DOCSLIB.ORG

In Defense of Deterrence

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
In Defense of Deterrence PPrroolliiffeerraattiioonn PPaappeerrss ______________________________________________________________________ In Defense of Deterrence The Relevance, Morality and Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons ______________________________________________________________________ In collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) Bruno Tertrais Fall 2011 Security Studies Center The Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. ISBN: 978-2-86592-925-2 © Ifri – 2011 – All rights reserved Ifri Ifri-Bruxelles 27 rue de la Procession Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – FRANCE 1000 – Brussels – BELGIUM Tel : 33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 Tel : 32 (0)2 238 51 10 Fax : 33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Fax : 32 (0)2 238 51 15 Email : [email protected] Email : [email protected] Website : http://www.ifri.org/ Fall 2011 In Defense of Deterrence The Relevance, Morality and Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons Bruno Tertrais Proliferation Papers Though it has long been a concern for security experts, proliferation has truly become an important political issue with the last decade, marked simultaneously by the nuclearization of South Asia, the weakening of international regimes and the discovery of frauds and traffics, the number and gravity of which have surprised observers and analysts alike (Iraq in 1991, Libya until 2004, North Korean and Iranian programs or the A. Q. Khan networks today). To further the debate on complex issues that involve technical, regional, and strategic aspects, Ifri’s Security Studies Center organizes each year, in collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), a series of closed seminars dealing with WMD proliferation, disarmament, and nonproliferation. Generally held in English, these seminars are structured around the presentation of an international expert. Proliferation Papers is a collection, in the original version, of selected texts from these presentations. An anonymous peer-review procedure ensures the high academic quality of the contributions. Download notifications are sent to an audience of several hundred international subscribers upon publication. Editorial board Editor: Etienne de Durand Deputy Director: Corentin Brustlein Principal Scientific Adviser: Jean Klein Layout Assistant: Laura Tanase How to cite this publication Bruno Tertrais, “In Defense of Deterrence: The Relevance, Morality and Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons”, Proliferation Papers, No. 39, Fall 2011. About the Author Dr. Bruno Tertrais graduated from the Institut d'études politiques de Paris in 1984. He also holds a Master’s degree in Public Law of the University of Paris (1985), and a Doctorate in Political Science of the Institut d'études politiques de Paris (1994). Between 1990 and 1993, he was the Director of the Civilian Affairs Committee, NATO Assembly, Brussels. In 1993, he joined the Délégation aux Affaires stratégiques (Policy Division) of the French Ministry of Defense. In 1995-1996, he was a Visiting Fellow at the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica. From October 1996 until August 2001, he was Special Assistant to the Director of Strategic Affairs at the French Ministry of Defense. He is now a Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS). In 2007-2008, he was a member of the French presidential commission on the White Paper on Defense and Security, as well as a member of the French ministerial commission on the White Paper on Foreign and European policy. Bruno Tertrais is also a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a contributing editor to Survival, a member of the editorial board of the Washington Quarterly, and a member of the Councils on the Global Agenda of the World Economic Forum (WEF). In 2010, he was the recipient of the Vauban Prize. He is the author, among many other publications, of War Without End (New-York: The New Press, 2005). Contents Introduction _____________________________________________ 7 Nuclear Deterrence Works _________________________________ 9 Nuclear Deterrence Is Neither Immoral nor Illegal _____________ 17 Nuclear Deterrence Is Cost Effective ________________________ 25 Nuclear Deterrence Remains Fully Relevant __________________ 35 Introduction ince 1945, nuclear deterrence has been the target of continuous S criticism on strategic, legal and moral grounds.1 But in the past five years, the renewed debate on nuclear disarmament has been accompanied by an increase in such criticism. Efforts led by four US statesmen, or the more radical “Global Zero” movement, as well as various diplomatic initiatives, have been accompanied by a flurry of new, serious academic studies questioning the legitimacy of nuclear weapons.2 More than ever, nuclear deterrence is attacked by many, both on the “Left” and on the “Right”. To the traditional arguments related to the credibility, the legality or the morality of nuclear deterrence are now added two other factors. First, nuclear weapons, it is argued, have limited value vis-à-vis proliferation and terrorism, and such risks bolster the case for nuclear disarmament. Second, alternatives such as high-precision conventional means and missile defense are said to now be much more effective than they were in the past. What follows is an attempt to respond to those arguments and offer a proper defense of nuclear deterrence. It is essentially devoted to the most traditional and widely used form of nuclear deterrence, that is, deterrence through the threat of nuclear retaliation (“deterrence by punishment”). It begins with revisiting and addressing the two classic criticisms of nuclear deterrence: its validity as a war-prevention mechanism (Part One, “Nuclear Deterrence Works”), and its legality as well as morality (Part Two, “Nuclear Deterrence Is Neither Immoral Nor Illegal”). It then goes on to address criticisms which, without being entirely new, have gained in importance in recent years: first, the cost-effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, in particular vis-à-vis so-called possible alternatives such conventional deterrence and missile defense (Part Three, “Nuclear Deterrence is Cost-Effective”); second, the validity of nuclear deterrence in This paper expands on a study conducted for the French Ministry of Defense (Directorate for Strategic Affairs) in 2011. 1 The author would like to thank Elbridge Colby and David Yost for their detailed comments and thoughtful suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. 2 For typical academic contributions see Ward Wilson, “The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence”, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2008; and Ken Berry et al., Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the validity of nuclear deterrence, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2010. For a recent statement by the ICRC, see Jakob Kellenberger, “Bringing the era of nuclear weapons to an end”, Statement to the Geneva Diplomatic Corps, 20 April 2010. B. Tertrais / In Defense of Deterrence the context of twenty-first century security (Part Four, “Nuclear Deterrence Remains Fully Relevant”). It concludes that maintaining and nurturing nuclear deterrence should remain a primary objective of Western governments. - 8 - Nuclear Deterrence Works Nuclear Weapons Have Been Effective War-Prevention Tools It is by definition impossible to prove that deterrence has worked, and correlation is not causality. But History gives us solid arguments in support of the positive role played by nuclear weapons, especially since our “database” now covers nearly 70 years. No major power conflict has taken place in nearly 70 years – The role of nuclear deterrence to explain this historical anomaly has been highlighted by leading historians and authors such as John Lewis Gaddis, Kenneth Waltz, and Michael Quinlan.3 No comparable period of time has ever existed in the history of States. There were two dozen conflicts among major powers in the equivalent amount of time following the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), and several after the Vienna Congress (1815).4 There has never been a direct military conflict between two nuclear States5 – Beyond this mere observation, two recent quantitative studies have shown that the possession of nuclear weapons by two countries significantly reduced – all things equal – the likelihood of war between them.6 Events in Asia since 1949 provide an interesting test case. China and India fought a war in 1962, but have refrained from resorting to arms against each other ever since. There were three India-Pakistan wars (1962, 1965 and 1971) before both countries became nuclear; but since the late 1980s (when the two countries acquired a minimum nuclear capability), none of the two has launched any significant air or land operations against the other. 3 See in particular John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace, New York, Oxford University Press,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Isolationism & Appeasement in Australia E. M. Andrews
    > Isolationism & Appeasement ü w* in Australia C /3 Reactions to the European Grises, 1935-1939 ‘They tell me things are not too good in Europe, Dave.’ ‘What’s wrong? Drought?’ ‘Unk’ White, Bulletin, 26 July 1939 E. M. Andrews Australian foreign policy in the late 1930s has till now been a neglected topic in historical writing. In this book the author examines Australian reactions to the aggressions which led to World War II — Abyssinia, Spain, Austria, Czecho­ slovakia, and Poland. He describes the early support in Britain and Australia for the League of Nations, and goes on to discuss the causes of the change to a policy of appeasement, culminating in the Munich crisis of 1938, and Australian reactions to that crisis. Additionally, he compares Australian foreign policy at that time and in the sixties, when Australia again supports a powerful ally, this time in Vietnam. To those who lived through the crises of the thirties and now wish to see those years in perspective, as well as to readers of a younger generation, who seek the causes for the development of present-day attitudes to Australian foreign policy, this book will make absorbing reading. For teachers and students of the history of the period it will provide a welcome insight into the reactions of Australian politicians and people to the European crises and to Britain’s part in them. Price in Australia $6.95 This book was published by ANU Press between 1965–1991. This republication is part of the digitisation project being carried out by Scholarly Information Services/Library and ANU Press.
    [Show full text]
  • Isolationism and the Soviet Public Discourse in the 1920S and Early
    NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH TITLE: ISOLATIONISM AND SOVIET PUBLIC DISCOURSE, In The 1920s And Early 1930s AUTHOR: Jeffrey Brooks CONTRACTOR: University of Minnesota PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Jeffrey Brooks COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER: 802-11 DATE: May 1990 The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research- The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of the author. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Contract No. 802-11) ISOLATIONISM AND SOVIET PUBLIC DISCOURSE In the 1920s and early 1930s by Jeffrey Brooks This is a study of the portrayal of public attitudes toward foreigners and foreign states in the Soviet press during the 1920s and early 193 0s, with a special emphasis on America. As Soviet society took shape, a new language of public life arose; existing traditions were jettisoned or amended, and new notions embraced or discarded- Daily life took on new meanings, and a repertoire of frameworks for understanding Soviet experience and its potential unfolded. Within these frameworks, representation of relations with other states and peoples was critical. Isolationism and xenophobia became hallmarks of the Stalinist system, and without them much of what happened would have been impossible, but the long story of Soviet history reveals a counterpoint. The xenophobia of the Stalin years faded quickly after 1953, first into ambivalence and then into a widely felt desire to participate fully in world systems and interact with other peoples. Xenophobia and much else once deemed immutably Soviet have now been marginalized, and yet something of the earlier experience remains.
    [Show full text]
  • Unit 3 Study Guide Name: Date: 1. in 1900 the United States Declared An
    Unit 3 Study Guide Name: Date: 1. In 1900 the United States declared an Open 3. Which of the following is the most accurate Door Policy that reflected which of the following example of President Taft's policy of “dollar beliefs? diplomacy”? A. The Chinese were secretly negotiating trade A. allowing for the nationalization of Latin privileges with European countries. American property owned by U.S. citizens B. Japan might conquer China and cut off all B. exerting economic influence rather than foreign trade. military force in Latin American countries C. All countries should have equal trading rights C. using international trade organizations to in China. stabilize Latin American economies D. American consumers would be hurt by D. maintaining a military force to discourage international trade. European colonization in Latin America 4. How did the United States help the Allies win 2. The United States' policy of acting as an World War I? international police force in the Western Hemisphere can be traced back to the early 1900s and the— A. The United States entered into a secret agreement with the Central Powers. A. Marshall Plan. B. The United States agreed to provide financial assistance to rebuild Germany. B. Roosevelt Corollary. C. The United States refused to fight an offensive C. Open Door Notes. war. D. Dawes Plan. D. The United States provided strong, energized troops. page 1 5. “Remember the Maine” is a memorable slogan 7. This graphic organizer represents U.S. involvement and rallying cry in American history. The slogan in the First World War. symbolizes the onset of which of the following wars? A.
    [Show full text]
  • Conspiracy of Peace: the Cold War, the International Peace Movement, and the Soviet Peace Campaign, 1946-1956
    The London School of Economics and Political Science Conspiracy of Peace: The Cold War, the International Peace Movement, and the Soviet Peace Campaign, 1946-1956 Vladimir Dobrenko A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, October 2015 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 90,957 words. Statement of conjoint work I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by John Clifton of www.proofreading247.co.uk/ I have followed the Chicago Manual of Style, 16th edition, for referencing. 2 Abstract This thesis deals with the Soviet Union’s Peace Campaign during the first decade of the Cold War as it sought to establish the Iron Curtain. The thesis focuses on the primary institutions engaged in the Peace Campaign: the World Peace Council and the Soviet Peace Committee.
    [Show full text]
  • AM IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS of the SENATE WARTIME ADDRESSES of ROBERT MARION LA FOLLETTE Harry R. Gianneschi a Dissertation Submitte
    AM IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SENATE WARTIME ADDRESSES OF ROBERT MARION LA FOLLETTE Harry R. Gianneschi A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY December . 197.5 618206 Vu.w ii Wo • ABSTRACT Robert Marion La Follette, leading American progres­ sive, Governor of Wisconsin for three terms, and U. S. Senator from 1905 to 1925, was selected by the 1957 Senate as one of five of its greatest members throughout this country’s history. In light of Ij.s subsequent praiseworthy reputation and of the popular support he maintained during most of his career, the reason for his publicly denounced "anti-war" stance in 1917 has remained a mystery to many critics. Viewing the stance as a break-away from his previous beliefs, historians have tagged him as pacifistic, ignorant, or demagogic in his approach to the war. This study was designed to investigate elements in La Follette's life and speaking which could clarify the motivation for his Senate speeches from April 4 to October 6 in 1917. Research on this topic was devoted to an in-depth investigation of La Follette's entire speaking career. Texts of the speeches he gave during his life, editorial writings presented in La Follette's Magazine, and the personal papers of La Follette, members of his family, and close friends, all located in the Wisconsin State Histori­ cal Society Archives, were studied. Reactions were discovered in accounts by his contemporaries and the newspapers of the day.
    [Show full text]
  • Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Seminar
    Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Seminar PANEL 2: The Uses of History 1. Jonathan Hunt, RAND The Bargain: The United States, Global Nuclear Order, and the Last War, 1956-1975 Objectives: The global nuclear regime is the culmination of efforts to manage nuclear technology internationally. The original meanings of the treaties that inaugurated the regime, which for interpretive purposes have been identified as the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which denuclearized Latin America and the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), are rooted in how and why they were first brokered. This book situates these international agreements in their original contexts, most notably the Cold War, decolonization, development and the United Nations. It also advances a historical theory of states’ attitudes toward nuclear weapons and correspondingly proliferation, which holds that a society’s memory of what Philip Bobbitt calls epochal wars and which I style “last wars,” frames how it views the relationship between sovereignty, national security and international order.1 Overview: The world’s states built a global regime to manage the development and dissemination of nuclear weapons from 1956 to 1975, when climbing sales of nuclear reactors and a drumbeat of nuclear crises at hotspots around the world convinced many that multilateral and international measures were needed to manage the atom. Three nuclear powers—the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom—worked together and within an international community then emerging from decolonization to devise common rules and collective arrangements for nuclear security. Three solutions were identified: a nuclear-test ban, regional pacts to keep nuclear weapons out of certain neighborhoods and a global agreement to forbid new states from acquiring them.
    [Show full text]
  • Honours Thesis Game Theory and the Metaphor of Chess in the Late Cold
    Honours Thesis Game Theory and the Metaphor of Chess in the late Cold War Period o Student number: 6206468 o Home address: Valeriaan 8 3417 RR Montfoort o Email address: [email protected] o Type of thesis/paper: Honours Thesis o Submission date: March 29, 2020 o Thesis supervisor: Irina Marin ([email protected]) o Number of words: 18.291 o Page numbers: 55 Abstract This thesis discusses how the game of chess has been used as a metaphor for the power politics between the United States of America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, particularly the period of the Reagan Doctrine (1985-1989). By looking at chess in relation to its visual, symbolic and political meanings, as well in relation to game theory and the key concepts of polarity and power politics, it argues that, although the ‘chess game metaphor’ has been used during the Cold War as a presentation for the international relations between the two superpowers in both cultural and political endeavors, the allegory obscures many nuances of the Cold War. Acknowledgment This thesis has been written roughly from November 2019 to March 2020. It was a long journey, and in the end my own ambition and enthusiasm got the better of me. The fact that I did three other courses at the same time can partly be attributed to this, but in many ways, I should have kept my time-management and planning more in check. Despite this, I enjoyed every moment of writing this thesis, and the subject is still captivating to me.
    [Show full text]
  • The Fallacy of Nuclear Deterrence
    THE FALLACY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE LCol J.P.P. Ouellet JCSP 41 PCEMI 41 Exercise Solo Flight Exercice Solo Flight Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs do not represent Department of National Defence or et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces without written permission. canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2015. le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2015. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 41 – PCEMI 41 2014 – 2015 EXERCISE SOLO FLIGHT – EXERCICE SOLO FLIGHT THE FALLACY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE LCol J.P.P. Ouellet “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion opinion of any agency, including the d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the gouvernement du Canada et le ministère Canadian Department of National de la Défense nationale du Canada.
    [Show full text]
  • Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes
    Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes Erik Gartzke 1 Dong-Joon Jo Word count: 10,833 Abstract Contrasting claims about the consequences of nuclear weapons rely on different interpretations about how leaders respond to risk, uncertainty, and the balance of power. Nuclear optimists use deterrence theory to argue that proliferation can promote stability and inhibit the use of force. Pessimists argue that proliferation precipitates nuclear hubris, accident, or anger that heighten the risk of war. It is also possible that nuclear weapons have no net effect on dispute propensity. Since states fashion their own bargains, nuclear status is bound to influence the distribution of influence. Proliferation also reflects existing tensions, biasing upward the apparent impact of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict. Instrumenting for the decision to proliferate, we find that nuclear weapons increase diplomatic status, without much affecting whether states fight. 1. Introduction Since the advent of the nuclear age, speculation has raged about whether taming the atom inflames or pacifies world politics. Optimists claim that nuclear weapons deter, and therefore stabilize the politics of nations (Mearsheimer 1984, 1993; Waltz 1981, 1990). Pessimists see nuclear weapons as inciting fear, hubris, and misperception (Jervis 1984, 1988, 1989; Sagan 1989). A third, somewhat neglected possibility is that both arguments are right, and wrong. Diplomatic bargains tend to dampen the observable impact of nuclear weapons, even as contrasting tendencies tend to cancel each other out. To the degree that nuclear weapons influence the concessions proliferators are likely to obtain in lieu of force, proliferation does much less to account for behavioral conflict. Possession of nuclear weapons increases the risks to opponents that choose to fight.
    [Show full text]
  • Bum Dope, Blowback, and the Bomb: the Effect of Bad Information on Policy-Maker Beliefs and Crisis Stability
    Chapter 8 Bum Dope, Blowback, and the Bomb: The Effect of Bad Information on Policy-Maker Beliefs and Crisis Stability Jeffrey Lewis How might bad information affect crisis stability? We like to imag- ine that elites—military offi cials, politicians, and experts—will be immune to the kind of rumor, disinformation, and propaganda with which the internet is awash. This chapter explores that notion, with a nod to political scientist Stephen Van Evera’s notion of blowback—the idea that propaganda can, in fact, warp elite perceptions. Van Evera was concerned about psychological blurring between rhetoric and sin- cere belief while others, like Jack Snyder, another expert on interna- tional relations, emphasized the risk that policy makers might become trapped by political rhetoric.1 This chapter is principally concerned with this idea: that bad infor- mation, even deliberate disinformation knowingly planted by some cyn- ical elites, might “blow back” (or echo) through a wider range of elites and worsen a nuclear crisis. It examines two contemporary case studies of bad information, both of which help illustrate how such informa- tion—to use George P. Shultz’s colorful phrase, “bum dope”—could undermine crisis stability.2 I conclude that the same pathologies seen in online discourse could undermine stability, even in a serious crisis involving nuclear weapons. In short, policy makers tend to engage in public rhetoric that, in turn, shapes their own thinking. Often such statements are propagandistic in their initial formulation. But as they become part of the public dis- course, policy makers tend to believe them. This carries additional risk HH7667-Trinkunas.indb7667-Trinkunas.indb 115959 11/17/20/17/20 88:49:49 AAMM 160 JEFFREY LEWIS in an era of social media.
    [Show full text]
  • 2018 Sartorius Christopher Ma
    UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE WARNING INTELLIGENCE IN NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT: AVOIDING CATASTROPHIC MISCALCULATION A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY By CHRISTOPHER M. SARTORIUS Norman, OK 2018 WARNING INTELLIGENCE IN NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGMENT: AVOIDING CATASTROPHIC MISCALCULATION A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE BY ___________________________ Dr. Ronald K. Gaddie, Chair ___________________________ Dr. Colin M. Barry ___________________________ Dr. Deven E. Carlson ___________________________ Dr. Jorge L. Mendoza ___________________________ Dr. Shad B. Satterthwaite © Copyright by CHRISTOPHER M. SARTORIUS 2018 All Rights Reserved. This dissertation is dedicated to my family and all intelligence professionals, military and civilian, past and present, who have dedicated their lives to protecting our great nation and our allies. Acknowledgements Working on this doctoral dissertation has been both a joy and a challenge. This work would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of countless individuals. At the most personal level, I would like to thank my wife, Fulvia, for her support over the past three years of this doctoral program and for her care and love over the past 25 years. I wish to thank my son, Konrad, for providing inspiration, much needed breaks in my work routine, and for sharing lunch together at the OU cafeteria followed by our fun table tennis matches. I also would like to thank my parents, Tim and Wanda Sartorius, for instilling in me the value of a great education. I would also like to thank Dr. Shad Satterthwaite, always friendly, open, and upbeat for enthusiastically encouraging me to pursue a doctoral degree at OU and Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Bill Robinson
    To: Bill Robinson <[email protected]> From: "Howard W. Hallman" <[email protected]> Subject: Re: Canadian churches and abolition Cc: Bcc: X-Attachments: At 12:43 PM 11/16/98 -0500, Bill Robinson wrote: >Dear Howard - > >Project Ploughshares, which is a project of the Canadian Council of >Churches, is considering the feasibility of organizing some kind of >outreach project between Canadian church leaders and church leaders in >other countries on the subject of nuclear abolition.... December 1, 1998 Dear Bill, I've been hanging onto your communication of November 16 about getting the Canadian Council of Churches to reach out to other countries on nuclear abolition. Since my response is somewhat complex, I'm just getting around to replying. Basically it's a good idea. Because the Canadian government is questioning some of the cold war assumptions about nuclear deterrence and has led the way in land mines, it would be useful for Canadian religious bodies to provide similar world leadership within the religious community. As you may recall, I initiated an effort related to the 1998 session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in Geneva that (1) produced a statement to delegates from Dr. Konrad Raiser, general secretary of the World Council of Churches, and Godried Cardinal Danneels, president of Pax Christi International, (2) sponsored a reception for delegates co-hosted by Dr. Raiser and Cardinal Danneels, and (3) developed a presentation to delegates on spiritual and moral values. I'm sending separately the Raiser-Danneels statement with some endorsers. I can send you the presentation to delegates if you want it.
    [Show full text]