Abe’s Foreign Policy Fiasco on the Northern Territories Issue: Breaking with the Past and the National Movement Akihiro Iwashita* Introduction: Towards the Legacy of Other Great Leaders Since December 2012, when he was inaugurated as Japan’s premier for a second time, Shinzo Abe has prioritized a Russia-focused foreign policy, and has particularly focused his attention on the “Northern Territories” (Southern Kuril) issue. This he recognizes as central to his political mission for two reasons. First, his family legacy is in play. Abe follows in the footsteps of his grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, the powerful Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Prime Minister who was behind the revision of the security alliance with the United States in 1960, his granduncle, Eisaku Sato, also an LDP Prime Minister and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, who gained Okinawa from the U.S. in 1972, and his father Shintaro Abe, the foreign minister who sought to resolve the Northern Territorial dispute with Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader. It is obvious that Abe wants to personally establish his legacy as a great leader, like his distinguished predecessors, by solving the territorial issue and concluding a peace treaty with Russia. Second, China has been a key factor for Japan maintaining good relations with Russia. Although many credible researchers of Sino-Russian relations have raised doubts about Japan’s success in creating a divide between Russia and China, Japan’s foreign policy circles retain this hope, and the Abe administration, with its initially anti-China orientation, welcomed this idea. If Japan and Russia solve the territorial problem with a peace treaty, improved relations may work as a deterrence to China in Northeast Asia.1 The Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea that followed the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi hindered Abe’s plan to resolve the Northern Territories issue, however. Japan, as a * Akihiro Iwashita is a professor at the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, Hokkaido University. 1 The general idea of involving Russia in the U.S.-Japan alliance as a counterweight to China has been floated since the mid-2000s. The “Japan-Russia-U.S. trilateral conference” initiated as a “second track” (factually “track 1.5”) by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) publicized the idea as a sophisticated suggestion. Accessed July 25, 2019: file:///G:/2019/201908/20120621e-JA-RUS-US.pdf The idea of pitting Russia against China, based on Bobo Lo’s “strategic tensions” between Russia and China, is said to be popular even now in Japan’s MOFA. Former diplomats, such as Kunihiko Miyake, are leading proponents. See for example, Gilbert Rozman, “Japan’s Debates on Russia and China: What is New in the Final Months of 2018?,” The Asan Forum, December 30, 2018. Accessed July 25, 2019: http://www.theasanforum.org/japans-debates-on-russia-and-china-what-is-new-in-the- final-months-of-2018/ Regarding Russia’s perception of its relations with Japan, see Anna Kireeva and Andrei Sushentsov, The Russian-Japanese Rapprochement: Opportunities and Limitations (Valdai Discussion Club Report: Moscow, 2017). Accessed July 25, 2019: http://valdaiclub.com/files/15312/; Russia – Japan Relations: New Stage of Development (Russian International Affairs Council: Moscow, 2019). Accessed July 25, 2019: https://russiancouncil.ru/papers/ Russia-Japan-WP50-En.pdf The Russian side is clearly aware of Japan’s policy to decouple Russia from China. DOI: 10.14943/ebr.10.1.111 111 Eurasia Border Review < Special Section > U.S. ally, joined the G7 sanctions against Russia, although the Abe administration also wanted to avoid harming relations with Russia. Abe had his opportunity to improve them in 2016. U.S. President Barack Obama, who had urged Abe not to get too close to Putin, was about to leave office, so the U.S. policy-community would not have their gaze on Japan diplomacy before the new presidential election. It was also around this time that Abe finally understood that there would be no progress in negotiations on the territorial dispute if Japan continued to maintain its claims to all of the four islands, e.g. Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai. Therefore, from early 2016 the Abe administration started to work on a “new approach” that could achieve a solution to the territorial issue. In the summer of 2016, Japan’s media rushed to report a “scoop” on possible scenarios for a peace treaty, such as the “return of the two islands of Shikotan and Habomai first” and the “joint administration of Etorofu and Kunashiri,”2 which had been leaked by the administration as a political trial balloon. In advance of the Abe-Putin summit in Yamaguchi and Tokyo planned for late 2016, many policy watchers expected that a “return of two islands plus alpha” agreement would be reached. On December 14, there was indeed a media circus celebrating Putin’s visit to Nagato City, Abe’s hometown in Yamaguchi prefecture and the summit between the two leaders. However, no agreement on the territorial dispute was reached there. Apparently, Putin refused to recognize the Tokyo Declaration of 1993, which refers to the four islands as the subject of negotiations, and refused to mention the territorial dispute at all. Many Japanese were disappointed, but the Abe administration, nonetheless, claimed the summit to be a “success” in moving towards a peace treaty, and emphasizing agreements made for “joint economic activities” to take place on the four islands. Three years have passed since the 2016 summit, during which time Abe and Putin have held more than ten meetings, yet no progress has been made towards resolving the territorial dispute, nor did the “joint economic activities” agreement bear any fruit. Nevertheless, the Abe administration has continued to tell the public that negotiations are on track. This paper seeks to shed new light on the Abe administration’s plan to resolve the territorial dispute and the causes for its failure. The paper consists of five parts: 1) Abe’s summit with Putin in December of 2016, 2) the behind-the-scenes story both before and after the summit, 3) realities of the “joint economic activities” promised at the summit, 4) Abe’s foreign policy toward Russia in the context of Japanese politics, and 5) failure to conceal Northern Territories negotiations. The paper concludes by exploring Abe’s policy mismanagement and its impact on future relations with Russia. Written as a narrative, the paper primarily utilizes Japanese media reports, together with insights gleaned by the author from discussions with policy actors.3 2 Yomiuri Shimbun, September 23, 2016; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 17, 2016. 3 For background to the current discussions, readers may wish to consult the following: Brad Williams, Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute: Hokkaido-Sakhalin Relations (London: Routledge, 2007); Brad Williams, “Dissent on Japan’s Northern Periphery: Nemuro, the Northern Territories and the Limits of Change in a ‘Bureaucrat’s Movement’.” Japanese Journal of Political Science 11:2 (2010): 221–244; Alexander Bukh, Japan’s National Identity and Foreign Policy: Russia as Japan’s “Other” (London: Routledge, 2011); Alexander Bukh, “Constructing Japan’s ‘Northern Territories’: Domestic Actors, Interests and the Symbolism of the Disputed Islands,” International Relations of Asia-Pacific 12:3 (2012): 483–509; Paul Richardson, At the Edge of the Nation: The Southern Kurils and the Search for Russia’s National Identity (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2018). 112 Akihiro Iwashita Abe’s 2016 Summit Plan for “Shikotan and Habomai Plus” The Abe administration’s effort to induce more cooperation from Russia became apparent in May 2016, when Abe visited Sochi to meet Putin during his tour of Europe on the eve of the Iseshima G7 summit in July. After the events in Crimea, Russia was out of the G7 and isolated from western countries. Abe was hoping to act as a bridge between Russia and G7 members. Doing so, he hoped, would lead to a political deal on the Northern Territories issue. Abe proposed to Russia a major economic cooperation plan, with its eight key points including the development of industries and export bases in the Russian Far East, the transfer of cutting-edge technology and people-to-people interactions.4 Putin listened to all of this with interest. The Abe administration also announced a “new approach” towards a peace treaty. At that point, the details of this “new approach” had not yet been revealed, but it was obvious that it included major economic incentives. As long as Japan stresses economic inducements, Putin’s response is always favorable because sanctions have caused considerable damage to the Russian economy. The Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September of 2016 encouraged Abe to strengthen Japan’s relations with Russia. The Russian Far East meeting seemed like a good chance to nudge Putin more toward Japan’s side. The Abe administration thought this would work in Japan’s favor because Russia wanted to avoid increased dependency on China. Putin, in turn, was very polite with Abe and accepted an invitation to visit Japan for the first time in ten years.5 As a result, the Abe administration became optimistic about a deal over the Northern Territories. According to some media reports, the Abe administration thought that a deal would be possible if Japan would retract its demand for the “four islands at once.” While disassembling this package, Japan still needed a symbolic concession related to Etorofu and Kunashiri islands. In short, on the condition of substantial economic assistance to Russia, Japan’s position changed to asking for the return of only Shikotan and Habomai, together with some “privileges” on Etorofu and Kunashiri. The November 2016 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Peru was an ideal place for testing the big deal before the forthcoming December Abe-Putin summit in Japan.