Persian Lng – a Giant Awakes

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Persian Lng – a Giant Awakes PERSIAN LNG – A GIANT AWAKES Ate Visser, Shell Gas and Power Carlos Quintana, Repsol YPF 1. INTRODUCTION Any examination of the list of holders of the world’s gas reserves immediately demonstrates why the Islamic Republic of Iran has to be regarded as a potential giant in the world’s international gas business of the 21st Century. Compared with the scale of its proven gas reserves, Iran’s relatively minor export role is at first sight surprising. All the more so, since close to half of Iran’s around 30 Trillion (10¹²) Cubic Metres of reserves is found in the supergiant South Pars field, a low cost resource rich in condensate. This same accumulation, as the North Field on the other side of the border with Qatar, already supports a flourishing gas export business. Iran has very strong credentials to take the lead in developing the next generation of LNG plants in the Persian Gulf region. Qatar, the other major reserve holder, is already a significant player and is heavily committed to expansions and new projects. Oman and Abu Dhabi which have made their mark on the world LNG scene are both resource limited, currently discussing pipeline imports from their neighbours via the Dolphin project and likely to be limited for the foreseeable future to the currently planned expansions. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait are all concentrating today on finding or importing gas for their rapidly growing power generation needs and their existing export industries. Iran not only has the reserves but also active production plans already under development at the South Pars and other gas fields which are likely to be more than sufficient to meet its growing local demand. Hence the stage is set for Iran to take the major step forward into the export markets. History shows several reasons for Iran’s absence from those markets today. In the 1970s, Iran had already begun to develop, with its international partners, LNG projects aimed at both Asia and the Atlantic Basin and was a gas exporter by pipeline to the USSR. But before most of these concepts could come to fruition, Iran was overtaken by changing market conditions and politics, and subsequently shaken by internal and external conflicts. More recently however, gas export, and in particular LNG, has re-emerged as a viable business opportunity for Iran. The enormous scale and importance for the whole Iranian economy of the export opportunity being missed is now widely recognised among the country’s leaders and the urgent need to commercialise Iran’s huge gas reserves has been publicly stated on many occasions. The export drive is already apparent through the recent start up of pipeline gas exports to Turkey and the ongoing discussions with the European Commission and other interested parties about a longer term pipeline to Europe. As a result, and in order to bring in the international capital and expertise which is needed to play a role in these markets, Iran is in the process of creating an increasingly attractive climate for foreign investors, both for upstream and downstream export projects. Today several international companies are working with Iranian partners and vying to create the first Iranian LNG export project. This paper describes a significant LNG project designed to provide Iran for the first time with access to some of the world’s major import markets. Persian LNG is a leading contender and offers exciting prospects not only for Iran but also for the LNG business in general. The LNG marketing support offered by both Repsol and Shell gives the project additional impetus. 2. WHAT IS PERSIAN LNG? 2.1 Background Persian LNG is being developed jointly by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) with Repsol YPF of Spain and the Royal Dutch Shell Group, based in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. A Memorandum of Understanding, finalised in January 2002, committed the three partners to undertake feasibility studies into an integrated LNG project to be located at Tombak on the Persian Gulf. The proposed partnership for the downstream project is 50% for NIOC and 25% each for the international partners. Repsol and Shell would jointly undertake the upstream part of the project on a 50/50 basis, although the precise nature and structure of how this would be done is still under discussion. The feasibility studies have now been completed and confirm the potential for a viable project, based on a liquefaction plant with a total annual production capacity well in excess of 10 million (106) tonnes. Some of the key conclusions are set out below. 2.2 Liquefaction Plant Persian LNG envisages the use of the double mixed refrigerant (DMR) liquefaction technology developed by Shell. This technology would allow the cost-effective construction of some of the largest LNG trains currently proposed, which would be air cooled. Each will have a capacity of well over 5 million tonnes per annum, and a unit capital cost lower than any of today’s projects – two of these liquefaction trains could be constructed at Tombak for less than US$ 2 billion (109). An artist’s impression of the layout is shown as Figure 1. Figure 1: Artist’s Impression of Proposed Layout at Tombak The project can be implemented without infringing United States export controls, an important consideration given the dominant role of US companies in LNG technology. Agreements for the provision of the technology and support services are currently being negotiated by Persian LNG with Shell Global Solutions International B.V., based in the Netherlands. 2.3 Marketing The feasibility studies have assumed that LNG will be marketed to a wide range of LNG markets, bearing in mind the particular marketing strengths of the project promoters. Target markets for the project include the Mediterranean and, in particular, Spain, a market in which strong demand growth for pipeline gas and LNG is forecast well into the next decade. The potential of this market is backed by Spain’s strong political links with Iran, recently demonstrated by the Iranian President Khatami’s recent successful visit. Moreover Repsol, together with Gas Natural, in which it has a significant shareholding, holds an extremely strong market position in this market as well as a developing role in the international LNG business. Shell too has a market position in Europe and the larger Atlantic Basin which it is seeking to grow by building on its expanding world network of LNG transportation and reception facilities. A significant proportion of the volume that Shell would be marketing would be aimed at the Indian market through the regasification terminal at Hazira in North West India which is currently under construction. In the longer term, the partners in Persian LNG recognise the potential of the Asia-Pacific markets to provide attractive project returns. This potential is enhanced by the growing links between Iran and both Korea and Japan. These are exemplified by the US $3 billion loans recently made available by Japan to the Iranian energy industry and the significant roles likely to be played by the Korean company LG and Japanese contractors and financiers in the development of Phases 9 and 10 of South Pars. 2.4 Offtake The studies are based on the assumption that, in the first instance, 8 million tonnes of LNG will be purchased at the outlet of the liquefaction plant by Repsol and Shell, with shipping being provided by those companies. LNG Sales and Purchase Agreements are currently being negotiated by Persian LNG with subsidiaries of each of the international partners. It is expected that these will be completed in the first half of 2003, thereby giving the project a sound basis to justify proceeding to the next stage of technical development. 2.5 Upstream Following the model which has proved successful in many other LNG projects around the world, the feasibility studies concluded that benefits would be gained by Persian LNG and all its partners if the project were developed on an integrated upstream/downstream basis. In particular, this was likely to provide the best foundation for raising external finance on behalf of the project as a whole. To provide a basis for the upstream section of the studies, NIOC has provisionally set aside a block (Phase 13) of South Pars as the intended supply source (See Figure 2). Figure 2: South Pars Development – Phase 13 To meet the requirements of the plant mentioned above, a delivery capacity of some 60 million cubic metres (1800 million cubic feet) per day would be needed. Commercial arrangements on the nature of the upstream structure and the terms of gas supply are under negotiation. These discussions are being led by Repsol on behalf of the partners and are now well advanced. It is once again anticipated that agreements can be reached in the next few months, which will allow the project to move forward. 2.6 Financing The feasibility studies proposed that Persian LNG should be project financed, with the expectation that significant cover from Export Credit Agencies would be used. Now that the commercial framework has been more sharply defined, Persian LNG has undertaken a selection procedure for a financial adviser. Interest was shown by a significant group of major international banks, and, after a thorough review, the partners selected Société Générale. This bank is now working with the project to optimise the financing plan. 2.7 Project Structure Once the conclusions of the feasibility studies had been presented and accepted, the partners agreed to undertake immediate negotiations to conclude the remainder of the major Commercial and Technical contractual agreements which would be required to underpin the project. As well as the Sales and Purchase Agreements and Upstream/Gas Supply Agreements mentioned above, these include the internal agreements such as the Project Agreement, Shareholders’ Agreement and Service Agreements which would allow a joint venture company to be established to carry the project forward.
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