PUBLIC 4-YEAR COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY FINANCE: EQUALITY OF STATE FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO PUBLIC HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

By

CHRISTOPHER WEAVER

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2018

© 2018 Christopher K. Weaver

To my mother, Dianne Weaver, without her none of this would be possible.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge my dissertation Chair and Co-Chair Dr. David Hedge and

Dr. Sharon Austin. I would also like to acknowledge my committee members Dr. Lynn Leverty,

Dr. Beth Rosenson, and Dr. Paul Ortiz. This also would not be possible if it wasn’t for the support of the University of Florida’s Office of Graduate Minority Programs administered by

Dean Henry Frierson, Dr. Tyisha Hathorn, Earl Wade, and Sarah McLemore.

I must also acknowledge Florida A&M University, for this illustrious institution is the inspiration of this study, the provider of my doctoral fellowship, and the institution that helped mold me into the man that I am today. FAMU taught me how to do more with less, that excuses are tools of the incompetent, and the meaning of “Excellence with Caring.” I would also be remised if I did not acknowledge the greatest fraternity ever organized, The Omega Psi Phi

Fraternity Incorporated. Through my association with this fraternity, I was able cultivate life long friendships with brothers who inspired me to be great. These brothers included but are not limited to: Tallie Brinson, Dr. Terrell Coring, Robert Little, Malachi Green, Reynaldo Russell,

Riccardo Jean, Gregory Boler, Quinton Stroud, Quinton Strother, Derrick Heck, Zeddrick

Barber, Omari Crawford, Brian Freeman, Jared Fields, Bradford Moye, Royle King, and Iman

Sandifer.

I would also like to acknowledge my beautiful partner Sarah Anderson who supported me, understood me and never complained about the time required away from her to finish this research project. Last but not least I would like to thank the countless anonymous people who reported me to the University Police for being suspicious while putting in late night hours in my department’s computer lab and the countless number of people who assumed that the only way I could attend the University of Florida was by running track or playing football. Their bias was my motivation.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... 4

LIST OF TABLES ...... 7

LIST OF FIGURES ...... 8

ABSTRACT ...... 9

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 10

Importance of Study ...... 14 Purpose of the Study ...... 16 Significance of the Study ...... 18

2 BACKGROUND ...... 23

The History of Black Higher Education- Past and Present ...... 23 Past: From Slaves to Educated Freeman ...... 23 Present HBCU Diversity ...... 35 Non-black Students Attending HBCUs ...... 35 Non-black Faculty at HBCUs ...... 39 Racial History of Inadequate HBCU Funding ...... 41

3 DATA AND METHODS ...... 48

Theoretical Framework ...... 48 The Basics of Public Higher Education Finance ...... 48 State Appropriations ...... 49 State Grants and Contract ...... 51 State Capital Appropriations ...... 53 Politics of Public University Budgeting ...... 54 State Governance and Institutional Autonomy ...... 58 Race and Public Policy ...... 60 Research Questions and Hypotheses ...... 64 Data ...... 65 Variable Construction and Description ...... 66 Dependent Variable ...... 66 Independent Variables ...... 67 State Mandated Spending ...... 67 Political Variables ...... 69 State Variables ...... 71

5

Institutional Control Variables ...... 72 Methodology ...... 75 Quantitative Analysis ...... 76 Assumptions ...... 80 Delimitations ...... 80 Limitations ...... 80

4 RESULTS ...... 83

State Financial Support Trends From 2004-2013 ...... 83 State Financial Support Political Model ...... 97 State Financial Support Institutional Model ...... 103 State Financial Support Full Model ...... 107 Summary ...... 110

5 CONCLUSIONS ...... 132

Summary Findings ...... 133 Question One: State Financial Support Trends ...... 133 Hypothesis One: State Interest Payments and State Financial Support to HBCUs ...... 136 Hypothesis Two: State Political Ideologies and State Financial Support to HBCUs ....140 Hypothesis Three: House Republican Majority and State Financial Support to HBCUs ...... 144 Hypothesis Four: State Unified Government and State Financial Support to HBCUs .148 Hypothesis Five: State Republican Unified Government and State Financial Support to HBCUs ...... 152 Hypothesis Six: State Governance and State Financial Support to HBCUs ...... 156 Hypothesis Seven: Fiscal Autonomy and State Financial Support to HBCUs ...... 160 Hypothesis Eight: HBCUs and State Financial Support to HBCUs ...... 165 Conclusion ...... 168

REFERENCE LIST ...... 172

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 188

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LIST OF TABLES

Table page

1-1 Public 4-Year Historically Black Colleges and Universities...... 20

1-2 Discontinued Black Colleges. Source: Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Post-Secondary Education Data System (IPEDS), 2013 ...... 22

2-1 Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Accreditation Decision 2003- 2013 Source: Source: Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Annual Report (2003-2013) ...... 47

4-1 HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Year ...... 120

4-2 HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Governance Structure ...... 121

4-3 HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Fiscal Autonomy...... 122

4-4 HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Funding Classification...... 123

4-5 HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Gubernatorial Control ...... 124

4-6 HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by State Government Control ...... 125

4-7 HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by State Senate Control ...... 126

4-8 HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by State House Control ...... 127

4-9 HBCU State Financial Support per FTE Trends by State...... 128

4-10 Random Effects Results for Political Model (n=359) ...... 129

4-11 Random Effects Results for Institutional Model Model (n=297) ...... 130

4-12 Random Effects Results for Full Model (n=923) ...... 131

5-1 Summary Results of Hypotheses Tests...... 171

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure page

1-1 Geographical Location of Public 4-year Historically Black Colleges and Universities. Source: Author’s collection using Google Maps...... 19

2-1 HBCU Enrollment data from 1980-1989. Source: U.S. Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System ...... 45

2-2 Public 4-year HBCU: Black and Non Black Enrollment 2004 – 2013. Source: U.S. Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System ...... 46

4-1 Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System ...... 112

4-2 Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by State Governance Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System ...... 113

4-3 Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Fiscal Autonomy Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System ...... 114

4-4 Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Funding Classification Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System ...... 115

4-5 Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Gubernatorial Party Control Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System .....116

4-6 Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Government Control Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System ...... 117

4-7 Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by State Senate Control Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System ...... 118

4-8 Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by State House Control Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System ...... 119

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

PUBLIC 4-YEAR COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY FINANCE: EQUALITY OF STATE FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO PUBLIC HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

By

Christopher K Weaver December 2018

Chair: David M. Hedge Cochair: Sharon D. Austin Major: Political Science

HBCUs are vital to the education of . However, the history of racism in America and the changing landscape of higher education is threatening the existence of these institutions. Anecdotal accusations suggests that Historically Black Colleges and Universities

(HBCUs) suffer from state funding discrimination in comparison to White institutions. This dissertation seeks to determine if these accusations are true by using quantitative models to examine the effects of politico-economic variables of state financial support to HBCUs. This dissertation will add to the academic bodies of work centered on race and policy, organization and budgeting, and politics and budgeting.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The Land Grant College Act or Morrill Act of 1862 was enacted to provide higher education access to middle and lower class American citizens. The land grant college system was the byproduct of the Morrill Act and the conduit through which working class Americans could receive a higher education (Mutakabbir, 2011). Southern states prohibited the practice of formally educating blacks prior to the civil war (Brooks & Starks, 2011). During this period, the only formal institutions that educated blacks were Wilberforce, Lincoln, and Cheney University

(Lovett, 2011). Blacks who attended institutions of higher education during this period primarily were enrolled in private colleges funded through charitable organizations and churches (Avery,

2009; Brooks & Starks, 2011; Canty, Bland, Mack, & Davis, 2012).

The Second Morrill Act was enacted in 1890 to make additional funding available to land grant colleges and universities outlined by the Morrill Act of 1862. This act included provisions that required land grant colleges and universities to discontinue the practice of race being an admission criterion (Morrill Act of 1890). To maintain compliance under the Second Morrill Act and prevent the possibility of racial integration of colleges and universities, states formed separate institutions for black students. States either designated established colleges as institutions for black students or started new institutions (Mutakabbir, 2011). Although institutions were established to educate blacks, the ruling of treatment established by Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) would be questioned by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Sweatt v. Painter (1950). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Texas State

University for Negroes failed to meet the separate but equal provisions of Plessy v. Ferguson

(1896). In the opinion of the court Thurgood Marshall School of Law, the only law school in

Texas created to educate blacks at that time, did not meet reasonable requirements of equality as

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other law schools. The courts factor in the size of the law library, the number of full-time professors, and its proximity to other professionals in the law field.

Beginning in the 1920s, Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) had consistently begun to achieve respect within institutional accrediting bodies (Canty, et al., 2012).

HBCUs had developed into important pillars of African American higher education by the 1930s

(Avery, 2009). The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA, 1965), legally designated HBCUs as institutions established earlier than 1964 and served the principal operation of cultivating African

Americans (HEA, 1965). Most HBCUs operate in 19 States, most of which are southern states

(Sink, 1995). The only federally funded HBCUs outside of Southern states are the University of the Virgin Islands and . The University of the Virgin Islands was selected as an HBCU by congress by 1986 (Avery, 2009; Brooks & Starks, 2011). Prior to the Brown v.

Board of Education (1954), more than 90% of college-educated African Americans were alumni of HBCUs (Kim, 2011).

Today there are 40 4-year public HBCUs (Integrated Postsecondary Education Data

System [IPEDS], 2013). Table 1-1 and Figure 1-1 lists 4-year public HBCUs and illustrates their geographical location. Jointly, students attending HBCUs represent 3% of the US Higher education population (Brooks & Starks, 2011; Jackson & Nunn, 2003). Nevertheless, HBCUs produce more than 33% of African Americans with bachelor’s degrees and account for 75% of doctoral degrees, 46% of business executives, 50% of engineers, 80% of federal judges, 50% of medical doctors and 50% of attorneys (Brooks & Starks, 2011). HBCUs have been pivotal in combating impediments to higher education access. HBCUs operate at lower cost relative to

Traditionally White Institutions (TWI’s). This makes them an important corridor of access to higher education for lower socioeconomic Americans (Betsey, 2008). Additionally, several

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researchers allude to the constructive collective function and active role that HBCUs play in the instruction of African Americans (Brooks & Starks, 2011; Canty, et al., 2012).

Despite the communal importance of HBCUs, many researchers wonder if HBCUs can survive given the contemporary fiscal environment in which institutions function (Betsey, 2008;

Brooks & Starks, 2011). HBCUs have been struggling with the adverse financial consequences of decreasing enrollments, decreasing state financial support, minimal endowments and increasing African American enrollment at Traditional White Institutions (Brooks & Starks,

2011). The perception of financial and operational challenges, have caused states to take a closer look at the benefits of HBCUs as an educational option as well as current relevance (Canty, et al., 2012; Kim, 2011). According to Brown and Ricard (2007), many citizens view HBCUs as being instrumental in maintaining mechanism of African-American cultural character. After

2008, state and federal governments overall support of colleges and universities began to steadily decline. Leachman, Williams, and Johnson (2011) discovered that in 2011, twenty states designed long range budgets that proposed extensive sequestration in higher education funding.

HBCUs continue to rely heavily on income from government sources (Evans, Evans, &

Evans, 2002). The financial instability of HBCUs assists in fostering institutional environments of reactionary leadership and management (Canty, et al., 2012). Lack of financial support is often introduced into the larger dialogue of HBCUs relevancy and valuation against their operational goals (Canty, et al., 2012). Robust financial revenue streams are critical to attracting and retaining faculty (Canty, et al., 2012). It has been suggested that HBCUs integrate fundraising from corporate grants, endowments, alumni giving and other alternative sources.

While private HBCUs have some documented success with endowment revenue; Public HBCUs

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have consistently underperformed compared to their private counter parts with respect to securing these types of revenue sources (Canty, et al., 2012; Evans, et al., 2002).

The underfunding of HBCUs, particularly at the state level, has negatively affected their ability to offer attractive areas of academic study as well as broaden their student population demographics and has contributed to the termination of some institutions (Brooks & Starks,

2011). Since the establishment of higher education institutions for African Americans, twelve have since closed. A majority of the closures were due to financial challenges and debt. One can only contemplate whether this is a general trend entrenched in historical bias. Table 1-2 illustrates defunct black institutions of higher education. Past legal action and case law appear to uphold this argument. According to Lum (2001), provisions of the , specifically Title VI caused states to aggressively address inequity in the funding of HBCUs through policies such as the upgrading of institutional infrastructure. By 1993, eleven of the nineteen states that operated HBCUs were involved in litigation or were out of compliance with the U.S. Department of Education’s civil rights regulations. The landmark Fordice v. United

States case challenged an alleged separate but equal system of higher education in the state of

Mississippi. The case was settled and $503 million was appropriated to augment resources and infrastructure at Mississippi’s three HBCUs (Lee, 2010).

Despite the legal settlement of Fordice v. United States and its subsequent increase in funding to Mississippi’s HBCUs, equality in state financial support has yet to be achieved relative to their Traditionally White Institution counterparts (Minor, 2008). Despite the collective importance of HBCUs within higher education, there is still the appearance of institutional bias. Minor (2008) posits that state budgeting processes act as de facto discrimination against HBCUs. Fiscal discrimination against HBCUs reduces the capacity for the

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institutions to eliminate access and degree attainment disparities between their TWI counterparts, which subsequently reduce state higher educational systems’ ability to serve underrepresented groups. Despite much research and policy innovations, the HBCU funding debate continues.

Importance of Study

The primary goal of this study is to determine political and institutional factors that affect state financial support of public 4-year HBCUs. In this dissertation, state financial support is defined as the sum of state appropriations, state operating grants, and state capital appropriations given to higher education institutions. The secondary goal is to update the already existing academic study of higher education policy- in particular public higher education finance. This study will also add to the little empirical information available on HBCU finance and the influence of state level politics. This work improves past research by updating the empirical studies of bureaucratic autonomy done by Meier (1985), Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast

(1989) and Hammond and Knott (1996) and higher education governance by Glenny and

Dalglish (1973), Levy (1980), Berdahl and McConnell (1994) and Volkwein and Malik (1997).

This research also improves upon the past research done by Sav (1997) by comparing the equality of state funding for HBCUs to Roughly Comparable Predominantly White Institutions

(RCPWIs). In the past HBCU funding was compared to all Predominantly White Institutions

(PWIs) including large flagship Universities; this was equivalent to comparing grapes to watermelons.

This research adds to the aforementioned previous studies by extending the scope of research to include the years 2004-2013, thereby showing the most recent interactions between public policy, higher education institution budgeting, state higher education governance structure and political influence. Empirical studies on Historical Black Colleges and Universities

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(HBCUs) finance are non-existent. This research will specifically introduce HBCUs into the in- depth analysis of higher education finance.

The objective of the dissertation is to determine the relationships between variations in state financial support and political and institutional variables at 38 public 4-year HBCUs. It is expected that state and federal policy as well as governance structures and institutional characteristics will impact state financial support at these financially vulnerable institutions. The governance structure may identify the potential impact of exogenous factors on public HBCUs.

Revenues and expenditures provide understanding into the prioritization and management of institutional resources as well as policy on the funding source for public HBCUs. In this analysis, institutional characteristics, state political characteristics and state governance variables are analyzed to determine whether these variables have a predictive relationship with state financial support.

State appropriations, tuition and fees, federal operating grants and sales and services are the primary source (90%) of most HBCU revenues. Income from state appropriation, state operating grants and state capital appropriation is an indication of state policy-maker’s willingness to exercise its authority in providing support for their institutions of higher education. State governance is a measure of whether a state’s higher education system is controlled by a coordinating board or a consolidated governing board. Fiscal autonomy is a measure of whether individual institutions maintain budgetary authority through a local board of trustees or if that authority is maintained by the state. In addition, state political ideology data and other legislative characteristics provided individual civic characteristics over the same temporal period and may offer a deeper understanding into political factors effecting the funding of HBCUs.

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It is expected that institutional and political factors have a relationship with state financial support of HBCUs. It is also expected that institutional characteristics and political relationships with state financial support differ according to governance structure and institutional autonomy.

The 10-year study time frame serves as the basis for the fiscal decision making process by consolidated governing boards and state coordinating boards.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study is (a) provide context through a descriptive analysis of HBCUs state financial support, governance, state political characteristics and institutional characteristics and (b) to determine the relationship between political and institutional variables and state financial support variation.

The aforementioned goals are obtained by answering the following questions: First, over the period from 2004 to 2013, did state financial support to public 4-year HBCU increase? The expectation is that state financial support to public 4-year HBCUs has decreased over this period as has been demonstrated in literature about public 4-year institutions (Snyder & Dillow, 2011).

Is there dissimilarity in the trends of state financial support between HBCUs and RCPWIs?

Second, what is the relationship between institutional characteristics and state financial support at public 4-year HBCUs from 2004 and 2013? The expectation is that as other institutional revenue sources increase, state financial support will decrease. Hauptman argues, as state leaders often tout publicly, the more state appropriations allocated to public higher education, the less a student will pay out of pocket for their degree (Hauptman, 2011, p. 68).

Consequently, tuition and fees increase faster when state and local support does not maintain funding sufficient to support enrollment increases and offset inflationary increases (State Higher

Education Executive Officers, 2011). Is there a difference in the relationship between

Institutional characteristics and state financial support among HBCUs compared to RCPWI’s?

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Third, what is the relationship between state political characteristics and state financial support to public 4-year HBCUs from 2004 to 2013? In other words, does state financial support to public 4-year HBCUs vary depending on state political characteristics? Related to the question above, the literature indicates that state appropriations for 4- year public institutions have a relationship with state political characteristics. Owings and Borck (2000) suggest that state government expenditures per capita are lower the less professional the state legislature. From the literature it is suggested that state political characteristics will have some relationship with state financial support of 4-year public HBCUs. Is there a difference in the relationship between state political characteristics and state financial support among HBCUs compared to RCPWI’s?

Fourth, what is the relationship between state economic characteristics and levels of state financial support of public 4-year HBCUs from 2004 and 2013? The literature suggests that more centralized governance structures limit the ability of institutions to lobby for increase resources from the state (Lowery, 2001). Is there a difference in the relationship between higher education governance structure and state financial support among HBCUs compared to RCPWI’s?

Fifth, are there differences in state financial support between HBCUs and RCPWIs? Past literature suggest HBCUs are underfunded compared to PWIs however past studies compared

HBCUs to larger PWIs. This research compares HBCUs to PWIs of comparable size and academic scope. Is there a significant difference in state financial support of HBCUs compared to RCPWIs?

The hypotheses are as follows:

 H1: States with higher long-term debt interest payments provide less financial support to HBCUs.

 H2: States that have more liberal political ideologies provide more financial support to HBCUs.

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 H3: States with a majority Republican House of Representatives provide less financial support to HBCUs.

 H4: States with a unified government provide less financial support to HBCUs.

 H5: States with Republican unified governments provide less financial support to HBCUs.

 H6: States with consolidated governing boards provide less financial support to HBCUs than coordinating boards.

 H7: HBCUs with fiscal autonomy receive more state financial support than HBCUs without fiscal autonomy.

 H8: HBCUs receive less state financial support than RCPWIs, holding all else constant.

Detailed information relating to the research question and hypotheses is included in Chapter

Three.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study comes from the importance of understanding the institutional characteristics and relationships of public 4-year HBCUs with political characteristics of the state. Little research has been conducted on HBCU finance and its relationship with federal and state policies.

This study will examine public HBCUs in the United States. In particular, this study focuses on Public HBCU financial support, with an emphasis on the relationship of various factors with state financial support. The Literature review section of this proposal will cover

HBCUs and funding issues, public higher education institutional finance, the politics of public university budgeting and institutional autonomy and state governance. The synthesis of this literature serves to highlight the historical context of state financial support at public 4-year

HBCUs.

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Figure 1-1. Geographical Location of Public 4-year HBCUs. Source: Author’s collection using Google Maps.

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Table 1-1. Public 4-Year HBCUs. Institution name Date Location Carnegie Classification Founded Cheyney University of 1837 Cheyney, Pennsylvania Master's Colleges and Universities Pennsylvania (smaller programs) University of the District of 1851 Washington, District of Master's Colleges and Universities Columbia Columbia (smaller programs) Lincoln University 1854 Lincoln University, Master's Colleges and Universities Pennsylvania (larger programs) Harris-Stowe State University 1857 Saint Louis, Missouri Baccalaureate Colleges--Diverse Fields 1865 Bowie, Maryland Doctoral/Research Universities Lincoln University 1866 Jefferson City, Missouri Master's Colleges and Universities (smaller programs) 1867 Montgomery, Alabama Master's Colleges and Universities (larger programs) 1867 Baltimore, Maryland Doctoral/Research Universities Fayetteville State University 1867 Fayetteville, North Master's Colleges and Universities Carolina (medium programs) 1871 Alcorn State, Master's Colleges and Universities Mississippi (medium programs) University of Arkansas at Pine 1873 Pine Bluff, Arkansas Baccalaureate Colleges--Diverse Bluff Fields Alabama A & M University 1875 Normal, Alabama Master's Colleges and Universities (larger programs) Prairie View A & M University 1876 Prairie View, Texas Master's Colleges and Universities (larger programs) 1877 Jackson, Mississippi Research Universities (high research activity) and A & 1880 Baton Rouge, Louisiana Master's Colleges and Universities M College (larger programs) Virginia State University 1882 Petersburg, Virginia Master's Colleges and Universities (smaller programs) Kentucky State University 1886 Frankfort, Kentucky Baccalaureate Colleges--Arts & Sciences University of Maryland Eastern 1886 Princess Anne, Master's Colleges and Universities Shore Maryland (smaller programs) Florida Agricultural and 1887 Tallahassee, Florida Doctoral/Research Universities Mechanical University 1887 Wilberforce, Ohio Baccalaureate Colleges--Diverse Fields Savannah State University 1890 Savannah, Georgia Baccalaureate Colleges--Arts & Sciences Delaware State University 1891 Dover, Delaware Master's Colleges and Universities (medium programs) Elizabeth City State University 1891 Elizabeth City, North Baccalaureate Colleges--Diverse Carolina Fields North Carolina A & T State 1891 Greensboro, North Doctoral/Research Universities University Carolina State University 1891 Institute, West Virginia Baccalaureate Colleges--Arts & Sciences Winston-Salem State 1892 Winston-Salem, North Master's Colleges and Universities University Carolina (medium programs) Fort Valley State University 1895 Fort Valley, Georgia Baccalaureate Colleges--Diverse Fields

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Table 1-1 Continued Institution name Date Location Carnegie Classification Founded 1895 Bluefield, West Virginia Baccalaureate Colleges--Diverse Fields South Carolina State 1896 Orangeburg, South Doctoral/Research Universities University Carolina 1897 Langston, Oklahoma Master's Colleges and Universities (smaller programs) 1900 Baltimore, Maryland Master's Colleges and Universities (smaller programs) Grambling State University 1901 Grambling, Louisiana Master's Colleges and Universities (medium programs) 1903 Albany, Georgia Master's Colleges and Universities (medium programs) North Carolina Central 1910 Durham, North Carolina Master's Colleges and Universities (larger University programs) State University 1912 Nashville, Tennessee Doctoral/Research Universities Texas Southern University 1927 Houston, Texas Doctoral/Research Universities 1935 Norfolk, Virginia Master's Colleges and Universities (larger programs) Mississippi Valley State 1950 Itta Bena, Mississippi Master's Colleges and Universities University (medium programs) Southern University at New 1956 New Orleans, Louisiana Master's Colleges and Universities Orleans (medium programs) University of the Virgin 1962 Charlotte Amalie, Virgin Baccalaureate Colleges--Diverse Fields Islands Islands Source: United States Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Post-Secondary

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Table 1-2. Discontinued Black Colleges. Source: United States Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Post-Secondary Education Data System (IPEDS), 2013 School City State Founded Closed Type College Dallas Texas 1881 1988 Private Booker T. Washington Junior College Pensacola Florida 1949 1965 Public J. P. Campbell College Jackson Mississippi 1930 1965 Private Cocoa Florida 1960 1963 Public Collier-Blocker Junior College Palatka Florida 1960 1964 Public Daniel Payne College Birmingham Alabama 1889 1979 Private Friendship College Rock Hill South Carolina 1891 1981 Private George R. Smith College Sedalia Missouri 1894 1925 St. Petersburg Florida 1957 1966 Public Seguin Texas 1884 1936 Private Ocala Florida 1958 1966 Public Marianna Florida 1961 1966 Public Johnson Junior College Leesburg Florida 1960 1966 Public Kittrell North Carolina 1886 1975 Private Leland University New Orleans Louisiana 1870 1960 Private Fort Pierce Florida 1960 1966 Public Mary Holmes College West Point Mississippi 1892 2005 Private Mississippi Industrial College Holly Springs Mississippi 1905 1982 Private Morristown Tennessee 1881 1994 Private Mount Hermon Female Seminary Clinton Mississippi 1875 1924 Private Natchez College Natchez Mississippi 1885 1993 Private Payne College Cuthbert Georgia 1879 1912 Roger Williams College Nashville Tennessee 1864 1929 Private West Palm Beach Florida 1958 1965 Public Rosenwald Junior College Panama City Florida 1958 1966 Public Saint Paul's College Lawrenceville Virginia 1888 2013 Private Southern Christian Institute Edwards Mississippi 1908 1954 Private Harpers Ferry West Virginia 1865 1955 Private Suwannee River Junior College Madison Florida 1959 1966 Public Volusia County Junior College Daytona Beach Florida 1958 1965 Public Western University (Kansas) Quindaro Kansas 1865 1943 Private

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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND

The History of Black Higher Education- Past and Present

Past: From Slaves to Educated Freeman

Separate higher education systems for black and white American’s were a materialization of racial culture and prohibitions which started during (J.E. Fleming, 1976; Myers, 1989;

Blackwell, 1991). Federal and state laws prohibited that education of slaves (Weinberg, 1977).

Slave owners used these restrictions to protect slaves from ideas that would increase their awareness of their social condition and cultivate resentment which could lead to insurrection

(Rothenberg, 1988). Many of these restrictions were reactions to the Nat Turner insurrection in

1831. Before it became legal to education blacks in America, slaves would secretly obtain academic instruction from religious white abolitionist (J.E. Fleming, 1976). Black education in the U.S. began as an act of defiance to the racial laws of that time.

During the time of the Emancipation of American slaves legal restrictions were in existence that prohibited blacks from enrolling into American Colleges and Universities (J.E.

Fleming, 1976). The beginning of the Reconstruction era saw freed slaves become legislators and some were able to enroll in integrated schools (J.E. Fleming, 1976). Black social and political participation became increasingly difficult due to several racist and regressive state and federal policies (Rothenberg, 1988). States began to revise their constitutions to exclude black political participation after federal troops were removed from the South. The Compromise of

1876 opened the door to several barriers to black political participation such as literacy test and poll taxes. These policy tools disenfranchised thousands of black voters.

The ’s Bureau provided the first capital investment for the establishment of black colleges. Financial investment from the Freedman’s Bureau assisted in the establishment

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of seventy-four normal schools and sixty-one industrial schools for educating blacks (Davis,

1933).

The first public higher education institutions for blacks after the civil war were called

“normal schools” (Commission on Civil Rights, 1981). The primary goals of these institutions were to train black teachers to educate free blacks in the south. Mayhew (1977) described the as an institution which trained graduates of elementary schools to become school teachers. Normal schools were the foundation of the creation of the U.S. dual education system

(Commission on Civil Rights, 1981).

Before the 1960s, there were less than 30 African Americans with baccalaureate degrees

(Harris, J., Figgures, C., & Carter, D.). During the mid-1960s, various Christian organizations including Baptist and Methodist were providing higher education instruction for blacks (Harris, et al., 1975; Holmes, 1934). Along with education, these organizations used institutions of higher education to teach their Christian principles to African American students. Most of the Christian organizations who aided in this endeavor operated in the north (Lockett and Simpkins, 1977).

Prior to the Civil war, few HBCU private HBCUs existed and public HBCUs were nonexistent. The greatest increase in private HBCUs succeeded the Civil war between 1865 and

1890. After the Civil War, 40 of the 54 private HBCUs were opened. Financial contributions from the Freedmen’s Bureau and Christian organizations aided in the influx of private HBCUs, most of which offered religious philosophy as core curriculum. Despite the increase in private

HBCUs, blacks still suffered high illiteracy rates. The Freedmen’s bureau was only supposed to function for one year after the Civil War, however the program lasted for 7 years before it was discontinued by congress. Private HBCUs scrabbled to find additional sources of support to make up for the discontinuation of support from the Freedmen’s bureau.

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The Second Morrill Act of 1890 improved upon the First Morrill Act by creating land grant institutions for blacks that were not permitted to attend PWIs. Land grant institutions' offered liberal arts instruction as well as agricultural, technical, and engineering education

(Harris, et al., 1975). The Plessy vs. Ferguson court ruling upheld the separate but equal decision of education being separated by race (Harris, et al., 1975; Kaplin, 1986). Most of the HBCUs were fashioned to be teachers colleges and normal schools (Kujovich, 1994).

In the early 1900s nearly 2,000 black Americans graduated from HBCUs while almost

800 blacks were attending HBCUs. HBCU graduates represented a range of professions including 37% educators, 11% preachers, 4% medical doctors, 3% attorneys, and 1% farmers. At the beginning of the 1900s Black Americans were over 2% of the American Higher education population (Cowan & Maguire, 1994).

The decade succeeding 1910 was dominated by a great debate over the future of advancement for black Americans. Booker T. Washington, founder of now , and W.E.B. DuBois, co-founder of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored

People (NAACP) debate on educational and sociological philosophies. Washington favored technical and vocational training specifically in agriculture as the future means of social and economical advancement for black Americans. DuBois on the other hand, believed that intellectual instruction was best to advance black Americans. DuBois held that the Black

American’s position in society was equally as important as the position of white Americans

(Hornsby, 1975; Jones, 1984).

The White political establishment favored vocation and technical training as the most practical instruction for blacks in America. Booker T. Washington’s perspective regarding Negro instruction accepted the social and racial structure of the early 1900s. Washington posited that

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Black Americans would carve out a segment of the economy and power structure through the cultivation of their own land. Booker T. Washington recognized that black empowerment could only be acquired through economic and technical growth (Hornsby, 1975; Jones, 1984).

DuBois believed that access to higher education for black Americans was the key to socioeconomic development. In opposition to the philosophy of Booker T. Washington, DuBois encouraged educational instruction of Black Americans. Liberal Arts HBCUs include Bennett

College, , Bethune-Cookman University, , Dillard

University, , and Howard University. Florida A&M University and Alabama

A&M University are a few of the HBCUs that were founded technical and industrial institutions

(Jones, 1984). Despite the diversity of education at HBCUs, accreditation and academic standards are still problematic at these institutions.

The United States Office of Education conducted a study in 1916 which concluded that most HBCUs were impediments to the progress of American higher education. ,

Howard University and were excluded from the study’s list of unproductive HBCUs (Hornsby, 1975). Fisk University was the first HBCU to receive accreditation from the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) (Jones, 1984).

Despite Fisk University’s accreditation milestone, PWIs still received higher status than HBCUs.

HBCU facilities lacked proper investment and maintenance, and HBCUs endured budgetary and fiscal constraints (Jones, 1984).

During the 1930s, most Black Americans had the ability to read and write. Decades later,

118 HBCUs were in operation with over 95% in the South and a little over 4% in the North

(Harris, et al., 1975; Hornsby, 1975; Lockett & Simpkins, 1977).

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During the 1950s equity within the American education system saw significant modification. The Brown v. Board of Education (1954) case overturned the prior ruling of the

Plessey v. Ferguson (1896) case. The Supreme Court ruled that division of students within the public education system on the basis of race is unconstitutional. Desegregation of public education systems was initiated after the Brown decision (Kaplin, 1986).

Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal government can stop federal appropriations to educational programs that refuse to comply with desegregation mandates

(Crew, 1992). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prompted the establishment of the Office for Civil

Rights (OCR) in 1965. The OCR operated under the U.S. Department of Health, Education and

Welfare and was given regulatory oversight authority to monitor multiple levels of education, health and social services (Crew, 1992). Today the OCR operates under the Department of

Education.

The Harvard Educational Review published an article in 1967 entitled “The American

Negro College.” The article issued a scathing report of HBCUs, describing them as a failure

(Willie, C.V. and Hedgepeth, C.M., 1979). Despite the negative critique, HBCUs awarded over

200,000 bachelor’s degrees between 1965 and 1975 (Lockett & Simpkins, 1977). By the 1970s, half a million black Americans attended higher education institutions and half of them attended

HBCUs.

A research study by the OCR in 1976 found that black Americans accounted for less than

6% of medical, law, and doctoral degrees in the United States (Crew, 1992). The study also found that black Americans represented 4% of graduate students at major research Universities.

Black American females represented 22% of black graduate students despite representing 50% of black undergraduate enrollment (Crew, 1992).

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Lack of adequate funding has caused some HBCUs to become extinct while others have consolidated. In response to funding short falls, a few HBCUs have altered their mission of providing higher education to African Americans and have begun to actively recruit white and other minority students (Sink, 1995).

HBCU enrollments increased during the 1980s. From 1980 to 1986 HBCU enrollments declined by 3.8%, from approximately 230,883 to 221,882, however from 1986 to 1989 enrollments increased by 11.2%. Figure 2-1 illustrates HBCU enrollment trends during the

1980s. The surge in HBCU enrollments were led by Grambling State University, Hampton

University, Florida A&M University, and Texas Southern University. Despite the increase in

HBCU enrollment during the 1980s, African American enrollment in U.S. higher education institutions increased by 40% from 1975 to 1994. Increasingly African Americans are attending

PWIs rather than HBCUs.

HBCUs improved after increased federal financial and policy support. The U.S. Congress passed legislation in 1986 which introduced Title III of the Higher Education Act. Congress determined that State Governments and the Federal Government discriminated in their support for public and private HBCUs. Discrimination against black colleges affected the allocation of resources and federal grants and contracts. Title III was established to strengthen physical facilities, financial management, academic resources and endowment capabilities of HBCUs in order to combat systemic and historical discrimination. Subsequently, federal funds appropriated to HBCUs increased 31% from 1988 to 1993. During the same period federal appropriations to all colleges and universities increased 18%. The White house’s policy on HBCUs changed as well. In 1983 President Reagan signed EO12320 which created the White House initiative on

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HBCUs. President George Bush signed EO12677 in 1989, establishing the Presidential Advisory

Board on HBCUs.

During the 1990s, HBCUs suffered from increased competition for with PWIs for elite

African American students. Despite these challenges, African American enrollment at HBCUs increased by 27% (Redd, 1998). HBCUs marketed themselves on the basis of their special academic and cultural support for black students, a quality that PWIs could not rival

(Tobolowsky, B. F., Outcalt, C. L., & McDonough, P. M., 2005). The increase in HBCU enrollments are attributed to the 1998 Congressional authorization of over 200 million in investments to HBCUs under Title III of the Higher Education Act. These funds went to strengthen administrative capacity, financial management, and research capabilities at HBCUs

(Wolanin, 1998).

In 1994, there were 103 HBCUs including 50 public institutions and 53 private or nonprofit institutions. A majority of the institutions are small with average enrollments of 3,000 students or less. According to data from the National Association of Independent Colleges and

Universities, in fiscal year 1994-1995 48% of undergraduate students at HBCUs receive financial aid for low and moderate income students compared to 29% of all undergraduates nationally during the same period (College Board, 1996).

During 1993, 18% of all black degree recipients graduated from HBCUs including 50% of black pharmacists, 30% of black dentists, and 30% of clergy received their degrees from

HBCUs. From 1980 to 1990, 60% of black males in STEM fields received their baccalaureate degrees from HBCUs or majority black institutions (Solorzano, 1995). According to the

Department of Defense, approximately 20% of black U.S. Air Force Officers received their bachelor’s degrees from HBCUs. A 1989 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study found that

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80% of black undergraduates at HBCUs attended to receive advanced degrees compared to 70% of blacks at PWIs (U.S. Department of Education, 1995).

In spite of increasing student enrollment and federal funding, black colleges continue to experience several challenges entering the twenty first century. These obstacles include diversifying student enrollment, improving organizational quality, and amending their mission

(Tobolowsky, et al., 2005). For nearly forty years, the purpose of black colleges has been to combat the two tiered system of higher education on the basis of race (Tobolowsky, et al., 2005).

HBCUs have continued to nurture African American students while creating an atmosphere that aids comprehensive expansion of students and the neighboring black communities. This function is in jeopardy especially when considering the foundation of HBCUs and the historical bias against black students by higher education institutions. Compared to PWIs, HBCUs are more efficient in student retention and producing favorable student results (Kim M. M., & Conrad,

C.F., 2006). Furthermore, HBCUs are the leaders among public institutions in the education of nontraditional students.

HBCUs continue to maintain an exception relationship with its students and the African

American community (Seifert, T. A., Drummond, J., & Pascarella, E. T., 2006). Black colleges develop social networks that increase the propensity for student’s success and support the economy of the surrounding communities through job creation and the procurement of local products and services (Seifert, et al., 2006). For example, the annual Homecoming of many

HBCUs act as an economic boost for many local business owners in the food service, retail, and entertainment industry. HBCUs continue to experience challenges in securing funding, amending their historical mission, and providing higher education access to underserved African American and minority students. The continued success of black colleges hinge on the support from the

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government at all levels, the African American community and increasingly other ethnic communities. If support is garnered HBCUs will overcome these challenges with quality management, instructional quality, and enhanced infrastructure.

Presently HBCUs have a new iteration of opposition. One of these challenges are politicians and higher education stake holders who call for the discontinuation of HBCUs (Riley,

2010; Wenglinsky, 1996; Williams, 2008). Some scholars believe that institutions for black students have outlived its usefulness in a post segregated educational system (Riley, 2010). It is also suggested that HBCUs should be downgraded to community colleges with a specialization in basic skill instruction for minority students. Other scholars cite low graduation rates as a reason to shut down HBCUs (Williams, 2008). It is also believed that HBCUs are no better than

PWIs at providing black students with a quality education (Wenglinsky, 1996).

Proponents of HBCUs continuation point to the economic and social impact they have for surrounding black communities, the unwelcoming climate on many PWI campuses due to racism especially in the south where a majority of HBCUs operate, and their reasonable cost compared to PWIs (Fields, 2001; Humphreys & Korb, 2006). An examination of the impact of HBCUs on local employment, income and job creation concluded that HBCUs were instrumental to their surrounding economy (Humphreys and Korb, 2006). In 2001, Tuskegee University accounted for over 20% of the local employment (Humphreys and Korb, 2006). Collectively, HBCUs had an economic impact of 4 billion dollars on the U.S. economy in 2001.

According to Dr. Joe A. Lee, President emeritus of , HBCUs are desired by students who want to be educated in a racist and prejudice free environment (Fields,

2001). Tuition and fees at HBCUs are on average over 50% lower than PWIs (Wilson, 2007)

Considering that the majority of African American students come from low- income households,

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the value of HBCUs increase as they become structures of social and economic mobility for black students (Wershbale, 2010). Furthermore, some scholars note that HBCUs offer instructional and cultural customs that are of value to black students. Continuing the transfer of these customs are views as important for the future of the African American community

(Hawkins, 2004).

Disproportionate attention has been given to the function HBCUs have played in instruction for students with below average competences in English comprehension and mathematics (Albritton, 2012). Reports indicate that this type of instructional involvement is a necessity as increasing numbers of college bound students requires remedial instruction, many of whom are students of color and ethnic minorities. The U.S. Department of Education (2011) projects a 13% increase in enrollment at public and private institutions by 2020.

Demographically, enrollment is projected to increase 25% for African American students, 46% for Latino students, 25% for Asian students, and 1% for white students. There projections are not limited to HBCUs however the disproportionate projected increase in minority students poses a unique opportunity for HBCUs to train students for an evolving economy. HBCUs must also work at attracting Asian students. Although they are numerically considered a minority group, they do not face the same cultural and socio-economic challenges as other minority groups.

Historically HBCUs have suffered from various internal challenges including: student retention, accreditation processes, revenue instability, and lack of sound financial management practices (Brown & Freeman, 2004; Schexnider, 2008; Thomas, 2005). Of the Top 300 U.S.

College endowments, Howard University, , and are the only HBCUs and all three of them are private HBCUs (National Association of College and

University Business Officers, 2013).

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The retention of students has been the subject of much debate among higher education scholars. Many question the ability of HBCUs to matriculate students and graduate them.

Several researchers have concluded that students of color are more likely to obtain academic degrees at an HBCU rather than a PWI (Allen, W. R., Jewell, J. O., Griffin, K. A., & Wolf, D. S.,

2007; Drewry & Doerman, 2001; Ricard & Brown, 2008; Wenglinsky, 1996). The latest data shows that graduation rates for African America students are low at both HBCUs and PWIs.

According to U.S. Higher Education statistics, the graduation rate for African American students is 16% (U.S. Department of Education, 2012).

HBCUs are often heavily dependent upon federal financial aid that is paid to a large portion of it students. Many HBCUs also have small endowments. These revenue barriers are creating accrediting difficulties for HBCUs. In 2008, 92% of African American students received federal financial aid, and most of those students received the maximum statutory limit (U.S.

Department of Education, 2010). Federal financial aid limits are determined on the basis of need as opposed to merit. Despite financial support from the federal government many students attending HBCUs dropout. During the 2008-2009 academic year, Clark Atlanta University student enrollment decreased 7.5% between the fall and spring semester. College students drop out for various reasons however there is no universally implemented exit survey for college students who do not graduate. Each percentage decrease in students is a percentage decrease in operating revenue. HBCUs endowments are often not large enough to effectively hedge against revenue volatility (Wershbale, 2010). A contributing factor to small endowments at HBCUs is the lack of wealth within the HBCUs alumni (Nichols, 2004; Rowley, 2014).

Lack of adequate operating expenses is one of the main reasons for HBCUs accrediting problems (Hawkins, 2013). The greater portions of HBCUs are under the accrediting authority of

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SACS. Between 1996 and 2006, HBCUs were 25% of the colleges and universities that were sanctioned or lost accreditation by SACS (Wershbale, 2010). Federal funds in the form of federal grants and federal student financial aid cannot be issued to institutions lacking accreditation

(Wershbale, 2010). St. Paul’s College in Virginia is the most recent HBCU to lose accreditation and Florida A&M University most recent HBCUs to be placed on probation (Hawkins, 2013).

Higher Education researchers conclude that current accreditation models do not account for HBCU concerns (Wershbale, 2010). Wershbale (2010) believes the accreditation process should allow for continued federal funding while incremental improvements to sanction mandates are being achieved.

Hierarchical governance structure is another challenge effecting HBCU operations (Guy-

Sheftall, 2006; Lewis, 2011; Phillips, 2002). Top heavy governance structure present a problem for higher education institutions. Research concludes the most effectual style of leadership is that which utilizes a collaborative approach to crafting and meeting institutional objectives (Lewis,

2011). A study by Lewis (2011) concludes that significant barriers to communication exist between administration and faculty at HBCUs. Lewis suggest that there should be more collaboration between faculty and administration in strategic planning of institutional goals.

Furthermore, Lewis suggests the hierarchical organizational structure prevalent in most HBCUs often lead to authoritarian leadership behavior. Authoritarian leadership behaviors are a factor in hindering HBCUs from meeting institutional objectives (Drewry & Doermann, 2001; Gasman,

2010; Minor, 2005).

During the 1960s higher education researchers believe that HBCU presidents subjugated faculty members. The earliest example of such subjugation was when the former president of

Philander Smith College implemented a external communications policy banning faculty from

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speaking to the press, faculty members who violated the policy were fired (Gasman, 2010). As recent as 2009, the president of Clark Atlanta University in Atlanta, Georgia was reprimanded by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) for firing full-time faculty members without the institution formally declaring financial exigency (Gasman, 2010). Financial exigency is an urgent need to reorder the nature and magnitude of financial obligations in such a way as to restore or preserve the financial ability of the institution.1 Phillips (2002) believes most HBCUs will experience the consequences of authoritarian style leadership. Phillips cites the 2001

Virginia State University abolishment of the faculty senate as an example of consequences of authoritarian leadership styles. Some scholars insist that HBCU presidents are not much different from presidents at PWIs (Nichols, 2004). Other scholars retort that academic freedoms and shared governance are forces preventing authoritarian leadership styles at PWIs.

Present HBCU Diversity

Non-black Students Attending HBCUs

HBCUs were created to educate African American students however members of other racial groups have been served by black college. In 2013, public 4-year HBCUs served 191,918 students, of the students served 79% are African American, 9% are white, 2% are Hispanic, 3% are race unknown, 1% are Asian, and 1% are two or more races. (U.S. Department of Education,

2013). A study by Baskerville (2010) concluded that 30% of HBCU students are representative of ethnic groups other than African American. Many HBCUs have recognized that increasing non-black enrollment should be an institutional priority moving forward (Turner, 2006). Figure

2-2 illustrates the enrollment percentages of black and non-black students attending public 4-year

1 Petersen, James L. (1976) "The Dismissal of Tenured Faculty for Reasons of Financial Exigency," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 51: Iss. 2, Article 13

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HBCUs. Non-black student enrollment at public 4-year HBCUs increased 20% from 2004 to

2013. The largest enrollment increase by race and ethnicity was shown in Hispanic students and race unknown students with increases of 90% and 228% respectively from 2004 to 2013. Black and white students showed the only enrollment decreases at -8% and -15% respectively from

2004 to 2013. A number of HBCUs have majority student populations other than African

American. Kentucky State University, Bluefield State University, West Virginia State University and Lincoln University Missouri have student populations in which black students are the minority (Baskerville, 2010).

Research conducted by Roebuck and Murty (1993) covers the demographical enrollment trends at HBCUs. Most of the earliest HBCUs were founded and run by whites. Black administration of HBCUs began in the early 1900s. Today HBCU leadership is comprised mostly of blacks however non-black faculty and staff continue to increase at HBCUs. The most recent data shows that 44% of HBCU faculty are non-black, while 20% of PWI faculty are non- white (Morris 2015). HBCUs continue to enroll increasing numbers of non-black students, first generation students, and low income students and show the ability produce remarkable student outcomes despite the socioeconomic challenges facing these core students (Gasman, 2013).

According to U.S. Department of Education post-secondary education data, in 2013 non- black students represented 20.4% of public 4-year HBCUs student population with white students representing the largest non-black student group. White enrollment at public 4-year

HBCUs decrease 1.5% from 2004 and 2013. Although non-black enrollment increased during

2004 and 2013, changes in ethnicity classification offered multiracial students and option from identifying strictly as African American (Lee & Keys 2013). Several factors influence non-black attendance at HBCUs. Higher education researchers have mentioned demographic changes

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within the institution’s community, increased efforts in the recruitment of robust student populations, lower tuition and fees, and improvement in the quality of HBCU programs as factors influence non-black enrollment at HBCUs. Non-black students represent higher percentages among the graduate student populations at HBCUs. According to IPEDS data in

2013 non-black students represented 24% of HBCU graduate student populations, 14% white,

4% Asian, and 3% Hispanic (U.S. Department of Education, 2013). HBCUs are challenged with shrinking revenue streams and competition from PWIs, HBCUs have actively recruited non- black graduate students to maintain increased revenue (Wieder 2012).

There are few studies on white enrollment at HBCUs however scarce research concludes that white students are generally satisfied with the education obtained at HBCUs (Strayhorn,

2010; Donald 2010; Closson & Henry 2008; Sum, Light, & King 2004). Greater qualitative research is needed on the experience of white students attended HBCUs. Closson and Henry

(2008) believe, white students becoming “temporary minority” groups on HBCUs will foster greater racial awareness in white students. According to a Peterson and Hamrick’s (2009) study, white male undergraduate students who attend HBCUs have improved feelings of racial awareness. Additionally, Kupenda (2008) believes there are social benefits to white enrollment at

HBCUs.

A rising theme in the communications efforts of HBCUs document the learning opportunities afforded to white students in studying with minority populations (Shalash 2010). In

2014, MSNBC conducted a panel discussion in which white graduate student at HBCUs highlighted their admiration for that opportunity to learn more about racial topics. White students described their enrollments at HBCUs as an astonishing experience that they wouldn’t have obtained anywhere else (Thomas-Lester 2004). Most recently, Lipman’s (2011) documented the

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experience of a white student athlete at an HBCU. The student described his interaction with student and community leaders as chance to demystify cultural stereotypes derived from limited interaction between different populations. HBCUs have had some success at recruiting the best and brightest white students from prestigious PWIs. Joshua Packwood is the first and only non- black valedictorian at Morehouse College. Joshua addressed his decision to choose Morehouse

College over several Ivy League offers and the benefits of a Morehouse education in his graduation commencement address (Rosenblatt & Lemon 2008).

The various experiences within white students attending certain HBCUs subgroups can influence their perception of racial identity. Amusingly, a study conducted by Steck, Heckert, and Heckert (2003) among white students at PWIs and HBCUs concluded that whites attending

HBCUs experience lesser levels of racial awareness. One explanation is that organizational, structural, and cultural factors influence the experiences of individual students. Many white students attending HBCUs enroll in the most prestigious academic programs at HBCUs including STEM fields, business, and other specialized fields which often keep them away from the larger HBCU student population (Conrad, Brier, & Braxton 1997). Florida A&M University maintains a joint engineering school facility with Florida State University at a location away from the main campus. Florida A&M University also maintains facilities specific to its College of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Science and School of Business. These are the only programs at this institution that do not conjugate instructional facilities with other academic programs.

White students attending HBCUs often elect to live at home in the case in which the institution is located in a majority white area. Conclusions from this research imply that location and financial considerations propels white attendance at HBCUs (Daniels 2008). Thus, at certain institutions

(and for particular programs), cadres of White students might be less likely to engage with the

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broader campus community or operate within contexts that encourage explicit exploration of racial identity.

Non-black Faculty at HBCUs

Little attention is given to studying the experience of non-black faculty at HBCUs.

Research conducted by Dawson-Smith (2006) concluded that white faculty has been present at

HBCUs since the 1930s when anti-Jewish sentiment barred Jewish professors from teaching at most PWIs. HBCU Campus administrators assumed that Jewish educators would be well equipped to identify with students who face similar racial oppression in the Jim Crow south.

However, many higher education scholars point out that white faculty at HBCUs receive a certain level of suspicion from black faculty and students under the assumption that their cultural and social norms are not attuned to educating black students and contributing to the mission of the institution. A popular assumption is that white faulty at HBCUs are there because they couldn’t gain employment elsewhere (Foster 2001; Smith & Borgstedt 1985).

According to Warnat (1976), white faculty at HBCUs are classified into four categories that have an effect on other’s perception or the “four Ms.” White faculty at HBCUs can be categorized as the “moron” with subpar credentials which prevented their employment at a PWI, the “messiah” with the mentality of saving underprivileged black students, the “martyr” who acknowledges their white privilege and educates minority students to compensate for perceived historical disenfranchisement of blacks, and the “marginal man/woman” who is challenged with finding his or her place among white and black populations. Regardless of the category, white faculty at HBCUs continues to suffer from negative perception among their students, colleagues, and co-workers.

An essay on HBCUs white faculty by Arroyo (2014) recommends that white faculty should do more to completely understand the HBCU importance in the black community, modify

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the European dominated method of education, connect with students more during instruction, and abstain from favoritism. Arroyo offers solutions to white faulty at HBCUs to acknowledge their white privilege, maintain pride in their white heritage while at the same time observing black empowerment. Arroyo attest that white faculty at HBCUs should abandon their westernized approach to education to be more beneficial to black students, while also scrutinizing long normative perceptions on what it is to be socially responsible as a white person in an increasingly racially diverse country. Despite this essay’s function as a guideline for improvement among HBCU white faculty, Arroyo fails to present concrete strategies on how to achieve these goals or how his tenure at an HBCU has shaped is racial awareness growth.

Scholars have highlighted the positive and negative issues facing white faculty members at HBCUs. However, greater attention should be given to the role of race and education.

Research conducted by Hale-Benson (1986) and Kunjufu (1984), acknowledged differences in the ideal method of learning based on a student’s racial ethnicity. Banks (2001) and Ladson-

Billings (1995) also introduce research in the area of ethnically applicable educational approaches. Learning differences on the basis of race are prevalent among college students, institution based on race, and between black students who attend PWIs and HBCUs (Roig 2008;

Matthews 1996; Fazarro & Stevens 2004; Rovai, Gallien, & Wighting 2008). These findings suggest that white faculty who transfer from PWIs and HBCUs can face significant teaching challenges despite having experience teaching black students at a PWI. According to Shaw et al.

(2012), faculty at HBCUs tends to be more flexible in their instructional approaches compared to faculty at PWIs. Providing white faculty at HBCUs the opportunity to work through teaching styles is vital since instructional training for faculty members is uncommon at worst and inadequate at best (Bok 2013).

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Future research on non-black faculty at HBCUs is highly recommended. The little literature that exists on this subject exclusively analyzes white faculty. Scholars have began to analyze white leadership and administration at HBCUs noting that skepticism on the basis of race from students and faculty increase once a promotion to an administrative role is obtained.

Despite the lack of research, negative experiences of white faculty at HBCUs exist. Eromosele

(2015) highlighted a case of reverse racism between a white faculty members at an HBCU. The progress of non-black faculty and their roles at HBCUs is worth future exploration potentially analyzing the effect of non-black faculty on the education outcomes of black students attending

HBCUs.

Racial History of Inadequate HBCU Funding

The history of the black public college reveals the nation's inadequate efforts to elevate its black population from a condition of slavery and enforced illiteracy to one of equality. Public higher education for black students was racially separate and never equal. In the early 1900s, the massive outlays of federal and state funds that made publicly subsidized, good quality higher education available to the white citizens of the south and of the nation were either denied to the black public colleges or inadequate for a separate and equal education. This isolation encouraged the faculties, administrators, and students of black public colleges to build on their own a system of higher education from scratch. From its beginnings in the 1870s to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, black public higher education had to contend with unequal resources and racial isolation (Kujovich, 1994).

In the 1900s, the shortage of resources for equipment, buildings, and other capital improvements was acute. In some schools, students constructed buildings, and in most black land grant colleges, students took care of maintenance and janitorial duties. The widespread neglect of the black land grant colleges made these institutions incapable of offering any significant higher

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education to their students. Kujovich (1994) reported on the importance of black higher education to the segregationist states by comparing two revenue resources. In 1928, in 14 states the amount of state funding for resident instruction in the black colleges was approximately equal to the revenue from athletic activities at the white land grant colleges. This disparity in funding for HBCUs still exists.

In 1967, the Southern Regional Education Board reported inadequate financial resources as the critical problem faced by public black colleges. The most critical needs of the colleges at that time were: (1) basic operating income which was stable, recurring, and sufficient to permit dramatically increased faculty salaries, and (2) supplementary funds to support the upgrading of curriculum and instruction, a full battery of remedial and compensatory programs, and the expansion of administrative services. Private HBCUs also continued to operate on a meager budget and had severe financial problems (Brown & Hendrickson, 1997; The financial squeeze,

1995). Many of these problems continued into the twenty first century. The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS), in their December 2002 report, cited the termination of the accreditation of and Mary Holmes College due to financial resources. In the same report, SACS revealed that several other HBCUs were placed on probation due to problems with financial resources. The institutions referred in the report included Grambling

State University, Grambling, LA; , Greensboro, NC; and ,

Talladega, AL. Florida A&M University and Texas Southern University were also recently placed on accreditation probation by SACS for financial instability (Walker, 2008).

Between 1996 and 2005, 25% of SACS's sanctions pertained to black colleges, while these institutions make up only 13% of the SACS institutional membership. Since 1989, nearly half of the 20 institutions that lost their accreditation from SACS are HBCUs (Bollag, 2006).

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Most reprimands and revocations of accreditation are due to financial deficits; however, faculty quality (degrees), campus infrastructure, student enrollments, and even library holdings play a role in the certification process. Further, an institution that has lost accreditation cannot distribute financial aid, which can lead to declining enrollments. The institutions cannot recover financially which can affect their chance of reaccreditation. Moreover, unaccredited black colleges cannot be members of United Negro College Fund and will lose access to additional sources of funding needed for their operating budgets (Gasman, Baez, Drezner, Sedgwick, Tudico, and Schmid,

2007).

HBCUs enroll a large population of students who come from educationally disadvantaged, low-income backgrounds and are first-generation college attendees. Many of these students cannot afford tuition and therefore get government assistance. Several grant programs from the federal government are aimed at developing and strengthening postsecondary institutions that serve this student population. These grants, Title III and Title IV, allocate millions of dollars every year to HBCUs to provide financial assistance to their students and for development of programs, faculty and staff. These subsidies are critical for the maintenance of private HBCUs that depend on tuition and the government grants (Mercer, 1998).

If HBCUs are to increase their competitiveness to attract and retain faculty and students, they must confront some of their institutional problems. Dr. Michael Lomax, president of Dillard

University said, "We can't just idealize our environments" (Fields, 2000). Dr. Joyce Payne,

Director of the Office for the Advancement of Public Colleges of the National Association of

State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, added that HBCUs must be vigilant in the pressure they apply on elected officials and government agencies to see that the funding-related inequities

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HBCUs are dealing with are eliminated. Dr. Payne added, "We must address some of the structural impediments to our success" (Fields, 2000). But these problems seem to still persist.

Walker (2008) reported that a study by Minor found that large schools received more funding from the state and federal resources. The amount a school received per student was lower at HBCUs compared to non-HBCUs. Sav (2000) used the Blinder- Oaxaca decomposition method to study the fiscal discrimination leading to unequal funding of public HBCUs. He concluded that 83% of the funding differential is due to the difference in institutional characteristics, including lower undergraduate and graduate credit hour production at public

HBCUs compared to public PWIs. The remaining 17% of the funding differential was due to the differential treatment of public HBCUs compared to public PWIs. The study implied that an overall redistribution of state funding would be necessary to move public HBCUs and public

PWIs toward funding equality.

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Figure 2-1. HBCU Enrollment data from 1980-1989. Source: U.S. Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System

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Figure 2-2. Public 4-year HBCU: Black and Non Black Enrollment 2004 – 2013. Source: U.S. Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System

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Table 2-1. Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Accreditation Decision 2003- 2013 Source: Source: Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Annual Report (2003-2013) Year Placed on Warning/ Denied Approvals Placed on Probation Loss of Accreditation Interdenominational Theological Center, 2003 Barber-Scotia College, NC GA LeMoyne-Owens College, TN St. Augustine's College, NC , TX Barber-Scotia College, 2004 LeMoyne-Owens College, TN Talladega College, AL NC , Texas College, TX FL 2005 Virginia Union University, VA Talladega College, AL LeMoyne-Owens College, TN 2006 LeMoyne-Owens College, TN 2007 Coahoma Community College, MS , TX , LA Florida A&M University, FL 2008 Dillard University, LA Texas Southern University, TX Florida Memorial University Paul Quinn College, TX Florida A&M University, FL Texas Southern University, TX 2009 Florida Memorial University, FL Alabama A&M University Paul Quinn College, TX Tougaloo College, MS South Carolina State University, SC 2010 , AL Texas Southern University, TX Fisk University, TN Tennessee State University, TN 2011 Southern University at Shreveport, LA Bennett College, NC Fort Valley State University, GA Tougaloo College, MS Savannah State University, GA Fisk University, TN Stillman College, AL Edward Waters College, FL Interdenominational Theological Center, GA 2012 Southern University at Shreveport, LA Florida A & M University, FL St.Pauls College, VA Southern University and A & M College Grambling State University at Baton Rouge, LA Fisk University, TN 2013 South Carolina State University, SC Benedict College, SC Interdenominational Theological Center, Norfolk State University, VA GA

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CHAPTER 3 DATA AND METHODS

Theoretical Framework

To better understand state financial support for public HBCUs it is imperative to understand the factors that affect resource allocation decision making for state higher education institutions. This section will highlight the theoretical framework of state financial support of public HBCUs. This study utilizes Tandberg’s (2009) Fiscal policy framework to construct two models which explain state financial support for public HBCUs: (1) State Political Model and (2)

Institutional Model.

The Basics of Public Higher Education Finance

Understanding the basics of public higher education finance provides important knowledge for anyone attempting to understand how colleges and universities are funded and higher education practitioners seeking to develop innovative strategies to manage today’s higher education budgetary challenges. The United States Constitution affirms that the states shall be responsible for public higher education, specifically from a fiscal and policy perspective. The

Tenth Amendment to the Constitution also states that “the powers not delegated to the United

States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people” (US Constitution, 2013). Similarly, the federal government maintains fundamental responsibilities with regards to finance matters that involve primarily research and financial aid. The result is an interconnected web of governmental activities between state and federal leaders who are all expected to provide collective oversight of

American higher education (Zumeta, Breneman, Callan, & Finney, 2011).

While each state uses many funding sources, including private dollars to finance public higher education, three common sources exist universally and can be directly influenced by

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policymakers in virtually every state. The three components of higher education finance that will be reviewed include: (1) state appropriations; (2) state grants and contracts; and (3) state capital appropriations. Managing these core financing sources requires the collective support of elected officials, educators, and other key stakeholders. In order to investigate how public universities are managing the ongoing fiscal crisis, it is imperative to take a closer look at how each of these financing sources are managed within political and academic contexts.

State Appropriations

The distribution of state appropriations to fund campus operations and activities is a critical funding source used to pay for the functional aspects of public institutions within a state supported system. State-based educational allocations often consist of state and local tax appropriations, as well as supplemental non-tax funding sources such as lottery funds or educational trust accounts. Most state educational appropriations support the general operations of public institutions; however, some funds are earmarked for focused spending on such items as research, agriculture, or medical education within a particular state. While these alternative revenue sources are clearly beneficial to public universities, they are also limited in their uses and do not always support the general operating needs of the institution (State Higher Education

Executive Officers, 2012).

Historically, state appropriations for higher education have been recognized by public institutions as a critical funding source required for its long-term sustainability and success.

Beginning with the Truman Commission’s 1947 report titled Higher Education for American

Democracy, key leaders and stakeholders recognized postsecondary education as a good investment for the government and encouraged significant financial support for its operations

(President’s Commission on Higher Education, 1947). While state appropriations have been

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challenged during difficult financial times in the past, public funding continues to remain a significant revenue source for higher education today. In 2011, state and local operating support for public higher education institutions – including funds from the American Recovery and

Reinvestment Act – totaled $87.5 billion. State sources alone accounted for nearly 91% of the almost $90 billion in revenue. Major uses for this funding included $68 billion for general operating expenditures and $10.4 billion for designated or special purpose appropriations.

Approximately 10% of state funding was allocated for state-supported student financial aid

(State Higher Education Executive Officers, 2012). When considered in the context of a state- wide budget, public funding for higher education is deemed so critical that it often represents

10% or more of state budgets across the nation (Hauptman, 2011).

Moving forward, policy experts suggest that documented increases in higher education enrollment over time in the United States – even in a post-recession era – highlight the importance of postsecondary education to the future of the nation. Furthermore, sustaining such growth during past economic recessions has been dependent upon strong and consistent public support per student by state governments. In addition to continued public support, economic recoveries of the past have also relied on students and their families to harbor a larger portion of the educational cost burden. The intensity and seriousness of the 2008 recession indicates that the trend of increasing student costs is unlikely to end anytime soon. Instead, competing priorities at the state level – such as health care, retirement, increasing enrollments and state public debt – are all critical public priorities, and enhanced support for higher education will likely be a significant fiscal challenge for the future of state-supported colleges and universities

(State Higher Education Executive Officers, 2012). As a result, Hypothesis 1 is as follows:

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 H1: States with higher long-term debt interest payments provide less financial support to HBCUs.

State Grants and Contract

A second state higher education financing source is state grants and contracts to public institutions. State grants and contracts is defined by IPEDS as revenues from governmental agencies and nongovernmental parties that are for specific research projects, other types of programs, or for general institutional operations. Examples are research projects, training programs, student financial assistance, and similar activities for which amounts are received or expenses are reimbursable under the terms of a grant or contract, including amounts to cover both direct and indirect expenses. State grants and contracts also includes Pell Grants and reimbursement for costs of administering federal financial aid programs as well as grant monies provided by the state for merit scholarships provided by the state; and tuition and fee waivers for which the institution was reimbursed by a state agency.

Although state grants and contracts monies fund state research projects performed by public institutions, a majority of state grants and contracts cover student financial needs. The cost shift to students and their families over time highlights the criticality of these funds for public higher education. Student aid programs, representing an even smaller portion of state higher education financing efforts, account for approximately 10% of total state spending on higher education nationally (State Higher Education Executive Officers, 2012). The role of financial aid is often considered as a means to discount the price of a college degree. Such a discount typically comes in three basic forms: (1) Grants or Scholarships; (2) Loans; or (3) Work study.

Additionally, financial aid is offered from many different sources, including the federal government, state government, private funding, or even the public institution itself (Heller,

2011). Funds provided through financial aid incentives often cover some of the following core

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college costs: tuition and general fees, room and board, books and supplies, transportation, other fees such as debt service or transit, and additional personal expenses (UNC Financial Aid

Overview, 2012).

As noted earlier, state-supported student financial aid programs across the nation – which includes allocations to public and independent institutions – represent approximately 9.8% of higher education expenditures. In fact, state and local spending on financial aid programs for public institutions increased from 5.6% of expenditures in 2006 to approximately 7.1% of expenditures in 2011, which is an increase of almost $2 billion (State Higher Education

Executive Officers, 2012). In 2010-11, all states collectively awarded about $11 billion in total state supported financial aid. Most student aid is allocated through grants, which accounted for about $9.2 billion in 2010-11. Of those funds, approximately 70%, or $6.4 billion, represents need-based aid and 30% accounts for merit based aid. Over a ten year period, between 2001 and

2010, funding for need-based grants and merit-based grants nearly doubled, which highlights the growing financial burden facing college students today.

As the figures above indicate, the rising costs of an education have shifted a greater cost burden to the student and led to a significant increase in the amount of financial aid funding, both need-based and merit-based. It is clear that, in many cases, increased financial aid needs have led to challenging debt loads for students hoping to maintain their ability to attend school. In today’s fiscal environment, more students are borrowing funds for school and utilizing financial aid than ever before (Callan, 2008). As a result of student borrowing doubling in the last ten years, researchers argue that financial aid priorities must be realigned with public policy priorities across the states.

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State Capital Appropriations

State Capital Appropriations are funds provided by state governments to higher education institutions to support construction, infrastructure improvements, physical plant maintenance, property acquisition and equipment purchases. Capital Appropriations are separate from general fund expenditures which are appropriated by state legislatures and therefore are resistant to the politics within the traditional appropriations process (NASBO 2017). According to a 2017 report by the National Associations of State Budget Officers (NASBO), higher education capital expenditures decreased by 6% from FY2015 to FY2016 compared to a modest 3.8% increase in total state higher education spending during the same period.

Studies on the variables impacting state capital spending is scarce. White and Musser

(1978) conducted the only study analyzing capital spending on higher education and found that state capital spending for higher education is more volatile than general fund and state education spending. More empirical studies on state higher education capital spending is needed because of the following: 1) states spend a large amount on capital projects and programs, 2) capital spending vulnerable to indirect political influence, 3) capital spending is more sensitive to state economic trends, and 4) state capital expenditures are a vital revenue resource for state higher education institutions.

According to the fiscal year 2017 report of the NASBO, states provided $11.6 billion to higher education institutions for capital projects and programs. Capital projects for higher education institutions represents the second largest capital expenditure category in state budgets behind transportation capital expenditures. Moreover, gross spending on higher education capital projects is only 7% less than total student financial aid spending of $12.5 billion in FY 2016, according to the National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP).

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Despite the importance and sizable investment into state capital expenditures for higher education, there are very little empirical studies on the subject.

According to NASBO data from 2017, capital spending for higher education is more volatile than state appropriations for higher education, which suggests capital spending maybe correlated with state economic factors. This suggestion is comparable to Hovey's hypothesis that posits state higher education appropriations balance state budgets because higher education institutions can manipulate student tuition to counter balance changes in state funding (Delaney and Doyle 2007; Hovey 1999). The past decade of capital spending in higher education shows uninterrupted decreased spending subsequent to the 2008 economic crisis (NASBO 2017).

Capital expenditures in higher education maybe vulnerable to political influence given the discretionary nature of capital projects, the regional economic impact of capital projects and the demand of capital projects during flush budget cycles. Michael Olivas studied the factors leading to the creation of the Ohio Board of Regents and found additional support for the political influence over higher education capital spending. Competition for limited capital funds among Ohio public colleges and universities influence the decision for creating a statewide coordinating board (Olivas 1984, 1990). State legislators fight hard to allocate capital funds for projects for campuses in their districts and for those in which there is a personal connection.

Politics of Public University Budgeting

In recent years, scholarship has considered political factors and its effect on state support of higher education. Tandberg (2009) developed a “fiscal policy framework,” using a cross sectional time-series analysis, which looks more directly at the factors that may be most influential on the dependent variable of state higher education funding per $1,000 in personal income. His research framework gives rise to political factors. He argued his research “clearly shows that the higher education appropriations process does not occur within a vacuum immune

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to politics and other budgetary forces” (Tandberg, 2009). Later, Tandberg (2010) wrote that

“politics appears to play a role in determining the share of state expenditures” devoted to higher education. Similarly, McLendon et al. (2009) wrote that the purpose of their study was driven by their perception that “state political indicators” have received “insufficient attention in the past” and was the “central focus” of their investigation. Political factors include the partisan balance within state legislatures, partisan affiliation of governors, and higher education as an interest group that lobbies for its share of the budgetary pie.

Some argue that party control of the legislature and the governor’s office is significant when it comes to funding of higher education. According to McLendon et al. (2009), when

Republicans control both the legislature and the governor’s office, higher education funding goes down. They found that a 1% increase in the number of Republican legislators is associated with a

$0.05 decline in higher education appropriations per $1,000 in personal income. Tandberg

(2009) found that Democratic legislatures are associated with an increase in higher education support but uni-party legislative control by either party has a significant and negative effect on higher education funding. Tandberg also found that having a Democratic governor is associated with an increased higher education funding effort. Kane et al. (2003) found that “increases in higher education appropriations are associated with a Democratic house, senate, or governor, though the coefficient on having a Democratic governor is not statistically significant.” As a result, the Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 are as follows:

 H2: States that have more liberal political ideologies provide more financial support to HBCUs.

 H3: States with a majority Republican House of Representatives provide less financial support to HBCUs.

However, not all agree. Weerts and Ronca’s (2012) analysis of funding changes by institutional type helps explain an interesting finding. Increases in percentage change of state

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support are correlated with Republican controlled legislatures. Republicans are often viewed as being more generous to associate’s two-year colleges than research universities, and the growth in higher education dollars during the past 20 years for 2-year colleges reflect this support. One explanation may be that “Republicans generally favor economic development initiatives, and the work of associate’s colleges is often in line with these state wide goals.”

Republican legislators in particular may view 2-year community colleges, which provide short-term skill training (such as for construction trades, diesel mechanics, and in the health professions) as well as transfer associate’s degrees, as more directly connected to the workforce than are colleges and universities that grant baccalaureate degrees, particularly for majors in the humanities or social sciences. However, the mean earnings for a bachelor’s degree in the U.S. were $56,665 in 2009 as compared to $39,771 for an associate’s degree (U.S. Census Bureau,

2012).

Dar (2012) found that in terms of higher education’s budget share, “as the share of

Democrats increases, higher education’s share of the budget diminishes.” She hypothesizes that this may be because Democrats may give a greater preference to “programs clearly targeted to low-income constituents (e.g. welfare, K-12 education).” According to Dar (2012) as politicians become more polarized, higher education becomes a loser in the competition for state funds. The empirical illustration suggests that the role of ideological polarization in higher education’s budgetary fortunes seems to be more relevant than previously assumed.

Peterson (1976) found that “interparty competition generates greater legislative responsiveness” and this “translated into higher expenditure level” for higher education. Koven and Mausolff (2002) found that party affiliation of the legislature was not significant, and

Delaney and Doyle (2011) did not find partisan control of legislative and governor offices made

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a statistically significant difference. Compton (2011) looked at the membership of key legislative committees in one state and found that those with alumni members, especially senators, disproportionately benefitted their alma mater.

So while there is not universal agreement in the literature, there is some evidence that party affiliation likely has an impact, although when there is a degree of partisan competition

(such as different party control of each legislative house), that may further improve higher education’s budgetary prospects, while polarization may decrease the chances for improved funding.

Can higher education, acting as a political interest group, impact legislative funding?

McLendon et al. (2009), found that for every registered higher education lobbyist in a given state, appropriations to higher education rise by about $0.05 per $1,000 of personal income.

Tandberg (2009) formulated a higher education interest group ratio by dividing the number of registered interest groups in a state by the number of higher education interest groups. He found that along with legislative professionalism, this ratio had “the largest effect...of all the political variables.” According to Tandberg’s (2009) study, as the higher education lobbyist increases in number relative to the rest of the state lobby, the state tends to increase its support for public higher education.

This recent research shows the importance of political factors—going far beyond

Hovey’s “balance wheel” theory. Most research, though not all, indicates that states with

Democratic governors and legislatures are more likely to spend more on higher education than those with Republican officials, particularly if both the legislature and governor’s office are controlled by the GOP. However, this is tempered somewhat by indications that uni-party legislative control by either party is negatively associated, suggesting that higher education

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funding does better where there is political competition between the state house and senate. As a result, Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5 is as follows:

 H4: States with a unified government provide less financial support to HBCUs.

 H5: States with Republican unified governments provide less financial support to HBCUs.

Further, the number of higher education legislative lobbyists is positively associated, as is legislative professionalism.

State Governance and Institutional Autonomy

The tremendous expansion of American higher education during the latter half of the twentieth century led to huge increases in state expenditures on higher education, from approximately $500 million in 1950 to about $1.4 billion in 1999 (Berdahl 1971, Chronicle of

Higher Education Almanac, 1999). As budgets for public higher education grew in the 1960s and 1970s in response to the rapidly growing student population, the relationship between state government and public higher education became more and more complex as states sought to regulate institutions without intruding into matters of academic freedom. This increasing complexity gave rise to the creation of higher education coordinating agencies, meant to function as intermediary mechanisms which transmit the needs of the institutions to the state and the wishes of the state to the institutions (Berdahl, 1971).

Many state legislatures realized that the assumption that unprofessional institutional governing boards would protect the public interest was only partially correct (Berdahl, 1971).

While trustees generally seemed to exercise due caution in spending public dollars, they also seemed to be increasingly influenced by institutional ambitions. However, state legislators of the day largely possessed neither the access nor the ability to digest objective, technical data about institutions to inform their decisions regarding institutional chartering or funding. As a result,

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many organizations, such as the American Council on Education and the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, became advocates for greater state control and oversight of higher education, arguing that the efficiency gains from consolidation outweighed the potential drawbacks of loss of institutional autonomy (Novak & Leslie, 2000).

State control of public institutions of higher education in most states has been achieved through the creation of statewide boards of higher education. These boards are charged with maintaining consistency between institutional actions and state priorities (Knott & Payne, 2004), although the specifics of the range and degree of authority they are granted over institutions varies across states. Among a number of classification schemes, McGuinness’ (1997) typology is representative of modern state governance structures: consolidated governing boards, regulatory coordinating boards, advisory coordinating boards, and planning agencies.

Governing boards consolidate control to provide both statewide coordination of higher education policy as well as management of the operations of institutions under their authority. A state may have a single consolidated governing board for the entire postsecondary system or separate boards for public 2-year and 4-year institutions. Coordinating boards, the predominant form of organization, may have either regulatory or advisory authority. Regulatory authority implies the ability to regulate and approve functions, while advisory boards focus more on system-wide planning of state needs with authority often limited to reviewing, monitoring, and providing guidance to institutional governing boards. Planning agencies are the least effective form in an advisory capacity that relies on voluntary cooperation by state institutions

(McGuinness, 1997). Lowry (2001a) found that governing boards reduce the impact and ability of public universities and colleges to lobby on their own behalf which negatively impacts state

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funding to public universities. Each type of governing board has a distinct role with respect to in institutional budgets and capital plans. As a result, Hypothesis 6 is as follows:

 H6: States with Consolidated governing boards provide less financial support to HBCUs than Coordinating boards.

Public colleges and universities have been criticized for declining affordability because of increased tuition prices and a lack of accountability. The influence of the state on public university financial management depends on the degree of centralization or decentralization of financial management at the state level. States that centralize financial management decisions reduce the autonomy of sub-state entities. In a decentralized financial management system, more decisions are made at the sub-state level.

Centralization limits autonomy of public authorities and other sub-state entities. This limited autonomy may adversely affect the level of capital spending by public entities; they may not be able to allocate resources that they consider vital to their institutional functions. With a decentralized approach, there is the possibility that authorities will overuse the finance process if there is no overall monitoring which may lead to shifting of fiscal burdens to future generations

(Bahl and Duncombe 1993). Each budgeting authority may not consider the overall financial position of the state. This is important because overlapping finance by various state agencies, public authorities, and others, increases the financial burden on institutions. As a result,

Hypothesis 7 is as follows:

 H7: HBCUs with fiscal autonomy receive more state financial support than HBCUs without fiscal autonomy.

Race and Public Policy

Much in the vein of critical race theory, several authors argue that race is central to the analysis of public policy and policymaking. Samuel Myers Jr. (2002) argues race should be a central component of policy analysis. Stating that race has largely been ignored as a substantive

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area of inquiry, Myers proposes the use of race analysis defined as ―the systematic application of the tools of historical and cultural analysis to understand the social and economic circumstances facing blacks and other racial minority group members. Race analysis is multi- disciplinary, drawing inspiration from history, psychology, economics, sociology, and biology.

Race analysis is useful across various professions, with legal scholars, political scientists, sociologists, and, generally, those specializing in ethnic studies, using race analysis as a framework for their research. While race has experienced a more prominent focus of analysis in the field of sociology (at various historical points), race and the use of race analysis have been understudied and underutilized by those who analyze, develop, and/or implement public policy

(Myers 2002).

Despite the relative absence of race analysis in the field of public policy, a growing body of research highlights that race continues to be an important issue in several public policy areas.

Several authors (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Hero 1998, 2007; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, and

O‘Brien 2001; Douglas 2005; and Soss, Fording, and Schram 2008) have made race the focal point of their analysis in understanding state public policy related to social and economic policies.

Recognizing that state policies result from the cooperation, competition, and conflict between and among dominant and subordinate groups for scarce resources, Hero and Tolbert offer evidence that racial and ethnic diversity is essential to understanding state policy and the variation in policy between states. Putting forth what is formally defined as the racial diversity thesis (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Hero 1998; 2007), the authors critique other studies that have examined state policy and highlight that previous examinations of state policy have largely ignored race as a significant factor in state policy development. The racial diversity thesis

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recognizes the significant history race/ethnicity has played in shaping American policy by placing race at the center of analysis. The racial diversity thesis contends that policy outcomes in a state are directly related to the level of racial diversity in the state (Hero and Tolbert 1996;

Hero 2007). Specifically, Hero and Tolbert demonstrate that examining a state‘s racial and ethnic diversity (including white ethnic groups from Southern and Eastern Europe) explain policy variation among states and that it can also indicate the disparate impact of public policy on a minority groups (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Hero 1998).

To explore racial and ethnic diversity, the authors categorized states into three groups: homogeneous states (states with small minority populations, small populations of white ethnics, and large white populations), heterogeneous states (states with moderate sized minority and white populations, and large white ethnics populations), and bifurcated states (states with large minority populations and large white populations, and small white ethnic populations (Hero and

Tolbert 1996; Hero 1998). Using regression analysis to examine the relationship between racial and ethnic diversity and state policies, the authors found an inverse relationship between racial diversity and policy outcomes. That is, when examining education and social policy (measured by infant mortality and Medicaid expenditures), in the aggregate, policy outcomes were particularly poor in bifurcated states - states with large minority and large white populations

(Hero and Tolbert 1996). Hero and Tolbert (1996) further contended that when the policies examined were separately analyzed by race, policy outcomes were particularly poor for minorities (specifically African Americans and Latinos) in homogenous states.

In addition to the work of Hero and Tolbert, research by Soss, Schram, Vartanian, and

O‘Brien (2001) also examined the role of race in public policy at the state level. In the article,

Setting the Terms of Relief: Explaining State Policy Choices in the Devolution Revolution, Soss

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et al. (2001) discovered that race was a significant factor in whether states adopted ―get-tough policies in the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) law developed in 1996. Soss et al. (2001) examined welfare policy in all 50 states because it was a policy moment in which all states reacted at the same time to a federal policy mandate and the federal government devolved some of its responsibility to the states in a way that gave states a great deal of flexibility to be innovative in implementation. The authors created an index welfare stringency that looked at the strength of sanction policy, strict work requirements, strict time limits, and family caps. States could score between 0-4 based on a point allocation where a state was given one point for each of the following: having a family cap, having a time limit that was shorter than the federal limit of sixty months, having a work requirement of less than twenty-four months, and having strong sanctions. Soss et al. (2001), using logistic regression, found that there was a racialized component to welfare policy decisions at the state level (though they were unable to state how race influences welfare policy). Specifically, the authors found that states with more minorities in their caseloads were more likely to score higher on their policy severity index and were more likely to adopt the most restrictive policies regarding sanctions, time limits, and family caps

(Soss, et al., 2001). Ultimately, the authors cautioned that state devolution could provide new opportunities to further race inequality in society, especially as it is related to African Americans

(Soss, et al., 2001).

Later building off of this finding, Soss, Fording, and Schram (2008) developed the racial classification model, which examined how race and racial composition influence the policy choices and outcomes in states. Specifically looking at the devolution of welfare policy the authors examined why certain states passed jurisdiction of welfare policy to the local level and the impact such ―second-order devolution had on racial groups. The authors develop the racial

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classification model, which infuses sociological theory related to social classification with public policy. There are three foundational tenets to the racial classification model. First and foremost, the authors acknowledged that categorization of people is a basic factor of society and that policymakers use social classifications to develop policy solutions to targeted groups in society

(Soss, Fording, and Schram 2008). Next the authors offer that in instances where racial minorities are thought to be prominent or are in fact prominent, in the policy context (e.g. welfare policy), policymakers are likely to use race as the means of classification, which in turn impacts policy choice. The last tenet of the racial classification model explains that the perceptions and stereotypes of racial groups held by policymakers are associated with racially disparate policy outcomes. That is, as policymakers seek policy solutions for target groups, stereotypical notions of a racial group are contrasted against those of another and become associated with policy differences applied to individuals and/or groups (Soss, Fording, and

Schram 2008). Soss, Fording, and Schram (2008) contend that the racial classification model is a model that explains the sufficient (not necessary) conditions in which racially disparate policy actions can occur. Testing the model on the question of welfare policy, Soss, Fording, and

Schram (2008) found that race explains the welfare policies developed in a state and the outcomes/impacts related to second-order devolution on racial and ethnic minority groups.

Relative to welfare policies, the authors conclude that ―racial differences have shaped policy choices, and policy choices, in turn, have shaped racial differences. As a result, Hypothesis 8 is as follows:

 H8: HBCUs receive less state financial support than RCPWIs (all variables being equal).

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The review of literature in Chapter 2 established the foundation for the following research questions:

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1. What were the state financial support trends of Public 4-year HBCU from 2004-2013?

2. What is the relationship between institutional characteristics and State Financial Support at public 4-year HBCUs from 2004 and 2013?

3. What is the relationship between state political characteristics and State Financial Support to Public 4-year HBCUs from 2004 to 2013?

4. What is the relationship between State economic characteristics and levels of State Financial support of public 4-year HBCUs from 2004 and 2013?

5. Is there a statistically significant difference in state financial support between HBCUs and RCPWIs, all else being constant?

These research questions, along with a comprehensive review of literature, led to the development of the following hypotheses:

 H1: States with higher long-term debt interest payments provide less financial support to HBCUs.

 H2: States that have more liberal political ideologies provide more financial support to HBCUs.

 H3: States with a majority Republican House of Representatives provide less financial support to HBCUs.

 H4: States with a unified government provide less financial support to HBCUs.

 H5: States with Republican unified governments provide less financial support to HBCUs.

 H6: States with Consolidated governing boards provide less financial support to HBCUs than Coordinating boards.

 H7: HBCUs with fiscal autonomy receive more state financial support than HBCUs without fiscal autonomy.

 H8: HBCUs receive less state financial support than RCPWIs (all variables being equal).

Data

Answering these five research questions will included testing against data provided by

The United States of Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data

System (IPEDS), State Higher Education Executive Officers and Education Commission of the

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States. Data sources also include; the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, National

Conference of State Legislatures, Council of State Governments, Census Bureau Annual Survey of State Government Finances, The Citizen Ideology developed by Berry et al. and the Bureau of

Justice Statistics. The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System is a survey conducted annually by the U.S. Department’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The

Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System encompasses several major subject fields; institutional characteristics, student financial aid and net prices, fall enrollment, finance, fall staff, instructional staff salaries and graduation rates. The Integrated Postsecondary Education

Data System provides fiscal data for all 7,687 colleges and universities, and it provides a definite timeframe for the collection data about colleges and universities. The data sets used for this study will include the years 2004-2013.

Variable Construction and Description

Dependent Variable

To measure state financial support for higher education institutions, this study uses

IPEDS data from 2004 to 2013, which distinguishes between state appropriations, state capital appropriations and state grants and contracts that flow through state houses. The independent variable is state financial support per FTE calculated as:

STATE FINANCIAL SUPPORT PER FTE =

푠푡푎푡푒 푎푝푝푟표푝푟푖푎푡푖표푛푠+푠푡푎푡푒 푐푎푝푖푡푎푙 푎푝푝푟표푝푟푖푎푡푖표푛푠+푠푡푎푡푒 푔푟푎푛푡푠 푎푛푑 푐표푛푡푟푎푐푡푠

퐼푛푠푡푖푡푢푡푖표푛푠 퐹푇퐸

The natural log of state financial support per FTE is used because state financial support per FTE does not follow a normal distribution.

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Independent Variables

The independent variables utilized within the econometric models of this paper will be discussed here.

State Mandated Spending

State mandated spending is outlays that is directed by methods or benchmarks enacted by legislation, instead of periodic appropriations. State mandated programs that require mandatory expenditures generally consist of welfare programs, K12 education, state corrections, and

Medicaid.1 State interest payments are not considered mandated spending however, interest payments can be generally obligated from the state’s general fund thus limited the amount of financial resources that can be utilized elsewhere.

Dar (2012) found that in terms of higher education’s budget share, “as the share of

Democrats increases, higher education’s share of the budget diminishes.” She hypothesizes that this may be because Democrats may give a greater preference to “programs clearly targeted to low-income constituents (e.g. welfare, K-12 education).”

State Welfare Expenditures. State public welfare expenditures is defined as the aggregate dollar amount that states spend on public social welfare programs. Examples of state welfare programs are: housing assistance, food stamps, and reemployment assistance. We accessed this data from Council of State Governments (CSG) “Book of States”

(http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/content-type/book-states). The natural log of state welfare expenditures is used because state welfare expenditures does not follow a normal distribution.

1 Medicaid is a joint federal and state program that helps with the medical costs of citizens with limited financial resources. Although state participation is voluntary, all 50 states are participants. Each state administers their own Medicaid program which must meet federal guidelines.

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State Corrections Expenditures. State correction expenditures is defined as the aggregate dollar amount that states spend on the rehabilitation and housing of state inmates. We accessed this data from Council of State Governments (CSG) “Book of States”

(http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/content-type/book-states). The natural log of state corrections expenditures is used because state corrections expenditures does not follow a normal distribution.

State Medicaid Expenditures. State Medicaid expenditures is defined as the aggregate dollar amount that states spend on medical care for low-income citizens and their children. States match a portion of the funds given by the federal government. We accessed this data from

Council of State Governments (CSG) “Book of States”

(http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/content-type/book-states). The natural log of state Medicaid expenditures is used because state Medicaid expenditures does not follow a normal distribution.

State K12 Expenditures. States K12 expenditures is defined as the aggregate dollar amount that states spend on primary and secondary schools. I accessed this data from Council of State

Governments (CSG) “Book of States” (http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content- type/content-type/book-states). The natural log of state K12 expenditures is used because state

K12 expenditures does not follow a normal distribution.

State interest payments. State interest payments is defined as the aggregate dollar that states spend on annual obligatory debt service payments of bonds, loans and commercial paper issue to the state by private banking institutions. We assessed this data from the Census Bureau Annual

Survey of State Government Finances (https://www.census.gov/programs-

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surveys/state/data/datasets.html). The natural log of state interest payments is used because state interest payments does not follow a normal distribution.

Political Variables

State Political Ideology. State Political ideology is defined as the measurement political philosophy of formal political leaders of a particular state (Berry, et al., 1998). The measure utilized is a 0-100 index developed by Berry et al. in which each state is assigned an ideology scores for all years between 1960 and 2016. A measure meant of zero would signify that a state’s political leaders are conservative while a measurement of 100 would signify that a state’s political leaders are liberal. We accessed the data from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) (https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/188).

House Republican Majority. House Republican majority is defined as the measurement of a state legislative body’s lower house control by the Republican Party. The variable is binary where 1= Republican control and 0= democratic control. Weerts and Ronca’s (2012) analysis of funding changes by institutional type helps explain an interesting finding. Increases in percentage change of state support are correlated with Republican controlled legislatures. We accessed this data from Council of State Governments (CSG) “Book of States”

(http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/content-type/book-states).

Senate Republican Majority. Senate Republican majority is defined as the measurement of a state legislative body’s upper house control by the Republican Party. The variable is binary where 1= Republican control and 0= democratic control. We accessed this data from Council of

State Governments (CSG) “Book of States” (http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content- type/content-type/book-states).

Gubernatorial Party Affiliation. Gubernatorial Party affiliation is defined as a measurement of which political party controls the state executive office. The variable is binary where 1 =

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Republican control and 0 = democratic control. Kane et al. (2003) found that “increases in higher education appropriations are associated with a Democratic house, senate, or governor, though the coefficient on having a Democratic governor is not statistically significant. We accessed this data from Council of State Governments (CSG) “Book of States”

(http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/content-type/book-states).

Unified Government. Unified government is defined as political control over the executive and legislative branches of state government by a singular party. The variable is binary where 1 = unified government and 0 = non-unified governments. Peterson (1976) found that “interparty competition generates greater legislative responsiveness” and this “translated into higher expenditure level” for higher education. Koven and Mausolff (2002) found that party affiliation of the legislature was not significant, and Delaney and Doyle (2011) did not find partisan control of legislative and governor offices made a statistically significant difference. We accessed this data from Council of State Governments (CSG) “Book of States”

(http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/content-type/book-states).

Republican Unified Government. Republican Unified Government is defined as political control over the executive and legislative branches of state government by the Republican Party.

The variable is binary where 1 = Republican unified government and 0 = non-Republican unified governments. According to McLendon et al. (2009), when Republicans control both the legislature and the governor’s office, higher education funding goes down. We accessed this data from Council of State Governments (CSG) “Book of States”

(http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/content-type/book-states).

Gubernatorial Budget Powers. Gubernatorial budget powers is defined as a measure of the state executives influence over state budgetary decisions. The variable is binary and includes

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whether the governor has the line-item veto on not where 1 = line-item veto power and 0 = absence of line item veto power. We accessed this data from Council of State Governments

(CSG) “Book of States” (http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/content- type/book-states).

State Variables

State Governance Structure. State governance structure is defined as a classification of a state’s formal higher education regulatory institution. The variable is binary where 1 = consolidated governing board and 0 = coordinating board. Lowery (2001) found that governing boards reduce the impact and ability of public universities and colleges to lobby on their own behalf which negatively impacts state funding to public universities. We accessed this data from

State Higher Education Executive Officers and Education Commission of the States (ECS)

(https://www.ecs.org/postsecondary-governance-structures/).

Institutional Fiscal Autonomy. Institutional fiscal autonomy is defined as a classification of a higher education institution’s control over budgetary and financial decision making. The variable is binary where 1 = institutional fiscal autonomy and 0 = state fiscal control. Scholars have theorized that a decentralized approach, in which institutions control financial decisions, cultivates a financial environment for the possibility that authorities will overuse the finance process if there is no overall monitoring which may lead to shifting of fiscal burdens to future generations (Bahl and Duncombe 1993). We accessed this data from State Higher Education

Executive Officers and Education Commission of the States (ECS)

(https://www.ecs.org/postsecondary-governance-structures/).

Formula Funding. Formula funding is described as a classification of a state’s higher education funding methodology. Formula funding is a binary variable where 1 = formula funding state and

0 = non-formula funding state. We accessed this data from SRI International States’ Methods of

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Funding Higher Education (SRI) (https://www.sri.com/sites/default/files/brochures/revised- sri_report_states_methods_of_funding_higher_education.pdf).

State long-term debt. State long-term debt is defined as the aggregate dollar amount states long- term debt obligations.1 Higher education scholars recognized that competing priorities at the state level – such as health care, retirement, increasing enrollments and state public debt – are all critical public priorities, and enhanced support for higher education will likely be a significant fiscal challenge for the future of state-supported colleges and universities (State Higher

Education Executive Officers, 2012). We assessed this data from the Census Bureau Annual

Survey of State Government Finances (https://www.census.gov/programs- surveys/state/data/datasets.html). The natural log of state long-term debt is used because state long-term debt does not follow a normal distribution.

Black Population percent. Black Population percent is defined as demographic measurement of a state’s population percentage that identifies as black or African-American. The variable is recorded as a percentage. The racial diversity thesis recognizes the significant history race/ethnicity has played in shaping American policy by placing race at the center of analysis.

The racial diversity thesis contends that policy outcomes in a state are directly related to the level of racial diversity in the state (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Hero 2007). We assessed this data from the United States Census Bureau. The natural log of black population percent is used because black population percent does not follow a normal distribution.

Institutional Control Variables

In this study we used institutional financial information to control for the differences in the financial statuses of individual higher education institutions. Walker (2008) reported that a

1 Long-term debt is debt owed by a government paid out over more than one year.

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study by Minor found that large schools received more funding from the state and federal resources. The amount a school received per student was lower at HBCUs compared to non-

HBCUs. Sav (2000) used the Blinder- Oaxaca decomposition method to study the fiscal discrimination leading to unequal funding of public HBCUs. He concluded that 83% of the funding differential is due to the difference in institutional characteristics, including lower undergraduate and graduate credit hour production at public HBCUs compared to public PWIs.

The remaining 17% of the funding differential was due to the differential treatment of public

HBCUs compared to public PWIs.

HBCU. The variable HBCU is defined as a categorical measure of whether a higher education institution is classified as an HBCU. The variable is binary where 1 = HBCU and 0 = RCPWI.

We accessed this data from the Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education

Data System (IPEDS) (https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/).

Pell Grants. Pell grants is defined as the aggregate dollar amount of Pell grant aid received by a higher education institution. We accessed this data from the Department of Education’s

Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) (https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/). The natural log of Pell grants is used because Pell grants does not follow a normal distribution.

Instruction Expenditures. Instruction expenditures is defined as the aggregate amount that a higher education institution outlays for student instruction. We accessed this data from the

Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)

(https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/). The natural log of instruction expenditures is used because instruction expenditures does not follow a normal distribution.

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Scholarship and Fellowship expenditures. Scholarship and Fellowship expenditures is defined as the aggregate dollar amount that a higher education institution outlays for student scholarships and fellowships. We accessed this data from the Department of Education’s Integrated

Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) (https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/). The natural log of scholarships and fellowships expenditures is used because scholarships and fellowships expenditures does not follow a normal distribution.

Federal grants and contracts revenue. Federal grants and contracts revenue is defined as the aggregate dollar amount that a higher education institution receives in grants and contracts from the federal government. We accessed this data from the Department of Education’s Integrated

Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) (https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/). The natural log of federal grants and contracts revenue is used because federal grants and contracts revenue does not follow a normal distribution.

Endowment assets valuation. Endowment assets valuation is defined as the aggregate dollar value of a higher education institution’s endowment fund. We accessed this data from the

Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)

(https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/). The natural log of endowment assets valuation is used because endowment assets valuation does not follow a normal distribution.

Percentage of students receiving federal grants. Percentage of students receiving federal grants is defined as the ratio of students receiving any form of grant aid from the federal government. We accessed this data from the Department of Education’s Integrated

Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) (https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/).

Average student loan aid. Average student loan aid is defined as the mean of loans given and accepted by students at a higher education institution. We accessed this data from the

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Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)

(https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/).

Student Tuition percent. Student tuition percentis defined as the percent of revenue that is collected from student tuition. Increases in student tuition have been attributed to decreases in state spending (Tandberg, 2009). We accessed this data from the Department of Education’s

Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) (https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/).

In-state undergraduate per credit hour cost. In-state undergraduate per credit hour cost is defined as the dollar amount cost of one undergraduate credit hour. Increases in student tuition have been attributed to decreases in state spending (Tandberg, 2009). We accessed this data from the Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)

(https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/).

In-state graduate per credit hour cost. In-state graduate per credit hour cost is defined as the dollar amount cost of one graduate credit hour. Increases in student tuition have been attributed to decreases in state spending (Tandberg, 2009). We accessed this data from the Department of

Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)

(https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/).

Methodology

In order to answer the questions of this study and better understand State Financial

Support of Public 4 year HBCUs, a review of the literature reveals that the relationship between politico-economic variables and state funding for higher education institutions has been established ( McLendon, et al., 2009). However, the lack of scholarship on the relationship between politico-economic variables and state financial support for HBCUs points to the need for analysis of descriptive variables as well as the formation of quantitative models to study the impact of political and institutional variables on state financial support to HBCUs. This research

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contributes to the literature regarding race and policy as well as politics and budgeting of higher education institutions. The variables used have been used to analyze variables impacting state higher education expenditures but they have not been used to examine state higher education expenditures to a particular category of higher education institutions such as HBCUs.

Finally, this research design contributes to the literature through the creation of a comprehensive dataset that analyzes state financial support to higher education institutions across 19 states for 10 time periods, 2004 thru 2013, and across 111 higher education institutions including 36 public HBCUs and 75 RCPWIs for a total of 1100 observations. This resulted in a unique panel dataset measuring state financial support to higher education institutions controlling for political and institutional variables over a time period of a decade which spanned two U.S.

Presidents, several state lower and upper houses, three state governorships and The Great

Recession.

Quantitative Analysis

This study examines how state political ideology, higher education institutional structures, state demographics and race influence state support to HBCUs. Before utilizing more advanced statistical techniques, this study first provides descriptive statistics. Previous quantitative studies investigating the relationship between higher education and other outcomes and state appropriations to higher education, provided descriptive statistics of the variables in the studies before employing advance statistical techniques (Delaney & Doyle, 2011; McLendon,

M.K., Hearn, J.C., & Mokher, C.G. 2009). Specifically, descriptive statistics including the mean, median, minimum, and maximum values for all variables will be calculated. Proportions will also be calculated for all categorical variables to understand the distribution of these variables.

After examining the results of the descriptive statistics, more advanced statistical analysis will be employed to explore the influence of state characteristics (e.g., higher education

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enrollments, prior appropriation levels), higher education governance systems, state economic variables, and unobservable variables within states on state appropriations to higher education.

The most appropriate method to examine how a number of observable variables and other unobservable variables in a panel data set affect an outcome is panel data analysis.

Two panel date models are constructed to explain the relationship between the explanatory variables and state support for higher education: (1) Institutional Model and (2) State

Political Model. State support for higher education is represented by proxy variables: state appropriations and state operating grants and contracts. Both models will be constructed to explain the relationship between selected independent variables and state appropriation and operating grants and contracts. Each model will use a sample population of HBCUs and a sample population that includes HBCUs and RCPWIs. In total eight separate models are constructed.

Panel datasets are also known as time-series cross-section dataset (TSCS), they contain both a longitudinal and chronological dimension (Eom, et al., 2008). A panel data examines the relationship between variables across a unit of analysis as well as within one unit across various time periods while also pooling repeated observations on units across multiple time units.

Several panel data analysis techniques have been employed in higher education and public policy research. The most commonly utilized panel data analysis techniques are fixed- effects and random-effects regression (Zhang, 2010). Both fixed-effects and random-effects regression analysis explore the relationship between independent variables and a dependent variable. A fixed-effects analysis takes into account unobservable state characteristics that are influencing the dependent variable, state appropriations to higher education. In contrast, random- effects models are utilized when observable variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with the

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unit group or the state error. Therefore, either a fixed-effects or random-effects panel data analysis may be employed for this type of study.

Fixed Effects (FE) or within effects allows for the researcher to focus on variation over time within a single unit (Yaffee, 2005). The outcome variable may be impacted because of the variance between units and unobserved heterogeneity. This causes the descriptive power of the independent variable to be reduced or lost in the analysis (Torres-Reyna, 2011). One can control for the unobserved heterogeneity and eliminate it from the analysis to avoid bias (Eom, et al.,

2008).

To control for unobserved heterogeneity, variables of each higher education institution are held constant assuming that the variables do not vary over time however they may influence the relationship between the dependent and independent variables (Torres-Reyna, 2011). The FE model separates unobserved heterogeneity from the individual error and is held constant. The intercept is also allowed to vary within the equation to indicate institutional specific traits that do not vary overtime and impact the dependent variable (Gujarati, 2003).

Contingent on the hypothesis and research question, dummy variables can be used to control for unobserved heterogeneity and examine different scenarios within the panel data

(Gujarati, 2003; Hsiao, 2003). In the most common studies using FE models, the hypothesis is concerned with variation over time within the unit. FE models also test hypotheses centered on chronological effects by using dummy variables for each time period. If there is variation across both unit and time, one would include dummy variables for unit and time period within the regression (Gujarati, 2003; Hsiao, 2003; Yaffee, 2005).

Random Effects (RE) deals with variation within and between units (Eom, et al., 2008).

RE models are appropriate when one believes that the effects within and between units affect the

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outcome variable (Torres-Reyna, 2011). RE models is the more efficient estimator and is able to utilize the totality of data available to the researcher. Diagnostic test such as the Hausman test are utilized to properly select the appropriate estimator.

The major difference between RE and FE models is that the RE model treats unobserved heterogeneity as a random variable while FE models use dummy variables to control for unobserved heterogeneity (Eom, et al., 2008). In the RE model differences amongst groups is represented by the error term that varies across units and groups which changes the way in which the intercept and error term are treated. The FE model makes the intercept constant over time however it varies across units by restricting the intercept. The RE models treats unobserved heterogeneity as a random variable hence the term “random effects” and therefore does not restrict the intercept (Gujarati, 2003).

A Hausman test is conducted on each model to determine whether a fixed-effects or random-effects model is most appropriate, as shown through previous higher education studies

(McLendon, et al., 2009). Hausman test determines whether the unique errors are correlated with explanatory variables. The null hypothesis is that random effects is appropriate while the alternative hypothesis is fixed effects is appropriate. A Hausman test p-value above .05 fails to reject the null hypothesis and thus random effects is appropriate. A Hausman test p-value below

.05 rejects the null hypothesis and fixed effects is appropriate.

Five research questions are investigated in this study. Questions two, three, and four are limited in scope to only HBCUs, therefore data used in the random effects model will only include 360 observations collected from 36 HBCUs over a ten year period. Question five involves HBCUs and RCPWIs therefore data used in the random effects model will include all

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1,100 observations from all HBCUs and RCPWIs over a ten-year period. For all the statistical computations above, STATA statistical software was utilized.

Assumptions

This study was conducted based upon the following deductive assumptions:

 The National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) Integrated Postsecondary Educational Data System (IPEDS) was the most appropriate data source for this study.

 The public higher education institutions in the study have submitted correct and complete data to IPEDS for the surveys and reporting periods of interest.

 Using the Carnegie Classification system and geographic region was the most appropriate ways to classify public higher education institutions included in the study.

Delimitations

In conducting this study, the researcher established the following delimitations:

 Only U.S. public 4-year HBCUs in the 50 states categorized as doctoral/research, doctoral and first-professional and master’s institutions in the Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education of 2013 Basic Classification were included.

 Only 38 U.S. Public 4-year HBCUs and 75 RCPWIs were included.

 Only public institutions that report financial data according to Governmental Accounting Standards Board requirements were included in order to have comparable financial variables.

 Public higher education institutions with a response status on the IPEDS Finance survey indicating a parent or child relationship were excluded because data were not reported under a unique identification number and, thus, the characteristics of a single institution among those reported aggregately could not be ascertained.

 Affiliated foundations of the public higher education institutions were excluded from the data set.

 As this study focuses on state financial support, public institutions that have not properly reported state appropriations and state operating grants and contracts were excluded.

 Public institutions with missing assets and liabilities data in any year were excluded.

Limitations

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This study was conducted with the following limitations:

 Institutions may have input data incorrectly.

 Institutions may interpret or define certain data elements differently.

 The data were limited only to the years in which the institutional characteristics, enrollment, and finance surveys were completed by institutions.

 All financial data is adjusted for inflation using the 2013 Consumer price index

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Table 3-1. List of Dependent and Independent Variables

Variable Name Description Dependent State Support per FTE (Ln) Annual Dollar amount of the sum of State Appropriations, State Grants and Contracts, and State Capital Appropriations per full-time equivalent using the Natural Log. Independent State Political Model State K-12 Expenditures (Ln) Annual Dollar amount spent on State K-12 education State Prison Expenditures (Ln) Annual Dollar amount spent on State Prisons State Medicaid Expenditures (Ln) Annual Dollar amount spent on State Medicaid State Welfare Expenditures (Ln) Annual Dollar amount spent on Welfare Programs State Formula Funding 1=Yes, 0=No State Interest payments (Ln) Annual dollar amount spent on interest payments State long term debt (Ln) Annual dollar amount of long term debt State Political Ideology Measure of State liberalism (0= Most Conservative, 100= Most Liberal) Gubernatorial Party Affiliation (1= Republican, 0= Democrat) State Senate Republican Majority Republican Majority in the Upper Chamber State House Republican Majority Republican Majority in the Lower Chamber Republican Unified Government Republican Control of all branches of government Unified Government Control of All branches of Government by 1 political party Gubernatorial Strength Compilation of Governor’s appointment power, budgetary power, veto power, and tenure potential HBCU 1= HBCU, 0= RCPWI Black Population percent (Ln) Percent of Black residents Institutional Model Institutional Fiscal Autonomy Fiscal Decision makers (1= Institution, 0= State) State Governance Structure 1= Consolidated Governing Board, 0= Coordinating Boards Federal Operating Grants and Contracts Annual Dollar amount of Federal Operating Grants and Contracts HBCU 1= HBCU, 0= RCPWI Federal Pell Grants (Ln) Dollar value of Pell Grants Student Tuition Proportion Percent value of student tuition revenue as a percentage of Total revenue Average Student Loans Aid Dollar value of annual average student loan aid Endowments (Ln) Dollar value of Institution Endowment In-Start Graduate Tuition Dollar value of graduate student tuition per credit hour In-State Undergraduate Tuition Dollar value of undergraduate student tuition per credit hour Scholarship and Fellowship Expenditures Annual Dollar amount spent on Institutional scholarships Percent Receiving Federal Grants percentage of Students receiving federal grants Instruction Expenditures (Ln) Annual Dollar amount spent on Student Instruction

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CHAPTER 4 RESULTS

Chapter 4 provides a meticulous examination of the results from the quantitative analysis.

Chapter 4 is partitioned into four sections, a section for the descriptive statistics and a section for each politico-economic model. Chapter 4 will review the findings of this study, with emphasis substantial and applicable results. A detailed discussion and explanation of the findings will be discussed in Chapter 5.

State Financial Support Trends From 2004-2013

Descriptive statistics in Chapter 4 allows for the familiarization of the quantitative data, exploration of the data, and the discovery of relationships among the variables of interest. First, an analysis of the data is conducted to explore the measures of central tendency, trends and measures of dispersion. Then an analysis of panel data across higher education institutions and states will be conducted. Panel data allows for the quantitative data to be examined across institutions, states, and other categorical variables of interest. Thru this detail analysis one can obtain a better depiction of the variation of each variable.

State Financial Support per FTE for HBCUs remained flat for from 2004 and 2013, as illustrated by Figure 4-1. HBCUs experienced increases in state financial support from 2004 to their peak in 2008, however after 2008 state financial support decreased steadily from 2008 to

2013, coinciding with the aftermath of the 2008 Global financial crisis.

In constant dollar terms, state financial support per fte for HBCUs increased $53 from

2004 and 2013, as displayed in Table 4-1. During the same period HBCU’s averaged year-to year increases of .4% in state financial support. In contrast from 2004 to 2008 average year-to- year increases in state financial support was 7.2% however, from 2008 to 2013 average year-to-

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year state financial support decreased 5.1%. During the period from 2004 to 2013 HBCUs had a year-to-year state financial support percent change volatility of 7.6% measured by it standard deviation. This means that from 2004 to 2013 average year-to-year percent changes in state financial support were 0.4% ± 7.6%. State financial support volatility for HBCUs were higher during the decline in financial support from 2008 to 2013, than it was during the increase in state financial support from 2004 to 2008. This shows that from 2004 to 2013 HBCUs were exponentially vulnerable to state financial support declines because of the increased unpredictability of state financial resource allocation to its institutions.

State financial support for HBCUs trends across governance structures from 2004 to 2013 show varying results, as illustrated in Figure 4-2. Among public HBCUs, those within states that operate consolidated governing boards experienced decreased state financial support per fte from

2004 to 2013 while HBCUs in states with coordinating boards experienced increased state financial support during the same period. Both governance structures experienced increased state financial support per fte from 2004 to 2008, while experiencing decreased state financial support from their peak in 2008 to 2013. HBCUs under state coordinating boards saw a minor increase in state financial support per fte from 2011 to 2013 after the declines following the 2008 global financial crisis.

Table 4-2 describes HBCUs state financial support per fte by governance structure from

2004 to 2013. HBCUs under state coordinating boards received 5.8% more in state financial support than HBCUs under consolidated governing boards from 2004 to 2013. From 2004 to

2013 HBCUs under consolidated governing boards had a mean state financial support per fte of

$11,031 while HBCUs under coordinating boards averaged $11,667 per fte. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs under consolidated governing boards was $10,501 and

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declined to $9,586 in 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs under coordinating boards was $9,662 and reached $11,071 in 2013. The highest level of state support per fte for

HBCUs under consolidated governing boards was $12,678 in 2008, while the lowest was $9,586 in 2013. The highest level of state support per fte for HBCUs under coordinating boards was

$14,331 in 2008, while the lowest was $9,662 in 2004. The data shows that HBCUs operating in states with coordinating boards receive more state financial support than HBCUs in states operating consolidated governing boards.

Average state financial support changes were larger for HBCUs under coordinating boards than consolidated governing boards. From 2004 to 2013 coordinating board HBCUs had a yearly average state financial support change of 2.2% while consolidated governing boards averaged -0.7%. The largest positive and negative change in state financial support for consolidated governing board HBCUs was 6.4% from 2005 to 2006 and -16.5% from 2009 to

2010. The largest positive and negative change in state financial support for coordinating board

HBCUs was 24.3% from 2004 to 2005 and -19.7% from 2008 to 2009. State financial support per fte’s volatility was higher in HBCUs under coordinating boards than those under consolidating governing boards from 2004 to 2013, as measured by their standard deviation.

From 2004 to 2013 HBCUs under consolidated governing boards had a percent change standard deviation of 7% while HBCUs under coordinating boards had a standard deviation of 11.3%.

This shows that despite higher average state financial support per fte under coordinating board

HBCUs, consolidated governing boards offer greater predictability of state financial support.

State financial support for HBCUs by fiscal autonomy from 2004 to 2013 is shown in

Figure 4-3. Among public HBCUs, those that maintain institutional fiscal autonomy experienced a slight increase in state financial support per fte from 2004 to 2013 while HBCUs under state

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fiscal autonomy experienced a slight decrease in state financial support during the same period.

For both types of institutions, increases or decreases in state financial support was not consistent across the study period. Both HBCU institution types experienced increased state financial support per fte from 2004 to 2008, while experiencing decreased state financial support from their peak in 2008 to 2013.

Table 4-3 describes HBCUs state financial support per fte by fiscal autonomy from 2004 to 2013. HBCUs with institutional fiscal autonomy received 23.2% more in state financial support than HBCUs under state fiscal autonomy from 2004 to 2013. From 2004 to 2013 HBCUs that were fiscally autonomous had a mean state financial support per fte of $12,540 while

HBCUs that relied on state fiscal autonomy had an average of $10,177 per fte. In 2004 state financial support per fte for fiscally autonomous HBCUs was $10,880 and increased to $11,443 in 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs with state fiscal autonomy was $9,500 but declined to $9,098 in 2013. The highest level of state support per fte for HBCUs that are fiscally autonomous was $15,009 in 2008, while the lowest was $10,880 in 2004. The highest level of state support per fte for HBCUs state fiscal control was $11,897 in 2008, while the lowest was $9,098 in 2013. This shows that HBCUs that are fiscally autonomous at the institution level average higher levels of state financial support than HBCUs who were fiscally autonomous at the state level.

Average state financial support changes were larger for fiscally autonomous HBCUs than state autonomous HBCUs. From 2004 to 2013 fiscally autonomous HBCUs had a yearly average state financial support change of 1.1% while state autonomous HBCUs averaged -0.15%. The largest positive and negative change in state financial support for fiscally autonomous HBCUs was 20.8% from 2004 to 2005 and -19% from 2008 to 2009. The largest positive and negative

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change in state financial support for state autonomous HBCUs was 9.8% from 2006 to 2007 and

-19.0% from 2009 to 2010. State financial support per fte’s volatility was higher for fiscally autonomous HBCUs than those under state fiscal control from 2004 to 2013, as measured by their standard deviation. From 2004 to 2013 fiscally autonomous HBCUs had a state financial support percent change standard deviation of 9.9% while HBCUs under state fiscal control had a standard deviation of 7.8%. This shows that despite higher average state financial support per fte under fiscally autonomous HBCUs, those under state fiscal control experienced greater predictability of state financial support from 2004 to 2013.

State financial support for HBCUs by funding classification from 2004 to 2013 is shown in Figure 4-4. Among public HBCUs, those in states with formula funding experienced a slight increase in state financial support per fte from 2004 to 2013 while HBCUs in states with non- formula funding experienced decreased state financial support during the same period. For both types of institutions, increases or decreases in state financial support was inconsistent across the study period. Both HBCU funding types experienced increased state financial support per fte from 2004 to 2008, while experiencing decreased state financial support from their peak in 2008 to 2013. It is also important to note that formula funding HBCUs saw slight increases in state financial support from 2010 to 2013 and non-formula funding HBCUs saw slight increase from to 2010 to 2011.

Table 4-4 describes HBCUs state financial support per fte by funding classification from

2004 to 2013. HBCUs in states with non-formula funding received 8.9% more in state financial support than HBCUs in states formula funding from 2004 to 2013. From 2004 to 2013 HBCUs in states with formula funding had a mean state financial support per fte of $11,000 while

HBCUs in states with non-formula funding had an average of $11,974 per fte. In 2004 state

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financial support per fte for formula funding HBCUs was $9,594 and increased to $10,093 in

2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with non-formula funding was

$11,481 but declined to $10,549 in 2013. The highest level of state support per fte for formula funded HBCUs was $13,127 in 2008, while the lowest was $9,594 in 2004. The highest level of state support per fte for HBCUs in non-formula funding states was $13,910 in 2008, while the lowest was $10,459 in 2013. This shows that HBCUs in non-formula funding states average higher levels of state financial support than HBCUs located in formula funding states however, throughout the study period HBCUs in formula funding states were receiving increases in state financial support as non-formula funded HBCUs were receiving decreases in state financial support.

Average state financial support changes were larger for formula funded HBCUs than non-formula funded HBCUs. From 2004 to 2013 formula funded HBCUs had a yearly average state financial support change of 1% while non-formula funded HBCUs averaged -0.6%. The largest positive and negative change in state financial support for formula funded HBCUs was

19.7% from 2004 to 2005 and -14.6% from 2008 to 2009. The largest positive and negative change in state financial support for non-formula funded HBCUs was 19.4% from 2006 to 2007 and -15.2% from 2009 to 2010. State financial support per fte’s volatility was higher for formula funded HBCUs than non-formula funded HBCUs from 2004 to 2013, as measured by their standard deviation. From 2004 to 2013 formula funded HBCUs had a state financial support percent change standard deviation of 9.3% while HBCUs in states with non-formula funding had a standard deviation of 9%. This shows that non-formula funded HBCUs had higher levels of state financial support per fte than formula funded HBCUs as well having less unpredictability than formula funded HBCUs.

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State financial support for HBCUs by Gubernatorial party control is shown in Figure 4-5.

Among public HBCUs, those in states with Republican governors experienced a decrease in state financial support per fte from 2004 to 2013 while HBCUs in states Democrat governors experienced increased state financial support during the same period. HBCUs in states governed by both Republicans and democrats, experienced inconsistent trends of state financial support. In

2005, state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with Democrat governors surpassed

HBCUs in states with Republican governors. This trend was maintained throughout the duration of the study period. HBCUs in states with Republican Party control experienced increased state financial support per fte from 2004 to 2006, while HBCUs is states with Democrat gubernatorial control experienced increased states financial support per fte from 2004 to 2008. HBCUs in states with Republican gubernatorial control showed steady decreases in state financial support from 2006 to 2013 and HBCUs in states with Democrat gubernatorial control showed decreases from 2008-2013. It is important to note that HBCUs in states with Republican gubernatorial control saw increases in state financial support from 2010 to 2013. The data shows that HBCUs in states with Republican gubernatorial control experienced declines in state financial support two years before HBCUs in states with Democrat gubernatorial control.

Table 4-5 describes HBCUs state financial support per fte by gubernatorial party control.

HBCUs in states with Democrat governors received 25.2% more in state financial support than

HBCUs in states with Republican governors from 2004 to 2013. From 2004 to 2013 HBCUs in states with Democrat governors had a mean state financial support per fte of $12,736 while

HBCUs in states governed by Republicans had an average of $10,173 per fte. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs is states governed by a Democrat was $9,680 and increased to $11,262 in 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with Republican

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governors was $10,574 but declined to $9,259 in 2013. The highest level of state support per fte for HBCUs in states governed by a Democrat was $15,207 in 2008, while the lowest was $9,680 in 2004. The highest level of state support per fte for HBCUs in states governed by Republicans was $11,744 in 2006, while the lowest was $8,266 in 2010. The aggregate data shows that

HBCUs in states governed by a Democrat average higher levels of state financial support than

HBCUs located in states governed by a Republican. HBCUs in state governed by a Republican experience the lowest level of state financial support during the study period in 2010, while

HBCUs in states governed by a Democrat experience the highest level of state financial support during the study period in 2008.

Average state financial support changes were larger for HBCUs in states governed by

Democrat governors than HBCUs in states governed by Republicans. From 2004 to 2013

HBCUs in states governed by democrats averaged yearly state financial support changes of 2.3% while HBCUs in Republican governed states averaged -1%. The largest positive and negative change in state financial support for HBCUs in states governed by democrats was 21.5% from

2004 to 2005 and -13.1% from 2008 to 2009. The largest positive and negative change in state financial support for HBCUs in states governed by Republicans was 6.8% from 2012 to 2013 and -22.7% from 2009 to 2010. State financial support per fte’s volatility was higher for HBCUs in states governed by democrats than HBCUs in states governed by Republicans from 2004 to

2013, as measured by their standard deviation. From 2004 to 2013 HBCUs in states governed by democrats had a state financial support percent change standard deviation of 11.6% while

HBCUs in states governed by Republicans had a standard deviation of 8.9%. This shows that

HBCUs in states governed by democrats experienced higher unpredictability of state financial support per fte than HBCUs in states governed by Republicans.

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Analysis of state financial support per fte for HBCUs categorized by government control varied and was inconsistent over time, as shown in Figure 4-6. Among public HBCUs, those in states with divided government experienced a decrease in state financial support per fte from

2004 to 2013 while HBCUs in states with unified government control experienced increased state financial support during the same period. In 2005, state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with unified governments surpassed HBCUs in states with divided governments, however in 2008 HBCUs in states with divided governments surpassed those in states with unified governments until 2011 in which this trend reversed. State financial support for HBCUs in states with unified governments reached its peak in 2007 before steadily declining until 2010 and subsequently increasing again until 2013. State financial support for HBCUs in states with divided governments reached its peak in 2008 and subsequently experienced a steady decline until 2013. The data illustrates that both HBCUs in states with unified and divided governments experienced cyclical movements in state financial support with HBCUs in states with unified governments trending upward and HBCUs in states with divided governments trending downward from 2004 to 2013.

Table 4-6 describes HBCUs state financial support per fte by government control.

HBCUs in states with unified governments received 0.3% more in state financial support than

HBCUs in states with divided governments. From 2004 to 2013 HBCUs in states with divided government had a mean state financial support per fte of $11,153 while HBCUs in states with unified governments had an average of $11,187 per fte. In 2004 state financial support per fte for

HBCUs in states with divided governments was $10,904 and decreased to $9,096 in 2013. In

2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with unified governments was $8,646 but increased to $10,473 in 2013. The highest level of state support per fte for HBCUs in states

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with divided governments was $14,667 in 2008, while the lowest was $7,892 in 2012. The highest level of state support per fte for HBCUs in states with unified governments was $13,194 in 2007, while the lowest was $8,646 in 2004. The aggregate data shows that on average there is little difference in state financial support between HBCUs in states with unified and divided governments. HBCUs in states with divided governments had greater fluctuations in state financial support than HBCUs in states with unified governments.

Average state financial support changes were larger for HBCUs in states with unified governments than HBCUs in states with divided governments. From 2004 to 2013 HBCUs in states with divided governments averaged yearly state financial support changes of -1.1% while

HBCUs in states with unified governments averaged 3%. The largest positive and negative change in state financial support for HBCUs in states with divided governments was 19% from

2007 to 2008 and -23.4% from 2011 to 2012. The largest positive and negative change in state financial support for HBCUs in states with unified governments was 37.98% from 2004 to 2005 and -10.8% from 2009 to 2010. State financial support per fte’s volatility was higher for HBCUs in states with unified governments than HBCUs in states with divided governments, as measured by their standard deviation. From 2004 to 2013 HBCUs in states with divided governments had a state financial support percent change standard deviation of 13.3% while HBCUs in states with unified governments had a standard deviation of 14%. This shows that HBCUs in states with unified governments experienced higher unpredictability of state financial support per fte than

HBCUs in states with divided governments.

Analysis of state financial support per fte for HBCUs categorized by senate majority varied and was inconsistent over time, as shown in Figure 4-7. Among public HBCUs, those in states with a majority Democrat senate experienced increases in state financial support per fte

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from 2004 to 2013 while HBCUs in states with a majority Republican senate experienced decreases in state financial support during the same period. In 2005, state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with majority Democrat senates surpassed HBCUs in states with majority Republican senates, however in 2009 HBCUs in states with majority Republican senates surpassed those in states with majority Democrat senates until 2011 in which this trend reversed. State financial support for HBCUs in states with majority Democrat senates reached its peak in 2007 before steadily declining until 2010 and subsequently increasing again close to peak levels in 2012. State financial support for HBCUs in states with majority Republican senates reached its peak in 2009 and subsequently experienced a steady decline until 2013. The data illustrates that both HBCUs in states with majority Democrat and Republican senates experienced ebbs and flows in state financial support with HBCUs in states with majority

Democrat senates trending upward and HBCUs in states with majority Republican senates trending downward from 2004 to 2013.

Table 4-7 describes HBCUs state financial support per fte by senate majority. HBCUs in states with Democrat senate majorities received 7.94% more in state financial support than

HBCUs in states with Republican senate majorities. From 2004 to 2013 HBCUs in states with majority Democrat senates had a mean state financial support per fte of $11,845 while HBCUs in states with Republican senate majorities had an average of $10,974 per fte. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with majority Democrat senates was $9,670 and increased to $11,646 in 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with majority Republican senates was $11,004 and decreased to $9,176 in 2013. The highest level of state support per fte for HBCUs in states with majority Democrat senates was $13,908 in 2007, while the lowest was $9,670 in 2004. The highest level of state support per fte for HBCUs in

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states with majority Republican senates was $13,316 in 2009, while the lowest was $9,176 in

2013. The aggregate data shows that on average HBCUs in states with majority Democrat senates received more state financial support than HBCUs in states with majority Republican senates during the study period.

Average state financial support changes were larger for HBCUs in states with majority

Democrat senates than HBCUs in states with Republican majority senates. From 2004 to 2013

HBCUs in states with majority Democrat senates averaged yearly state financial support changes of 3% while HBCUs in states with majority Republican senates averaged -1.4%. The largest positive and negative change in state financial support for HBCUs in states with majority

Democrat senates was 21% from 2004 to 2005 and -20.2% from 2008 to 2009. The largest positive and negative change in state financial support for HBCUs in states with majority

Republican senates was 13.1% from 2008 to 2009 and -20.9% from 2009 to 2010. State financial support per fte’s volatility was higher for HBCUs in states with majority Democrat senates than

HBCUs in states with majority Republican senates, as measured by their standard deviation.

From 2004 to 2013 HBCUs in states with majority Democrat senates had a state financial support percent change standard deviation of 13.6% while HBCUs in states with majority

Republican senates had a standard deviation of 10.5%. This shows that HBCUs in states with majority Democrat senates experienced higher unpredictability of state financial support per fte than HBCUs in states with majority Republican senates despite majority Democrat senates granting more state financial support from 2004 to 2013.

Analysis of state financial support per fte for HBCUs categorized by house majority also varied and was inconsistent over time, as shown in Figure 4-8. Among public HBCUs, those in states with a majority Democrat house experienced increases in state financial support per fte

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from 2004 to 2013 while HBCUs in states with a majority Republican house experienced decreases in state financial support during the same period. In 2005, state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with majority Democrat house surpassed HBCUs in states with majority

Republican senates and maintain this trend throughout the study period. State financial support for HBCUs in states with a majority Democrat house reached its peak in 2008 before steadily declining until 2010 and subsequently increasing again close to peak levels in 2012. State financial support for HBCUs in states with a majority Republican house reached its peak in 2008 and subsequently experienced a steady decline until 2013. The data illustrates that both HBCUs in states with majority Democrat and Republican senates experienced ebbs and flows in state financial support with HBCUs in states with majority Democrat senates trending upward and

HBCUs in states with majority Republican senates trending downward from 2004 to 2013.

Table 4-8 describes HBCUs state financial support per fte by senate majority. HBCUs in states with Democrat house majorities received 11.69% more in state financial support than

HBCUs in states with Republican house majorities. From 2004 to 2013 HBCUs in states with majority Democrat houses had a mean state financial support per fte of $12,004 while HBCUs in states with Republican house majorities had an average of $10,748 per fte. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with majority Democrat house was $9,466 and increased to

$11,542 in 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with majority

Republican houses was $11,111 and decreased to $9,354 in 2013. The highest level of state support per fte for HBCUs in states with majority Democrat houses was $13,636 in 2008, while the lowest was $9,466 in 2004. The highest level of state support per fte for HBCUs in states with majority Republican houses was $13,066 in 2009, while the lowest was $9,354 in 2013. The aggregate data shows that on average HBCUs in states with majority Democrat houses received

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more state financial support than HBCUs in states with majority Republican houses during the study period.

Average state financial support changes were larger for HBCUs in states with majority

Democrat houses than HBCUs in states with Republican majority houses. From 2004 to 2013

HBCUs in states with majority Democrat houses averaged yearly state financial support changes of 2.96% while HBCUs in states with majority Republican houses averaged -1.2%. The largest positive and negative change in state financial support for HBCUs in states with majority

Democrat houses was 23.1% from 2004 to 2005 and -15.3% from 2012 to 2013. The largest positive and negative change in state financial support for HBCUs in states with majority

Republican houses was 16.2% from 2012 to 2013 and -17.8% from 2011 to 2012. State financial support per fte’s volatility was higher for HBCUs in states with majority Democrat houses than

HBCUs in states with majority Republican houses, as measured by their standard deviation.

From 2004 to 2013 HBCUs in states with majority Democrat houses had a state financial support percent change standard deviation of 12.3% while HBCUs in states with majority Republican houses had a standard deviation of 11.1%. This shows that HBCUs in states with majority

Democrat houses experienced higher unpredictability of state financial support per fte than

HBCUs in states with majority Republican houses despite majority Democrat houses granting more state financial support from 2004 to 2013.

States vary in their financial support for HBCUs, as illustrated in Table 4-9. During the study period Maryland lead all states in average financial support per fte to HBCUs while West

Virginia was last in average state financial support given to HBCUs. During the study period,

Maryland averaged $17,856 in state financial support per fte while West Virginia averaged

$5,810 in state financial support per FTE to HBCUs. Maryland’s state financial support per fte

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decreased from $18,387 in 2004 to $12,804 in 2013 or a 30% decrease during the study period. .

West Virginia’s state financial support per fte slightly increased from $6,013 in 2004 to $6,265 in 2013 or a 4% increase during the study period. In 2004 Maryland and Kentucky led the nation in state financial support per fte to HBCUs by giving $18,387 and $16,299 respectively. In 2013

North Carolina and Maryland led the nation in state financial support per fte to HBCUs by giving

$15,069 and $12,804 respectively.

North Carolina and Pennsylvania saw the greatest increases in state financial support per fte to HBCUs during the study period, increasing state financial support per FTE by 48% and

24% respectively. During the same study period Florida and Delaware saw the greatest decreases in state financial support per fte to HBCUs, decreasing state financial support by 42% and 37% respectively. Prior to 2008 North Carolina and Alabama led the nation in increasing state financial support to HBCUs, increasing state support per FTE by 68% and 48% respectively.

During the same period, Georgia and Delaware led the nation in decreasing state financial support to HBCUs, decreasing state financial support to HBCUs by 9% and 6% respectively.

Post 2008, West Virginia and Arkansas were the only states that experience increases or flat state financial support to HBCUs. Post 2008, Florida and Louisiana saw the greatest declines in state financial support to HBCUs. From 2008 to 2013 Florida and Louisiana saw declines in state financial support to HBCUs of 55% and 46% respectively.

State Financial Support Political Model

The random effects analysis was implemented using the demeaned variables from the

State financial support political model. State financial support per fte was regressed on independent variables holding within unit effects constant. The natural log of the dependent variable and seven independent variables was used because the variables are not normally distributed. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Hausman test indicated random effects analysis as the

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most appropriate for this model. This model test five hypotheses: 1.) states with higher long-term debt interest payments provide less financial support to HBCUs, 2.) states that have more conservative political ideologies provide less financial support to HBCUs, 3.) states with a majority Republican House of Representatives provide less financial support to HBCUs, 4.)

States with a unified government provide less financial support to HBCUs and 5.) States with

Republican unified governments provide less financial support to HBCUs. The results reported below display the results for all observations.

Table 4-10 reveals the results for the state financial support political model. The coefficient for state long-term debt interest payments is -0.073807. This shows an inverse relationship between long term debt interest payments and state financial support to HBCUs. A one percent increase in state long-term debt interest payments results in a .0738% decrease in state financial support per fte to HBCUs, all else being constant. The variable state long-term debt interest payments was statistically insignificant, indicating that one is less than 95% sure that the estimated coefficient will fall within the range of the confidence interval. The standard significance level is set at 95% which would indicate that one is 95% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. Due to the statistically insignificant coefficient state long-term debt interest payments, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for H1.

The direction of the effect is negative for state long-term debt interest payments. As state long- term debt interest payments increase, state financial support to HBCUs decrease, which concurs with the stated hypothesis H1: states with higher long-term debt interest payments provide less financial support to HBCUs.

The coefficient for state political ideology is 0.0031076. A one percent increase in state political ideology results in .31% increase in state financial support per FTE to HBCUs, all else

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being constant. As a states becomes more liberal, state financial support to HBCUs increases, holding all else constant. The variable state political ideology is statistically significant at the

99% level, indicating that one is 99% sure that the estimated coefficient will fall within the range of the confidence interval. The standard significance level is set at 95% which would indicate that one is 95% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. Due to the statistically significant coefficient of state political ideology, we reject the null hypothesis for H2. The direction of the effect is positive for state political ideology, which is as hypothesized. As state political ideology become more liberal, state financial support increased to HBCUs, which coincides with the stated hypothesis H2: States that have more liberal political ideologies provide more financial support to HBCUs.

The coefficient for state house Republican majority is 0.0042585. States with majority

Republican House of Representatives offers .42585% more in state financial support per fte to

HBCUs than states with majority Democrat House of Representatives, holding all else constant.

The variable state house Republican majority was statistically insignificant, indicating that one is less than 95% sure that the estimated coefficient will fall within the range of the confidence interval. The standard significance level is set at 95% which would indicate that one is 95% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. Due to the statistically insignificant coefficient state house Republican majority, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for H3. The direction of the effect is positive for state house Republican majority, which contradicts the state hypothesis. States with a majority Republican House of

Representatives offer more state financial support per fte to HBCUs than states with a majority

Democrat House of Representatives, holding all else constant. Although statistically

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insignificant, the coefficient coincides with the stated hypothesis H3: states with a majority

Republican House of Representatives provide less financial support to HBCUs.

The coefficient for State Unified Government is 0.1356018. States with a unified government gives 13.5% more in state financial support per fte to HBCUs than states without a unified government, holding all else constant. The variable unified government was statistically significant at the 90% level, indicating that one is 90% sure that the estimated coefficient will fall within the range of the confidence interval. The standard significance level is set at 95% which would indicate that one is 95% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. Due to the statistically significant coefficient of State Unified

Government, we reject the null hypothesis for H4. The direction of the effect is positive for State

Unified Government, which is not as hypothesized. We can conclude that states with a unified government provide more state financial support per fte to HBCUs than states without a unified government, holding all else constant. Although statistically significant, the directional relationship of the coefficient does not coincide with the stated hypothesis H4: states with a unified government provides less financial support to HBCUs.

The coefficient for state Republican unified government is -0.2998981. States with a

Republican unified government gives 29.9% less in state financial support per fte to HBCUs than states without a unified Republican government, holding all else constant. The variable

Republican unified government was statistically significant at the 95% level, indicating that one is 95% sure that the estimated coefficient will fall within the range of the confidence interval.

The standard significance level is set at 95% which would indicate that one is 95% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. Due to the statistically significant coefficient of state Republican unified government, we reject the null hypothesis for

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H5. The direction of the effect is negative for state Republican unified government, which is as hypothesized. We can conclude that states with a Republican unified government provide less state financial support per fte to HBCUs than states without a Republican unified government, holding all else constant. The variable state Republican unified government is both statistically significant and shows a directional relationship within its coefficient that coincides with the stated hypothesis H5: states with a Republican unified government provides less financial support to HBCUs.

The state financial support political model also regressed state financial support against variables not mentioned in the stated hypotheses. Of the remaining ten variables, the following variables are statistically significant at the standard 95% level: welfare and Republican majority senate.

The coefficient for welfare is -0.2318104. A one percent increase in state welfare expenditures results in a .231% decrease in state financial support to HBCUs, all else being equal. The variable welfare is statistically significant at the 95% level, indicating that one can be

95% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. The coefficient for state welfare expenditures is negative, indicated an inverse relationship between state welfare expenditures and state financial support for HBCUs. We can conclude that state financial support for HBCUs decreases as state welfare expenditures increase.

The coefficient for Republican senate majority is 0.1584267. States with a Republican senate majority provides 15.84% more in state financial support per fte to HBCUs than states without a Republican senate majority, holding all else constant. The variable Republican senate majority is statistically significant at the 99.9% level, indicating that one can be 99.9% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. The coefficient for

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Republican senate majority is positive, indicating a positive relationship with state financial support for HBCUs. We can conclude that states with Republican senate majority provide more financial support per fte than states without a Republican senate majority.

The state financial support political model included statistically insignificant variables, however these variables can offer insight into their relationships with state financial support of

HBCUs. The following variables are statistically insignificant in the state financial support political model: K12 education, Medicaid, formula funding, state political ideology, Republican governor, gubernatorial budget power and black population percent. K12 education, Medicaid, political ideology, and Republican governor all have a positive relationship with state financial support per fte.

State K12 expenditure has a coefficient of 0.1236711. A one percent increase in state

K12 expenditures results in a .1236% increase in state financial support to HBCUs, all else being constant. State Medicaid expenditure has a coefficient of 0.0381658. A one percent increase in state Medicaid expenditures results in a .03816% increase in state financial support to HBCUs, all else being constant. State corrections expenditures have a coefficient of 0.0514743. A one percent increase in state corrections expenditures results in a .0514% increase in state financial support to HBCUs, all else being constant. States with Republican governors provide 8.5% more in state financial support per fte to HBCUs than state without Republican governors, holding all else constant. States with gubernatorial budget power provide 9.1% less state financial support per fte to HBCUs than states without gubernatorial budget power, all else being equal. The variable gubernatorial budget power is statistically significant at the 90% level. Black population percentage has a positive effect on state financial support per fte to HBCUs, all else being equal.

A one percent increase in black population percentage results in a .0309% increases in state

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financial support per fte to HBCUs, all else being equal. State long-term debt has a positive relationship with state financial support per fte, all else being constant. Finally, the overall R- square value for the state financial support political model is .1436 indicating that the model explains 14.36% of the variance in the outcome variable.

State Financial Support Institutional Model

The random effects analysis was implemented using the demeaned variables from the

State financial support institutional model. State financial support per fte was regressed on independent variables holding within unit effects constant. The natural log of the dependent variable and five independent variables was used because the variables are not normally distributed. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Hausman test indicated random effects analysis as the most appropriate for this model. This model test two hypotheses: 1.) states with consolidated governing boards provide less financial support to HBCUs than Coordinating boards and 2.)

HBCUs with fiscal autonomy receive more state financial support than HBCUs without fiscal autonomy. The results reported below display the results for all observations.

Table 4-11 reveals the results for the state financial support institutional model. The coefficient for state governance is 0.0569903. States with consolidated governing boards provide

5.69% more in state financial support per fte to HBCUs than states without consolidated governing boards, holding all else constant. The variable state governance is statistically insignificant indicating that one is less than 95% sure that the estimated coefficient will fall within the range of the confidence interval. The standard significance level is set at 95% which would indicate that one is 95% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. Due to the statistically insignificant coefficient, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for H6. The directional effect for consolidated governing boards is positive. States with consolidated governing boards provide more state financial support per fte to HBCUs than

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states without consolidated governing boards, which contradict the stated hypothesis H6: states with consolidated governing boards provide less financial support to HBCUs than coordinating boards.

The coefficient for institutional fiscal autonomy is 0.0224736. This indicates that within the model, HBCUs with institutional fiscal autonomy receive 2.24% more in state financial support per fte than HBCUs without institutional fiscal autonomy, holding all else constant. This shows a positive relationship between institutional fiscal autonomy and state financial support to

HBCUs. However, the variable institutional fiscal autonomy was statistically insignificant, indicating that one is less than 95% sure that the estimated coefficient will fall within the range of the confidence interval. The standard significance level is set at 95% which would indicate that one is 95% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. Due to the statistically insignificant coefficient of institutional fiscal autonomy, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for H7. The directional effect is positive for institutional fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomous HBCUs receive more in state financial support per fte than

HBCUs without fiscal autonomy, which concurs with the stated hypothesis H7: HBCUs with fiscal autonomy receive more state financial support than HBCUs without fiscal autonomy.

The state financial support institutional model also regressed state financial support against variables not mentioned in the stated hypotheses. Of the remaining ten variables, the following variables are statistically significant at the standard 95% level: Pell grants and instructional expenditures. The remaining eight variables are not statistically significant at any acceptable level required for rigorous social science research, however these variables will be highlighted to explain their relationship with state financial support per fte within the model.

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The coefficient for Pell grant is -0.4579418. A one percent increase in pell grant revenues results in a .458% increase in state financial support to HBCUs, all else being constant. The variable Pell grants is statistically significant at the 99.9% level, indicating that one can be 99.9% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. The coefficient for Pell grant receipts is negative, indicating an inverse relationship between student

Pell grant receipts and state financial support for HBCUs. We can conclude that state financial support for HBCUs decreases as student Pell grant receipts increase, all else being constant.

The coefficient for instruction is 0.4817446. A one percent increase in institutional instruction expenditures results in a .4817% increase in state financial support to HBCUs, all else being constant. The variable instruction is statistically significant at the 99.9% level, indicating that one can be 99.9% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. The coefficient for instruction expenditures is positive, indicating a positive relationship between instruction expenditures and state financial support for HBCUs. We can conclude that state financial support for HBCUs increases as instruction expenditures increase, all else being constant.

The state financial support institutional model included statistically insignificant variables, however these variables can offer insight into their relationships with state financial support of HBCUs. The following variables are statistically insignificant in the state financial support institutional model: Federal Operating Grants and Contracts, average student loan aid, value of endowment assets, scholarships and fellowship expenditures, student tuition percent, in- state graduate tuition cost per credit hour, in-state undergraduate tuition cost per credit hour and percent of students receiving Pell grants. Federal Operating Grants and Contracts, average student loan aid, scholarships and fellowship expenditures, student tuition percent and in-state

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undergraduate tuition cost per credit hour all have a negative relationship with state financial support per fte, however value of endowment assets and in-state undergraduate tuition cost per credit hour have a positive relationship with state financial support per fte.

Federal Operating Grants and Contracts revenue has a coefficient of -0.0043421. A one percent increase in federal operating grants and contracts results in a .004342% decrease in state financial support per fte, holding all else constant. Average student loan aid has a coefficient of

-0.0000114. A one unit increase in average student loan aid results in a .00114% decrease in state financial support per fte, holding all else constant. Value of endowment assets has a coefficient of .00873. A one percent increase in the value of endowments results in a .873% increase in state financial support per fte, holding all else constant. Scholarships and fellowship expenditures has a coefficient of 0.0125658. A one percent increase in scholarship and fellowship expenditures results in a .0125658% increase in state financial support per fte, holding all else constant. Student tuition percent has a coefficient of -0.0010049. A one unit increase in student tuition percentage results in a .10049% decrease in state financial support per fte to HBCUs, holding all else constant. In-state graduate per credit hour cost has a coefficient of

-0.0000711. A one unit increase in in-state graduate per credit hour cost results in a .00711% decrease in state financial support per fte, holding all else constant. In-state undergraduate per credit hour cost has a coefficient of -0.0005784. A one unit increase in in-state undergraduate per credit hour cost results in a .05784% decrease in state financial support per fte, holding all else constant. The variable percent receiving federal grants has a coefficient of 0.0009051. A one unit increase in precent receiving federal grants results in a .09051% increase in state financial support per fte, holding all else constant. Finally, the overall R-square value for the state

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financial support institutional model is .1765 indicating that the model explains 17.65% of the variance in the outcome variable.

State Financial Support Full Model

The random effects analysis was implemented using the demeaned variables from the state financial support full model. State financial support per fte was regressed on independent variables holding within unit effects constant. The natural log of the dependent variable and 12 independent variables was used because the variables are not normally distributed. The random effects analysis of the State financial support full model which includes all independent variables regressed in the state financial support political and institutional models as well was the binary variable HBCU. The model also adds 696 observation from RCPWIs. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Hausman test indicated random effects analysis as the most appropriate for this model. This model test one hypotheses: 1.) HBCUs receive less state financial support than RCPWIs, holding all else constant. The overall R-square value for the state financial support full model is .1765 indicating that the model explains 17.65% of the variance in the outcome variable. The results reported below display the results for all observations.

Table 4-12 reveals the results for the state financial support political model. The coefficient for HBCU is .5008229. This indicates that HBCUs receive 50% more in state financial support per fte than RCPWIs, holding all else constant. The variable HBCU was statistically significant at the 99.9% level, indicating that one is 99.9% sure that the estimated coefficient will fall within the range of the confidence interval. The standard significance level is set at 95% which would indicate that one is 95% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. Due to the statistically significant coefficient of the variable HBCU, we reject the null hypothesis for H8. The direction of the effect is positive for

HBCU, which is not as hypothesized. We can conclude that HBCUs are provided more state

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financial support per fte than RCPWIs, holding all else constant. Although statistically significant, the directional relationship of the coefficient does not coincide with the stated hypothesis H8: HBCUs receive less state financial support than RCPWIs, holding all else constant.

The state financial support full model also regressed state financial support per fte against variables not mentioned in the stated hypotheses. Of the remaining twenty-seven variables, the following variables are statistically significant at the standard 95% level: Pell grants, instruction expenditures, Republican majority senate, scholarship and fellowship expense, and political ideology. The next variable is statistically significant at the 90% level which is below the social science standard of 95% however it is worth highlighting its relationship with state financial support to HBCUs and their RCPWIs. Black population percentage is the only statistically significant variable with a statistical significance less than 95%. In total 6 non hypothesized variables were found to be statistically significant in the State financial support full model.

The coefficient for Pell grant is -0.4041153. A one percent increase in an institutions Pell grant aid results in a .404% decrease in state financial support per FTE to the institution, all else being constant. The variable Pell grants is statistically significant at the 99.9% level, indicating that one can be 99.9% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. The coefficient for Pell grant aid is negative, indicating an inverse relationship between student Pell grant receipts and state financial support for HBCUs. We can conclude that state financial support for HBCUs decreases as student Pell grant receipts increase, all else being constant.

The coefficient for instruction expenditures is 0.4625599. A one percent increase in an institutions instruction expenditures results in a .462% increase in state financial support per FTE

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to the institution, all else being constant. The variable instruction expenditures is statistically significant at the 99.9% level, indicating that one can be 99.9% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. The coefficient for instruction expenditures is positive, indicating a positive relationship between instruction expenditures and state financial support for HBCUs. We can conclude that state financial support for HBCUs increases as instruction expenditures increase, all else being constant.

The coefficient for Republican senate majority is 0.0869444. States with a Republican senate majority provides 8.6% more in state financial support per fte to higher education institutions than states without a Republican senate majority, holding all else constant. The variable Republican senate majority is statistically significant at the 99% level, indicating that one can be 99% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. The coefficient for Republican senate majority is positive, indicating a positive relationship with state financial support for HBCUs. We can conclude that states with

Republican senate majority provide more financial support per fte than states without a

Republican senate majority.

The coefficient for scholarship and fellowship expenditures is 0.0458556. A one percent increase in an institutions scholarship and fellowship expenditures results in a .0458 increase in state financial support per FTE to the institution, all else being constant. The variable state welfare expenditures is statistically significant at the 99% level, indicating that one can be 99% confident that the estimated coefficient falls with the range of the confidence interval. The coefficient for state welfare expenditures is negative, indicating an inverse relationship between state welfare expenditures and state financial support for HBCUs. We can conclude that state

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financial support for HBCUs decreases as state welfare expenditures increase, all else being constant.

The coefficient for political ideology is 0.0014184. A one unit increase of s states political ideology index results in a 0.14% increase in state financial support per FTE to the institution, all else being constant The variable political ideology is statistically significant at the

95% level, indicating that one can be 95% confident that the estimated coefficient falls within the range of the confidence interval. The coefficient for political ideology is positive, indicating a positive relationship with state financial support to institutions. We can conclude that politically liberal states provide more financial support per fte to higher education institutions than conservative states, all else being equal.

The coefficient for black population percent is 0.0899012. A one percent increase of s states black population percentage results in a .09% increase in state financial support per FTE to higher education institutions, all else being constant. The variable black population percent is statistically significant at the 90% level, indicating that one can be 90% confident that the estimated coefficient falls within the range of the confidence interval. The coefficient for black population percent is positive, indicating a positive relationship between black population percent and state financial support for HBCUs. We can conclude that state financial support to higher education institutions increase as the states black population percent increase, all else being constant.

Summary

Chapter 4 presents the results for the descriptive statistics and random effects analysis.

The results for the three random effects models revealed consistent and, largely, significant results. The three models revealed eleven statistically significant variables. This includes state welfare expenditures, unified government, Republican unified government and senate

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Republican majority in the state political support model, Pell grants and instruction expenses in the state institutional model and Pell grants, instruction expenses, state welfare expenditures, unified government, senate Republican majority and HBCUs in full model. Table 4-12 displays a summary of the results for the hypotheses.

These results counter the literature and the hypothesized relationships, resulting in an interesting interpretation and analysis, which will be discussed at length in Chapter 5. These results also limit the ability to make inferences based on the predictor and outcome variables.

However, there is ample room for analysis in investigating potential solutions and answers for the contradictory results.

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Figure 4-1. Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System

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Figure 4-2. Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by State Governance Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System

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Figure 4-3. Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Fiscal Autonomy Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System

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Figure 4-4. Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Funding Classification Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System

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Figure 4-5. Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Gubernatorial Party Control Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System

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Figure 4-6. Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Government Control Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System

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Figure 4-7. Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by State Senate Control Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System

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Figure 4-8. Average HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by State House Control Source: U.S Department of Education Integrated Postsecondary Education System

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Table 4-1. HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Year Institution 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 HBCUs $ 10,152.05 $ 11,417.34 $ 11,834.60 $ 12,811.79 $13,367.14

% Change 11% 4% 8% 4%

Institution 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 HBCUs $ 11,951.94 $ 10,502.84 $ 10,518.11 $ 10,219.72 $10,205.53 % Change -12% -13.797% 0.145% -2.920% -0.139%

Mean Volatility

$ 11,298.11 7.81% Source: Author's calculations using the Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)

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Table 4-2. HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Governance Structure Year Coordinating Board % Change Consolidated Governing Board % Change

2004 $ 9,662.21 $ 10,501.93

2005 $ 12,006.17 20% $ 10,975.72 4%

2006 $ 12,053.82 0% $ 11,678.01 6%

2007 $ 13,462.77 10% $ 12,346.81 5%

2008 $ 14,331.18 6% $ 12,678.54 3%

2009 $ 11,511.35 -24% $ 12,266.65 -3%

2010 $ 10,871.59 -6% $ 10,239.44 -20%

2011 $ 10,679.16 -2% $ 10,403.08 2%

2012 $ 11,028.11 3% $ 9,642.31 -8%

2013 $ 11,071.58 0% $ 9,586.93 -1%

Mean Mean

$ 11,667.79 $ 11,031.94

Volatility Volatility

11.40% 7.78%

Source: Author's calculations using the Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)

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Table 4-3. HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Fiscal Autonomy. Year No Fiscal Autonomy % Change Fiscal Autonomy % Change

2004 $ 9,500.06 $ 10,880.75 2005 $ 9,790.89 3% $ 13,139.46 17% 2006 $ 10,195.97 4% $ 13,666.00 4% 2007 $ 11,194.37 9% $ 14,619.50 7% 2008 $ 11,897.29 6% $ 15,009.91 3% 2009 $ 11,762.84 -1% $ 12,163.29 -23% 2010 $ 9,528.12 -23% $ 11,592.23 -5% 2011 $ 9,661.06 1% $ 11,475.99 -1% 2012 $ 9,149.22 -6% $ 11,416.17 -1% 2013 $ 9,098.04 -1% $ 11,443.33 0%

Mean Mean

$ 10,177.79 $ 12,540.66

Volatility Volatility

8.93% 10.18% Source: Author's calculations using the Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)

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Table 4-4. HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Funding Classification. Year Non Formula Funding % Change Formula Funding % Change

2004 $ 11,418.31 $ 9,594.90 2005 $ 11,277.76 -1% $ 11,481.31 16% 2006 $ 11,201.89 -1% $ 12,112.99 5% 2007 $ 13,380.63 16% $ 12,561.51 4% 2008 $ 13,910.82 4% $ 13,127.92 4% 2009 $ 13,639.97 -2% $ 11,209.21 -17% 2010 $ 11,571.74 -18% $ 10,032.52 -12% 2011 $ 11,926.25 3% $ 9,898.53 -1% 2012 $ 10,960.59 -9% $ 9,893.74 0% 2013 $ 10,459.14 -5% $ 10,093.95 2%

Mean Mean

$ 11,974.71 $ 11,000.66

Volatility Volatility

8.80% 9.22% Source: Author's calculations using the Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)

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Table 4-5. HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by Gubernatorial Control Year Democrat Governor % Change Republican Governor % Change

2004 $ 9,680.43 $ 10,574.02 2005 $ 11,761.21 18% $ 11,159.43 5% 2006 $ 11,947.31 2% $ 11,744.43 5% 2007 $ 14,285.61 16% $ 11,164.59 -5% 2008 $ 15,207.07 6% $ 11,527.21 3% 2009 $ 13,212.88 -15% $ 10,691.00 -8% 2010 $ 13,633.76 3% $ 8,266.47 -29% 2011 $ 13,419.53 -2% $ 8,671.75 5% 2012 $ 12,954.73 -4% $ 8,673.85 0% 2013 $ 11,262.85 -15% $ 9,259.52 6%

Mean Mean

$ 12,736.54 $ 10,173.23

Volatility Volatility

11.00% 10.73% Source: Author's calculations using the Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)

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Table 4-6. HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by State Government Control Year Divided Government % Change Unified Government % Change

2004 $ 10,904.70 $ 8,646.74 2005 $ 10,884.04 0% $ 11,921.01 27% 2006 $ 11,409.66 5% $ 12,214.81 2% 2007 $ 12,333.68 7% $ 13,194.29 7% 2008 $ 14,677.35 16% $ 12,533.37 -5% 2009 $ 12,800.95 -15% $ 11,192.30 -12% 2010 $ 11,237.01 -14% $ 9,978.43 -12% 2011 $ 10,296.57 -9% $ 10,603.32 6% 2012 $ 7,892.27 -30% $ 11,114.90 5% 2013 $ 9,096.94 13% $ 10,473.13 -6%

Mean Mean

$ 11,153.32 $ 11,187.23

Volatility Volatility

14.32% 11.60% Source: Author's calculations using the Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)

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Table 4-7. HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by State Senate Control Year Democrat Senate % change Republican Senate % Change

2004 $ 9,670.20 $ 11,004.55 2005 $ 11,698.92 17% $ 10,994.97 0% 2006 $ 12,013.57 3% $ 11,553.37 5% 2007 $ 13,908.53 14% $ 11,586.03 0% 2008 $ 13,604.56 -2% $ 13,101.78 12% 2009 $ 10,859.91 -25% $ 13,316.98 2% 2010 $ 10,471.85 -4% $ 10,537.47 -26% 2011 $ 11,147.86 6% $ 10,068.29 -5% 2012 $ 13,431.26 17% $ 8,404.51 -20% 2013 $ 11,646.10 -15% $ 9,176.56 8%

Mean Mean

$ 11,845.28 $ 10,974.45

Volatility Volatility

13.74% 11.90% Source: Author's calculations using the Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)

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Table 4-8. HBCU State Financial Support per FTE by State House Control Year Democrat House % Change Republican House % Change

2004 $ 9,466.96 $ 11,111.17 2005 $ 11,658.35 19% $ 11,055.82 -1% 2006 $ 11,889.54 2% $ 11,748.26 6% 2007 $ 13,336.90 11% $ 11,882.77 1% 2008 $ 13,636.45 2% $ 13,066.14 9% 2009 $ 12,120.87 -13% $ 11,740.78 -11% 2010 $ 11,240.62 -8% $ 9,678.26 -21% 2011 $ 11,528.49 2% $ 9,796.41 1% 2012 $ 13,627.75 15% $ 8,050.98 -22% 2013 $ 11,542.81 -18% $ 9,354.54 14%

Mean Mean

$ 12,004.87 $ 10,748.51

Volatility Volatility

11.77% 12.04% Source: Author's calculations using the Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)

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Table 4-9. HBCU State Financial Support per FTE Trends by State State 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Alabama $ 8,742.75 $ 9,165.68 $ 10,878.28 $ 12,416.44 $ 15,692.87 Arkansas $ 10,827.47 $ 11,186.09 $ 11,687.74 $ 11,039.87 $ 10,230.84 Delaware $ 14,370.71 $ 14,026.99 $ 13,879.61 $ 13,420.94 $ 13,510.05 Florida $ 13,705.12 $ 13,177.47 $ 14,430.94 $ 16,367.23 $ 18,620.59 Georgia $ 8,750.90 $ 8,709.83 $ 8,307.51 $ 8,351.28 $ 7,499.62 Kentucky $ 16,299.29 $ 18,117.77 $ 15,061.77 $ 21,345.58 $ 18,294.17 Louisiana $ 7,753.86 $ 8,745.41 $ 9,293.27 $ 9,413.54 $ 9,702.42 Maryland $ 12,607.26 $ 11,430.39 $ 12,154.75 $ 15,575.23 $ 16,578.28 Mississippi $ 8,893.96 $ 9,917.18 $ 10,189.38 $ 11,988.91 $ 14,237.10 Missouri $ 10,492.40 $ 9,212.19 $ 7,617.01 $ 7,408.79 $ 8,153.12 North Carolina $ 10,357.93 $ 17,073.90 $ 17,259.03 $ 19,616.67 $ 20,605.36 Ohio $ 13,640.39 $ 25,244.07 $ 30,281.49 $ 19,631.66 $ 20,590.10 Oklahoma $ 8,171.65 $ 12,161.87 $ 12,901.42 $ 13,294.03 $ 13,527.81 Pennsylvania $ 14,731.93 $ 3,895.61 $ 3,771.19 $ 3,707.54 $ 3,978.63

South Carolina $ 8,464.70 $ 8,953.89 $ 9,406.45 $ 9,375.64 $ 9,495.30

Tennessee $ 7,264.00 $ 7,219.14 $ 8,990.82 $ 8,181.67 $ 9,655.65

Texas $ 8,560.17 $ 8,681.61 $ 10,268.51 $ 10,603.32 $ 11,925.26

Virginia $ 11,176.14 $ 12,308.36 $ 13,363.96 $ 14,358.60 $ 10,833.50

West Virginia $ 6,066.57 $ 5,818.74 $ 5,355.50 $ 6,524.72 $ 7,300.06

Table 4-9 Continued State 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Mean Alabama $ 10,665.45 $ 9,680.09 $ 10,946.54 $ 9,668.49 $ 8,856.56 $ 11,379.21 Arkansas $ 9,311.64 $ 10,534.08 $ 11,418.89 $ 12,465.70 $ 13,403.20 $ 10,994.40 Delaware $ 13,613.67 $ 11,506.93 $ 10,770.42 $ 11,701.69 $ 9,086.73 $ 13,841.66 Florida $ 13,243.38 $ 12,077.51 $ 14,360.64 $ 9,413.69 $ 8,328.97 $ 15,260.27 Georgia $ 6,499.06 $ 4,932.75 $ 5,077.90 $ 5,004.26 $ 5,556.61 $ 8,323.83 Kentucky $ 12,889.30 $ 12,266.63 $ 12,186.08 $ 12,360.61 $ 11,680.59 $ 17,823.72 Louisiana $ 9,316.10 $ 6,413.79 $ 6,084.53 $ 5,546.38 $ 5,006.34 $ 8,981.70 Maryland $ 17,368.72 $ 14,446.49 $ 14,594.53 $ 13,761.35 $ 13,170.28 $ 13,669.18 Mississippi $ 12,214.80 $ 9,702.00 $ 9,461.59 $ 10,465.50 $ 10,544.74 $ 11,045.31 Missouri $ 15,720.64 $ 9,761.87 $ 8,792.88 $ 8,331.82 $ 8,654.58 $ 8,576.70 North Carolina $ 15,720.02 $ 16,890.34 $ 16,034.65 $ 17,102.56 $ 17,395.22 $ 16,982.58 Ohio $ 28,175.08 $ 18,521.35 $ 19,532.08 $ 18,972.89 $ 18,941.12 $ 21,877.54 Oklahoma $ 14,026.20 $ 12,756.78 $ 15,436.05 $ 11,329.23 $ 11,240.71 $ 12,011.35 Pennsylvania $ 3,925.96 $ 3,471.41 $ 3,301.76 $ 3,421.25 $ 3,580.32 $ 6,016.98 South Carolina $ 8,681.96 $ 8,097.37 $ 6,115.21 $ 6,565.08 $ 7,739.38 $ 9,139.20 Tennessee $ 7,820.13 $ 6,433.33 $ 7,607.70 $ 5,938.30 $ 5,636.86 $ 8,262.26 Texas $ 11,525.28 $ 10,308.32 $ 10,027.22 $ 8,838.12 $ 8,961.58 $ 10,007.77 Virginia $ 7,622.00 $ 8,090.67 $ 7,747.36 $ 7,202.91 $ 8,556.18 $ 12,408.11 West Virginia $ 5,535.78 $ 5,566.73 $ 5,632.29 $ 6,192.05 $ 6,688.92 $ 6,213.12

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Table 4-10. Random Effects Results for Political Model (n=359) Coefficient Standard error z p Formula Funding -0.077 0.186 -0.41 0.679 Political Ideology 0.003 0.001 2.91 0.004** Republican Governor 0.085 0.067 1.28 0.202 Unified Government 0.136 0.073 1.85 0.064 Republican Unified Government -0.300 0.133 -2.25 0.025* Governor Budget Power -0.092 0.050 -1.85 0.064 Republican House 0.004 0.066 0.06 0.949 Republican Senate 0.158 0.052 3.07 0.002** K12 Education (log) 0.124 0.080 1.55 0.121 Corrections (log) 0.051 0.072 0.72 0.472 Medicaid (Log) 0.038 0.052 0.73 0.464 Welfare (log) -0.232 0.103 -2.26 0.024* State Interest payment (log) -0.074 0.121 -0.61 0.541 State long-term debt (log) 0.154 0.141 1.09 0.276 Black population percent (log) 0.031 0.086 0.36 0.72 Constant 7.526 1.546 4.87 0.001***

Note: Overall R2 .0468

Two-tailed p values, *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001

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Table 4-11. Random Effects Results for Institutional Model Model (n=297) Coefficient Standard error z p Fiscal Autonomy 0.0225 0.1561 0.1400 0.8860 State Governance 0.0570 0.1579 0.3600 0.7180 Average Student Loan aid 0.0000 0.0000 -1.1000 0.2730 Student tuition percent -0.0010 0.0025 -0.4100 0.6830 In-State Graduate per credit -0.0001 0.0004 -0.1600 0.8720 In-State Undergraduate per credit -0.0006 0.0005 -1.2700 0.2060 Percent receiving federal aid 0.0009 0.0015 0.5900 0.5530 Federal Grants (log) -0.0043 0.0229 -0.1900 0.8500 Pell Grants (log) -0.4579 0.0774 -5.9200 0.001*** Endowment value (log) 0.0087 0.0232 0.3800 0.7070 Scholarship and Fellowship expense 0.0126 0.0303 0.4200 0.6780 Instruction expense (log) 0.4817 0.0935 5.1500 0.001*** Constant 8.2034 1.4817 5.5400 0.001***

Note: Overall R2 .1765

Two-tailed p values, *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001

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Table 4-12. Random Effects Results for Full Model (n=923) Coefficient Standard error z p Fiscal Autonomy -0.0054 0.0799 -0.07 0.946 State Governance -0.0410 0.0820 -0.5 0.618 Average Student Loan aid 0.0000 0.0000 0.47 0.639 Student tuition % -0.0014 0.0012 -1.18 0.24 In-State Graduate per credit -0.0004 0.0002 -1.67 0.096 In-State Undergraduate per credit -0.0003 0.0003 -1.17 0.24 Percent receiving federal aid 0.0006 0.0009 0.62 0.533 Federal Grants (log) 0.0039 0.0118 0.33 0.739 Pell Grants (log) -0.4041 0.0372 -10.86 0.001*** Endowment value (log) -0.0103 0.0101 -1.02 0.308 Scholarship and Fellowship expense 0.0459 0.0176 2.6 0.009** Instruction expense (log) 0.4626 0.0520 8.89 0.001*** Formula Funding -0.0198 0.0933 -0.21 0.832 Political Ideology 0.0014 0.0006 2.46 0.014* Republican Governor 0.0558 0.0385 1.45 0.147 Unified Government 0.0593 0.0444 1.33 0.182 Republican Unified Government -0.0936 0.0765 -1.22 0.221 Governor Budget Power -0.0434 0.0304 -1.43 0.153 Republican House -0.0435 0.0312 -1.39 0.164 Republican Senate 0.0869 0.0311 2.8 0.005** K12 Education (log) 0.0345 0.0474 0.73 0.466 Corrections (log) -0.0243 0.0449 -0.54 0.589 Medicaid (Log) 0.0167 0.0254 0.66 0.51 Welfare (log) -0.0096 0.0583 -0.16 0.869 State Interest payment (log) 0.0150 0.0649 0.23 0.817 State long-term debt (log) -0.0336 0.0689 -0.49 0.625 Black population percent (log) 0.0899 0.0460 1.95 0.051 HBCU 0.5008 0.0929 5.39 0.001*** Constant 6.5913 1.0934 6.03 0.001***

Note: Overall R2 .2503

Two-tailed p values, *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001

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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS

Chapter 5 will bring the summaries of prior chapters together and answer each of the five research questions as well as discuss the eight hypothesis presented in Chapter 4. This study has been dedicated to analyzing state financial support for HBCUs as well was comparing HBCUs state financial support with RCPWIs. The research questions discussed in this study are as follows:

1. What were the state financial support trends of Public 4-year HBCU from 2004-2013?

2. What is the relationship between institutional characteristics and State Financial Support at public 4-year HBCUs from 2004 and 2013?

3. What is the relationship between state political characteristics and State Financial Support to Public 4-year HBCUs from 2004 to 2013?

4. What is the relationship between State economic characteristics and levels of State Financial support of public 4-year HBCUs from 2004 and 2013?

5. Is there a statistically significant difference in state financial support between HBCUs and RCPWIs?

These research questions, along with a comprehensive review of literature, led to the development of the following hypotheses:

 H1: States with higher long-term debt interest payments provide less financial support to HBCUs.

 H2: States that have more liberal political ideologies provide more financial support to HBCUs.

 H3: States with a majority Republican House of Representatives provide less financial support to HBCUs.

 H4: States with a unified government provide less financial support to HBCUs.

 H5: States with Republican unified governments provide less financial support to HBCUs.

 H6: States with Consolidated governing boards provide less financial support to HBCUs than Coordinating boards.

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 H7: HBCUs with fiscal autonomy receive more state financial support than HBCUs without fiscal autonomy.

 H8: HBCUs receive less state financial support than RCPWIs (all variables being equal).

Chapter 5 will answer the above questions and discuss the above hypothesis while also providing recommendations for future policies and research.

Summary Findings

Question One: State Financial Support Trends

State financial support per fte to HBCUs were flat from 2004 to 2013, rising a total of

$53 per fte during this period. During the same period HBCU’s averaged year-to year increases of .4% in state financial support per fte. HBCUs had a year-to-year state financial support percent change volatility of 7.6% measured by it standard deviation from 2004 to 2013.

HBCUs operating in states with coordinating boards received 5.8% more in state financial support per fte than those operating in states with consolidated governing boards.

During this period, state financial support for HBCUs in states with coordinating boards increased while those in states with consolidated governing boards decreased. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs under coordinating boards was $9,662 and reached $11,071 in 2013, rising a total of $1,409 per fte. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs under consolidated governing boards was $10,501 and declined to $9,586 in 2013, decreasing a total of

$915 per fte. HBCUs in states with consolidated governing boards displayed lower volatility in state financial support per fte than those in states with coordinating boards.

Among public HBCUs, those that maintain institutional fiscal autonomy experienced a slight increase in state financial support per fte from 2004 to 2013 while HBCUs under state fiscal autonomy experienced a slight decrease in state financial support during the same period.

HBCUs with institutional fiscal autonomy received 23.2% more in state financial support than

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HBCUs under state fiscal autonomy from 2004 to 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for fiscally autonomous HBCUs was $10,880 and increased to $11,443 in 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs without fiscal autonomy was $9,500 but declined to $9,098 in 2013. State financial support per fte’s volatility was higher for fiscally autonomous HBCUs than those under state fiscal control from 2004 to 2013.

Among funding classifications public HBCUs in states with formula funding experienced a slight increase in state financial support per fte from 2004 to 2013 while HBCUs in states with non-formula funding experienced decreases in state financial support per fte during the same period. HBCUs in states with non-formula funding received 8.9% more in state financial support than HBCUs in states formula funding from 2004 to 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for formula funding HBCUs was $9,594 and increased to $10,093 in 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with non-formula funding was $11,481 but declined to $10,549 in 2013. State financial support per fte’s volatility was higher for formula funded HBCUs than non-formula funded HBCUs from 2004 to 2013.

HBCUs in states with Republican governors experienced decreases in state financial support per fte from 2004 to 2013 while HBCUs in states Democrat governors experienced increased state financial support during the same period. HBCUs in states with Democrat governors received 25.2% more in state financial support than HBCUs in states with Republican governors from 2004 to 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs is states governed by a Democrat was $9,680 and increased to $11,262 in 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with Republican governors was $10,574 but declined to

$9,259 in 2013. State financial support per fte’s volatility was higher for HBCUs in states governed by democrats than HBCUs in states governed by Republicans from 2004 to 2013.

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States with divided government experienced a decrease in state financial support per fte to public HBCUs from 2004 to 2013 while HBCUs in states with unified government control experienced increased state financial support during the same period. HBCUs in states with unified governments received 0.3% more in state financial support than HBCUs in states with divided governments from 2004 to 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with divided governments was $10,904 and decreased to $9,096 in 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with unified governments was $8,646 but increased to $10,473 in 2013. State financial support per fte’s volatility was higher for HBCUs in states with unified governments than HBCUs in states with divided governments.

Among public HBCUs, those in states with a majority Democrat senate experienced increases in state financial support per fte from 2004 to 2013 while HBCUs in states with a majority Republican senate experienced decreases in state financial support during the same period. HBCUs in states with Democrat senate majorities received 7.94% more in state financial support per fte than HBCUs in states with a Republican senate majority. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with majority Democrat senates was $9,670 and increased to

$11,646 in 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with majority

Republican senates was $11,004 and decreased to $9,176 in 2013. State financial support per fte’s volatility was higher for HBCUs in states with majority Democrat senates than HBCUs in states with majority Republican senates.

HBCUs in states with a majority Democrat house experienced increases in state financial support per fte from 2004 to 2013 while HBCUs in states with a majority Republican house experienced decreases in state financial support during the same period. HBCUs in states with

Democrat house majorities received 11.69% more in state financial support than HBCUs in

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states with Republican house majorities. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with majority Democrat house was $9,466 and increased to $11,542 in 2013. In 2004 state financial support per fte for HBCUs in states with majority Republican houses was $11,111 and decreased to $9,354 in 2013. State financial support per fte’s volatility was higher for HBCUs in states with majority Democrat houses than HBCUs in states with majority Republican houses.

Maryland lead all states in average financial support per fte to HBCUs while West

Virginia was last in average state financial support given to HBCUs. In 2004 Maryland and

Kentucky led the nation in state financial support per fte to HBCUs however in 2013 North

Carolina and Maryland led the nation in state financial support per fte to HBCUs. North Carolina and Pennsylvania saw the greatest increases in state financial support per fte to HBCUs while

Florida and Delaware saw the greatest decreases in state financial support per fte to HBCUs.

Prior to 2008 North Carolina and Alabama led the nation in increasing state financial support to

HBCUs, increasing state support per FTE. During the same period, Georgia and Delaware led the nation in decreasing state financial support to HBCUs. Post 2008, West Virginia and

Arkansas were the only states that experience increases or flat state financial support to HBCUs.

Post 2008, Florida and Louisiana saw the greatest declines in state financial support to HBCUs.

Hypothesis One: State Interest Payments and State Financial Support to HBCUs

The first variable of interest is state interest payments. The variable is utilized to measure the aggregate amount financial resources that a state expends for contractual debt service. The linkage between debt service payments and state financial support for higher education is not explicitly found in the literature, however competing state priorities and obligations are theorized to be significant fiscal challenges to higher education institutions (State Higher Education Executive Officers, 2012).

This study sought to expand the literature regarding the relationship between state debt and debt

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service payments and state financial support to higher education institutions, specifically HBCUs by studying the variable at the micro level. Hypothesis 1 tested is as follows:

 H1: States with higher long-term debt interest payments provide less financial support to HBCUs.

Table 5-1 gives a review of the results across two models, the state political and full model.

State interest payments was statistically insignificant (p<.05) in predicting state financial support for HBCUs, holding all else constant. The statistical strength and direction of the coefficient changes from the political model to the full model. The coefficient weakens from the political model to the full model and the directional effect of the relationship changes from negative to positive. It is worth noting that the full model provides additional observations which includes panel data from RCPWIs. As state interest payments increase one percent, state financial support per FTE to HBCUs decreases .0738%, holding all else constant. In regards to the state political model, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. This shows that there is no statistically significant association between state interest payments and state financial support per FTE to HBCUs.

The state political model resulted in a statistically insignificant, negative coefficient for state interest payment. The full model resulted in a smaller, positive coefficient that failed to reach statistical significance. The results reveal that state debt obligation payments have no statistically significant impact on state financial support to HBCUs or higher education institutions however there is a negative relationship between state debt payment and state financial support to HBCUs and a positive relationship between state debt payments and state financial support to HBCUs and RCPWIs, all else being constant. The following section returns to the literature in an attempt to explain the statistical results.

Contextual analysis. There is a dearth of literature studying the linkages between state debt service expenditures and state financial support for HBCUs. Examining the linkages

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between these two variables adds to the body of literature on the subject of state budgetary constraints and higher education expenditures. Although there is no direct study examining the linkages between state debt service payments and financial support for higher education, scholars have studied the relationship between other state priorities and higher education spending. These studies have found that there is competition between state mandatory spending such as Medicaid and correction and higher education spending (Tandberg, 2009; Kane, et al., 2003). It is found that that state’s Medicaid expenditures have a negative impact on state higher education expenditures (Tandberg, 2009). Other research has shown that as state’s Medicaid and corrections expenditures trend upward over time, state’s higher education expenditures have tend to trend downward during the same time period (Kane, et al., 2003). The results of this study support the claim that state’s obligatory spending such as debt service expenditures have a negative impact on financial support for higher education, specifically HBCUs.

In this study there is an inverse relationship between state interest payments and financial support per FTE for HBCUs, however when RCPWIs are included in the analysis the relationship between state interest payments and financial support for higher education institutions becomes positive. Holding all else constant, state interest payments does not have a statistically significant impact on state financial support per FTE for HBCUs (p=-.0738), however the relationship is negative. In terms of measurement, as state interest payments increase by one percent, state financial support per FTE decrease by .0738%. The coefficient is larger in the state political model than the full model, in addition the full model relationship is positive.

The results reveal that although statistically insignificant in both models, the state political model which only includes observations from HBCUs depicts a negative relationship

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between state interest payments and state financial support per FTE. The full model including

HBCUs and RCPWIs depicts a positive relationship between state interest payments and state financial support for higher education institutions. This reveals that state financial support per

FTE for HBCUs is cut when state debt service payments increase, while RCPWIs receive slightly more state financial support per FTE when state debt service payments increase.

Increases in state long-term debt and subsequent interest payments usually occur during times of economic turmoil. Literature on race and policy, specifically during economic stress, reveals that contractionary public policies have race specific impacts in which African-Americans are negatively impacted at a higher degree than white Americans (Rogers, 2008).

The findings also illustrate the inability of HBCUs to effective operate as an interest group and lobby state legislatures during the budgetary process. Research by Heinz et al. (1993) has concluded that state interest groups influence government action in certain circumstances and

Nice (1984) found that state-level interest group activity has an impact on state spending decisions. Despite the increasing influence of higher education interest groups, HBCUs and their limited resources have not appeared to be the benefactors of the increased influence of the higher education lobby at the state level. According to Tandberg (2010), many large research institutions are equipped with government affairs offices that lobbies at the state and federal level, while institutions with less resources traditionally rely on university presidents to fulfill that role. This might explain the extent in which HBCUs are disadvantaged when competing for scarce state resources.

One possibility not considered in this study is the influence of black state legislators on state financial support of HBCUs. Higher education researchers posit that state higher education appropriations balance state budgets because higher education institutions can manipulate

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student tuition to counter balance changes in state funding (Delaney and Doyle 2007; Hovey

1999), however students attending HBCUs lack the economic resources of students attending

RCPWIs and struggle at a higher degree to pay increased tuition when state debt service payments cause legislators to decrease higher education spending. This reality might be considered more by black legislators than their white counter parts.

In summary, within the state political model an increase in state interest payments led to a decrease in state financial support per FTE to HBCUs, however the relationship was statistically insignificant. In contrast, within the full model an increase in state interest payments led to an increase in state financial support per FTE for higher education institutions, however the relationship was also statistically insignificant. These results may be because HBCUs lack the resources to effectively lobby state legislators for increased financial support during times of amplified resource competition, African-Americans and their institutions are negatively affected to a higher degree than whites and their institutions by contractionary policies such as decreased state higher education funding, and because of a lack of black legislators who understand the importance of HBCUs to the state education system. The directional relationship of the first hypothesis was expected however the results were not statistically significant. Further qualitative research is need to explain and add context the results of this hypothesis.

Hypothesis Two: State Political Ideologies and State Financial Support to HBCUs

The second variable of interest is political ideology. This variable is utilized to index the political ideology of formal political leaders within a state. Research indicates that state political ideology is a critical factor in the analysis of state financial support for higher education

(Tandberg, 2010; McLendon, et al., 2009; Soss, et al., 2001). Past studies have found that as states become more liberal, expenditures to higher education increase (Tandberg, 2009;

Archibald and Feldman, 2006). Analysis of state political ideology and state financial support

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per FTE to HBCUs allows one to determine whether state political ideology has a statistically significant effect on state financial support to HBCUs and the relationship between the two variables. Analysis of the relationship between state political ideology and state higher education spending is common within the literature however, state political ideology and state financial support to HBCUs is nonexistent and will contribute substantially to the literature. Hypothesis 2 is as follows:

 H2: States that have more liberal political ideologies provide more financial support to HBCUs.

Table 5-1 gives a review of the results across two models, the state political and full model.

State political ideology was statistically significant (p<.05) in both models in predicting state financial support for HBCUs, holding all else constant. The strength of the coefficient weakens from the political model to the full model. It is worth noting that the full model provides additional observations which includes panel data from RCPWIs. As state political ideology increases by one unit, state financial support per FTE to HBCUs increases .31%, holding all else constant. In regards to the state political model, we reject the null hypothesis. This shows that there is a statistically significant association between state political ideology and state financial support per FTE to HBCUs, the full model also supports these results. The directional relationship of state political ideology and state financial support per FTE is as hypothesized for both models.

The state political model resulted in a statistically significant, positive coefficient for state political ideology. The full model resulted in a smaller, positive coefficient that also reached statistical significance. The results reveal that state political ideology have a statistically significant impact on state financial support to HBCUs and higher education institutions, all else

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being constant. The following section returns to the literature in an attempt to explain the statistical results.

Contextual analysis. The literature studying the linkages between state political ideology and state financial support for HBCUs is nonexistent. Examining the linkages between these two variables adds to the body of literature on the subject of politics and higher education expenditures. Although there is no direct study examining the linkages between state political ideology and state financial support for HBCUs, scholars have studied the relationship between state political ideology and higher education spending. These studies have found that states that are more liberal are more generous in their appropriations to higher education (Tandberg, 2009;

Archibald and Feldman, 2006). The results of this study support the claim that more liberal states are more generous in appropriations to higher education. This study also shows that more liberal states provide greater financial support to HBCUs, all else being constant.

In this study there is positive relationship between state political ideology and financial support per FTE for HBCUs in both the political and full models. Holding all else constant, state political ideology has a statistically significant impact on state financial support per FTE for

HBCUs (p=.004), and the relationship is positive. In terms of measurement, as state political ideology increased by unit, state financial support per FTE increased by .31%. The coefficient is slightly larger in the state political model than the full model however both models illustrate a positive relationship.

The results reveal that although state political ideology is significant in both models, the state political model, which only includes observations from HBCUs depicts a higher coefficient than the full model. This reveals that state political ideology has a slightly greater relationship to state financial support per FTE specifically to HBCUs than higher education institutions as a

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whole. More liberal states provide greater financial support to HBCUs than they do higher education institutions as a whole. Literature on political ideology and higher education expenditures have concluded that more liberal state provide greater financial support for higher education (Tandberg, 2009; Archibald and Feldman, 2006). This has also proven true for state financial support to HBCUs in this study.

The findings also illustrate that HBCUs are more sensitive to a state’s political ideology than higher education institutions as whole. This can be concluded by the decrease in coefficients when going from the political model to the full model. The political which only includes HBCUs has a stronger coefficient (.0031076) than the full model (.0014184). This can be interpreted that as political ideology decreases one unit, state financial support decreases .31% for HBCUs while it would decrease .14% for higher education institutions as a whole, all else being constant. This might illustrate that HBCUs are more effective at lobbying liberal government institutions for financial support than more conservative government institutions.

One should research further the contradictory findings between state political ideology and party control of government institutions. All else being constant, more liberal states invest more into higher education than more conservative states however, within the same models states with Republican governors, and legislatures invest more into higher education than those with

Democrat governors and legislatures (Tandberg, 2010; Archibald and Feldman, 2006). This study shows similar results to the literature when examining the relationships of these variables to state financial support to HBCUs. When political ideology is excluded from the state political and full models, the directional relationship of house Republican majority changes from positive to negative. One can suppose that the political ideology of state political leaders has more effect on state financial support for higher education than political party affiliation. According to Noel

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(2013) political ideology influences political parties and the policies that they support. Political parties are only concerned with seeking power and creating coalitions that help them obtain more power even if that means creating coalitions with groups whose ideologies differ. In regards to the results of this study, house Republican legislators would be less generous to HBCUs than

RCPWIs if it wasn’t for the possible need to maintain coalitions across the ideological spectrum to garner support to maintain political power

In summary, within the state political model state political ideology had a statistically significant effect on state financial support per FTE to HBCUs and the relationship was positive, all else being constant. The full model yielded almost identical results with the state political model with a slightly lesser coefficient. These results support the literature that more liberal states are more generous in their investments into higher education. Past studies have concluded that more conservative states and states that are governed by Republicans have adopted a policy of investing more into community colleges and vocational schools (Weerts and Ronca, 2012).

These schools often compete with HBCUs for first generation and low income students which might explain the lack of investment in HBCUs relative to their more liberal states. Further qualitative research is needed to explain and add context the results of this hypothesis.

Hypothesis Three: House Republican Majority and State Financial Support to HBCUs

The third variable of interest is state house Republican majority. This variable is utilized to identify which political party controls the lower house legislative body of a given state. Research indicates that Republican run legislatures are less financially generous in their appropriations to their state’s higher education systems (McLendon, et al., 2009; Kane, et al., 2003, Tandberg, 2009;

Archibald and Feldman, 2006). Analysis of state house Republican majority and state financial support per FTE to HBCUs allows one to determine whether legislative party control has a statistically significant effect on state financial support to HBCUs and the relationship between the

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two variables. Analysis of the relationship between state house Republican majority and state higher education spending is common within the literature however, state house Republican majority and state financial support to HBCUs is nonexistent and will contribute substantially to the literature.

Hypothesis 3 is as follows:

 H3: States with a majority Republican House of Representatives provide less financial support to HBCUs.

Table 5-1 gives a review of the results across two models, the state political and full model.

State house Republican majority was statistically insignificant (p<.05) in both models in predicting state financial support for HBCUs, holding all else constant. The coefficient strengthens from the political model to the full model. It is worth noting that the full model provides additional observations which includes panel data from RCPWIs. States that have a Republican majority in the lower house legislature offers .42585% more in financial support to HBCUs than states with a democratic majority in the lower house legislature. In regards to the state political model, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. This shows that there is no statistically significant association between house Republican majority and state financial support per FTE to HBCUs, the full model also supports these results. The directional relationship of house Republican majority and state financial support per FTE for the political model is not as hypothesize however the directional relationship is not as hypothesized in the full model.

The state political model resulted in a statistically insignificant, positive coefficient for state house Republican majority. The full model resulted in house Republican majority having a larger, negative coefficient that also failed to reach statistical significance. The results reveal that state house

Republican majority has no statistically significant impact on state financial support to HBCUs and higher education institutions, all else being constant. The following section returns to the literature in an attempt to explain the statistical results.

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Contextual analysis. The literature studying the linkages between state legislatures and state financial support for HBCUs is nonexistent. Examining the linkages between these two variables adds to the body of literature on the subject of politics and higher education expenditures.

Although there is no direct study examining the linkages between state legislatures and state financial support for HBCUs, scholars have studied the relationship between state legislatures and higher education spending. These studies have found that states with democratic controlled legislatures are more generous in their appropriations to higher education than Republican legislatures (Tandberg,

2009; McLendon, 2009; Luciana and Lee, 2014). The results of this study contradicts the literature on the claim that Democrat legislatures are more generous in appropriations to higher education, specifically state lower house legislatures. This study shows that in the state political model that

Republican controlled state lower house legislatures provide more financial support per FTE to

HBCUs than lower house legislatures that are controlled by democrats, all else being constant.

In this study there is positive relationship between state house Republican majority and financial support per FTE for HBCUs in the political model and a negative relationship in the full model. Holding all else constant, state house Republican majority has a statistically insignificant impact on state financial support per FTE for HBCUs (p=.949), and the relationship is positive. In terms of measurement, a state with a Republican majority in the lower house provides .42585% more in state financial support to HBCUs than Democrat controlled lower house legislatures. The coefficient is slightly smaller in the state political model than the full model. The relationship also changes from positive to negative from the political model to the full model.

The results reveal that although state house Republican majority is insignificant in both models, the state political model, which only includes observations from HBCUs depicts a positive relationship while the full model depicts a negative relationship. This reveals that Republican legislatures offer more financial support to HBCUs than Democrat legislatures but offer less financial

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support to higher education institutions as a whole than Democrat legislatures. The literature on partisanship and higher education expenditures have concluded that democrats provide greater financial support for higher education (Tandberg, 2009; Archibald and Feldman, 2006; Luciana and

Lee, 2014). This has not been proven true for state financial support to HBCUs in this study.

The findings of the political model are contradictory to similar studies on partisanship and state higher education spending. The literature has provided possible explanations for the disharmony of the results of this study and past scholarship. According to Fernandez and Rogerson (1995), public spending on higher education is not a progressive policy because children from families of higher socio-economic status reap the benefits disproportionately resulting in negative redistribution of public tax dollars. Democrats may not fully support higher education spending because it benefits wealthier students and pulls resources from other social programs that their constituents support (Doyle, 2007). These explanations shows that HBCUs financial support from state legislatures are contingent upon external higher education policies such as merit based scholarships.

One should further research the contradictory findings between state legislatures and state financial support for HBCUs. All else being constant, more Republicans invest more into higher education than democrats however, this may due to polarization within the legislature, which is a variable that was not controlled for. During low levels of polarization democrats are more likely to support higher education however during high levels of polarization democrats prioritize social programs to appease their traditional base (Luciana and Lee, 2014). Another area of further research is the relationship between enrollment and partisan financial support to higher education. As enrollment decreases, the proportionality of incoming students tend to skew toward upper and upper- middle class students which prompts more right-wing legislatures to increase financial support for their constituents (Garritzmann, 2017).

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In summary, within the state political model state house Republican majority had a statistically insignificant effect on state financial support per FTE to HBCUs and the relationship was positive, all else being constant. The full model yielded almost the opposite results as the state political model with a stronger and negative coefficient and a stronger p-value to statistical significance. The results of the political model contradicts the literature that Democrat controlled legislatures are more generous in their investments into higher education. Although this study shows that Republican controlled lower house legislatures are more generous to

HBCUs, the results are statistically insignificant and explanations from the literature point to conditional linkages such as merit based aid, political polarization and student enrollment rather than unconditional support to their constituents.

Hypothesis Four: State Unified Government and State Financial Support to HBCUs

The fourth variable of interest is State Unified Government. This variable is utilized to identify whether there is partisan consolidation of power in the executive and legislative branches of state government. Studies conducted on the relationship between unified governments and state higher education spending show mixed results. Kane, et al. (2003), found that “increases in higher education appropriations are associated with a Democratic house, senate, or governor, though the coefficient on having a Democratic governor is not statistically significant. In contrast, Tandberg (2009) found that uni-party legislative control by either party has a significant and negative effect on higher education funding. Delaney and Doyle (2011) did not find partisan control of legislative and governor offices made a statistically significant difference.

Analysis of State Unified Government and state financial support per FTE to HBCUs allows one to determine whether state government party control has a statistically significant effect on state financial support to HBCUs and the relationship between the two variables.

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Analysis of the relationship between State Unified Government and state higher education spending is common within the literature however, State Unified Government and state financial support to HBCUs is nonexistent and will contribute substantially to the literature. Hypothesis 4 is as follows:

 H4: States with a unified government provide less financial support to HBCUs.

Table 5-1 gives a review of the results across two models, the state political and full model.

State unified government was statistically insignificant (p<.05) in both models in predicting state financial support for HBCUs, holding all else constant. Within the political model, State Unified

Government is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. The coefficient and the statistical significance weakens from the political model to the full model. It is worth noting that the full model provides additional observations which includes panel data from RCPWIs. States that have a unified government offers 13.56% more in financial support to HBCUs than states without a unified government. In regards to the state political model, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. This shows that there is no statistically significant association between State Unified Government and state financial support per FTE to HBCUs, the full model also supports these results. The directional relationship of State Unified Government and state financial support per FTE for the political model and full model is not as hypothesize.

The state political model resulted in a statistically insignificant, positive coefficient for State

Unified Government. The full model resulted in State Unified Government having a smaller, positive coefficient that also failed to reach statistical significance. The results reveal that State Unified

Government has no statistically significant impact on state financial support to HBCUs and higher education institutions, all else being constant. The following section returns to the literature in an attempt to explain the statistical results.

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Contextual analysis. The literature studying the linkages between State Unified

Government and state financial support for HBCUs is nonexistent. Examining the linkages between these two variables adds to the body of literature on the subject of politics and higher education expenditures. Although there is no direct study examining the linkages between State Unified

Government and state financial support for HBCUs, scholars have studied the relationship between state legislatures and higher education spending. These studies have resulted in mix results in whether partisan control of both the state executive and legislature have significant impacts on state expenditures for higher education (Kane, 2003; Tandberg, 2009; Delaney and Doyle, 2011). The results of this study shows that unified governments do not have a statistical significant impact on state financial support per FTE to HBCUs and higher education institutions overall. One should note that unified government was statistically significant in relation to state financial support per FTE to

HBCUs at the 90% confidence level. In both models the relationship was positive. This study shows that all else being constant, states with unified governments are more generous to HBCUs than states without a unified government.

In this study there is positive relationship between State Unified Government and financial support per FTE for HBCUs within the political model. Holding all else constant, State Unified

Government has a statistically insignificant impact on state financial support per FTE for HBCUs

(p=.064), and the relationship is positive. In terms of measurement, a state with a unified government provides 13.56% more in state financial support to HBCUs than a state without a unified government.

The results reveal that State Unified Governments offer more financial support to HBCUs than states without unified governments but the coefficient is less when modelling for higher education institutions as a whole. The literature on government control and higher education expenditures have concluded that unified governments have no impact on financial support for higher

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education (Kane, 2003). This is partially true for state financial support to HBCUs in this study, the variable State Unified Government is close to statistical significance.

The findings of the political model are similar to studies on government control and state higher education spending. The literature has provided possible explanations for the results of this study and past scholarship. According to Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006), governing parties distribute funds in favor of areas that provide them with the greatest electoral support. It is possible that states with a unified government are more generous in their support for higher education if the institutions are located in areas that offer the greatest electoral support. Compton

(2011) found that key members of legislative committees often supported institutions that were located in their districts and institutions in which they were alumni. The lack of party competition that states with unified governments are afforded allows state politicians to reward higher education institutions within their districts without political consequence from advocates of other spending priorities such as welfare programs. These explanations shows that HBCUs financial support from state governments could be contingent upon the voter preference of the geographical area surrounding HBCUs.

In contrast, Peterson (1976) found that “interparty competition generates greater legislative responsiveness” and this “translated into higher expenditure level” for higher education, however divided governments are less able to react to policy preferences of their constituents particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature (Alt and Lowry, 1994). Studies on

State Unified Governments have found that divided governments makes legislation less effective and more difficult to pass, particularly legislation dealing with budgetary issues (Edwards, Barrett, and

Peake, 1997; Sundquist, 1992; Clarke, 1998). Concurring studies on State Unified Government also suggest that State Unified Governments generally foster in-party cooperation which affords greater success at implementing the controlling party’s legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins, 1991;

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Aldrich, 1995; Coleman, 1999). Due to HBCUs lack of resources for lobbying activities, State

Unified Governments could be ideal for HBCUs navigation of government to obtain greater financial resources. This is because there is less political competition between parties for funding state priorities such as welfare programs, healthcare, and public safety. With less political competition it is less likely that HBCUs can be used as political pawns during intra-party budgetary conflicts.

In summary, within the state political model State Unified Government had a statistically insignificant effect on state financial support per FTE to HBCUs and the relationship was positive, all else being constant. The full model yielded almost similar results as the state political model with a lesser and positive coefficient and a weaker p-value to statistical significance. The results of the political model contradicts the literature that divide state governments are more generous in their investments into higher education. Although the results are statistically insignificant at the confidence level set within the study, the results within the state political model is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level and should be considered for further research.

Hypothesis Five: State Republican Unified Government and State Financial Support to HBCUs

The fifth variable of interest is state Republican unified government. This variable is utilized to identify whether there is Republican partisan consolidation of power in the executive and legislative branches of state government. Studies conducted on the relationship between Republican unified governments and state higher education spending show almost uniform results in which

Democrat controlled governments generally spend more than Republican governments (McLendon,

2009; Kane, et al., 2003; Epp, Lovett and Baumgartner, 2014). In contrast, Delaney and Doyle

(2011) did not find partisan control of legislative and governor offices made a statistically significant difference. A later study conducted by Li (2017) found that Unified Republican and unified

Democratic governments are both more likely to cut spending compared to a divided government.

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Analysis of state Republican unified government and state financial support per FTE to

HBCUs allows one to determine whether state government party control by the Republican Party has a statistically significant effect on state financial support to HBCUs and the relationship between the two variables. Analysis of the relationship between state Republican unified government and state higher education spending is particularly uncommon within the literature and nonexistent in regards to HBCUs. This study will contribute substantially to the literature.

Hypothesis 5 is as follows:

 H5: States with a Republican unified government provide less financial support to HBCUs.

Table 5-1 gives a review of the results across two models, the state political and full model. State Republican unified government was statistically significant (p<.05) in the political model but not the full model, holding all else constant. Within the political model, state

Republican unified government is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and the relationship is negative. The coefficient and the statistical significance weakens from the political model to the full model. It is worth noting that the full model provides additional observations which includes panel data from RCPWIs. States that have a Republican unified government offers 29.9% less in financial support to HBCUs than states without a Republican unified government. In regards to the state political model, we reject the null hypothesis. This shows that there is a statistically significant association between state Republican unified government and state financial support per FTE to HBCUs, all else being constant. The directional relationship of state Republican unified government and state financial support per

FTE for both models is as hypothesize.

The state political model resulted in a statistically significant and positive coefficient for state Republican unified government. The full model resulted in state Republican unified

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government having a smaller, positive coefficient that failed to reach statistical significance. The results reveal that State Unified Government has no statistically significant impact on state financial support to higher education institutions as a whole, all else being constant. The following section returns to the literature in an attempt to explain the statistical results.

Contextual analysis. The literature studying the linkages between state Republican unified government and state financial support for HBCUs is nonexistent. Examining the linkages between these two variables adds to the body of literature on the subject of politics and higher education expenditures. Although there is no direct study examining the linkages between state Republican unified government and state financial support for HBCUs, scholars have studied the relationship between state legislatures and higher education spending. These studies have resulted in somewhat uniform results in whether Republican control of both the state executive and legislature have significant impacts on state expenditures for higher education (McLendon, 2009; Kane, et al., 2003;

Epp, Lovett and Baumgartner, 2014). The results of this study shows that state Republican unified governments have a statistical significant impact on state financial support per FTE to HBCUs but not higher education institutions overall. In both models the relationship was negative. This study shows that all else being constant, states with Republican unified governments are less generous to

HBCUs than states without a Republican unified government.

In this study there is negative relationship between state Republican unified government and financial support per FTE for HBCUs within the political model. Holding all else constant, state Republican unified government has a statistically significant impact on state financial support per FTE for HBCUs (p=.025), and the relationship is negative. In terms of measurement, a state with a Republican unified government provides 29.9% less in state financial support to

HBCUs than a state without a Republican unified government.

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The results reveal that state Republican unified governments offer less financial support to HBCUs than states without Republican unified governments but the coefficient is less when modelling for higher education institutions as a whole. The literature on Republican government control and higher education expenditures have concluded that Republican unified governments spend less on higher education than Democrat unified governments (McLendon, 2009; Kane, et al., 2003; Epp, Lovett and Baumgartner, 2014). This is also true for state financial support to

HBCUs in this study.

The findings of the political model are similar to studies on government control and state higher education spending. The literature has provided possible explanations for the results of this study and past scholarship. According to Weerts and Ronca’s (2012), Republicans are more generous to two-year community colleges than research institutions because community colleges focus on short term vocational training such as construction trades, mechanics, and healthcare professionals which are more directly connected to the workforce. Republicans are more in favor of economic initiatives and they view skills training as being a part of statewide workforce initiatives.

HBCUs often admit students of low socio-economic status who traditionally have been recruited for trade skill workforce training administered by community colleges. It is possible that the inclination of Republican governments to fund HBCUs less is because they view them as competing institutions with state community colleges. State economics can also play a role in state Republican government’s financial support for HBCUs. When state long term debt and interest payments were excluded from the state political model the statistical significance of state

Republican unified government increased and the coefficient decreased to show a greater decrease in funding to HBCUs. The same results are shown when state long term debt and

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interest payments are excluded from the full model. Further survey research should be conducted on the attitudes and perceptions of state Republican politicians towards HBCUs and the effects of state employment variables on state financial support to HBCUs.

In summary, within the state political model state Republican unified government had a statistically significant effect on state financial support per FTE to HBCUs and the relationship was negative, all else being constant. The full model yielded almost similar results as the state political model with a negative coefficient and a p-value showing statistical insignificance. The results of the political model supports the literature that Republican controlled state governments are less generous in their investments into higher education.

Hypothesis Six: State Governance and State Financial Support to HBCUs

The sixth variable of interest is state governance. This variable is utilized to identify the governance structure of state higher education systems. Studies conducted on the relationship between state higher education governance structures and state higher education spending show uniform results in which state governance structures have no significant impact on state spending on higher education (McLendon, 2009; Nicholson-Crotty and Meier, 2003; Lowry, 2001a).

Although all studies show that the variable for governance structure was statistically insignificant, all the studies showed a positive relationship between states with consolidated governing boards and state expenditures to higher education institutions. These studies were in conflict with the researcher’s initial belief that consolidated governing boards would yield greater spending to higher education institutions.

Analysis of state governance structure and state financial support per FTE to HBCUs allows one to determine whether state governance structures have a statistically significant effect on state financial support to HBCUs and the relationship between the two variables. Analysis of the relationship between state governance structure and state higher education spending is minor

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and outdated within the literature and nonexistent in regards to HBCUs. This study will contribute substantially to the literature. Hypothesis 6 variable is as follows:

 H6: States with Consolidated governing boards provide less financial support to HBCUs than Coordinating boards.

Table 5-1 gives a review of the results across two models, the state institutional and full model. State governance structure was statistically insignificant (p<.05) in the institutional model and full model, holding all else constant. Within the institutional model, state governance structure is statistically insignificant at the 95% confidence level and the relationship is positive.

The directional relationship changes from positive to negative from the institutional model to the full model. It is worth noting that the full model provides additional observations which includes panel data from RCPWIs. States that have a consolidated governing board offers 5.6% more in financial support to HBCUs than states with a coordinating board. In regards to the state institutional model, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. This shows that there is not a statistically significant association between state governance structure and state financial support per FTE to HBCUs, all else being constant. The directional relationship of state governance structure and state financial support per FTE is not as hypothesized in the institutional model but was as hypothesized in the full model despite also being statistically insignificant.

The state institutional model resulted in a statistically insignificant and positive coefficient for state governance structure. The full model resulted in state governance structure having a smaller, negative coefficient that failed to reach statistical significance. The results reveal that state governance structure has no statistically significant impact on state financial support to higher education institutions as a whole, all else being constant. The following section returns to the literature in an attempt to explain the statistical results.

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Contextual analysis. The literature studying the linkages between state governance structure and state financial support for HBCUs is nonexistent. Examining the linkages between these two variables adds to the body of literature on the subject of organizational structure and higher education expenditures. Although there is no direct study examining the linkages between state governance structure and state financial support for HBCUs, scholars have studied the relationship between state governance and higher education spending. These studies have resulted in uniform results in whether state governance structure have significant impacts on state expenditures for higher education (McLendon, 2009; Nicholson-Crotty and Meier, 2003; Lowry, 2001a). The results of this study shows that state governance structure has a statistical insignificant impact on state financial support per FTE to HBCUs and higher education institutions overall. In the institutional model the directional relationship is positive however the full model shows a negative relationship. This study shows that all else being constant, states with consolidated governing boards are more generous to

HBCUs but less generous to higher education institutions as a whole than states without a consolidated governing board.

In this study there is positive relationship between state governance structure and financial support per FTE for HBCUs within the institutional model. Holding all else constant, state governance structure has a statistically insignificant impact on state financial support per

FTE for HBCUs (p=.718), and the relationship is positive. In terms of measurement, a state with a consolidated governing board provides 5.6% more in state financial support to HBCUs than a state without a consolidated governing board.

The results reveal that state consolidated governing board’s offer more financial support to HBCUs than states without a consolidated governing board but the coefficient is less and negative when modelling for higher education institutions as a whole. The literature on state higher education governance structure and higher education expenditures have concluded that

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consolidated governing boards spend more on higher education than coordinating boards, however the results were not statistically significant (McLendon, 2009; Nicholson-Crotty and

Meier, 2003; Lowry, 2001a). This is also true for state financial support to HBCUs, however consolidate governing boards offer less to higher education institutions as a whole in this study.

The findings of the institutional model are similar to studies on state higher education governance and state higher education spending. The literature has provided possible explanations for the results of this study and past scholarship. According to McLendon, et al.

(2009), consolidated governing boards are associated with an increase in state funding to higher education institutions as these centralized agencies are more effective proponents of the higher education industry than coordinating boards. The results show that HBCUs are treated no differently than other higher education institutions as the results of this study is similar to hast research on state governance structure and higher education institutions. The centralized nature of these agencies also make it easier for HBCUs government relations departments to advocate and lobby for resources. Knott and Payne (2004), found that governing boards are charged with maintaining consistency between institutions and state priorities. This may be another explanation as to why HBCUs and their financial support from consolidated governing boards show similar results to past studies as centralized agencies tend to insulate themselves and their policies from politics (Meier, 1993).

The purpose of higher education governance structures is to effectively use state resources for higher education to reach statewide education goals, provide professional staff, and to insulate higher education policy from the political process. Further research should be conducted to determine just how independent state higher education agencies from politicians.

The autonomy of these agencies can have implications in the financial support of HBCUs as

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legislators often organize agencies in such a way as to maintain the most control. According to

Lowry (2001a), centralized agencies lower transaction cost for individuals seeking to influence policy. Seeing that HBCUs have limited resources to lobby agencies, centralized agencies such as consolidated governing boards seem to be ideal for HBCUs and their advocacy efforts for greater resources. However the statistical insignificance of governance structure could be a result of the lack of agency change within higher education governing institutions. According to

McGuinness (1997), governance structures have remained consistent over several decades leading to similar policy outcomes across various governance structures.

In summary, within the state institutional model state governance structure had a statistically insignificant effect on state financial support per FTE to HBCUs and the relationship was positive, all else being constant. The full model yielded almost similar results as the state political model with a negative coefficient and a p-value also showing statistical insignificance.

The results of the institutional model supports the literature that state governance structure has a statistically insignificant impact on state financial support to HBCUs and higher education institutions and particularly in the institutional model, consolidate governing boards are more generous in their financial support to higher education institutions.

Hypothesis Seven: Fiscal Autonomy and State Financial Support to HBCUs

The seventh variable of interest is institutional fiscal autonomy. This variable is utilized to identify whether financial decisions are decentralized to individual institutions or centralized within a state agency. Studies conducted on the relationship between fiscal autonomy and state higher education spending show that decentralization of financial management of higher education institutions can lead to inefficient uses of financial resources however there is little empirical evidence to support their claims (Bahl and Duncombe, 1993; Lowry, 2001a; Sabloff,

1997). Although all studies posit that autonomous institutions were more inefficient with

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financial resources than institutions under centralized systems, there is a lack of studies examining the relationship between institutional financial autonomy and state financial support.

Higher education institutions have the ability to raise revenue thru student tuition therefore more autonomous institutions are better equipped to deal with volatile trends of state financial support.

Analysis of institutional fiscal autonomy and state financial support per FTE to HBCUs allows one to determine whether fiscal autonomy has a statistically significant effect on state financial support to HBCUs and the relationship between the two variables. Analysis of the relationship between fiscal and state higher education spending is minor and outdated within the literature and nonexistent in regards to HBCUs. This study will contribute substantially to the literature. Hypothesis 7 is as follows:

 H7: HBCUs with fiscal autonomy receive more state financial support than HBCUs without fiscal autonomy.

Table 5-1 gives a review of the results across two models, the state institutional and full model. Institutional fiscal autonomy was statistically insignificant (p<.05) in the institutional model and full model, holding all else constant. Within the institutional model, institutional autonomy is statistically insignificant at the 95% confidence level and the relationship is positive. The directional relationship changes from positive to negative from the institutional model to the full model. It is worth noting that the full model provides additional observations which includes panel data from RCPWIs. HBCUs with fiscal autonomy received 2.2% more in financial support from states than HBCUs without fiscal autonomy. In regards to the state institutional model, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. This shows that there is not a statistically significant association between institutional fiscal autonomy and state financial support per FTE to HBCUs, all else being constant. The directional relationship of institutional

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fiscal autonomy and state financial support per FTE is as hypothesized in the institutional model but was not as hypothesized in the full model.

The state institutional model resulted in a statistically insignificant and positive coefficient for institutional fiscal autonomy. The full model resulted in institutional fiscal autonomy having a smaller, negative coefficient that also failed to reach statistical significance.

The results reveal that state governance structure has no statistically significant impact on state financial support to higher education institutions as a whole, all else being constant however

HBCUs that were fiscally autonomous received greater financial support from their respective states. The following section returns to the literature in an attempt to explain the statistical results.

Contextual analysis. The literature studying the linkages between institutional fiscal autonomy and state financial support for HBCUs is nonexistent. Examining the linkages between these two variables adds to the body of literature on the subject of organizational structure and higher education expenditures. Although there is no direct study examining the linkages between institutional fiscal autonomy and state financial support for HBCUs, scholars have studied the relationship between decentralized financial management and higher education spending. These studies have resulted in uniform results theories on the effects of centralized and decentralized financial management of higher education institutions (Bahl and Duncombe, 1993; Lowry, 2001a;

Sabloff, 1997). Lowry (2001a), attempted to find empirical evidence on the relationship between financial management and intuitional resource allocation and revenue generation. The results of his study shows that tuition revenue decreased as the percent of external trustees increased however the results were statistically insignificant at the 95% confidence level and statistically significant at the

90% confidence level. The results of this study shows that institutional fiscal autonomy has a statistical insignificant impact on state financial support per FTE to HBCUs and higher education

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institutions overall. In the institutional model the directional relationship is positive however the full model shows a negative relationship. This study shows that all else being constant, HBCUs with fiscal autonomy receive more state financial support than HBCUs without fiscal autonomy however the results are statistically insignificant.

In this study there is positive relationship between institutional fiscal autonomy and financial support per FTE for HBCUs within the institutional model. Holding all else constant, institutional fiscal autonomy has a statistically insignificant impact on state financial support per

FTE for HBCUs (p=.886), and the relationship is positive. In terms of measurement, HBCUs with fiscal autonomy receive 2.2% more in state financial support than HBCUs without fiscal autonomy.

The results reveal that fiscally autonomous HBCUs receive more state financial support than HBCUs without fiscal autonomy however the coefficient is less and negative when modelling for higher education institutions as whole. The literature on institutional fiscal autonomy and higher education expenditures have concluded that decentralized financial management yields inefficiencies in institutional fiscal behavior which lead to less state financial support, however the results were not statistically significant (Bahl and Duncombe, 1993;

Lowry, 2001a; Sabloff, 1997). This is not true for state financial support to HBCUs, however overall institutions with fiscal autonomy receive less state financial support.

The findings of the institutional model are similar to centralized financial management and state higher education spending. The literature has provided possible explanations for the results of this study and past scholarship. According to Lowry (2001a), institutions with centralized financial management charge lower prices than institutions with decentralized financial management. The findings of this study contradicts these findings. One possible explanation for fiscally autonomous HBCUs receiving more state financial support than HBUCs

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without fiscal autonomy is that fiscally autonomous HBCUs have the authority to and are more likely to lower tuition cost for their students, most of whom are low income first generation students. In contrast HBCUs without fiscal autonomy are dependent upon state higher education agencies to set tuition rates and appropriation in accordance with statewide priorities.

Lowry (2001) found that consolidated governing boards reduce the impact and ability of higher education institutions of higher education institutions to lobby on their own behalf which negatively impacts state funding. HBCUs have special needs such as a high percentage of low income students and physical plant dilapidation that are not prevalent in RCPWIs, therefore autonomy is needed to lobby these specific needs. This may explain why fiscally autonomous

HBCUs receive greater state financial support than HBCUs without fiscal autonomy.

The mission of HBCUs are unique to their institutions and have been embedded since their inception almost 100 years ago. The mission of HBCUs has consistently been the education and cultural enrichment of African-Americans to equip them with the skills to solve problems unique to the condition of blacks in America. The maintenance of fiscal autonomy is key to the success of their mission. The purpose of centralized higher education financial management systems is to influence higher education decisions thru funding mechanisms (Chiang, 2004).

These decisions are usually in accordance with statewide education planning which may be in conflict with the ideal education for African-Americans. For this reason fiscal autonomous

HBCUs are able to increase their state financial support by offering educational programs that do not overlap with programs offered at other state public universities. An example of this is Florida

A&M University’s College of Pharmacy whose only state public institution competition is the

University of Florida’s College of Pharmacy.

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In summary, within the state institutional model institutional fiscal autonomy had a statistically insignificant effect on state financial support per FTE to HBCUs and the relationship was positive, all else being constant. The full model yielded almost similar results as the state political model with a negative coefficient and a p-value also showing statistical insignificance.

The results of the institutional model supports the literature that institutional fiscal autonomy has a statistically insignificant impact on state financial support to HBCUs and higher education institutions and particularly in the institutional model, fiscally autonomous HBCUs received more state financial support than HBCUs without fiscal autonomy.

Hypothesis Eight: HBCUs and State Financial Support to HBCUs

The eighth variable of interest is HBCUs. This variable is utilized to identify whether the higher education institution is a HBCU or a RCPWI. Empirical research conducted on the relationship between HBCUs and state higher education spending is nonexistent however there is a longstanding anecdotal accusation that spending disparities exist between HBCUs and

RCPWIs. Research on HBCUs have been limited to their resource allocation (See Hamrick, et al., 2004), minority enrollment at HBCUs (see Sissoko, and Shiau, 2005), perceptions and attitudes of HBCU faculty (see Hubbard and Stage, 2009) and HBCU leadership (see Nichols,

2004). Analysis of HBCUs and state financial support per FTE allows one to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference in state financial support to HBCUs and RCPWI and the statistical direction of the difference. The hypothesis for this variable is as follows:

 H8: HBCUs receive less state financial support than RCPWIs (all variables being equal).

Table 5-1 gives a review of the results of the full model. The dummy variable HBCU was statistically insignificant (p<.05) in the full model, holding all else constant. Within the full model,

HBCU is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and the relationship is positive. It is worth noting that the full model provides additional observations which includes panel data from

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RCPWIs to allow for the comparison between HBCUs and RCPWIs. HBCUs received 50% more in financial support from states than RCPWIs, all else being constant. This shows that at least from

2004 and 2013 the longstanding assumption that HBCUs are funded less the RCPWIs is false when controlling for other variables. The directional relationship of HBCUs and state financial support per

FTE is not as hypothesized in the full model.

The full model resulted in a statistically significant and positive coefficient for HBCUs. The results reveal that the HBCU designation has a statistically significant impact on state financial support per FTE, all else being constant. The following section returns to the literature in an attempt to explain the statistical results.

Contextual analysis. The literature studying the linkages between HBCUs and state financial support compared to RCPWIs is nonexistent. Examining the linkages between these two variables adds to the body of literature on the subject of race, policy and higher education expenditures. Although there is no direct study examining the linkages between HBCUs and state financial support for higher education institutions, scholars have studied HBCUs as higher education institutions and organizations (see Hamrick, et al., 2004; Sissoko, and Shiau, 2005; Hubbard and

Stage, 2009; Nichols, 2004). The results of this study in regards to HBCUs and state financial support contradicts the aforementioned hypothesis which was based on anecdotal accusations. These accusation were established by literature on race and policy which found that when minorities are primary participants of a government program the government will adopt restrictive policies (Soss, et al., 2001; Hero and Tolbert, 1996).

One possible explanation for the results of this study centers on the observations.

Historically HBCUs and the state financial support they the received were compared to all PWIs including larger research institutions. These comparisons were often misleading as it was akin to comparing “grapes to apples.” When comparing state financial support from one higher

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education institution to the next the institutions should be comparable to one another in student population and degree offerings. An institution with an affiliate hospital, law school, and engineering school should not have its state financial support compared to an institution that only offers a few doctoral programs. In this study we specifically chose institutions that were similar in size and degree offerings to control for the financial support that comes from having a robust higher education institutions. With the largest HBCU in the country have under 13,000 students it was imperative to choose comparable institutions.

The notion that HBCUs are better funded than comparable white institutions was argued in Fordice v. United States (1992), citing Mississippi Valley State University (HBCU) being funded more than Delta State University (RCPWI) despite Delta State University having higher enrollment and having close geographic proximity to Mississippi Valley State University. During oral arguments, Justices of the U.S. Supreme court questioned the idea of whether past funding discrimination and the degradation of physical plants that resulted at HBCUs before Brown v.

Board of Education of Topeka (1954) warranted present and future additional funding to HBCUs as a remedy to correct past funding discrimination. This idea may be another possible explanation for HBCUs receiving more state financial support than RCPWIs, all else being equal.

Another possible explanation for the results of this study is the acknowledgement by states of the importance of HBCUs to their statewide education goals. Due to the lack of minorities in critical fields such as STEM, many HBCUs offer critically needed professional degrees that are not offered at RCPWIs at an affordable price. Examples include Jackson State

University’s College of Science, Engineering and Technology, Alcorn State University’s School of Nursing, Alabama A&M University’s College of Engineering, Technology and Physical

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Sciences and College of Agricultural, Life and Natural Sciences, North Carolina Central

University School of Law, South Carolina State University Nuclear Engineering Program,

Columbus State University’s School of Computer Science, Texas A&M University Thurgood

Marshall School of Law, Southern University Law Center and Florida A&M University’s

College of Pharmacy, College of Engineering and College of Law. Many HBCUs offer STEM programs and professional degree programs which require more funding to operate than traditional liberal arts programs offer at RCPWIs of similar size. Furthermore HBCUs and the critical needed affordable programs that they offer are increasing attracting first generation and non-white students.

In summary, within the full model the dummy variable HBCU had a statistically significant effect on state financial support per FTE and the relationship was positive, all else being constant. The results of the full model contradicts the literature and anecdotal accusations that HBCUs receive less state financial support then RCPWIs. The explanations for this finding centers around the offerings of high demand affordable academic programs, logical institutional comparisons, and past funding discrimination.

Conclusion

This study was designed to extend the literature regarding race and public policy and politics and budgeting. By adapting a politico-economic model proposed by McLendon et al.

(2009), the research design analyzed state financial support to higher education institutions as a function of political and institutional factors. This research design analyzed these relationships across 19 states for 10 time periods, 2004 thru 2013, and across 111 higher education institutions including 36 public HBCUs and 75 RCPWIs for a total of 1100 observations. This resulted in a

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comprehensive panel dataset measuring state financial support to higher education institutions controlling for political and institutional variables over a time period of a decade which spanned two U.S. Presidents, several state lower and upper houses, three state governorships and The

Great Recession.

The results reveal that the adaptation of McLendon’s politico-economic model did not significantly predict the variance of state financial support to higher education institutions and in particular HBCUs. In fact, the results were often contradictory to the established literature on state higher education funding. However, the analysis left implications for further research.

While this research design was not entirely successful, additions to the independent variables, guided by the future literature and research, may fare better in predicting the variance in state financial support for higher education institutions and particularly HBCUs. Alternatively, the insignificant results indicate that unobserved fundamental mechanisms are at play. The crux of this study is the comparison of state financial support to HBCUs and RCPWIs. The results contradict longstanding assumptions that funding discrimination to HBCUs exists as HBCUs received significantly greater state financial support during this study period than RCPWIs.

State financial support to HBCUs and higher education institutions as a whole is a matter of concern for any state. The vitality of the U.S. economy and continue international hegemony depends on the ability of America to provide equitable education to all citizens regardless of race, sex, religion, socioeconomic status, and sexual orientation. HBCUs are still an important and invaluable institution within the U.S. education system, however scholars and policymakers now question the need for HBCUs in a “post racial” America. This study took an important step forward in analyzing an empirical model of state financial support to higher education institution and particularly HBCUs within US states in order to identify factors that may be impeding the

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appropriations disbursement of funding need to improve and at the very least maintain American higher education institutions.

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Table 5-1. Summary Results of Hypotheses Tests. Political Model Intuitional Model Full Model H1 State interest payments Fail to Reject - Fail to Reject

Predicted Relationship/Outcome Negative/Yes Negative/Yes

H2 Political Ideology Reject Null - Reject Null

Predicted Relationship/Outcome Positive/Yes - Positive/Yes

H3 Republican House Fail to Reject - Fail to Reject

Predicted Relationship/Outcome Negative/No - Negative/Yes

H4 Unified Government Fail to Reject - Fail to Reject

Predicted Relationship/Outcome Negative/No - Negative/No

H5 Republican Unified Government Reject Null - Fail to Reject

Predicted Relationship/Outcome Negative/No - Negative/Yes

H6 Consolidated Governing Board - Fail to Reject Fail to Reject

Predicted Relationship/Outcome - Negative/ Yes Negative/ Yes

H7 Institutional Fiscal Autonomy - Fail to Reject Fail to Reject

Predicted Relationship/Outcome - Positive/ No Positive/ No

H8 HBCUs - - Reject Null

Predicted Relationship/Outcome - - Negative/No

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Christopher Weaver was in Boynton Beach, Florida to Dianne Weaver. He received a

B.S. in Criminal Justice and a M.S. in Political Science from Florida A&M University. Chris graduated with a PhD in Public Policy and Administration from The University of Florida in the fall of 2018. His research interest include: Public Budget and Finance, Race and Policy and

Internationl Political Economy.

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