In the Path of Hizballah. tion,” November 4, 2009. Electronic Intifada, January 14, 2007. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004. 108-135. 23 E. Al-Rihani, “Long Live Saraya,” Al-Manar, March 29 Hugh Macleod, “Lebanon’s Militant Hizballah Also see Naim Qassem. Hizballah: The Story from Within. 15, 2011. Forging New Ties,” San Francisco Chronicle, November London: Saqi, 2005. 187-205. 24 E. Al-Rihani, “Long Live Saraya,” Al-Manar, March 1, 2007. 18 Amal Khalil, “Lebanese Resistance Leader: The 15, 2011. 30 Al-Akhbar [Beirut], “Saida Salafi Cleric to Form Saraya is Here to Stay,” Al-Akhbar [Beirut], October 19, 25 Naim Qassem. Hizballah: The Story from Within. Militia: Official,” November 13, 2012. 2013. London: Saqi, 2005. 122 31 Amal Khalil, “Lebanese Resistance Leader: The 19 Naim Qassem. Hizballah: The Story from Within. 26 Chris Zambelis, “Assad’s Hurricane: A Profile of Saraya is Here to Stay,” Al-Akhbar [Beirut], October 19, London: Saqi, 2005. 122 the Paramilitary Wing of the Syrian Social Nationalist 2013. 20 Nizar Hamzeh. In the Path of Hizballah. Syracuse: Party,” Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), 32 Elie Hajj, “Lebanon’s Assir Gone, But Problems Syracuse University Press, 2004. 91. Volume 12, Issue 6, March 20, 2014. Remain,” Al-Monitor, June 26, 2013.

11 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11

The events in Sidon are best understood network in the predominantly Christian Libya’s South: The within a broader context, particularly village of Ras Baalbek, an area located Hizb Allah’s consistent efforts to in the northeast Bekaa Valley not far Forgotten Frontier demonstrate its self-proclaimed from the Syrian town of Qusair that stance as a bulwark against violent bore witness to one of Hizb Allah’s By Geoffrey Howard Islamist extremism and sectarianism initial forays in Syria and only a few in Lebanon. For example, Nasrallah miles south of the flashpoint Lebanese Libya’s south has long been a key area frequently addresses the danger of town of Arsal. Ras Baalbek has come of political contestation. The region sectarianism that has sowed dissention under attack by Jabhat al-Nusra and was at the heart of Col. Muammar al- between Sunnis and Shi’a across the analogous elements. This prompted Gadhafi’s support base, providing a Islamic world and threatened religious a regional Saraya representative to core constituency of the regime’s armed minorities.33 In doing so, Hizb Allah is organize what they call a “self-defense forces and allowing the former leader able to position itself as a unifying and committee” made up of local Christians. to exploit tribal and ethnic divisions even moderate stabilizing force in light The “self-defense committee” is armed to cement his highly personalized form 1 of what is a catastrophic alternative and conducts regular patrols of the area, of governance. His divide and rule promoted, according to Nasrallah, by the often acting on intelligence information tactics, manipulation of citizenship, likes of Saudi Arabia and other Persian provided by Hizb Allah.37 and profligate stance towards the Gulf Arab monarchies.34 Hizb Allah’s highly lucrative smuggling networks support for the Saraya and analogous “For many Lebanese, the that traverse the region have left a militias, especially those made up of inherent weakness of the considerable mark on the Sahel-Sahara non-party members, is a further case in region and continue to shape political point. As evidenced by the expansion of military and the wider and security dynamics following the 2 informal militia networks made up of security apparatus leaves 2011 uprising. Christians and Muslims – Sunni, Shi’a, and Druze – and others situated in Hizb Allah as the only “Whilst transnationanl vulnerable locations in the Bekaa Valley credible deterrent to the along the Lebanese-Syrian frontier and militant groups are elsewhere in Lebanon, Hizb Allah’s brand of violence being certainly present in message appears to be resonating wrought in Syria.” widely.35 Equally important, there are southern Libya, their indications that many of the Christian intent to engage in violence militias that have received Hizb Allah support are composed of supporters in Libya is likely to be of the Michel Aoun’s al-Tayyar al-Watani In light of the multitude of threats lower than key communal al-Hurr (Free Patriotic Movement), that confront Lebanon, Hizb Allah’s Lebanon’s largest Christian party and employment of the Saraya and similar groups in the region.” Hizb Allah’s chief ally in the March 8 militia formations is likely to expand. coalition.36 Hizb Allah’s preoccupation with developments in Syria coupled with Conclusion growing fears of Jabhat al-Nusra and These complex dynamics are not well ISIL will continue to compel Lebanese understood and developments in There are indications that organized of various backgrounds to seek a the region often go unreported. The Saraya factions are currently security guarantor in the absence of ongoing crises in Libya’s north, where mobilizing their own militia sub- other viable alternatives. For many more ideologically defined groups are networks, particularly ones operating Lebanese, the inherent weakness of battling for control of institutions, the on the village level in volatile areas in Lebanese institutions, particularly the formal and informal economy, and what the Bekaa Valley that lie on the front military and wider security apparatus, remains of the fast collapsing political lines of the conflict. The Saraya has leaves Hizb Allah as the only credible process has further deflected attention reportedly established one such sub- deterrent to the brand of violence being from developments in Libya’s Sahel- wrought in Syria. Saharan region. Disproportionate levels of reporting have also focused on 33 Al-Manar [Beirut], “Lebanese Hizballah Leader the emerging presence of transnational Accuses Saudi Arabia of Promoting Takfiri Trend,” Chris Zambelis is a senior analyst specializing in Middle East affairs with Helios Global, Inc., a risk militants. Whilst these groups are October 27, 2014. certainly present in southern Libya,3 34 Al-Manar [Beirut], “Lebanese Hizballah Leader management consultancy based in the Washington, Accuses Saudi Arabia of Promoting Takfiri Trend,” D.C. area. The opinions expressed here are the October 27, 2014. author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the 1 See Dirk Vandewalle ed., Libya since 1969 (New York: 35 Al-Monitor, “Hizballah Calls for Resistance position of Helios Global, Inc. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). against IS,” August 27, 2014. Also see Saada Ouloua, 2 See “Divided We Stand: Libya’s Enduring Conflicts,” “Christians in Eastern Lebanon Prepare for Worst,” Report No.130, International Crisis Group, September Al-Monitor, July 29, 2014. 2012. 36 Nadine Elali, “Christian resistance brigades?,” NOW 37 Economist [London], “Taking Charge: Lebanon’s 3 These details are based on the author’s interviews Lebanon [Beirut], September 25, 2014. Border with Syria,” June 15, 2014. and research conducted in Libya in 2013 and 2014; see

12 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11 their intent to engage in violence in is precisely the support of the Tuareg and borders, strategic assets (such as energy Libya is likely to be lower than key Tubu, with their links across the Sahel, infrastructure and roads), and the communal groups in the region. which will be essential in mitigating formal and informal economy, as well the threat from transnational militias. as gain political supremacy over their “The Arab political elite’s Losing this support risks losing control rivals. Complex dynamics between these over the south. key groups, the growing redundancy inability to address of political institutions, and the near the concerns of ethnic Communal Dynamics in the South collapse of the transitional process has reduced the willingness of domestic minorities, especially Libya has two principal non-Arab ethnic actors to engage in the political process relating to political minority groups that are present in the and risks encouraging these groups to country’s Sahara: the Tuareg and the engage in a more concerted campaign of representation and Tubu.4 They have different degrees of violent and disruptive action to achieve citizenship rights, poses a intermarriage with the numerically and their aims. politically dominant Arab population, critical threat to stability which is split into a number of tribes, The Tubu and risks driving these including the Gadhadhfa, Warfalla, Merghara, Awlad Suleiman, Fezzanis, The Tubu were the original inhabitants groups to engage in greater Hassawna, and Zuwayah. of the region around the south-eastern and more concerted levels oasis towns of Kufra, Rebiana and Gadhafi manipulated tribal affiliations Buzeyma. They also inhabit northern of violence.” for his own political ends; he sought Chad and Niger. The Tubu population in the support of a number of groups to the south has grown in recent decades, strengthen his support base in the primarily as a result of immigration absence of viable political institutions, from Chad, in particular from the This article argues that the current and used a patronage system under Tibesti region. The relative socio- focus on developments in Libya’s which he promoted some groups while economic marginalization and political coastal region and concern over the marginalizing others.5 Three tribal disenfranchisement of the Tubu by Arab presence of transnational groups risk groups emerged as the backbone of tribes has led to increasing antagonism missing the pivotal role likely played his support: Gadhafi’s own Gadhadhfa between the Arab and Tubu groups. by key domestic actors, including tribes tribe, which is based in Sebha and This has been particularly pronounced and ethnic minorities, in determining Sirte (having settled in the latter with in Kufra with the Arab Zuwayah (or longer-term stability in the south, and Gadhafi’s encouragement); the Warfalla, Zwai) tribe, where divisions between the in Libya as a whole. This article focuses which is Libya’s largest tribe and whose Tubu and members of Arab community on two groups – the Tubu and Tuareg members are spread throughout the have triggered serious and persistent ethnic minorities – in order to highlight country; and the Merghara, whose violence since the start of 2012, leading some of the key dynamics shaping members tend to be found in the south- to the deaths of at least 200 people.8 stability in the region. It argues that the west of the country around Sebha.6 primarily Arab political elite’s inability These tensions stem from Arab tribes’ to address the concerns of these two Since the 2011 uprising, hitherto economic and political dominance ethnic minorities, especially relating to marginalized groups are attempting over the Tubu, mistrust between political representation and citizenship to supersede those groups that these groups, competition for political rights, poses a critical threat to stability Gadhafi favored. This inversion of the power, and clashes over control of and risks driving these groups to engage previously established tribal power lucrative smuggling networks, as well in greater and more concerted levels of structures has contributed to significant as widespread discriminatory attitudes violence. communal tensions and led to frequent among the country’s Arab majority outbreaks of violence across Libya’s towards darker-skinned Libyans and This failure risks fueling a much larger south.7 Groups are competing to control black Africans.9 Under Gadhafi, the conflict, which if left unchecked has the Zuwayah became the demographic and potential to severely destabilize Libya 4 A third non-Arab minority group, the Amazigh political majority in the south-east as and its neighbors, including southern (Berber), resides mainly in coastal areas and parts of the well as the principal landowners around Europe which remains vulnerable Nafusa Mountains. Kufra. By contrast, the Tubu have had to increasing flows of sub-Saharan 5 Wolfram Lacher, “The Rise of Tribal Politics,” in Ja- poor access to employment opportunities African migrants traveling unchecked son Pack ed., The 2011 Libyan Uprising and the Struggle for and social welfare. Discrimination has from Libya’s ports. An unstable south the Post-Qadhafi Future (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, will provide greater space in which 2013). 8 See “Libya Clashes Kill Scores in Al-Kufra,” BBC, Feb- transnational militants, as well as 6 Hanspeter Mattes, “Formal and Informal Authority ruary 21, 2012; “Fresh Violence Flares in Kufra,” Libya smugglers of illicit goods and people, are in Libya Since 1969,” in Dirk Vandewalle ed., Libya since Herald, April 10, 2013; and various articles at http:// able to operate with impunity. Indeed, it 1969 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). www.qurynanew.com. 7 See Geoffrey Howard and Henry Smith, “Will Ter- 9 Henry Smith, “The South,” in Jason Pack ed., The Wolfram Lacher, “Libya’s Fractious South and Regional rorism in Libya Be Solely Driven by Radical Islamism?” 2011 Libyan Uprising and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi instability,” SANA Dispatches, February 2014. CTC Sentinel 7:2 (2014). Future (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).

13 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11 intensified since 2011 because of claims between the Tuareg and the broader entrenched prejudice from mainly Arab that Gadhafi employed sub-Saharan Libyan population which, coupled with politicians towards non-Arab ethnic African troops as mercenaries during tensions over the control of borders, minorities have created a disjointed the civil war.10 the informal economy, and political and incoherent government response influence, sparked continued outbreaks that has served to deepen communal Since the end of the 2011 uprising, of violence across the south since 2011, tensions and fueled disaffection towards the Tubu community has expanded including in Sebha, Ubari, Ghat and the post-uprising political process.16 its influence in the southern desert Ghadames. Significant mistrust exists Left unresolved, the continued denial of region, and now has a dominant between the Tuareg and the inhabitants citizenship risks stripping a substantial position in providing security at energy of Ghadames, where Gadhafi employed number of people in the south of their infrastructure, in border areas, and elements of the Tuareg to suppress rights, including access to social on key roads leading into Chad, Niger, unrest during the uprising. When services and suffrage. and Sudan.11 This has bolstered their the town was freed from Gadhafi position and attracted greater migration control in September 2011, its Arab The increased migration of Tubus of Tubus, particularly from Chad. This residents detained members of the and Tuaregs from neighbouring Sahel has heightened tensions with the local local Tuareg population and razed their countries following the 2011 uprising Arab communities, who fear that these neighborhood in the town, forcing them has created tensions amongst the demographic patterns may lead to an to resettle, primarily in the towns of local Arab, as well as Libyan Tuareg erosion of their economic and social Dirj and Debaba.14 Tit-for-tat attacks and Tubu, communities.17 Given the dominance in the south. Perceptions between Arabs in Ghadames and the porous nature of the desert region and that illegally settled transnational town’s remaining Tuareg community the limited capacity of government Tubus are attempting to exploit Libya’s continue, and socio-political tensions institutions, many of these groups have bulbous welfare state have stoked these there remain high.15 settled illegally in towns in Libya’s tensions further. south. This has led to persistent tensions over perceptions that these The Tuareg “Resentment over access groups are attempting to access the to citizenship rights plays benefits of Libya’s generous welfare The Tuareg are indigenous inhabitants state. Such tensions have fed into of the Sahara and estimated to number a significant role in fueling unstable communal dynamics across the between two and three million. political disaffection south and triggered violence in several Traditionally nomadic pastoralists, locations, including Kufra, Sebha and they occupy a vast swathe of the Sahel- amongst groups in the Ubari. Sahara region – moving with relative south.” ease across Libya’s southern borders. Both the Tubu and the Tuareg have Gadhafi incorporated some Tuareg into long been pushing for greater political Libya’s security forces from the 1980s representation and citizenship rights. onwards, and some members of the The transitional authorities’ reluctance community fought for him during the Citizenship to grant full identity cards to members 2011 uprising.12 There are allegations – of these communities has increased of varying degrees of credibility – that Resentment over access to citizenship resentment and fed into perceptions Tuareg from both inside and outside rights plays a significant role in fueling that they are being marginalized Libya fought as paid mercenaries for political disaffection amongst groups during the post-uprising transition Gadhafi.13 Nevertheless, some Malian in the south. Gadhafi manipulated the process. This was seen most recently and Nigerien Tuareg were long-standing granting of citizenship for his own in the June 2014 elections for Libya’s members of Libya’s security forces. political purposes, and made promises new interim legislature, the House of of citizenship to transnational Tuareg Representatives, when a large number Elements of Libya’s population perceive and Tubu units that fought in his of Tuareg and Tubu were unable to vote the Tuareg as mercenaries and Gadhafi security forces. For the most part, these after the government ruled that people ‘loyalists’ because of the ties that some promises did not materialize. As such, without full identity cards would not be of them had with the former regime. the post-uprising authorities have faced allowed to take part.18 Resulting violence This has created considerable mistrust competing and unresolved demands for disrupted polling in locations in the citizenship from these groups. south, including in Sebha where attacks

10 “Divided We Stand: Libya’s Enduring Conflicts,” Report No.130, International Crisis Group, September Shifting power dynamics between Arab 16 Wolfram Lacher, “Libya’s Fractious South and Re- 2012. Wolfram Lacher, “Fault Lines of the Revolution,” and non-Arab groups in the region and gional instability,” SANA Dispatches, February 2014. SWP Research Paper, May 2013. 17 “Libya: The Demographic-Economic Framework of 11 These details are based on the author’s interviews 14 Rebecca Murray, “Tackling Conflict on Libya’s Migration,” Migration Policy Centre, European Univer- and research conducted in Libya in 2013 and 2014. Margins,” Al-Jazeera, August 10, 2012; Rebecca Murray, sity Institute, June 2013. 12 See Ronald Bruce St John, Libya from Colony to Revo- “Tribal War Simmers in Libya’s Desert,” Inter Press 18 “Elections in Libya,” International Foundation for lution (London: Oneworld Publications, 2012). Service, October 11, 2012. Electoral Systems, June 23, 2014; also see Wolfram 13 Wolfram Lacher, “Libya’s Fractious South and Re- 15 “Ghadames Local Council Says Town is Besieged,” Lacher, “Libya’s Fractious South and Regional instabil- gional instability,” SANA Dispatches, February 2014. Libya Herald, January 19, 2013. ity,” SANA Dispatches, February 2014.

14 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11 against polling stations meant that only redundant and the political process perceptions of marginalization are three were able to open.19 The High nears collapse, the likelihood of greater likely to encourage groups to engage National Elections Commission also political and citizenship rights for in violence, or potentially encourage cited security reasons for its decision to Tubus and Tuaregs reduces. This risks separatist sentiment. only open five of the 15 polling stations driving radicalization amongst these in the area around Kufra.20 groups and increasing their intent to Geoffrey Howard is Control Risks’ lead Libya engage in violence. analyst, conducting in-depth research into political, security and operational dynamics in “Tubu military Conclusion Libya and other countries in the Middle East and commanders have North Africa. Mr. Howard travels regularly to The preceding analysis has shown that the region and has lived in both Libya and Syria. commented that they dynamics in the south do not occur in a Prior to joining Control Risks, Mr. Howard are only willing to wait vacuum divorced from northern-centric worked in Tripoli for a number of leading Libyan political developments. Yet continued institutions. a limited amount of exclusion from the rights associated with time before they engage political representation and citizenship risks fueling rising discontent, reducing in more violent and the willingness of groups to engage in the disruptive tactics in order political process, and increasing their intent to engage in violence. Although to force a response to their much of the focus surrounding the demands.” country’s deepening political crisis and institutional fragmentation has rested on quasi-military operations in Tripoli and sustained violence in Benghazi, the south could yet be the greatest casualty The transitional authorities have faced a of the current political malaise. multitude of competing demands from a broad range of domestic political actors, “Continued perceptions and the two Saharan ethnic minorities’ demands for political representation of marginalization are and citizenship have so far fallen on deaf ears and have been overshadowed likely to encourage groups by groups who have received greater to engage in violence, or publicity, such as the Amazigh (Berber) with their boycott of the constitution potentially encourage drafting process earlier this year.21 separatist sentiment.” However, Tubu military commanders in particular have commented that they are only willing to wait a limited amount of time before they engage in more violent and disruptive tactics Tackling the question of citizenship in order to force a response to their will also help to keep a lid on simmering demands.22 Both groups possess the ethno-nationalist tensions between the capability and intent to engage in Tuareg and Tubu, divisions that relate violent and disruptive activism. As the to historic relations under Gadhafi, and interim authorities become increasingly relations between transnational and domestic groups.23 There are already 19 Kareem Fahim and Suliman Ali Zway, “Violence and signs that these divisions are beginning Uncertainty Mar Libyan Election for a New Parlia- to mirror political tensions between 24 ment,” New York Times, June 25, 2014. rival factions in Tripoli. Continued 20 “Libyan Elections: Low Turnout Marks Bid to End Political Crisis,” BBC News, June 26, 2014; “Kufra Elec- 23 Wolfram Lacher, “Libya’s Fractious South and Re- tions Stalled But No Tebu Boycott,” Libya Herald, June gional instability,” SANA Dispatches, February 2014. 25, 2014. 24 Tuareg militias on November 5, 2014 stormed 21 Ulf Laessing, “Libya’s Berber to Boycott Committee Libya’s major El Sharara oilfield, looting equipment, Drafting Constitution,” Reuters, November 13, 2013; firing shots, and forcing the facility to close. Local Taziz Hasairi, “Amazigh Supreme Council Continues media reported that the attack formed part of a wider Islamist , and that some members of the Boycott of Constitutional Assembly,” Libya Herald, attempt by Islamist groups that support the General Tubu have sided with the anti-Islamist forces. See Feras April 12, 2014. National Congress to secure control of oilfields in the Bosalum and Ahmed Elumami, “Gunmen Storm Libya’s 22 Based on the author’s interviews and research con- south-western desert. Local media also reported that El Sharara Oilfield, Shut Down Production,”Reuters , ducted in Libya in May, June, and July 2014. some Tuaregs have sided with the Misratans and the November 5, 2014.

15 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11

The “Seventh Stage” Of Chinese authorities believe that since “For the Uighurs, China’s 1990 there have been “six stages” of Terrorism in China terrorism in Xinjiang and that over minority policy ironically this time period the TIP’s capabilities, created a sense of shared By Sajjan M. Gohel to include its tactics, target selection, geographic reach, and international identity in a historically On October 28, 2013, a new phase of connections, have evolved and grown, as divided people.” terrorist violence emerged in China. has the danger it poses in the country.4 On that day a man drove a jeep packed It is the opinion of the author that this with explosives and carrying his wife Tiananmen Square attack served as and mother into a crowd in Tiananmen the initiation of the “seventh stage” of Square, in the country’s capital Beijing. Uighur-linked terrorism, a stage that The Uighurs Two civilians were killed in the incident will now include attacks outside the along with the driver and the two other traditional area of Xinjiang. The term ‘Uighur’ refers to the Turkic, passengers, the latter of whom were all predominantly Muslim people who ethnic Uighurs from China’s western This article explores recent trends in are concentrated in Xinjiang, which is 1 province of Xinjiang. Following the Uighur-linked militancy and terrorism. China’s largest administrative region. attack, Abdullah Mansour, the leader It specifically assesses the security Uighurs constitute 45% of the region’s of the Pakistan-based and Uighur-led threats on China’s critical national population whereas 40% are Han Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) released a infrastructure, primarily its railways, Chinese.5 propaganda video praising the plotters that emerged in 2013 and 2014 and how 2 and warned of future attacks. the violence that had previously been Under the chairmanship of Mao Zedong, contained in Xinjiang has started to China revived the term ‘Uighur’ as part “The Tiananmen Square spread across the country. The article of a broader initiative to manage ethnic will also assess the evolution of the tensions. Under Beijing’s policies, attack served as the TIP and its media, and the role a small minority ethnicities received special initiation of the ‘seventh number of radicalized Uighurs have recognition and limited discretion played in plotting terror attacks outside in governing specifically designated stage’ of Uighur-linked China and taking part in global theaters autonomous areas. This was intended to terrorism, a stage that of conflict. encourage them to support the Chinese state in the future.6 will now include attacks outside the traditional area For the Uighurs, however, China’s minority policy ironically created a where the party elite live and work, was also very close of Xinjiang.” sense of shared identity in a historically to the location of the attack. divided people. Xinjiang has rarely 4 Personal interview, official from the Ministry of constituted a unified political entity but Public Security, March 28, 2011; Overview of the Stages: instead has been a collection of rural Stage 1: Creating an Atmosphere of Terror - On April The attack carried enormous symbolic oases separated by mountains, clan 5, 1990, violent protests erupted in Baren, a township significance as it took place meters conflicts, and clashes between farmers in Aktu County; Stage 2: Explosive Attacks - February from the giant portrait of Chairman and nomadic herders.7 28, 1991, an explosion at a bus station in Kuqa County, Mao Zedong that hangs outside the Aksu Prefecture, killing one person; Stage 3: Assassina- main entrance to the Forbidden City in Kashgar – A Front Line for Conflict tions - August 24, 1993, two men stabbed and injured the heart of Beijing. On the west side of Abliz Damolla, an executive committee member of the the square stands the Great Hall of the Kashgar is the birthplace of the short- CPPCC Yecheng County Committee in Kashi Prefecture People, where a meeting of the plenary lived Islamic state of Turkestan, led by and imam of the Great Mosque; Stage 4: Attacks on session of the Chinese Communist Party Islamic scholar Sabit Damolla in 1933, Police and Government Institutions - August 27, 1996, was planned.3 and the cultural center of Xinjiang’s six drove to the office building of the Jangilas Township Uighurs, as well as the stronghold of the People’s Government, Yecheng County, where they Uighur anti-state resistance activity.8 1 Jonathan Kaiman, “Islamist Group Claims Respon- killed a local administrator and a policeman; Stage 5: sibility for Attack on China’s Tiananmen Square,” The Organizing Disturbances and Riots - From February 5 Guardian, November 25, 2013; “China Sentences Three to 8, 1997, rioters calling for a caliphate attacked people 5 “Xinjiang Profile,”BBC, May 22,2014.. to Death for Tiananmen Square Attack,” Reuters, June and destroyed stores and burned and damaged cars and 6 James Millward and Peter Purdue, “Political and 16, 2014; Police found gasoline, two knives, steel sticks, buses in Yining, Ili Kazakh Prefecture. Seven people Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the and a white flag in the vehicle which drew a striking were killed, more than 200 people were injured; Stage 6: Late Nineteenth Century,” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim similarity to the one the Taliban used in Afghanistan Poison Attacks – From January 30 to February 18, 1998, Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: M.E. inscribed with the shahada in black. Uighur terrorists conducted 23 poisoning cases in Kash- Sharpe, 2004), pp. 27-62. 2 “TIP Leader Speaks on Suicide Attack at Tiananmen gar resulting in one fatality, and four others suffering 7 Ibid. Square,” Site Monitoring Service, January 15, 2014. For ill-effects. For a more detailed breakdown of the stages 8 James A. Millward and Najiban Tursan, “Political additional background on the organizational evolution see Justin V. Hastings, “Charting the Course of Uyghur History and Strategies of Control, 1884-1978,” in Xin- of the TIP and its precursor groups see below. Unrest,” China Quarterly, Volume 208, December 2011, jiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr 3 Zhongnanhai, the red-walled leadership compound pp. 893-912. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), pp. 76-78; Because of

16 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11

Following the collapse of the Soviet was stabbed to death just after leading The decision to target the Yunnan Union, returning Uighurs from Kashgar early morning prayers. While the transportation system was certainly who had fought against the Soviets in exact motivation for Tahir’s death is significant. China’s rail network is a Afghanistan were emboldened by the not known, one possible explanation cornerstone of its economy and Beijing Soviets’ departure and believed that suggests that the killing of Tahir served views Yunnan as one of China’s three they could also weaken Communist rule as a warning to other local Uighurs key bridgeheads (qiaotoubao) into other in China through violence.9 These issues who side with or associate with Beijing provinces and nations.17 The other two came to a head in April 1990 when a that there could be costs attached to bridgeheads are Xinjiang to Central violent and bloody uprising started in maintaining such associations.13 Asia and Heilongjiang to Russia.18 Baren, a township in Aktu County in close proximity to Kashgar.10 Similar to the Tiananmen Square attack, “Similar to the Tiananmen the incident in Kunming was timed just Since that time Kashgar has played an Square attack, the incident before a major political meeting. China’s important role for a variety of anti-state leaders at the time were gathering in Uighur militants. For example, Kashgar in Kunming was timed just Beijing for the opening of the National was the scene of one of the biggest before a major political People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese attacks in China when on August 4, People’s Consultative Conference 2008, two men crashed a dump truck meeting.” (CPCC) conventions.19 into a group of police officers before throwing five homemade explosive There also appears to be some other devices into their barracks. Sixteen unique logistical factors that made policemen were killed and 16 injured in Kunming an attractive target. For the attack. The incident occurred four Targeting China’s Critical Infrastructure - The example, Kunming is the closest major days before the opening ceremony of the Railway Attacks city to Yunnan’s border with Laos. Olympic Games in Beijing. The timing of Criminal networks have in the past the attack was strategic and was likely On March 1, 2014, a Uighur gang of operated out of Boten city in Northern designed to embarrass China on the eve eight knife-wielding attackers targeted Laos, where there is a casino north of of the much anticipated Olympics.11 commuters at the Kunming Railway the Laotian immigration and customs Station in Yunnan province killing 31 post. According to a Laotian official Kashgar’s significance as a center of and injuring 141.14 The operatives, who interviewed for this article, Chinese gravity for Uighur-linked militancy were dressed in black, stormed into visitors do not have to pass through a is reflected in a statement made by the railway station and began slashing Laotian checkpoint to access this city.20 Chinese President Xi Jinping this past and stabbing people randomly.15 This Given these reportedly weak security July, in which he called Kashgar the incident illustrated that the October measures, it is not outside the realm of “front line” for counterterrorism and 2013 Tiananmen Square attack was possibility that the Kunming plotters – asked for more local Uighurs to play a not an isolated incident of terrorism just like criminal actors – could have role in security operations.12 outside Xinjiang. During the Kunming also used Boten city as a safe-sanctuary attack, police shot and killed four of the before the attack. Ironically, perhaps as a sign of the attackers and later apprehended several challenge Beijing faces, the next day others. Two of the perpetrators were “In the video the TIP Jume Tahir, the imam of the historic Id women. One woman was killed by police, Kah Mosque in Kashgar and a deputy while the other was captured. All of the leader threatens to conduct of the National People’s Congress, suspects were Uighurs from Hotan in attacks across China Xinjiang, although it is not clear what its geographical location and historical role as a trade type of organizational connection – if rather than confining 16 and cultural nexus, Kashgar is also a target for drug any – they had to TIP. them to Xinjiang, as had traffickers coming in through the Karakoram Highway. Kashgar is a crucial part of China’s vision for a “Silk 13 “Imam of China’s Largest Mosque Killed in Xinji- been the group’s previous Road Economic Belt” that will link China to Central ang,” BBC, June 31, 2014; Jume Tahir’s predecessor, Ar- narrative.” Asia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, as well as the Middle unhan Aji, was a target for a failed assassination attempt East. Kashgar is also supposed to be the Chinese hub for on May 12, 1996, suffering multiple stab wounds. the planned China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. 14 “Four Sentenced in China over Kunming Station 9 J. Todd Reed and Diana Raschke, The ETIM: China’s Attack,” BBC, September 12, 2014. Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat (Santa 15 The Kunming attackers had in their possession a flag 17 Xiaobo Su, “From Frontier to Bridgehead: Cross- Barbara: Praeger, 2010), pp.42-43. similar to the one that the Tiananmen Square plotters border Regions and the Experience of Yunnan, China,” 10 Ibid, p.47. had used which also illustrated their agenda had politi- International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 37:4 11 Peter Foster and Richard Spencer, “Beijing Olympics: cal and ideological motivations. See Jacob Zenn, “Ter- (2013), pp. 1213–1232. Security Stepped Up After Terror Attack Kills 16 Chi- rorist Attack in Kunming Reveals Complex Relationship 18 Ibid. nese Policemen,” Daily Telegraph, August 4, 2008. with International Jihad,” China Brief, 14: 5 (2014). 19 Nicholas Dynon, “Kunming: A New Phase of Terror- 12 Shannon Tiezzi, “Counterterrorism, Ethnic Unity 16 Mimi Lau and Mandy Zuo, “Police Name Kunming ism in China,” The Diplomat, March 5, 2014. the Focus as Xi Visits Xinjiang,” The Diplomat, April 29, Massacre Mastermind as Three Suspected Attackers are 20 Personal interview, official from the Laos Ministry of 2014. Arrested,” South China Morning Post, March 6, 2014. Public Security, October 30, 2014.

17 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11

Several days after the Kunming attack, Kunming, where the first train stabbing province on June 26, 2009.32 Mansour, the TIP leader, released a attack took place.27 video from his Pakistani base in which Rabiya’s misrepresentation of events he expressed support for the attack Urumqi and the Issue of Communal Violence provided the TIP with an opportunity saying the “blood of those who are to seize the narrative and call for killing themselves is not being spilled Despite the violent incidents across broader violence. In the words of then- for nothing, for their blood will bring China, Urumqi remains the primary TIP leader, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, tens of more to carry out jihad.”21 center for terrorism in China. Urumqi “[The Chinese] must be targeted both Mansour went on to add that “China is holds such a distinction because it is the at home and abroad. Their embassies, not only our enemy, but it is the enemy axis of Xinjiang’s cultural melting pot consulates, centers, and gathering of all Muslims....We have plans for many where Uighurs and Han Chinese live and places should be targeted. Their men attacks in China.”22 What is significant work side-by-side. Due to this mix, there should be killed and captured to seek about Mansour’s comments, compared is a perennial fear in Urumqi of ethnic the release of our brothers who are to previous statements, is that in the tensions spilling over violently into jailed in Eastern Turkistan.”33 video he threatens to conduct attacks broader communal conflict, potentially across China rather than confining them provoked by attacks that aim to ignite Al-Turkistani’s ominous warning has to Xinjiang, as had been the group’s such violence. On July 5, 2009, violent manifested itself several times since previous narrative. riots erupted in Urumqi which caused then but perhaps most violently on May the deaths of 184 people and seriously 22, 2014, when Uighur terrorists driving One month later, in April 2014, the TIP injured more than 1,000.28 According to two vehicles crashed past barriers and took responsibility for a bomb and knife press reports, Uighur rioters attacked rammed down shoppers while setting attack at the South Railway Station of Han Chinese businesses and people off explosives at a bustling outdoor Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang.23 The on the streets.29 Significant numbers street market in Urumqi. The cars then timing of the attack coincided with of Urumqi’s Han population then took crashed head-on and exploded. At least a trip Chinese President Xi Jinping to the streets in retaliation.30 While 39 people died in the incident.34 The made to the province to discuss ethnic tensions eventually receded, death toll from this act of violence was counterterrorism matters.24 Similar to they remained an issue in the ensuing the highest in Xinjiang since 2009. the Kunming attack, the TIP terrorists months. slashed commuters with knives. Unlike that previous attack, however, they The Urumqi riots attracted international “Despite the removal of also detonated several explosives.25 attention and became a propaganda several of TIP’s leaders, the Two TIP fighters died in the blasts and battle between the TIP and separatists one civilian was also killed. Seventy- led by World Uighur Congress (WUC) group has still been able nine people were injured. All surviving president Rebiya Kadeer. Kadeer’s to regenerate and foment members of the cell that conducted the reputation as a moderate leader of attack were arrested by the Urumqi the WUC was tainted during the broader violence in China.” police.26 Urumqi riots when she appeared on international news channels holding a On May 6, 2014, there was another large photograph that she claimed was stabbing attack at Guangzhou train evidence of a harsh police crackdown station by a single perpetrator. The on the Uighur protestors.31 However, The TIP and its Media timing of that attack could have been it later emerged that the photograph symbolic as the incident occurred just was taken by Nanfang Weekly at another The TIP has approximately 300–500 before the K366 train arrived from unrelated protest in Shishou, Hubei fighters in Pakistan and also a network in Turkey and Central Asia.35 The TIP 21 “China Says Uighur Militant’s Support of Knife At- 27 Charles Liu, “Knife Attack at Guangzhou Train claims to be the successor organization tack Proves Terror,” Reuters, March 19, 2014. Station Injures Six People,” The Nanfang Insider, May 6, to the East Turkistan Islamic Movement 22 Saud Mehsud and Maria Golovnina, “From his Paki- 2014; Tania Branigan and Jonathan Kaiman, “Chinese (ETIM) which had been led by Hasan stan Hideout, Uighur Leader Vows Revenge on China,” Police Arrest Man after Six Injured in Train Station Mahsum, an Uighur militant who had Reuters, March 14, 2014; “TIP Commanders Speak on Knife Attack,” The Guardian, May 6, 2014; Jacob Zenn, trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan 36 Kunming Knife Attack,” Site Monitoring Service, March “Beijing, Kunming, Urumqi and Guangzhou: The and was part of the Baren Riots. 18, 2014. Changing Landscape of Anti-Chinese Jihadists,” China 23 “TIP Claims Urumqi Bombing, Video Shows Brief- Brief, 14:10 (2014). 32 Jia; Shishou, Hubei province is some 3,330 km away case Bomb,” Site Monitoring Service, May 13, 2014. 28 Yan Hao, Geng Ruibin, and Yuan Ye, “Xinjiang from Urumqi. 24 Ben Blanchard, “China Says Three Killed in Attack Riot Hits Regional Anti-Terror Nerve,” Xinhua, July 18, 33 “Militant Urges Targeting China over Uighurs,” at Xinjiang Train Station,” Reuters, April 30, 2014. 2009. Reuters, August 1, 2009. 25 Blanchard; Stephen Chen, “Seven Arrested in 29 Tania Branigan, “China Locks Down Western 34 Andrew Jacobs, “Suspects in China Market Attack Xinjiang Over Deadly Attack May 1 at Urumqi Train Province after Ethnic Riots Kill 140,” The Guardian, July Are Identified,”New York Times, May 25, 2014. Station,” South China Morning Post, May 18, 2014; Sui- 6, 2009. 35 Jacob Zenn, “Beijing, Kunming, Urumqi and Lee Wee, “Chinese Police Blame Separatist Group for 30 Ibid. Guangzhou: The Changing Landscape of Anti-Chinese Urumqi Bombing,” Reuters, May 18, 2014. 31 Cui Jia, “Using Wrong Photo, Kadeer Pleads Case,” Jihadists.” 26 Ibid. China Daily, July 10, 2009. 36 Reed and Raschke, p.46.

18 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11

The ETIM agenda, which has been The documentary claims that the number Radicalized Uighurs have begun to take continued by the TIP, has been to of videos posted online by the TIP has part in terrorist-related activity beyond forcibly separate Xinjiang from China sharply risen over the last few years the confines of China. For example, on and to create an independent Islamic and that the increase in online material January 30, 2012, a Norwegian court state called East Turkestan. Although is directly connected with the escalation convicted Mikael Davud, a Norwegian the ETIM has never formally declared of attacks executed inside China.43 Uighur, for planning to attack the a change in name, the TIP is believed The documentary also emphasized the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten because to be a continuation of ETIM after the international dimension of the problem, it printed cartoons of the Prophet coherency of the latter group faded in noting that much of the TIP propaganda Muhammad. Davud was sentenced the early 2000s.37 is located on servers outside of China.44 to jail for seven years. The judge in Indeed, the TIP shows no signs of the case said that Davud had planned Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, a former leader inhibiting its new media profile.45 the attack together with al-Qa’ida, as of ETIM and TIP fighters, was killed in a representatives of the group trained February 2010 drone strike operation in him in the use of explosives at a camp North Waziristan, Pakistan.38 Abdullah “Radicalized Uighurs in Pakistan. Davud admitted he was Mansour subsequently took over the planning to attack Chinese interests in TIP leadership.39 Despite the removal of have begun to take part in Norway.49 several of TIP’s leaders, the group has terrorist-related activity still been able to regenerate and foment History has also illustrated that broader violence in China. beyond the confines of networks of fighters forged together China.” in conflicts abroad often do not remain Al-Turkistani formed and developed silent in the years to come, and the the TIP’s media wing, Islom Awazi potential of blowback from the conflict (Voice of Islam). Since 2012, the TIP in Syria will be an ever-growing concern has also co-issued videos with the for China, just like there has been media wing of the Islamic Movement of Involvement of Radicalized Uighurs in Other blowback from conflicts in Afghanistan Uzbekistan (IMU), Jund Allah Studios. Conflicts and Pakistan.50 On September 3, 2014, In 2008 the TIP also began publishing a the Iraqi Ministry of Defense revealed quarterly Arabic-language publication In an August 2012 video, a Turkish that the Iraqi Army captured a Chinese called “Islamic Turkistan,” a product TIP militant issued a video statement Uighur who was fighting with the designed to reach a broader audience explicitly warning of attacks in China’s Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in the Muslim world.40 In 2013, Abu major cities, illustrating that the TIP’s (ISIL).51 Subsequently, it emerged that Zar al-Burmi, the spiritual leader of the agenda was no longer just locally- four Uighurs were arrested on the IMU, promised the Uighur militants oriented. The militant, ‘Nururddin Indonesian island of Sulawesi where that China will replace the United States Mehmet’, boasted in the video that they were intending to link up with the as the “number one enemy.”41 “Islamist flags will soon be raised at the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT).52 White House and Beijing’s Tiananmen MIT’s leader, Santoso, has reportedly The influence of TIP’s propaganda Square.”46 In May 2013, Mehmet carried sworn allegiance to ISIL.53 It is yet to be machinery appears to have Chinese out an attack against U.S. forces in established if the Uighurs had been sent authorities concerned. For example, Afghanistan.47 The TIP posted a video by ISIL leaders to Indonesia, but this on June 20, 2014, Chinese Central of his attack.48 issue does show the broadening of the Television (CCTV), the state broadcaster, Uighur jihadist movement. released a 24-minute documentary on Tube, June 24, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/ the connection between online terrorist watch?v=IByWrxkMOmI; 49 “Norway Jails Two for Danish Newspaper Terror propaganda and training videos and “China releases footage of terrorist attacks,” YouTube, Plot,” BBC, January 30, 2012; Lars Akerhaug , Bjørnar terrorist attacks within China. The June 24, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=- Tommelstad, and Tor-Erling Thømt Ruud, “Slik var video included footage from a number of u0KEO2zvYw#t=14. e-post-kontakten med al-Qaida,” Verdens Gang, January terrorist attacks within China, including 43 Ibid. 30, 2012. in Tiananmen Square, the Kunming 44 Ibid. 50 See above the example of Uighur suicide bomber 42 railway, and the Urumqi market. 45 Lucy Hornby, “Xinjiang Leader Says Online Videos Nuruddin Mehmet in Afghanistan. Spark China Separatist Attacks,” Financial Times, June 51 Jaime A. FlorCruz, “Capture of Chinese National 37 Ibid. 6, 2014. Fighting with ISIS Gives China Jitters,” CNN, September 38 Ibid. 46 “Advice to Our Muslim Brothers in East Turkistan,” 5, 2014. 39 Ibid. Islom Awazi, August 2012; On August 24, 2014, Chinese 52 Zachary Abuza, “Uyghurs Look to Indonesia for Ter- 40 Jacob Zenn, “China is Not Used to Dealing with authorities revealed that three of the “masterminds” of ror Guidance,” Asia Times, October 10, 2014. Attacks of the Magnitude it is Witnessing in 2013 and the Tiananmen Square attack had been executed as part 53 Personal interview, Dr Kirsten E. Schulze, Septem- 2014,” Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst, February 5, of President Xi Jinping’s strategy to create a “wall of ber 17, 2014; See also Evan Jendruck, “OSINT Sum- 2014. bronze and iron” to fight against terrorism. mary: Indonesian Militant Islamists Pledge Allegiance 41 Abu Zar al-Burmi, “To the Muslims of Turkistan: 47 Jacob Zenn, “On the Eve of 2014: Islamism in Central to Islamic State,” Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Monitor, We Have To Prove Islam Is In Our Hearts,” Islom Awazi, Asia”, Hudson Institute, June 24, 2013. July 1, 2014; Rendi A. Witular, “Abu Bakar Ba’asyir July 10, 2013. 48 “TIP Video Shows Suicide Bombing in Afghanistan, Calls on Followers to Support ISIL,” The Jakarta Post, 42 “China releases Xinjiang terrorists video,” You- Promotes Jihad,” Site Monitoring Service, May 25, 2013. July 14 2014.

19 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11

“In order for the West conflict. A Classical Analysis of To tackle this problem Beijing needs to meaningfully engage to step up pressure on the Pakistani the 2014 Israel-Hamas Beijing on counter- military to play a more active role Conflict in rooting out TIP and other Uighur terrorism issues, it must terrorists training within its borders. By Elad Popovich understand the TIP’s Such concerns will also be foremost on Beijing’s mind after U.S. and NATO On July 8, 2014, after more than 80 capabilities and intentions, troops transition from Afghanistan. If rockets were fired in one day from Gaza, as well as the growing China is not successful in pressuring Israel launched a military operation Pakistan to act there is a danger that against Hamas and the Palestinian international dynamic the TIP could possibly refit and expand Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the Gaza Strip. The of independent Uighur its training and operations in Pakistan operation was preceded by a month of and Afghanistan, which could lead to escalating violence that began with the fighters travelling abroad a new wave of attacks in Xinjiang and abduction and murder of three Israeli for conflict.” elsewhere in China. teenagers by Hamas operatives in the West Bank, and continued with the Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel is International Security widespread arrest of Hamas leaders and Director for the Asia-Pacific Foundation (APF), the dismantling of Hamas institutions an independent security and intelligence think-tank in the West Bank by the Israeli Defense Conclusion based in London. Sajjan is also a visiting lecturer Forces (IDF).1 and teacher at the London School of Economics & Uighur extremism is no longer confined Political Science (LSE) and serves as the Senior This article deconstructs the 2014 to Xinjiang alone. It has now become a Advisor to the Partnership for Peace Consortium’s Israel-Hamas asymmetric conflict using nationwide Chinese problem following Combating Terrorism Working Group, (CTWG). classical levels of war analysis (strategy the terrorist attacks that took place in The CTWG is a collaborative research project and doctrine, operational aspects, the country in 2013 and 2014. These investigating current trans-national security tactics and techno-tactics). attacks are symptomatic of new trends threats and is comprised of members from over 30 in Uighur militancy. Three targeting countries and multilateral organizations such as trends in particular stand out. First, NATO and the OSCE. “One of the IDF’s Uighur militants have recently significant lessons illustrated a preference for attacking soft, symbolic civilian targets where learned from the ‘Second security is minimal, lax or non-existent. Intifada’ was Israel would Second, the attacks are designed to cause maximum panic in an area with not be able to achieve a large crowds of people. Third, targeting decisive military victory of commercial and logistical facilities illustrates that groups like TIP want in its confrontations with to damage, destabilize, and paralyze Hamas.” China’s economy. Taken together, all of these trends aim to undermine the confidence people have in the Chinese government and its ability to keep its The Strategic Purpose: Restoring the Status people safe. Quo One of Beijing’s problems has been its inability to successfully articulate One of the IDF’s significant lessons to the West the problem and threat of learned from the “Second Intifada” terrorism it faces. The reality is that (2000-2005) was Israel would not there is an active Uighur terrorist be able to achieve a decisive military movement that has developed an victory in its confrontations with Hamas. ideological agenda that is not dissimilar It could only achieve a satisfactory to that espoused by al-Qa’ida, and that security situation that would last an has the ability for small cells to conduct unspecified period of time. Following operations throughout China. In order the 2005 Israeli disengagement from the for the West to meaningfully engage Gaza Strip, a move that symbolized the Beijing on counter-terrorism issues, it end of the “Second Intifada,” Israel and must understand the TIP’s capabilities and intentions, as well as the growing 1 Hamas’s armed branch is the Ezzedeen Al-Qassam international dynamic of independent Brigades. For consistency, this article uses just Uighur fighters travelling abroad for “Hamas.”

20 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11

Hamas went on to wage an additional rockets and thousands of mortar shells The message Israel wanted to signal to six major military campaigns. The IDF’s had been stockpiled by Hamas and Hamas was to restore the status-quo or goal for most of these campaigns was to the PIJ.6 The IDF had nine functional else. Hamas’s offensive doctrine was restore the status quo and deter Hamas Iron Dome batteries (two of them had to launch a full-scale attack on what from waging future violence.2 The last been rushed into operational service they identified as Israel’s CoG—Israeli of these “deterrence operations” was when the conflict began). During the political-civilian endurance (also known named “Operation Protective Edge” course of the conflict, approximately as “national resilience”).9 During the (the 2014 Israel-Hamas conflict). The 4,600 rockets and mortar shells were initial phase, however, Israeli doctrine operation’s declared end state was fired at Israel, threatening 70 percent did not work as anticipated. Hamas’s “restoring security to Israeli civilians of Israel’s population. Some 3,600 defensive doctrine made the strategic living under Hamas rocket fire.”3 After rockets fell in unpopulated areas and difference. Due to Hamas’s inability the discovery of increasing numbers 735 were successfully shot down by the to counter the overwhelming power of of Hamas’s cross-border tunnels— Iron Dome anti-missile defense system, the IDF, the organization transferred built so that Hamas combatants could which achieved an unprecedented most of its activities (offensive, surreptitiously emerge behind IDF lines success rate of 90 perecnt. The rockets defensive, logistics, and command) or inside communities on Israeli land— (and mortar shells) that breached the underground. Just as the Iron Dome signaled an immediate and significant Iron Dome’s defenses7 resulted in four was the game-changer for Israel, the threat, an additional military goal was Israeli civilian deaths and the death of underground network complex became introduced: “dismantling the Hamas a Thai citizen in Israel on a work visa. the strategic balancer for Hamas.10 tunnel network used to infiltrate The effectiveness of the Iron Dome Reports also indicate that Hamas used Israel.”4 served as a strategic balancer, which “internationally designated safe-haven allowed Israel’s decision makers more spaces,” including hospitals, schools, “The effectiveness of the time to develop Israel’s response. As mosques, even United Nations facilities, Israel Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon to house munitions used against Israel.11 Iron Dome served as a noted, “…the Iron Dome system is The Israeli military stated that Hamas strategic balancer, which saving lives and preventing enormous also fired rockets from such facilities, economic damage. It allows the decision and has released video and images it allowed Israel’s decision makers to have vast leeway in managing claims demonstrate such activity.12 makers more time to the campaign and in the decisions that we make.”8 Throughout the aerial phase, the IDF develop Israel’s response.” was unable to mitigate the emerging Doctrine: Bottom-Up “Effects-Based threat of the cross-border tunnels13 and, Operations” and Joint “Network-Centric in response, the IDF quickly shifted Warfare” into the ground phase. The doctrine Strategic Balancer: Iron Dome for the IDF’s ground phase was the During the 2012 Israel-Hamas conflict, Joint “Network-Centric Warfare Hamas began firing rockets into Israel the IDF’s initial war doctrine was a (NCW)” model. Military analysis of the as far back as April 2001. These initial variant of the U.S. Air Force’s “effects- strategic failures of the 2006 Lebanon rockets were often homemade with a based operations” (EBO). According War had led to a transition in the IDF short range and limited destructive to the traditional conception of EBO, operational concept. The coordination impact. In recent years, however, Hamas the enemy’s high-value targets are the between ground, air, and naval forces, and other organizations operating in first targets to be attacked in order to and intelligence, led to a vast combined the Gaza Strip have switched to using disrupt the enemy’s strategic “center military-quality rockets.5 Since early of gravity” (CoG). In contrast to this 9 As Hizb Allah before them; see Ron Tira, The Nature 2011, the IDF has employed the Iron approach, in 2014 the IDF created a of War: Conflicting Paradigms and Israeli Military Ef- Dome system to intercept rockets and bottom-up approach. The new doctrine fectiveness (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2010), pp. mortar shells within a range of three to employed in the 2014 conflict posits 85-108. 45 miles. The Iron Dome can calculate that the enemy’s CoG will be disrupted 10 See Eitan Yitzhak, “Underground,” Ma’arachot (He- the trajectory of a rocket and engages by increasing pressure via the gradual brew), Vol. 422 (Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 2008), p. 27. rockets only when they are predicted ratcheting up of the intensity of attacks 11 “Secretary-General, Outraged at Rockets Found in to explode in populated areas. On and target value as perceived by Hamas. United Nations-Administered School in Gaza, Directs the eve of the 2014 conflict, it was Full Review, Swift Implementation of Security Plan,” estimated that some 8,000 to 10,000 Secretary-General, SG/SM/16045, July 23, 2014; “UN 6 Most of these rockets were of the type 122mm Grad Admits its Schools in Gaza Were Used to Store Hamas (maximum range of 12-25 miles and a 40-48 pound Rockets,” WorldTribune.com, July 23, 2014; Gili Cohen, 2 Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, “Mowing the Grass: warhead). Hundreds of them were 333mm M-75/Fajr-5 “Mosques Used for Military Operations, Say Hamas Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict,” (maximum range of 50 miles and a 130-200 pound POWs,” Ha’aretz, August 26, 2014. Journal of Strategic Studies 37: 1 (2014); pp. 65-90. warhead) and dozens were 320mm R-160/M-302 (maxi- 12 “Hamas Acknowledges its Forces Fired Rockets from 3 “Special Report: Operation Protective Edge,” IDFblog. mum range of 100 miles and a 330 pound warhead). Civilian Areas,” AP and Ha’aretz, September 23, 2014. 4 Ibid. 7 And the Israeli bomb shelters’ second line of defense. 13 There was intelligence on 31 tunnel starting points in 5 Yiftah S. Shapir, “Lessons from the Iron Dome,” Mili- 8 “Iron Dome Breaking Records,” IsraelDefense (He- the Gaza Strip, but none on their exit points were inside tary and Strategic Affairs 5:1 (Tel Aviv: INSS, 2013). brew), July 26, 2014. Israel.

21 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11 training effort, the unification of to seven of which were cross-border) goals: creating severe damage to Hamas’s military language, and an effective and 60 fighting shafts, neutralizing 13 tunnel complex and inflicting significant network connection between forces. others and disrupting six.19 The IDF damage to Hamas’s organization and its ground forces withdrew from the Gaza infrastructure.22 The IDF ground forces Operational Level: Air-Ground-Air Strip on August 4, 2014. were active mainly at nighttime due to their night-vision advantages. Daytime In the wake of the 2012 conflict, the After several ceasefire attempts failed was spent resting and regrouping in IDF began prioritizing a list of targets the IAF targeted four senior leaders shielded areas.23 Their limited ground throughout the Gaza Strip based on their of the Hamas armed branch, targeted maneuver was supported with close- degree of importance to Hamas.14 During Hamas’s head of finance, and destroyed range artillery (even direct fire on the first ten days of the aerial phase of several of the largest buildings in the several occasions),24 attack helicopters, the 2014 operation the IAF dropped Gaza Strip.20 On August 26, Israel, and ground-launched PGMs.25 For the hundreds of tons of ordnance and Hamas, and the PIJ accepted an first time in the IDF’s history, IAF attacked 1,950 targets in the Gaza Strip.15 Egyptian-mediated ceasefire as the first attack planes equipped with diverse One of IAF’s major considerations step in long-term truce talks. PGMs switched their operational was to respond in proportion to the role to providing close-range tactical operation’s military necessity by support for ground forces.26 The IDF using only precision-guided munitions “The Israeli ground phase also perfected its new approach of (PGMs).16 According to Palestinian had two major goals: “intelligence-based warfare,” which official estimates, this phase’s death dictates that tactical intelligence is toll produced approximately 223-240 creating severe damage to delivered constantly (even during fatalities.17 However, due to Hamas’s Hamas’s tunnel complex the actual fighting) for the benefit of adaptation via asymmetric defensive operational activities all the way down doctrines (underground domain and and inflicting significant to company and platoon commanders human shields), the IAF failed to achieve damage to Hamas’s through Command, Control, and its operational goal of diminishing Communications (C3) systems.27 Hamas’s rocket fire. organization and its infrastructure.” Hamas’s most common urban warfare On July 14, 2014, Egypt intervened in tactics included rigging houses and an attempt to broker a ceasefire (based even entire streets with improvised on the agreement stipulated in 2012). explosive devices (IEDs), supplemented Israel accepted this overture, but Hamas by Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) continued to fire rockets into Israel. Tactics and Techno-Tactics: Cycle of and snipers. The IDF’s countertactics On July 17, Hamas’s Special Forces Adjustment were slow but very effective. They infiltrated Israel by means of a cross- used massive firepower (artillery, tank border tunnel. Dismantling Hamas’s When Hamas realized that the Iron fire, and mine-clearing line charge tunnel network thus became a military Dome system effectively intercepted systems) to undermine Hamas from a necessity.18 its rockets, the organization tried to safe distance. Additional countertactics rebalance the asymmetric equation by included sending tanks and D9 Because the IAF could not resolve the deploying naval commandos to raid bulldozers into Hamas compounds tunnel threat from the air, the IDF the southern shores of Israel and by followed by infantry forces, which swept 28 shifted its operational activity from a using cross-border tunnels for attacks, buildings for tunnels and weapons. campaign dominated by aerial precision capturing soldiers and kidnapping standoff attacks to “military operations civilians. The IDF managed to discover 22 Lt. Col. Eli, battalion commander (Givati Infantry in urban terrain” (MOUT). During the and respond to some infiltrations while Brigade), IDF YouTube Channel, July 27, 2014. ground phase, the IDF maneuvered at three tunnel incidents Hamas’s Al- 23 Lt. Col. Bark, reconnaissance battalion commander two miles inside the Gaza Strip with Nokhba (elite forces) infiltrated Israel (Nahal Infantry Brigade), Channel 1 News, July 22, 2014. five brigade task forces augmented by and killed eleven IDF soldiers before 24 Lt. Col. M., battalion commander (Artillery Corps), Special Forces battalions. During the either escaping or being killed by the IDF YouTube Channel, July 27, 2014. 18 days of the ground phase, IDF forces IDF.21 25 Unlike attack helicopters, which can support ground succeeded in destroying 13 tunnels (six forces for limited time periods, the ground-launched The Israeli ground phase had two major Spike-NLOS system allows for the advantage of deadly long-range firepower, always accessible, day and night, 14 See Amos Harel, “No End in Sight for Operation and in almost all types of weather. Protective Edge,” Ha’aretz, July 9, 2014. 19 “Target After Target: Operation Protective Edge 26 Brig. Gen. Nitzan, IAF intelligence group command- 15 GOC IAF Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel, remarks made after Main Events,”IDF Website (Hebrew), August 29, 2014. er, as cited in David Greenwald, “Coming First, Going Security Cabinet meeting, July 10, 2014. 20 Nidal al-Mughrabi and Maayan Lubell, “Israeli Last,” IAF Journal (Hebrew), Vol. 218, August 1, 2014; 16 Ibid. Air Strike Kills Three Hamas Commanders in Gaza,” Shir Cohen, “Fire from the Sky,” IAF Journal (Hebrew), 17 “Ministry of Health Emergency Operation Room Reuters, August 21, 2014. Vol. 218, August 1, 2014. Sitrep on Gaza,” State of Palestine - Ministry of Health, 21 Aaron J. Klein and Mitch Ginsburg, “Could Israeli 27 “IBW: Tactical Intelligence Down to the Junior Com- July 17, 2014. Soldiers, Not Civilians, be the Target of the Attack Tun- manders at the Front,” IsraelDefense, January 17, 2014. 18 Shapir, “Lessons from the Iron Dome”. nels?” The Times of Israel, July 29, 2014. 28 The directive was to shoot a shell, fire a missile, or

22 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11

When confronting anti-tank missile Shuja’iyya, most of the close combat onto a battlefield it did not control.39As threats, the IDF used the encounters during the ground phase part of the IDF’s improvisational combat MK 4m equipped with a Trophy active were Israeli initiatives. Hamas’s culture, soldiers from the Givati Infantry protection system (APS). The APS was “regular” forces would typically Brigade tackled the tunnel threat using able to handle modern anti-tank guided withdraw as more IDF troops advanced, an adaptation of the ancient Roman missiles such as the Russian Kornet.29 usually leaving their weapons and Legions’ tactic during the Bar-Kokhba equipment behind and transforming Revolt (132-136 AD)—smoke. Givati “The Israeli forces into non-combatants.33 soldiers (followed by other units) used large smoke grenades and industrial did not initially grasp Another example of the asymmetric fans to smoke out Hamas fighters from the complexities of character of the battle was that while the tunnels and also to identify, using the IDF functioned in brigade task force pillars of smoke, tunnel shafts. operating in close- formation and dominated the above- quartered underground ground dimension, Hamas needed just At the operational level, over the course one opportunity to capture an Israeli of the conflict Israel managed to attack surroundings.” soldier in order to achieve strategic 5,226 targets while Hamas and the PIJ success.34 Hamas almost managed to do managed to fire an average of 90 rockets so by means of tunnels in both Shuja’iyya and mortar shells per day throughout and Rafah. The IDF responded to these the conflict. Yet, by dismantling vast The IDF has been aware of the tunnel kidnapping attempts with heavy fire, portions of Hamas’s tunnel complex, the threat for over 10 years and knew the mostly delivered by artillery. The IDF IDF destroyed one of the most strategic approximate location of 31 of them.30 was successful in averting soldier assets of the organization.40 Over the course of the ground phase of abduction; however, it is suspected that the conflict the IDF learned of their exact Hamas acquired the remains of two IDF As part of the bottom-up EBO doctrine, routes and began to slowly dismantle soldiers. In the Rafah incident alone, 41 the Iron Dome missile shield provided them.31 However, the Israeli forces did Palestinians were killed.35 Israeli decision makers with enough not initially grasp the complexities flexibility so they would not have to of operating in close-quartered Lessons: Technological Advantages and immediately attack rocket launchers underground surroundings.32 Because of Improvised Solutions located close to civilians—attacks that the IDF’s environmental disadvantages, could have caused major collateral it took the IDF longer than expected to As in the asymmetric conflicts in damage. As a defensive mechanism, disable the tunnels. Hamas benefited Afghanistan and Iraq, weapons such the Iron Dome intercept system gave from certain advantages that created as mortar shells, anti-tank missiles, Israeli decision makers the option two tactical problems for the IDF. First, IEDs, and sniper rifles caused most of to build up Israel’s international Hamas was able to use cross-border the IDF’s casualties.36 The use of APS- legitimacy by allowing them to accept tunnels in order to emerge behind IDF equipped tanks and heavily armored several ceasefires while ensuring forces inside Israeli territory. Second, infantry fighting vehicles37 reduced the minimal damage to the Israeli home Hamas was able to navigate tunnels and potential casualty rate on the Israeli front. Hamas in its turn failed in most attack shafts inside the Gaza Strip and side. Main battle tanks proved their of its tactical actions and operational accordingly surface in an unpredictable worth in the urban warfare terrain, plans, yet it adjusted itself to Israel’s pattern. as Hamas fighters withdrew from doctrines by shifting the confrontation engagement when they appeared.38 to an underground surrounding (both With the exception of the Battle of The IDF’s “intelligence-based warfare” offensively and defensively). On August approach worked effectively, but the 26, 2014, all sides agreed to an open- IDF still struggled to adjust to Hamas’s ended ceasefire once again mediated by send a D9 bulldozer through every house before sending tunnel-based warfare and found itself Egypt. in an infantry soldier; Col. Ofer Vinter, Givati Infantry in an unfavorable position when lured Brigade commander, Channel 1 News, July 31, 2014. Conclusion 29 The system managed to intercept at least 10 AT missiles. 33 Lt. Col. Bark, reconnaissance battalion commander Over the past decade Israel and Hamas 30 In the aftermath, the IDF discovered 32 tunnels (6 to (Nahal Infantry Brigade), Channel 1 News, July 22, 2014. have engaged in six major military 7 of them were cross-border) and 60 attack shafts. 34 Col. Eliezer Toledano, paratroopers infantry brigade campaigns. IDF’s main goal in these 31 This was conducted by air attacks or by the IDF’s commander, Uvda, August 7, 2014. campaigns was not to achieve a decisive combat engineering tunnel warfare platoon (SAMOOR) 35 “Debriefing ‘Hannibal Directive’ Incident in Rafah: using standard issue explosives or the specially desig- Conclusions and Unanswered Questions,” IsraelDefense, nated emulsion (“Emulsia”) explosives injection system. September 22, 2014. 39 Rashid Khalidi, “War on Gaza: Military Strategy and 32 ������������������������������������������������������Maj. Gen. (res.) Israel Ziv and Maj. Gen. (res.)����������� Yaa- 36 Forty percent of the IDF’s casualties were caused by Historical Horizons” [panel talk], The Center for Pales- kov Amidror, Channel 2 News, July 25, 2014; Brig. Gen. mortar shells. tine Studies and the Middle East Institute, September Nitzan, IAF intelligence group commander, as cited in 37 Such as the Namer IFV (Merkava chassis-based) and 19, 2014; Col. Eliezer Toledano, paratroopers infantry Greenwald, “Coming First, Going Last.” See also “Situ- the Achzarit APC (T-54/T-55 chassis-based). brigade commander, Uvda, August 7, 2014. ational Surprise” in Zvi Lanir, Fundamental Surprises 38 Author interview, Cpt. D., infantry platoon com- 40 IDF Chief-of-Staff Lt.-Gen. , IDF You- (Tel Aviv: Center for Strategic Studies, 1983). mander, August 27, 2014. Tube Channel, July 27, 2014.

23 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 11

military victory, but rather to restore thwarted Hamas’s desire for conflict CTC Sentinel Staff the status quo and deter future attacks. mediation through Turkey and Qatar, Since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in because Israel had secured Egypt as the Editorial Board 2007 (from the Palestinian Authority sole mediator. COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. (PA)/Palestinian Fatah), the military Department Head campaigns have ended with Egyptian- Hamas achieved several objectives Department of Social Sciences (West Point) mediated ceasefire agreements. In in this conflict as well. It gained the 2014 conflict, Israel strived for a international legitimacy, garnered COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. ceasefire agreement that would restore power in the Palestinian political arena, Deputy Department Head the security of its citizens for a lengthy shut down Israel’s international airport 41 Department of Social Sciences (West Point) period of time. Due to the effectiveness for 48 hours, caused the suspension of of the Iron Dome anti-missile defense Israel’s southern train line, threatened MAJ(P) Bryan Price, Ph.D. system, Hamas’s imminent threat was 70 percent of the Israeli population until Director, CTC shifted from rockets to infiltration via the last day of the conflict, and managed cross-border tunnels and short-range to utilize its counter-doctrine in a mortars. The IAF failed to resolve the manner that resulted in international tunnel threat from the air causing Israel criticism against Israel. to launch a ground attack. IDF’s ground phase was slow but mostly effective. It appears that the question of which side Although it took much more time than was more successful during the conflict first expected, the IDF’s ground phase remains open. The fragile deadlock managed to achieve its secondary goal between Israel and Hamas remains, and disable the imminent threat posed with both sides already preparing for by tunnels. the next round. Contact Combating Terrorism Center “IDF’s main goal in these Elad Popovich is a visiting research fellow U.S. Military Academy campaigns was not to affiliated with the Roger Hertog Program on Law 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall and National Security at Columbia Law School, West Point, NY 10996 achieve a decisive military and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Haifa. Phone: (845) 938-8495 victory, but rather to He is an Israel Institute Doctoral Fellow and Email: [email protected] serves on the Israel Bar Association’s military and Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ restore the status quo and security national committee. He previously served deter future attacks.” as secretary and an executive committee member * For Press Inquiries: (845) 938-8495 of the Association of Civil-Military Scholars in Israel.

It is too early to know if Israel achieved its main objective, but as of the end of November 2014, Israel had severely support damaged Hamas’s tunnel network and The Combating Terrorism Center would infrastructure, denied Hamas most like to express its gratitude to its financial of its 10-point list of demands,42 and supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like the 41 “PM Netanyahu’s Statement and Press Conference at CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv,” Israel Prime Minis- are interested in learning more about how ter’s Office, August 2, 2014. to support the Combating Terrorism Center, 42 (1) [Withdrawal of Israeli tanks from the Gaza please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call border]; (2) Freeing all the prisoners that were arrested Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association after the killing of the three youths; (3) Lifting the siege of Graduates at 845-446-1561. and opening the border crossings to commerce and people; (4) Establishing an international seaport and airport which would be under U.N. supervision; (5) Increasing the permitted fishing zone to 10 kilometers; (6) Internationalizing the Rafah Crossing and placing it under the supervision of the U.N. and some Arab na- tions; (7) International forces on the borders; (8) [Easing conditions for permits to pray at the Al Aqsa Mosque]; The views expressed in this report are those of (9) Prohibition on Israeli interference in the reconcilia- the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, tion agreement; (10) Reestablishing an industrial zone the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. and improvements in further economic development in the Gaza Strip.

24