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LATAKIA the European Union CITY FACTSHEET CONFLICT TIMELINE and POPULATION FOOTPRINT 1

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LATAKIA the European Union CITY FACTSHEET CONFLICT TIMELINE and POPULATION FOOTPRINT 1 URBAN ANALYSIS NETWORK This project is funded by LATAKIA The European Union CITY FACTSHEET CONFLICT TIMELINE AND POPULATION FOOTPRINT 1 Location and significance Lattakia is Syria’s fifth largest city with a population of 859,340 (April 2019) and 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 the capital of the northwestern governorate of Lattakia. Considered a May May May May May manufacturing center for its neighboring villages, Lattakia city is connected May May May by road to Aleppo in Syria, and Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon, making it a crucial transit point for Syrian imports and exports. More importantly, it houses the second largest port in Syria, which remains a strategic economic and military access point for the Government of Syria and Russian Military forces. Previously an Alawite stronghold, the city’s demography is now majority Sunni due to an influx of primarily Sunni IDPs. The current political and military situation Because it remained under the control of the Government of Syria since the beginning of the conflict, Lattakia city has been relatively stable, however local security is challenged by an increasing crime rate and sporadic vehicle explosions. The Government of Syria’s military presence in the city is GoS Control Illuminated Partially Illuminated Not Illuminated represented by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and the Syrian security services, as well as other pro-Government forces such as Suhail Al Hassan forces, the 2 Syrian Marines, the Eagles of the Whirlwind (Nusour al Zawba'a), and Saraya Al SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE ‘Areen. Russian military forces are also present across Lattakia city due to the location of the Hmeimim military airbase in the south east countryside of the Severe Moderate Good No Data city. A limited number of Iranian soldiers are also present in the city along with Average functionality by city area the Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah group. On March 13, 2019 Functionality per sector for entire city Turkish-backed militias in northern Lattakia Governorate launched rockets targeting the city. The attack may signify the start of a wave of retaliatory Aug 2016 Jan 2019 attacks on Lattakia city in response to Russian and Government of Syria Aug 2016 Jan 2019 attacks on rural Idlib and Hama, despite the September 18, 2018 Demilitarization Agreement. However, these attacks are sporadic in nature 2 and do not represent a major threat to overall stability and security within the city at this time. There is also a small possibility that Israel carries out airstrikes against Iranian and Government of Syria military targets if the A A Iranian presence inside the city were to increase. B B Access and population return environment D C D C Owing to the city’s relative stability, the number of IDPs reached 412,620 in April 2019 (48.0% of the city’s population). Registered IDPs in 2014 numbered only 167,000 (39.5% of total population). This massive influx of IDPs was the result of violent clashes between Government of Syria forces, which were F E F E supported by Russian and Iranian-backed forces, and opposition militias in Lattakia, Aleppo and Idlib governorates. Two crossing points, Samira and Yunesiya, connecting Turkey to Lattakia Governorate are closed, while the Kassab crossing point which is controlled by Turkish customs and the 0 1.13 1.47 2 Government of Syria recently opened. Marketplaces inside Lattakia city have 2016 remained intact, however trade with Aleppo has been disrupted. In addition, 2019 the city’s economy previously relied heavily on tourism, which has declined 0.91 2 substantially as a result of the conflict. Syrian businessmen are active in the city’s war economy and maintain close relations with the Government of Syria. Severe Moderate Good Governance Health Solid Waste Markets Electricity WASH 0 The Municipality of Lattakia city is led by the Governor’s office, which oversees activities conducted by the City Council, Executive Committees, and local sub-committees which are in charge of providing and overseeing basic public 4 3 services. The structure of the Municipality has not changed drastically since POPULATION DAMAGE TO HOUSING the beginning of the conflict, and a number of the newly reinstated officials had already served in the previous City Councils. All official NGOs must register and receive approval from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and ESTIMATES INFRASTRUCTURE conduct their work under the supervision of the Ministry and the Higher Relief Committee. Officially registered NGOs on the list of Syrian Foreign Ministry are 3.5% 29.1% also able to receive internal and external funding through their officially opened bank accounts and can cooperate with registered INGOs. However, it ,140 ELDERLY CHILDREN 404 ) is challenging for many NGOs to operate in the city as they are required to (60+) (5-18) disclose sensitive information related to the organization and their donors in PRE-CONFLICT order to receive registration. POPULATION (2010) 2018 No Damage Response environment MALE The influx of IDPs to Lattakia city has put pressure on the current housing (Aug market, public services, infrastructure, and local businesses. Currently, the ) city is especially in need of projects aimed at expanding housing capacity to 412,535 47.4% 47 9% accommodate the IDPs and residents, with a specific focus on meeting the 2019 ESTIMATED FEMALE demands of residents who are unable to afford finished housing. Moreover, 870,897 the city’s electricity, WASH, educational and health sectors are overwhelmed (Jul and require major rehabilitation and support. ESTIMATED CURRENT IDPS HOSTED POPULATION IN THE CITY 52.1% AVERAGE FUNCTIONALITY5 BY SECTOR AND NEIGHBORHOOD Energy Education Health WASH Solid Waste Severe (0 - 0.69) Moderate (0.7 - 1.39) Good (1.4 - 2.0) No Data CITY MAP 5 A Al Hasakeh Lattakia ! B D C City Areas: Consists of neighbourhoods: A : Al Asad LEGEND F E B : Ogharit, Basnada, Squbeen, Sunjuwan C : Tishrine Administrative D : Al- Thawrah, Baath, 7 Nisan, Jomhouriyeh Basic Services E : Jame'et Tishrine, Quds Open Spaces and Greenary F : Oweina, Qalaa, Sheikh Daher, Sleiba, Tabiyat Residential Street 0 1.5 3 6 km "The information contained in this report is intended to help our partners within the Urban Analysis consortium to better plan, target and monitor humanitarian and recovery interventions in urban areas in Syria. While every effort has been made to verify the information provided in this document, the findings are not intended as a substitute or to be solely relied upon for project or program-specific interventions outside of the consortium’s scope of work. The information and views set out are those of the authors and0 do not necessarily1.5 reflect the official3 opinion of the European Union. Neither6 the European Union institutions and bodies nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained therein." Km METHODOLOGY 1. NIGHTTIME/POPULATION FOOTPRINT For each of the indicators and for the composite index, a cumulative functionality of services essential for the neighborhoods’ In order to assess the population distribution in the City, granular data three-threshold qualifier was used to describe the quality of access livability; namely WASH, solid waste management, electricity, at the level of neighborhood are needed (e.g. data on distribution of to the service. A functionality index value of 0 – 0.69 is considered education and health. The index considers functionality in terms of aid, disaggregated at neighborhood level). This data does not exist “severe”, 0.7-1.39 “moderate” and 1.4 – 2 is considered “good” the community’s perceived accessibility, reliability and quality of except for a few large cities. In the secondary Cities, UrbAN-S relied functionality. those services . The below table breaks down the list of indicators on a proxy indicator to give an approximate picture of the likely used to produce the maps. 3. AVERAGE FUNCTIONALITY BY SECTOR AND NEIGHBORHOOD population distribution. Using nighttime images that capture the 4. DAMAGE TO HOUSING INFRASTRUCTURE average radiance composite on a monthly basis, an annual composite This section through the use of maps tries to break down into a neighborhood level the functionality of each sector. It does so by The analyses of damage relied both on pre-conflict statistical data, was produced for each year since 2012 (except when the data was not that describes housing stock by neighborhood, and by building available). Nightlight data from VIIRS was used as provided by the taking not only 1 indicator per sector, as in the previous section, but through two or three indicators per sector. It provides a metric for the typology, as well as the occupancy rate. Damage as a result of the NOAA Earth Observations Group (EOG) conflict was assessed using remote sensing analytics. The distribu- (https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/viirs/download_dnb_composites.html) tion of damage points as detected by remote sensing was used to Prior to averaging the version 1 suite product, the DNB data was INDICATORS classify the neighborhoods into four damage classes: filtered to reduce the impacted by stray light, lightning, lunar Sector Services and Average Functionality 1. Neighborhoods/City areas with less than 1% of the area damaged: illumination, and cloud-cover, but external light sources such as fires Infrastructure Sector and Neighborhood marked as “no damage” were not removed. 2. Neighborhoods/City areas with area damage between 1%-9.9%: HEALTH • How long does it take a • How long does it take a patient in this marked as “light damage” VIIRS light intensity values were extracted for 20 cities and ranged patient in this neighborhood neighborhood to travel to the nearest between 0 to 85 nanoW/cm2/sr with 0 nanoW/cm2/sr indicating to travel to the nearest functional healthcare facility (average 3.
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