PPrroolliiffeerraattiioonn PPaappeerrss ______________________________________________________________________ In Defense of Deterrence The Relevance, Morality and Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons ______________________________________________________________________ In collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) Bruno Tertrais Fall 2011 Security Studies Center The Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. ISBN: 978-2-86592-925-2 © Ifri – 2011 – All rights reserved Ifri Ifri-Bruxelles 27 rue de la Procession Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – FRANCE 1000 – Brussels – BELGIUM Tel : 33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 Tel : 32 (0)2 238 51 10 Fax : 33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Fax : 32 (0)2 238 51 15 Email : [email protected] Email : [email protected] Website : http://www.ifri.org/ Fall 2011 In Defense of Deterrence The Relevance, Morality and Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons Bruno Tertrais Proliferation Papers Though it has long been a concern for security experts, proliferation has truly become an important political issue with the last decade, marked simultaneously by the nuclearization of South Asia, the weakening of international regimes and the discovery of frauds and traffics, the number and gravity of which have surprised observers and analysts alike (Iraq in 1991, Libya until 2004, North Korean and Iranian programs or the A. Q. Khan networks today). To further the debate on complex issues that involve technical, regional, and strategic aspects, Ifri’s Security Studies Center organizes each year, in collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), a series of closed seminars dealing with WMD proliferation, disarmament, and nonproliferation. Generally held in English, these seminars are structured around the presentation of an international expert. Proliferation Papers is a collection, in the original version, of selected texts from these presentations. An anonymous peer-review procedure ensures the high academic quality of the contributions. Download notifications are sent to an audience of several hundred international subscribers upon publication. Editorial board Editor: Etienne de Durand Deputy Director: Corentin Brustlein Principal Scientific Adviser: Jean Klein Layout Assistant: Laura Tanase How to cite this publication Bruno Tertrais, “In Defense of Deterrence: The Relevance, Morality and Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons”, Proliferation Papers, No. 39, Fall 2011. About the Author Dr. Bruno Tertrais graduated from the Institut d'études politiques de Paris in 1984. He also holds a Master’s degree in Public Law of the University of Paris (1985), and a Doctorate in Political Science of the Institut d'études politiques de Paris (1994). Between 1990 and 1993, he was the Director of the Civilian Affairs Committee, NATO Assembly, Brussels. In 1993, he joined the Délégation aux Affaires stratégiques (Policy Division) of the French Ministry of Defense. In 1995-1996, he was a Visiting Fellow at the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica. From October 1996 until August 2001, he was Special Assistant to the Director of Strategic Affairs at the French Ministry of Defense. He is now a Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS). In 2007-2008, he was a member of the French presidential commission on the White Paper on Defense and Security, as well as a member of the French ministerial commission on the White Paper on Foreign and European policy. Bruno Tertrais is also a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a contributing editor to Survival, a member of the editorial board of the Washington Quarterly, and a member of the Councils on the Global Agenda of the World Economic Forum (WEF). In 2010, he was the recipient of the Vauban Prize. He is the author, among many other publications, of War Without End (New-York: The New Press, 2005). Contents Introduction _____________________________________________ 7 Nuclear Deterrence Works _________________________________ 9 Nuclear Deterrence Is Neither Immoral nor Illegal _____________ 17 Nuclear Deterrence Is Cost Effective ________________________ 25 Nuclear Deterrence Remains Fully Relevant __________________ 35 Introduction ince 1945, nuclear deterrence has been the target of continuous S criticism on strategic, legal and moral grounds.1 But in the past five years, the renewed debate on nuclear disarmament has been accompanied by an increase in such criticism. Efforts led by four US statesmen, or the more radical “Global Zero” movement, as well as various diplomatic initiatives, have been accompanied by a flurry of new, serious academic studies questioning the legitimacy of nuclear weapons.2 More than ever, nuclear deterrence is attacked by many, both on the “Left” and on the “Right”. To the traditional arguments related to the credibility, the legality or the morality of nuclear deterrence are now added two other factors. First, nuclear weapons, it is argued, have limited value vis-à-vis proliferation and terrorism, and such risks bolster the case for nuclear disarmament. Second, alternatives such as high-precision conventional means and missile defense are said to now be much more effective than they were in the past. What follows is an attempt to respond to those arguments and offer a proper defense of nuclear deterrence. It is essentially devoted to the most traditional and widely used form of nuclear deterrence, that is, deterrence through the threat of nuclear retaliation (“deterrence by punishment”). It begins with revisiting and addressing the two classic criticisms of nuclear deterrence: its validity as a war-prevention mechanism (Part One, “Nuclear Deterrence Works”), and its legality as well as morality (Part Two, “Nuclear Deterrence Is Neither Immoral Nor Illegal”). It then goes on to address criticisms which, without being entirely new, have gained in importance in recent years: first, the cost-effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, in particular vis-à-vis so-called possible alternatives such conventional deterrence and missile defense (Part Three, “Nuclear Deterrence is Cost-Effective”); second, the validity of nuclear deterrence in This paper expands on a study conducted for the French Ministry of Defense (Directorate for Strategic Affairs) in 2011. 1 The author would like to thank Elbridge Colby and David Yost for their detailed comments and thoughtful suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. 2 For typical academic contributions see Ward Wilson, “The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence”, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2008; and Ken Berry et al., Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the validity of nuclear deterrence, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2010. For a recent statement by the ICRC, see Jakob Kellenberger, “Bringing the era of nuclear weapons to an end”, Statement to the Geneva Diplomatic Corps, 20 April 2010. B. Tertrais / In Defense of Deterrence the context of twenty-first century security (Part Four, “Nuclear Deterrence Remains Fully Relevant”). It concludes that maintaining and nurturing nuclear deterrence should remain a primary objective of Western governments. - 8 - Nuclear Deterrence Works Nuclear Weapons Have Been Effective War-Prevention Tools It is by definition impossible to prove that deterrence has worked, and correlation is not causality. But History gives us solid arguments in support of the positive role played by nuclear weapons, especially since our “database” now covers nearly 70 years. No major power conflict has taken place in nearly 70 years – The role of nuclear deterrence to explain this historical anomaly has been highlighted by leading historians and authors such as John Lewis Gaddis, Kenneth Waltz, and Michael Quinlan.3 No comparable period of time has ever existed in the history of States. There were two dozen conflicts among major powers in the equivalent amount of time following the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), and several after the Vienna Congress (1815).4 There has never been a direct military conflict between two nuclear States5 – Beyond this mere observation, two recent quantitative studies have shown that the possession of nuclear weapons by two countries significantly reduced – all things equal – the likelihood of war between them.6 Events in Asia since 1949 provide an interesting test case. China and India fought a war in 1962, but have refrained from resorting to arms against each other ever since. There were three India-Pakistan wars (1962, 1965 and 1971) before both countries became nuclear; but since the late 1980s (when the two countries acquired a minimum nuclear capability), none of the two has launched any significant air or land operations against the other. 3 See in particular John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace, New York, Oxford University Press,