William Cormack on William Pitt and the French Revolution
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Jennifer Mori. William Pitt and the French Revolution: 1785-1795. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. xi + 305 pp. $55.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-312-17308-1. Reviewed by William S. Cormack Published on H-France (November, 1998) In the eyes of the Jacobins the French Repub‐ graphical division between the "conservative leg‐ lic's most dangerous enemy was British prime end", which portrays Pitt as the steadfast oppo‐ minister William Pitt the Younger. Not only was nent of revolutionary anarchy and thus hero of he the guiding spirit behind the First Coalition emerging "Toryism", and the interpretation of against France, but they attributed internal divi‐ "liberal descent", which suggests he was a Whig sions and treacheries to the corrupting power of reformer until the emergency of 1792 set him "Pitt's Gold". The claim made by the Committee of against the expansionist Revolution. Mori con‐ Public Safety's naval expert, Andre Jeanbon Saint- tends that referring to Pitt's speeches alone can be Andre, that the treason of Toulon and the mutiny misleading and cannot explain his multiple and of the Brest feet in 1793 were the outcome of a contradictory policies as prime minister. Instead, vast counter-revolutionary conspiracy involving she seeks to clarify the distinction between his Pitt, was not unique [1]. While more sceptical carefully constructed public image and his private about his machinations, French historians have opinions. Mori explains the rhetoric and actions also portrayed Pitt as the Revolution's arch-antag‐ of the Pitt ministry from 1785 to 1795 in terms of onist. Yet was Britain's war with France in the their intended political effects, and not in terms of 1790s an ideological crusade, of which Pitt's re‐ deeply-held intellectual conviction. pression of British radicals was part and parcel? One of the book's principal themes is that This is an important question for the broad histo‐ complex European diplomatic considerations mo‐ ry of the revolutionary period, and Jennifer tivated Pitt's policies before and during the Revo‐ Mori's well argued and meticulously documented lutionary War. Before 1789 Pitt was determined to study shows that the answer is far from simple. restore British power while avoiding continental There is considerable ambiguity regarding confrontations or entanglements. The crisis of the the Younger Pitt's stance towards the French Rev‐ Old Regime had rendered France diplomatically olution. This is reflected in the British historio‐ impotent, as the Prussian invasion of the Dutch H-Net Reviews Republic in 1787 made clear, and Pitt saw official 1795, however, Mori argues that Pitt began to re‐ neutrality toward the Revolution as the best treat from ideological war. His underestimation of means of keeping peace while maintaining British French strength in 1793-94 convinced him that freedom of action. In 1791 the ministry withdrew complete victory was possible and in 1795 it led into isolation rather than join Austria and Prussia him to believe that the Directory would negotiate in condemning the French Revolution, which Pitt a peace settlement; in both cases the ministry and his cabinet colleagues did not fear. The Revo‐ wanted to keep its options open. lution was polarizing British public opinion, how‐ Security concerns rather than international ever, and in 1792 the ministry sponsored the Roy‐ diplomacy lay behind some of Pitt's domestic poli‐ al Proclamation against Seditious Writings and cies during the Revolutionary War, but Mori condemned Tom Paine's Rights of Man. Mori ar‐ stresses that the government's campaign against gues that Pitt's motivations for thus checking dis‐ sedition and treason was neither premeditated sidents was the desire to show France and other nor driven by conservative ideology. Pitt moved foreign powers that the British government was the suspension of Habeas Corpus in May 1794 be‐ secure at home. In November 1792 the ministry cause the cabinet was convinced that the threat of was shocked by the new French Republic's inten‐ French invasion was real and that British radicals tion to open the Scheldt to navigation, in defiance planned an armed uprising to support the landing of existing treaties, and by its decree of fraternity and to discredit the government. This initiated a and assistance to peoples wishing "to recover crackdown which culminated in the state trials of their liberty", but Pitt's bellicose rhetoric and en‐ radical leaders for treason in the summer of 1794. couragement of loyalist organizations were in‐ Yet juries acquitted the accused, the ministry can‐ tended to strengthen the government's interna‐ celed the remaining trials and restored Habeas tional image. Similarly, following the outbreak of Corpus in June 1795. These measures were re‐ war in 1793, Pitt sought to reassure the Dutch of sponses to a specific crisis, according to Mori, and British commitment to defend the international thus were dropped when the crisis passed. Simi‐ status quo with his militia proclamation and the larly, the Treasonable and Seditious Practices Act Alien Act. While the ministry attacked revolution‐ and the Seditious Meetings Act of 1795 represent‐ ary principles in public statements, for much of ed the government's vigorous response to the 1793 it remained neutral towards political devel‐ mob attack on George III three days following the opments in Paris. According to Mori, this contra‐ London Corresponding Society's mass meeting in diction reflected a war strategy based more on October. Pitt was not afraid of the movement call‐ traditional British interests than on ideology. Pitt's ing for parliamentary reform, but of the violence government aimed to cripple French power, but it seemed to unleash and he believed that the rad‐ was reluctant to impose a Bourbon restoration: icals hoped to coerce his government into a pre‐ this was apparent in the British occupation of mature peace with France. Toulon from August to December 1793. Yet Toulon Indeed, Mori's Pitt is a statesman with the marked a shift towards a war of principle. The spirit of a reformer. In 1785 he moved a bill for Revolutionary Government identified Great the reform of parliament and of the electoral Britain as France's main enemy and prepared to process, and he consistently supported calls for invade England, while in January 1794 Pitt's min‐ the abolition of the slave trade on the basis of sin‐ istry committed itself to total war and, after Prus‐ cere humanitarian and intellectual conviction. sia made peace with France in April 1795, to sup‐ Pitt was influenced not only by Adam Smith but porting royalist counterrevolution. Even before also by the larger sweep of the Enlightenment. the failure of the Quiberon expedition in June 2 H-Net Reviews Unlike Edmund Burke, from whom Mori distin‐ nations for Pitt's policies should remind histori‐ guishes Pitt intellectually as well as politically, he ans of France that public opinion had also become did not see anarchy and terror as the inevitable crucial across the Channel. result of the French Revolution's initial principles, While Mori's picture of Pitt as a moderate for which Pitt had some sympathy. First and fore‐ who was intellectually opposed neither to Enlight‐ most, however, Mori's Pitt is a politician. He rec‐ enment ideas nor to the existence of a French Re‐ ognized clearly that his ministry's power was public is entirely convincing, she perhaps under‐ based on a governing consensus in Britain, which plays Pitt's ideological opposition to certain as‐ by 1792 was moving to the right. While never pects of the French Revolution. Pitt wanted to see abandoning his personal sympathy for various a government in France which enjoyed sufficient liberal reforms, Pitt adopted a public image as the stability and authority to negotiate with Britain. staunch defender of the status quo both at home Such a government would need to recognize in‐ and in Europe to secure and maintain the broad ternational agreements, but revolutionary author‐ support of the landed gentry as well as the Lon‐ ity denied the legitimacy of any such limitations don fnancial interests. This consensus did not on the "People's Will". Historian Alfred Cobban preclude toleration of some dissent, but in the explained revolutionary war and tyranny in context of war Pitt would not countenance radi‐ terms of this idea of popular sovereignty, and calism which openly sympathized with the ene‐ quoted Pitt as one who recognized its danger: my. "They will not accept, under the name of Liberty, Mori marshals an impressive array of evi‐ any model of government but that which is con‐ dence from parliamentary archives and official formable to their own opinions and ideas; and all documents, as well as private papers and corre‐ men must learn from the mouth of their cannon spondence, to support her conclusions. Despite the propagation of their system in every part of her wide-ranging and careful research, Mori's the world [3]." Certainly this was political book contains a small number of factual errors: rhetoric, but it suggests a continuity between the French National Convention abolished slavery Pitt's denunciation of the 1792 decrees and his in 1794, not in 1795 (pp. 31, 220); republican au‐ horror at the dictatorship of the Revolutionary thorities delivered Toulon into Anglo-Spanish Government during the Terror. It also accounts hands in the name of Louis XVII, not of Louis XVI for his antipathy towards domestic radicals who who had been guillotined seven months earlier (p. sought to rouse popular support by attacking the 159); Toussaint L'Ouverture was not the leader of legitimacy of the government. Yet the claim for black republicans on Guadeloupe, where Victor Pitt's opposition to revolutionary popular Hugues freed the slaves and called for insurrec‐ sovereignty neither makes him a conservative tion on neighboring islands, but on Saint- ideologue like Burke, nor does it suggest any fun‐ Domingue (pp.