Cadernos de Estudos Africanos

38 | 2019 Three Decades of Elections in Africa: What have we learned about democracy?

Edição electrónica URL: http://journals.openedition.org/cea/4196 DOI: 10.4000/cea.4196 ISSN: 2182-7400

Editora Centro de Estudos Internacionais

Edição impressa Data de publição: 1 dezembro 2019 ISSN: 1645-3794

Refêrencia eletrónica Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 38 | 2019, « Three Decades of Elections in Africa: What have we learned about democracy? » [Online], posto online no dia 09 março 2020, consultado o 25 setembro 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/cea/4196 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/cea.4196

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NOTA DA REDAÇÃO

This dossier evaluates the state of African democracy and raises important questions such as: What is the impact of elections on democratisation and turnover? How do voters behave in different types of elections? What explains variations in citizens’ political participation over time? What is the role of political institutions on democratisation and conflict mitigation? Can the internet and social media act as forces of democratisation? The contributions in this dossier address these questions using different types of data and methodologies – ranging from comparative to in- depth cases studies. This methodological pluralism, is in our view an additional strength of this publication.

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SUMÁRIO

Dossier

Introduction Edalina Rodrigues Sanches, José Jaime Macuane e Chipo Dendere

Elections as Vehicles for Change? Explaining different outcomes of democratic performance and government alternation in Africa Edalina Rodrigues Sanches e José Jaime Macuane

Madagascar’s Fluid Party System: Authoritarian legacies and an uneven playing field in an enduring competitive authoritarian regime João Pedro Garrido Conduto e Edalina Rodrigues Sanches

Elections in Cape Verde, 1991-2016: Testing the second-order election model in a consolidated semi-presidential African democracy José Santana Pereira, Susana Rogeiro Nina e Danielton Delgado

As Eleições Legislativas de 2018. Acerca da Sobrevivência da Democracia em São Tomé e Príncipe Augusto Nascimento

The Role of the Courts in Mitigating Election Violence in Nigeria Stephanie M. Burchard e Meshack Simati

The Effect of Electoral Violence on Electoral Participation in Africa Carlos Shenga e Amílcar Pereira

Tweeting to Democracy: A new anti-authoritarian liberation struggle in Zimbabwe Chipo Dendere

Democracy, Governance and Legitimacy in Zimbabwe since the November 2017 Military Coup Aaron Rwodzi

Articles

O Conflito de Casamansa e as Relações de Poderna Senegâmbia: Senegal, Guiné-Bissau e Gâmbia Antonieta Rosa Gomes

25 Anos de Política Nacional de Saúde na República da Guiné-Bissau: Memórias do seu Planeamento Estratégico em Saúde Cátia Sá Guerreiro, Zulmira Hartz, Paulo Ferrinho e Philip J. Havik

Book review

Takuo Iwata (Ed.). New Asian Approaches to Africa: Rivalries and Collaborations. Delaware: Vernon Press. 2020. 296 pp. ISBN 978-1-62273-809-0 Clara Carvalho

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Dossier Dossiê temático

Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 38 | 2019 4

Introduction

Edalina Rodrigues Sanches, José Jaime Macuane and Chipo Dendere

1 Some thirty years ago, Benin’s Conférence des Forces Vives de la Nation paved the way for the end of Mathieu Kérékou rule and inaugurated a new democratic order in country (Banégas, 1995; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). The successful transition in Benin pioneered the wave of democratisation in Africa and the demise of formal one-party rule in most countries. In the backcloth of domestic and international pressures, incumbent authoritarian parties embarked in significant liberalisation reforms, from the early 1990s-on, leading up to landmark constitutional revisions, and the introduction of laws allowing the formation of political parties, and the realisation of multiparty elections, for the first time ever or in decades. By mid-1990s virtually all countries had organised a round of competitive multiparty elections (Bratton, 1998; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997).

2 Initial appraisals qualified the African democratic wave as political “miracle” or “second independence” (Joseph, 1991, p. 11) and highlighted the democratising role of elections (Lindberg, 2006). Though elections did not translate in democracy in most countries, their increasing acceptance as the legitimate way to choose a government was a significant departure from the past. As Figure 1 helps demonstrate, most countries have been able to hold regular parliamentary elections: as of 2019, 14 countries have held up to five elections, 21 countries are in the sixth round of elections and 10 have held more than seven elections. The latter group includes, among others, Botswana, Mauritius and Gambia, which have held elections since independence in the 1960s.

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Figure 1: Parliamentary elections in 45 sub-Saharan African countries (from the founding elections until December 2019)

Image 1000B8D800002F20000016D2B68C1A8C0DBB2F34.emf

Source: Authors’ compilation Note: We counted a total of 268 parliamentary elections. For most countries the period covered is 1990s-2019, but in some cases – of political instability, blocked transitions, etc. – we only included the most recent elections (e.g. for Angola, Nigeria, Liberia we only counted the elections held in the 2000s).

3 While elections have become more common, it remains unclear whether they have transformed the essence of African politics (Bleck & van de Walle, 2018; Lynch & Crawford, 2011; Rakner & van de Walle, 2009). It has been argued that instead of producing alternation in power and more democratic regimes, the successive rounds of elections led to the emergence of new types of nondemocratic government and to the proliferation of dominant party systems, where the former authoritarian parties still hold a considerable share of votes/seats (Lynch & Crawford, 2011; Rakner & van de Walle, 2009). Moreover, no substantive improvements have happened over time: liberal democracies tend to remain liberal democracies while electoral autocracies or full autocracies remain as such (Bogaards, 2013).

4 This has implications for the way we think about the relationship between elections and democratisation. As Figure 2 shows, 42% of all elections (114 out of 268) take place in partly free countries, i.e. in countries that can be qualified as hybrid regimes or electoral autocracies. The second largest number of elections (90) are held in authoritarian regimes (not free), while only 64 elections are being conducted in liberal democracies (free).

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Figure 2: Parliamentary elections in 45 sub-Saharan African countries, by freedom status in 2019

Image 1000BB5C0000301E000014EF566063A09660502F.emf

Source: Authors’ compilation, and Freedom House 2019 report

5 Adding to the above, world indexes place the continent as the worst in terms of electoral integrity due to persisting episodes of (pre- or post-) electoral violence, vote buying and fraud (Norris & Grömping, 2019). Though all this reinforces the narrative that elections in Africa are but a “shadow of democracy” (Adejumobi, 2000), it is also true that multiparty elections have in some instances given birth to exemplar democracies as in Cabo Verde, Ghana and Mauritius, for instance. Overall, the outcomes of the democratic experiments have been mixed, with experiences of success and failure (Cheeseman, 2015).

6 This dossier evaluates the state of African democracy and raises important questions such as: What is the impact of elections on democratisation and turnover? How do voters behave in different types of elections? What explains variations in citizens’ political participation over time? What is the role of political institutions on democratisation and conflict mitigation? Can the internet and social media act as forces of democratisation?

7 The contributions in this dossier address these questions using different types of data and methodologies – ranging from comparative to in-depth cases studies. This methodological pluralism, is in our view an additional strength of this publication. The article by Sanches and Macuane draws on an original dataset of 179 elections in 27 African countries and finds that alternation in government in the founding elections improves democratic performance, and the odds of turnover in the future. The latter is also increased by the level of political competition and the quality of elections. Conduto and Sanches survey the limited impact of elections on party system institutionalisation in Madagascar. The authors show how leadership centralisation, ethnicity, personalism and clientelism shaped party formation during the authoritarian era and beyond; and also how incumbents’ attempts to uneven the played field have been countervailed by the opposition.

8 Santana Pereira, Susana Nina and Delgado focus on Cabo Verde, a successful democratic story. They analyse electoral behaviour in all legislative, presidential and local elections held between 1991 and 2016, and show that local elections present the features of second-order elections much more clearly than the presidential elections. Nascimento, in turn, focuses on São Tomé and Príncipe, a small island state that managed to democratise despite the odds, but that seems to be facing a democratic

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backslash since 2014. The author argues that big men rule and pervasive clientelism undermine the strength of democratic institutions. Burchard and Simati examine the sources of electoral violence in Nigerian elections (2015 and 2019) and show the relevance of courts as moderators of election-related violence. More specifically successfully challenging an election outcome in the courts is related to a reduction in the lethality of violence in the next election, but only if the courts are generally perceived as trustworthy. Using Afrobarometer data, Shenga and Pereira analyse how perceptions of violence (general and electoral) influence electoral participation and attitudes towards democracy. Dendere draws on extensive ethnographic study of 50 WhatsApp and Facebook communities in Zimbabwe to understand how they have increased participation and mobilisation. Finally, Rwodzi focuses on the democracy and legitimacy debates in Zimbabwe after the ouster of Robert Mugabe from power by his erstwhile ally, Emmerson Mnangagwa.

9 The various articles of this dossier provide some lessons on thirty years of elections in Africa, namely that: regular elections do not lead necessarily to more democracy, founding elections matter to understand current events, democracies can slide back or remain stuck in hybridity, political institutions are essential to strengthen democracy and mitigate conflict, and citizens can push democracy forward. Overall, African countries, like much of the world, face significant challenges but there have been some positive strides. The democratic experiment will continue to see turns and twists as countries make adjustments following decades of misrule. A remaining challenge for countries is the promotion of democratic turnover between leaders. In countries hailed as making good strides either presidents like Kagame have sought ways to stay in power longer or as is the case in Botswana the ruling parties continue to dominate politics. New forms of technology such as social media have opened political space but not to a great extent – their full impact is still yet to be seen. Suffice to say that it is not yet Uhuru.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adejumobi, S. (2000). Elections in Africa: A fading shadow of democracy? International Political Science Review, 21(1), 59-73.

Banégas, R. (1995). Action collective et transition politique en Afrique: La conférence nationale du Bénin. Cultures & Conflits, 17, 137-175.

Bleck, J., & Walle, N. van de. (2018). Electoral politics in Africa since 1990: Continuity in change. Cambridge University Press.

Bogaards, M. (2013). Reexamining African elections. Journal of Democracy, 24(4), 151-160.

Bratton, M. (1998). Second elections in Africa. Journal of Democracy, 9(3), 51-65.

Bratton, M., & Walle, N. van de. (1997). Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press.

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Cheeseman, N. (2015). Democracy in Africa: Successes, failures, and the struggle for political reform. Cambridge University Press.

Joseph, R. A. (1991). Africa: The rebirth of political freedom. Journal of Democracy, 2(4), 11-24.

Lindberg, S. I. (2006). Democracy and elections in Africa. The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lynch, G., & Crawford, G. (2011). Democratization in Africa 1990-2010: An assessment. Democratization, 18(2), 275-310.

Norris, P., & Grömping, M. (2019). Electoral integrity worldwide. The Electoral Integrity Project.

Rakner, L., & Walle, N. van de. (2009). Opposition weakness in Africa. Journal of Democracy, 20(3), 108-121.

AUTHORS

EDALINA RODRIGUES SANCHES Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt, 9 1600-189 Lisbon, Portugal [email protected]

JOSÉ JAIME MACUANE Universidade Eduardo Mondlane Avenida Julius Nyerere Maputo, Mozambique [email protected]

CHIPO DENDERE Wellesley College 106 Central St., Wellesley, MA 02481 United States of America [email protected]

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Elections as Vehicles for Change? Explaining different outcomes of democratic performance and government alternation in Africa1 Eleições enquanto veículos de mudança? Análise de variações no desempenho da democracia e na alternância no governo em África

Edalina Rodrigues Sanches and José Jaime Macuane

EDITOR'S NOTE

Recebido: 03 de dezembro de 2019 Aceite: 12 de dezembro de 2019

1 It is well established that free and fair elections are a necessary but not sufficient condition of democracy (Schmitter & Karl, 1991), and Africa is no exception to this convention. Following the third wave of democratisation, the proportion of countries organising multiparty elections rose from about 25% in 1988 to 92% in 2012; 80% of these had held four or more elections, and 60% six or more elections (Van Ham & Lindberg, 2015). But what has the transformative impact of elections in Africa been? A decade ago, Lindberg claimed that repeated elections, even if not entirely free and fair, would promote democratic qualities in the long run (Lindberg, 2006a, p. 149). However, 30 years after the inception of democratic experiments in Africa, it is clear that most countries did not move linearly towards democracy. Although almost all countries in the region have introduced liberalisation reforms and conducted multiparty elections, only a few transitioned to a liberal democracy and are experiencing democratic consolidation (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Cheeseman, 2015; Lynch & Crawford, 2011).

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2 In a study that covered elections held between 1990 and 2010, Lynch and Crawford demonstrate that while some African countries experience democratic progress, others slide back towards authoritarianism; but more importantly, most countries remain stuck as “‘hybrid regimes’, which are neither fully democratic nor classically authoritarian” (Lynch & Crawford, 2011, p. 281). Bleck and van de Walle (2019) recently argued that elections failed not only to generate democratic consolidation, but also to change the patterns of electoral competition. The authors demonstrate how incumbent presidents rely on an array of mechanisms – access to state resources, control of clientelistic and patronage networks – to survive electoral contests. Nevertheless, a handful of democratic success stories – Cabo Verde, Ghana, São Tomé and Príncipe, Mauritius and Senegal – show that frequent turnovers in government can go hand in hand with democratic developments (Sanches, 2018a). Thus, the relationship between elections, turnover and further democratisation is at best far from univocal, and includes experiences of success and failure (Cheeseman, 2015).

3 This study examines whether elections are vehicles for change (a term we borrow from Cheeseman, 2010) in terms of both democratic performance and alternation in government. It addresses two fundamental questions: Does having more regular elections improve democratic performance in Africa? And have elections transformed the patterns of alternation in government? These questions will be successively analysed in two empirical analyses.

4 The first empirical analysis tests whether elections have contributed to further democratisation in Africa. It takes democratic performance as the dependent variable and focuses on government alternation (in the founding multiparty elections and subsequent elections) as the key explanatory variable. In theory, consolidated democracies are expected to pass the “two-turnover” test so as to prove losers’ acceptance of the rules of the game (Cheeseman, 2010; Gasiorowski & Power, 1998; Huntington, 1991). Political alternation in this sense represents a moment when democratic procedures become accepted and routine, and are supported by the majority of the society, including the political actors (Linz & Stepan, 1996). However, in practice things are far more complex. On the one hand, most elections in Africa have not promoted democratic consolidation, which means democratic performance varies greatly (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Lynch & Crawford, 2011; Cheeseman, 2015). On the other, although new opposition parties emerged during and after democratic transition, it is uncertain whether they were able to push democracy forward and accept the democratic rules of the game. Therefore, turnover may represent fresh opportunities for changes in the rules of competition but may not necessarily result in democratic gains if parties fail to act as democratic forces (Cheeseman, 2010; Wahman, 2014).

5 The second empirical analysis examines whether elections have changed the patterns of alternation in government. It has been argued that elections have brought little political change to Africa and that authoritarian parties/presidents have managed to thrive in the new multiparty era (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019; Bogaards, 2004; Rakner & Svåsand, 2002). Nevertheless, great variation has been found with some countries experiencing more episodes of transfer of power than others (Cheeseman, 2010; Sanches, 2018a). Understanding the sources of this variation is the main motivation here. The second analysis takes government alternation as a dependent variable, while alternation in government in the founding multiparty elections, political competition

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and fairness of elections are the key independent variables. Overall, the two studies will allow us to understand whether elections have been a vehicle of change in Africa.

6 The two empirical analyses draw on an original time-series cross-sectional dataset of 179 elections in 27 African countries, from the founding multiparty elections until May 2019. The main finding for the first study is that while government alternation in the founding elections impacts democratic performance over time, opposition victories in subsequent elections do not produce democratic gains. This means that opposition parties/leaders – as much as incumbent parties/leaders – fail to act as agents of democracy. The results of the second study reveal that alternation in government in the founding elections, the level of political competition and the quality of elections significantly increase the odds of government alternation in future elections.

7 Overall this study reveals that alternation in government and democratisation strengthen each other. On the one hand, alternation in the founding multiparty elections shapes the prospects of democratisation; on the other, democratic principles such as political competition and clean elections increase the likelihood of turnover. These findings contribute to literature linking elections, democracy and turnover in Africa.

8 The study is organised as follows: The two theoretical sections outline the arguments and hypotheses linking elections to changes in democratic performance and in patterns of alternation in government over time. The methodological section clarifies how the main hypotheses will be tested, operationalises the dependent and independent variables in each study, and presents data on democratisation and government alternation in Africa. The empirical section discusses the main results of the statistical models estimated. The conclusion reflects on the implications of our findings for future research on democracy, elections and turnover in Africa.

Elections as a vehicle of democratic performance

9 Democratisation is far from a linear process as it involves complex dynamics, timing and sequences between liberalisation, transition and consolidation (Schneider & Schmitter, 2004). Focusing on democratisation rather than its outcome – democracy – allows us to observe regime performance in Africa over time and space, and why some countries manage to progress while others experience democratic backslide or remain stuck in hybrid regimes. Democratisation is usually explained on the basis of certain requisites such as homogenous social structure, economic development (or modernisation), pro-democratic political culture, power sharing political institutions and international context (Gasiorowski & Power, 1998; Norris, 2008; Teorell, 2010). Democratic performance, as it is used here and will be explained later, is assessed using as references political rights, civil liberties, checks and balances, rule of law, and the quality of elections.

10 In the African setting, scholars have put forward innovative theses of democratisation, one of which addresses the role of elections. In his seminal work The Surprising Significance of African Elections, Staffan Lindberg (2006a) made an important contribution to the prolific debate on how elections affect democratisation. Whilst acknowledging that elections are not the only nor the main explanatory factor for democratisation, Lindberg suggests that holding repeated elections in the new electoral regimes in Africa fosters and develops democratic qualities (Lindberg, 2006a, p. 149). Under

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Lindberg’s main argument, even if regular elections in the case of sub-Saharan Africa were flawed, they contributed to democratisation in the long run as they stimulated processes and behaviour that change citizens’ and institutions’ practices and attitudes toward democracy. In this sense, elections turn citizens into voters who demand responses and hold their representatives accountable by encouraging them to pressure political leaders to defend democratic principles, thus promoting a democratic mind- set in society. Moreover, civic organisations learn and create social capital to defend political rights and civil liberties, state institutions and officials see the importance of defending civil liberties, and the media takes on an increased role in protecting and promoting democracy (Lindberg, 2006a).

11 Reacting to Lindberg’s argument on “democratisation by elections”, Bogaards (2013) argues that it is also true that multiparty elections helped perpetuate non-democratic leaders on the continent. Democratisation by elections also has different patterns of stability and change, with free countries remaining free and electoral autocracies remaining autocracies. Based on the analysis of 324 multiparty elections up to 2011 in 43 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Bogaards concludes that only five of those that held at least two consecutive multiparty elections went through a democratisation process by elections, and two of these reverted to electoral authoritarianism. In the same vein, based on the cases of Southeast Asia where authoritarian regimes oversaw 88 competitive elections from 1945 to 2015, Morgenbesser and Pepinsky argue that elections did not necessarily result in democracy in the region over time, since only two countries – the Philippines and Indonesia – are currently electoral democracies (Morgenbesser & Pepinsky, 2018). According to Bogaards, these findings call for the revision of the argument of democratisation by elections and the need to combine electoral reform with conditions that favour alternation in power, which is considered a key element for democratisation in the recent growing literature of the field (Bogaards, 2013).

12 Turnover is an important benchmark of the democratisation process (Lodge, 2013). The argument is that democracy establishes itself when an incumbent party loses an election, and it is consolidated when at least two turnovers occur after the introduction of democratic elections (Huntington, 1991). As mentioned previously, the regularity of elections on the continent did not necessarily result in full-fledged democratisation. One of the critical points in the process is turnover, with many examples of leaders or parties maintaining themselves in power despite the regularity of elections and the introduction of limits on terms (Cheeseman, 2010; Tull & Simons, 2017).

13 Most studies in the field focus on power transfers at the presidential level, showing that specific traits and trends of African politics have prevented the continent from democratically ensuring a transfer of power (Cheeseman, 2010). Military takeover of power is one such trait and, albeit not specific to the continent, it has implications on turnover. In Africa, leaders who took power militarily were found to be reluctant to relinquish power voluntarily and tend to stay in power until they die or their health fails (Durotoye, 2016). Although the African Union and international donors’ organisations oppose the unconstitutional prolonging of terms, they have been neither effective nor proactive in enforcing such rules and have allowed African leaders to resort to these practices in impunity (Durotoye, 2016; Tull & Simons, 2017).

14 The so-called “third-termism” or “third term bids” is another growing trend; this hallmark of Africa’s democratic backsliding is characterised by the manipulative stance

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of democratically elected leaders altering the Constitution to change the terms’ limit to remain in power longer, thus hampering the prospects of alternation in power (Durotoye, 2016; Tull & Simons, 2017). From 1990 to 2016, over 10 African presidents tried to amend the constitution to alter the term limits (Durotoye, 2016; Tull & Simons, 2017) and there has been a democratic backsliding in the continent (Bogaards, 2013). Even countries formally hailed as success stories like Mozambique are experiencing a democratic backsliding (Muchemwa & Harris, 2018). Term limits are key mechanisms for the institutionalisation of power and for democratisation because they influence the way leaders come to office or leave power in a context where, according to some scholars, politics have been historically dominated by “big men” that are particularly resilient and good at manipulating institutions to stay in power (Tull & Simons, 2017).

15 Given this scenario, what is the (democratic) role of opposition parties? Can turnover at the government level lead to further democratisation? Rakner & van de Walle (2009) posit that strong opposition parties are a central component of any strategy of democratisation by elections, and that “opposition parties’ evolving ability to compete politically should in theory correlate with the level and quality of democratic practice” (Rakner & van de Walle, 2009, p. 109). However, several studies suggest that the democratic role of opposition parties is far from guaranteed.

16 Drawing on a dataset consisting of 210 elections in electoral regimes in Africa, Lindberg (2006b) demonstrated that opposition parties’ participatory behaviour – that is their decision to either contest or boycott elections – significantly improved the democratic qualities of elections and he therefore concluded that opposition behaviour was an “important determinant of democratisation by elections” (Lindberg, 2006b, p. 133). On the other hand, Cheeseman (2010) relies on illustrative case studies to highlight the variation and unpredictability of turnover (at the presidential level) in Africa: while Benin witnessed positive improvements after the transfer of power in 1991, this was not the case in Zambia or Kenya. Using data on competitive authoritarian regimes between 1989 and 2008, Wahman (2014) offers additional insights into this discussion. The study starts by demonstrating that newly elected governments are not more prone to democratic development than re-elected ones, before specifying the conditions under which this may vary. Wahman argues that when elected governments are uncertain about the prospects of their re-election – which is more common in weakly institutionalised party systems – they will be more reluctant to reduce the incumbents’ advantage through further democratisation (Wahman, 2014, p. 221). This argument is illustrated with the case studies of Senegal, Kenya and Ghana.

17 We aim to contribute to this discussion by re-evaluating the conditions under which government alternation leads to democratisation. This is innovative as the trend in the field has been to analyse power transfers at the presidential level (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Cheeseman, 2010), thus neglecting the governmental arena, and the role of political parties. The first explanation here proposed focuses on path dependency, and argues that government alternation during transition helps improve democratic performance in the future. Several scholars have developed a path dependency argument to explore how the mode of transition from authoritarian rule shaped the prospects of democratic consolidation in Southern Europe and Latin America (Munck & Leff, 1997; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Schmitter & Karl, 1991). Our goal is to extend this logic in order to understand the long-term impact of government alternation during transition on democratisation.

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18 The minimalist definition of path dependency is that “what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time” (Sewell, 1996, p. 263, cited in Mahoney & Schensul, 2006, p. 459). This is expected because as the process advances the “costs of exit” – switching to some previously plausible alternative – rise (Pierson, 2000, p. 252). Democratic transitions can be conceived as “formative or founding moments” that shape subsequent political developments (Munck & Leff, 1997, p. 343). They affect “the form of post-transitional regime and politics through” their “influence on the pattern of elite competition, on the institutional rules crafted during the transition, and on key actors’ acceptance or rejection of the new rules of the game” (Munck & Leff, 1997, p. 345).

19 During the African democratic wave, many countries held multiparty elections for the first time ever or in decades. Bratton and van de Walle (1997, p. 196) allude to the relevance of founding elections when saying that “they heralded regime transition in the sense that they laid down new procedures of political competition that broke down with monopolistic authoritarian antecedents and established the potential for democratic rule”. The numerous opposition parties that formed during this period and participated at the polls had different degrees of success, as incumbents managed to be elected in many countries. Nevertheless, the losers’ acceptance of the results in countries like São Tomé and Príncipe, Cabo Verde or Benin, to mention just a few examples, demonstrated a new attachment to democratic rules and principles (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997, p. 197). In sum, founding elections can be perceived as key moments when pro-democratic behaviours and norms emerge, and this can shape regime performance over time. Experiences of turnover at the transition stage are, therefore, meaningful, not because they immediately lead to democracy but because they introduce changes in the status quo, hence:

20 Hypothesis 1 (path dependency): Government alternation in the founding multiparty elections positively impacts democratisation over time.

21 However, the democratic gains of turnover after the transition are less obvious over time. As previously discussed, opposition parties do not always act as forces of democratisation (Cheeseman, 2010) and once in government they may try to revert democratic gains if they fear electoral defeat (Wahman, 2014). The current trends of democratic backslide and authoritarian resurgence in countries that have experienced turnover – at the executive and/or presidential level – suggest that a power shift may not necessarily lead to further democratic development. Thus:

22 Hypothesis 2 (democratisation by turnover): Government alternation following the founding elections has a smaller effect on democratisation.

Elections as vehicles for government alternation

23 Several studies suggest that multiparty elections have had a limited transformative impact on African party systems: incumbent authoritarian parties and leaders managed to be re-elected (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019; Rakner & Svåsand, 2002) and dominant party systems have proliferated in most countries (Bogaards, 2008). However, more variation emerges when we revisit the studies that analysed the impact of elections on party systems using indicators of stability (Lindberg, 2007) or institutionalisation2 (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001; Rield, 2014; Sanches, 2018a). But regardless of the metric

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used, these studies reveal that party systems differ substantively in how they operate – some countries have experienced more change between elections while others less.

24 To explain diversity in the level of stability or institutionalisation, scholars have resorted to a set of explanations based on history, economy, political institutions and social structure. It has been argued that authoritarian legacies – strategies of power accumulation and clientelistic networks established during authoritarianism – have a greater impact on African party systems than economic performance and type of political institutions (Riedl, 2014). Ferree (2010) and Weghorst and Bernhard (2014) provide some support for social structure explanations when showing that parties’ ability to form winning coalition of ethnic groups helps stabilise the party systems. Finally, incumbency is an important advantage in the context of an uneven playing field where opposition parties’ lack of access to state resources affects their ability to distribute patronage and develop strong nation-wide structures (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019; Cheeseman, 2010; Wahman, 2017).

25 In what regards political alternation, several studies draw interesting descriptive inferences from the analysis of presidential elections (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Cheeseman, 2010; Lodge, 2013). Looking at elections from the 1990s until 2010, Lodge (2013) finds that 15 countries experienced an orderly succession of presidents of different party affiliation either during or following the transition, while 12 countries did not experience power transfer – not even once. Some variation is also captured by Cheeseman (2010) using data from presidential elections held between 1990 and 2009. Finally, Sanches (2018a) measured the patterns of alternation in government in Africa using data on 178 elections held in 30 (hybrid or) democratic countries between the founding multiparty elections and 2016. The study shows great variation across countries, with alternation in government occurring in half of the elections held in the observed period.

26 While these studies are important contributions for our understanding of electoral politics in Africa since the introduction of multiparty elections, the question of why some countries experience more alternation in government than others remains unanswered. To contribute to this discussion, the explanatory model developed here focuses on the effects of path dependency, the level of political competition and the quality of elections as key explanatory factors. The rationale connecting each of these factors to alternation in power is discussed next.

27 The first explanation is that current trends of electoral competition in Africa trace back to the transition stage. Parties’ ability to succeed in the founding multiparty polls crucially shaped both competition in the short-term and future rounds of elections (path dependency). As explained previously, this is expected because the democratic transitions are critical junctures of party formation and institutional crafting during which party elites (incumbents and newcomers) seek to minimise the odds of losing power. The choices they make at this point will influence the kind of competition that will emerge in the future even if they are confronted with high levels of uncertainty (Lupu & Riedl, 2013, p. 1344). Studies from South European countries are illustrative of the importance of the transition. In fact, they show how this period had a “significant impact in shaping the new parties (party unit level) and relations among parties (party system level)”, namely by determining patterns of coalition and alternation in power over time (Cotta, 1996, p. 73).

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28 In the African setting, several studies make path dependency a plausible argument when explaining patterns of government alternation; we elaborate this further. It has been demonstrated that second elections in Africa resembled the early founding round in terms of winners and losers and levels of political participation (Bratton, 1998). Voters “generally sought continuity in political leadership in the aftermath of turbulent interludes of regime transition” (Bratton, 1998, p. 61). And studies covering more years and elections reveal that the events of the early 1990s crucially shaped future rounds of elections (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019). The incumbent’s success in the founding multiparty elections was crucial for political dominance/stability over time and to reduce the opportunities for alternation; but once a country experiences one alternation, the probability of another in future elections increases (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019). Thus we formulate that:

29 Hypothesis 3 (path dependency): Countries that experienced alternation in government in the founding elections are more likely to experience it again in future rounds of elections.

30 The second explanation observes levels of competition during elections. According to Bartolini and Mair (1990), electoral volatility is influenced by the number of parties in competition as the probability that each individual voter will vote for the same party in two consecutive elections will decline as the number of different available options increases. In other words, limited political offer is expected to lower the level of volatility and thus the likelihood of electoral shifts in government. Early empirical assessments of elections in Africa recognise that leadership alternation3 was associated with close races (Bratton, 1998, p. 64); and subsequent research found a positive relationship between the number of electoral parties and party system institutionalisation (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001; Sanches, 2018a) or stability (Ferree, 2010). This discussion informs the following hypothesis:

31 Hypothesis 4 (level of political competition): The larger the number of relevant electoral parties, the greater the probability of alternation in government.

32 The final explanation concerns the quality of elections. The minimalist definition of democracy requires political leaders to be chosen in competitive, free and fair elections (Dahl, 1971). However, elections in Africa are the world’s worst in terms of electoral integrity (Norris & Grömping, 2019). Twenty years ago, Bratton (1998) noted that the quality of multiparty elections in Africa deteriorated over time: in the second elections held after the transition, presidents resorted to executive power to rig the rules against their challengers. He also added that: In contrast to electoral volatility and incumbent turnovers in second elections in Eastern Europe and Latin America, dominant parties in Africa have usually been able to reinforce their supremacy the second time around. After a period of turbulent transitions, African politics is returning to an institutional legacy of “big man” rule, and the electoral alternation of leaders is again becoming abnormal. (Bratton, 1998, p. 65)

33 More recent appraisals of elections and democracy in Africa note that vote buying, intimidation and harassment have been used to skew the competition in favour of the incumbent parties (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019; Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018). Hence, the final hypothesis postulates:

34 Hypothesis 5 (quality of elections): The cleaner the elections, the greater the probability of alternation in government.

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Methods and data

35 To test the hypotheses raised in this study, we draw on an original dataset of 179 parliamentary elections held in 27 countries from the founding multiparty elections until May 2019. As can be seen in annex A, most elections were conducted between 1990 and 2019 but the analysis also includes the cases of Botswana, Mauritius and The Gambia where multiparty elections have been held since the 1960s. The countries included in this study score at least partly free in the latest Freedom House report, they hold competitive elections regularly4, and have (minimum) legal provisions that guarantee political rights and civil liberties.

The dependent variables

36 Two types of analysis will be performed using democratic performance and alternation in government as dependent variables. Democratic performance is measured by the Varieties of Democracy Project’s Liberal democracy index which varies from low to high (0-1). This index takes into account political rights, civil liberties, checks and balances, rule of law, and the electoral component of democracy.

37 As can be observed in Figure 1, the countries included in this study vary substantively in terms of democratic performance. In the overall depiction, Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana, Senegal and Benin are exemplary cases of democratic progress and they have been systematically rated the best democracies in Africa – despite some internal variations. Cases such as Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Madagascar or Lesotho have witness periods of both progress and, more recently, democratic retreat.

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Figure 1: Democratic performance (country, averages)

Image 101845B00000276300002992B9ADFA4EBA2BB907.emf

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on V-Dem data (https://www.v-dem.net/) Note: Liberal democracy index (D) (v2x_libdem). To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

38 The second dependent variable – alternation in government – measures whether there was wholesale, partial or no alternation in power following the elections (Casal Bértoa & Enyedi, 2016; Mair, 1996). In the first scenario (wholesale alternation), the incumbent government leaves office and is totally replaced by a new party or coalition. In the second scenario (partial alternation), the new cabinet contains both new parties and old ones from the previous government. In the third scenario (no alternation), alternation is complete absent and the same party or parties remain in exclusive control of government (Mair, 1996). To compute the variable, we analysed all parliamentary/general elections and verified whether there was a transfer of power at the government level following the elections.

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Figure 2: Alternation in government in 27 countries (as of May 2019)

Source: Authors’ elaboration

39 As exhibited in Figure 2, there are striking variations across countries: 87 out of 179 elections produced no alternation in power, while wholesale alternation occurred 50 times and partial alternation 42 times. Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania never experienced alternation of power. The dominant parties, respectively the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo), South-West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), African National Congress (ANC) and the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), successfully managed to close political competition and deter new party entries. Cabo Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, and Niger are among the countries where elections produce regular alternation in power. The two major parties in Cabo Verde – Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde (PAICV) and Movimento para a Democracia (MPD) – have peacefully rotated in government since the founding democratic elections. Just a few months after its foundation in March 1990, the MPD unexpectedly won the founding multiparty elections in 1991 and repeated the win in 1995 and more recently in 2016. After losing parliamentary elections in 1991 and 1995, the PAICV won subsequent elections (2001, 2006, and 2011) with broad parliamentary support (more than 50% of the seats). Similarly, in Ghana the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) are the two largest parties in the system and the only ones to have legitimate expectations of forming one-party cabinets. The NDC won elections in 1992, 1996, 2008 and 2012, while the NPP took power in 2000, 2004, and 2016.

40 In contrast, several countries appear to have a more unpredictable electoral market. Benin has the most open party system, with partial alternation in government in all elections since 1995. The only exception is the founding multiparty election in which there was wholesale alternation. In São Tomé and Pr íncipe and Mauritius, most elections also resulted in the formation of cabinets combining both new and incumbent parties. Finally, elections in countries such as Lesotho and Burkina Faso led to partial, wholesale or no alternation in government.

The independent variables and controls

41 In the first study, where the dependent variable is democratic performance, there are two main independent variables: alternation in government in the founding elections, which is coded 1 if there was wholesale or partial alternation during the transition, and 0

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otherwise; and alternation in government following the founding elections, which is also measured dichotomously (1= wholesale or partial alternation; 0= non alternation) but takes into account all elections held from the transition until 2019. These variables allow us to test the underlying assumptions of our two hypotheses, namely whether alternation in government in founding elections (hypothesis 1) and subsequent elections (hypothesis 2) impacts democratic performance over time.

42 These hypotheses are tested alongside a set of controls that are usually linked to democratisation. Ethnicity is often related to democratic performance, but the relationship between the two is far from straightforward. Reilly (2001), for instance, argued that highly fragmented societies can experience democratic progress if no group can control power alone. Ethnicity is measured with Alesina et al. (2003) Fractionalisation Data, which varies from 0 (homogeneity) to 1 (heterogeneity) and collapses the degree of linguistic, ethnic and religious fractionalisation within a country. GDP growth (annual %) is retrieved from the World Bank and accounts for the economic explanations for democratisation. The models also account for type of electoral system (1= plurality; 0= otherwise), form of govern (1= presidential; 0= otherwise), and time (measured as years since the first multiparty elections) for different reasons. Plurality formulas are known to increase the potential for conflict, and democratic breakdown given their winner takes all nature, while proportional representation favours proportionality and power sharing between competing forces (Norris, 2008). There is lack of consensus when it comes to forms of government: while some warn of the perils of presidentialism (van Cranenburgh, 2008; van de Walle, 2003), others show that presidentialism is not inherently bad and suggest that it bears negatively on democratisation when combined with high levels of party fragmentation and ethnic politicisation (Sanches, 2018b). Time since the first multiparty elections accounts for the more temporal dynamics of democratisation in Africa, and provides for an additional control of the democratisation by elections argument. Given the temporal and cross-sectional nature of the data and type of the dependent variable, we estimated a linear regression correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) in STATA with the command xtpcse.

43 The second study, for which alternation in government is the dependent variable, has three main independent variables as indicated in hypotheses 3, 4 and 5: alternation in government in the founding elections which is measured dichotomously as in the first study (1= wholesale or partial alternation; 0= non alternation); political competition which is calculated following Laakso & Taagepera (1979) Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) formula; and, finally, quality of elections which is measured by the Varieties of Democracy clean elections index5 (varies from 0= low to 1= high). These independent variables will enter the regression models alongside a set of controls, considered relevant to electoral competition in Africa.

44 As in the prior study, we control for ethnicity (as measured by Alesina et al., 2003) which significantly shapes party formation and competition in Africa (Ferree, 2010; Weghorst & Bernhard, 2014). Least squares index (LSq) is the second control, measuring the disproportionality between the distribution of votes and of seats; it is therefore of a finer measure of the effects of electoral systems on party systems. It is expected that higher disproportionality will favour the incumbent and major parties vis-à-vis opponents and smaller parties (Colomer, 2005). The robustness of civil society is measured by the Varieties of Democracy Core civil society index6 (varies from 0= low to

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1= high), which allows us to control for the fact that the strength of civil society might influence the kind of alternatives that can emerge and put pressure on the incumbent government (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). A set of variables – drawn from the World Bank – are also added to account for the macro-structural changes that can foster political change. These include GDP growth (annual %), urban population (as %) and unemployment (% of total labour force; modelled ILO estimate). Finally, a variable measuring number of elections was included to identify any significant changes over repeated elections. Once again, given the temporal and cross-sectional structure of the data and the binary nature of the dependent variable, we estimated logistic regressions in STATA with the command xtlogit. Basic descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables used in both studies are presented in annex B.

Main results

45 The first study tests the effects of alternation in government on democratisation, and the results of the models estimated are presented in Table 1. Model 1 includes the key independent variables – alternation in the founding elections, and alternation following the founding elections; Model 2 adds the controls.

46 The results confirm our theoretical expectations. First, if a country has experienced a power transfer during democratic transition, this strongly influences its capacity to continue to democratise over time. In other words, political alternations are unique formative moments when new democratic values and expectations are formed. Over time, countries that managed to democratise the most during the transition stage and experienced a peaceful transfer of power, experienced more positive democratic developments. However, and as most literature suggests, whether or not a country experiences alternation in future elections is not important to democratisation (Cheeseman, 2010; Wahman, 2014). As our data show, in addition to there being no significant effect of government turnover on democratisation, the association is negative. That is, opposition victories did not bring democratic gains and, ultimately, this means democracy is poorly rooted at the elite level, both in governing and opposition elites. In short, this first study confirms hypotheses 1 and 2. Though our expectations were confirmed it is important to note that the models have relatively low explanatory power (Model 1 R-square = 0.02; Model 2 R-square = 0.15) which suggest that other variables must be included in the analysis.

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Table 1: The effect of alternation in government on democracy in Africa

Image 1005C85C0000324D00002071C391B36D0FC157FB.emf

Notes: significant at +p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0,001. Dependent variable is Quality of democracy measured by the Liberal democracy index which varies from low to high (0-1). Given the temporal and cross-sectional structure of the data and the type of dependent variable, the regression models were estimated with the command xtpcse in STATA. Multicolinearity is within acceptable standards (that is <10): in Model 1 the mean VIF = 2.36; and in Model 2 the mean VIF = 3.09 (estimated with the command vif, uncentered).

47 Turning to the sources of government alternation: Which factors matter the most? The second study provides answers to this question. Table 2 presents two models seeking to test our assumptions on the role of alternation in government in the founding multiparty elections, level of political competition and quality of elections on government turnover. Using a similar structure, we first estimated a model with the three main independent variables and a lagged dependent variable to account for the prior outcome for alternation in government (Model 3), and then added the controls (Model 4).

48 Taken together, the results corroborate hypotheses 3, 4, and 5. Hypothesis 3 posited that countries that experienced alternation in government in the founding elections would be more likely to experience alternation in successive rounds of elections, and this is confirmed in both models: the two variables are positively and significantly correlated, hence confirming the importance of transitional legacies and their structuring of competition in the future. Hypothesis 4 tested the assumption that close races had a significant impact on the likelihood of government alternation; this is confirmed by our results: a larger number of effective electoral parties has a significant and positive effect on alternation in government. Finally, hypothesis 5 predicted that clean elections favour alternation; and indeed, the results show a strong association between the two variables in both our models. This set of results reveals the significance of democratic credentials to alternation. In fact, both political competition and quality of elections are part of minimalist definitions of democracy.

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Table 2: The sources of alternation in power in Africa

Image 100722A400002D8A000029469FFF7707839910D4.emf

Notes: significant at +p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0,001. Dependent variable is Alternation in Government measured dichotomously (1= wholesale or partial alternation; 0= non-alternation). Given the temporal and cross-sectional structure of the data and the type of dependent variable, the regression models were estimated with the command xtlogit in STATA. Multicolinearity is within acceptable standards (that is <10): in Model 3 the mean VIF = 1.31; and in Model 4 the mean VIF = 1.63 (estimated with the command collin).

49 Overall, the two studies conducted herein reveal the importance of path dependence, more specifically, that of transition legacies to future political developments in Africa. They also show that government alternation and democratisation are strongly interrelated; especially at the early phase of democratisation, when new (democratic) values are adopted by the political actors, and start embodying the political game from the beginning of the process.

Conclusion

50 Although multiparty elections have become commonplace in Africa, it is also true that most countries have not seen democratic gains and that the same political class continues in power. So do more elections bring more democracy to Africa? And have they transformed the patterns of competition for government? The great variation found across African countries suggests that the answer is far from straightforward. In fact, it is necessary to revisit the arguments linking elections to democracy and turnover, and cover a larger time span and more countries than prior studies.

51 We relied on an original dataset of 179 elections in 27 countries to examine whether elections are vehicles for improved democratic performance and alternation in government; and performed two tests with democratic performance and government

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alternation as dependent variables. The first set of findings reveals that although government alternation in the founding elections positively impacts democratic performance, opposition victories in subsequent elections do not produce democratic gains. This finding underlines the role of democratic transitions as critical junctures when the seeds for the future flourishing of democracy are planted. However, the fact that alternation in government in subsequent elections has a limited impact on democratisation is revealing of the weak democratic role of opposition parties, which – like incumbent parties/leaders – fail to improve the democratic credentials of the regime once in power.

52 The second set of findings relate to why some countries experience more transfers of power than others. The results of our statistical models demonstrate that government alternation during transition, the level of political competition and the quality of elections significantly increase the odds of turnover over time in Africa; this implies that alternation in government results from a mix of structural and contextual factors.

53 Together, these findings further the existing literature in three complementary ways. First, they show that what happened during transition is still important and shapes democratic developments and competition for power in Africa today. While prior studies explored the impact of colonial heritage on democracy (Bernhard et al., 2004), or the role of authoritarian and transition legacies on party system development (LeBas, 2011; Riedl, 2014; Sanches, 2018a), to the best of our knowledge this is the first large-N study that assesses the impact of transitional outcomes – more specifically turnover in founding elections – for the prospects of democratisation and government alternation in Africa. Second, they highlight the notion that the fairness of elections matters for government alternation which, on a more negative note, is revealing of the uneven playing field in Africa and of the ways in which incumbency advantage, electoral malpractices and authoritarian practices continue to distort the character of African elections and nature of representation. Thirdly, the results are also telling of the fact that alternation and democratisation strengthen each other. On the one hand, alternation in government in the founding multiparty elections shapes the prospects of democratisation; on the other, democratic principles such as political competition and clean elections increase the likelihood of turnover over time.

54 Overall, this study shows that elections produce a diversity of outcomes in terms of both democratic developments and alternation in government. This variation is largely explained by historical legacies and continuous struggles over the rules of the game. It also raises issues on why political alternation after transition does not necessarily lead to further democratisation. This is an unexplored area deserving further study. An insight that emerges from this study is that the conditions that lead political elites to embrace democratic values in Africa matters for understanding democratisation. It would also be interesting to explore political culture and socialisation in future studies, by analysing the political trajectories and socialisation of the incoming elites that replace the incumbents when political alternation occurs.

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APPENDIXES

ANNEX A - Countries and elections covered Image 100C9988000030B600003C1FA700B76E60639B12.emf

B - Descriptive statistics on independent variables and controls

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Image 10068BE800002E6E000027963B48069AF463F7BE.emf

NOTES

1. The authors would like to thank the reviewers for their careful reading and valuable feedback on prior iterations of this article. This work has been supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology through the project CEECIND/ 02527/2017 and the strategic project no. UID/SOC/50013/2019. 2. Institutionalisation is “the process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted” (Mainwaring, 1999, p. 25) while stability – the most important dimension of institutionalisation – expresses the extent to which a stable set of parties interact in relatively stable ways over time (Mainwaring, 2018). Indicators of institutionalisation include, inter alia, volatility, vote difference between elections, mean age of parties, share of seats for historical parties, party identification (Mainwaring, 1999), while stability is usually measured by different types of volatility. 3. Leadership alternation refers to electoral turnover of chief political executives (Bratton, 1998, p. 54). 4. Not interrupted by episodes of political instability or major armed conflicts as these have a profound effect on parties and party systems (e.g. some parties are banned or dissolved and formal rules are frequently changed with the draft of new constitutional laws). For instance, in the case of Nigeria, only elections since 1999 were included. 5. “Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence”. See codebook, variable v2xel_frefair https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/e6/d2/ e6d27595-9d69-4312-b09f-63d2a0a65df2/v-dem_codebook_v9.pdf

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6. The core civil society index provides “a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived”. See codebook, variable v2xcs_ccsi https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/e6/d2/e6d27595-9d69-4312- b09f-63d2a0a65df2/v-dem_codebook_v9.pdf

ABSTRACTS

Does having more regular elections improve democratic performance in Africa? And have elections transformed the patterns of alternation in government? To answer these questions, two analyses are conducted drawing on an original dataset of 179 elections in 27 African countries, from the founding multiparty elections until 2019. The first tests the effects of alternation in government on democratic performance and shows that while alternation in government in the founding elections improves democratic performance, opposition victories in subsequent elections do not produce democratic gains. The second examines why alternation in government is more frequent in certain countries than in others; and reveals that the odds of turnover are increased by alternation in government in the founding elections, the level of political competition and the quality of elections. These findings contribute to literature linking elections, democracy and turnover in Africa.

Eleições regulares melhoram o desempenho da democracia em África? E qual o efeito das eleições nos padrões de competição pelo governo? Respondemos a estas questões através de duas análises empíricas que utilizam uma base de dados original com eleições realizadas em 17 países africanos desde as eleições fundadoras da era multipartidária até 2019. A primeira testa o efeito da alternância no governo no desempenho da democracia, e demonstra que enquanto a alternância no governo nas eleições fundadoras melhora o desempenho da democracia no futuro, a vitória da oposição em eleições subsequentes não produz ganhos democráticos. A segunda examina porquê alguns países experimentam maior alternância no governo e outros menos; e revela que a probabilidade de alternância ao longo do tempo é maior, quando também houve alternância nas eleições fundadoras do multipartidarismo e as eleições são mais competitivas e justas. Estes resultados contribuem para a literatura que associa eleições, democracia e alternância em África.

INDEX

Keywords: Africa, alternation in government, democratic transition, level of political competition, quality of elections Palavras-chave: África, alternância no governo, transição democrática, grau de competição política, qualidade das eleições

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AUTHORS

EDALINA RODRIGUES SANCHES Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt, 9 1600-189 Lisbon, Portugal [email protected]

JOSÉ JAIME MACUANE Universidade Eduardo Mondlane Avenida Julius Nyerere Maputo, Mozambique [email protected]

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Madagascar’s Fluid Party System: Authoritarian legacies and an uneven playing field in an enduring competitive authoritarian regime1 O sistema partidário fluído de Madagáscar: Legados autoritários e condições de competição desiguais em um regime autoritário competitivo duradouro

João Pedro Garrido Conduto and Edalina Rodrigues Sanches

EDITOR'S NOTE

Recebido: 04 de dezembro de 2019 Aceite: 21 de dezembro de 2019

1 Finding the reasons why some party systems grow and mature with time while others remain fluid is an exercise that is both relevant and challenging. Though a constellation of macro-level factors – historical legacies, political institutions, economics, social structure – combine to explain the likelihood of institutionalisation or stabilisation over time2, there are also striking variations within and across regions (Sanches, 2018). The great diversity in the format and functioning of African party systems offers an excellent laboratory for revisiting the weight of existing explanations. In fact, while dominant parties and party systems have proliferated in countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania and Mozambique (Bogaards & Boucek, 2010), those in Madagascar, Kenya, Comoros and Zambia, just to name a few examples, have experienced massive vote shifts in elections, high fragmentation and the frequent emergence and success of new parties and independent candidates (Salih & Nordlund, 2007; Sanches, 2018). This article’s main goal is to understand why Madagascar’s party system has failed to institutionalise over repeated elections and remains as fluid as it was at the beginning of the Third Republic.

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2 Existing scholarship shows that the passing of time has had little effect on party system development in Africa (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001; Lindberg, 2007; Sanches, 2018), whereas authoritarian legacies have lasting effects (LeBas, 2011; Riedl, 2014). Thus, parties that, during authoritarianism, were able to rely on pre-existing organisational structures (LeBas, 2011) or to garner support by incorporating local elites (Riedl, 2014) were better able to endure over time. Though also acknowledging the relevance of these historical legacies, this study proposes a more dynamic framework.

3 The overall argument is that the way politics plays out in the present results from a mix between the legacies from prior historical periods, and the extent to which political elites are continuously able to make the playing field uneven (Levitsky & Way, 2010b). Consequently, where parties mainly rely on personal or material resources to build support (Levitsky & Way, 2013) and fail to effectively skew the competition in their favour (Levitsky & Way, 2010b) they will be more likely to fragment over time. This argument is tested in the case of Madagascar, which is relevant for at least three reasons.

4 First, it is one of the few countries with experience of a multi-party system prior to the start of the democratic wave in Africa in the early 1990s. Elections were competitive during the First Republic (1960-1975) and, although they became more restrictive in the Second Republic (1975-1993), parties were allowed to run as long as they supported the state’s socialist ideals by joining the National Front for the Defence of the Revolution (FNDR) dominated by the ruling Vanguard for the Malagasy Revolution (AREMA) (Thibaut, 1999, p. 533). Second, though the Third Republic (1993-2010) marked a transition to more democratic elections, at least formally, in practice the regime remained “competitive authoritarian” (Bogaards & Elischer, 2016, p. 12; Levitsky & Way, 2010a, p. 276), meaning that “electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources, and varying degrees of harassment and violence” often skewed the playing field in favour of incumbents (Levitsky & Way, 2010a). Third, Madagascar is often depicted as an “unstable competitive authoritarian regime” characterised by weak parties, and recurrent political crises (Bogaards & Elischer, 2016; Levitsky & Way, 2010a). In this sense, it resembles other cases in the continent (e.g. Malawi, Kenya and Zambia).

5 The study is structured as follows: The theoretical section highlights the major trends in electoral politics in Africa since the 1990s and presents the theoretical framework. Then Madagascar’s key political and historical developments are briefly described. The following sections examine the role of authoritarian legacies in party building and mobilisation strategies, as well as the tactics used by incumbents to skew the playing field. Drawing on multiple sources of data including electoral data, election observation reports and legislation, our findings show that leadership centralisation, ethnicity, personalism and clientelism shaped party formation during the authoritarian era and beyond; and that incumbents use their advantage to create asymmetries in access to resources, media and law. Interestingly, however, the analysis also indicates that the strategies used to skew the playing field only produce short term gains; they do not prevent rotation in power in a subsequent election. This set of findings contributes to an understanding of “competitive authoritarianism” in contexts of high instability, weak parties, weak state capacity and ineffective power structures. This will be discussed further in the concluding section.

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Understanding party systems in Africa

6 African party systems are often characterised by high levels of electoral and legislative volatility, loose linkages with society and low legitimacy accorded to elections and political parties (Basedau, 2007; Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001; Lindberg, 2007; Riedl, 2014; Sanches, 2018). However, there are also striking cross-country variations. Of a sample of democratic countries, Ghana and Cabo Verde feature stable party systems in which two organisationally strong parties truly aspire to form a government, while dominant parties in Botswana and South Africa have never experienced loss of power, and Mauritius has seen a succession of various coalitions (Resnick, 2011; Sanches, 2018). In the group of authoritarian regimes – e.g. Angola, Gambia, Gabon, Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea – dominant parties and party systems are more prevalent. Incumbents often rely on multiparty elections, parliaments and coercion to prolong their authoritarian rule (Bogaards & Elischer, 2016). Finally, in the cluster of hybrid regimes3 – e.g. Zambia, Comoros, Madagascar and Kenya – party systems have remained unstable since the first multiparty elections (Sanches, 2018). These are just some instances, from a broader sample, of the diversity and dynamics of African party systems.

7 To explain this diversity, scholars have looked at a constellation of structural, institutional and economic factors. Ethnicity is assumed to be the quintessential social cleavage in Africa and to strongly influence party competition (Erdmann, 2007). Most relevant parties emerged out of crystallised territorial and ethnic cleavages (Manning, 2005) and rely on these identities to build support (Salih & Nordlund, 2007). Furthermore, it has been shown that a party system can institutionalise if parties are able to cut across ethnic divisions and construct winning coalitions (Ferree, 2010; Riedl, 2014; Sanches, 2018; Weghorst & Bernhard, 2014), while political institutions and the economy generally have a small and unsystematic effect. In any case, studies show that presidential and proportional systems, as well as economic growth, engender higher levels of party system stability or institutionalisation (Ferree, 2010; Kuenzi et al., 2017; Riedl, 2014; Sanches, 2018).

8 A final set of explanations relevant to this study highlights the role of authoritarian legacies – specifically “behavioural patterns, rules, relationships, social and political situations, and also norms, procedures and institutions, either introduced or strongly and patently strengthened by the immediately preceding authoritarian regime” (Morlino, 2010, p. 508). Thus, LeBas (2011) argues that, where the authoritarian state has allowed the existence of mobilising structures such as trade unions, they have served as focal points for the formation of strong opposition parties during the transition, and this has promoted institutionalisation over time (LeBas, 2011, p. 5). Riedl (2014), in turn, demonstrates how power accumulation strategies during the authoritarian era allowed incumbent parties to survive the transition and beyond: rulers who had incorporated the local elites enjoyed more support and were able to control the transition and build more institutionalised party systems. Loxton’s (2018) study on authoritarian successor parties worldwide showcases a panoply of forms of authoritarian legacies including “(1) a party brand, (2) territorial organization, (3) clientelistic networks, (4) source of party finance, and (5) source of party cohesion” (Loxton, 2018, p. 10). Grzymala-Busse, in turn, explores “usable pasts”, i.e. “the historical record of party accomplishments to which the elites can point, and the public

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perceptions of this record”, and “portable skills”, i.e. “the expertise and administrative experiences gained in the previous regime” (Grzymala-Busse, 2002, p. 5).

9 In Madagascar, the absence of a strong historical party, the frequent rotation in power, and the weakness of the state (Levitsky & Way, 2010a, p. 276) suggest that parties do not benefit much from “usable pasts” or “portable skills”. Furthermore, they cannot count on strong economic performance, an effective coercive apparatus or a stable patronage machine to avoid intra-party conflict and guarantee their survival (Mukonoweshuro, 1990, p. 385; Levitsky & Way, 2010a, p. 267). Thus, to better understand the fluidity of the Malagasy party system, we focus on authoritarian legacies of party formation and their sources of elite cohesion and the clientelistic networks. Leadership centralisation, ethnicity, personalism and clientelism will be discussed as the key (authoritarian) behavioural patterns structuring party formation and development.

10 However, since historical legacies fade over time, it is important to consider how party elites continuously reshape the rules of the game to gain leverage over their opponents. A “level playing field” is part of any definition of democracy, but “competitive authoritarian regimes” are characterised by an uneven playing field where “1) state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends; 2) the incumbent party is systematically favoured at the expense of the opposition; and 3) the opposition’s ability to organize and compete in elections is seriously handicapped” (Levitsky & Way, 2010b). The analysis here explores how incumbents create asymmetries in the playing field by limiting access to resources, the media and the law (Levitsky & Way, 2010b); however, and most importantly, it also shows the limits of these tactics.

11 Though the analysis centres on authoritarian legacies and elites’ tactics, it does not neglect the importance of other variables. For instance, it has been argued that, where state capacity is lower, “elections are more likely to spin out of control, forcing the regime to turn to more blatant forms of fraud or large-scale violence, which tends to cause regime destabilisation” (Croissant & Hellman, 2018, p. 4). The Malagasy party system functions in an environment of low organisational power, weak state infrastructures and coercive capacity, which have left governments more vulnerable to domestic and foreign pressures (Levitsky & Way, 2010a, p. 277). Overall political elites have been unable to reduce political uncertainty and structure the competition in a predictable way.

Madagascar’s Third Republic: electoral competition in the “new democratic era”

12 After independence from France in 1960, the First Malagasy Republic was led by the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and its leader, Philibert Tsiranana, who ruled for over a decade before he was forced to resign and hand over power to the military. After three years of military rule, in 1975 former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Didier Ratsiraka, was installed as president, marking the beginning of the Second Republic. Ratsiraka’s first period as president (1975-1993) was defined by its political commitment to a “Leninist scientific socialism”, demonstrated through drastic reforms of political and economic institutions (Marcus, 2004, p. 2). The “socialist turn” experienced on the island was also felt at the party system level because parties were, indeed, allowed to run as long as they supported the state’s socialist ideals by joining the FNDR4 (Thibaut, 1999). In this

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context, the AREMA, created by Ratsiraka himself, was, unsurprisingly, the strongest FNDR party, often winning elections by a landslide5. However, despite its strong outer appearance, AREMA was lacking “organizational and institutional capacity” and was “weakly rooted in society” (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, p. 501).

13 In addition, the state remained weak and poorly implanted in the countryside; Ratsiraka failed to establish control over society and the economy deteriorated under his incumbency (Levistky & Way, 2010, p. 277). By the end of the 1980s, socialist policies had been laid to rest with the helping hand of the Bretton Woods institutions, but crippling debt and economic underperformance still plagued the country, leading to a rise in political opposition that was able to challenge the ruler.

14 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the coming of the Third Wave of democratisation to Africa made it almost impossible for Ratsiraka to remain in power and, in 1991, almost half a million strikers marched in Antananarivo6 and completely paralysed the economy, forcing the president, later that year, to sign the Panorama Convention and allow a transitional government to take over. The following year, the constitution that provided for a semi-presidential system was approved via referendum, marking the beginning of the Third Republic. After the senate had been abolished under the Second Republic, leaving the National Assembly as the unicameral parliament, the new republic reinstated bicameralism and defined a mixed electoral system to elect members of parliament. As for the senate, two-thirds of senators are indirectly elected and one-third appointed by the president. The president is elected in a two-round system.

15 Three critical moments mark the political shifts in the island-state over the last three decades or so: first, the 1992/1993 presidential elections and the 1993 legislative elections marked the beginning of multiparty elections in Madagascar (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, pp. 501-502); second, the post-electoral crisis of 2001-2002 put an end to Ratsiraka’s rule and resulted in the rise of Marc Ravalomanana; finally, the 2009 coup d’état led to the resignation of the democratically elected president Marc Ravalomanana and consequent political crisis that signalled the end of the Third Republic and ultimately led to the consolidation of Andry Rajoelina.

16 Though Madagascar is a semi-presidential regime, presidential elections are the most relevant and mark the tone of electoral competition. Legislative elections have taken place after the presidential race since the outset of democratic transition, which means they have a confirmatory status and mainly serve to secure parliamentary support for the incumbent president. This “honeymoon” between presidential and parliamentary elections is confirmed by the fact that the party (or allies) that support the winning presidential candidate eventually win a majority in the national assembly elections. However, competition is far from predictable: there is frequent rotation in power at both the parliament and presidency levels, independent office seekers easily break through (Table 1 and Table 2), and the effective number of parliamentary parties fluctuates significantly (Figure 1).

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Table 1: Percentage of votes won by major presidential candidates in Madagascar elections (1992-2018)

Image 100653E400004D1600001AE3113F121CEE2331CC.emf

Source: IPU Parline (http://archive.ipu.org/), and IDEA Voter Turnout Database (https://www.idea.int/ data-tools/data/voter-turnout)

Table 2: Number and percentage of votes per party in parliamentary elections in Madagascar (1993-2019)

Image 1007140400003E34000028C7E3CF68C6994C9751.emf

Source: IPU Parline (http://archive.ipu.org/), and IDEA Voter Turnout Database (https://www.idea.int/ data-tools/data/voter-turnout)

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Figure 1: Effective number of parliamentary parties

Image 1000D67C000031680000216FDA8E01B2B17243F4.emf

Source: Authors’ elaboration

17 In the first three presidential races, Albert Zafy, Didier Ratsiraka and Marc Ravalomanana were successively elected and managed to secure parliamentary support. Thus, in the 1993 parliamentary elections the political grouping with the most votes was the Hery Velona, an alliance of President Zafy, the Rally for Social Democracy (RPSD) and the Movement for Proletarian Power (MFM). Zafy was eventually impeached for violation of the constitution but contested the 1996 election. His main challenger was the former authoritarian leader Ratsiraka, who eventually won the race in the second round (Thibaut, 1999, p. 533). The coalition Hery Velona was disbanded, paving the way for a clear victory for AREMA (Table 1).

18 In 2001, Marc Ravalomanana won the presidential elections amid great controversy. After it was reported that Ravalomanana was leading the polls with over 50% of the vote, the National Electoral Committee (CNE) opted to continue the count behind closed doors, raising some concerns. When the High Constitutional Court (HCC) announced the results, neither Ravalomanana nor Ratsiraka had secured a majority of the votes, meaning that, under the constitution, a second round was needed. Thousands of protesters took to the streets in support of Ravalomanana, demanding a recount, and he decided to act on the will of the people and declared himself president. In response, Ratsiraka declared a State of Emergency, put the nation under Martial Law and established his political stronghold, Toamasina, as the new “capital”. With the country divided in two, oil and food supplies to Antananarivo cut off and increasingly violent protests, the nation was on the brink of civil war when Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana agreed on a recount. Following these events, a newly constituted HCC announced that Ravalomanana had won with 51.46% of the vote (compared with Ratsiraka’s 35.90%) and the new president was inaugurated in May. Unwilling to accept the results, Ratsiraka fled to France, putting an end to the civil unrest (Marcus, 2004, pp. 6-11).

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19 The 2002 legislative elections that followed the national crisis proved the widespread support for Ravalomanana’s party, I Love Madagascar (TIM): TIM won 102 of the 156 seats in parliament whereas their close allies, Firaisankinam-Pirenena, won 20 seats. With independent candidates taking over 23 seats, no other party made much of an impact. Confirming Ratsiraka’s downfall, AREMA took only three seats, all of them elected from Toamasina. It should be noted that, prior to the election, AREMA was divided in two factions, with one of them (“Front du Refus”) boycotting the elections (European Parliament, 2003, p. 5). Despite some success in former elections, MFM had only two successful candidates and LEADER-Fanilo only one (European Parliament, 2003). The rapid rise of TIM and the equally sudden fall of some of the traditional parties (such as AREMA, LEADER-Fanilo and MFM) demonstrates the weak institutionalisation of political parties in Madagascar and points to the country’s political instability (Marcus, 2010).

20 The following cycle of elections witnessed a repetition of this trend: Ravalomanana won the 2006 presidential race and his party TIM increased its share of seats to 66.3% in the 2007 parliamentary elections. Between these two elections, there was a national referendum that sought, among other things, to increase presidential powers and redefine the island’s administrative divisions (Marcus, 2010, p. 126). As the 2007 referendum shows, Ravalomanana used his second presidential term to extend his power and neopatrimonial network. Authoritarianism increased under Ravalomanana but he faced strong contestation. Andry Rajoelina, the mayor of Antananarivo, and founder of the political party Determined Malagasy Youth (TGV), gained visibility after criticising a deal that the government intended to seal with Daewoo, which implied leasing about 1.3 million hectares of Malagasy land without clear benefits to the people (Marcus, 2010, p. 123).

21 In late 2008, when the president ordered the closing of Rajoelina’s television station VIVA after it broadcast an interview featuring former president Ratsiraka, the young mayor used this to incite thousands of Malagasy to take to the streets of the capital. The protests faced violent repression and dozens of citizens were reported dead or injured. The president’s unwillingness to reopen the TV station led Rajoelina to declare himself president of a transitional government, which had no constitutional support. The president reacted by firing him from the office of mayor of Antananarivo, which contributed to further deterioration of Ravalomanana’s support amongst the general population and, more importantly, the military elites of the country. After the mutiny of a small group of soldiers, the military decided to take action, forcing Ravalomanana to hand over power to the military in March 2009 – power was then handed Rajoelina, who became, officially, the president of the High Transitional Authority (HAT) (Cawthra, 2010, p. 14; The Carter Center, 2013, pp. 17-18).

22 While this was widely perceived as a coup d’état, Rajoelina headed the HAT government until 2013. He proposed a new constitution to enhance presidential powers but, as in the past, lack of transparency meant that voters were not fully aware of what this new constitution implied, causing several opposition parties to boycott the act. Therefore, the constitution that inaugurated the Fourth Republic was approved by 74.2% of the vote. Ahead of the 2013 elections, tensions continued to escalate between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina, until the mediation process opted for what they called a “ni ni” solution, a mutual agreement that excluded both of them from the future election and resulted in a “proxy election”: Ravalomanana chose Jean-Louis Robinson, a

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former World Health Organization official, to represent his interests and Rajoelina picked former finance minister, Hery Rajaonarimampianina (The Carter Center, 2013, pp. 17-18).

23 A record 33 candidates participated in the presidential race and the results were widely spread. Robinson (Ravalomanana’s candidate) led the first round of voting with only 21.2% of the vote and Rajaonarimampianina followed with 15.9%. Neither Robinson nor Rajaonarimampianina were supported by Ravalomanana’s TIM or Rajoelina’s TGV. Instead, the leading candidates were backed by the newly-formed New Forces for Madagascar (Rajaonarimampianina) and Avana (Robinson). Despite leading the first round, Robinson lost the election to Rajaonarimampianina in a tight second round vote.

24 The 2013 post-crisis general elections were, in some way, a return to normalcy. The political movements behind each candidate gathered most of the vote, with a clear victory to Miaraka Aminny Andry Rajoelina (MAPAR), winning 49 seats against TIM’s 20 seats. Rajaonarimampianina became the only president in Madagascar’s history to win a presidential election without the corresponding party winning (or even contending) the legislative election. Opposition from smaller parties seemed to have increased again as new parties and independent candidates continued to flourish. In office, Rajaonarimampianina proceeded to distance himself politically from his supporter Rajoelina (Bozzini, 2018). However, this did not translate into political stability for the nation. Three different prime-ministers were appointed in the course of four years and the president himself suffered an attempted impeachment in May 2015 (Freedom House, 2016).

25 Elections for the senate and local government were only held at the end of 2015, about two years into Rajaonarimampianina’s presidency, after which the government was, for the first time since the 2009 coup d’état, fully in place. The president’s party polled about 65% of the vote in local elections and he himself appointed, as the constitution allows, one-third of the senate. Rajoelina along with MAPAR became a strong political voice in opposition, regularly asking the president to step down and urging early elections. The “honeymoon” between presidential and parliamentary elections was eventually restored as Andry Rajoelina would be elected president in the 2018 presidential race while his MAPAR7 gained 84 of the 151 parliamentary seats in 2019. Ravalomanana’s TIM was down to 16 and 46 independent candidates entered parliament. Overall, elections in Madagascar show repeated instability, unpredictability, frequent political change and significant gains for new and president- led parties, and independent office seekers. The following sections explore the factors underlying these dynamics.

Authoritarian legacies

26 The most relevant parties that have emerged since independence were created by political elites, bringing together divergent interests. Given the absence of mobilising structures, such as strong trade unions, and of clear ideologies and programs, political parties had to grow from scratch, on the basis of calculations by the elites. Hence, political parties in Madagascar emerged from above, created by influential or charismatic leaders, and mainly relied on ethnicity, personalism and neopatrimonialism to build internal and external support. This can be seen in the independence period and throughout the authoritarian era but, in addition, current

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political parties in Madagascar are extremely dependent on the wealth and prestige of their leader, and few survive if their leader loses the presidency. Parties have shown little capacity to strengthen their grass-roots organisation and interparty competition is generally more defined by ethnic, personal and clientelistic ties than by ideologies.

27 In terms of ideologies, AREMA aimed to implement a program of “scientific socialism” but the party lacked the institutional capacity to meet its goals. Neopatrimonial in nature, the true strength of AREMA was almost solely based on the figure of Ratsiraka and his personal connections, as its support base derived directly from the president’s patronage networks, partially made up of former PSD supporters, including prominent military figures, businessmen, rich families and local elites from various provinces. As a consequence, many close friends or relatives of the president were seen occupying significant political positions during this period. Nicknamed “Deba” (which translates as “Big Man”), Ratsiraka was of Betsimisiraka ethnicity and had his political stronghold in the coastal Toamasina, away from the capital city. The “Red Admiral”8 was, for a period, able use his decentralising policies to juggle the island’s ethnic divides, stripping the Antananarivo-based Merina ethnic group of its traditional control of both the administration and the economy but appointing close Merina acquaintances to important governmental roles. The apparent decentralisation was, however, a strategy that made it easier for the executive to make top-down decisions. Even when Ratsiraka’s popularity began to fall, considerable influxes of foreign aid from international partners (in response to the country’s bankruptcy) were largely perceived as a gesture of support for the island’s authoritarian leader. However, strong perceptions of corruption and the increasing marginalisation of the Merina people were seen as contributing significantly to the decay of national unity and support for the regime (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, p. 501; The World Bank, 2010, p. 12).

28 Despite losing the founding presidential/parliamentary elections, Ratsiraka and AREMA returned to power in 1996/1998. Ratsiraka, however, following the same old way of doing politics, proceeded to re-establish himself in the coastal provinces as part of a long-term strategy. Moreover, reverting to his neopatrimonial roots, he once again put his close friends and relatives in significant political positions and helped them achieve control over the economy by providing commercial and industrial opportunities (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, p. 503).

29 Besides AREMA, two other noteworthy parties emerged on the Madagascar scene: Albert Zafy’s Hery Velona and Marc Ravalomanana’s TIM somehow built their strengths on their leaders’ neopatrimonial networks (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005). Being essentially an “electoralist catch-all party”, the Hery Velona suffered from serious “internal heterogeneity” and lacked a coherent ideology, which impeded stable government (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, pp. 502-503). When his turn came, Zafy followed the pattern of most (if not all) Malagasy presidents, taking clear advantage of the country’s weak democratic institutions to consolidate his power9. He turned Hery Velona into his own neopatrimonial network, much as Ratsiraka had with AREMA, but his efforts to impede attempts to amend the constitution in order to limit presidential powers were generally not well received, and he was impeached in 1996 on charges of corruption (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, pp. 502-504; Thibaut, 1999, p. 533).

30 In Malagasy political parties, personalism and neopatrimonialism cannot be read separate from ethnicity. The Merina-Côtier10 ethnic divide has shaped politics in the country since colonial times and political leaders continue to exploit it. It has served as

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the political pretext for the creation of the PSD, and later for AREMA. The two parties had also in common the fact that they were a “loose coalition of divergent interests” (Allen & Covell, 2005). AREMA was the creation of Didier Ratsiraka, a côtier from the Betsimisaraka ethnic group. Côtier resentment of Merina was just one of the strategies used by Ratsiraka to gain political support, as in “Antananarivo-centred dissent and in his unsuccessful calls for ‘federal’ secession in 1992 and 2002” (Allen & Covell, 2005, p. 68).

31 Scholars like Cole (1998) also point to the ethnic dimension behind the rise of Hery Velona. Capitalising on the failure of Ratsiraka’s policies to benefit the urban population, Hery Velona’s support was mostly based in the Antananarivo area and, according to Cole, they “spoke with enthusiasm about the upcoming changes”, referring to the 1992/1993 elections. On other parts of the island, AREMA would actually promote ethnic tensions, claiming that the Merina, whose interests were represented by Hery Velona, would enslave the coastal people11, “were they given the opportunity by this election” (Cole, 1998, p. 617). Later, during the 2001/2002 political crisis, Ratsiraka played the ethnic card again, going as far as inciting “his supporters to pretend to be Merina and threaten côtier groups”, in an attempt give the appearance of an ethnic conflict (Marcus, 2004, pp. 9-10).

32 Considering the Malagasy party system and the country’s historical ethnic divide, one cannot help but acknowledge the immense success of Marc Ravalomanana as a candidate, and of his party. Before Ravalomanana entered the political scene, it was very unlikely that a Merina candidate would win a presidential election, mostly because it was very unrealistic to expect him to win outside the Antananarivo province. In reality, the Merina leader went on to defeat Ratsiraka in several coastal provinces, including some that had historically voted against Merina candidates and, even though he lost there, he did manage to achieve a good result in his rival’s hometown. Even though Ratsiraka had “spent his entire second presidency manipulating institutions and deepening his personal networks”, Ravalomanana prevailed in the election for three main reasons: first, the unpopularity of his opponent and the population’s growing demand for a change; second, his role as a businessman, with a liberal approach to the economy and the power to make a real change; and finally, his nationalist campaign, which, during a time of crisis, urged the various ethnic groups to stand together for the country’s greater good. We cannot, however, underestimate the importance of Ravalomanana’s dairy company Tiko, one of the country’s biggest and most internationalised companies, which was a fundamental tool in the establishment of Ravalomanana and TIM, being not only a considerable source of party funding but also the place where Ravalomanana recruited his personal elite. After his election, the senate saw Ratsiraka’s supporters replaced by individuals who served both the party and the company. Tiko was thus a means of strengthening the new party before the elections and the neopatrimonial base that would hold it together (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, pp. 504-508). As we shall see in the next section, Tiko was also important in the way Ravalomanana skewed the playing field.

An uneven playing field

33 Since the beginning of the Third Republic, all the presidents have changed the constitution to increase their power, but they resort to other strategies to gain leverage

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over their opponents, and this is particularly evident during elections. The political playing field may be uneven in a variety of ways, but three are of particular importance: unequal access to resources, the media, and the law (Levitsky & Way, 2010b). When the incumbent is able either to easily “appropriate state resources” and “make widespread partisan use of public [means]” or to fund personal businesses or party-owned enterprises through “public credit, concessions, licensing, privatization or other policy instruments”, it means the opposition cannot compete on a level playing field (Levitsky & Way, 2010b, p. 58).

34 In Madagascar politics is often contested by very wealthy individuals, which negates asymmetries in access to state resources. As in most African countries, access to state resources is important, and generally benefits the incumbent party, but there are alternative pathways to power for those in opposition. Parties created by wealthy leaders can rely on the leader’s resource base, and neopatrimonial networks to build support and this has been one of the keys to incumbents keeping the playing field uneven, but it has also made it possible for some new contenders successfully to challenge incumbents.

35 Before entering politics as mayor of Antananarivo in 1999, Ravalomanana was already a household name amongst the business elite, a “self-made millionaire” who owned a big company and had just founded his own party (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, p. 506). Despite being new to presidential elections, Ravalomanana had, in Tiko, a robust campaign machine at his disposal: on the one hand, it was the source of his revenue, allowing him to spend huge amounts of money on his campaign; on the other, Tiko’s merchandise could be found throughout the country, even in the most remote villages, making Ravalomanana’s brand and name well-known throughout the territory. Traditionally, such breadth of coverage has been problematic for many candidates. The island’s size and the lack of an efficient transport system has made it very difficult for every contender to campaign in every province, and it made this millionaire’s personal helicopter a useful asset (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005; Moser, 2004, p. 8). In an attempt to skew the playing field, Ratsiraka increased the candidacy fees, making it very difficult for smaller/independent candidates to participate (Marcus, 2004, pp. 5-6), but this strategy could not fend off candidates as wealthy as Ravalomanana, who successfully challenged Ratsiraka’s presidency.

36 With regard to disparities in resources, the situation only worsened when the new president took office, as Ravalomanana’s immense private wealth had merged with state resources. The Tiko Group’s subsidiaries constantly received favourable treatment in awarding government contracts, working closely with foreign companies and purchasing privatised state companies, and it expanded exponentially12 during Ravalomanana’s first presidency. And the overlap between the Tiko elite and the TIM elite, the line between private and public became increasingly blurred. Tiko’s dominance also had consequences for the already waning opposition, which could be more easily punished and weakened by being excluded by the government from economic opportunities (Marcus, 2010, p. 122).

37 With the merging of public and private and TIM and Tiko, Ravalomanana managed to increase the imbalance on the playing field far more than it had been under Ratsiraka and almost to extinguish opposition. Candidates were expected not only to pay high fees to participate in elections, but also to print their own ballots, adding to the cost of the electoral process. This excluded several contenders who could not afford to run,

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with some not having the resources to print enough ballots for every constituency, and it benefitted those with more financial resources (EISA, 2007). As a result, Ravalomanana became the first (and so far only) candidate, since the end of the Second Republic, to win a presidential election without going to a second round, having secured over 50% of the vote in the first round.

38 Despite a very uneven playing field during Ravalomanana’s tenure as president, it was still not enough to extend his rule over the island, as another strong contender had emerged: Andry Rajoelina, the young founder of the TGV party and owner of the VIVA radio and television station, among other enterprises. The similarities between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana were undeniable: both were self-made Merina millionaires who had become mayors of the capital amid the presidency of an increasingly authoritarian leader and both owned media enterprises that were crucial for voicing criticism and to mobilising the population.

39 In the elections that followed (2013 and 2019), the issues concerning the lack of party/ campaign finance regulation and of transparency regarding each candidate’s spending13 continued, unsurprisingly, to be pointed out as one of the biggest flaws in the Malagasy electoral process (The Carter Center, 2013, pp. 28-36).

40 On a different level, if equal access to resources is necessary for fair elections, the same goes for equal access to the media. Levitsky and Way’s (2010b) understanding of what makes access to the media unequal is perfectly illustrated in Madagascar: the playing field is skewed if “the state either monopolizes broadcast media or operates the only television and radio stations with a national audience” (Levitsky & Way, 2010b, p. 59). During Madagascar’s multiparty history, unequal access to media has seen no dramatic changes. The president and the ruling party usually dominate public media (television and radio), which is the only media that covers the whole territory. Private and print media have traditionally been free from government-imposed restrictions but generally lack the capacity to reach broader audiences (EISA, 2008). During the 2001 presidential elections, the government imposed restrictions on the media, ensuring that only the news agencies chosen by Ratsiraka himself could cover the election (Marcus, 2004, pp. 6-8). As seen in Ravalomanana’s and Rajoelina’s paths to political power, access to media is crucial for mustering political support and these two candidates benefited from having their own television/radio stations, when, as members of the opposition, their access to the media was limited.

41 Finally, even if access to state resources and to the media are equal between incumbent and opposition, a playing field cannot be levelled if there is not equal access to the law. In this scenario, incumbents “control the judiciary, the electoral authorities, and other nominally independent arbiters”, removing their autonomy and impartiality, making them unreliable and using them to harass the opposition. The incumbent enjoys legal impunity, while the opposition cannot denounce injustice effectively (Levitsky & Way, 2010b, p. 60). Throughout Madagascar’s Third Republic there have been several instances when the institutions lacked the required autonomy to make decisions fully independent from the executive or when the law was deployed to hinder the opposition.

42 For example, while the High Constitutional Court (HCC) remained independent of the executive during Zafy’s administration, even allowing for his impeachment, Ratsiraka’s return to power brought a decrease in the autonomy of the political institutions. During his presidency, the HCC was used to crush his opposition in the 1999 local

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elections, by altering the results “through a series of controversial court decisions” that allowed AREMA and its allies to win (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, pp. 502– 504). On another occasion, at the 2001 presidential elections, when the Committee to Elect Marc Ravalomanana (KMMR) reported that he was leading the polls with 54.95% of the vote, Ratsiraka pressured the CNE to continue the voting process behind closed doors. The result did not give Ravalomanana immediate victory14, although both the KMMR initial count and the Consortium of Election Observers (CNOE), a civil society group, gave Ravalomanana over 50% of the vote. The discrepancy in figures produced by the different bodies was suspicious and raised questions about the CNE’s autonomy, and the absence of international observers only diminished the credibility of the results. With the other bodies unable to access the remaining third of the votes, the results were highly controversial. It was up to the HCC to publish the official results, but the composition of the HCC had been changed by order of the incumbent a few months before, making the HCC obviously more likely to support Ratsiraka. In the same elections, Ravalomanana tried unsuccessfully to petition the HCC to disqualify Ratsiraka on the grounds that he had violated the electoral law, namely by using state resources for his personal campaign (Marcus, 2004, pp. 6-8).

43 Ravalomanana, too, has used the HCC to fend off potential challengers. In the 2006 presidential election, the HCC disqualified four candidates on different grounds, three of whom were widely regarded as Ravalomanana’s strongest opponents: exiled opposition leader and former deputy prime-minister under Ratsiraka, Pierrot Rajaonarivelo15, who was not allowed to return to Madagascar to formalise his candidacy; General Randrianafidiosa, another strong rival, who refused to pay Ariary 25,000,000 to run; and Didier Ratsiraka himself, because his residence in France made him unable to submit his candidacy in person (as the law requires) (EISA, 2007).

44 An example of Ravalomanana’s abuse of the law was the matter of the allocation of seats right before the 2007 parliamentary election. According to the EISA mission, it was “undertaken without any clear or defined criteria”, not taking into consideration the size of the constituencies, and thus eroding the principle of “one person, one vote”. For instance, while the constituency of Antananarivo II had two seats allocated for a population of about 130,000, the constituency of Mananjary had one seat for a population of over 700,000. This was largely perceived as a strategy by the president to strengthen his political heartland and weaken the regions where the opposition was traditionally stronger. Facing an increasingly uneven playing field, some opposition parties decided to join forces in specific constituencies where they had no advantage in running alone, but TIM still ended up winning 105 of the 127 possible seats (EISA, 2008).

45 These are just illustrations of how the playing field is constantly reshaped and adjusted in the interests of the party/president of the day. The tactics described above are so prevalent that those in opposition behave in the same way when they get into power. In fact, parties in Madagascar behave not as agents of democracy but as agents of neopatrimonialism (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005), and resort to other mechanisms – access to law and media (public and private) – to skew competition in their favour. Paradoxically, however, this analysis also demonstrates the limits of these tactics in Madagascar’s politics. The extreme volatility and turnover in elections, and the sudden rise and fall of political parties and leaders, suggest that these strategies are not as effective as expected and fail to reduce electoral uncertainty. At best parties and presidents only achieve short-term gains.

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Conclusion

46 This article’s main goal was to understand why the Madagascar party system has remained fluid, showing no signs of consolidation since the beginning of the Third Republic. The explanatory model developed here has explored party building strategies during the authoritarian era, and also the extent to which incumbents have successfully skewed the playing field to their advantage.

47 Regarding authoritarian legacies, we noted that parties emerged from above on the basis of elites’ calculations to enter the political contest. Parties generally lacked strong organisation and social anchors, and represented loose interests and vague ideologies. In this context, neopatrimonial leadership in combination with ethnic identity and personalism, have been essential assets for party development since independence and beyond the Third Republic. Indeed, party organisations that emerged in Madagascar during the last two decades have traits that can be traced back to the First and Second Republics: centralised leadership, thin organisation, lack of core ideologies and prevalence of ethnic, personal and clientelistic appeals. Precisely because they relied more on material sources of support – that is on their ability to reward their supporters – rather than on more symbolic and ideological foundations, these parties have proven more vulnerable and less durable.

48 Regarding the playing field, observing key electoral moments allowed us to reveal the ways in which the rules of the game are in constant flux. Incumbent parties take advantage of state resources to further expand their neopatrimonial networks but also rely on the wealth, prestige and visibility of their leaders; but so do opposition parties that successfully challenge incumbency. Overall, there are no substantive differences in party behaviour: those in opposition eventually mimic the same actions when they get into power.

49 The analysis also highlighted important paradoxes that deserve further discussion. On the one hand, the attempts of presidents/parties to change the rules of the game have failed to guarantee their survival over time. While elsewhere in Africa, skewing the playing field is a strategy that incumbent autocrats have used to maintain their position, in Madagascar, parties and candidates do not stay long in power; on the contrary, there is a high electoral turnover. On the other hand, by showing the limits of these tactics, this study also points to an endemic instability built on the origins of political parties, and the weakness of the state.

50 But taking this discussion further, there seems to be a pattern in the rise and fall of parties and candidates in Madagascar that might help explain why strategies of creating uneven playing fields has not contributed to the consolidation of a stable authoritarian leadership but rather has resulted in a high frequency of changes of power. Despite successful attempts by Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana to skew the playing field, their opponents (Ravalomanana and Rajoelina, respectively) had access to resources that allowed them to overcome imbalances: immense personal wealth that compensated for the lack of access to state resources, business enterprises in television and radio to counter the uneven access to the media, and popular support that enabled them to contest unequal access to the law. While the playing field was indeed rigged enough to neutralise the remaining forces of the opposition, this combination of factors allowed both Ravalomanana and Rajoelina to compete on the same level as the

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incumbents. The only exception seems to have been in the transfer of power from Zafy to Ratsiraka, in 1996. However, given that Zafy was peacefully removed from office through an impeachment process, we can make a case for there having been a not-so uneven playing field. The electoral contest between Rajaonarimampianina and Robinson does not count as an exception, since Ravalomanana and Rajoelina were not allowed to contend; had they been allowed, the other two candidates would not have stood a chance, given the conditions of the playing field.

51 Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of the functioning competitive authoritarianism in contexts of weak parties, weak state structures and ineffective coercive structures, which also seem to characterise other countries on the continent, such as Malawi, Kenya, Zambia and Comoros. Further research should continue to explore how the various forms of authoritarian legacy impact the contemporary dynamics of party system development, and how incumbent and opposition parties interact in a competitive authoritarian regime. In particular, it is important to examine the strategies used by both sides and why and when tactics to skew the playing field succeed or fail.

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NOTES

1. The authors would like to thank the reviewers for their careful reading and insightful comments. This work has been supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology through the project CEECIND/02527/2017 and the PhD scholarship SFRH/BD/145649/2019. 2. Institutionalisation and its dimensions have been measured variously in studies spanning all regions in the world, but stability has come to be considered its most relevant aspect (Casal Bértoa, 2018; Mainwaring, 2018). Institutionalisation and stability are often used interchangeably, and are conceptually connected. Stability expresses the extent to which a stable set of parties interact in relatively stable ways over time (Mainwaring, 2018), while institutionalisation is a more complex phenomenon, referring to “the process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted” (Mainwaring, 1999, p. 25). In Africa, scholars have ranged from using multiple indicators and dimensions of institutionalisation (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001; Lindberg, 2007; Sanches, 2018), to focusing exclusively on stability (Lindberg, 2007; Ferree, 2010). 3. Those regimes that combine democratic and authoritarian elements (Diamond, 2002).

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4. A total of five parties joined the FNDR and competed in general elections during the Second Republic. 5. In 1983, it won 117 of the 137 seats in the National People’s Assembly, and 120 in 1989, despite fading support and adverse economic conditions. 6. Political support for Ratsiraka was always weaker in urban areas, especially in the Merina’s traditional stronghold (Antananarivo). Because of the disastrous economic reforms and the decentralisation process that focused mainly on the rural areas, urban living standards worsened sharply – hence the easier mobilisation of the urban population on the 1991 strike (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, p. 502). 7. Interestingly, Rajoelina won the presidential election with the support of TGV (his first party), but MAPAR (Rajoelina’s party during Rajaonarimampianina’s presidency) replaced it in the parliamentary elections. Once again, this may indicate the poor institutionalisation of political parties in Madagascar. 8. “Red admiral” is a term used to refer to the highest ranked admiral in the navy, a position once occupied by Ratsiraka. It was also a reference to his commitment to the socialist cause, also associated with the colour red. 9. Zafy used the referendum to gain the right to appoint the Prime Minister, and to weaken provincial power to the benefit of the central government (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005; Thibaut, 1999). 10. The term côtier designates other ethnicities than the Merina, which is the dominant and historically advantaged ethnic group (Allen & Covell, 2005). 11. A direct reference to the 19th century Merina enslavement of the côtiers. This was the experience of the Betsimisaraka, the ethnic group covered by Cole’s anthropological research, which Ratsiraka claimed to be his own (Cole, 1998, p. 617). 12. Tiko Group was comprised of more than a dozen corporations, working across diverse sectors of the economy. Besides their original dairy products, Tiko operated in “bottled water, fruit juice, vegetable oils, raw materials extraction, animal husbandry, agriculture, television, radio, newspapers, printing, manufacturing, civil engineering, food distribution, and private aircraft storage” (Marcus, 2010, p. 122). 13. According to Global Voices, in 2018: “During the 2013 presidential elections, then- elected President Hery Rajaonarimampianina spent 43 million dollars – the equivalent of 21.3 dollars per voters – double the amount spent by US President Donald Trump in 2016.” Available at: https://globalvoices.org/2018/12/13/in-madagasgar-costly- presidential-campaigns-dont-add-up-to-a-better-life-for-citizens/ (accessed 30 September 2019). 14. The incumbent president received 40.61% of the vote, while his new challenger obtained 46.44%. With neither having an absolute majority of votes, the constitution required a second round. 15. Previously, Rajaonarivelo was sentenced in absentia for misappropriation of state funds, a charge he claimed was politically motivated. Ravalomanana would close the country’s international airports every time Rajaonarivelo tried to fly to the island.

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ABSTRACTS

Party systems are expected to grow and mature with time; however, the case of Madagascar is one of high fluidity: parties and leaders rise and fall from one election to the next and there is a low entry cost for new contenders. This study explores the role of authoritarian legacies and elites’ efforts to skew the playing field as key factors for understanding why the Malagasy party system has failed to institutionalise since the start of the Third Republic. The findings show how leadership centralisation, ethnicity, personalism and clientelism shaped party formation during the authoritarian era and beyond; and also how incumbents’ attempts to create asymmetries in access to resources, media and law have been ineffective and successfully countervailed by the opposition.

Espera-se que os sistemas partidários cresçam e amadureçam com o tempo; no entanto, o caso de Madagáscar é de alta fluidez: há elevada volatilidade entre partidos e líderes em sucessivas eleições, e os novos competidores facilmente são eleitos. Este estudo explora o papel dos legados autoritários e as estratégias de distorção das condições de competição eleitoral enquanto fatores- chave para entender por que razões o sistema partidário malgaxe não se institucionalizou desde o início da Terceira República. Os resultados demonstram que a centralização da liderança partidária, a etnicidade, o personalismo e o clientelismo moldaram a formação dos partidos durante – e para além – do período autoritário; e que as tentativas dos incumbentes de criar assimetrias no acesso a recursos, meios de comunicação e legislação têm sido ineficazes e compensadas com sucesso pela oposição.

INDEX

Palavras-chave: Madagáscar, eleições, partidos, sistemas partidários, legados autoritários, igualdade nas condições de competição Keywords: Madagascar, elections, parties, party systems, authoritarian legacies, level playing field

AUTHORS

JOÃO PEDRO GARRIDO CONDUTO Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt, 9 1600-189 Lisbon, Portugal [email protected]

EDALINA RODRIGUES SANCHES Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt, 9 1600-189 Lisbon, Portugal [email protected]

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Elections in Cape Verde, 1991-2016: Testing the second-order election model in a consolidated semi- presidential African democracy1 Eleições em Cabo Verde, 1991-2016: Teste ao modelo de eleições de segunda ordem numa democracia semipresidencialista consolidada em África

José Santana Pereira, Susana Rogeiro Nina and Danielton Delgado

EDITOR'S NOTE

Recebido: 20 de junho de 2019 Aceite: 16 de outubro de 2019

1 Not all elections have the same importance: not for parties and not for voters. The second-order election model by Reif and Schmitt (1980) and its subsequent empirical tests remind us of this. In parliamentary systems, the first-order elections are the national legislative elections, and, in presidential systems, the presidential races. The stakes in these elections are high, and voters understand their importance, since they determine the distribution of power at the most important level of political decision- making. Second-order elections, in turn, have little effect on who controls executive power. Examples of second-order elections are local elections, European parliament elections and presidential elections in weak semi-presidential regimes.

2 The second-order election model has been extensively used in Europe but travelled little outside the European continent’s borders. Here we seek to fill this gap by conducting an analysis of the aggregate turnout and electoral behaviour patterns of Cape Verdean voters. It is now almost 30 years since the Cape Verde regime became a multi-party democracy, a process that was formalised by the 1991 legislative elections. These elections led to an immediate change in the incumbent and peaceful alternation

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in political power since then (Évora, 2001, 2009) – an important characteristic of consolidated democratic systems, which, along with other factors, causes Cape Verde to be portrayed often as a haven of democracy, an exception in the African panorama (Baker, 2006; Meyns, 2002). By applying a traditional model of aggregate electoral patterns to a recent democracy in Africa, we aim at contributing to the flourishing field of African electoral politics research by testing the explanatory power of a tool designed for consolidated democracies in their younger counterparts.

3 The Cape Verdean context seems ideal for testing the assumptions made by the second- order elections model outside the European context in which it was initially developed. First, Cape Verde is a recent democracy, and this often means that second-orderness assumptions are less clearly confirmed due to the fluidity of party systems and attachments (e.g. Schmitt, 2005). Second, Cape Verde is an archipelago, which may mean that local elections could matter more than in continental democracies, merely due to the geographical distance from the central national government experienced by several islands; also, research has shown than in African polities local elections are often very participated, which would deny the idea that citizens look at them as less important (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019). Therefore, to what extent are local elections in Cape Verde indeed second-order? Third, the fact Cape Verde’s political system is semi- presidential (and hence the president has more powers than the head of state in parliamentary regimes) leads us to question whether voters actually consider presidential elections to be second-order, especially in a region of the world in which both presidentialism and the president’s formal and informal powers are mainstream and paramount (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019; van de Walle, 2003).

4 We set out four hypotheses derives from Reif and Schmitt’s (1980) second-order elections model. Thus we expect different electoral behaviour across parliamentary and presidential and local elections in Cape Verde. To test our expectations, we examined aggregate data regarding every presidential, legislative and local election that took place in the country since 1991. Some of the data used in this analysis was found on the official webpage of Cape Verde’s National Election Commission (CNE - Comissão Nacional de Eleições), while the older data was obtained at the CNE headquarters. This data is analysed as a whole and within specific electoral cycles determined by the legislative election, which provides the most appropriate context to test second-order election model-related hypotheses (e.g. Freire, 2005).

5 This article is divided into six sections. The first is dedicated to the theoretical framework, namely the second-order election model assumptions and its test in new democracies. We then turn to a discussion of the presidential elections as second-order elections within semi-presidential regimes, with a special focus on the Cape Verdean context, and to what extent can local elections be defined as second-order elections within the African context. In the fourth section, we present our goals, the methodology adopted, and the hypotheses to be tested. We then test our hypotheses using the official aggregate data. The article concludes with a discussion of the main patterns identified through the empirical analysis.

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The second-order election model in old and new democracies

6 In their seminal article on the European Parliament election, Reif and Schmitt (1980) called for the qualitative differentiation of election types and for a distinction between first- and second-order elections. At the heart of these two election types is the idea that voting behaviour and election results are determined by the perception voters have of what is at stake in the election.

7 According to Reif and Schmitt (1980), legislative (in parliamentary and semi- presidential systems) and presidential elections (in presidential regimes) are first-order contests, since their result determines how national executive power will be allocated, with important consequences in terms of decision-making process (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). First-order elections are marked mainly by an increase in conflict and salience (Schmitt, 2005), providing voters with an arena to make a critical decision about who should govern the country and what public policies should be adopted (Norris, 1997). Second-order elections, however, have no direct influence on who controls national executive power, and consequently are perceived as minor elections by both voters and political actors (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). Instead of factors directly having to do with the arena or function that the elected will cover, in a second-order election voting behaviour is determined by the voter’s assessment of the political parties based on their domestic policy, government popularity and economic performance (de Vries et al., 2011). This will have a two-fold impact: on the one hand, in terms of voter turnout and, on the other, voting choices (Hobolt & Wittrock, 2011; Norris, 1997; Reif & Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996).

8 Voter turnout tends to be lower in second-order elections simply because individuals are less likely to go to the polls if they believe what is at stake is of lesser importance (e.g. Freire & Magalhães, 2002). However, when they do vote, they tend to base the vote on their concerns about the national government, often treating these elections as an opportunity to express dissatisfaction with the party of government (de Vries et al., 2011). In fact, second-order elections tend to offer minor parties more chances of success, often denied them in the first-order elections, which tend to be dominated by mainstream parties (Hix & Marsh, 2007; Hobolt & Wittrok, 2011; Reif & Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996). In this sense, political actors involved in first-order elections can be punished directly through second-order elections (Marsh, 1998), especially when second-order elections are held in a moment of the electoral cycle in which the incumbent’s popularity is low (Fortes & Magalhães, 2005; Reif & Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk, Franklin & Marsh, 1996).

9 Reif and Schmitt (1980) argue this behaviour has two causes: 1) the absence of strategic voting – second-order elections are a means by which voters can express their party preferences (Ferrara & Weishaupt, 2004); and 2) protest voting – voters use such elections to express their dissatisfaction with the performance of the government and as a way to punish the incumbent party (van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996).

10 While its original formulation was aimed first and foremost at explaining differences in voting behaviour between national and European Parliament elections, the second- order election model was later extended to other types of competitions: local elections (Anderson & Ward, 1996; Freire, 2005; Norris, 1997; Schmitt, 2005; Sotillos, 1997), mid-

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term elections in the United States (Kernell, 1977; Stimson, 1976; van der Eijk, Franklin & Marsh, 1996), parliamentary by-elections in the United Kingdom (Norris, 1997) and presidential elections in semi-presidential regimes (Fortes & Magalhães, 2005).

11 In 1997, Reif, Schmitt and Norris conducted a theoretical review of second-order elections and highlighted some shortcomings in the original 1980 article, such as the fact it was restricted to consolidated European democracies. Looking at the changes that have taken place over the past 40 years, it is about time to ask if the second-order election model remains accurate and valid when applied to new situations – such as in countries that have only recently become democracies. From 2004 on, research in this field of electoral politics has encompassed the Central and Eastern European (CEE) new democracies, which has brought some of the flaws of the second-order election model to light. Some studies suggest Reif and Schmitt’s original theory is less useful in terms of explaining and forecasting differences between elections in new democracies due to the feeble patterns of party identification and more fluid party competition trends that characterize these contexts. For instance, Koepke and Ringe’s 2006 analysis of four CEE democracies concluded that voters do not use second-order elections to engage in protest voting against their national governments, and that electoral losses of larger parties decreased as the first-order electoral cycle proceeded. Hix and Marsh (2007) observed a cleavage between the new and old democracies in respect of the electoral success of small and mainstream parties in the 2004 European elections. Despite incumbent parties largely losing electoral support in both old and new European democracies when compared to smaller parties, in the post-communist states there were unique features related to party competition, with high levels of volatility, creating a more complex panorama. Schmitt (2005) reached a similar conclusion in his comparison of the 2004 PE election results with the previous first-order election in each EU country: in the new Eastern democracies, voting losses do not follow the cyclical arrangement of second-order elections, in the sense that the small parties do not perform consistently better in EP elections compared to mainstream parties. According to Schmitt (2005) and Mainwaring and Torcal (2005), this is explained by the fact that post-communist democracies did not enjoy a stable, consolidated party system and thus experienced high levels of electoral volatility. Indeed, the party organisational and programmatic instability makes it more challenging for voters to identify the actors involved in party competition, assign accountability and assess the government’s performance. To a certain extent, these are also traits of African new democracies (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019), but perhaps to a lower extent in Cape Verde, where party system institutionalization levels are comparatively high (Sanches, 2018).

12 To our knowledge, the second-order election model was never implemented in an African consolidated new democracy such as Cape Verde. Considering that, in terms of postdemocratization electoral dynamics, Africa can be compared to the experience of former Soviet Union and Eastern European democracies (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019), an educated guess would state that the likelihood of fit between the second order model theoretical assumptions and the empirical patterns would be low. In the following two sections we lay out the grounds of the assumptions regarding to what extent may presidential and local elections in Cape Verde, despite its celebrated exceptionality vis-à-vis the African general panorama, be less viewed as second order.

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Presidential elections in Cape Verde – first- or second- order?

13 As mentioned above, presidential elections in semi-presidential systems may be characterised as second-order elections (e.g. Fortes & Magalhães, 2005), albeit the use of this framework in this type of elections is less common in the literature. Resorting to the definition of semi-presidentialism, in which presidential power is limited, and the president does not govern (Elgie, 1999), Marsh and Franklin (1996) argue such elections are strong candidates to be described as second-order. Yet, a comparative study of semi-presidential systems by Fortes and Magalhães (2005) shows that the applicability of the second-order model to presidential elections in semi-presidential regimes is not straightforward and depends mainly on the powers the president has. The argument is that the more power they have, the more important the election will be to voters, making them more likely to be first-order elections; however, if the president’s power is limited, then voters will treat the election as less important and, therefore, as second-order (Fortes & Magalhães, 2005; van der Brug, van der Eijk & Marsh, 2001).

14 With this in mind, what can we say about Cape Verde? In fact, there is no consensus among researchers in respect of the nature of the system of government established by Cape Verde’s 1992 Constitution (Canas & Fonseca, 2007; Madeira, 2015): while some describe it as a form of rationalised or mitigated parliamentarism, others prefer to call it semi-presidential (Costa, 2009). In any case, the system in place distinguishes Cape Verde from several other African political systems, in which presidentialism is the most popular choice in terms of system of government (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019) – and in which presidential elections are clearly first-order.

15 The powers granted the President of Cape Verde by the 1992 Constitution do not allow the holder of that office to make big decisions independently; rather, the most important decisions can only be achieved with the consent of the political forces represented in the National Assembly and, in some cases, take into account the result of national election (Canas & Fonseca, 2007; Costa, 2009). It would therefore seem the powers granted the president of Cape Verde and the rather limited way in which they can be exercised would make Cape Verde’s presidential elections strong candidates to be perceived as second-order. However, it is worth noting that in a comparison of the power of popularly elected presidents in semi-presidential systems, the powers held by the president of Cape Verde are deemed greater that those exercised, for instance, by the Portuguese president since 1982, although they are not as extensive as the powers available to the presidents of France or São Tomé and Príncipe (during the 1980s) (Fortes & Magalhães, 2005).

16 An initial test of the second-order model in Cape Verde proved that voter turnout in presidential elections was consistent with second-order theory predictions (Fortes & Magalhães, 2005). This means the second order tag provided an accurate characterisation of presidential elections in this country, at least in terms of turnout. However, these conclusions are drawn from the analysis of a very small set of Cape Verde elections, and do not focus on the other assumptions of the model. It is now 15 years since the article by Fortes and Magalhães was published, and a considerable number of elections happened in Cape Verde since then, so it is important to ask if the elections that have taken place in this increasingly consolidated democracy since then also show signs of these patterns.

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Local elections in Cape Verde: second-order?

17 The expectation that local election is, in terms of electoral behaviour, second-order has been empirically tested in a number of countries. For instance, studies on the United Kingdom, Netherlands and Belgium indicated those elections are “one-and-three- quarter order” (Heath et al., 1999), as they take a middle position in the first- and second-order elections dichotomy. This is so because voter turnout is generally lower than national elections but higher than in EP elections (Heath et al., 1999; Lefevere & van Aelst, 2014; Marien et al., 2015; Rallings & Thrasher, 2005). Moreover, empirical studies have shown that personal ties with local candidates are more important than national preferences (Fuentes & Villodres, 2010) and the election of the local government is less a matter of ideology and more about personality, experience and personal network (Marien et al., 2015). However, as voters do not judge the track record of that specific level of government, and the amount of information about local politics is scarce (Berry & Howell, 2007; Lefevere & van Aelst, 2014), the mechanism of electoral accountability is not always guaranteed at regional and local level.

18 What about local elections in Cape Verde? The broader literature about these elections in Africa would lead us to question their second-orderness in the eyes of the electorate. In terms of turnout, Bleck and van de Walle (2019) find that: African citizens seem to turn out for local races in relatively high numbers, at least compared to other regions of the world […] these patterns diverge from those in elections in the United States and Europe, where turnout for presidential, legislative, and gubernatorial elections is consistently higher than that for local elections. (p. 226)

19 Several reasons may be behind this: local politicians may be more visibly responsible for delivering goods and services to their constituents, thus increasing the apparent importance of the election (and this may be even more the case in Cape Verde, due to the fact that it is composed of islands scattered in the Atlantic ocean); the lack of incumbency advantages one finds in presidential races may mean that electors might think they are more likely able to affect the election’s outcome, because incumbent candidates do not enjoy the same degree of incumbency advantage presidents or prime-ministers have; mobilization may also be more successful since in some contexts these elections are dubbed “elections of proximity” in which people mobilizes members from their local networks, which contrast with more elite-based legislative and presidential races (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019).

20 Also, it is possible that no behavioural change vis-à-vis the elections can be spotted because, as Bleck and van de Walle (2019) suggest, voters may feel that voting for the same party that controls higher levels of government will make coordination and resource delivery to the local level easier. This would mean no punishment of the incumbent party whatsoever.

Goals, hypotheses and methodology

21 This article analyses the existence of differences in turnout and electoral choice in different types of elections, in line with the second-order elections model defined by Reif and Schmitt (1980), in the Cape Verdean context. Cape Verde is an interesting case

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to study this because it shares the features of a consolidated democracy with those of a recent democratic system and the challenges of African electoral politics. Therefore, being Cape Verde a young but consolidated democracy in a somewhat different African landscape, differences in participation levels between first- and second-order elections can be understood as an additional example of democratic maturity on the part of Cape Verdean voters. Cape Verde is an example of semi-presidentialism regime in which presidential elections can be more or less seen as second-order elections; the same applies to local elections for the reasons debated above. In turn, legislative elections, through which deputies are elected to the National Assembly, are without doubt first- order elections, insofar as the results have a direct impact on the allocation of political positions at the national level and, consequently, within the governmental apparatus.

22 The time period covered by this research ranges from the first free elections in 1991 to the most recent elections, which took place in 2016. This article uses electoral data published in Cape Verde’s official bulletins. Part of the data was sourced from Cape Verde CNE’s official website, and the remainder gathered directly from the CNE offices. The elections analysed can be found in Table 1.

Table 1: Dates of elections in democratic Cape Verde (1991-2016)

Image 10064AB000002BC1000020D7F358FF75D10D3D8D.emf

23 Resorting to Reif and Schmitt’s (1980) second-order election theory, we formulate four hypotheses which will guide our analysis of the aggregate data. These are designed in order to access the second-order nature of local and presidential elections in the country.

24 Hypothesis 1: Participation levels are expected to be lower in local and presidential elections than in parliamentary elections in Cape Verde.

25 Participation rates tend to be lower for second-order elections because voters are less inclined to take part since they believe there is less at stake. As such elections do not make a direct contribution to the distribution of executive power, voters tend to be less engaged with them compared to legislative elections, which directly contribute to the

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allocation of power, and thus will be less likely to turn out to vote (Freire, 2005; Freire & Magalhães, 2002; Reif & Schmitt, 1980).

26 Hypothesis 2: Smaller parties in Cape Verde are more likely to perform better in local and presidential elections than in parliamentary elections.

27 There is a consensus among researchers that second-order elections tend to benefit smaller parties, while first-order elections tend to favour the larger parties, also because the latter may receive votes from supporters of the former, in a process of strategic or tactical vote (van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996; van der Eijk et al., 1996; Norris, 1997; Hobolt & Wittrok, 2011). In the case of presidential elections, which are not partisan stricto sensu, we will analyse the results of the candidates backed up by specific parties.

28 Hypothesis 3: There will be more blank and spoiled papers in local and presidential elections in Cape Verde than there will be in parliamentary elections.

29 Voters may express their discontent with the parties and/or candidates by spoiling their papers in second-order elections or expressing no preferences in the ballot. As a result, there may well be an increase in the number of spoiled and blank papers in second-order elections (Reif & Schmitt, 1980).

30 Hypothesis 4: The national incumbent party will be penalised in local and presidential elections by receiving fewer votes than it did when it was elected.

31 Since second-order elections are not considered crucial elections for determining the distribution of power, especially in the period between first-order elections, discontent voters will be more willing to use these elections to send the governing party a message. Voters will often use second-order elections to punish the incumbent party (Freire, 2005; Reif & Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996; van der Eijk et al., 1996).

Results

Elections in Cape Verde (1991-2016): Overview

32 Table 2 shows the results of all legislative elections in Cape Verde between 1991 and 2016. During this period there were six legislative elections, with only the two largest parties, the Movement for Democracy (MPD – Movimento para a Democracia) and the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV – Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde), being able to govern. Since the 1991 multiparty elections, these two parties have exerted executive power for relatively equal periods: the PAICV governed from 2001 to 2016 and the MPD from 1991 to 2001 and then since 2016. Of the smaller political parties that have stood for parliament, up until now only three parties had elected deputies to the National Assembly: the Democratic Convergence Party (PCD – Partido da Convergência Democrática) in 1995, the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADM – Aliança Democrática para a Mudança) in 2001 and the Democratic and Independent Cape Verdean Union (UCID – União Cabo-verdiana Independente e Democrata) in 2011. None of these other parties have managed to elect a deputy to the National Assembly: Social Democratic Party (PSD – Partido Social Democrático), Democratic Renewal Party (PRD – Partido da Renovação Democrática), Labour and Solidarity Party (PTS – Partido do Trabalho e da Solidariedade) and the Popular Party (PP – Partido Popular). Voter turnout has

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declined over the past decade, particularly compared to the 1990s; however, the abstention rate was lower in the last two legislative elections. For details on the background and grounds for party competition in these elections, see Sanches (2018).

Table 2: Legislative elections in Cape Verde (1991-2016)

Image 1005FEC00000309D0000176A1E4A889919FF2412.emf

Source: CNE. All values were rounded to one decimal place

33 In turn, Table 3 displays the results of all six presidential elections held in Cape Verde between 1991 and 2016. Only candidates supported by the two main parties, the MPD and PAICV, have been elected president. Pedro Pires, the PAICV candidate, won in 2001 and 2006, while the two MPD’s candidates won twice each: in 1991 and 1996 (António Mascarenhas Monteiro) and 2011 and 2016 (Jorge Carlos Fonseca). Independent candidates stood for the presidency in 2001 (Jorge Carlos Fonseca and David Hopffer Almada), 2011 (Aristides Lima, in dissidence with PAICV, and Joaquim Monteiro) and 2016 (Albertino Graça and Joaquim Monteiro), with none receiving enough votes to participate in a second round. After a first presidential race, still in the transition period (1991), marked by high turnout (this election was considered of paramount importance due to the context and the charisma of the competing leaders; Sanches, 2018), turnout rates for presidential elections have slightly declined over the years, with considerably low values in 1996 (a non-competitive election) and 2016. Interestingly enough, the time between presidential and legislative elections in each electoral cycle is usually very short, varying between one and seven months.

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Table 3: Presidential elections in Cape Verde (1991-2016)

Image 10079A9C000032CC00001FBFE24698CD9C710EAA.emf

Source: CNE. All values were rounded to one decimal place

34 Lastly, Table 4 presents the results of all seven local elections that have taken place in Cape Verde between 1991 and 2016. As with the other elections, there is a tendency for the large parties to dominate, with the MPD coming out on top in 1991, 1996, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016, and the PAICV in 2000. This trend was spotlighted by Janira Hopffer Almada, PAICV leader, last April when she set up as a goal to break the MPD’s hegemony2 on local elections by winning eight municipalities in 2020 3. A number of small parties and independent groups have run in these elections since the early 1990s, but with some exceptions their results are often modest.

Table 4: Local elections in Cape Verde (1991-2016)

Image 100C0E8400004E4700002385A6C5B68B9C962EEA.emf

Source: CNE. All values were rounded to one decimal place

35 A total of 15 small parties and independent groups took part in the first local elections in 1991, with all but one obtaining less than 5% of the vote: the exception was the

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Movement for the Renaissance of St. Vincent (MPRSV – Movimento para o Renascimento de São Vicente) with 6%. Just nine small parties and independent groups took part in the 1996 local elections, with the MPRSV gaining 10.5% and beating the PAICV, which obtained 7.4%. The 2000 local elections were contested by 13 small parties and independent groups, with the PCD and the Action for Work and Solidarity (ATS – Acão para o Trabalho e para a Solidariedade) winning 6.6% and 7%, respectively. In 2004, none of the nine small parties and independent groups contesting the local elections obtained more than 5%, and in 2008 local elections, none of the smaller competitors took more than 4%. Again, while a total of nine small parties and independent groups stood in the 2012 local elections, their results were below the 5% threshold. Finally, of the nine smaller parties and groups that contested the 2016 local elections, only UCID won more than 5% of the vote (5.1%).

36 It is worth noting that the time between these elections and the previous legislative elections varied between one month and three years, but that most local elections are not held close to the legislative election date (the January 1996 election, held one month after the legislative contest, is a clear outlier in this set of local elections). Turnout at local elections generally varies between 55% and 60%, but it was higher in 2008 and 2012.

Hypotheses testing

37 Our four hypotheses are tested in two phases. First, we look at the democratic period in Cape Verde as a whole, comparing average differences between the patterns observed in presidential and local elections and the preceding first-order elections; then we test them through an analysis of the electoral cycles, composed of legislative elections and the local and presidential elections that followed. The first electoral cycle is that of 1991, the year in which the country held its first multiparty elections. The second cycle includes the years 1995, 1996 and 2000, with legislative and presidential elections in the first two years and local elections in the second and the latter. The third electoral cycle ran from 2001 to 2004, with presidential and legislative elections in 2001 and local elections in 2004. The fourth electoral cycle corresponds to the years 2006 to 2008, with presidential and legislative elections in the former and local elections in the latter. The fifth cycle took place from 2011 to 2012, with presidential and legislative elections in the former and local elections in the second. Finally, the sixth electoral cycle took place in 2016, a year in which all three types of election were held. While the overall analysis identifies general patterns, the election cycle analysis allows us to test our hypotheses with more precision and robustness, since second-orderness effects in terms of participation and vote choice are expected to be linked with the specificities of legislative election cycles (Reif & Schmitt, 1980).

Overall analysis of the period 1991-2016

38 We begin by analysing the global average differences between turnout rates in local and presidential elections and the legislative election that preceded them (Table 5). Taken as a whole, presidential and local elections display negative figures, which suggest that more people voted in the previous first-order elections (the overall average difference is of almost 10 percent points). Despite the differences being much

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greater in the case of presidential elections (-14.4) than local elections (-3.6), these patterns confirm our first hypothesis.

39 The next two columns of Table 5 present the data used to test the second hypothesis (small parties obtaining better results in elections other than the parliamentary competitions). We see an overall average difference of 5.5 percentage points, with both the presidential and local elections showing positive values of 2.4% and 7.6%, respectively. This confirms the second hypothesis. It is nevertheless interesting to see that, if we look at the overall average difference in the electoral result of large parties between the two election types, while we observed an overall difference that is congruent with our expectations (negative: -5.4), the average difference for presidential elections is actually positive (5.1%), while local elections are those in which a negative difference can be spotted (-17.5%).

40 Looking at the local and presidential elections as a whole, it is not possible to spot more blank and spoiled papers than in the previous legislative election (our third hypothesis), since the overall average difference was of 0.3 percentage points. This is because the average difference for the presidential elections is negative (-1.1%), while for the local elections the figure is positive (1.9%). This means the hypothesis is only confirmed for local elections. Interestingly enough, in the case of the local elections, the difference is positive for every election, while in the case of presidential elections it is always negative.

41 Finally, looking at the hypothesis stemming from the argument that presidential and local elections may be used to punish the party of government, the data points to an overall average of -3.1 percentage points difference in the incumbent’s results (Table 5). The average for presidential elections is positive (4.0%), while for local elections it is negative (-11.2). This partially confirms the fourth hypothesis, only for local elections.

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Table 5: Comparison between first- and second-order elections

Image 101FD5D8000036AA000049E9A4949C2924A771D6.emf

Analysis of electoral cycles

42 Looking at the election results in each cycle (Tables 5 and 6), we see that the first hypothesis (lower voter turnout in presidential and local elections in Cape Verde compared to the turnout in first-order elections) is confirmed in most electoral cycles (1991; 1995/1996/2000; 2011/2012; and 2016). However, this was not the case in the 2001/2004 electoral cycle, when both local and presidential elections had a higher turnout than the first-order elections. This, however, may be due to the specific context of the 2001 legislative election, when alternation was expected after the MPD faced change in leadership, corruption accusations, internal turmoil and dissidence (Meyns, 2002; Sanches, 2018), which may cause their voters to demobilize. However, the hypothesis is confirmed for the first round of the presidential elections in this 2001/2004 cycle, which had a lower voter turnout than the first-order elections. Considering that the two candidates had virtually the same result in the first round, it is not surprising that voters felt more mobilized in the second round – due to a very intense campaign (Meyns, 2002). Also, the hypothesis is confirmed for the 2006/2008 electoral cycle only when comparing the legislative and presidential elections. Again, legislative elections were poorly participated, very much due to contextual reasons that would be overcome in the 2011 race (Sanches, 2018).

43 Therefore, the fact that the hypothesis about turnout is not confirmed in the second round of the presidential elections and the local elections of the 2001/2004 electoral cycle, and its partial confirmation in the 2006/2008 electoral cycle, may be due to the climate of public opinion. While in some cases government popularity could be the

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cause of increased voter turnout in second-order elections, this pattern may also be explained by voter “discontent” with the positions adopted by the party of government, with the increased participation being accompanied by a decline in support for the incumbent party or its favoured candidate in second-order elections when compared to the results obtained in first-order elections. This argument gains weight especially when we realise that in all the non-parliamentary elections that took place during these two electoral cycles, with the exception of the 2001 presidential elections, and even when there was an increase in voter turnout rates, the incumbent party lost support (in terms of vote share) compared to the results it had received in the preceding first-order elections.

44 As for the second hypothesis (greater probability of smaller parties in Cape Verde obtaining better results in local and presidential than in first-order elections), our analysis highlighted three different situations. First, the hypothesis is partially confirmed in the 1995/1996/2000, 2001/2004 and 2006/2008 electoral cycles, only when we compare the sum of the results achieved by small parties in local elections with their results in legislative elections. The hypothesis was confirmed, however, for all elections in the 2011/2012 and 2016 electoral cycles. Lastly, the hypothesis could not be tested at all in the 1991 election cycle (because there were not small parties in the 1991 legislative race) and for presidential elections in the 1995/1996/2000 (because there was only one candidate, supported by the MPD) and 2006/2008 electoral cycles (due to the absence of candidates who were either independent or supported by small parties).

45 The third hypothesis (that there would be more blank and spoiled papers in presidential and local elections in Cape Verde than in first-order elections) is confirmed in all electoral cycles, but only for local elections. The hypothesis is indeed not confirmed when we compare the percentage of spoiled papers in legislative elections with those in presidential elections in each election cycle; in fact, there were actually fewer spoiled papers in every presidential election than in any of the legislative elections. One of the explanations for this hypothesis not be confirmed could be the fact that presidential elections are more personalized, so it is possible voters feel it is easier to express their views.

46 Lastly, the fourth hypothesis (incumbent party punished in local and presidential elections) is partially confirmed for local elections in the electoral cycle of 1991, the year in which the first multi-party elections were held, as well as in the 1995/1996/2000, 2001/2004 and 2006/2008 electoral cycles, when the incumbent party suffered a substantial decline in vote share relative to the elections it had won. Yet, we should mention that it was not possible to carry out a valid test of the 1995/1996/2000 cycle in what regards the presidential election, because there was only one candidate, António Mascarenhas Monteiro, supported by the MPD, the incumbent party at the time4.

47 The hypothesis is ultimately confirmed in the 2011/2012 electoral cycle, when the incumbent party received a lower vote share than it had secured in legislative elections in both the local and presidential elections. The government-supported candidate in the 2011 presidential elections lost, with a slight decline in their percentage share of the vote – however, this was much due to the fact that another PAICV personality decided to run as presidential candidate (Sanches, 2018). Moreover, not only there was a large fall in the share of votes won by the incumbent party in the 2012 local elections, but this meant that it lost those elections to the opposition parties. In turn, this

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hypothesis was rejected in the 2016 electoral cycle, the last year in which elections were held, and in which the party of government displayed a better electoral performance in both second-order contests. The non-confirmation of the fourth hypothesis in the 2016 electoral cycle may be due to the fact the MPD (the winner of the first of these three elections) had been the main opposition party for three mandates (15 years). In this sense, Cape Verde voters may have seen this election an opportunity to punish the PAICV, which had governed the country for more than a decade, more than the newly elected party with whom they were still honeymooning.

Table 6: Testing the hypotheses in each electoral cycle

Image 1010D9FC000030B60000380EA0EF269118930FE2.emf

Conclusions

48 This article sought to apply Reif and Schmitt’s (1980) second-order election model to Cape Verde by assessing if there are any differences in voter turnout and electoral choice in legislative, presidential and local elections consistent with the model proposed. To accomplish this goal, we examined all the elections that took place between the first multi-party elections in 1991 and the most recent elections held in 2016.

49 The empirical patterns observed allow us to highlight some points that help understand the dynamics of participation and voting behaviour in local and presidential elections in Cape Verde. First, the results suggest without doubt that Cape Verde voters view local elections as second-order: lower participation, more blank and spoiled papers, better results achieved by smaller parties and the party of government being punished. However, in the case of presidential elections, their second-order

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nature is less clear and not always verified: if, on the one hand, turnout is almost always lower than that of the previous legislative race, as expected, the other trends are either completely absent or present in but a few presidential races.

50 There could be two reasons for this. The most likely explanation is the fact that legislative and presidential elections have almost always been held within a few months of each other. Presidential elections therefore happen in the honeymoon phase of the first-order electoral cycle. This may not lead to a case in which a considerable amount of voters are discontent and so seek to penalise the party of government in subsequent presidential elections, either by voting for the main opposition party, spoiling their ballots or voting for smaller parties (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). Indeed, both Costa (2009) and Sanches (2010) mention a sort of contagion effect between the legislatives and the presidential elections in Cape Verde due to the timing, with the candidates supported by the winner of the legislative race having good results in the presidential election. The fact that presidential elections are scheduled to occur soon after the legislative elections and do not produce any changes in terms of who governs would actually be a distinct sign of these elections’ second-orderness. Nevertheless, despite Cape Verde being a semi-presidential regime, the president does have a number of powers (Costa, 2009; Fortes & Magalhães, 2005; Madeira, 2015), which make it possible to argue that perhaps the Cape Verdean voters do not regard, or at least do not always regard, presidential elections as being actually second-order, and therefore do not vote in line with Reif and Schmitt’s (1980) theoretical expectations. This would actually put Cape Verde in line with a clear trend in terms of electoral politics in African democracies: that of a considerable weight of presidents and presidential elections (e.g. van de Walle, 2003). Subsequent research, perhaps benefiting from more variation in the distance between the legislative and presidential election dates in Cape Verde, may shed light on this interesting puzzle.

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NOTES

1. Funds for the translation of this article were provided by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia through the Strategic Financing of the R&D Unit UID/SOC/ 03126/2019. 2. MPD won in 20 out of 22 municipalities in the 2016 local elections. 3. https://www.asemana.publ.cv/?Lider-da-oposicao-PAICV-quer-combater-a&ak=1

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4. It is worth mention that Monteiro was the only candidate in the history of democratic Cape Verde to run alone in an election, but also the only to have won an election against a president in office (in 1991; Bleck and van de Walle, 2019).

ABSTRACTS

In this article, we analyse patterns of turnout and electoral choices of Cape Verde’s citizens in different types of elections, looking at all legislative, presidential and local elections held between 1991 and 2016, and testing four hypotheses derived from the second-order election model about differences in terms of turnout, number of spoiled/blank papers, results for the incumbent party and the electoral success of smaller parties. Our results show that, in what regards turnout and electoral behaviour, local elections present the features of second-order elections much more clearly than the presidential elections in this semi-presidential regime. However, this pattern does not necessarily mean that voters look at the latter as less second- order, but since they often took place in the honeymoon period of the legislative electoral cycle, it may only mean that there were lower incentives to punish the incumbent and/or disengage from political participation.

Neste artigo, procuramos perceber os padrões de participação e as escolhas eleitorais dos cidadãos cabo-verdianos em diferentes tipos de eleições. Analisamos todas as eleições (legislativas, presidenciais e autárquicas) entre 1991 e 2016 para testar quatro hipóteses formuladas a partir do modelo de eleições de segunda ordem, relativas diferenças nos níveis de participação, número de votos inválidos/em branco, resultados do partido incumbente e sucesso eleitoral dos pequenos partidos. No que diz respeito à participação e comportamento eleitoral, os resultados revelam que há uma tendência para as eleições autárquicas apresentarem mais características de eleições de segunda ordem do que as eleições presidenciais neste regime semipresidencial. Contudo, tal não significa que os eleitores considerem as eleições presidenciais como menos de segunda ordem. Uma vez que as eleições presidenciais ocorreram durante o período de lua de mel do ciclo eleitoral legislativo, tal pode apenas significar que os eleitores têm tido menos incentivos para punir o partido incumbente e/ou absterem-se de votar.

INDEX

Keywords: Cape Verde, second-order elections, turnout, local elections, semi-presidentialism Palavras-chave: Cabo Verde, eleições de segunda ordem, participação eleitoral, eleições autárquicas, semipresidencialismo

AUTHORS

JOSÉ SANTANA PEREIRA Centro de Investigação e Estudos de Sociologia (CIES-IUL) Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL)

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Av. das Forças Armadas 1649-026 Lisbon, Portugal [email protected]

SUSANA ROGEIRO NINA Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt, 9 1600-189 Lisbon, Portugal [email protected]

DANIELTON DELGADO Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL) Av. das Forças Armadas 1649-026 Lisbon, Portugal [email protected]

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As Eleições Legislativas de 2018. Acerca da Sobrevivência da Democracia em São Tomé e Príncipe The 2018 legislative elections. About the survival of democracy in São Tomé and Príncipe

Augusto Nascimento

NOTA DO EDITOR

Recebido: 30 de junho de 2019 Aceite: 02 de outubro de 2019

1 Neste texto analisaremos sumariamente o devir histórico e as contingências do sistema democrático e, em particular, as eleições de 7 de outubro de 2018 em São Tomé e Príncipe, procurando recensear pontos de reflexão sobre a sobrevivência da democracia num contexto micro-insular em África. Ao invés de equacionar a viabilidade da democracia representativa1 à luz de uma presumida idiossincrasia africana, sopesa-se a sintonia da evolução histórica e do apriorismo da superioridade da democracia enquanto regime de governação2 com as escolhas políticas dos são- tomenses, as quais, tendo por base princípios políticos ou meras motivações de contingência ou de conjuntura, não constituem necessariamente a razão3.

2 Neste texto não se invoca uma noção cristalizada de insularidade ou uma suposta idiossincrasia, nem se absolutiza uma noção normativa ou estrita de democracia4, assente na realização de eleições livres e nas liberdades individuais que as possibilitam e com elas se podem fortalecer. Sopesada a história e os condicionalismos da recente evolução política no arquipélago, intenta-se uma interpretação dos resultados eleitorais de outubro de 2018 e, bem assim, da performance dos órgãos institucionais enquanto garantes da democracia formal, esteio das liberdades cívicas e do espaço de decisão política dos cidadãos.

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3 A incerteza sobre o devir histórico não é menor por se tratar de duas pequenas ilhas. Ao arrepio da eventual suposição sobranceira relativamente à mais fácil resolução dos problemas sociais, a micro-insularidade revela-se crescentemente complexa, fruto do avolumar desses problemas, da escassez de recursos, da deliquescência das instituições e, arriscaríamos dizer, da consequente facilidade de dominação de um meio insular. Também por isso, ao invés do que erroneamente se queira inferir das votações5, não sobram razões para otimismos quanto à preservação ou ao apego à democracia, desde logo pelas inúmeras dificuldades respeitantes às necessidades mais primárias, do que resulta a inexistência de tempo político para os sucessivos governos, em especial na ausência de ondas de adesão emocional a um big man ou a políticos carismáticos.

4 Noutros termos, apesar do curso de palavras emblemáticas em ocasiões solenes, permanece incerta a relação entre, por um lado, traços idiossincráticos eventualmente imputáveis à micro-insularidade, forçosamente facetada pela história e, em particular, pelas contingências do pós-independência, e, por outro, a tendência de evolução política no arquipélago, cuja adesão à democracia representativa poderia estar a diminuir, menos pela aventada inadaptação dos mecanismos constitucionais do que pela incapacidade de parar o acúmulo das dificuldades das pessoas ao cabo de sucessivas governações.

5 Entre as dificuldades, cite-se, para lá da custosa angariação da sobrevivência, a desregulação social e os imprevisíveis óbices a qualquer esperança, a desconfiança e a acrimónia que desembocam na interiorização de visões depreciativas dos são-tomenses sobre si mesmos e na conclusão da necessidade de uma regeneração pela imposição de um certo sentido de ordem por um “pulso forte”, personificado em tempos e moldes diferentes por Pinto da Costa ou Patrice Trovoada6.

6 Assim, importa avaliar a evolução política pelas ações tendentes à observância e à salvaguarda da democracia e, concretamente, pelos resultados das derradeiras eleições. Diga-se, conquanto seja difícil sopesá-lo cabalmente, talvez cumpra não descartar o chamado substrato cultural7, fruto dos moldes da vida coletiva pautada pela influência de instituições passadas, por exemplo, na noção de indivíduo, disjunta da baseada em laços imprescritíveis entre as pessoas que opera noutros contextos africanos. Em todo o caso, a distinção não é clara e tal substrato, apesar de moldado pela insularidade, não deriva de uma qualquer essência insular, mas da história que em 1975 abriu as portas para uma deriva inimaginável, até para os adeptos da independência.

7 Embora se relativize a importância de supostas idiossincrasias, não se menoriza o peso do contexto social na corrosão das instituições e, daí, da democracia representativa. Tal corrosão – politicamente bem mais relevante do que a influência diáfana de celebrados artefactos culturais – resulta evidente na dificuldade da administração da justiça, indesmentível quando estão em juízo os mandantes e, bem assim, os seus protegidos. Os escolhos na justiça não se resumem à difícil imparcialidade no juízo de causas próximas, antes se evidenciam na perniciosa subordinação dos juízes aos poderosos e na (eventual) instrumentalização impune do aparelho judicial para pendências civis e, sobretudo, para lutas políticas8.

8 Em suma, a micro-insularidade há de ser histórica (cf. Nascimento, 2017) e, da democracia, consideremos a vertente, porventura redutora, conquanto não menos decisiva, da livre escolha eleitoral9. Apesar de alvitres acerca de fórmulas adaptadas ou locais de democracia, a realização regular de eleições permitiu a alternância no poder desde 1991 e revelou-se importante quando a democracia esteve ameaçada pela

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concentração de poder nas mãos de Patrice Trovoada na esteira da conquista da maioria absoluta de deputados em 2014, da vitória de Evaristo Carvalho em 2016 e da subversão da Constituição do país. Sem tempo nem ocasião para ativismos ou lucubrações sobre fórmulas alternativas de democracia, os são-tomenses usaram as eleições para um veredito sobre a governação numa legislatura sem entropias que não as criadas pelo próprio governo.

9 Os derradeiros anos demonstraram a fragilidade da democracia perante uma ofensiva política que, sem a derrogar completamente, a esvaziava de conteúdo, como o atesta o banimento de órgãos de justiça na sequência de sentenças revertidas de forma atrabiliária, apenas porque pressupostamente pouco conformes a desejos de mandantes.

10 Apesar de restrições, por exemplo, ao pluralismo na imprensa10, as eleições de 2018 puseram, ao menos momentaneamente, fim a uma deriva autoritária. Não se estava perante uma restauração autoritária11, que, anos depois, sobrevém à vaga (ou à condicionalidade) democrática dos anos 90 em África12, a que, embora por pouco, se antecipou o intento de democratização de São Tomé e Príncipe. Aqui, as eleições de 2018 equivaliam à ratificação, ou não, de uma deriva autoritária decerto meticulosamente gizada e bem executada13 para a dominação na terra através da divisão dos ilhéus. Podemos, pois, falar de uma deriva autoritária14, percebida como tal por muitos que a viveram e, a dado passo, tiveram medo de falar dela e, até, de a nomear.

11 As eleições de 2018 poderiam ter permitido perpetuar a entrementes encetada subversão do Estado de direito democrático, tornando São Tomé e Príncipe num Estado de um direito qualquer, preterível e ajustado à vontade do mandante. Uma vitória eleitoral de Patrice Trovoada teria permitido alento e tempo para a consolidação a breve trecho de uma situação quase inamovível, tal a especulação plausível em face da facilidade com que, como de um sopro, se subverteu o Estado de direito. Neste artigo, procurar-se-á descrever a recente evolução política do arquipélago, ressaltando o trajeto de atores políticos com desígnios de recorte autoritário num cenário político onde avultam, como linhas de força, a deliquescência das instituições e as pulsões da rua. Focar-se-á a tentativa de construção de uma solução autoritária por Patrice Trovoada, primeiro-ministro entre 2014 e 2018 e chefe e patrono de um partido de um homem só, tentativa interrompida por uma derrota tangencial nas eleições de outubro de 2018.

12 Para o propósito deste texto, a descrição densa pareceu o melhor suporte para a compreensão e a explicação históricas – as que permitem um balanço crítico – da trajetória de conquista de poder e de um modo de governação, assente, por um lado, na hábil exploração do ressentimento e do desejo de reparação da injustiça e, por outro, no aproveitamento das debilidades institucionais, as mais das vezes substituídas por dependências pessoais e pela consequente informalidade dos processos decisórios.

A deriva do São Tomé e Príncipe independente

13 Com uma população a rondar os 70.000 indivíduos, o arquipélago tornou-se independente em 1975. Após a independência, a pequena elite independentista15 impôs um regime de partido único de vocação socialista como a concretização de uma independência dita “verdadeira”. Tal implicava continuar uma “luta”, até então

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retórica, mas que, a partir daí, se prolongava na procurada emancipação de imaginárias formas de neocolonialismo. Supostamente, este desígnio visava a mobilização em prol de um futuro melhor, mas, na prática, traduzia-se na demanda de obediência a quem, invocando embora os verdadeiros interesses do “povo”, governava de forma autoritária, cerceando as liberdades individuais em nome da unidade de propósitos dos são-tomenses. O poder do Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP) e do “líder”, Pinto da Costa, acabou transformado numa canga sobre o dia a dia de grande parte dos são-tomenses independentemente da condição social ou do estatuto político.

14 Estatizou-se a economia, mormente as roças produtoras de cacau, cuja mão de obra era constituída por ex-serviçais, décadas antes importados de outras colónias portuguesas, e pelos seus descendentes. Tal deveria ter alavancado maior justiça social, mas a economia colapsou, para o que contribuíram as iniquidades nas roças geridas por são- tomenses, a burocratização e, a outro nível, as dificuldades dos anos 80 agudamente sentidas no continente africano.

15 Esvanecido o inebriamento da independência, numa trajetória de empobrecimento e de crescentes privações, quando apenas florescia o mercado negro, não era fácil manter o poder em nome de um futuro ridente cada vez menos alcançável, tal a convicção disseminada e corroborada pela perceção da disparidade de condições de governantes e governados, disparidade em tudo avessa ao apregoado ideário socialista.

16 Uma fome inusitada em 1983-1984 levou o presidente Pinto da Costa a decidir-se pela abertura à iniciativa privada no domínio económico. Já no plano político, apesar da falência da ideologia e da corrosão da legitimidade16, não existiam movimentações sociais que o forçassem a uma liberalização17, nem mesmo dos ditos “renovadores”, obrigados a antepor a lealdade ao líder às contidas sugestões no sentido de abertura política sem pôr em causa o poder. Porém, anos depois da abertura na economia, Pinto da Costa teve o rasgo ou a intuição (ou, ainda, a sapiência de acolher a sugestão) de mudar o regime para uma democracia representativa. Anterior à vaga suscitada pela queda do muro de Berlim, este lance político, embora arrostando com a relutância de parte do aparelho partidário, concitou um amplo consenso num referendo ao projeto de Constituição decalcado da portuguesa, ainda que com adaptações atinentes ao reforço dos poderes presidenciais em matéria de relações externas, crivo crucial para a preservação do poder, e no tocante às possibilidades de dissolução da assembleia (cf. Sanches, 2015, p. 143).

17 Ao invés do sucedido em eleições noutros países convertidos à democracia, sob o lema redentor da “mudança”, o partido histórico da independência foi derrotado pelo Partido da Convergência Democrática - Grupo de Reflexão (PCD-GR), composto de elementos derrotados em 1975 e de sucessivos desafetos do MLSTP durante a quinzena de anos do putativo “socialismo” e de “partido único”. Miguel Trovoada, um dos elementos do pequeno grupo que arvorara o lema da independência e que, já primeiro- ministro, estivera preso, sendo depois exilado, seria recebido triunfalmente antes de vencer eleições presidenciais de 1991 para que não teve competidor, por desistência de outros dois candidatos18.

18 Afora ter apadrinhado a criação da Ação Democrática Independente (ADI)19, que concorreu às eleições de 1994, Miguel Trovoada adotou uma atitude de litigância com dois governos do PDC-GR, formados por apoiantes da sua eleição. Ao cabo dos dois mandatos, teve um lance tático de génio ao promover a candidatura de um seu “substituto”, Fradique de Menezes, um negociante que, certamente nunca tendo

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imaginado ser presidente, tinha a vantagem de se apresentar como um outsider da “política” erodida pelo contínuo de carências e pela pobreza avassaladora no arquipélago. Ainda com a memória do tempo do partido único bem viva entre os são- tomenses, a escolha foi certeira para travar o passo à eleição de Pinto da Costa.

19 Eleito em 2001, Fradique não se revelou tão manipulável quanto porventura dele se esperaria. Fradique também criou um partido de um homem só, o Movimento Democrático Força da Mudança - Partido Liberal (MDFM-PL). Fosse como fosse, prevaleceu o carácter errático da sua ação política, vazia de ideias, programa e objetivos. Patrice Trovoada, filho do ex-presidente, que começara por ser diretor da sua campanha eleitoral e ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros do primeiro governo empossado por Fradique, dispôs-se a disputar a corrida presidencial em 2006, enquanto paulatinamente começava a crescer o apoio à ADI, de que se tornou secretário-geral em 2002 (cf. Santos, 2014, p. 218).

20 Desde a independência o país experimentara sucessivas soluções salvíficas – independentemente dos contextos, traduzidas na adesão a personalidades que induziram a criação de partidos seus20 – que, no plano económico, tinham redundado em desilusão e na contínua erosão das instituições21. Ao cabo de dois decénios de democracia sobreveio a desilusão por força da continuação da precariedade, nalguns casos extrema, da condição de vida das pessoas. O cenário político diversificara-se, ao mesmo tempo que valores ideológicos e programas substantivos eram substituídos pela ascendência temporária de sucessivos chefes. Porém, por entre as inúmeras questiúnculas políticas, derivadas da luta pelo açambarcamento das oportunidades tidas como irrepetíveis, o arquipélago tornou-se uma referência como país com arraigadas liberdades, onde, ao invés do sucedido na era colonial e no regime de partido único, era assaz difícil travar a liberdade de expressão e, até, os excessos da “rua” relativamente aos “políticos”. Com efeito, a par da duplicidade dos que orbitavam nas esferas de poder e, bem assim, da rarefeita mediação política qualificada, o moralismo sumário e a linguagem desbragada da “rua” eram o reverso das suas cada vez maiores provações.

21 Os impasses resultantes do marasmo económico que também em democracia não se conseguiram resolver levaram alguns a questionar as virtudes da democracia ou a demandar a sua adaptação a uma (nunca definida) matriz cultural local22. Fosse como fosse, não só esta não foi posta em causa, como as eleições – seu último e decisivo fundamento e reduto – se foram realizando num ambiente aberto, competitivo e livre. Foi por essa via que Patrice Trovoada chegou ao poder.

A senda do poder

22 Apesar da rampa de lançamento comum em África – a de filho de presidente –, a trajetória de Patrice Trovoada até à conquista do poder é notável, desde logo por não aparentar ter a loquacidade de vários dos seus opositores. Também é certo que, dada a usura da palavra dos “políticos” por força do estendal de promessas por cumprir e do crescendo das clivagens económicas23, ele retirou ganhos da parcimónia das palavras. Seja como for, sobra a questão de saber porque é que os são-tomenses lhe creditaram boas intenções quando, por regra, apodam os políticos de ladrões24.

23 Face a outros políticos, Patrice Trovoada tem a vantagem de “ter mundo” – de ter lidado com poderosos – e de não ter laços na terra, onde raramente ou nunca vive

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quando não está no poder25 – o que lhe confere a faceta salvífica que os são-tomenses tendem a conferir a quem vem de fora26. Da ausência os ilhéus inferem que ele não precisa da terra para viver. Evidentemente, tal não elimina a hipótese de a terra lhe servir, como, decerto, serviu a outros políticos antes dele, hipótese que, enquanto foi encarado como um salvador, a “rua” rejeitava sem outro fundamento que o da adesão acrítica à sua pessoa.

24 Patrice Trovoada cultiva o distanciamento face aos seus concidadãos, entre os quais teve (e tem) fiéis ou clientes, alguns deles mantidos anos a fio27. A sua solidariedade ritual, pública, para com um dos seus numa ocasião difícil decerto não se desdobrará numa cumplicidade firmada no convívio comum na terra, nem na comunhão de destinos que a concretização de um projeto político de monta devia suscitar. Assim o sugere o facto de os contornos dos seus desígnios permanecerem imperscrutáveis para os seus seguidores, como o indiciam as decisões nunca antes sequer alvitradas – por exemplo, entrada no país da guarda pretoriana ruandesa, rompimento das relações com Taiwan, emissão de novas notas –, algumas conhecidas depois de concretizadas e concretizadas independentemente da necessária aprovação parlamentar prévia.

25 A ascensão ao poder foi um longo tirocínio que certamente contou com lealdades subterrâneas28, possivelmente até nos partidos opositores29. Algumas lealdades permaneceram insuspeitas porquanto datam de épocas em que a sua ascensão ao poder era inimaginável, desde logo por força da aversão à figura do pai, o principal visado no equivocado golpe de 1995. Não se pode arredar a hipótese de ter inspirado a contestação social fomentadora do descontentamento face a sucessivos governos. Naturalmente, não sendo atribuíveis a uma qualquer fidelidade inconfessada, essas contestações eram encaradas como resultado da idiossincrasia dos ativistas, a quem, de resto, não faltavam boas razões para contestar corrosivamente sucessivos governos.

26 Patrice Trovoada construiu uma clientela de indefetíveis, desde titulares de instituições estatais a spin doctors, incluindo ministros que, quedos e mudos largas temporadas, preservaram a disponibilidade para a assunção do cargo. Com efeito, um dos aspetos a realçar é a disponibilidade para retomar o desempenho político subalterno – e que assim permaneceria visto ser a ADI um partido do chefe onde não existia competitividade política – uma vez passado o pousio do afastamento do poder. Mesmo tendo presente a primazia da ação política em desfavor do pensamento crítico, surpreende que algumas personalidades abdicassem (se é que não continuam a fazê-lo) de inevitáveis convicções próprias por troca com uma fidelidade a toda a prova em nome de desígnios assaz vagos, erráticos, quando não imprevistos e nunca imaginados.

27 A imagem de homem poderoso, que a parcimónia de palavras não desmentia, resultou tanto da mobilização de meios quanto de um percurso político singular onde se foi insinuando como cada vez mais imprescindível. Depois do empurrão dos Trovoadas a Fradique de Menezes, enfrentou-o nas eleições de 2006. Aparentemente, era o único político a dispor-se a perder contra o quase inevitável vencedor, Fradique, menosprezado por muitos ilhéus que, todavia, não o afrontavam, eventualmente por não quererem perder para quem rebaixavam nas conversas maledicentes da rua. Ou, hipótese porventura mais fecunda, por lhes faltar horizonte para além dessa luta, o que, sabemo-lo hoje, não ocorria com Patrice Trovoada. Seja como for, importa perguntar porque é que o MLSTP não avançou com o apoio a algum militante em vez de objetivamente promover alguém30 que seria sempre – e isso era previsível – um adversário31? Só uma trajetória de perda e de desnorte político do MLSTP podia

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transformar o ressentimento contra Fradique e a inconfessada impotência em o derrotar em razões para o apoio à candidatura de Patrice Trovoada.

28 O erro do MLSTP foi vincado por um episódio prenunciador do que anos depois viria a estar politicamente em jogo, a saber, a predisposição para condutas atrabiliárias desde que garantida a impunidade. A campanha eleitoral de 2006 ficou marcada pela insólita invasão da Televisão São-Tomense (TVS) à hora da emissão do telejornal. Em resultado dessa invasão, os estúdios ficaram danificados. Tal foi a forma de protesto contra a alegada parcialidade da TVS a favor da campanha do presidente em exercício. Protagonizado por políticos com responsabilidades, Edgar Neves, da ADI, e Jorge Amado, do MLSTP, este ato de vandalismo passou sem consequências32.

29 Nessas eleições, Patrice Trovoada obteve 38,5% dos votos, uma percentagem apreciável, talvez não devidamente sopesada porque displicentemente atribuída à rejeição inspirada por Fradique. Ao invés de adesões irruptivas relativamente a outras figuras, o movimento de suporte a Patrice Trovoada foi gradual, tendo, todavia, acabado por surpreender os do MLSTP, sobranceiramente fiados em que, na hora, os votos acabavam inevitavelmente por pender para o seu lado. Em sucessivas eleições, Patrice Trovoada foi amealhando apoio em razão do acúmulo de ressentimento contra os “políticos” em crescendo desde a independência. Nas ruas, nas vésperas das eleições de 2010, esse ressentimento era indisfarçável entre os mais jovens que repetiam que iam usar o voto como arma contra os “ladrões”33.

30 Se por ocasião dos primeiros lances políticos de Patrice Trovoada ainda se ouviram vozes a rejeitar que São Tomé e Príncipe fosse um “país do pai e do filho” – um dichote decerto ditado pela aversão a Miguel Trovoada e com que ainda se ensaiava dissociar o arquipélago de outras realidades africanas –, a desesperante involução do país ajudou à caminhada de Patrice Trovoada que, sem crivos ideologicamente excludentes, antes com critérios pragmáticos ou de oportunidade, se foi firmando também pelo reconhecimento do seu partido como força política e dele como ator relevante na composição de soluções governativas. Em fevereiro de 2008, Fradique34 convidou-o para a condução de um governo, decisão com que Fradique desconsiderou o primeiro- ministro, Tomé Vera Cruz, do seu próprio partido, o mais votado mas que não aprovou o orçamento. Assim, Patrice Trovoada, chefe do terceiro partido mais votado, tornou-se primeiro-ministro de um governo suportado por vários partidos, a saber, MDFM, PCD e ADI. É mister supor uma conexão causal diversa da sugerida pela cronologia, a saber, a de a rejeição do orçamento se ter sucedido a um conluio para derrubar Tomé Vera Cruz35. Em todo o caso, não tardou que o PCD fizesse cair o governo de Patrice Trovoada ao sair da coligação. Em junho, foi empossado um novo governo, composto por todos os partidos com exclusão da ADI. Esse governo chefiado por Rafael Branco (MLSTP/PSD) durou até às eleições de 2010, mas nada teria sido mais benéfico para a vitimização de Patrice Trovoada do que um governo da coligação encabeçada pelo MLSTP.

31 Às eleições de 1 de agosto de 2010, seguiu-se novo governo de Patrice Trovoada suportado por uma maioria relativa. Entrementes, em 2011, o antigo presidente do regime do partido único, Pinto da Costa, chegou à presidência por uma pequena margem sobre o candidato da ADI, Evaristo Carvalho. Como a pulsão sobrepujou a razão, não se cedeu à tentação de repetir a tática, contraproducente, de tentar isolar a ADI. Presumivelmente por inspiração de Pinto da Costa, o governo de Patrice Trovoada foi apeado por uma moção de censura em finais de 2012. No caso, a legalidade processual só podia desesperar ainda mais os desapossados que viam nas leis um

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instrumento, não da prossecução do bem comum, mas da perpetuação, mesmo se rotativa, dos mesmos de sempre no poder36 em prejuízo do grosso dos são-tomenses. Não espanta que, pressentindo a enchente da sua maré política, um deputado da ADI aludisse a violências sangrentas, se necessárias fossem, palavreado que escandalizava os deputados mas que encantava os desapossados das ruas, cuja decisão se decantava do desejo de desagravos e de vingança dos “políticos” que aí circulavam mas em carros de alta cilindrada. De alguma forma, a anunciada rutura da futura governação de Patrice Trovoada cativava pelas insinuadas facetas de um justicialismo, comummente esperado pelo “povo pequeno”37 das grandes figuras. O suposto propósito de reposição da justiça e da equidade não deixava de contar com a pose de antissistema dos das ruas.

32 Na sequência da citada moção de censura de finais de 2012, o sucedâneo governo de iniciativa presidencial foi chão fértil para ataques aos “políticos” assaz proveitosos para a ADI. Desde 2013, vários spin doctors aventavam que Pinto da Costa tencionava instaurar uma ditadura38, o que, sendo por demais improvável, decerto até para quem o enunciava, não deixava de correr como uma certeza39 e a benefício de Patrice Trovoada.

33 Ciente do apoio popular que concitava, após a queda do seu governo em 2012, Patrice Trovoada desafiou Pinto da Costa para umas eleições pessoalizadas40. A sua proposta era a de uma revisão constitucional para se adotar um regime presidencial. Ao cabo de um ano de um governo de transição, realizar-se-iam eleições, das quais se presumia e, decerto, seria vencedor. Em rigor, os resultados de 12 de outubro de 2014 só poderiam surpreender os mais desprevenidos. Mais do que a ADI – como os demais partidos, transformada num partido de um homem só –, foi Patrice que ganhou com maioria absoluta.

34 Em 2016, pela primeira vez, um presidente não conseguiu um segundo mandato. Em parte pela fragmentação no MLSTP, mas certamente também por ser tido como mentor do derrube do governo de Patrice Trovoada, obteve uma votação dececionante na primeira volta, abdicando de disputar a segunda volta. Em 2011, Evaristo de Carvalho perdera para Pinto da Costa, eleito por conta de um desejo de um “pulso forte” que restabelecesse uma certa ordem no quotidiano. Mas em 2016 Patrice fez eleger Evaristo Carvalho, que se tornara um incondicional dos Trovoadas, para presidente.

35 A posse, a 3 de setembro, de um presidente que, embora pretextando o contrário, se anunciara dependente do chefe do partido com uma maioria de mandatos parlamentares, tornou o primeiro-ministro Patrice Trovoada detentor de um poder tendencialmente absoluto, cuja construção começara muito antes.

36 O mandato de Patrice Trovoada revelou a atonia ou a incapacidade da sociedade – também por nenhum vulto ter sido capaz de corporizar o descontentamento – perante a subversão das leis e das instituições, cujos efeitos, até pelo histórico da sua paulatina deliquescência, poderão ser duradouros. Da mesma forma poderão ser duradouros os efeitos da cizânia. Hoje, ninguém asseverará crer nos atores institucionais – por exemplo, juízes –, pressupondo que estão politicamente motivados pagos ou, talvez até, a soldo, o que implicará um qualquer ganho indevido por parte de quem neles supostamente manda.

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A deriva autoritária

37 Até 2014 prevalecera entre os políticos e outras proeminentes figuras de distintas afinidades ideológicas e sociais a lógica da espera pelas oportunidades que, cedo ou tarde, chegariam a todos eles e às respetivas clientelas. Ora, o propósito de rutura de Patrice Trovoada visava não apenas a perpetuação no poder, mas a desestruturação da oposição. Em consonância com o espírito belicoso patenteado na Assembleia pelos seus arautos, que tinham prometido sangue, encetou-se uma governação assente na exclusão, mormente após a eleição de Evaristo de Carvalho. Progressivamente, a governação tornou-se um fator de incerteza e de medo.

38 Em maio de 2017 chegaram militares ruandeses sem que, até à véspera, a sua missão fosse conhecida ou estivesse autorizada por qualquer acordo validado na Assembleia41, com o que se violava a legalidade constitucional. Alegadamente, chegavam para dar instrução, mas a uma guarda pretoriana de Trovoada, um sinal da desconfiança deste relativamente aos militares e aos demais concidadãos que eram intimidados pela intrusiva presença dos “seguranças” no espaço público.

39 Em inícios de 2018 constituiu-se um Tribunal Constitucional (TC), cuja inexistência até então fora suprida pelo Supremo Tribunal de Justiça (STJ) chamado a desempenhar esse papel ad hoc. Ao TC competia funcionar como tribunal eleitoral. A urgência de criação de um TC colocou-se após a presidência do STJ mudar para um juiz independente de Patrice Trovoada. Era por demais plausível que a criação de um TC visasse garantir sentenças favoráveis em eventuais demandas no tocante à contagem de votos (Nascimento, 2018a).

40 Aprovada uma lei inconstitucional reguladora do processo de eleição dos juízes do TC, seguiu-se uma eleição conflituosa de um TC de fação, por fim lograda de permeio com atuação da polícia de intervenção, que culminou um processo ilegal e inconstitucional validado por um presidente por quem a rua entrementes desafeta perdia o já escasso respeito que por ele tinha, apodando-o de “pau mandado”42. Após audiências com este, representantes de partidos da oposição disseram ter ouvido, a propósito das medidas inconstitucionais, a alegação de que se estava sob a “mudança”, pelo que tudo era permitido43.

41 Os derradeiros tempos da legislatura assistiram não só à derrogação da Constituição como à decapitação da justiça independente. A uma sentença do STJ sobre a posse da fábrica de cervejas Rosema, pressupostamente contrária a inconfessados interesses do governo – de outra forma não se entenderia que este enviasse a polícia para obstar à execução da sentença –, seguiu-se o banimento dos juízes desafetos do STJ e a posterior criação de um STJ de exceção com juízes nomeados pela maioria da ADI. Qual efeito da estrita obediência, a maioria de deputados não deu nota do mínimo incómodo com o possível atropelo institucional subjacente a esta medida tomada de supetão44. Mesmo se eventualmente escorada numa enviesada leitura da letra da lei, a medida não deixava de violar o princípio basilar da separação de poderes. Partidos e instituições clamaram que estava em causa a democracia e o Estado de direito (democrático). Em vão.

42 Mudados os ventos, aflorava nova divisão entre a “rua” e alguns políticos próximos de Trovoada, manifesta a propósito de itens da governação, entre eles, a amiudada ausência do primeiro-ministro do país. Pessoas diferenciadas defendiam tal anormalidade, pretextando que as oposições não queriam senão impedir o “homem de

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trabalhar pelo país”, quando elas mesmas não podiam crer no que diziam. Na falta de duplicidade, o medo suscitava raciocínios distorcidos, por exemplo, o de que Patrice Trovoada perseguia a concretização de intentos ditatoriais, mas por via democrática. Que tal asserção ilógica compusesse uma impossibilidade – nalgum momento, um putativo ditador, mesmo se eleito, abandona os trilhos da lei e da democracia –, pouco importava, porquanto o medo pesava mais do que qualquer ponderação. Aliás, talvez o medo não pesasse pouco nas eleições de 2018, às quais a sociedade são-tomense chegou dividida, sem esperança e partilhando receios de vários desenlaces possíveis.

O “ar irrespirável” e a resiliência dos ilhéus

43 Sem embargo da observância de direitos políticos – mormente do de manifestação da mole revoltada, mas inoperante, desde logo por falta de liderança45 –, o governo introduziu uma dinâmica de desconfiança, conflitualidade e de medo. Em contraponto à observância das liberdades na rua e na internet, que, apesar das ameaças de punição46, não conseguiu silenciar, afrontou as liberdades, incluindo as prerrogativas dos deputados, intentando a sua intimidação através do propósito de os fazer revistar à porta do Parlamento numa operação policial assistida pelos militares ruandeses.

44 O ano de 2018 começou com uma manifestação a 9 de janeiro, que, suportada pelos partidos da oposição, juntou três mil pessoas47. Animada, entre outras razões, pela declaração de nulidade por inconstitucionalidade dos atos do presidente da República – uma sentença do STJ que supostamente não poderia deixar de produzir efeitos, mas que seria inútil –, essa significativa manifestação não causou, longe disso, nenhum abalo telúrico. Era bem mais relevante do que a anteriormente intentada manifestação de jovens que mobilizara mais polícias do que manifestantes, mas não teve sequência nem consequências. Num ambiente crispado como o desses dias, é de supor que a manifestação – politicamente conveniente porque antevista como inócua – se manteve ordeira por força do musculado aparato policial que a emoldurava. Afinal, realizada contra a posse do TC de fação, que se constituiria dias depois, esgotou-se em si mesma.

45 A raiva levava ilhéus a invetivar Patrice Trovoada48 com o epíteto de “gabonês”, no que poderá ressoar a antiga desqualificação dos antigos escravizados “gabão” ou a rejeição da submissão a padrões políticos pressentidos como opressivos. A mudança da hora para a hora dita do Gabão e a visita do filho de Bongo, presidente do Gabão e amigo pessoal de Patrice Trovoada, praticamente a seguir à de Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, foram sentidas como sinais de uma indesejada direção política, que, todavia, não se travava com epítetos. Expressões erradas de sentimentos porventura fundados, epítetos desta índole apenas acirravam a cizânia.

46 Vigorava um estado de exceção disfarçado, onde prevaleciam a delação e a desconfiança. Nos órgãos de comunicação, em vez do contraditório prevalecia a “bufaria”49, receando-se que esta se estendesse à sociabilidade, mormente com a prometida introdução de escutas para auxiliar a investigação e, também, para mudar os hábitos do dia a dia, tal o fito que Patrice Trovoada considerava uma exigência da sociedade50.

47 Em junho, praticamente ao mesmo tempo em que falava da futura aquisição de equipamento de escutas telefónicas, o governo anunciava o desmantelamento de uma tentativa de assassinato do primeiro-ministro, cuja verosimilhança quedou logo diminuída pela rejeição das provas carreadas pelo tribunal de primeira instância. Já em

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agosto, a TVS mostrava imagens de alegadas provas de um novo complô, desmantelado a 4, golpe que, contando com mercenários estrangeiros detidos, visava, uma vez mais, a eliminação física do primeiro-ministro51.

48 Enquanto isso, crescia a violência. Já em vésperas das eleições, a morte de um jovem de Monte Café às mãos da polícia gerou revolta, tendo o comando policial na Trindade e o hospital sido protegidos por contingentes policiais que visavam conter a ira de populares. O corpo seria enterrado de noite e os presumíveis autores imediatamente pronunciados52. As eleições impunham tal medida.

49 Ao cabo de décadas, ao passo que o progressivo esvaziamento e a desestruturação tinham tornado o Estado informal e inepto, o poder estava personalizado (Castells, 2002, p. 123). Como que invertendo um embrionário grau de mediação institucional nos derradeiros anos do colonialismo, o processo de deliquescência institucional e de correlata personalização do poder é anterior a 1990. Depois, a personalização do poder político prosseguiu com a democracia, sucedendo-se os patronos dominantes. Ao mesmo tempo que se destruía o Estado, mantinha-se o seu aparato formal, preenchendo-se os vários órgãos com clientes ou apaniguados. Porém, foi durante o governo de Patrice Trovoada que a apropriação de todos os órgãos de poder por uma rede de fiéis encimada por uma figura se extremou. Assinale-se a baldeação de quadros de topo de outros partidos para a esfera da sua influência durante a sua governação.

50 Chegadas as eleições, perguntar-se-ia o que pesaria mais, se o medo de um Estado musculado que formalmente garantia certos direitos, se a sensação difusa de que o país importara a “tradição africana” de violência que só poderia ser tolhida pela reposição da legalidade. Noutros termos, obviamente Patrice Trovoada não podia ser responsabilizado pela morte do economista Jorge Santos53 mas, para uma fração da sociedade, um clima de crescente disrupção e de violência impune por parte de alguns que lhe eram próximos não podia deixar de ser sentido como uma ameaça de uma futura violência irrestrita e infrene, realidade bem mais tangível do que as inventonas de atentados contra o primeiro-ministro.

51 A pretexto da falta de verbas, as eleições autárquicas tinham sido adiadas para 2018 e acopladas às legislativas, o que já sucedera em anteriores ocasiões. Sem embargo, o manejo do calendário eleitoral pode ser relacionado com o intuito de somar vitórias por efeito de empatia, o que já funcionara em 2014, e, presumivelmente, com o intuito de protelar eleições porventura sinalizadoras de dissidências um ano antes das legislativas de 2018, o que aumentaria as dificuldades da governação e de repetição da maioria absoluta. Não se dirá que a eventual intuição relativa à necessidade de evitar expor fissuras no bloco de poder não estivesse certa...

52 Acerca dos prováveis resultados, aventar-se-ia que o então primeiro-ministro ganhava ou... ganhava, prognóstico que antecipava o possível efeito de arrastamento do exercício do poder – efeito comprovado pela votação obtida pela ADI – por contraposição ao presumido esfacelamento da oposição, que, ademais, não apresentava nenhum vulto politicamente arrebatador. Tal prognóstico contemplava igualmente a hipótese de eventual manipulação dos resultados, se necessária fosse, para sustentar a vitória do governante, tal a inferência decorrente dos atropelos às disposições constitucionais pelos quais se criara um TC de fação, na circunstância, tribunal eleitoral.

53 A dinâmica conflitual introduzida pela governação na sociedade reduzia a hipótese de repetição de uma votação assente na esperança existente em 2010 e renovada em 2014.

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Depois de a confrontação ter chegado à intervenção da polícia no Parlamento, só a maioria absoluta era uma vitória, que, contudo, parecia incerta, como o indiciou o inesperado dizer do presidente, “o povo põe, o povo tira”. A reprodução desta coloquialidade da terra destoava da até então incondicional obediência ao primeiro- ministro.

54 O ar tornara-se “irrespirável” até para militantes da ADI. Dados vários fatores – subversão e instrumentalização das instituições, controlo dos meios de comunicação social tornados órgãos de propaganda, capacidade de mobilização com base em operações de marketing, medo instalado e curso de uma narrativa irrebatível acerca do chefe –, as eleições deveriam ser encaradas como a possibilidade de o povo protestar e de se livrar de um, se assim considerado, potencial ditador. Em alternativa a esta possível hipótese, o poder podia exercer um efeito de arrastamento favorável a Patrice Trovoada, o que ficou comprovado pela votação que este obteve54.

55 Estava em causa a democracia55. Embora sem figuras galvanizadoras que mobilizassem a população em torno de uma alternativa política, partidos da oposição coligaram-se para não se desperdiçarem votos. Dramatizadas pela bipolarização e pela afirmação da imperiosa necessidade de uma maioria absoluta – o que pode ter feito recuar o “banho” 56 –, as eleições terão sido determinadas pela emotividade.

56 Quebrados pela metade, os votos traduziram uma relativa aceitação da governação ou, talvez, a descrença na melhoria advinda da alternância no poder. Aliás, legítimas habilidades de circunstância ajudaram Patrice Trovoada a (quase) alcançar a vitória. A criação por trânsfugas do MLSTP de um partido correspondente a uma afinidade local57 no sul de São Tomé, em Caué, o Movimento de Cidadãos Independentes de São Tomé e Príncipe, resultou em ganhos de deputados, de outro modo difíceis de conseguir para a ADI, mas que certamente alinhariam com Patrice Trovoada se tal tivesse proporcionado a maioria absoluta58.

57 Embora por uma margem estreita – pouco consonante com os queixumes generalizados, incluindo até de correligionários, entre quem, todavia, pode ter lavrado o receio da revanche, indício de que, uma vez instalada, a dinâmica de medo é de difícil remoção –, os resultados penderam para a rejeição de Patrice Trovoada.

58 Mais relevante, comprovaram a inequívoca importância das eleições e, afinal, da tão depreciada democracia representativa, ocidental, como gratuita e diletantemente se a usa apodar. Todavia, e prudentemente, não se dirá que para a maioria dos ilhéus a questão do regime e de quem manda não seria irrelevante se tivessem minimamente asseguradas necessidades básicas, segurança e previsibilidade nas suas vidas.

O incêndio do jipe, a deserção e a alternância no poder

59 Às primeiras horas do escrutínio dos votos, quando o futuro do arquipélago se decidia pela diferença de um deputado, não faltou um apagão por falta de eletricidade. Mesmo se rotineiro, um apagão na hora da contagem de votos e com a oposição à frente lançava a suspeição59. Não era claro se houvera, ou não, fraude, mas compreende-se a suspeita quanto à possível viciação dos resultados, porquanto a ADI prontamente pretextou que a recontagem de votos em Água-Grande, distrito da capital, lhe garantia um deputado. Porém, se atribuído a um partido da oposição, permitia a esta guindar-se ao poder (ADI, 25, e Movimento de Caué, 2, perfaziam 27 mandatos, excedidos pelos 28,

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23 do MLSTP e 5 da formação PCD/MDFM/UDD). A reivindicação da ADI de mais um deputado pode ser entendida como uma experimentação da possibilidade de alterar os resultados. No ver da “rua”, fora para a eventualidade de ter de dirimir a contento pleitos eleitorais que ilegalmente se criara um TC de fação.

60 Foi por estas circunstâncias e, também, pela afinidade com a irmã, ministra da Justiça, que se presumiram as intenções da juíza Natacha Amado Vaz. A destruição do seu jipe durante a manifestação teve um tom de resposta ao teste da tomada de pulso do ambiente social pela ADI. Na realidade, quem quer que recontasse votos era potencialmente suspeito de cumplicidade numa fraude em prol do governo. Quiçá injustamente, lavrou a suspeita de que a juíza Natacha estaria a transformar os votos nulos em votos da ADI, o que ela enfaticamente negou. Para a oposição, tal validação era ilegal, sem embargo de, pelas suas contas, nem isso bastar para a ADI eleger o deputado em falta para obter a maioria absoluta em coligação com Movimento de Caué.

61 Fosse como fosse, alguns jovens pretextaram defender a vontade ditada nas urnas. Durante o protesto, os manifestantes incendiaram o jipe da juíza Natacha, um episódio algo inesperado, não à luz da violência crescente desde há anos, mas pela passividade das forças policiais que, ostensivamente presentes noutras atuações preventivas, pareceram ressentir-se da ausência de mando.

62 O incêndio do jipe poderá ter sido uma das chaves do rumo dos eventos após as eleições. Só a posteriori as forças policiais intervieram, mas o comedimento pautou a sua atuação. A desajeitada proibição, pela Polícia Nacional, de manifestações enquanto durasse a contagem final dos votos e durante 72 horas após a publicação dos resultados denotou desnorte. A Polícia foi publicamente desautorizada por exorbitar poderes, não tendo sido secundada por qualquer governante. Embora contido, como que se manteve um estado de vigilância, enquanto o apuramento se arrastava – parecendo incompreensível a demora da contagem de menos de cem mil votos – sob escrutínio internacional que, num primeiro momento, também foi considerado suspeito e conivente com a propalada adulteração dos votos.

63 Talvez a contestação nas ruas não tivesse pesado não fosse a antevisão da deserção de Patrice Trovoada, um dado politicamente relevante por desmoralizador dos correligionários. Todavia, também é difícil asseverar que a tergiversação e a contemporização, evidenciadas aquando das anteriores denegações atrabiliárias de fundamentos do Estado de direito, chegariam à viciação dos resultados, sendo de admitir que, mesmo se residuais, imperativos de ordem moral poderiam obstar a fraudes, as quais, se concretizadas, minariam de forma drástica o valor das eleições como último reduto – e prova – da democracia no arquipélago. Ora, a premonição do abandono do chefe, saído a 12 de outubro60, antes da confirmação dos resultados, desferiu uma machadada na eventual predisposição para falsear resultados ou para ações repressivas. Em razão do abandono do chefe – se não antes imaginado, decerto prontamente percebido como inevitável e duradouro –, as hostes claudicaram, a fidelidade deslassou e a belicosidade cedeu lugar à contemporização61. Dir-se-ia até que só o pressentido abandono do chefe permitiu a manifestação e a ocorrência de violências, porquanto, sem ele, ninguém quis arriscar decisões que poderiam cindir ainda mais os são-tomenses62.

64 A 11 de outubro, Patrice Trovoada lamentou que a justiça ainda não tivesse acusado os suspeitos do último dos alegados atentados contra si, acrescentando que “a situação de risco se mantém”63. Poucos terão reparado nesta afirmação que, substantivamente oca,

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se destinaria a justificar a saída do país a 12. Os seus clientes tiveram de começar a pensar em sobreviver sem ele, enquanto alguns mais fiéis ou dependentes, tomando o seu desejo por uma inevitabilidade, começaram a prognosticar a queda do futuro governo da oposição e, decerto, a antever a volta do patrono.

65 O país quedou sem governo, não por qualquer caos criado nas ruas, mas por, ao lastro de décadas de progressiva deliquescência das instituições, se somar a ausência do chefe. Patrice Trovoada saiu do país, alijando sem mais as suas obrigações, mas mantendo – oficialmente em parte incerta – as prerrogativas de primeiro-ministro. O governo só seria demitido pelo Presidente aquando da tomada de posse da nova Assembleia ocorrida a 22 de novembro.

66 A aparente solidez da união contra Patrice Trovoada levou à alternância no poder. Se, no passado, os sortilégios na recomposição das alianças para efeitos eleitorais, tributários da liquefação ideológica e da vacuidade programática, resultavam incongruentes e desacreditavam a ação política – abrindo espaço a crenças em soluções providenciais –, o governo saído das eleições polarizou, ao menos momentaneamente, a esperança num desempenho competente que, na falta de outra medida, a vox populi avaliará pela inexistência de negociatas e pelo cumprimento de promessas relativas a itens básicos. Afinal, e ainda mais do que no passado, a nenhum governo restaria qualquer tempo, um bem precioso na política mas que só os governos ditatoriais conseguem criar.

67 O dramatismo das eleições colocou o governo de Jorge Bom Jesus – fruto da coligação de todos os partidos da oposição, encabeçada pelo MLSTP – no fio da navalha. Como ação imediata, repôs-se a ordem constitucional64. O governo ficou obrigado a ser exemplar, exigência agravada pelo facto de o comum das pessoas ter como certo que nenhuma das instituições, mormente a judicial, é independente. No imediato, impõe-se-lhe uma governação transparente, que, avessa ao arbítrio, reintroduza a decência e a ética nas relações políticas e cívicas. Outra conduta desmentiria a valia de um Estado de direito democrático, prezado pelos são-tomenses65 conforme se comprovou nas eleições pelas quais a maioria deles esperou com paciência.

68 Num quadro de dificuldades financeiras, de degradação de serviços e na impossibilidade de prover de pronto bens básicos, resta ao governo a solidariedade moral com a esmagadora maioria dos ilhéus que pouco ou nada tem e, menos ainda, esperança. Noutros termos, importaria incutir nos vínculos políticos uma noção de confiança derivada da irmandade e da necessidade de convivência pacífica, tudo escorado no fortalecimento das instituições que garantem a liberdade dos homens.

69 Os resultados sugerem uma clivagem, quiçá mais aparente ou mutante do que decantada ou de princípios, porquanto, dada a volatilidade do ambiente político – as fidelidades partidárias são lassas e as ideológicas quase inexistentes, propiciando a movimentação de indivíduos na direção de outras forças políticas –, o suporte eleitoral da ADI poderá desfazer-se se o “chefe” se tornar (ou parecer) definitivamente ausente. Mas poderá recompor-se se entrementes se perspetivar um regresso do “chefe”.

70 Ao invés do alvitre de que Patrice Trovoada se desqualificou irremediavelmente pela fuga, demonstrando não estar à altura do cargo, diria que o abandono da função não o desqualifica para futuros tirocínios políticos por, afinal, a qualificação em política e, em particular, em São Tomé e Príncipe ter pouco a ver com ponderações racionais sobre factos da história, incluindo da recente. Se a evolução política e social se mostrar propícia, não será impossível a Patrice Trovoada arriscar uma candidatura presidencial.

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Em futuras eleições, poderá reaparecer como salvador e até ser eleito por ressentimento. Se o futuro político de Trovoada se mantiver relevante, é porque, num Estado de direito democrático política e institucionalmente deslassado, a sociedade terá continuado mergulhada num défice de esperança.

71 Sem embargo da titânica luta dos ilhéus pela afirmação da sua dignidade num quotidiano pejado de incomensuráveis escolhos, dada a vulnerabilidade da sociedade insular, não se tentarão muitos ilhéus a aderir de novo a quem, chegado de fora e com signos de poder e riqueza, acene com uma mirífica promessa de uma melhoria mínima das condições de vida, por exemplo, através da cooptação para a respetiva clientela? Maior dúvida será a de saber por quanto tempo prevalecerá o atual quadro político…

Por fim, vozes africanas, democracia africana ou… tão-somente democracia?

72 As eleições puseram a nu a vanidade de muitas lucubrações sobre a viabilidade da democracia no meio são-tomense. Com fundamento variável, algumas menções a uma democracia de feição local66 ou “africana”67 emanam de genuínas inquietações políticas, ao passo que outras advêm de modismos ou de particulares sentidos de oportunidade68, caso, por exemplo, de tentativas de ganho de votos. Adiante-se, estas tentativas são risíveis e inúteis porque a determinação do voto tem pouco a ver com a dita feição da democracia. No limite, arriscaríamos dizer que, se aos desapossados dissesse respeito, a determinação do voto teria pouco a ver até com a natureza do regime…

73 Seja como for, a democracia representativa, dita redutora por algum ativismo propenso a idealizar o mundo e as ações, não deixou de ser crucial para os ilhéus. Os eventos recentes colidem com a argumentação acerca da necessária especificidade da democracia são-tomense, cujos défices, em termos simplistas, radicam antes na incapacidade de nomear os poderosos que instrumentalizam a lei e de prevenir ou coibir práticas corrosivas das instituições, das leis e da regulação social do bem comum.

74 É certo que, desde há anos, se assiste a uma renovação do autoritarismo em África, e não só, ao mesmo tempo que se passou a duvidar de que a democracia seja o melhor regime para assegurar a boa governação69 ou o crescimento económico, para já não referir a coesão e a justiça social70. Apesar de décadas de observância formal dos mecanismos democráticos, quantos são-tomenses não estariam rendidos à ideia de que a boa governação era a do “pulso forte”, almejando que esta se revelasse justiceira ao punir os privilégios indevidos... até que a governação atrabiliária de Trovoada veio mostrar a importância da democracia, mesmo se reduzida a eleições competitivas e livres? Relembre-se que nas eleições a sociedade se cindiu.

75 Em parte, a benevolência para com o “pulso forte” resulta de há muito não se vincarem princípios políticos e éticos, uma falha por vezes explicada por imperativos da governação. Este espaço de um forçoso (e movediço) pragmatismo pode também ser um cadinho das derivas ditatoriais amparadas em virtudes ilusórias que, por vezes, população e governantes julgam ver nessas derivas. Por isso, não raro a “democracia africana” acaba reduzida a uma das várias modalidades do “pulso forte” ou a uma deriva autoritária.

76 Logo, a par da denodada aposta no fortalecimento das instituições que garantem os direitos dos cidadãos, talvez seja imperiosa a inequívoca afirmação de princípios, a

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estender à regulação dos desempenhos institucionais – por onde, aliás, deveria começar – para se poder lidar com a agrura e a acrimónia inevitavelmente resultantes das privações que, há décadas, avassalam a sociedade são-tomense.

77 Para parte dos ilhéus as eleições de 2018 decidiam entre a paragem ou a continuação da deriva autoritária. No caso, a equação era complicada pela circunstância de Patrice Trovoada nunca ter enjeitado a democracia71, mesmo se a governação se pautou por sucessivos atropelos à lei e, por fim, pela subversão do Estado de direito democrático – formalmente mantido como parte da sua subversão –, que só não foi completa pela realização de eleições. Estas comportavam uma escolha dilemática, assaz diversa das lucubrações sobre a aplicabilidade da democracia.

78 Pela primeira vez desde a implantação da democracia, umas eleições decidiam da respetiva sobrevivência72. A governação de 2014 a 2018, pautada pela surpreendente facilidade com que se desmorona um edifício constitucional, devia tornar os opinion makers e estudiosos mais cônscios da necessidade de sopesarem o valor de lemas criativos mas desajustados das realidades. Num tal contexto não será desarrazoado advogar uma supostamente exigente, mas, afinal, vaga e indefinida democratização da sociedade para além da observância das leis e da realização de eleições? Embora possa parecer banal, não será de saudar a realização de eleições livres e a paz política e social quando sobre a terra se abatia um horizonte de medo e de violência?

BIBLIOGRAFIA

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Cahen, M. (1991). Arquipélagos da alternância: A vitória da oposição nas ilhas de Cabo Verde e de São Tomé e Príncipe. Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos, 14-15, pp. 113-154.

Cardoso, C., Macamo, E., & Pestana, N. (2002). Da possibilidade do político na África lusófona. Alguns subsídios teóricos. Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 3, pp. 5-25.

Castells, M. (2002). Fim de milénio (3ª ed.). Paz e Terra.

Ceita, J. G. V. de. (2012). Memórias e sonhos perdidos de um combatente pela libertação e progresso de São Tomé e Príncipe. S/ed.

Chabal, P. (1998). A transição democrática em África: Problemas e perspectivas. Colóquio Internacional Que Estados, que nações em construção nos cinco? (pp. 143-157). Fundação Amílcar Cabral.

Chabal, P., et al. (2002). A history of postcolonial Lusophone Africa. Hurst & Co.

Chabal, P., & Daloz, J.-P. (1999). Africa works: Disorder as political instrument. James Currey.

Falola, T. (2004). Nationalism and African intellectuals. University of Rochester Press.

Frynas, J. G., Wood, G., & Oliveira, R. M. S. S. de. (2003). Business and politics in São Tomé e Príncipe: From cocoa monoculture to petro-state. African Affairs, 102, pp. 51-80.

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Kieh Jr., G. K., & Agbese, P. O. (2014). Introduction. The tragedies of authoritarian state in Africa. In K. Kieh Jr., & P. O. Agbese (Eds.), Reconstructing the authoritarian state in Africa (pp. 1-17). Routledge.

Lindberg, S. I. (2006). Democracy and elections in Africa. The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Mbembe, A. (2013). África insubmissa. Cristianismo, poder e Estado na sociedade pós-colonial. Pedago.

Nascimento, A. (2007). Ciências sociais em S. Tomé e Príncipe: A independência e o estado da arte. Edição digital. Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto (CEAUP). http:// www.africanos.eu/ceaup/uploads.EB005/pdf

Nascimento, A. (2010).São Tomée Príncipe na idade adulta:A governação e o descaso da rua. Revista Tempo do Mundo, 2(3), 45-73. http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/ 111024_rtm_portugues03.pdf (Acedido em 27 de janeiro de 2014).

Nascimento, A. (2013). As pulsões na política em São Tomé e Príncipe. Africana Studia, 20, pp. 135-152.

Nascimento, A. (2017). A politização do ser são-tomense e da santomensidade. In R. Carneiro, O. T. Almeida, & A. T. de Matos (Coord.), A condição de ilhéu (pp. 365-378). CEPCEP, Universidade Católica Portuguesa.

Nascimento, A. (2018a).São Tomée Príncipe:Recordar os mortos e… que dizer dos vivos? http:// blog.cei.iscte-iul.pt/sao-tome-e-principe-recordar-os-mortos-e-que-dizer-dos-vivos/ (Acedido em 26 de janeiro de 2018).

Nascimento, A. (2018b). A abrasiva situação política em São Tomé e Príncipe: Por quem os sinos dobram? http://blog.cei.iscte-iul.pt/a-abrasiva-situacao-politica-em-sao-tome-e-principe-por-quem-os- sinos-dobram/ (Acedido em 11 de maio de 2018).

Nascimento, A. (2019). São Tomé e Príncipe: As tramas da política e a emancipação do saber histórico. BISTP.

Sanches, E. R. (2015). O desenvolvimento dos sistemas partidários de Cabo Verde e São Tomé e Príncipe em perspetiva comparada (1991-2014). Anuário de Direito de São Tomé e Príncipe (pp. 121-146). Instituto do Direito de Língua Portuguesa & Instituto do Direito e Cidadania. http:// repositorio.ul.pt/bitstream/10451/25347/3/ICS_ERSanches_Desenvolvimento_ARN.pdf (Acedido em 22 de junho de 2019).

Santos, C. O. (2014). Patrice Trovoada: Uma voz africana. Âncora.

Seibert, G. (2001). Camaradas, clientes e compadres. Colonialismo, socialismo e democratização em São Tomé e Príncipe. Vega.

Tenreiro, F. (1956). Cabo Verde e S. Tomé e Príncipe: Esquema de uma evolução conjunta. Cabo Verde, 76, pp. 12-17.

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NOTAS

1. Independentemente de prováveis facetas não democráticas do sistema político no arquipélago, passíveis de inventariação num estudo tipológico norteado pela ciência política (atente-se nas possíveis variáveis e nos indicadores a considerar; cf., por exemplo, Lindberg, 2006), é indubitável que em São Tomé e Príncipe se viveu desde

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1990 em regime democrático. Sem embargo da rala e desigual participação política, preservaram-se, mesmo se diminuídos pelas circunstâncias, crivos decisivos como a liberdade de expressão e o voto livre. 2. Desde há anos, a democracia perdeu adeptos por deixar de estar associada à melhor performance económica por que, nos anos 90, no rescaldo das dificuldades da década precedente, os Estados africanos ansiavam. Ora, embora sociedades democráticas sejam mais abertas à competitividade e à inovação, a correlação entre democracia e progresso económico não é intemporal nem linear, dependendo de variadíssimos fatores e de sortilégios da história, como a do arquipélago o confirma. 3. A racionalidade não é um dado da decisão política no terreno. E menos o é em função da impetuosa avalanche de informação não mediada ou da reflexividade crescente mas imponderada nos dias de hoje. Qualquer otimismo a respeito da sensatez da nova praça pública em qualquer sociedade tornou-se uma crendice ingénua e uma fonte de erros de análise. 4. Estamos cientes da diferença entre democracia e multipartidarismo (Chabal, 2002, pp. 127-128 e 133) – ainda assim grosso modo coincidentes no arquipélago durante décadas –, como também das nuances de regimes entre o democrático e o autoritário, que, por vezes, não se deixam de reclamar de democráticos. Até pela complexa interação e pela facilidade de construção de dependências pessoais num contexto micro-insular, valemo-nos de uma definição de democracia atida ao exercício das liberdades para uma livre escolha dos governantes. 5. Por vezes de significados múltiplos, intrincados e, porventura, algo contraditórios. Por exemplo, a persistente adesão a Patrice Trovoada, traduzida numa votação relativamente equilibrada nestas eleições de 2018, não quererá significar que os seus votantes não quisessem preservar a possibilidade de validar a sua governação através de atos eleitorais, ao que, em última análise, se poderá resumir a democracia. 6. Tal foi a expetativa em parte subjacente à eleição de Pinto da Costa em 2011 (Nascimento, 2013). Não se estranhe que uma das mensagens de Patrice Trovoada fosse a da necessária restauração da autoridade do Estado. Obviamente, os sentidos das expetativas populares e dos dizeres dos políticos são assaz diversos e, no caso da governação de Patrice Trovoada, o reforço da autoridade do Estado quase se resumiu ao apetrechamento da polícia e ao acréscimo da sua discricionariedade e da sua dominação apesar da observância (retórica) das disposições legais e constitucionais alteradas ad hoc. 7. Referindo-se a Cabo Verde, Chabal defende que a matriz cultural é mais importante do que a ideologia na determinação do modo de funcionamento do campo político (cf. 2002, p. 91). A propósito, anotem-se as diferenças entre Cabo Verde e São Tomé e Príncipe já observáveis na era colonial (Tenreiro, 1956), evidenciadas nos rumos divergentes dos dois arquipélagos após a independência a despeito da comunhão da ideologia. 8. Em março de 2013, Frederique Samba foi nomeado procurador-geral. Em junho, Patrice Trovoada foi acusado de lavagem de dinheiro, mas, salvo uma diligência risível, o processo nunca andou. Em 2014, a meses das eleições, Patrice Trovoada negou a acusação de branqueamento de capitais, atribuindo-a a motivações políticas, o que parecia plausível, mesmo para não apoiantes. Perante a maré política, a acusação caiu. Já o procurador acabaria nomeado em julho de 2018 juiz do STJ no âmbito do rearranjo ad hoc dos órgãos judiciais por decisão da ADI na assembleia. Diga-se, as acusações de parcialidade, antes atribuíveis à influência de Patrice Trovoada, atêm-se agora às

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acusações a membros do anterior governo. A prisão de um ministro é imputada à influência do governo de Jorge Bom Jesus (matéria que transcende o escopo deste texto). 9. Para Chabal, multipartidarismo e democracia não são sinónimos (cf. 2002, pp. 127-128 e 133). Várias noções de democracia – mormente as que remetem para a democratização e para a pluralidade da vida política e social – têm menor relevância por serem idealizações menos atidas à realidade do arquipélago, onde a ação política falece por força da desagregação social, da deliquescência institucional e, não menos importante, da rara probidade pública e política numa terra de intenso escrutínio da vida alheia. 10. Veja-se, por exemplo, a expressão das preocupações americanas em inícios de 2018 em https://www.telanon.info/politica/2018/02/02/26352/eua-alerta-o-poder-sao- tomense-para-garantia-da-liberdade-de-imprensa/ (Acedido em 26 de junho de 2019). 11. Segundo Falola, desde há anos ocorre um renovado movimento no sentido do autoritarismo (2004, p. 273), qual refluxo do que, afinal, teria sido mais um constrangimento do que uma adesão à democracia. Ora, apesar quer deste contexto africano, quer das provações sociais e das pulsões políticas, em São Tomé e Príncipe a democracia ainda concita apoio, incluindo da “rua” que prontamente invetiva os “políticos”. Num certo sentido, a democracia ainda parece oferecer alguma segurança contra a arbitrariedade decorrente da propensão voluntarista e autoritária. 12. Para uma abordagem concisa quer da onda democrática e do seu refluxo, quer das análises desse movimento, ver Lindberg (2006, pp. 52-53). 13. Aliás, tão bem que, há anos, o apoio da rua e as adesões incondicionais, impensadas ou dúplices, de indivíduos socialmente distintos conferiram à eleição de Patrice Trovoada e ao seu esperado protagonismo político uma dimensão salvífica. 14. Dir-se-ia que se compreenderia mal tais intentos autoritários de quem alega ter nascido no estrangeiro por força da “luta” e foi vítima da prepotência totalitária após a independência. Porém, é uma crendice inane supor que vítimas da arbitrariedade não a reproduzem. 15. Acerca da luta entre nacionalistas no período de transição, ver Nascimento (2019). 16. Apesar de somadas às dificuldades económicas agravadas de ano para ano no início da década de 1980, a quebra da ideologia e a corrosão da legitimidade do poder (assinaladas por Sanches, 2015, p. 122) não conduziram a movimentações políticas e sociais de oposição. Na prática, estas reduziam-se a críticas à boca pequena que causticavam o regime à medida que se percebia que a sanha persecutória perdia fôlego. As movimentações políticas tiveram lugar depois da perceção do passo tendente à liberalização. Assim, como afirma Seibert, a adoção da democracia não resultou da pressão interna (2001). Para uma súmula do debate sobre a “mudança” para a democracia, ver Nascimento (2007, pp. 74-76). 17. Talvez a expressão que melhor sintetize o sentimento político de então, pautado pela quebra do ímpeto revolucionário e autoritário, seja a de marasmo ou de completa ineficiência, conforme descrição em Cahen (1991, pp. 130-131). 18. Acerca das incidências impolíticas dessa campanha, ver Ceita (2012, pp. 397 e 419). 19. Na biografia de Patrice Trovoada, Santos defende que Miguel Trovoada foi alheio à ideia e à formação da Ação Democrática Independente (2014, pp. 178-179). A prudência e a comparação obrigam a duvidar desta tese, cabendo admitir como plausível a confluência de vontades entre o então presidente e o filho, Patrice Trovoada. Cumpriria comprová-la, indagando, por exemplo, quem e em que circunstâncias desencantou e

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apresentou aos dirigentes da ADI a hipótese de candidatura presidencial de Fradique de Menezes. Se ela tivesse sido apresentada por Patrice teria tido a mesma força entre aqueles que esperavam pela sua hora como recompensa pelo seu amparo a Miguel Trovoada? 20. O “modelo promotor”, consequência das decisões tomadas no período de transição para a democracia, facilitou esta criação de partidos, a fragmentação partidária e a competitividade política. Veja-se, por comparação com o modelo protetor operante em Cabo Verde, as consequências do modelo promotor no tocante à competição partidária em São Tomé e Príncipe (cf. Sanches, 2015, p. 142). Acrescente-se que, na ausência de competição entre as ilhas enquanto locus criador de identificação, e dada a crença no sucesso de uma arquitetura política consentânea com o substrato cultural, terá parecido negligenciável a proteção institucional da competitividade política. Na realidade, os são-tomenses não terão imaginado nem os efeitos política e socialmente corrosivos da continuação da pobreza, nem os efeitos do aprofundamento das dinâmicas de pessoalização do poder – iniciada aquando da independência – perniciosos para a ação das instituições, dinâmicas contra as quais de nada valeriam as baias de cariz institucional. Neste caso, as consequências, muitas inimagináveis, decorrem, não das medidas tomadas num período crucial – em 1990, a exemplo do já sucedido em 1974-1975 (Nascimento, 2019) –, mas das medidas não tomadas, entre outras razões, por incapacidade ou desinteresse em pensar as múltiplas possibilidades de deriva política e institucional. 21. Por conta da debilitação das instituições, a sociedade e a democracia pagam um elevado preço porque a dado passo parece que só o voluntarismo e a força de alguém resolverão os problemas. Face a tal deriva, advogar mudanças de arquitetura política sem denunciar a autoria da infração às leis corresponde a uma sorte de escapismo intelectual, nalguns casos porventura bem-intencionado mas, em todo o caso, inútil e contraproducente… 22. O problema não está na democracia, nem sequer na impossibilidade de a adaptar (em termos talvez nunca concretizados). Uma das dificuldades, e de monta, é a de nomear os farsantes ou responsabilizar os políticos. Ora, na impossibilidade de nomear os políticos – liberdade que a “rua” tem –, inculpar a democracia é fácil mas inútil. Labora-se numa equação errada porque a democracia não é um ator, é um cenário de possibilidades de ação e de decisão. Obviamente – e como sustentou Patrice Trovoada em entrevista ao semanário português Sol (cf. https://sol.sapo.pt/artigo/76608/patrice- trovoada-pinto-da-costa-nao-esta-a-altura, acedido em 25 de novembro de 2019) – o problema são as pessoas. De resto, foi com tais asserções que ele ganhou o eleitorado. Claro que à verdade que a conjuntura conferia ao que ele dizia, importaria acrescentar que o pecado original é de todos, mormente de todo e qualquer um que viole a lei. Diga- se, em São Tomé e Príncipe as instituições são demasiado frágeis e incapazes de prevenir e punir a violação continuada e sistemática das leis. Diria que, ao arquipélago, só já lhe valem, ainda que cada vez menos, os valores que sustentam as sociedades quando lhes falecem as instituições e as leis. 23. Porventura, operam outros considerandos de difícil computação na formação dos sentimentos políticos. Anos a fio, a vox populi nomeava este e aquele político, para não dizer a totalidade, como “ladrões”. Porém, prevalece a adesão, por vezes incondicional, a quem afeta a posse de meios de origem desconhecida, desde logo por não provirem de atividade na terra. A indulgência (impensada ou inconfessada) relativamente a cada político decorre da adesão, conjuntural, das gentes se ele se revelar ou se perfilar como

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o mais forte. Neste caso, é como se se esvanecesse a capacidade crítica da “rua” e o moralismo sumário fosse substituído por uma crença acéfala nos propósitos do putativo mandante, avaliados pelo valor facial das promessas e, sobretudo, pela prodigalidade de meios. Acerca deste mecanismo enviesado de contato entre quem se apropria e distribui os recursos e o comum das gentes em privação crónica, veja-se Chabal e Daloz, para quem o verdadeiro desapossado seria o que não tem chefe (1999, p. 42), não vendo, por isso, reconhecida a sua existência social. 24. Independentemente do juízo que se possa fazer acerca de cada um dos visados, a verdade é que, no que é de conhecimento público ou se propala – o que nas ruas vale o mesmo –, não faltariam motivos pelos quais os ilhéus o poderiam invetivar como aos outros políticos. “De facto, já após a conquista do poder, não foi preciso andar muito nas ruas para ouvir acerca dele o que comummente é dito dos políticos e de qualquer um que esteja ou tenha estado no poder” (Testemunho pessoal, A. Nascimento). 25. Quando está no poder, também prima pela ausência, como foi por demais evidente nestes últimos quatro anos. 26. Diga-se, a dimensão salvífica foi atribuída a outros políticos, por vezes a partir do nada – o mesmo é dizer, por o ponto de partida desses políticos ser exterior à vivência local – e por força das circunstâncias, como resulta dos casos de Pinto da Costa, Miguel Trovoada e, em especial, Fradique de Menezes. Porém, estes não podiam ter a convicção de um dia chegar ao poder como homens providenciais. Diferentemente, a trajetória de Patrice Trovoada foi engenhosamente preparada. 27. “Cabe uma advertência: é impossível adicionar comprovação empírica de alguns laços e de alguns lances sem colocar em causa pessoas. Por isso, algumas inferências quedam aferíveis apenas pela congruência da narrativa e da explicação” (A. Nascimento). 28. Esta inferência baseia-se em indiscrições relativamente a lealdades devidas a Patrice Trovoada – que tive ocasião de comprovar pela trajetória das pessoas – e na leitura de entrevistas com vários anos que indiciam que tais lealdades já operavam. Eram lealdades subterrâneas porquanto as pessoas aparentavam e até protestavam ser independentes ou ter outras filiações partidárias, majorando, dessa forma, o impacto da (posterior) aceitação de Patrice Trovoada, assim aureolado como providencial. 29. Esta inferência é difícil de provar por falta de suporte empírico bastante (embora possivelmente os são-tomenses tenham conhecimento de factos indiciários dessas relações). Não obstante, e tomando como exemplo o MLSTP, a sua oposição afigura-se tão inane que não se pode deixar de equacionar uma tal hipótese. 30. Santos alude ao apoio do MPLA à candidatura de Patrice Trovoada contra Fradique de Menezes, detestado pelos angolanos (Santos, 2014, pp. 239-240). Ao tempo, à luz dos interesses do MLSTP, deveria importar que o MPLA se tivesse decidido pelo apoio a Patrice Trovoada? 31. Em 2006, Posser da Costa era responsável máximo do MLSTP. Em 2018, na qualidade de advogado de Melo Xavier – empresário angolano com vários interesses em São Tomé e Príncipe e, concretamente, na cervejeira Rosema, cuja posse foi disputada em sede judicial –, veio a ser afrontado por Patrice Trovoada aquando da reversão da sentença do STJ por ação policial, ação que, evidentemente, não teria acontecido sem a anuência de Patrice Trovoada. 32. Cf. https://uk.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/saotome/conversations/messages/ 15487 (Acedido em 16 de agosto de 2015).

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33. Acerca do ambiente político por ocasião das eleições de 2010, veja-se Nascimento (2010). A esse momento e, por certo, ao das eleições de 2014 poderia aplicar-se a interpretação de Santos acerca do paradoxo dos Trovoadas que concitavam, por um lado, o apoio e o respeito do “Povo” e, por outro, o ódio e as manobras de uma elite política (Santos, 2014, pp. 182-183). Apesar de simplista e maniqueísta, referido a 2010, tal apontamento ainda tinha sentido em 2014, quando Patrice Trovoada ainda não perfizera uma governação por que pudesse ser avaliado. 34. Fradique foi destratado na encomiástica biografia de Patrice Trovoada (Santos, 2014, pp. 217-218). 35. Tomé Vera Cruz acusou Fradique de deslealdade. A este respeito, veja-se a carta aberta de Vera Cruz, de 2010. https://www.telanon.info/politica/ 2010/05/27/4139/4139/ (Acedido em 20 de junho de 2019). 36. Desde há anos que se assinala a ausência de diferenças ideológicas entre os partidos. Como também Frynas, Wood e Oliveira notaram, a causa dos conflitos no seio da elite é a partilha dos fundos da ajuda internacional. Mais do que conflitos duradouros, ocorrem pequenos conflitos cuja solução acaba por não excluir futuros acordos entre os litigantes e, mais concretamente, as figuras-chave (Frynas et al., 2003, pp. 74-76). Ora, uma razão para a clivagem mais profunda entre Patrice Trovoada e os demais políticos era o seu ostensivo propósito de se furtar a tal lógica de rotatividade observável desde a adoção da democracia. 37. Com essa designação, Patrice Trovoada vincava a assimetria entre esse povo e as elites de “ladrões” e “corruptos”, com quem prescindia de dialogar. 38. Cf. http://www.dw.com/pt/s%C3%A3o-tomenses-acreditam-que-uma-ditadura- esteja-a-caminho-no-seu-pa% C3%AD s/a-17093222 (Acedido em 14 de agosto de 2015). 39. “Em 2014, em Lisboa, ouvi falar do propósito de instaurar uma ditadura. Perguntei ao orador quem queria concretizar tal propósito e foi-me respondido ‘Pinto da Costa’” (A. Nascimento). Para os circunstantes, a par da eventual vontade em acreditar, o desassombrado processo de intenções ao presidente talvez fosse a melhor prova da verdade da asserção. Em todo o caso, a análise não podia guiar a tal conclusão, desde logo por a conjuntura ser avessa a tal intento, se ele porventura existisse (diferentemente, corroboraria a ideia de que a mais que provável retumbante vitória da ADI não agradava a Pinto da Costa). Afinal, o presidente marcara eleições na véspera. Fosse como fosse, a seriedade analítica fora trocada a favor de um registo panfletário que se sabia não corresponder à verdade. 40. Cf. https://sol.sapo.pt/artigo/76608/patrice-trovoada-pinto-da-costa-nao-esta-a- altura (Acedido em 10 de junho de 2019). 41. Cf. https://www.telanon.info/politica/2017/05/07/24362/militares-ruandeses- destacados-em-sao-tome-com-polemica/ (Acedido em 17 de junho de 2019); http:// pt.rfi.fr/sao-tome-e-principe/20170508-oposicao-contra-presenca-de-oficiais- ruandeses-em-sao-tome (Acedido em 11 de junho de 2019). Aparentemente, desconhecia-se o número de militares ruandeses e o tempo de permanência no território. Os militares ruandeses terão treinado um corpo especial de são-tomenses, que, bem equipado, obedecia ao primeiro-ministro Patrice Trovoada. 42. Uma expressão corrente na campanha para a eleição derivada da avaliação do seu trajeto, da pertença a um partido de homem só, fulcral para a sua eleição, e, porventura, do curso da sua vida. Obviamente, Evaristo Carvalho tentou rebater esse epíteto (cf. https://ivairs.wordpress.com/2016/08/11/evaristo-carvalho-o-novo- presidente-de-sao-tome-e-principe-afirma-nao-serei-um-pau-mandado/, acedido em 17

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de junho de 2019) que, todavia, a sua atuação e, em particular, a promulgação de diplomas inconstitucionais ou a tergiversação perante ilegalidades, comprovou. 43. Cf. https://www.telanon.info/politica/2018/01/03/26176/mlstp-evaristo-rasgou-a- constituicao-politica-e-lanco u-para-o-lixo/ (Acedido em 14 de junho de 2019). 44. Acerca das consequências deste passo, coteje-se Nascimento (2018b). 45. Embora relutante a teorias conspirativas como explicações históricas, não arredaria a hipótese da captura de dirigentes de um partido de oposição. 46. Em setembro de 2017, o procurador-geral prometeu punir os autores de crimes de difamação e injúrias na internet (https://www.telanon.info/politica/ 2017/09/27/25379/procurador-geral-promete-cacar-criminosos-ciberneticos/, acedido em 17 de junho de 2019), propósito apoiado pelo primeiro-ministro (https:// www.telanon.info/politica/2017/10/ 03/25399/patrice-e-bom-que-a-justica-toma- conta-deles/, acedido em 17 de junho de 2019). A intimidação não terá surtido efeitos práticos, desde logo pela duplicidade dos sequazes de fidelidade menos estrita e, também, pela falta de meios para concretizar tal ameaça. 47. Cf. http://abola.pt/Mundos/Noticias/Ver/710201 (Acedido em 9 de janeiro de 2018). 48. A acusação amiudada de que Patrice Trovoada é um “gabonês” – avivada, aliás, pelo pouco que se sabe dos seus atos, incluindo os processos de decisão – tem contornos políticos que importa considerar enquanto elemento de formação dos juízos políticos na sociedade islenha. Porém, cumpre reafirmar que a interpretação do sentido dos atos políticos, e não só, de modo algum pode menorizar a plenitude política e jurídica da nacionalidade de todos os são-tomenses. 49. Cf. https://www.telanon.info/politica/2017/05/04/24348/stp-falar-nao-pode/ (Acedido em 17 de junho de 2019). 50. Cf. https://www.telanon.info/politica/2018/06/12/27197/patrice-pj-com-escutas- para-mudar-comportamentos-na-socie dade/ (Acedido em 17 de junho de 2019). 51. Já após as eleições, a acusação seria alterada para crime contra o presidente Evaristo Carvalho. Cf. https://www.telanon.info/politica/2018/08/08/27560/alegada- operacao-terrorista-para-subverter-a-ordem-constitucional-em-stp-foi-desmantelada/ e https://www.telanon.info/politica/2018/11/09/28160/mp-deduziu-acusacao- contra-20-ale gados-golpistas/ (Acedido em 18 de junho de 2019). Porém, por ocasião da posse do novo governo, por decisão judicial os cinco réus presos foram soltos e sujeitos a termo de identidade e residência. Mais tarde, o ministro da Defesa e Ordem Interna veio dizer que não existiu qualquer tentativa de golpe. Cf. https://www.telanon.info/ politica/2018/12/19/28408/ministro-da-defesa-denuncia-golpes-de-estado-forjados/ (Acedido em 19 de junho de 2019). 52. Na circunstância, agentes da polícia e um elemento da guarda pretoriana do primeiro-ministro foram pronunciados pela morte do jovem. Cf. https:// www.telanon.info/sociedade/2018/10/05/27920/jovem-morre-nas-maos-da-forca- governamental-e-tumulto-agita-trindade/; https://www.telanon.info/sociedade/ 2018/10/05/27930/morte-do-jove m-funeral-foi-esta-noite/, https:// www.telanon.info/sociedade/2018/10/05/27933/morte-do-jovem-agentes-da-forca- governamental-acusados-pelo-ministerio-publico/ (Acedido em 19 de junho de 2019). 53. Ex-presidente do conselho de administração da Autoridade Conjunta Nigéria / São Tomé e Príncipe, o economista Jorge Santos foi aparentemente vítima de um assalto à sua residência.

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54. Este efeito de arrastamento – contrário à suposição de que as eleições seriam um momento de desforra da população desencantada, como, de resto, já sucedera com o “castigo” do partido único, a derrota do PCD e as do MLSTP desde 2010 – também se observa noutros países, onde os resultados eleitorais por vezes revelam um conformismo algo inexplicável. Noutros termos, a adesão ao mais forte – porventura o fator mais decisivo para parte dos votantes – e o receio de novos conflitos não terão jogado o seu papel? 55. Ver, por exemplo, https://www.telanon.info/politica/2018/09/15/27764/o-que-vai- estar-em-jogo-nestas-eleicoes-e-a-sobrevivencia-da-democracia/ (Acedido em 18 de junho de 2019). 56. Se em momentos anteriores, a relação chefe-cliente fora fundamental, porquanto a população esperava ajuda concreta em troca do apoio político, sendo esta a única perspetiva segundo a qual a política faz sentido para a população (Chabal & Daloz, 1999, pp. 38-39), para a diminuição do “banho” em 2018 pode ter contado a intuição de indesejáveis incertezas advindas da provável deriva autoritária. 57. Mesmo que traduzam uma afinidade étnica ou laços clientelares, nem por isso os votos no Movimento de Cidadãos Independentes de Caué são menos legítimos do que outros (em todo o caso, a estar em vigor a lei nº 8/90, o dito Movimento poderia representar uma violação da interdição da formação de partidos de cariz regional concorrentes às legislativas). Seja como for, esses votos indiciam clivagens internas e disrupção social. Sobretudo, evidenciam o quanto a pobreza e a exclusão tornam as pessoas permeáveis a um mísero “banho” ou, talvez ainda mais, ao caciquismo. Ainda que não se possa aceitar acriticamente o relato do jornal (https://www.telanon.in fo/ politica/2018/10/09/27960/povo-resgatou-a-democracia-e-tera-dado-golpe-de- misericordia-ao-banho/, acedido em 18 de junho de 2019), não deixa de ser significativa a fidelização dos votantes aos irmãos Monteiro. 58. Não era evidente que na ausência deste movimento, os resultados fossem favoráveis à ADI. Este passo denota uma apuradíssima noção da oportunidade e da tática política. 59. No arquipélago, não eram inéditas as acusações de fraude mas, ao invés das anteriores, formuladas de modo contido e à guisa de desculpa por derrotas, desta feita a suspeição revestia-se de dramatismo. 60. Os primeiros resultados foram anunciados a 8. Patrice Trovoada saiu a 12 e, só dias depois, a 19, deu sinal de si, numa entrevista em Portugal na qual admitiu afastar-se do poder. Cf. https://www.dn.pt/mundo/interior/sao-tomeeleicoes-pm-patrice-trovoada- pede-entendimento-alargado-e-admite-afastar-se-do-poder--10033336.html (Acedido em 18 de junho de 2019). 61. Quem anos antes prometera sangue, veio afirmar não poder dizer que as eleições tinham sido falseadas quando tinham sido livres e justas. Cf. https://www.telanon.info/ politica/2018/12/12/28358/convulsao-na-adi-levy-nazare-partiu-as-loicas-todas-e-diz- que-teme-pela-sua-vida/ (Acedido em 19 de junho de 2019). Já o ministro Olinto Daio não se prontificou a ser imolado à frente de um governo por antecipadamente derrotado no Parlamento. Cf. https://www.telanon.info/politica/2018/11/25/28241/ olinto-daio-declinou-o-convite-de-patrice-para-ser-candidato-ao-cargo-de-1o- ministro/ (Acedido em 19 de junho de 2019). Esta apreciação de um ator do lado perdedor não elide um problema virtual mas significativo para a análise e valoração das eleições, a saber, o de como considerar tais eleições se porventura Patrice Trovoada – do qual se poderá dizer ser autor de uma deriva autoritária em curso mas não um

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rematado autocrata ou ditador – tivesse ganho. À luz de que dados e ponderações se poderia considerar as eleições como não livres nem justas? 62. Um quadro de possibilidades posteriormente confirmado pelas declarações de Levi Nazaré após entrar em rota de colisão com Patrice Trovoada. Segundo Levy Nazaré, ele recusou-se a mobilizar militantes da ADI para contramanifestações, endossando tal responsabilidade a quem lho demandava, Patrice Trovoada. Cf. https:// www.telanon.info/politica/2018/12/12/28358/convulsao-na-adi-levy-nazare-partiu-as- loicas-todas-e-diz-que-teme-pela-sua-vida/ (Acedido em 19 de junho de 2019). 63. Cf. https://www.lusa.pt/article/24952696/pm-s%C3%A3o-tomense-lamenta-atraso- na-acusa%C3%A7%C3%A3o -de-suspeitos-de-alegado-plano-de-ataque (Acedido em 12 de outubro de 2018). 64. Diga-se, tal pode não bastar para uma sociedade, que, de tão frágil, se afigura facilmente capturável por desígnios políticos nebulosos, voluntaristas e, nessa medida, inapelavelmente disruptivos e excludentes. 65. Poderíamos sopesar a perspetiva de que a relação entre governantes e governados tem pouco a ver com as estruturas formais de poder, pelo que os fundamentos da responsabilidade política são extrainstitucionais, feitos de laços particulares – de fação – entre os big men, ou chefes, e as respetivas comunidades. De resto, não seria evidente que a democratização e as transições democráticas tivessem modificado as relações políticas entre governadores e governados (cf. Chabal & Daloz, 1999, p. 37). A ser adotada para São Tomé e Príncipe, esta perspetiva interpretativa – para que se encontra algum suporte empírico – poderia sustentar a ideia da inviabilidade da democracia, até por falta de independência e de capacitação do Estado. Por ora, o arquipélago ainda não se enquadra completamente nesta caracterização, até por, em última análise, ainda se invocar o Estado quando se apela à ordem social e se concita à autoridade, à regulação e à coesão, mesmo se já se está ciente de que o Estado não é mais a entidade presente, como, por exemplo, foi no ocaso do colonialismo e, por algum tempo, no regime de partido único. 66. Enfatize-se que, pressupondo uma cultura islenha ou um conjunto de artefactos culturais singulares e supostamente específicos dos são-tomenses, procurar facetar uma democracia adaptada à matriz cultural dos ilhéus parecerá um intento louvável. Porém, independentemente da celebração da são-tomensidade, importará inquirir o que é que esta noção, e o conglomerado cultural a que ela alude, têm de transitivo para a prática política ou, mais propriamente, se serve de muito quando se pensa em escolhas como a das eleições de outubro de 2018. Acresce que a idealizada são- tomensidade forçosamente estará corroída pelos expedientes de safar a vida no difícil dia a dia dos desapossados no arquipélago. 67. Contra a facilidade com que se invoca não se sabe bem o quê, cite-se a opinião de Mbembe de que o “bastão, o gorro de leopardo e o enxota-moscas constituem símbolos de modos de governar que, para se sistematizarem ideologicamente, recorrem a conceitos espantosos como o de ‘democracia à africana’” (2013, pp. 102-103). Para dar nota da vacuidade da supracitada invocação, acrescente-se que alguns destes referentes (miméticos) de uma suposta africanidade – que ainda chegaram a entrar em São Tomé em 1975 – foram celeremente preteridos em benefício das balalaicas, tornadas o traje oficioso do regime. 68. Contra apriorismos sedutores mas apartados das realidades, é forçoso supor que muitos trocariam, talvez envergonhadamente mas de bom grado, a sua parcela individual de decisão política pela resolução dos seus problemas básicos mesmo se à

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custa da contenção do seu padrão de necessidades. Atualmente, em São Tomé, laborará contra a democracia a perceção de esta não servir senão para os “políticos” enriquecerem por conta de um desempenho fictício em prol do bem comum. À vez, e consoante as afeições, todos os políticos acabam por ser encarados depreciativamente. Neste particular, a São Tomé e Príncipe aplicar-se-ia a ideia de que a desejável reconstrução social em África com base na autoconfiança é tolhida pelos óbices apostos pelos interesses e valores da maioria das elites e de suas redes de patronagem (Castells, 2002, p. 154). 69. Em tese, cumpre acolher dúvidas pertinentes e legítimas, por exemplo, a de ser, ou não, a democracia o melhor regime para assegurar a boa governação (por exemplo, Falola, 2004, pp. 273 e 274). Em todo o caso, o autor, que lista entre as heranças do colonialismo o Estado-nação como um fardo, o capitalismo como um falhanço, e a democracia como uma ilusão, pondera a circunstância de parecer inexistirem alternativas credíveis (Falola, 2004, p. 117). Embora seja uma reconhecida voz africana, não estará tão distante quanto outros (ditos ocidentais ou eurocêntricos) do contexto aqui em apreço? Poderá uma boa governação dispensar a observância da lei emanada de um poder representativo? 70. Pode ser argumentado que, entregue a si mesmo, o mercado – um pressuposto da democracia liberal ou representativa – nem sequer democratiza o ambiente económico. Ao contribuir para a pobreza e para outras iniquidades sociais, também por força da integração desigual de África no mercado mundial, não reforça, antes pelo contrário, a democratização da sociedade, pois que os itens da democracia dirão pouco aos desprovidos dos mais básicos bens necessários à sobrevivência (Kieh Jr. & Agbese, 2014, p. 8). Este argumento merece ponderação. Porém, queda por saber que outra arquitetura política preveniria os efeitos dolosos da dicotomia entre a esfera económica e o poder político, talvez também presentes, ainda que sob outras roupagens, noutros regimes políticos impostos após as independências. 71. Aduziu como prova da democracia a existência do Tela Non. Cf. https:// www.telanon.info/sociedade/2018/ 05/14/27001/patrice-indica-tela-non-como-prova- da-liberdade-de-imprensa-em-stp/ (Acedido em 27 de junho de 2019). 72. Numa síntese forçosamente simplista, dir-se-ia que a trajetória de empobrecimento e de desespero, por um lado, e de deliquescência institucional, por outro, tornam São Tomé e Príncipe uma sociedade onde, por força de vincadas clivagens sociais, o primarismo e a pulsão se impõem à ponderação, à mediação, impedindo a construção de um mínimo denominador e abrindo o caminho a derivas autoritárias (presumivelmente) envoltas em desígnios aparentemente restauradores da justiça e da equidade. As disrupções sociais são avessas à democracia, de que até hoje persistiu a possibilidade de eleições livres e competitivas (de que, independentemente de outros condicionalismos, o “banho” fez parte). No arquipélago, as eleições como que traduzem um resiliente consentimento tácito a uma decisão comum. Seja como for, tais disrupções sociais, impensáveis há não muitos anos – para já não mencionar os projetos da independência –, não são de bom agouro para a democracia porque a história do arquipélago, e não só, se faz de lances que, ao contrário de lucubrações de intelectuais e de presumidos desejos de políticos, não se constituem de racionalidade e ponderação.

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RESUMOS

Este texto procura descrever e analisar o devir histórico e as contingências do sistema democrático em São Tomé e Príncipe. Em particular, pretende realçar o significado político das eleições de 7 de outubro de 2018, que se revelaram um marco da democracia no arquipélago. Este texto procura recensear pontos de reflexão sobre a sobrevivência da democracia num contexto micro-insular em África. Ao invés de equacionar a viabilidade da democracia representativa à luz de uma presumida idiossincrasia africana, avalia-se a sintonia do apriorismo da superioridade da democracia com as escolhas dos são-tomenses, frequentemente menos baseadas em princípios políticos do que, por exemplo, na adesão a homens fortes e a projetos salvíficos, tal um dos dados da cultura política prevalecente nas ilhas.

This text seeks to describe and analyze the historical development and contingencies of the democratic system in São Tomé and Príncipe. In particular, it intends to highlight the political significance of the October 7, 2018 elections, which proved to be a hallmark of democracy in the archipelago. This text aims to identify points of reflection on the survival of democracy in a micro-island context in Africa. Rather than equating the viability of representative democracy in the light of a presumed African idiosyncrasy, it assesses the superiority of democracy in the face of São Tomé’s choices, often less based on political principles, than, for example, on the adherence to big men or salvific projects, as one of the data of the prevailing political culture in the islands.

ÍNDICE

Keywords: São Tomé and Príncipe, democracy, authoritarianism, elections Palavras-chave: São Tomé e Príncipe, democracia, autoritarismo, eleições

AUTOR

AUGUSTO NASCIMENTO Centro de História da Universidade de Lisboa Alameda da Universidade 1600-214 Lisboa, Portugal [email protected]

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The Role of the Courts in Mitigating Election Violence in Nigeria O papel dos tribunais na redução da violência eleitoral na Nigéria

Stephanie M. Burchard and Meshack Simati

EDITOR'S NOTE

Recebido: 06 de junho de 2019 Aceite: 16 de outubro de 2019

1 African countries reintroduced1 multiparty politics in the early 1990s as the curtains came down on the Cold War era. By 1997, 75% of countries in sub-Saharan Africa had adopted multiparty elections, with the exception of Eritrea, which has not conducted presidential or national assembly elections since its independence referendum in 19932. Many sub-Saharan African countries have made significant strides towards democratic development, but election-related violence has also increasingly become a common feature of the politics of alternation of power in Africa. Thus, while elections in sub- Saharan Africa have become ubiquitous, challenges around election management, particularly related to electoral violence, still remain.

2 On average, a majority of elections conducted in sub-Saharan Africa result in violence. Conservative3 estimates from the Social Conflict in Africa Dataset (SCAD) (Salehyan et al., 2012) indicate that sub-Saharan African countries conducted 390 elections from1990 to 2012 in which 57 percent of the elections experienced some form of electoral violence. Of the 390 elections, 132 elections experienced pre-election violence while 91 elections also experienced post-election violence. Consistent with the SCAD dataset, Straus and Taylor’s (2012) African Electoral Violence Database (AEVD) also indicate that at least 60 percent of African elections experience electoral violence from 1990 to 2008. Burchard’s (2015) work concludes that at least 55 percent of elections conducted in Africa experienced some form of electoral violence and suggests that whereas post- election violence is less common, it tends to be more intense.

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3 Electoral violence has been associated with various negative consequences ranging from instability to the increased likelihood of civil war (Bekoe, 2012). For instance, electoral violence experienced in Ethiopia 2005, Nigeria 2007, Kenya 2007, Zimbabwe 2008 and Ivory Coast in 2011 was deemed violent enough to destabilize each of these countries4. Similarly, electoral violence has been linked to effects on voter turnout (Bekoe & Burchard, 2017; Collier & Vicente, 2012) and the quality of democracy as assessed by potential voters (Burchard, 2015). Burchard further suggests that voters are less likely to express satisfaction with and support democracy or have trust in governing institutions if they are routinely subjected to electoral violence. Therefore, lessening election violence might help improve voter satisfaction, trust in governing institutions and overall shore up support for democracy. Such sentiments also find support in works such as Diamond (1997), which lend credence to the role of institutions in improving the quality and consolidation of democracy5.

4 What we know so far in the burgeoning literature on electoral violence are potential reasons for some countries provide fertile grounds for election violence both at the national or macro-level (Fjelde & Höglund, 2016; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014; Norris et al., 2015; Salehyan & Linebarger, 2015) and subnational or micro-level (de Smedt, 2009; Höglund & Piyarathne, 2009; Klaus & Mitchell, 2015 and Söderberg Kovacs & Bjarnesen, 2018). Yet, less examined, is the role of institutions in exacerbating or reducing electoral violence.

5 Recent research efforts, motivated to identify effective interventions to mitigate electoral violence, have focused on exploring strategies that can be employed to alleviate electoral violence; however, the role of courts as an intervention strategy remains under-researched. To this end, we conduct an empirical analysis on the effect of election petition tribunals (EPTs) on the likelihood of election violence taking place in contemporary Nigerian elections. EPTs are temporary courts specifically established by the Nigerian government to resolve disputes after an election has occurred. Nigerian elections have been particularly violent since the country’s return to civilian governance in 1999. In relation to the rest of Africa, elections in Nigeria tend to be more violent than the average case, with significant numbers of physical injuries and fatalities. Fatalities have occurred before and after elections in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2019.

6 Elections by their very nature are contentious and it seems reasonable to assume that a dedicated mechanism put in place to adjudicate election-related grievances and suspected violations could reduce incentives to engage in electoral violence. If electoral actors believe that irregularities can be fairly challenged in an impartial venue, they may be less likely to resort to violence to win. In situations where electoral actors believe that there are no viable venues to resolve problematic elections, political actors may be more likely to turn to intimidation, harassment, and physical attacks to win elections. Furthermore, if political actors believe that an independent court system will hold them accountable for electoral infractions, they may be less likely to engage in fraud and violence. If no such judicial avenue exists, the inverse may be true.

7 In this paper, we test the efficacy of the judiciary in mitigating electoral violence with the caveat that for the courts to have a suppressive effect on electoral violence, political actors must have trust in the system. We argue that if those aggrieved during the electoral process, specifically political elites, lack trust in the dispute resolution mechanism, the expected utility of the courts as an alternative to violence for resolving

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election disputes will remain low. We argue that, particularly in Nigeria, the courts can provide an alternative to violence in disputed elections and reduce the prevalence of electoral violence, but only if the courts are perceived as trustworthy. The paper proceeds as follows. We start with an overview of electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa. We follow with the theoretical argument on why courts can reduce electoral violence. We then conduct an empirical test on the effects of the courts on electoral violence in Nigeria’s 2015 and 2019 elections. We analyze and discuss the findings in the section thereafter then conclude with how and why courts matter in reducing electoral violence and consolidating democracy.

Overview of electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa

8 Electoral violence is not a new phenomenon nor is it idiosyncratic to Africa. Countries in the early throes of democratic transition often face election-related violence as citizens seek to exercise their freedoms within an extended franchise. Seymour and Frary (1918) present an early example of violent electoral tactics in the 20th century positing that Magyars in Hungary engaged in non-Magyar voter suppression by destroying bridges and quarantining horses in the outlying villages that would be used to get the non-Magyars to polling stations.

9 More recent research has argued for disaggregating electoral violence based on timing, strategy and actors to better understand the motivation behind violence. On the timing of electoral violence, scholars have argued that election violence essentially falls into three phases with each phase ideally driven by different theoretical motivations and causal processes. Both Höglund (2009) and Daxecker (2014) suggest that the motivation behind pre-election and election day violence is to affect the outcome of the elections or disenfranchise voters that would otherwise help tip the election in favor of an opponent. On the other hand, post-election violence is employed as a response to the outcome of an election deemed fraudulent or in order to force the hand of other actors like courts or election commissions to recount the ballots or cancel the results and call fresh elections. Essentially, whereas pre-election and election day violence is theoretically intended to increase the chances of winning for the violence entrepreneur by suppressing voter turnout for the opposing party election, post- election violence happens as a reaction to a contested election outcome.

10 To this end, although the timing of elections can be categorized into three distinct phases of pre-electoral, election day and post- electoral violence, the motivations for electoral violence map onto two broad categories of pre-6 and post-election7 violence. As we have suggested above, the motivations for pre-electoral violence are to primarily influence the outcome of the election whereas post-electoral violence is a reaction to the election outcome. Subsequently, we conceptualize electoral violence into two phases of pre-electoral violence and post-electoral violence. Due to the messiness of separating election violence that happens six months before election day and violence that happens on election day, we stay consistent with other researchers (Burchard, 2015; Straus & Taylor, 2012) who conceptualize pre-electoral violence as combining both phases since both phases have similar theoretical motivations for violence. Similarly, electoral violence can be strategically employed to suppress voter turnout or mobilize supporters, or it can occur incidentally due to heightened competition between different political camps (Bekoe & Burchard, 2017). At the same time, both

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state actors and opposition groups can engage in electoral violence strategically to influence the turnout and outcome of elections, although state actors are much more likely to engage in electoral violence. Taylor et al. (2017) estimate that upwards of 80 percent of electoral violence is perpetrated by the state.

Prevention of electoral violence

11 The general understanding that electoral violence can lead to prolonged conflict (Bekoe, 2012), lower satisfaction with and support for democracy (Burchard, 2015), and democratic stagnation (Bogaards, 2013) due to poor quality elections has led to a budding research whose efforts are directed at exploring election violence prevention. These efforts are informed by the theoretical argument that political exclusion is the main driver for electoral violence and political inclusivity might lower the likelihood of electoral violence. To this end, electoral violence prevention strategies have been based around interventions such as capacity building (Birch & Muchlinski, 2018; Claes & von Borzyskowski, 2018; Darnolf & Cyllah, 2014), attitude transformation (Birch & Muchlinski, 2018; Finkel, 2014; Fischer, 2017; Höglund & Jarstad, 2011), security planning (Claes, 2016; Claes & von Borzyskowski, 2018), and election monitoring (Asunka et al., 2019; Claes, 2016; Claes & von Borzyskowski, 2018).

12 Proponents of capacity building suggest that building technical skills in entities entrusted with conducting elections, for instance, election management bodies, to help conduct credible elections can reduce electoral violence by increasing institutional trust, the quality of elections, ensure the acceptability of the election outcome for involved parties and, subsequently, legitimates the winner. Attitude transformation interventions are also deemed to reduce electoral violence by targeting grievances that would otherwise foment and lead to electoral violence. These interventions can include educating voters, peace messaging, mediation, engaging the youth, roundtable discussions, peace pledging, and codes of conduct. Similarly, as Claes and von Borzyskowski (2018) find, security engagement by way of the police having a closer working relationship with local communities is associated with lower levels of electoral violence as evidenced by Kenya and Liberian elections. The evidence regarding the impact of election monitoring interventions, on the other hand, is very mixed. While some have found that the presence of election observers can decrease the likelihood of electoral violence from breaking out under certain circumstances (see Smidt, 2016), recent research suggests that election observation can exacerbate electoral violence instead of mitigating it by incentivizing political actors to strategically shift violence to the pre-election period not observed by election monitors (see Daxecker, 2014; Luo & Rozenas, 2018; von Borzyskowski, 2019).

13 Although the above research on interventions to mitigate electoral violence is instrumental and groundbreaking, it tends to focus on programmatic efforts that can be undertaken in the pre-election period to avoid electoral violence during or after elections. Subsequently, the gap we find in the literature so far is the lack of scholarly work on the role of domestic courts as key intervention actors by virtue of their dispute resolution role. Therefore, we are examining what exactly is the role of courts in mitigating electoral violence.

14 Ideally, the courts would alleviate electoral violence by providing a dispute resolution mechanism through which aggrieved political contenders can seek redress. In other

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words, whereas interventions around capacity building, attitude transformation, and security planning can pacify the eruption of electoral violence, they lack a dispute resolution component that political actors can revert to if they perceive that they have lost an election unfairly. It is against this backdrop that countries like Nigeria have tried to address election-related disputes by creating election petition tribunals (EPTs) at the federal and state level for legislative and gubernatorial election petitions that deal specifically with cases stemming from electoral fraud, irregularities, and other illegalities. Established by the 1999 Constitution, and amended in 2010, the specific statute tasks tribunals with determining whether an individual has been validly elected (Library of Congress, 2011). Consequently, we are interested in understanding if an impartial and independent court, as measured by trust in judiciary and EPT ruling, has any effect on electoral violence. Because in Nigeria there is variation in both the occurrence of electoral violence and public trust in the courts across the country’s 36 states, Nigeria is an ideal candidate to examine how judicial processes could impact the frequency and/or intensity of electoral violence.

Theory: judicial systems and electoral violence

15 The constitutional function of courts as arbiters of domestic disputes predisposes them to being viewed as one of the first institutions political actors might seek intervention from during the electoral period. Ideally, the courts would provide an alternative for resolving election disputes because political actors would seek redress from the courts instead of resorting to violence. Additionally, a robust court system may act as a deterrent for violence if political actors believe they will be punished for the use of violence during an election campaign, but no research at this point exists to help us understand the effect of courts on electoral violence.

16 What we know so far is that judicial independence in Africa varies widely and different countries have taken different pathways to achieve judicial independence. Works such as Widner (2001), VonDoepp (2006), VonDoepp and Ellet (2011), Ellet (2013), and Prempeh (2017), although unrelated to the effectiveness of judiciaries in reducing electoral violence, have spoken to the evolution of the independence in African judiciaries. While Widner (2001) attributes the rise of judicial independence since the end of colonialism to the role of judges within the judiciary fighting for the independence of courts, Prempeh (2017) offers cautious optimism that the judicial constitutional revival in Africa has been curtailed by imperial presidencies that are too strong to be checked by weak legislatures. VonDoepp (2006) and VonDoepp and Ellet (2011) examine factors that might affect judicial assertiveness suggesting that the security of tenure by the incumbent, extent of power concentration in one actor, and the level of interest in a given case by political actors will determine whether judges will choose to be assertive or exercise strategic self-restraint. In analysis of Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi, Ellet (2013) finds that judicial independence was higher in countries that had a robust civil society, a strong independent media, and a strong law society.

17 We also know that, at least for Latin American countries, effectively functioning judiciaries are important for maintaining democratic gains. Larkins (1996) opines that an institutionalized judiciary is integral to democratic consolidation because it is the one institution tasked with enforcing the rule of law both on citizens and governments

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from exceeding their reach. To this end, various researchers are in agreement (Chavez, 2004; Diamond, 1997; Larkins, 1996; Utter & Lundsgaard, 1993) that strong judiciaries play a critical role in consolidating democracy; however, the effectiveness of judiciaries in Africa still remains under-researched.

18 To this end, research conducted by Abul-Ethem (2002) and Widner (2001), for example, point to the shortcomings of African judiciaries to safeguard the rule of law, while Kaaba (2015) suggest that African judiciaries have been complicit in the failure to help consolidate democracy in Africa. For instance, Widner (2001) suggests that competing centers of power and the weight of colonial legacies effectively delegitimized the African judicial systems by understaffing them while expecting them to blend customary and common law. Handicapped as such, African judiciaries perennially suffered from a lack of legitimacy by overpromising but failing to deliver justice. The lack of legitimacy by African judiciaries can be seen by the perennially low trust in judiciaries among African citizens. Based on survey data from 2014 and 2015, only a slight majority of respondents across 36 African countries stated that they had confidence in the courts, and around one-third stated that “most” or “all” judges are corrupt (Logan, 2017). The lack of trust in the judiciary is compounded by African court’s proclivity for consistently ruling in favor of the incumbent in presidential election petitions (Kaaba, 2015), with the rare exception being Kenya in 2017.

19 As poignant as these works are, they fail to interrogate the extent to which judiciaries have been effective in reducing violence or forestalling instability. This is partly due to the lack of data on judicial decisions and the long processes the courts take before making pronouncements on cases. For instance, Simati’s (2018) dissertation work finds that it took an average of two years for the courts to pronounce themselves on election petitions filed against President Moi’s election victories in 1992 and 1997. There is also a consensus that institutions responsible for dispute resolution in unconsolidated democracies have become increasingly important. Widner (2001) posits that when courts adjudicate election-related disputes, they forestall the potential for violence and instability between contestants and negate the attraction of these groups from resorting to pressing their grievances through their social groups. Ostensibly, during elections, those that feel aggrieved by the electoral process but have less trust in the judiciary are more likely to resort to other means of dispute resolution, for instance violence. Essentially, by providing an avenue through which electoral disputes can be addressed, courts would ideally reduce the utility of reverting to electoral violence during elections by political actors.

20 Nevertheless, the mere presence of courts will not incentivize political actors to choose courts to resolve their election disputes instead of using violence. Political actors are more likely to take their election-related grievances to court if they have trust that the court will be impartial. For instance, while looking at the behavior of the Ugandan courts regarding presidential and parliamentary election petitions, Murison (2013) finds that whereas the Ugandan High Court upheld election petitions and nullified various parliamentary elections, the Court of Appeal overturned most of the high court decisions. Similarly, although the Uganda Supreme Court acknowledged irregularities in the presidential elections won by Museveni in 2001 and 2006, it was unwilling to rule in favor of the opposition candidate and nullify the presidential elections. Under such circumstances, the opposition is less likely to lodge their complaints with the courts

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due to perceived lack of impartiality and trust. Consequently, they are more likely to resort to electoral violence.

21 Similar research looking at the effect of courts on electoral violence from a dissertation by Simati (2018) conducted cross nationally on African countries between 1990-2012 finds that variation in judicial independence can influence both state actors and the opposition’s choice to employ post-election violence. The author finds that both the incumbent and the opposition are less likely to employ post-election violence in African countries that have independent or dependent judiciaries. Under independent judiciaries, both actors are more likely to bring their election related grievance to court due to trust in the impartiality of the court system. Similarly, under dependent judiciaries controlled by the incumbent, the opposition is less likely to strategically employ electoral violence to influence the judges because the judges are less likely to strategically defect and rule in favor of the opposition. The author argues that post- election violence is particularly prevalent under semi-independent judiciaries precisely because opposition candidates can strategically use electoral violence to create levels of political uncertainty in order to influence judges to strategically defect or be assertive. Strategic use of violence is especially useful for the opposition if they deem the incumbent weak either due to a minority in the legislature8 or a small win margin.

22 Since courts can mitigate both pre-election and post-election violence by providing an alternative to election violence, we theorize that a trusted dispute resolution mechanism can alleviate electoral violence. However, in the absence of a trusted court system, political actors are more likely to revert to electoral violence either to influence the outcome of an election or in reaction to a concluded election. We therefore argue that increased trust in courts will be correlated with lower levels of electoral violence while low trust in courts will be associated with higher levels of electoral violence. Similarly, we argue that successful nullification of election results by the EPTs will have a constraining effect on electoral violence. Due to data limitations, we only conduct our analysis on pre-election violence9, not post-election violence.

23 Data and variables

24 We seek to test this theory of court effects on electoral violence on the pre-election period in Nigeria during the 2015 and 2019 elections based on the independent variable operationalized as the EPT decisions from the 2011 and 2015 elections, respectively. We conduct this analysis on Nigeria because the country’s history with the systematic violence that routinely breaks out during elections makes it a good candidate for this type of empirical analysis. More importantly, Nigeria is the only African country with specific EPTs set up precisely to deal with election petitions and pre- and post-electoral disputes. A similar court exists in South Africa, but as a standing body that is not reconstituted every election period. Other African countries adjudicate electoral related disputes within the existing judicial framework, which takes longer for the petitions to be resolved. We also examine changes over time in Nigeria as we believe that experience with the courts in one election can impact behavior in subsequent elections.

25 After independence in 1960, Nigeria was largely ruled by successive military governments, with brief interruptions for episodic civilian rule. In 1999, Nigeria transitioned to a civilian-led government and conducted its first multiparty elections of its Fourth Republic. Violence has been a common feature of every election since 1999, although the intensity, timing and type of violence have varied across different

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elections. For instance, Nigeria experienced significant levels of pre-electoral violence with an estimated 300 fatalities and 100 fatalities before the 2007 and 2015 elections respectively (Bekoe, 2012). However, the 2011 elections experienced extreme post- election violence with around 800 fatalities taking place after the results were announced (Bekoe, 2012).

26 Electoral violence in Nigeria has varied across both time and space. Nigeria is a federal republic with 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, located in Abuja. Certain states such as Lagos, Rivers, and Delta State have seen more of the brunt of electoral violence. During the 2015 election, violence was concentrated in the southwest of the country, with some fatalities also occurring in the Middle Belt (Harwood, 2019). During the 2019 elections, much of the violence took place in southern Nigeria and the Middle Belt again (Harwood, 2019).

27 For the purposes of our analysis, we use data on violent events from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) to code the dependent variable, pre-election violence events. ACLED collects information on political violence by type, time, intensity, and location. We identify election-related events and the number of associated fatalities, if any, and aggregate them at the state level for elections in 2015 and 2019. Since Nigeria typically holds general elections for all elected offices over a two-week period, we collected information on pre-electoral violence associated with the presidential, assembly, senate, state house, and gubernatorial races. Similar to other researchers, we confine our analysis of pre- electoral violence to the six-month period prior to the elections (including election day) (Burchard, 2015; Straus & Taylor, 2012). After a six-week postponement to allow the government to address insecurity in the North East related to the Boko Haram insurgency, elections in 2015 were held on March 28th for President and National Assembly and April 11 th for governor and the state houses. Elections in 2019 were delayed one week due to logistical challenges and ultimately held on February 23rd for President and National Assembly and March 9 for governor and state houses.

28 Based on data from ACLED, pre-election violence took place in most Nigerian states prior to the 2015 and 2019 general elections at roughly similar rates. Across Nigerian states10, only five states (Abia, Ekiti, Kogi, Niger, and Zamfara) did not have a recorded instance of pre-election violence prior to the 2015 election and only two states (Gombe and Kebbi) did not have a recorded instance prior to the 2019 election. Ahead of the 2015 elections, there was an average of 4.8 violent events per state. Post-election violence was significantly lower in 2015 than in 2011. After the 2015 elections, there was an average of 0.79 violent events per state and an estimated 6 fatalities. Prior to the 2019 elections, there was an average of 4.6 violent events per state. There were at least 98 fatalities across 20 states in 2015 and 91 fatalities across 19 states in 201911. Eighteen states experienced fewer violent incidents in 2019 compared to 2015 while 14 states experienced more violent incidents. In terms of fatalities, 12 states experienced fewer election-related fatalities in 2019 compared to 2015 where 12 states experienced more fatalities.

29 According to Sani (2015), the Nigerian government established election petition tribunals in the 1999 Constitution to resolve electoral disputes in a timely fashion due to delays experienced through the regular court system in previous petitions. Through the 2000s, however, EPTs were still not known for their speed. For example, it took 34 months to resolve a 2003 gubernatorial dispute. Similarly, the success rate of the courts

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ability to mitigate election petitions has been low. Omenma et al. (2017) find that the courts in Nigeria have done little to build confidence among voters on the courts ability to overturn elections even in the context of overwhelming evidence of fraud. The authors find that between 1999 and 2011, 160 gubernatorial elections were challenged in court, but the court overturned only 10 elections, which translates to a 6.3 percent success rate.

30 As such, the 2006 electoral act also introduced a raft of changes aimed at improving efficiency in adjudication of election petitions by empowering any state or federal High Court to address all pre-election disputes. The 2010 Amendment to the Constitution requires that all election petitions be submitted within 21 days after an election has been decided; that EPTs deliver their final written verdict within 180 days; and that all appeals are heard and adjudicated within 60 days of the initial judgment.

31 EPTs vary by level of election and institution. EPTs at the state level hear cases from the National Assembly petitions whose appeal terminates at the Court of Appeals. The presidential and gubernatorial EPTs appeals terminate at the Supreme Court. Only candidates or parties directly participating in an election can file a petition. A petition must be based on at least one of the following four criteria: a candidate was not qualified to contest the election; the election was marred by corruption or non- compliance with the Electoral Act (as amended in 2010); the winner did not actually receive a majority of the votes; and/or the petitioner was unlawfully prevented from participating in the election. Temporary EPT appointments are managed by the President of the Court of Appeals, National Judicial Commission, and Federal Judicial Service Commission. EPTs comprise of three to five justices from the High Court, Sharia Court of Appeal, Customary Court of Appeal, or other judiciary members at the rank of chief magistrate or higher. See Table 1 for an overview of the number of petitions filed per election since 2003 (PLACNG, 2017).

Table 1: Election petitions by year

Election year Petitions filed

2003 560

2007 1290

2011 732

2015 ~600

32 To code the independent variable (election petitions filed at the state level), we collected data from a number of sources including the National Democratic Institution, a non-profit organization located in Washington D.C., and the Policy and Legal Advocacy Center, a non-governmental organization located in Abuja. For the 2011 and 2015 elections, in particular, we were able to track how election petitions were ultimately resolved. From this data, we created our independent variables on EPT decisions for the 2011 and 2015 elections. Since elite-level choice to use the court can be informed by previous court decisions, we create the tribunal election nullification variable by coding the petitions that were successfully overturned by the EPTs in 2011

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as a 1, representing a nullified election, and 0, which represents an upheld election. We do the same for 2015 EPT decisions and create a dummy variable where 1 represents at least one successful EPT challenge at the state level and 0 represents no EPT successes. Across all elective offices in 2015, there were a total of around 600 election petition challenges filed in 2015 (PLACNG, 2017)12. The range was from 2 to 49 election petitions challenges per state. There were a total of 333 appeals filed, with a range from 1 to 46 per state. Approximately 15 percent (84) of the total challenges at either the tribunal, appeals, or High Court stage were successful in overturning the election result or requiring either a partial or complete re-run of the election. Delta State in particular was forced to re-run several elections for both state and federal offices in March 2016 after the 2015 results were annulled due to corruption and violence. This marks a substantial increase in the success rates of cases before tribunals. In 2007, only around 2 percent of all cases were successful in annulling the results or forcing new elections (Sani, 2015). This figure increased to 4 percent after the 2011 elections (Sani, 2015).

33 To calculate trust in the courts, we used Afrobarometer survey data. We created an index measuring trust in the courts for respondents using rounds 6 and 7 of the Afrobarometer survey, conducted in 2014 and 2017 before the 2015 and 2019 elections, respectively. The index ranges from low to high trust, captured numerically between 1 and 3, where 1 indicates low trust, 2 some trust, and 3 high trust13.

34 We control for the total population of the state at the last census (logged due to its right skew) as some have found that localities with higher populations have higher incidences of electoral violence (see Daxecker, 2012, 2014) and trust in the national elections commission (NEC)14. We also control for the intensity of pre-election violence by including a variable for number of pre-election fatalities that took place in a given state in the six-month period prior to an election15. We believe that more violent elections could have a negative influence on the decision of political actors and dilute the role of trust in encouraging actors to turn to the courts16. Our primary independent variable is informed by our theory that courts give election political players a less violent avenue through which they can adjudicate election-related disputes. We use the independent variable, trust in courts, to gauge the likelihood of political players’ choice to take their case to the courts as opposed to the streets. Subsequently, high trust in court indicates the political players’ belief in the impartiality in the court and vice versa. We include the above control variables because previous research suggests they help explain the occurrence of electoral violence. We include them in the model in order to rule out that these control variables are the ones driving the relationship between our dependent and independent variables. Since our analysis only covers three election cycles in the same country, we do not control for electoral system17 because there is no variation in electoral rules that would influence electoral violence.

Discussion and analysis

35 For the empirical analysis, we use a negative binomial regression to test whether the nullification of elections results by EPTs and trust in court have a constraining effect on pre-election violence at the state level.18 We test this hypothesis for the 2015 elections in model 1 and model 2 for 2019 elections while controlling for logged population, trust in the national election commission, and pre-election fatalities (See table 2).

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Table 2: Dependent variable: Number of pre-election violence events

______Model 1: 2015 Model 2: 2019

-0.504** -0.057 Election overturned (0.266) (0.228)

Trust in court

-0.491 -0.750*** Some trust (0.477) (0.272)

-0.775* -0.878*** High trust (0.434) (0.264)

-0.010 Trust in NEC (0.009)

0.186*** 0.094*** Pre-election fatalities (0.034) (0.019)

-0.049 -0.137 Logged population (0.357) (0.252)

5.241 3.616 Constant (0.357) (3.809)

Observations 33 33

Notes: *p≤0.10, *p≤0.05, ***p≤0.01: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses. Negative binomial regression used.

36 For model 1, we find support that overturning an election outcome by an election tribunal and high trust in courts reduce the likelihood of pre-election violence in the next election. The election overturn by tribunal variable has a negative coefficient (-0.504) and is statistically significant with a (0.050) p-value. The high trust in court variable is also statistically significant with a negative coefficient (-0.775) and p-value (0.07). The control variable for pre-election fatalities is also statistically significant with a positive coefficient (0.186) and p-value (0.00) indicating that intensity of violence can lead to more violence, possibly retributive. Both controls for population and trust in the national election commission are not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that all else being equal, favorable rulings for the challenger by the EPT in the 2011 elections and trust in court prior to 2015 were important factors in reducing the possibility of pre-election violence during the 2015 elections in Nigeria.

37 In model 2, we run the same analysis for the 2019 elections, modeling the effect of EPT decisions and trust in the courts on pre-election violence at the state level. We use successful nullification of an election in 2015 and Afrobarometer’s trust in courts from round 7 (conducted in 2017 before the 2019 elections) as our main independent variables. We control for population and 2019 pre-election fatalities while excluding trust in the national election commission because the variable was not available for 2019. We find that having trust in the court significantly reduced the likelihood for pre-

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election violence in the 2019 elections. While controlling for population and pre- election fatalities, we find that having some trust in the court was statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.750 and a p-value of 0.006. Similarly, having high trust in the court was also statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.878 and a p-value of 0.001. However, the successful nullification of elections by EPTs in 2015 did not have any significant effect on the pre-election violence experienced during the 2019 elections. Consistent with 2015 elections, pre-election fatalities experienced prior to the 2019 elections also influenced the prevalence of pre-election violence.

38 Unlike an ordinary least squares model where we can interpret the substantive effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable based on coefficients, the coefficients on the negative binomial regression, as a maximum likelihood model, help indicate the direction of the effect but less so in interpreting the substantive effect of the EPT decisions and trust in courts on pre-election violence. To this end, we use incident rates ratio (IRR) to explain the substantive effect of EPT decisions and trust in courts on electoral violence for models 1 and 2. The results are presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Incidence rates ratio for pre-election violence for 2015 & 2019 by state

______2015 2019

______IRR Std. error IRR Std. error

Election overturned 0.604 0.160 - -

Some trust in court - - 0.472 0.129

High trust in court 0.460 0.199 0.415 0.109

Pre-election fatalities 1.204 0.040 1.099 0.022

Notes: We estimate the incidence ratio for pre-election violence for the statistically significant variables found in Table 2. Some trust in the courts (2015) and election overturned (in 2019) are missing incidence ratio estimates in Table 3 because they were not statistically significant in the models reported in Table 2.

39 Based on the IRR estimated for 2015, every election result that was overturned by an EPT in 2011 reduced the incidence of pre-election violence by a factor of 0.60, holding other variables constant. Comparing low trust and high trust in courts, we find that having high trust in courts reduced the incidence of pre-election violence by a factor of 0.46 in comparison with the reference category of low trust. Pre-election fatalities also increased the incidence of pre-election violence by 1.20. In 2019, having some trust and a lot of trust in the courts reduced the incidence of pre-election violence, by 0.47 and 0.42 respectively, while pre-election fatalities increased incidences of pre-election violence by factor of 1.09.

40 These findings, although limited to elections in Nigeria, suggest that the role of courts and trust in dispute resolution mechanisms can be instrumental in alleviating pre- election violence. We find that if an EPT overturns an election in favor of the petitioner, the likelihood of pre-election violence in a subsequent election reduces by 60 percent. Similarly, the number of election petitions filed in 2015 was significantly related to the disposition of petitions associated with the previous 2011 election. The

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number of petitions filed was significantly higher in states where a tribunal overturned previous election results (average: 21.5, n=14 states) in 2011, than in states where no elections were overturned in 2011 (average: 12.9, n=19 states). This suggests that a successful experience with the tribunal system might encourage others to turn to tribunals to resolve disputes in future elections. Most importantly, trust in courts is a good indicator of whether election related disputes will be resolved through the court or through violence. We find that on average, incidences of pre-election violence reduce by 45 percent if citizens have some trust or a lot of trust in courts.

Conclusion

41 Recent efforts targeted at interventions for preventing electoral violence have emphasized election monitoring, security planning, attitude transformation and capacity building, but the courts as a key domestic component responsible for dispute resolution still remains under-researched. This work contributes to the ongoing research on electoral violence prevention by evaluating the role election petition tribunals and citizens trust in courts play in mitigating electoral violence. We find that all else being equal, rulings that nullify election results and trust in the judicial system constrain the prevalence of electoral violence.

42 Although these findings may or may not be generalizable to sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the democratizing countries around the world due to the fact that Nigerian elections are more violent than average, we hope that at the very least they should stimulate future research efforts regarding the role of the judiciary in mitigating electoral violence. From a policy implication perspective, there might be value setting up ad hoc election petition tribunals and building capacity in domestic judiciaries to be efficient in adjudicating election-related disputes in a shorter time frame. Work could also be undertaken to build trust in the courts by citizens. Both factors are important in reducing incentives for election-related violence. Due to data constrains, the focus of this research was on the pre-election period. Future work can look at whether the same relationship holds for the post-election period.

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Smedt, J. de. (2009). ‘No Raila, no peace!’ Big man politics and election violence at the Kibera grassroots. African Affairs, 108(433), 581-598.

Smidt, H. (2016). From a perpetrator’s perspective: International election observers and post- electoral violence. Journal of Peace Research, 53(2), 226-241.

Söderberg Kovacs, M., & Bjarnesen, J. (Eds.). (2018). Violence in African elections: Between democracy and Big Man politics. Zed Books.

Straus, S., & Taylor, C. (2012). Democratization and electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2007. In D. Bekoe (Ed.), Voting in fear: Electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 15-38). United States Institute of Peace.

Taylor, C. F., Pevehouse, J. C., & Straus, S. (2017). Perils of pluralism: Electoral violence and incumbency in sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Peace Research, 54(3), 397-411.

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NOTES

1. After the end of colonialism, most African countries emerged with at least two political parties, many informed by either a Western or Soviet Union ideology. Countries such as Botswana, Kenya, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia, for example, all held multiparty elections in the 1960s. These countries, however, reverted to a one- party system shortly thereafter as many founding fathers sacrificed democracy for political stability, which they deemed favorable for managing such diverse social groups. See Englebert and Dunn (2013). 2. For more on elections in Eritrea, see http://africanelections.tripod.com/er.html 3. Demarest and Langer look at conflict patterns in Nigeria as recorded by Social Conflict in Africa Dataset (SCAD), Armed Conflict Locations and Events Dataset (ACLED) and a dataset developed by the authors using Nigerian sources and suggest that ACLED tends to under-report conflict events because it relies on international sources which are more likely to only report high profile events. See Demarest and Langer (2018). 4. For more, see Bekoe (2012).

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5. See Lindberg (2006) field work in Ghana which suggests that the quality of democracy improves as countries engage in regular elections. 6. Conceptualized as violence related specifically to elections, starting six months before elections to include election day. 7. We conceptualize and measure post-election violent events as election related violent events that happen right after polling stations close to three months after polling. 8. For presidential elections. 9. At the time of writing this paper, data on pre-election violence for the 2019 elections was available but the data on post-election violence and EPT rulings for 2019 election petitions was not available yet. Subsequently, we are able to test the effect of the 2011 and 2015 EPT rulings on the 2015 and 2019 pre-election violence respectively. In other words, how did the 2011 EPT rulings affect the 2015 pre-election violence? Similarly, how did the 2015 EPT rulings affect the 2019 pre-election violence? 10. Due to insecurity in the North East, elections were not held in Adamawa, Borno, or Yobe states. We do not include data for these three states in our analysis. 11. Data for the 2019 post-election period was not available at the time of writing. 12. PLACNG only provides disposition data for 560 of the petitions filed in 2015. 13. For robustness checks, we took the average percentage of respondents who stated they had “no trust” in the courts over a 12-year period at the state level as our alternative measure of trust/lack of trust. We did this for two reasons. First, the total number of respondents per survey per state ranges from about 15 to 80, so aggregating surveys together over time increased our total number of respondents per state, increasing our ability to generalize from the sample. Additionally, because public opinion can be temporarily influenced by short term shocks or specific events close to the timing of the survey (i.e., a corruption scandal or the like), we chose to take the average of the past several surveys (round 3 fielded in 2005 through round 7 fielded in 2017) as an alternative measure of trust and the findings still stay consistent and significant compared with using round 6 and 7 trust indices for 2015 and 2019 elections, respectively. 14. The role of competent electoral commissions in reducing the likelihood of election violence taking place has been extensively examined by works such as Birch and Muchlinski (2018); Darnolf and Cyllah (2014); Claes and von Borzyskowski (2018). 15. While we acknowledge that election violence has many consequences other than death, ranging from physical, psychological, displacement, destruction, etc., our paper focuses on fatality because it is a consequence that is both measurable and readily accessible in available datasets. 16. There is some evidence to suggest that the intensity of violence and/or conflict has an impact on institutional trust (see Bellows & Miguel, 2006). 17. Works by Höglund (2009), Fjelde and Höglund (2016) and Dunaiski (2015) argue that electoral rules can influence the likelihood of pre-election violence taking place. 18. The Nigerian state is our primary unit of analysis. The 33 observations are the number of Nigerian states in which elections were held in both 2011 and 2015. General elections were suspended in three states in 2015 (Adamawa, Borno, & Yobe) due to insecurity caused by Boko Haram.

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ABSTRACTS

Violence occurs in a slight majority of elections held in sub-Saharan Africa. Several recent studies have examined the effectiveness of various interventions on the prevalence of violent elections; however, the role of the courts has been relatively less studied. Using data on electoral violence during the 2015 and 2019 Nigerian elections, we examine under what conditions courts can moderate election-related violence. We find that successfully challenging an election outcome in the courts is related to a reduction in the lethality of violence in the next election, but only if the courts are generally perceived as trustworthy. These findings indicate that in addition to building judicial capability, improving generalized trust in judicial institutions is key to reducing electoral violence.

A violência ocorre numa ligeira maioria das eleições realizadas na África subsariana. Vários estudos recentes têm analisado a eficácia de diversas intervenções sobre a prevalência de eleições violentas; no entanto, o papel dos tribunais tem sido relativamente menos estudado. Utilizando dados sobre a violência eleitoral durante as eleições nigerianas de 2015 e 2019, examinamos em que condições os tribunais podem moderar a violência associada às eleições. Observamos que contestar com sucesso um resultado eleitoral nos tribunais está relacionado com uma redução da letalidade da violência nas eleições seguintes, mas só se os tribunais forem comummente percebidos como confiáveis. Estes resultados indicam que além de reforçar a capacidade judicial, melhorar a confiança generalizada nas instituições judiciais é fundamental para reduzir a violência eleitoral.

INDEX

Keywords: elections, electoral violence, judiciary, dispute resolution, institutional trust, Nigeria Palavras-chave: eleições, violência eleitoral, poder judicial, resolução de disputas, confiança institucional, Nigéria

AUTHORS

STEPHANIE M. BURCHARD Institute for Defense Analyses 4850 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, VA 22311 United States of America [email protected]

MESHACK SIMATI California State University San Marcos 333 S. Twin Oaks Valley Road San Marcos, CA 92096-0001 United States of America [email protected]

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The Effect of Electoral Violence on Electoral Participation in Africa O impacto da violência eleitoral na participação eleitoral em África

Carlos Shenga and Amílcar Pereira

EDITOR'S NOTE

Recebido: 31 de maio de 2019 Aceite: 22 de outubro de 2019

1 After three decades of multiparty elections in Africa, there are now many studies on electoral participation in the continent. A more recent study talks about “184 multicandidate presidential elections and 207 multiparty legislative elections held in some forty-six [African] countries between 1990 and 2015” (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019, p. 30). But how electoral participation is dealt with in the scholarly work varies from study to study. Too often scholars refer to electoral participation as the act of voting. However, casting a vote on election day is only one aspect of it (Bennett & Bennett, 1986).

2 By definition the broader concept of political participation, which includes electoral participation, consists of “legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and the actions they take” (Verba et al., 1978, p. 46). It is a multidimensional concept encompassing many indicators. It includes, among other things, collective actions around policy issues, contacting political representatives, and outbursts of street protests (Bennett & Bennett, 1986). Dalton (2002) points out three modes of political participation: voting, campaign activity and community activity. Verba et al. (1978, p. 55) add to that two other modes of participation: contacting officials and protesting. Bratton et al. (2005) indicate the following forms of political participation: voting, attending election campaign, working for a candidate, attending a community meeting, joining lobbying

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effort, attending a demonstration, writing a letter, contacting leaders and group membership.

3 These dimensions of political participation can be clustered into three subsets. The first subset is of participation after election. It includes attending a community meeting referred to as community activity in Dalton (2002), joining a lobbying effort, attending a demonstration, writing a letter, contacting leaders, and affiliating in a community or developmental group. The second is participation on election day – that is, voting. And the third is participation before election day – that is, campaign activity, specified in Bratton et al. (2005) as attending an election campaign and working for a candidate. But this dimension also includes voter registration – that is, “a gateway to enfranchisement” (Pintor & Gratschew, 2002).

4 This study focuses on political participation in a multidimensional perspective. But instead of using the broader concept of political participation, it focuses on two subsets of it: participation before election day and participation on election day. The combination of the two subsets can be named “electoral participation” and defined as: the act of participating in an election commencing from election registration to voting on election day. We measure electoral participation in this study by using data from the Afrobarometer public opinion surveys1.

5 Of the two most recent Afrobarometer surveys, Round 6 (2014-2015) and Round 7 (2016-2018), Round 6 is more equipped with information on the different dimensions of electoral participation. It includes five items of electoral participation (i.e. voting, attending an election campaign rally, working for a party or candidate, attending a campaign meeting, and trying to persuade others to vote for your party or candidate). Round 7 only includes the first three. In this study we employ the most recent Round 7 data. Whilst we are aware of its limitation tapping the concept of electoral participation, our choice is mainly driven by one of its predictors, electoral violence, on which items are mainly found in Round 72.

6 The first objective of this study is to examine the effect of electoral violence on electoral participation. Studying electoral violence is relevant as it affects democratic consolidation (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019; Burchard, 2015). When elections are characterized by the malpractice of election violence the system support tends to be low in that voters tend to lose confidence in the legislature and government and they are less likely to be satisfied with democracy and to obey the law (Norris, 2014, p. 129).

7 Violence has been significant in African elections. Of the several hundred competitive legislative and presidential elections that have been held in Africa since 1990 (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019) about 25 percent have been violent (Fisher, 2002; Straus & Taylor, 2012). Violence has been part of elections in Nigeria (Bratton, 2013; Sisk, 2012), Côte d’Ivoire (Boone & Kriger, 2012), Sudan (Sisk, 2012), Kenya (Burchard, 2015; Mueller, 2012), Ethiopia (Smith, 2012), Zimbabwe (Boone & Kriger, 2012; Bratton, 2015), Uganda (Blattman, 2009), Togo and Zanzibar (Boeke, 2012); and more recently in Zambia in 2016 (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019, p. 1; Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018, p. 122) and Mozambique in 2019 (Shenga & Howe, forthcoming).

8 The studies of the effect of electoral violence on electoral participation are limited in Africa, as electoral violence is a relatively recent phenomenon (Burchard, 2015). As is shown under the literature review section, there are at least two systematic studies of the effect of electoral violence on electoral participation in Africa: one by Burchard (2015) and the other by Bratton (2013). Whilst they found a negative relationship

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between the former and the later, these studies are limited in the way they measure these concepts. Both Bratton (2013) and Burchard (2015) measure electoral participation only by voting; and electoral violence only by threats of violence at the polls.

9 Based on these previous African studies (Bratton, 2013; Burchard, 2015) and Norris (2014), this study also expects to find a negative impact of election violence on electoral participation. With less experience of alternation of power and some predominance of dominant parties, we argue that in Africa electoral violence is used by the incumbent parties to prevent the opposition supporters from turning out (Hafner-Burton et al., 2014).

10 This study contributes to the literature by testing this electoral violence theory using multiple dimensions of electoral participation and electoral violence. This study enlarges the scope of measurement of electoral violence by including two measures: fear of violence in an election campaign and fear of violence at a political rally or campaign event.

11 The second objective is to investigate the implications of the quality of elections for democratic consolidation. The quality of elections is a multidimensional concept that include electoral malpractice (including electoral violence) and electoral integrity (Norris, 2014). When elections are violent they are characterized by a malpractice and are of low quality. In the first objective we are concerned with the malpractice of electoral violence per se, as it is a relatively new phenomenon in Africa with limited studies on it, but in the second, instead of being minimalist on the concept of electoral malpractice, we broaden and expand it. In doing so, we look at the whole package that includes electoral malpractice and electoral integrity to represent it as the quality of elections. Elections are of high quality if they are of low malpractice and of high integrity.

12 We expect to find a positive relationship of electoral integrity with democratic consolidation; and a negative connection of electoral malpractice with democratic consolidation, as Norris (2014) findings. Greenberg and Mattes (2013) also found a positive association between the quality of elections and supply of democracy. Greenberg and Mattes (2013) measured the quality of elections using only a single item of electoral integrity – that is, free and fair elections. Norris (2014) used multiple indicators for both electoral malpractice and electoral integrity but on the malpractice of electoral violence used only one: threats of violence at the polls.

Literature review

13 Electoral violence affects electoral participation. Systematic studies of the impact of electoral violence on electoral participation show a negative association between the two. A cross-sectional study revealed that voters who have experienced threats of election violence at the polls were less likely to vote in Nigeria (Bratton, 2013, p. 129). A cross-national study also found the same globally (Norris, 2014, p. 143). In this case, it can be argued that electoral violence is used by the incumbent to prevent the opposition supporters from turning out (Hafner-Burton et al., 2014).

14 Another cross-national study showed that “electoral violence affects willingness to [not] vote, but this effect differs by partisan attachment and specific electoral context”

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(Burchard, 2015, p. 143). In cases where opposition supporters were exposed to electoral violence they were more willing to vote. Although not significant, in cases where the incumbent supporters were exposed to violence they were less likely to vote (Burchard, 2015, p. 139). Depending on the type of violence (whether strategic or incidental, the identity of the perpetrators and or the message that it is meant to convey to voters) and how it affects directly individuals, electoral violence can be used to mobilize voters to vote (see Travaglianti, 2014), to prevent them to turnout or to punish victors (Bekoe & Burchard, 2017; Burchard, 2015).

15 These studies measured electoral violence and electoral participation only by single items. Burchard (2015) and Bratton (2013) measured electoral violence by threat of violence at the polls. Norris (2014) did the same but her measurement of electoral violence was integrated in the scope of an electoral malpractice index together with other items. On electoral participation, they measured it by voting participation (Bratton, 2015; Burchard, 2015; Norris, 2014).

16 The quality of elections, in general, has an impact on electoral participation. “Elections work well [when] they can provide the main opportunity for most people to participate in politics” (Powell, 2000). Norris (2014) found that voter turnout tended to be high when there was electoral integrity – that is, when votes were counted fairly, elections were fair, voters were offered genuine choice in the elections and journalists provided fair coverage of elections. It tended to be low when there was electoral malpractice, for example, rich people bought elections, television news favoured the governing party, voters were bribed, opposition candidates were prevented from running and voters were threatened with violence at the polls (p. 143).

17 Norris (2014) notes that “too often elections around the globe are deeply flawed” meaning that they do not have integrity. In Africa the scenario is also of concern. As Bleck and van de Walle (2019) described it: “extensive intimidation of the opposition” and suspension of the opposition newspaper took place, respectively, in the 2016 Gambian and Zambian elections (pp. 2-3). Districts were gerrymandered in Zimbabwe ahead of the 2008 election (Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018, p. 41); and candidates in Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana and Kenya were found to distribute largesse and buy votes (Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018, pp. 61-92).

18 Performance evaluation (of institutional actors, such as: the incumbent or opposition parties and individual actors like the incumbent or opposition candidates) affect voting behaviour. It is based on rational choice theory that assumes that voters act rationally – that is, before deciding on a course of action (such as buying a particular product) they weigh up the costs and benefits of the various alternatives and they will take the decision which maximizes the benefits and minimizes the costs to themselves. (Denver, 2007)

19 Thus, voters vote and make a party choice based on the performance evaluation they make of political parties and candidates by looking at current political issues, campaign events and personalities of party leaders or candidates.

20 Bratton et al. (2005) found a negative relationship between performance evaluation of the president and voting. But Bratton et al. (2013) discovered a positive connection of prospective sociotropic economic evaluation and economic policy performance with an intention to vote for the ruling party (p. 92). In the African context of electoral violence, Collier and Vicente (2012) found that voters that were exposed to violence and were the targets of an institutional actor (ActionAid International Nigeria’s anti-

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violence campaign) were more likely to vote than others. As is shown later in this study we analyse the effect of evaluation of government performance on election violence.

21 Electoral participation can be also predicted from the habit of participating in politics in general. Bratton et al. (2005) found that the act of participating in politics after elections by contacting and communing led Africans to participate on election day and even in other forms of political participation like protesting. They also found that participating on election day led voters to contacting and communing (Bratton et al., 2005, p. 297). Bechtel et al. (2018) found that the long-term and spillover effects of compulsory voting in the Swiss canton of Vaud (1900-1970) increased turnout in federal referendums by 30 percentage points.

22 Yet the context where people live is a predictor of people’s behaviours. Context matters (Goodin & Tilly, 2006). Context affect people’s attitudes and behaviours. People living in dominant party systems will be expected to be supplied less with democratic goods like freedoms and equality that are necessary for them to participate in elections in particular and in politics in general. This is because dominant parties are detrimental to the quality of democracy (van de Walle & Buttler, 1999) and the prospects of liberal democracy (du Toit, 1999). They pose the greatest threat to consolidation of third wave democracies (Huntington, 1996) as they can degenerate into dominant authoritarian or hegemonic parties.

23 Whilst scholars have classified dominant parties by counting the effective number of parties, this is found to be problematic and flawed (Bogaards, 2004). In this study we use Sartori’s counting rule of dominant party meaning “the party that have secured at least three consecutive parliamentary majorities and the presidency” (Bogaards, 2004, p. 191). Thus, the dominant party systems in our sample are the following countries: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

24 Access to news media is another driver of electoral participation. Based on studies suggesting that media exposure has a sizable impact on voting behaviour (Bratton et al., 2005, p. 297; Norris, 2001; Verma & Sardesai, 2014), one would state that voters who often access news media will be more engaged in electoral participation than others. Due to recent development of news media, where we can distinguish traditional media3 from new news media4, different outcome could be expected: as the new news media tends not to be regulated across the world, including in Africa, and thus with less ethics on its use (Martens et al., 2018), scholars would expect it to have more a negative influence than traditional ones.

25 The social structure also shapes people’s behaviours. Modernization theory suggests, for instance, that urban dwellers will be more likely to participate in elections, as they are more exposed to the information necessary to know the role of elections and how society functions. In contrast, in the African context, rural residents are more likely to vote (Bratton et al., 2005); and they do so for the ruling parties (Bratton et al., (2013, p. 92). With respect to gender, women are less likely to be interested in public affairs and discuss politics (Afrobarometer & CPGD, 2013; Pereira et al., 2005; Shenga & Pereira, 2009), to be represented in parliament (Shenga, 2014, p. 113) and more likely to be victim of violence (Bachman, 1994). Although initial evidence from Afrobarometer found no evidence of the impact of gender on voting, African women were less likely to commune and contact (Bratton et al., 2005).

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26 In addition to electoral participation, it is also important to review the relationship between the quality of elections and democratic consolidation, as the former has implications on the later. The quality of elections has an effect on democratic legitimacy. Norris (2014) found that perceived electoral integrity had a positive impact on satisfaction with democracy while perceived malpractice had a negative effect (Norris, 2014, p. 125). Greenberg and Mattes (2013) found that the perceived freeness and fairness of elections affected positively the supply of democracy, indicated by satisfaction with democracy and the extent of democracy (p. 247).

27 Greenberg and Mattes (2013) measured the quality of elections only by free and fair elections; but Norris (2014) included a battery of items. For electoral integrity, she used the following items: votes are counted fairly, election officials are fair, voters offered genuine choice in an election, and journalists provide fair coverage of elections. For electoral malpractices, she used: rich people buy elections, television news favours the government party, opposition candidates are prevented from running and voters are threatened with violence at the polls.

Data and methods for explaining electoral participation

28 We perform our analysis and tests using Afrobarometer5 public opinion surveys conducted between 2016 and 2018 in 346 African countries that have made democratic political reform7. The Afrobarometer surveys includes a set of questions on election violence, the quality of elections, government performance preventing election violence, political participation, media exposure, demographics, and democratic consolidation.

29 We measure violence by using five items of which two tap electoral violence. Fear of election violence is indicated by the survey question: “During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence? A lot, somewhat, a little bit or not at all?”. The last four violence items are indicated by the following questions: “… Please tell me whether, in the past two years, you have ever personally feared any of the following types of violence: 1) Violence among people in your neighbourhood or village? 2) Violence at a political rally or campaign event? 3) Violence of public protest? 4) An armed attack by political or religious extremists? [If yes:] Have you actually personally experienced this type of violence in the past two years?” Reponses ranged from: no – never; yes – feared but did not experience it; and yes – feared and experienced it.

30 In the model of electoral participation, the quality of elections is measured by trust in the Electoral Management Body (EMB), freeness and fairness of elections, and whether the opposition was prevented from running in elections. Trust in EMB is measured by the following Afrobarometer question: “How much do you trust EMB?” Responses could be given varying from not at all to just a little, somewhat and a lot. Freeness and fairness of elections is indicated by question: “On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in XXXX? Was it: not free and fair, free and fair with major problems, free and fair but with minor problems or completely free and fair?” Opposition prevented from running is measured by: “In your

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opinion, during this country’s elections, how often are opposition candidates prevented from running for office?” Answers varied from never to sometimes, often and always.

31 But in the model of democratic consolidation, the quality of elections is boosted. Besides being specified into considerations that taps both electoral integrity and electoral malpractice, it also includes the malpractices of electoral violence. At this point, electoral integrity includes measures of trust in the EMB and freeness and fairness of elections; and electoral malpractice includes aspects related to electoral violence covered in this study and opposition being prevented from running.

32 To measure government performance preventing election violence we use the following question: “How well or badly would you say the current government is handling ‘Preventing political violence during election campaigns’? Very badly, fairly badly, fairly well or very well?”

33 Participation after election is measured by membership in a community association development group; attending a community meeting, and participating in a demonstration or protest march; joining others to raise an issue, and to request government action; and contacting the media, contacting an official for help and contacting officials. Membership in a community association development group is specified by: “Could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member of voluntary association or community group?”

34 Attending a community meeting and participating in a demonstration or protest march are indicated by the questions: “Please tell me whether you, personally, have 1) Attended a community meeting [and] 2) Participated in a demonstration or protest march, during the past year?” Joining others to raise an issue, and to request government action is specified by: “Please tell me whether you, personally, have 1) Got together with others to raise an issue [and] 2) Joined others in your community to request action from government during the past year?”

35 Contacting the media and officials for help are specified by: “Please tell me whether you, personally, have contacted 1) the media, like calling a radio program or writing a letter to a newspaper [and] 2) a government official to ask for help or make a complaint during the past year?” Contacting officials is indicated by: “During the past year, how often have you contacted: 1) A local government councillor, 2) A member of Parliament, 3) An official of a government agency, 4) A political party official, 5) Traditional leaders, and 6) Religious leaders about some important problem or to give them your views?”

36 Participation on election day – that is, voting is measured by: “Understanding that some people were unable to vote in the most recent national election in XXXX, which of the following statements is true for you? You were not registered to vote. You voted in the elections. You decided not to vote. You could not find the polling station. You were prevented from voting. You did not have time to vote. You did not vote because you could not find your name in the voters’ register. You were too young to vote?” Participation before election day is specified by attending a campaign rally and working for a candidate or party “Thinking about the last national election in XXXX, did you: 1) Attend a campaign rally? and 2) Work for a candidate or party?”

37 Media exposure is measured by: “How often do you get news from: 1) Radio, 2) Television, 3) Newspapers, 4) Internet and 5) Social media? Never, less than once a month, a few times a month, a few times a week or every day?” Two social structure indicators are used: residential location (rural/urban) and gender.

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38 Democratic consolidation is specified by three items: First, support for democracy: “Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have”. Second, extent of democracy: “In your opinion, how much of a democracy is [COUNTRY] today?” Third, satisfaction with democracy: “Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [COUNTRY]?” At public opinion individual level, democracies consolidate when, on the one hand, citizens demand it, saying ”democracy is preferable than any other forms of government”, and reject authoritarian forms of government, such as: one party rule, military rule and one-man rule. On the other hand, when they perceive that their country is being supplied of democracy – that is, saying [COUNTRY] is a full democracy, and they are satisfied with democracy (see Bratton et al., 2005; Greenberg & Mattes, 2013).

39 All of these variables are measured with individual level data and they will be analysed at that level. However, the analysis will be performed at a multi-level to take into account the contextual-country level dominant party variable that has been created from the countries being analysed. Since Eswatini does not have party system, the number of observations drops from 34 to 33 countries.

40 We test the effect of electoral violence on electoral participation controlling for other factors simultaneously, and then the impact of the quality of elections on democratic consolidation, using binary logistic multiple regression analysis. All items in the regression were coded 1-0. Items tapping supposedly the same thing were merged into a single item to create a multidimensional concept or index. In order to merge them into an index we used factor and reliability analyses8. As reliability analysis did produce a valid reliable index for items of demand for democracy and supply of democracy, we employ them separately. We dropped items indicating rejection of authoritarian rule to avoid many items.

Findings

41 The effects of electoral violence on electoral participation, controlling for other factors, are presented in Table 1. As an unexpected finding, the results show that the malpractice of electoral violence leads individuals to participate in elections. All electoral violence effects are positive. Fear of violence in an election campaign is positive and significant on participating in an election campaign rally. It also appears to be positive, but not significant, on voting. Fear of violence at a political rally or campaign event is positive and significant both on voting and attending an election campaign rally. Table 1: The effect of electoral violence on electoral participation, binary logistic model

Attending Working for Voting campaign rally candidate/party

B S.E. B S.E. B S.E.

Violence

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Perceived fear of political violence in 0.05 0.04 0.10* 0.04 -0.06 0.05 an election campaign

Perceived fear of violence in a -0.06 0.04 -0.14** 0.05 0.05 0.06 neighbourhood

Perceived fear of violence at a political 0.15** 0.05 0.37*** 0.05 0.09 0.06 rally or campaign event

Perceived fear of violence in a public 0.01 0.05 -0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 protest

Perceived fear of violence by an -0.20*** 0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.10** 0.06 extremist group

The quality of elections

Trust EMB 0.20*** 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05

Free and fair elections 0.64*** 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.28*** 0.05

Opposition prevented from running -0.24*** 0.05 -0.17** 0.06 0.18** 0.06

Government performance

Preventing election violence 0.11** 0.03 0.13*** 0.04 -0.22*** 0.05

Country context

Dominant party system -0.23*** 0.03 0.10** 0.04 -0.21*** 0.05

Participation after election

Member of an association or group 0.17*** 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.35*** 0.05

Attend community meeting 0.48*** 0.04 0.51*** 0.05 0.22*** 0.06

Attend demonstration -0.42 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.27*** 0.07

Join others to raise an issue -0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.12* 0.06

Join others to request govt. action 0.24*** 0.05 0.17*** 0.05 0.08 0.05

Contact the media -0.12* 0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.22** 0.06

Contact an official for help 0.10 0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06

Contacting index 0.17*** 0.02 0.28*** 0.02 0.40*** 0.03

Participation on election day

Voting X X 0.71*** 0.04 0.33*** 0.05

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Participation before election day

Attend a campaign rally 0.70*** 0.04 X X 2.49*** 0.05

Work for a party/candidate 0.27*** 0.05 2.49*** 0.05 X X

Media exposure

Radio news 0.22*** 0.04 0.27*** 0.05 -0.00 0.05

TV news -0.11** 0.04 -0.26*** 0.05 0.19** 0.05

Newspaper news 0.12** 0.05 0.10 0.05 -0.03* 0.06

Internet news -0.06 0.07 -0.25*** 0.08 -0.09 0.10

Social media news -0.45*** 0.07 0.20* 0.08 -0.20*** 0.10

Social structure

Rural -0.01 0.04 0.21*** 0.04 0.07*** 0.05

Female -0.12*** 0.03 -0.16*** 0.04 -0.2*** 0.05

Constant -0.06 0.06 -2.48 0.08 -3.36 0.1

Nagelkerke R Square .19 .40 .43

All dependent and independent variables were coded 1 and 0. Indexes were created using factor analysis, which extracted one single unrotated factor using Maximum Likelihood method and reliability analysis, with Cronbach Alpha greater than .60. Items that incorporate indexes were coded 1-0 before factor and reliability analysis. ***p=.001, **p=.01, *p=.05; N=44,623 individuals 18 years and older. Eswatini was removed from the analysis as it does not have party system.

42 On the other hand, violence in general has a significant and negative effect on participation in elections. Fear of violence in a neighbourhood prevent voters from attending election campaign rallies. Fear of violence by extremist groups reduces the prospects of voting and working for parties or candidates.

43 The effects of other predictors of participation in elections appear mostly to support the literature. The quality of elections affects electoral behaviour. As expected, electoral integrity fosters participation in elections, whereas electoral malpractice reduces it. Africans who perceive that elections are free and fair tend to participate on election day by voting and during election campaigns by attending rallies and working for candidates or parties. Those who trust EMBs are also likely to vote. And those who view that the opposition is prevented from running are less likely to cast a vote and attend a campaign rally. But, unexpectedly, those who view that the opposition is prevented from running are likely to work for a candidate or a party.

44 The effect of government performance preventing election violence is significant on all of the three measures of electoral participation but is, unexpectedly, negative in one. Whilst Africans who rate positively the performance of their governments preventing

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violence during election campaign are likely to vote and attend an election campaign rally, they are unlikely to work for a candidate or a party.

45 Living in a context where “the same party secured at least three consecutive parliamentary majorities and the presidency” (Bogaards, 2004) drives Africans to not cast a vote or work for a candidate or party, as expected. However, it does not with respect to attending an election campaign rally. Africans who live in a context of dominant parties are likely to attend an election campaign rally.

46 The habit of participation in politics in general tends to affect participation in elections. Participation after elections leads individuals to participate in elections either on election day or during the election campaign. With only two exceptions – contacting the media and attending a demonstration or protest march. All indicators tapping participation after election that are significant have positive effects. The negative effect of contacting the media on electoral participation could be explained by the media highlighting negative aspects of elections. Too often the media highlights the negative and even sometimes make the negative to appear worse (Rosenthal, 2009). With respect to the negative effect of attending a demonstration or protest march it is possible that those who reported attending a demonstration or protest march are more exposed to news media. The different dimensions of electoral participation affect positively one another. Those who say that they vote in elections also say that they attend election campaign rallies and work for a candidate or party and vice versa.

47 Moving to news media consumption, the results tend to indicate, although not consistently, that traditional news media drives individuals to participate in elections while new news media move them away from elections. Accessing radio news makes Africans to vote and attend campaign rallies. The same applies to accessing newspaper news on voting. Television news has mixed effects. It leads Africans to abstain from voting and abstain from attending an election campaign rally but surprisingly it does lead them to work for a candidate or a party. On the other hand, we observe that new news media have negative impacts, with exception to one case. Individuals who obtain news media from the internet are less likely to attend an election campaign rally and those who do so through social media are less likely to vote and work for a candidate or a party. But, unexpectedly, social media has a positive effect on attending a campaign rally.

48 Last but not least, rural residents tend more than urban residents to attend an election campaign and work for a party or candidate. This might be explained by the high incidences of poverty that characterize mainly rural areas in Africa. Rural dwellers may view that there could be gains for them to participate in an election campaign rally as it is in those periods that they may receive a free t-shirt, hat or fabrics (often promoting a political party), watch free concerts in rallies and even receive money or basic food stuff. Whereas on election day they get “nothing”. Note that although it is not statistically significant, living in a rural area is negatively associated with voting. By focusing on a subset of Round 6 of Afrobarometer surveys and using more extensive measures of electoral participation, Shenga (2018) found that poor Africans were less likely to vote but more likely to attend election campaign rallies, persuade others to vote for their party or candidate and work for a party or candidate. The same trend applies to rural residents. African females appear to be mainly disengaged in politics. They are less likely to vote, attend an election campaign rally and work for a party or candidate.

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The implications of the quality of elections for democracy

49 The effect of the quality of elections on democratic consolidation, controlling for the context of a dominant party system, is presented in Table 2. Here, following Norris’s model (2014) of the quality of elections, election integrity and election malpractice, we integrate election violence measures into what we call the quality of elections. The measures of electoral integrity in our model are: trust the EMB and free and fair elections. The measures of electoral malpractice are: our two measures of electoral violence and the opposition prevented from running.

50 The logistic regression results of the effect of the quality of elections are all significant and continue to hold from initial (correlation) analysis. Election malpractice affects negatively dimensions of democratic consolidation. Africans who perceive a fear of violence at a political rally or campaign event are less likely to say they live in a full democracy and are satisfied with the way democracy is functioning in their country. But they still view democracy as the most preferable form of government. Those who fear violence during an election campaign rally are less likely to view that they are being supplied with democracy in their countries as well as less likely to support democracy. Yet those who view that the opposition is prevented from running become disillusioned with democracy to the extent that they do not prefer it because they view that they are already being supplied with democracy.

51 On the other hand, electoral integrity affects democratic consolidation positively. Africans who trust the EMB and rate elections free and fair tend more to prefer democracy and to view their country as a full democracy and are satisfied with it.

Table 2: The quality of elections and democratic consolidation, binary logistic regression

Support Extent Satisfaction Support Extent Satisfaction for of w/ for of w/ democracy democracy democracy democracy democracy democracy

Pearson’s correlations B

THE QUALITY OF ELECTIONS

Electoral malpractice

Perceived fear of violence of a .112*** -.185*** -.069** .012** -.069** -.059** political rally or (0.02) (0.03) (.02) campaign event

Perceived fear of political violence -.058** -.234*** -.198*** -.021** -.071** -.080** in election (0.02) (0.03) (.02) campaign

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Opposition -.115*** -.243*** -.399*** prevented from -.027** -.068** -.103** running (0.03) (.05) (.03)

Electoral integrity

Free and fair .194*** 1.266*** .791*** .054** .271** .241** elections (0.02) (.03) (.02)

.212*** .638*** .869*** Trust EMB .059** .179** .254** (0.02) (.03) (.02)

CONTEXTUAL CONTROL

Dominant party -.028 -.013 .065** -.013** -.028** -.012* system (0.02) (.03) (.02)

Nagelkerke R .009 .144 .14 Square

All dependent and independent variables were coded 1 and 0. ***p=.001, **p=.01; N=44,623 individuals 18 years and older. Eswatini was removed from the analysis as it does not have party system.

52 Africans who live in a dominant party system uncritically overrate the performance of their political system by reporting that they tend to be satisfied with democracy. Yet, in a dominant party system, democratic procedures of the rule of law, accountability, participation and competition tended to be subverted by life time parties. As one would expect, other coefficients of a dominant party system are negative but not significant.

Conclusions

53 Scholarly work using a systematic approach finds that electoral violence tends to drive Africans away from participating in elections (Bratton, 2013; Burchard, 2015). By using the same approach, with more recent data, we found the opposite to be true. Africans who perceived electoral violence were more likely to attend an election campaign rally and vote. Instead of being used by the incumbent parties to prevent the opposition supporters from turning out (Hafner-Burton et al., 2014), electoral violence in Africa appears to motivate those who perceive it to participate more. This finding, which is different from previous studies, is associated with the multidimensional approach to measuring both electoral violence and electoral participation and the use of more recent dynamics of African elections. It might be also associated with the climate of fear that persists from decades of colonial and post-colonial authoritarian rules.

54 No less important in Africa is the effect of violence in general. Violence has a negative effect on participation in elections. Africans who perceive a threat of violence in a neighbourhood also tended to report they do not attend election campaign rallies. And those who perceive a fear of violence by extremist groups tended not to work for parties or candidates. If a neighbourhood is perceived to be unsafe, voters might leave

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their residential location thus losing their prospect to vote in the neighbourhood where they were registered to vote.

55 Although this study points out that election violence is used to mobilize voters participating in elections, this malpractice is not conducive for democratic consolidation. Norris (2014) found that the perceived electoral integrity is associated with system support; and Greenberg and Mattes (2013), more specifically, found that free and fair elections is linked positively with the supply of democracy. On the other hand, Norris (2014) found electoral malpractice is negatively associated with system support. This study confirms these findings. Those who perceive the malpractice of electoral violence are less likely to support for, and be satisfied with democracy, and are less likely to evaluate their country as full democracy. Whilst those individuals who perceive the quality and integrity of elections are more likely to support, and be satisfied with, democracy.

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NOTES

1. Afrobarometer is non-partisan, pan-African research institution conducting public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy and society in more than 30 countries repeated on a regular cycle. www.afrobarometer.org 2. Round 6 has two measures of electoral violence (i.e. fear of political violence in election campaign, and threats of violence at the polls) whilst Round 7 has three: fear of political violence in election campaign, fear of violence at a political rally or campaign and government performance preventing election violence. In addition, Round 7 has three measures of violence in general. 3. This includes radio, television and newspapers. 4. This includes internet and social media (Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, etc.) 5. Afrobarometer data are available at www.afrobarometer.org. The Afrobarometer surveyed through a face-to-face structured questionnaire nationally representative, random, stratified probability samples of 1,200 to 2,400 ordinary African citizens – individuals 18 years and older. The samples were drawn by taking the smallest

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geographic units, census Enumeration Areas (EAs) and stratifying all EAs across countries into separate lists according to province and urban or rural status. From these lists were then randomly selected 150-300 EAs with the probability proportionate to its size in the overall population, ensuring that every eligible adult had an equal and known chance of being selected. Eight households were then randomly selected within each EA, and a respondent 18 years of age or older was randomly selected from each household. A gender quota ensured that every other interview must be with a female. 6. Whilst the surveys were conducted in 34 countries only 33 countries are analysed in this study. Eswatini was removed from the analysis as it does not have party system. Further details follow in this section. 7. One of the prerequisites for countries to be surveyed is that they have adopted multiparty democracy in their constitution. This is because researchers need to have freedom to conduct research; and respondents need to air their views freely without pressure either from the government or other agencies. 8. The factor analysis extracted one single factor using the maximum likelihood method and reliability analysis showed internal consistency of the index of at least 60 percent.

ABSTRACTS

Systematic African studies have revealed that electoral violence tends to have a negative impact driving Africans away from participating in elections. However, by using a multidimensional approach to electoral violence and electoral participation, combined with a recent dynamic from the 2016 to 2018 Afrobarometer public opinion surveys of 33 African countries, this study finds the opposite. Africans who perceived electoral violence were more likely to attend an election campaign rally and vote. Instead of being used by the incumbent to prevent the opposition supporters from voting, electoral violence appears to motivate those who perceive it to participate. However, whilst election violence may increase electoral participation, this malpractice is not conducive for consolidating democracy or fostering support for, or satisfaction with, democracy.

Estudos africanos sistemáticos mostraram que a violência eleitoral tende a ter um impacto negativo, levando os africanos a não participar nas eleições. Através do uso de uma perspetiva multidimensional no estudo da violência eleitoral e participação eleitoral, combinado com a dinâmica recente dos inquéritos de opinião pública do Afrobarómetro de 2016 e 2018 de 33 países africanos, este estudo conclui o oposto. Os africanos que perceberam violência eleitoral tendiam mais a participar nas campanhas eleitorais e a votar. Em vez de ser usada pelo titular do poder para impedir os apoiantes da oposição de votar, a violência eleitoral parece motivar aqueles que a percebem a participar nas eleições. No entanto, embora a violência eleitoral possa aumentar a participação eleitoral, esta má prática não é conducente à consolidação democrática ou promoção da, ou satisfação com, a democracia.

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INDEX

Keywords: electoral violence, electoral participation, electoral integrity, electoral malpractice, democratic consolidation, Africa Palavras-chave: violência eleitoral, participação eleitoral, integridade eleitoral, má prática eleitoral, consolidação democrática, África

AUTHORS

CARLOS SHENGA Universidade Joaquim Chissano Maputo, Mozambique [email protected]

AMÍLCAR PEREIRA Universidade Eduardo Mondlane Avenida Julius Nyerere, Maputo, Mozambique [email protected]

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Tweeting to Democracy: A new anti- authoritarian liberation struggle in Zimbabwe Tweetar para a democracia: Uma nova luta de libertação antiautoritária no Zimbábue

Chipo Dendere

EDITOR'S NOTE

Recebido: 15 de setembro de 2019 Aceite: 27 de outubro de 2019

1 In the last two decades, African democracies have made remarkable progress in expanding suffrage and opening political space. Democratic transitions and economic development have enabled far-reaching radio and television network expansion. The majority of African respondents in the 2018 Afrobarometer surveys report that they receive the majority of their news via the radio. Additionally, the proportion of those who receive their news from the television has also dramatically increased from just 21% in 1999 to 38.5% who said they received news from TV daily. There is a general sense that increased access to digital information technology is good for democracy in Africa and other developing regions (Bailard, 2012; Bailard & Livingston, 2014).

2 However, even as access to information has become more accessible, incumbent governments continue to wield power over media and use that power to restrict citizen access to information when it suits them. Thus, more and more citizens are relying on the internet for more diverse independent news sources. The growth of cellphone networks and fiber optics across the continent has lowered the cost of receiving and sending information. In the last decade, the proportion of Africans in the Afrobarometer surveys who reported that they receive news from the internet rose from 2.6% in 2008 to 14.5% in 2014. Improved fiber optic-networks have also made the

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internet easily accessible on mobile phones. Over 70% of African respondents in the 2015 Afrobarometer surveys reported that they use their mobile every day. In 2017, Facebook reported that it had reached 170 million users in Africa (Shapshak, 2017). There is no publicly available official data from social media companies or governments in African for other social media platforms. However, conservative estimates from websites that track internet usage such as internetworldstats.com suggest that at least 11 million African users are active on Twitter, LinkedIn, and WhatsApp and that more than 2.9 million videos are viewed from YouTube each month (Internet World Stats, 2017). African citizens are using online platforms to connect with friends and family, as well as to discuss politics. With the goal of contributing to the growing literature on the impact of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) on African politics, this paper asks the following questions: 1) how are people getting involved in politics through social media? 2) how are they trying to push democracy? And 3) what have been the responses of the authoritarian government?

3 This paper begins with a theoretical look at the literature on digital engagement and goes into a brief history of social media engagement in various African contexts. The paper then goes into an in-depth discussion of the methodology used for this study and a discussion of the findings.

Theorizing the digital citizen

4 Since the success of the Arab Spring revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa, there has been growing expectation that digital Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), particularly social media platforms like Facebook, can foster political mobilization thereby contributing positively to democratic growth (Breuer & Groshek, 2014). Scholars in support of ICTs as a “liberation technology” argue that mobile phones and internet access offer citizens low cost, secure, and decentralized pathways to engage with politics (Castells, 2011; Mustvairo & Sirks, 2011). It is further argued that these technologies shield citizens, particularly those in authoritarian regimes, where communication is heavily monitored and regulated from the prying eyes of the state. Theoretically, we would also expect that it should be easier for politicians to reach previously excluded people in politics (Bode, 2012; Conroy et al., 2012; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Vitak et al., 2011; Steenkamp and Hyde-Clarke, 2014). Lee (2012) found that Chinese citizens in the privacy of their homes and on their phones and computers can discuss grievances, and this engagement can translate into real political action by joining protests. In the Zimbabwean case, we have seen some increase in the degree to which citizens are engaging in politics.

5 For young people with limited financial resources, social media is a low-cost way to engage with the political conversation. Unlike traditional text messaging systems that charge users per message sent in most countries, users buy monthly bundles for WhatsApp or Facebook that allow them unlimited usage for costs as low as US$1/ month. In countries like Zimbabwe were citizen political engagement is heavily policed by the state, engaging on social media away from the watchful eye of the state, allows citizens to engage with politics with a sense of security. WhatsApp claims that their messages are encrypted, and users also use false names on public platforms likes Facebook and Twitter.

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6 In recent years, Africans, especially in the sub-Saharan region, have embraced social media as a tool to engage with politics. In 2015, the #feesmustfall campaign, the demand by South African University students for more affordable tuition, attracted significant regional and global attention, forcing the South African government to freeze proposed tuition increments (AfricaIsACountry, 2015; Booysen, 2016). The success of #feesmustfall ignited citizen campaigns, often referred to as the hashtag movements all across the continent. In 2016 alone, there were at least 15 high profile social media campaigns. The campaigns ranged from those demanding significant changes in policy such as #feesmustfall, a campaign demanding that university lower fees or those seeking to redress social inequalities by calling for the removal of historical monuments such as #rhodesmustfall and #ghandimustfall to those with minimal asks such those demanding that the cost of internet bundles be reduced in Zimbabwe and South Africa #datamustfall. Among the high-stake campaigns was the #rhodesmustfall, which demanded the removal of the statue of British colonialist Cecil Rhodes at the University of Capetown (UCT) in South Africa (Chaudhuri, 2016). At the University of Ghana, a #ghandimustfall petition on charge.org calling for the removal of Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s statue from campus garnered nearly 2,000 signatures (Aberqu, 2016). Sponsors of the petition argued that although Gandhi is globally renowned for his fight against racism in India, he was, in fact, very racist towards black Africans, and, thus, his troubled legacy in Africa was sufficient to remove his statue form public spaces (Taylor, 2016). Social media campaigns are often led by youth and those in the middle class.

7 In Zimbabwe, a little-known Pastor, Evan Mawarire, shook Zimbabwean politics when his homemade video bemoaning the lost promises of the nation’s liberation struggle went viral attracting nearly a million views in Zimbabwe. Pastor Evan Mawarire’s #thisflag campaign in an unprecedented move revived urban activism, which had been thwarted by citizen fatigue and state repression. For 25 days starting on April 18, 2016, Evan Mawarire posted daily videos on various socio-economic topics. In July 2016, he joined with other activist groups, including the youth-led more radical #tajamuka “we are fed up” and called for a national shutdown. Since then, Mawarire has been arrested and accused by the state of being an informant. At the peak of his engagement, citizens widely shared and discussed the contents of his videos on social media and Facebook groups. Mawarire’s online videos had an impact factor well into the millions as people from all over the world relied on his message for their take on the ongoing situation in Zimbabwe. Using #AfricaDecides, Africans followed election events across the continent. Many Africans commented online that this was their first time publicly showing interest in elections other than their own. Africans and the world followed with interest the events in the Gambia after former President Jammeh lost the election and then reneged on his televised promises to step down. In the Zimbabwean WhatsApp groups, citizens discussed the Gambian election looking for similarities to their situation. As it became clear that Jammeh would not only leave office but the country as well, Zimbabweans discussed the possibility of organizing community engagement to protect elections. Using social campaigns like #ifafricawasabar started by then 21-year-old pan-Africanist Siyanda Mohitsiwa, Africans used humor to poke fun at their national politics and challenge stereotypes.

8 In April 2016, the UK-based firm Portland published an extensive report on “how Africa tweets” (Portland Communications, 2016). Their analyses of over 1.6 billion geo-located

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tweets found that 1 in 10 of the most popular African hashtags in 2015 was related to political issues and politicians, compared to 2 percent of hashtags in the United States and the United Kingdom. In Africa, every tweet or Facebook post has the potential to become political. In January 2017, during his tenure as Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa received a coffee mug engraved “boss” as a gift. A picture of the mug was circulated on social media and eventually used against Mr. Mnangagwa in ZANU PF’s factional wars (News24, 2017). The rise of online activists like Evan Mawarire brought to the forefront a question that has been raised since the 2012 Arab Spring. Can the internet revolutionize African politics? In this paper, I argue that the internet can revolutionize politics but not in the way of the Arab Spring. The revolution will not be broad, sweeping, as we witnessed in North Africa. Instead, while the campaigns will be sporadic and often small in size, they will also make a substantial political impact. The Zimbabwean government and opponents of Evan Mawarire mocked #thisflag and other citizen movements, calling them “popcorn movements” (Frey, 2017). Their strength in changing politics will come in small bursts and tiny “revolutionary” acts that have already begun to open up politics.

9 An analysis of the impact of social media on African politics that only focuses on quantifiable wins may miss the small but powerful impact of citizens raising their voices. Following the first shutdown, Zimbabwe’s First Lady addressed the ZANU PF women’s league. In an impassioned speech targeting Pastor Evan Mawarire, the former First Lady Dr. Amai Grace Mugabe decried the millions of dollars that her business lost over the two-day shutdown. Mawarire was arrested a week after the first shutdown and a day before the scheduled second shutdown. His arrest prompted several thousand citizens to show up at the courthouse in protest of what many citizens considered an unjust arrest. When I arrived at the courthouse at 10 am that morning there were less than 50 people, by the time he was released shortly after 7 pm there were an estimated 5,000 citizens peacefully protesting his arrest.

Methodology: Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and WhatsApp as fieldwork

10 According to Facebook’s official statistics released in May 2017, users send 31.25 million messages and view at least 2.77 million videos per minute (Facebook, 2017). On Twitter, users send out over 300,000 tweets per minute, over 48,000 Instagram pictures are shared per minute, and at least 300 hours of video are uploaded every minute on YouTube (Lowe, 2016). These numbers change by the minute as new users join the social media sphere. Users can also choose to make private or public their posts on these platforms; this can make a systematic study of behavior online tricky but not impossible.

11 Given the difficulty of collecting data on Facebook and WhatsApp platforms, which are private and encrypted, I decided to use ethnographic participant observation methods to study the breadth of political conversation among Zimbabweans between June 2016 and June 2017. In this particular case, the researcher joined the group as a member (participant) but did not make any contributions to the conversations, thus maintaining an ethnographic distance and allowing for participant observation. The use of digital ethnographic methods to study communication and citizen behavior on the internet is becoming more standard (Murthy, 2008; Mutsvairo & Sirks, 2015).

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However, scholars continue to debate the best strategies to use and the ethics of studying behavior on the internet (Wilson et al., 2012). On the one hand, scholars see tension by referring to studies that are not conducted in the physical field in which the researcher shares space with subjects as ethnographic. The full debate on ethnographic complexity is beyond the scope of this paper, but it suffices to say that this study meets the basic goals of ethnography “attendance and observation” (Wittel, 2000). By immersing myself in Zimbabwe’s online community, this study also meets the standards set by Clifford Geetz for thick description, which can be achieved if a researcher spends extended time engaged with the community under study.

12 To study the impact of social media in Zimbabwean politics, the initial methodology included large scale analyses of citizen political engagement on Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp. Scholars interested in explaining large scale citizen engagement on social tend to use a variety of software tools that harvest tweets from the web for analysis (Zimmer & Proferes, 2014). Quantitative analysis of digital media reveals larger patterns of behavior that can be generalized beyond one subgroup (Marwick, 2014). In the Zimbabwean context, the data collected using NodLex software revealed that the majority of tweets are by a few individuals, many of whom are either middle class elites or members of the diaspora. These two groups play an important role in Zimbabwean politics, but the unrepresentative nature of data collected from Twitter made it impossible to conduct any meaningful and generalizable quantitative analysis. Another important revelation was that some of the popular Tweeter users are unverifiable. This is to say there are no known individuals behind the Twitter account. In authoritarian regimes, it is not surprising that individuals might to choose to use pseudo names to protect themselves against government policing of their public thoughts. The presence of fake accounts complicates the ability to do meaningful ethnographic work. With this in mind I decided to focus this paper on data collected from Facebook and WhatsApp groups.

13 On Facebook and WhatsApp, the majority of conversation occurs in private or public social network groups. Facebook groups are communities created with the Facebook social networking site that are based on real-life interests or groups that declare support/affiliation with a cause. Creators of the Facebook groups can choose to make group membership open meaning that anyone with a Facebook account can join the group or membership can be granted once approved by a group administrator. More and more groups now require approval to join. Therefore, it is impossible to use software tools to collect data. An additional disadvantage of using software tools to pull data is that much of the communication does not happen in standard English language and people tend to code switch.

14 People in Facebook groups tend to find solidarity with a community that shares common interests and in order to fully understand the dynamic of each group, traditional ethnographic methods of participant observation are best. To that end, this researcher joined 50 of the most popular Zimbabwean Facebook pages, groups and WhatsApp groups. A group was deemed popular if it had more than 2,000 members and if in a week a single post attracted over 1,000 comments and likes on any topic. One women’s group has a membership of over 70,000 Zimbabwean women with group members somewhat evenly spread between those residing in Zimbabwe and those in the diaspora. In addition to joining groups, the methodology included analysis of trends on popular pages like zimeye.net, a tabloid/news website with popular social media

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presence, Voice of America’s Harare Studio Seven, political party pages, and becoming friends with or following popular activists, politicians and social commentators like Pastor Evan Mawarire and iHarare, another social /local gossip and politics page.

15 On WhatsApp, community groups are private and there is no easy way to find access conversation without invitation from one of the administrators. I contacted active politicians and activists, academics, journalists and friends for permission to join their WhatsApp groups. Groups joined for this research included those that only discuss politics, partisan groups, social activist groups, and family groups. In total, I actively followed political conversation in 25 online community groups between June 2016 and June 2017.

16 To supplement observational data, I conducted 20 interviews with randomly selected members of WhatsApp and Facebook groups. Respondents were asked open-ended questions on their level of political interest and engagement, their main sources of news and what if any political actions they would be willing to take. In 2016, group members were also asked if they had participated in specific citizen led political rallies and stayaways. Where possible, respondents were asked to share pictures as evidence of their participation in the different political activities. Citizens were more likely to stayaway than to attend a rally. However, more citizens attended rallies in 2016 than in the past based on self-reports and data from the rallies.

17 Can the revolution be tweeted? To answer this question, a final part of the methodology was to show a connection between citizen demands via social media and government response. Government response ranges from acknowledgement of a problem by a minister to a change in policy aligned with the demands of citizens. Laws often take a long time to become final but in the majority of African countries where the executive is very powerful a change in policy can be immediate. The government can also respond negatively by shutting down a campaign, ignoring demands or adding further restrictions.

Social media politics in an authoritarian regime: increased access to information when the media is the enemy

18 African presidents are rarely seen or heard from. The image of African leaders is well choreographed. Under Section 33 of Zimbabwe’s Criminal Codification and Reform Act, a person could be jailed for up to a year or fined $100 (£64) for insulting the president’s office. The law states: Any person who makes any abusive, indecent or obscene statement about or concerning the President or an acting President, whether in respect of the President personally or the President’s office shall be guilty of undermining the authority of or insulting the President and liable to a fine not exceeding level six or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or both. (Criminal Law Act, 33, (2), (b))1

19 Although the law was deemed unconstitutional in 2013, many Zimbabweans have since been arrested or forced into exile under this law for offenses that range from writing a song (Zimbabwe, 2013), that is deemed offensive by the state, journalists writing about the 92-year-old president’s fragile health (CPJ, 2017) or citizens distributing “subversive” material detailing cases of corruption committed by government officials

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(Deutsche Welle, n.d.). Many opposition politicians have been disappeared for offenses as small as using the president’s toilet (Smith, 2011). In all these cases charges were eventually dropped but trial process is used to install fear in other citizens.

20 In Zimbabwe, as in most African governments, officials are mandated to hang the president’s portrait in their offices and public spaces (BBC Talking Point, 2000). While private businesses are not required by law to do this it is commonly understood that not hanging the portrait can be interpreted as a sign of defiance. In 2012, Oliver Mtukudzi’s lighting technicians were arrested “inciting political sentiment”2 after he had allegedly directed spotlights onto portraits of President Mugabe during the song Wasakara (you’re now wasted), the title track of Mtukudzi’s Bvuma/Tolerance album. The president’s spokesperson Mr. George Charamba in a typical state response said what the technician did was an abuse of the office of the president.

21 In Zimbabwe citizens understand that there is freedom before speech, but human rights and freedom are not guaranteed after speech. Under the 2002 Public Order and Security Act (POSA) public gatherings require a seven-day prior notice and get approval from the police, failure to get either can result in both criminal and civil charges against the organizers (Thornycroft, 2001). As such, citizens have often had to be too careful what they say about politics. When asked if they discuss politics with friends and family, Zimbabweans have consistently said that they are afraid to do so.

22 Access to internet has opened political communication, the ability of citizens to circulate media about the president, pictures or jokes has demystified political leaders. From the safety of their mobile phones, Zimbabweans have been able to share jokes, comments and thoughts on politics without fear of retribution. On February 5, 2015 President Mugabe publicly fell. Pictures of the statesman falling garnered global attention and memes by Zimbabweans on social media went viral.

Figure 1: Mugabe falling from Twitter

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Figure 2: Mugabe falling from WhatsApp

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23 Zimbabweans used the memes to mock the state media’s iron clad control of the news narrative. It was not just that the president fell, but for the first time in a long-time citizens could comment without fear of retribution because social media provided them a veil of anonymity. The meme’s also humanized Robert Mugabe. Since independence Robert Mugabe has been viewed as this towering figure that cannot be challenged and cannot be mocked.

24 Zimbabwe’s television and radio spaces are tightly controlled by the ruling party. The local radio channels and the one TV channel is run by the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation (ZBC) which, like the state-run newspaper The Herald only broadcast preapproved information. According to a report by the independent Think Tank Kubatana, during the 2008 election ZBC devoted 210 hours to coverage on ZANU PF against the 16 hours they devoted to the other political parties (MMPZ, 2008). This obvious partisanship behavior by ZBC is unconstitutional. In 2000, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe declared the monopoly of the state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation unconstitutional, and yet the government has still not awarded an operating license to any prospective private broadcaster. Using the internet and social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube and Instagram independent broadcasters have been able to provide political commentary on important topics which the state media refuses to report on. Comedy shows that emulate American late-night political comedies have mushroomed in the last few years.

25 One popular comedian is Comrade Fatso, a young white Zimbabwean who runs Magamba TV, one of the most popular apolitical satire online channels. It was co- founded in 2008 by Farai Monro “Comrade Fatso” and Tawanda “Outspoken” Makawa, an extension to their now banned music group. Magamba TV is described as “Zimbabwe’s leading producer of cutting edge, political satire and comedy shows” on their Facebook and YouTube pages which have 30,905 and over 3,000 subscriber’s reviewers respectively. Since independence the population of white Zimbabweans in broadcasting has declined. In fact, Farai is one of very few white Zimbabweans openly commenting on politics. Social media provides access to marginalized groups who cannot openly participate in Zimbabwean politics. Their most popular segment, from December 2016, which they mocked the government’s proposal to introduce a parallel currency to the American dollar, has been viewed over 50,000 times on Facebook and YouTube and shared nearly as many times on WhatsApp.

26 BusStopTV is a two-woman popular comedy channel that addresses popular social and political issues. Their style is influenced by the very popular Ugandan comedian Anne Kansiime, who also addresses political issues like corruption using satire. BusStopTV

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has 15,000 subscriptions on YouTube and over 80,000 likes on Facebook. Their following has grown steadily. Their most popular segments are ones that mocked local celebrities, including religious leaders. However, in the last year, segments that mock politicians have also grown in popularity. Following Grace Mugabe’s diplomatic scandal in South Africa wherein the First Lady allegedly beat up a young woman who was in the company of her children using an extension code and the Vice President Mnangagwa’s ice-cream poisoning, they released their most popular segment to date, Women’s Month, which was viewed 90,000 times within four days of being posted on Facebook. However, political satire is not without cost. The first challenge for the young activists is the exorbitant cost of producing film.

27 Zimbabwe’s ruling party perceives the media, especially independent media, as a political rival, not as an independent arm of democratic governance. The executive branch of the government tightly controls the state media. Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution protects the right to “freedom of expression which includes the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and or communicate ideas without interference” (Section 60, 1-4), but ZANU PF constantly reminds citizens that while there is freedom before speech, freedom after speech is not guaranteed. In Zimbabwe, insulting the office or person of the president and his subordinates is a criminal offense. Journalists are often physically and verbally abused and in some extreme cases, those who publish information considered treasonous are forced into exile, tortured or killed. During the 2016 protests, the government arrested at least 31 journalists (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

28 Former President Robert Mugabe and the First Lady would often publicly chide journalists, including those from state media, if they feel that the media has slighted them. At a ZANU PF rally in July 2017, the First Lady Dr. Grace Mugabe, publicly chided the president’s spokesperson George Charamba for going off script and specifically for not using his platform to write positive reports on her philanthropic work. She also expressed anger over George Charamba, for using the state-controlled Herald newspaper as a platform for attacking some ZANU PF activists like ministers Moyo and Kasukuwere among others (ZemTV News, 2017). In earlier speeches at rallies in 2017, the President and First Lady also publicly called on ZANU PF youth to “take the war” to social media and deal with those trying to sellout the country using social media.

Social media politics: four examples

Baba Jukwa the whistleblower

29 In the period leading up to the 2013 elections, Zimbabwean politics was shaken by the rise of an online whistleblower by the pseudo name Baba Jukwa. Baba Jukwa described himself on his Facebook page as a “concerned father, fighting nepotism and directly linking community and their leaders” (Muzamindo, 2015). Baba Jukwa’s profile picture was that of an old non-threatening wise grandfather holding a cane. Baba Jukwa was assumed to be a disgruntled ZANU PF insider, possibly a member of the intelligence community. However, in 2014, Edmond Kudzayi, editor-in-chief of the state-controlled Sunday Mail, together with his brother Phillip Kudzayi and two others were arrested and accused of administering the Baba Jukwa Facebook page. Daily for a period of about eight months Baba Jukwa would leak information on classified government events, he

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would predict government responses to his leaks and in some cases, he would leak photos and other personal information of those involved in a tabloid-like manner.

30 Baba Jukwa was coined the Julian Assange of Zimbabwe. Baba Jukwa predicted a number of high-profile events that turned out to be true. In fact, on June 13th, 2015 Baba Jukwa predicted the arrest of the Kudzayi brothers and two others accused of administering the page. This was unprecedented in Zimbabwean politics where the state has always closely guarded information. Information is parceled out in bits and pieces such that citizens are never fully knowledgeable about the state of national affairs. Until the rise of online news outlets, the major news sources were heavily controlled by the state. Independent media publishing houses have been victims of state violence. The leading national newspaper, Herald, functions like a mouth-piece for the ruling party ZANU PF. More often than not, Herald coverage is only free and fair to the extent that the paper is pushing an agenda supported by one of ZANU PF’s factions. Television broadcast is also heavily controlled by the state.

31 Whereas ZANU PF rallies are broadcast live on television, opposition rallies do not get any coverage. Baba Jukwa was welcomed by citizens hungering for an inside look into the government. Baba Jukwa also exposed the state’s weaknesses in their ability to control information in the digital age. The Zimbabwean government is repressive and has powerful tools to silence dissenters, it was expected that they would soon discover Baba Jukwa and silence him. However, during his very brief existence Baba Jukwa exposed the weakness in ZANU PF’s control over information. Baba Jukwa’s page has been viewed more than a few million times. In June 2013, a month before the 2013 election, I recorded that it had just over 300,000 followers. By the time Baba Jukwa was apprehended the page’s following had increased to over 480,000. In contrast, social media following for pages dedicated to President Robert Mugabe and MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai had about 100,000 followers each in 2013 (Regan-Sachs, 2013).

32 Baba Jukwa’s following was very diverse, it cut across different societal cleavages: ethnicity, race, tribe, and class. Access to Baba Jukwa was cheaper than buying a newspaper3, in 2013 one could buy Facebook internet bundles for $1/month. In 2013, a few months before the July election I conducted focus groups in Harare with potential voters. When I asked, “Where do you get your news?,” the majority, over fifty percent of those who responded said they checked Baba Jukwa’s Facebook page first thing in the morning. In the absence of a robust independent media, Baba Jukwa was the anecdote to ZANU PF’s Herald propaganda. A month before the election Baba Jukwa revealed that the life of a young member of Parliament, Edward Chindori Chininga, was at risk and that the government thought to replace him with a less threatening figure. Chininga, who had released a damning report on corruption, was found dead nine days after Baba Jukwa released this scoop (NewsDay, 2013). In Zimbabwe, political opponents of the regime are often disappearing or die under mysterious circumstances.

33 Baba Jukwa was also appealing to readers because most of what he reported was gossip and scandalous. As much as Baba Jukwa revealed important stories he also fed voters sensational stories about the personal lives of those in government. In a country where information is heavily policed even the most mundane gossip becomes worthy news and citizens held on to that. The most popular “news” sources online are those that publish (stats) tabloid news. Baba Jukwa did not revolutionize Zimbabwean politics in the sense that the news that he provided increased voter turnout. Instead he fed citizen interest in the political process. Baba Jukwa’s more direct efforts to get citizens to

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register to vote do not appear to have had much impact on voters. Using his mantra “Asijiki” we will not be tired, he also used his message to get people to turn out and vote but this message drew little interest from voters who were more drawn to the scandals. After the 2013 election, most voters expressed anger towards Baba Jukwa blaming him for ZANU PF’s win. Citizens took to Facebook and Twitter to express their anger; many argued that Baba Jukwa had been used by ZANU PF to divert voters from the real issues. While it is doubtful that Baba Jukwa was intended to benefit ZANU PF at the election, one of the lessons that can be drawn from this is that online engagement has broad implications including unintended consequences. That said, there is no doubt that Baba Jukwa liberated the control of information and demystified political leaders. Baba Jukwa exposed citizens to the political power of social media. While Baba Jukwa’s popularity has died down, the Baba Jukwa 2018 election page only has 17,000 followers and most of his posts receive less than 15 comments on any day, the political activity of Zimbabweans on social media has gone up.

Gukurahundi as a current topic

34 Gukurahundi (wash away the dirt) refers to the 1983 mass killing of citizens in Matabeleland at the instruction of the newly elected Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, and his fifth brigade army. In an interview with Dali Tambo in 2012 President Mugabe referred to the incident as a “moment of madness” (Tambo, 2013). Until recently, the majority of Zimbabweans did not publicly discuss Gukurahundi because history and school text books have been carefully curated to exclude any mention of Gukurahundi along with other events that do not fit the government’s preferred historical narrative. In 2012, artists created a visual portrayal of Gukurahundi that went viral and created an opening for citizen dialogue on the issue. The government retaliated against the artists whose work was featured in the exhibit (Dugger, 2011). The government was forced to push back on allegations that Vice President Mr. Mnangagwa played an active role in the massacres.

35 Since announcing her run for President, following her expulsion from ZANU PF and the office of the Vice Presidency, Joice Mujuru has had trouble answering questions on her involvement in Gukurahundi on the campaign trail (Muzulu, 2017). Ten years ago, most people would not have expected that Gukurahundi would become an important campaign issue. It is unlikely that the Gukurahundi cloud will be damaging to any of the ruling party contenders in the immediate future, but it cleared that Zimbabwean citizens are increasingly concerned about the issue. In May 2017, when bones from a Gukurahundi dumping site were published by an online news website, the publication received a lot criticism and backlash from citizens forcing them to retract the story and delete the offending pictures. Building on citizen interest in Gukurahundi, Vice President Mphoko in May 2017 proposed that the government implement a peace and reconciliation program to directly address victims of Gukurahundi and other atrocities. Mr. Mphoko said that there was need for the nation to collectively address the issue to allow victims to move on with their lives.

Operation Murambatsvina

36 One of the most recent heinous crimes committed by the ZANU PF government was the clean-up exercise conducted in 2005 that left at least 700,000 urban families homeless.

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The majority of poor vendors affected by operation Murambatsvina lost their sources of livelihood. Interviews with those impacted in Harare and Victoria Falls also showed serious adverse health impact for HIV patients impacted by operation Murambatsvina. Operation Murambatsvina was the ZANU PF’s government first attempt at destroying the homes of citizens hiding behind the need to clean up the city. They did the same in Epworth and other peri-urban areas in 1995 and 1996. As in 2005, earlier efforts were also conducted around election time and each time voters were strategically relocated to bolster support for ZANU PF.

37 In early 2016, the city of Harare began a new wave of demolitions in the city. Onlookers took videos of the demolitions and circulated them online via WhatsApp, Twitter and Facebook. One video that garnered the most viewership was the demolition of a fully furnished double story home. The public called out the city officials who gave contractors passing grades at each level of building only to rescind their approval years after the buildings had been completed and occupied. The city council was not responsive until the First Lady brought up the videos, which she said she had also received via WhatsApp. Grace Mugabe chided the opposition run city council and demanded that they offer reparations to those affected by the newest wave of demolitions.

38 However, social media attention does not always result in the positive resolution of social justice issues. In June 2017, picture of families of mostly women and children including a newly born baby who were evicted from land claimed by the First Lady made rounds on social media, but the First Lady chose to ignore public demands for redress. It is unlikely that social media pressure from citizens will force the First Lady to address the situation, but citizen awareness on the issue is an important first step. In the past, atrocities by those in power have not been known to citizens. Some citizens have responded to the situation in Mazowe farms by calling for a boycott of dairy products from the First Family’s farm.

The rise of #thisflag, #tjamuka, Zimbabwe’s 2016 shutdown and impact

39 In Zimbabwe, hashtag campaigns have been citizen driven, sometimes political parties have joined in to support a cause but by and large the campaigns have been the brainchild of a small group of citizens. In 2016, a little-known Harare Pastor began his 25 day #thisflag campaign to highlight the social and economic problems in Zimbabwe. In the first video shot in a dimly lit office with a small Zimbabwean flag on his desk he expressed concern and frustration that the liberation struggle promises embodied in the colors of the national flag have been realized for the younger generations. He made a pledge to post every day until May 25. Pastor Evan Mawarire’s popularity grew steadily. On social media groups comments and views on his posts grew from less than ten during the first week to a few thousands on Facebook and to real engagement on WhatsApp. His message #thisflag was different because it was not immediately political, he was a pastor unaffiliated with any political party and most people interviewed at the time said they liked listening to him because he was a father. Evan Mawarire was petitioning the government to change things and not calling for an ouster of the government.

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40 In May, interviews on the ground revealed that Mawarire’s message was not nearly as widespread as social media likes and comments suggested, but for the first time in many years someone had unified Zimbabwean political rhetoric. Mawarire’s signature symbol, the Zimbabwean flag draped around the shoulders, became a symbol for a generation disgruntled. In June, the economic crisis was deepening, civil servants had not been paid for months and the general mood around the country was tense. Earlier that year another citizen group #tajamuka had also gained popularity among “ghetto” urban youth. Tajamuka is a Shona word meaning we are upset. Unlike #thisflag which was very middle class in its design, the use of cell phone videos and English to address the public #tajamuka was very active on the ground and unafraid to use physical means to express their message. The #thisflag and #tajamuka messages were used by citizens to call for #shutdowns. The last public strike was in the mid-1990s even the MDC had not been able to convince Zimbabweans to shut down the country. Messages asking people to stay at home were circulated via social media on Facebook and WhatsApp groups. On social media citizens were skeptical about the shutdown because there was no central space to get clarifications or instructions on what to do. The shutdown was solidified when the public transport drivers announced that they would not be operating on the day of the shutdown. There were also threats of violence against those who chose to leave their houses, but such messages were not as widely circulated as the ones appealing to nationalism and the shared dream of a better Zimbabwe.

41 On July 6, Zimbabwe was indeed shutdown, in both urban and rural areas there was no economic activity. The handful of businesses that did not heed the call to shutdown faced public lash. The following day only the state media reported that the city had been “bustling with energy” and that it was “business as usual”. Two days after the shutdown I asked a diverse group of young students, representing the rich northern, middle income and poor southern neighborhoods to describe the shutdown from their activities and each student recounted that it was very quiet. Civil servants had been informed that missing work due to the shutdown was grounds for dismissal but even then, many of them were unable to make it work because there was no public transport. The stay away was successful not just because of Pastor Evan Mawarire and his social media posts, but because of the joint efforts of multiple citizen groups as well and the efforts on the ground by public transport drivers and conductors.

42 In the weeks that followed, citizens returned to work and it felt as though the #shutdown had not made a real impact on the government and the economy. However, in a speech marking her election to leader of the women’s league, First Lady Grace Mugabe addressed the shutdown, social media and their impact on the economy. The First Lady directly attacked Pastor Evan Mawarire and called him misguided, she then explained to the crowd that the stay away had cost the country millions of dollars and if this had gone on for a week the impact would have been irreversible. The First Lady went on to explain that her dairy farm had been affected by the losses they incurred from a single day of shutdown.

43 A week after the first #shutdownzim citizen groups again called for another #shutdown. By all indicators the second shutdown was going to be a flop. The major weakness for hashtag citizens’ groups is their lack of a centralized unit; their goals are not always quantifiable, and, in some cases, citizens might not notice the impact of the campaign. It came as a surprise when word spread via social media that Pastor Evan Mawarire had been arrested. As usual, the details of his arrest were classified, even

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though the Constitution demands that one should have their arrest details read to them on the day of the arrest. The following day social media was inundated with mixed messages about the Pastor Evan Mawarire’s court appearance.

44 In Zimbabwe, government spaces are sacred and feared. When one drives past the State House/Presidential Residency they are expected to keep a wide distance and look away from the building. Making eye contact with the guards could be grounds for arrest or being shot at. The Court House never used to be barricaded, this changed after the Mawarire case, but citizens where not expected to walk too close to the high court unless they had evidence of business on the premises. When #thisflag first announced on social media that instead of the shutdown they were now calling on people to show up at the courthouse in solidarity with Pastor Evan, their message was met with skepticism. I arrived at the courthouse 9 am, at that time there was just a handful of people. I attended a workshop in the CBD, which was most certainly bustling with energy in direct contrast to the previous weeks’ stay away environment. When we returned to the courthouse at 2 pm the crowd had increased significantly. Although there was no formal crowd count, unofficial estimates suggest that at least 2,000 citizens showed up at the courthouse. I conducted 30 official interviews with people who had travelled from different parts of Harare; two in particular had walked at least five kilometers in the wintertime to show their support.

Government response

45 African governments have not been very receptive to the rise of social media. Governments in countries where citizen protests grown out of social media movements have tightened their repressive laws or created new laws to curb social media access. In 2016, AccessNow, an organization dedicated to fighting internet shutdowns reported that African countries accounted for 11 out of the 56 global shutdowns. This was an increase of over 50% from 2015 (Ngwa, 2017). The most severe shutdowns were experienced in Ethiopia and Cameroon. In both countries’ governments shut down the internet for extended periods of time after intense demonstrations that challenged the government’s hold on power. Cameroon’s shutdown lasted 93 days in English-speaking regions of the country. It followed weeks of protests from lawyers, teachers and other residents in those areas who have been agitating for better treatment from the French- speaking government, which they say has long marginalized their communities. A Brookings Institute report estimated that the internet shutdowns in 2016 alone cost countries an estimated $2.4 billion. Beyond financial cost the shutdowns disrupted business, travel and in extreme cases examination periods for students were delayed. In response to the citizen protests in July 2016, and internet campaigns that followed, the government of Zimbabwe drew up internet restriction bills similar to those in China. Minister of Information, Communication and Technology, Supa Mandiwanzira, tried to calm public fears by explaining that the restrictions were to curb social media bullying. The Zimbabwean government, like their counterparts in Cameroon, Ethiopia and across the continent, has argued that these restrictions are part of national security.

46 While a very authoritarian executive runs Zimbabwe, the judicial and legislative branches of government have remained somewhat autonomous and strong. Therefore, the ruling party will circumvent the legal law-making process to push forward their agenda outside the traditional platforms. The government initially hiked the cost of

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data/internet bundles as a quick strategy to discourage people from sharing political information online. The cost of going online has always been a lot more expensive in Zimbabwe comparatively. In 2015, USD$1 would buy between 10 megabytes and 17 megabytes between the three providers, Econet (10MB), Netone (17MB), Telecel (9.5MB). The cheapest provider, NetOne, is government controlled and has poor service. The more affordable and privately-owned telecommunications company, Telecel, was forced into a government by out in 2016 (The Financial Gazette, November 29, 2016). The more popular and very expensive Econet is owned by exiled Strive Masiyiwa, a successful tech mogul. Masiyiwa has managed to do well in every other country except his native Zimbabwe because of the government laws that are targeted at keeping him out of business and also physically out of the country. In response to data hikes citizens began the #datamustfall campaign which resulted in the slashing of data fees, but the overall price remains high for the average person earning less than USD$100 per month.

47 In Zimbabwe, the more successful social media campaigns have been those with a direct ask and ones that do not directly challenge the government’s authority. Efforts to block the first amendment to the Constitution fell on deaf ears. ZANU PF parliamentarians voted with the president. One very active independent candidate who won his seat with support from the opposition, which had actively opposed the first amendment, voted with ZANU PF and used his Twitter celebrity status to mock those who disagreed with his vote.

The emperor is not asleep

48 Although active social media users tend to be opposed to the ruling party, ruling parties are also engaging with social media. In November 2016, officials approached this researcher from the ZANU PF youth league that was interested in learning more about social media and politics. The league also disclosed that the ruling party was actively recruiting young people with an interest and expertise in social media. ZANU PF’s web presence has grown and surpassed activities by all other parties, including the leading opposition, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The main ZANU PF in Zimbabwe has more than five active Facebook pages dedicated to sharing party news and live streaming events. Their live stream events have grown in popularity because while ZANU PF is not popular, citizens are still interested in what happens at the rallies and often ZANU PF is the only party providing live stream. ZANU PF-UK chapter has a strong Twitter presence, they use their presence to mock the opposition and explain ZANU PF policies. In contrast, the MDC has virtually no presence on Facebook and very weak activity on Twitter.

49 Former President Robert Mugabe and First Lady Grace Mugabe regularly addressed the need for youth in their party to join social media and fight against “detractors of the revolution” using social media. One of the very few Twitter verified Zimbabwean users is Minister of Higher Education Jonathan Moyo, also regarded as the brain behind many of ZANU PF’s most restrictive policies. Moyo is one of the few politicians who constantly engage with citizens. Moyo has developed a strong love and hate relationship with users. Until recently he was the only official engaging directly with citizens. On Jonathan Moyo’s birthday citizens agreed to have a political ceasefire and encouraged each other to only send him well wishes and refrain from political

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arguments. However, even Jonathan Moyo’s social media is not completely free from party control. He has refused to attend live debates or any events where questions are not delivered in advance and agreed upon. Since his inauguration, President Mnangagwa has also taken up an active role on social media where he offers regular updates of his trips and answers citizen questions.

Conclusion

50 The full impact of social media on African politics, in particular Zimbabwe, will continue to evolve. Among Zimbabweans, social media has increased citizen discussion of politics beyond traditional networks. Facebook and WhatsApp groups allow citizens to expand their friend and network groups in pretty significant ways. This engagement does not always result in physical participation in rallies or protests in part because the state continues to respond with brutality against protesting citizens thus creating a lot of fear. During the 2018 election, there was a lot of online discussion about the elections but the electoral turnout was not that much higher from previous elections. One possibility is that those already planning to vote are also engaging in online discussions about politics whereas those abstaining from voting are not engaging in online discussions.

51 As it does, it is clear that the positives outweigh the negative. However, African citizens must be wary of internet dangers such as fake news which tend to spread faster than true news and can have real negative impact. In general citizens have become more engaged with their politics and taken ownership of their democracy in ways that would not have been possible without access to social media. Future studies must be conducted on the impact of online engagement on citizen turnout. Anecdotal evidence from elections in Zimbabwe and other African countries suggests that online engagement has not done much to increase voter participation but it is unclear why those engaged online are not turning up to vote.

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NOTES

1. https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/zwe/2006/ criminal_law_codification_and_reform_act_html/ criminal_law_codification_and_reform_act.pdf 2. http://allafrica.com/stories/200101050240.html 3. Newspapers cost USD$1. The average domestic worker earns USD$100. His following grew to just 400,000 by the time of their arrest in July 2014.

ABSTRACTS

What does it take for a citizen movement to topple a deep-rooted authoritarian regime? This paper analyses the successes and failures of citizen-led social media campaigns in Zimbabwe. Using data drawn from an extensive ethnographic study of 50 WhatsApp and Facebook communities, this paper studies the conditions under which citizen activism, particularly those movements that originate on social media, become street protests that can effectively unseat an illegitimate regime. I find that the success of recent movements – evidenced by policy changes and increased citizen participation – is in part because of the rise of a youth citizenry that does not feel indebted to the liberation struggle. Zimbabwean born frees are more willing to take political risks by speaking candidly about politics online and mobilizing their peers.

O que é preciso para um movimento cidadão derrubar um regime autoritário profundamente enraizado? Este artigo analisa os sucessos e fracassos das campanhas nas redes sociais conduzidas por cidadãos no Zimbábue. Utilizando dados extraídos de um extenso estudo etnográfico de 50 comunidades WhatsApp e Facebook, este artigo estuda as condições sob as quais o ativismo cidadão, particularmente os movimentos originados nas redes sociais, se tornam protestos de rua que podem efetivamente destituir um regime ilegítimo. Considero que o sucesso de movimentos

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recentes – evidenciado por mudanças de política e aumento da participação cidadã – é devido em parte à emergência de jovens cidadãos que não se sentem em dívida com a luta de libertação. Os zimbabuanos nascidos livres estão mais dispostos a assumir riscos políticos falando abertamente sobre política online e mobilizando os seus pares.

INDEX

Keywords: social media, citizen protests, engagement, online politics, Zimbabwe, authoritarian regime Palavras-chave: redes sociais, protestos cidadãos, engajamento, política online, Zimbábue, regime autoritário

AUTHOR

CHIPO DENDERE Wellesley College 106 Central St., Wellesley, MA 02481 United States of America [email protected]

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Democracy, Governance and Legitimacy in Zimbabwe since the November 2017 Military Coup Democracia, governação e legitimidade no Zimbábue desde o golpe militar de novembro de 2017

Aaron Rwodzi

EDITOR'S NOTE

Recebido: 07 de junho de 2019 Aceite: 02 de dezembro de 2019

1 The most dominant debate after the ouster of Robert Mugabe in November 2017 has been on the forms and content of “democracy” in Zimbabwe under the new government led by President Emmerson Mnangagwa. Zimbabwe constitutionally undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy (Sylvester, 1995, p. 405) whose core components include multipartyism, free, fair and open periodic elections to enable the populace to choose their leaders freely (Taylor & Williams, 2002, pp. 560-561). In any true democracy, the people, through their own chosen representatives, have the final say in matters of governance and in all issues to do with their livelihoods (Milimo, 1993, p. 37). This article evaluates the Second Republic in terms of (1) its (in)ability to move away from Mugabe’s authoritarianism and (2) its inclination to perpetuate Mugabe’s legacy, entrench its rule and defy the clarion call for democracy from the main opposition Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) under Nelson Chamisa.

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Conceptual/theoretical framework

2 This article uses Rotberg’s (2004, p. 1) theory of governance. The theory holds that governance is the delivery of political goods to citizens and the better the quality of that delivery and the greater the quantity of political goods being delivered, the higher the level of governance, everywhere at jurisdictional level, not just in Africa (Rotberg, 2004, p. 1). Bratton and van de Walle (1997, p. 97) analyse democracy at two levels: in behavioural terms and at the structural level. In behavioural terms it relates to meaningful competition, participation and liberties. At structural level it means the electoral system, multiparty organs and an independent legislature and organs. However, they conclude that, in Africa, institutional pluralism is the recipe for intensified particularisms and therefore antithetical to any robust transition to democracy (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997, p. 97). Worse still, democracy is generally conceived in neo-colonial terms because it is prescriptive and based on Western standards. There is, quite unfortunately, too much premium of multiparty elections in Africa without making an appraisal of the past colonial state. Competing opposition parties seem not to have substantial alternatives in terms of policy, resulting in voters voting without choosing (Akinrinade, 2000). Museveni of Uganda introduced a “no party democracy” where all political elements were incorporated into the structures of the National Resistance Movement (Akinrinade, 2000). In this case, as almost elsewhere in Southern Africa, national consensus was prioritized in a bid to establish enduring democratic structures.

Statement of the problem

3 Zimbabwe, at the time of writing, suffers from electoral illegitimacy and lawlessness. The Second Republic under Emmerson Mnangagwa appears to be increasingly focusing its energies towards consolidating power through any means necessary as opposed to constructing effective representative institutions that make economic development and improved standards of living in the country possible. Zimbabweans continue to suffer the effects of an economy that was subjected to 37 years of plunder by the governing elite under the former President Robert Mugabe’s tutelage. The coup leaders who arrogated to themselves the mandate to rule after the elections of July 2018 are earnestly perpetuating the Mugabe legacy and perfecting it to suit the corporate interests of the military-backed government with a substantial proportion of careerist who retired to assume the work of government. Military intervention is inherently undemocratic, yet Western countries, among them Britain as the former colonial power, were quick to legitimize a regime which was a direct product of a military takeover. The regime, through a popular election whose outcome remains disputed, was sanctified by the Constitutional Court that confirmed the position of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) that the incumbent Emmerson Mnangagwa had won the presidential race amidst numerous election irregularities and lack of transparency.

Literature review

4 The political system operative in Zimbabwe is quite difficult to characterize as either a democracy or an illiberal society in which elections are regularly held in accordance

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with the country’s Constitution despite not being free and fair. Zimbabwe was led by the former president Robert Mugabe for 37 years, being compelled to involuntarily surrender power to his erstwhile comrade of the armed struggle, Emmerson Mnangagwa, thanks to a coup in November 2017 by the military. Institutions of democracy that serve as constitutional safeguards on the exercise of executive powers include the Auditor General, the Public Protector, Public Service Commission and the Human Rights Commission among many others. A strong civil society underpins democracy (Hugo et al., 1995, p. 115). It includes a strong and vigilant press, the labour movement, professionals, students and civil organisations and these ought not to be affiliated with any political party. Mugabe was constrained from declaring Zimbabwe a one-party state by the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution that entrenched multipartyism (Stoneman & Cliffe, 1989, p. 91).

5 In Zimbabwe, the military is an institution that people perceive as key to the sustenance of ZANU-PF hegemony since independence from Britain in 1980. In rare circumstances such as Ghana under Jerry Rawlings, democracy can be established through a coup as argued by Varol (2017, p. 106). The military is also viewed as an instrument of the suppression of democratic change and Zimbabwe is a fitting example. Western scholars are blinded by romantic mythology that contends democratic transitions are led by the people taking to the streets (Varol, 2017) as happened in Zimbabwe in November 2017. However, many Western countries as well as the United States of America (USA) referred to these November events as befitting a military coup. Hardly a week after President Mnangagwa’s election victory as president, the USA renewed its Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA). This Act was passed in 2001 by the American Congress to compel Zimbabwean authorities to return to the rule of law and to respect human rights following the government’s racialized land redistribution programme (African Arguments Forum, 8 November 2018). In most dictatorships, the military is often the only institution with the clout to challenge the ruler. They are apt to act in support of their corporate interests as measured in resources and influence and in good times, the military is a reliable pillar of the status quo (Varol, 2017, p. 108).

6 Western style democracy presupposes a consensus on the values that set limits to partisanship. The political process in many states is about domination, not alternation in office, which takes place by coups rather than constitutional procedures (Kissinger, 1994, p. 811). The sad truth is that holding elections has been exposed as reversible and tentative, and internationally sanctioned elections have installed into power the very elements they were intended to defeat (Varol, 2017, p. 114). The Nyalali Commission established by Julius Nyerere in Tanzania to debate the possibility of introducing multipartyism noted that true democracy rested on four essential pillars namely respect for the rule of law, respect for human rights, periodic free and fair elections for leadership and policies and freedom of information through free mass media (Tambila, 1995, p. 477). The decision to consider the multiparty option in Tanzania came after Nyerere’s realization that the one-party system his government had pursued since independence in 1963 had not transformed Tanzania into a socialist egalitarian state. This background knowledge about Tanzanian socialism provides an appreciation of how democracy can be exercised even within the one-party political strategy, and when, through Nyerere’s initiative, politicians were encouraged to break away from Chama Cha Mapinduzi to form their own parties (Ngasongwa, 1992).

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7 Lodge (2004) argues that consolidation of power in stable democracies depends on institutionalized party systems in which rules and regularities in how parties compete are wisely observed. He further intimates that this is also dependent on the existence of organisations with firm social followings, ideological predictability, good connections with interest groups and possessing their own corporate identity that is independent of the personalities at the helm (Lodge, 2004). It is suggested from his analysis of parties that strong parties should therefore be able to attract durable support so that they can survive their charismatic founders. One of the most interesting observations Lodge makes is that parties that remain in office for a long time subject themselves to factionalism as informal groupings are constituted within the party around certain leaders. These factional grouping result from an institutionalised system of patronage that controls appointments not only in the party, but also in government. Such an approach blurs state-party boundaries and in most cases, executive national decisions by governments originate from the party hierarchy, in which case the party is supreme all the way. Consequently, many African governments end up dominated by political careerists, a development predicated on the fact that parties are perceived as instruments to one’s political advancement. Mohan, Pumpuni and Abdulai (2018, p. 274) in their analysis of party politics in Ghana, focus on the role that political ideas play in shaping resource governance with specific reference to oil.

8 Political parties are characterized as civil society organisations that summarise the interests of a particular group, articulate and represent them (Mexhuani & Rrahmani, 2017, p. 1). They also intimate that parties are established from the social elite that gather around them a group of influential supporters to defend their positions and from citizens who seek people’s support of the same opinion in order to achieve political and social change (Mexhuani & Rrahmani, p. 1). There is one interesting dynamic in ZANU-PF as a political party. It is both a revolutionary and a political party. The former is premised on the party’s guerrilla war history against imperialism and the latter relates to its reorganization and transformation in readiness for power to rule through constitutional means. This dynamic is also important because it facilitates our understanding of the party’s behaviour and suspicions over the intentions of the whites whom they fought against for fifteen years.

9 Democracy is difficult to establish in ethnically diverse societies. Resource distribution poses serious challenges particularly where some regions are replete with resources whilst others are poor. The case example of the distributive concerns in Ghana can be universally applicable to Africa, given the fact that tendencies towards secession in most parts of the continent, for example, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, among others, are situated at the heart of resources that are not judiciously and even-handedly distributed. Modern democracy is erroneously only conceptualized in terms of political parties which, in Africa, are assumed to play an important role in making representative democracy work, at least in the African sense.

10 The Mandela Administration intervened twice, in Zambia and Malawi, to dissuade presidents from seeking a third term in office in the face of mobilized public opposition (Friedman, 2008, p. 34). It was during Thabo Mbeki’s rule that South Africa offered sustained aid and comfort to the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe by sending a delegation which endorsed elections regarded by independent sources as fraudulent (Friedman, 2008, p. 34). At that time Zimbabwe had become a pariah state, having been at odds with Western countries and the rest of Europe for the regime’s human rights violations

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and the absence of the rule of law. The South African delegation was silent on human rights violations. This is why Prah (2003) argues that many African political parties are cliques and aggregations of personalities (p. 3). According to Prah, multiparty political systems are the most reliable systems for the cultivation, development and institutionalization of democracy because it allows a hundred flowers to blossom and a hundred schools of thought to contend. Prah also points out that the only elections known to have been free and fair without any vote rigging within multiparty systems were those ushered in by the first post-independence governments (Prah, 2003). This view suggests that the pressure exerted on African governments to toe the democracy path has contributed to the phenomenon whereby elections become an exercise in wasting time. Winners are predetermined by the electoral systems put in place by incumbent regimes in order to defeat electoral procedures and buttress their authoritarianism.

Methodology

11 This research is based on a qualitative paradigm. It was motivated by the need to interrogate the efficacy of a military takeover of the state at a time Zimbabweans were yearning for a return to good governance and democratic rule after many years of de facto one-party rule. The ideas discussed in this article are drawn from focus group discussions with individuals interested in the democracy debate in Zimbabwe. Secondly, two focus group discussions were held with members of the Zimbabwe History Association (ZHA) to complement the six interviews in Harare the researcher held with political activists from ZANU-PF and the MDC Alliance. Some of the questions from these interviews were raised during my Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) research on “Constraints on multiparty democracy in Zimbabwe”. Of importance was the Skype interview with Senator David Coltart of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Secondary sources such as textbooks, journals, newspapers and ZANU- PF and MDC party manifestos were used to complement current arguments raised on the democracy debate.

12 The current political climate in Zimbabwe is not conducive to conducting interviews with politicians within ZANU-PF rankings. The democracy debate in the country is an area of serious contestation because the presidential election outcome of the 2018 elections is endlessly disputable, thus rendering any research on the issue of democracy dangerous. However, the results of this study remain useful despite the above highlighted shortcomings, in making an informed evaluation of Zimbabwe’s democracy over years.

Discussion and analysis

The politics of accumulation

13 The seizure of white owned farms by the Zimbabwean government that started in earnest in 2000 was a culmination of a stand-off between Zimbabwe and Britain. Britain had back trekked on its earlier commitment to compensate white farmers whose land would have been availed to government for redistribution on a willing-seller willing- buyer principle. The constitutional provision in the Lancaster House Agreement

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constrained the Zimbabwe government from interfering with property right in line with modern democratic tenets that over-emphasize this proviso. Because some whites had come to settle permanently in the country, they resisted the government overtures, and this led to the unleashing of violence on those whites whose farms the government had designated to peasant resettlement. This era was popularized as the Third Chimurenga or jambanja, a word that denotes high levels of lawlessness as armed war veterans undertook pioneering operations into white owned farms. As the ZANU- PF stalwart Nathan Shamuyarira noted, the area of violence is an area ZANU-PF has strong, long and successful history (Financial Gazette, 5-10 October 2000). Mugabe was at pains to assert that ZANU-PF has degrees in violence, and he threatened to go back to the trenches should he lose the 2002 presidential elections (Chaumba et al., 2003) that pitted him against Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC. This confirmed the sentiments of the ZANU-PF stalwart and journalist, Nathan Shamuyarira, that the area of violence was an area where ZANU-PF has a very strong, long and successful history (Financial Gazette, 5-10 October 2000). As a result of all these pronouncements, ZANU-PF is viewed as a party that thrives on having enemies and when it there are none, it creates them to remain in existence (Ankomah, 2018).

14 During the jambanja era, the landscape was visibly politicized, and it was characterized by a proliferation of signposts that proclaimed “no go area: war vets inside”. Zimbabwean flags were planted on anthills and hung from trees with posters labelled “Land is the economy and the economy is the land. Zimbabwe will never be a colony again” (Chaumba et al., 2003, p. 543). Tekere argued that too many farms were already owned by too few chiefs (top government officials) (Sachikonye, 1989, p. 122). Tekere appealed to Joshua Nkomo, the vice president then, to make appeals to Cabinet and to party leadership at their meetings to begin reversing the trend set in motion in 1980 before he could go to white commercial farmers and dispossess them of their farms (Financial Gazette, 21 July 1989). The new crop of black bourgeoisie that replaced white capital now has vested interests in the existing status quo in land ownership and it has become the major beneficiary of the foiled land redistribution programme. This new black elite has become the landowning class and has no intention of giving up that ownership nor of supporting a significant redistribution amongst the peasants (Sachikonye, 1989, p. 123). Yet democracy is not limited to elections alone but encapsulates everything people should share and enjoy together on equal terms. This means that the land issue upon which the armed struggle for decolonization and independence was premised, regarded fair land redistribution as an ingrained aspect of democracy.

15 Powers-that-be that managed to acquire several farms from the MDC side settled on that land in terms of the 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA). The Agreement categorically stated that there was no reversal of the land reform (GPA, 2008) and the MDC absentee land beneficiaries too, were unwilling to return the fertile land to the former white landowners (Shubin, 2013, p. 58). The list of absentee landlords in Zimbabwe was similar to the list of British noblemen and therefore, the British government was paying compensation to themselves or to their kith and kin (Shubin, 2013, p. 44). Although the GPA affirmed the irreversibility of land acquisition and redistribution, the parties to this GPA differed on the methodology of acquisition and redistribution. They were agreed that colonial racial land ownership patterns established during the colonial era and largely maintained in the post-independence

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period were unsustainable and against the national interest, equity and justice (Shubin, 2013, p. 52).

The politics of plots and the “new dispensation”

16 The 2017 coup leaders sounded South Africa, the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) before they seized power from Mugabe. Many people after the 2017 November coup felt that the swearing in of the coup President Emmerson Mnangagwa, even before elections were held, heralded a return to democracy, yet he too, had a tainted past. For example, Mnangagwa ran Mugabe’s military and spy apparatus for much of his political career, including the Matabeleland massacre. He also commanded the military in the 1998 DRC war in which his generals handsomely benefited from clandestine and pirate mining operations that saw the plundering of copper and diamond in large quantities (Venage, 2017, p. 15). Most military generals used the proceeds from these mining deals in building hotel-sized mansions in the country. Mnangagwa was popular for his ruthlessness in the Gukurahundi fiasco and in ZANU- PF’s habitual election violence that made him the most feared politician in Zimbabwe (Meredith, 2018, p. 136).

17 In 2017, the military intervened ostensibly to arbitrate and fix the instability within the ruling ZANU-PF party and this fact was glossed over by the international media. It also missed the fact that the real struggle that gave credence to a coup in November 2017 was predicated on the unhappiness of the military that the counter-revolutionary faction within ZANU-PF, the G40 around Mugabe, had hijacked state and party power (Ankomah, 2018, p. 18). In response to the alleged counter-revolutionary force, the military postulated: What is obtaining within the revolutionary party is a direct result of the machinations of counterrevolutionaries who have infiltrated the party and whose agenda is to destroy it from within […] We must remind those who are behind the current shenanigans that when it comes to matters of protecting our revolution, the military will not hesitate to step in. (Ankomah, 2018, p. 18)

18 Each successful coup increases the odds of a further coup. This suggests that each military government carries with it the seeds of its own removal (Londregan & Poole, 1990). The view among many African scholars interested in the study of democracy is that Britain is the paragon of liberal democracy that places heavy emphasis on people’s freedoms, individual rights and the supremacy of the Constitution. In the case of Zimbabwe, the decolonization process was a failure as evidenced by fifteen years of fighting between the recalcitrant regime of Ian Smith and the nationalist parties such as ZAPU and ZANU. One of the unresolved matters at the Lancaster House Agreement that ended the war in Rhodesia was the issue of land. The British during the negotiation process sought to preserve the rights of whites to property including land, and inserted a clause in the liberal Constitution that would allow the black government to re-gain land for redistribution on a willing-seller-willing-buyer basis and that the British government would fund the process of land acquisition by the Zimbabwe government based on that principle.

19 The British reneged on the promise to fund the process of land resettlement and Tony Blair, the British prime minister, clearly intimated that the British government that he then led was not obligated to honour the arrangement. The development compelled Mugabe to push through parliament an Act to compulsorily acquire land from white

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landowners without compensation. In a hurry to stop the land reform as envisaged under the Compulsory Land Acquisition Act, Britain is alleged to have released $12 million to the Nigerians who deployed themselves in various provincial capitals for ease communication throughout the country (Godobori, 2011). The British were therefore complicit in the 2002 failed coup attempt (Godobori, 2011). Coups are responsible for about 75 per cent of democratic failures, making them the single largest danger to democracy (Spivak, 2017). Another alleged coup attempt in 2007 involved Life Mleya (aide-de-camp to Mugabe), and one of his accomplices, Fakazi Mleya – who headed the signal corps responsible for the army’s national communications –, was given a lethal injection and then sent to Heroes Acre (The Zimbabwean, 16 August 2007) in Harare for burial as a national hero. Ncube, Rugeje and Moyo were under house arrest by June 2017 (from 2007 when they were alleged have organized a coup) (The Zimbabwean, 16 August 2007). The Western countries were consulted about it and indicated that they publicly condemned it, but secretly supported it only if it would restore democracy in Zimbabwe.

20 Zimbabwe’s military, in all intents and purposes, is an integral part of ZANU-PF architecture although it is not seen on the party’s organogram. The two entities developed from the same nucleus during the armed struggle. The military that executed the so-called bloodless coup in November 2017 denied that it was a coup, but rather, a military arbitration in a party in which the military are stakeholders (Ankomah, 2018, p. 18). Sibusiso Moyo, one of the generals who made a televised speech to the nation on the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBCTV) announced: “The Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) remain the major stakeholder in respect of the gains of the liberation struggle and when these are threatened, we are obliged to take corrective measures” (Ankomah, 2018).

21 Due to factional fights within the ruling ZANU-PF party between the old guards as remnants or survivors of the armed struggle and the Young Turks popularly known as Generation 40, there was an internal party clash between the old and the new. The possibility of a coup was played down although Grace Mugabe of the G40 faction raised it first when she stated that Mnangagwa and his team were plotting to seize power and that action had to be swiftly taken to prevent that from happening. The military point of view was that the history of the revolution could not be re-written by those who did not participate in it and that the military remained committed to protecting the revolutionary legacy against those who were bent on hijacking (Ankomah, 2018, p. 19). This was after Oppah Muchinguri, a woman freedom fighter, had amidst factional skirmishes within the party, been replaced by Grace Mugabe as chairperson of the party’s Women’s League. Patrick Chinamasa, of the Lacoste faction, lamented that Grace could not come to the party and then fire a person like Oppah with all her liberation credentials. Chinamasa had been given an obscure Ministry of Cyber Security after his demotion from the Minister of Finance in a Cabinet reshuffle in October 2017 (DailyNews, 10 October 2017). On the other hand, Muchinguri intimated that all was well in the party before Mugabe invited his wife into politics and that Mugabe’s downfall was Grace’s responsibility for she destroyed the personality of the president singlehandedly (Ankomah, 2018, p. 19).

22 The military argued that the November events were not a coup, but a re-arrangement of power within ZANU-PF. They also argued that had they not intervened, there would have been an outbreak of violence following the sacking of Vice President Mnangagwa

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(New African, 2017, p. 59). The sacking of Mnangagwa had cleared the path for Grace to be able to contest the vice president position during the Congress set for December 2017 and the only process that could avert this development was a military intervention or a party rebellion. This was to be done swiftly before Mnangagwa lost relevance in the power struggle in the party. After the sacking of Mnangagwa, there were threats that Mnangagwa’s allies would also be purged at the above Extraordinary Congress in December. The Congress was extraordinary in order to deal precisely and decidedly with the Mnangagwa faction.

23 Vice President Mpoko issued a statement in October 2017 attacking Mnanga-gwa of peddling lies for political purposes. Mnangagwa was accused of attempting to undermine the authority of President Mugabe and destabilize the country by peddling lies to fan ethnic tensions for political purposes (The Zimbabwe Independent, 6 October 2017). In response Mnangagwa confirmed: “I have an impeccable history of unflinching loyalty to the party and His Excellency, Mugabe, and have never acted in a manner that undermines his authority or the stability of Zimbabwe” (Ankomah, 2018). The paradox of it all is that Mnangagwa, in less than two weeks after these allegations and his outright denial, assumed the leadership of the state in a dramatic turn of events in favour of the Crocodile (Lacoste) faction that he led.

Role of the military in regime sustenance

24 There is reliance on the legitimacy of the gun in ZANU-PF politics. The military leaders derive their power from the barrel of the gun. The reason for this is that the transformation of liberation movements into modern political parties is frequently complex and incomplete (RAU, 2018). As Way commented: revolutionary struggles frequently create strong ties between the political leaders and the security forces. Having emerged out of the revolutionary struggle, the leadership of the Zimbabwean security forces is often deeply committed to the survival of the regime and bathed with the philosophy of the ruling party. (Way, 2011, p. 20)

25 Way (2011) opines that a violent revolutionary struggle (such as the one fought in Zimbabwe) tends to produce a generation of leaders with the stomach for violent repression. Mandaza (1991) and Bratton and van de Walle (1997) discuss the propensity for military-party conflation and the resort to violence. From the above, it can be argued that liberation parties disposed more towards violence than towards peaceful resolution mechanisms because they aver that they are still at war with forces of counter-revolution and sabotage. As a result, they do not transform themselves into modern political parties because they, according to Moyo (1992), have still not taken off their uniforms and laid down their guns. To them, life is characterized by continuous strife.

26 The civil-military theory postulates that in modern democratic states, the military has to subordinate itself to civilian choices of leadership (Maringira & Masiya, 2017, p. 400). Morris Janowitz refers the military as a “constabulary force” in the sense that it is mandated to provide protection to civilians from any threat, not to protect the regime in power (Maringira & Masiya, 2017, p. 400). Yet in most cases, the military’s sole client is the state, and this makes the military political. For example, army generals in the Middle East have always maintained that politics is too important to be left to civilians (Maringira & Masiya, 2017, p. 402). Major General Chedondo in Zimbabwe postulated:

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As soldiers we will never be apologetic for supporting ZANU-PF because it is the only party. A National Defence Force the world over is there to protect national politics, national integrity, the Executive and other systems that form part of the Government. By virtue of this, defence forces automatically become a political animal. (The Zimbabwe Daily, 9 May 2012)

27 This reasoning is not unique to the Zimbabwe military alone but could be the position in most African states. Due to the of lack of legitimacy resulting from elections that are not transparently coordinated at various levels of the electoral process, the security institutions in Zimbabwe have always played a very significant role in keeping losers at the helm of power by deciding on who should rule in exchange for inflated military budgets designed to satisfy them almost immediately before they have time to cause trouble. The military, through the Joint Operations Command (JOC) was integral to Mugabe’s electoral comeback in the June 2008 presidential re-run. It is alleged that it managed the elections by controlling the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) which then announced the election results (Barclays, 2010, p. 93).

28 Vice President Joice Mujuru lost the vice presidency to Mnangagwa in 2014 because the army supported him. In one of the popular ZANU-PF youth jingles Zvikaramba toita zvenharo (If it fails we use force) it is purported that the military belongs to ZANU-PF and that if, at any given time, ZANU-PF loses the presidential seat to the opposition, they would rather use the army to retain power than surrender it to the opposition (Maringira & Masiya, 2017, p. 406). The military that took over in 2017 promised to serve as a guardian of democratic progress and as a representative of the people. The prospect for free and fair elections became far-fetched. The military played a prominent role in Zimbabwean politics since independence in 1980 from Britain. They kept Mugabe and ZANU-PF in power in 2008 when the MDC Tsvangirai backed out of the presidential run-off (Sguazzin & Latham, 2019).

29 Any negotiations must reckon with the military factor because the army plays a key role in the country’s politics. The army serves as a guarantor of ZANU-PF’s power. In return, the military is venerated by the ideology of the ruling party and its comrades given lucrative landownership and positions within the state parastatals. The military personnel are deployed to strategic positions in the various state institutions responsible for governance such as Grain Marketing Board (GMB), National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) and the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM). In the 2002 presidential elections, the army chief Vitalis Zvinavashe declared that his forces would only recognize a government headed by a veteran of the armed struggle (Masunungure, 2008).

30 Events in November 2017 were described as “military assisted transition”, “not a coup coup” or “a coup that wasn’t a coup”. It was endorsed by the street mobs in Harare, the High Court, Southern Africa Development Conference (SADC) and the African Union (AU). The army took extreme measures which included a speech of return to normalcy as if they represented institutional interests and as a show of democracy in order for Zimbabwe to qualify for international support and aid (News Stateman, 2017). JOC developed strategies to influence election outcomes in 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013 and 2018. Mugabe wanted to concede defeat in 2008 but the securocrats, the JOC and beneficiaries of Mugabe’s patronage system refused to allow this to happen (Thomas- Greenfield & Wharton, 2019, p. 9). It was a de facto coup. This makes the military deeply entrenched in the economy making their economic interests just as powerful as their fears for accountability for human rights. This was evidenced by the report by Valerio

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Sibanda to the Kgalema Montlanthe Commission that President set up to investigate the 1 August shooting in Harare when six civilians were killed. In his testimony, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) commander denied military responsibility (News24, 13 November 2018) despite audios showing the army firing live ammunition into panicking crowds of demonstrators1.

The Mugabe legacy: change and continuity and the fate of democracy

31 Commenting on a multiparty system in Zimbabwe after the inception of the MDC in 1999, Mugabe in an address to the ZANU-PF Politburo remarked: The party in opposition vows never to be in agreement with the party in government because to be seen to be in agreement with the party in government on fundamental issues is to show oneness with that party and therefore creates no basis for the existence of a separate party […] the opposition party is there to oppose the government whether the government is right or wrong […] that is a waste of the taxpayer’s money. (Hugo et al., 1995)

32 The army moved away from Mugabe because of his inclination towards a personalist regime that would cut the generals from power. He sacked Mnangagwa in a bid to position his wife Grace to succeed him and usher in dynastic politics (News Statesman, 2017). Mugabe’s impeachment was based on Mugabe’s allowing his wife to usurp constitutional power (Thomas-Greenfield & Wharton, 2019). Mnangagwa was sworn in as president on 24 November 2017 even if elections had not been conducted. In his inauguration speech, Mnangagwa praised Mugabe as a father, a mentor, a comrade-in- arms and my leader (Meredith, 2018, p. 138). He proceeded to build a government that was wholly exclusive of the opposition MDC that had assisted ZANU-PF to impeach Mugabe and force him to tender his resignation under duress. An alternative arrangement, for the sake of national unity and political stability in the country, could have been the establishment of a transitional arrangement involving the major political players from the political divide together with other civic organisations pending elections in 2018.

33 Mugabe exhibited his attachment to brute force in 1976 when he set out his views about electoral democracy if he won the elections: He postulated: “Our votes must go together with the guns […] the gun which produces the vote should remain its security guarantor. The people’s vote and the people’s guns are always inseparable twins” (Meredith, 2018, p. 129). Those who opposed Mugabe such as Josiah Magama Tongogara and Solomon Mujuru, whose Chimurenga (war of liberation) name was Rex Nhongo, found themselves demoted or victims of suspicious accidents. Mugabe based his regime on a system of patronage in which he controlled all appointments to senior posts in the civil service, defence, police, and parastatals. His new elite was allowed to engage in a scramble for resources, property, farms and business contracts. For example, Phillip Chiyangwa boasted that he was rich because he belonged to ZANU-PF and he encouraged those who wanted to get rich to join ZANU-PF (Meredith, 2018, p. 134). Under these arrangements, Mugabe warned that the MDC would never be able to form a government in his lifetime even after he died. This was after the 2000 referendum in which 55% voted against the proposed Constitution (Slaughter & Nolan, 2000) that was set to give enormous powers to the president. The 2008 re-run saw Mugabe make a vow to go to war to prevent an MDC victory: “We are not going to give up our country

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because of a mere X. How can a ballpoint pen fight with a gun?” (American Enterprise Institute, 19 June 2008). That mantra is still very relevant in ZANU-PF.

Capture of state institutions and dispute resolution mechanisms vis- à-vis democracy

34 The 2017 coup in Zimbabwe was sanctified when the High Court ruled that the military actions were constitutionally permissible and lawful. The High Court was therefore captured to legitimize a coup. To Magaisa, the coup amounted to effectively legalizing military intervention in the affairs of government (Thomas-Greenfield & Wharton, 2019). Deputy Finance Minister Terence Mukupe said: “How can we say the soldiers took the country from Mugabe to come and hand it over to the opposition leader Nelson Chamisa? MDC will never rule Zimbabwe” (Thomas-Greenfield & Wharton, 2019). Mnangagwa’s regime is known for grossly disproportionate use of police and the military to stop protesters and looting. Mugabe had an insatiable lust for power. In 2008 he stated: “If you lose an election and are rejected by the people, it’s time to leave politics” (Winter, 2017). He did not do it after losing to Tsvangirai.

35 Dispute resolution mechanisms in Zimbabwe have not been tested or have a history of partisanship. In 2011, SADC accepted an election replete with violations of its own guidelines in the DRC. Mugabe threatened to leave SADC “if it made silly decisions” (International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 2). This was on the eve of the July 2013 harmonised elections. These elections went ahead despite SADC facilitated negotiations failure for six years to implement security sector reforms (realignment), media reforms and accessibility to all, cancelation of POSA. ZANU-PF continued to have influence over important elements of the judiciary. To Mugabe, the 2013 electioneering was a do-or- die contest for ZANU-PF in defence of its revolution (International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 6).

36 Single party state was adopted in Zambia in 1973. The argument was that it was the best antidote for divisive tribalism (Milimo, 1993, p. 35). Separation of executive, judiciary and legislative powers into clearly identifiable and separate units of government in both legal terminology and in practice takes place in liberal democracies. Whereas in single party states, the party, rather than the people through their elected representatives, has the final say in matters of governance. Irregularities that cast doubts on the freeness and fairness of elections include restricted opposition campaigning facilities, bias in media coverage, misappropriation of public transport to aid the ruling party, intimidation and arrest of opponents by the police force, violence against the opposition, abuse of secret ballot, misappropriation of campaign funds, high voter absenteeism (Baynham, 1992).

37 Rigging in Zimbabwe is practiced not only in controlling the work of election officials and law enforcement agents, but also in manipulating a defective electoral roll system with millions of ghost voters. Elections are a critical aspect of democracy as they enable the citizens to exercise their democratic right to choose who shall rule them. Elections in Zimbabwe have become a mere concession to prepare to democratise, a gross form of lip service to democracy characterized by the ZANU-PF’s regime’s use of authoritarian tactics such as violence and intimidation to coerce the electorate to vote for it (SW Radio Africa, 3 June 2011).

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Conclusion and recommendations

38 Zimbabwe became politically polarized after the 2017 coup and soon after the subsequent 2018 harmonized election whose presidential results were, and still remain, contentious. After many years of de-industrialisation under Mugabe’s presidency, his ouster brought hopes of a return to democratic rule and economic development. However, a military government cannot be trusted to govern democratically. The intimates that prospects for political reconstruction depend on the willingness of the political establishment to acknowledge the indispensability of opposition formations and to genuinely open up political space for credible elections. It concludes that there is need for a paradigm shift in the government’s modus operandi from the culture of violence and impunity to the politics of tolerance, reconciliation and accountable governance as sine qua non for economic progress and political stability to exist. Democracy in Africa is still threatened by the military, ethnic conflicts and secessionism.

39 If levels of economic development are high, Africa can be able to create sustainable democratic systems. This is because it is difficult for governments to implement democracy when people struggle with poverty and when there are extreme inequalities that make societal cohesion inconceivable. The quality of African leadership matters a great deal and Africa has had a fair share of tyrannical, corrupt and incompetent politicians who have dealt the continental democracy project a death blow. In any case, many African governments are primarily pre-occupied with the challenge of establishing order and stability and secondarily with the problem of establishing democracy in a bid to manage ethnicity. Governance, legitimacy and democracy issues remain central to Zimbabwean politics and unless the electoral laws are revised to allow for equal participation by competing political parties, ZEC is freed from political interference by ZANU-PF and the Judiciary is politically independent. The revolutionary mentality within ZANU-PF is a stumbling block in the national drive towards democracy because the military repeatedly affirms its decision not to have as president someone with no liberation credentials. The 2023 elections are likely to produce yet disputed presidential outcome because no substantial bureaucratic changes in media control, ZEC, Electoral Laws and security institutions have been made, except for those that were intended to buttress the incumbent regime and to consolidate its hold on power ahead of the next elections.

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NOTES

1. The video was viewed on the WhatsApp social media by everyone with a smart phone. One soldier was in a kneeling position resting his gun on his shoulder and firing before another one came to stop him from doing so.

ABSTRACTS

This article focuses on the democracy and legitimacy debates in Zimbabwe after the ouster of Robert Mugabe from power by his erstwhile ally, Emmerson Mnangagwa, in November 2017. President Mnangagwa popularized the terms “Second Republic” and “New Dispensation” to show that his regime differed from Mugabe’s in terms of governance style. The position of this article is that Mnangagwa’s regime could not abandon the system established under the reign of Mugabe. Instead, it argues that the Second Republic reflects continuities of the Mugabe era being transposed into a quasi-military edifice whose commandist approaches denigrate cries for democracy and transparency. This qualitative research draws on data from interviews with political elites in the opposition and ruling parties as well as secondary sources.

Este artigo centra-se nos debates sobre democracia e legitimidade no Zimbábue após a destituição de Robert Mugabe do poder pelo seu antigo aliado, Emmerson Mnangagwa, em novembro de 2017. O Presidente Mnangagwa popularizou os termos “Segunda República” e “Nova Dispensação” para mostrar que o seu regime era diferente do de Mugabe em termos de estilo de governação. A posição deste artigo é que o regime de Mnangagwa não podia abandonar o sistema estabelecido sob o reinado de Mugabe. Em vez disso, argumenta que a Segunda República reflete a continuidade da era Mugabe transposta para um edifício quase militar cujas abordagens “comandantes” denigrem os apelos à democracia e à transparência. Esta pesquisa qualitativa baseia-se em dados de entrevistas com elites políticas dos partidos na oposição e no poder, assim como em fontes secundárias.

INDEX

Palavras-chave: democracia, governação, restabelecimento, legitimidade, eleições, multipartidário Keywords: democracy, governance, resettlement, legitimacy, elections, multiparty

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AUTHOR

AARON RWODZI Catholic University of Zimbabwe 18443 Cranborne Ave Harare, Zimbabwe [email protected]

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Articles Artigos

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O Conflito de Casamansa e as Relações de Poder na Senegâmbia: Senegal, Guiné- Bissau e Gâmbia The conflict of Casamance and the relations of power in Senegambia: Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Gambia

Antonieta Rosa Gomes

NOTA DO EDITOR

Recebido: 19 de abril de 2018 Aceite: 07 de janeiro de 2019

1 O Movimento das Forças Democráticas de Casamansa surgiu em 1947, com o objetivo de reivindicar o desenvolvimento da região de Casamansa em igualdade às outras comunas do Senegal, como Dakar, Saint-Louis, Gorée e Rufisque (Allen Yero Embaló, comunicação pessoal, Bissau, 20 de junho de 2011), e a autonomia económica e maior peso político no contexto das colónias francesas da África Ocidental (Diouf, 1994). Há outras fontes que informam que o MFDC existiu desde 1944 (Seck, 2005), contudo começou a ter notoriedade somente a partir de 1947. Após a independência do Senegal em 1960, ficou inativo por algum período e ressurgiu em 1982 como movimento armado de secessão, reivindicando a independência de Casamansa. As causas do ressurgimento do MFDC foram as seguintes: que a região de Casamansa foi ilegalmente anexada pelo Senegal, aquando da independência do Senegal, em 1960 (Diouf, 1994; Marut, 2001, p. 8); que os terrenos dos autóctones foram expropriados e atribuídos de forma prioritária pela Administração local aos senegaleses vindos do norte (Marut, 2010); que os casamanceses, na sua maioria Jola, foram marginalizados dos postos da Administração local e do direito das pescas e não beneficiavam dos recursos de Casamansa, que eram

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desviados para o centro e norte do Senegal, maioritariamente Wolof (Beck, 2008; Darbon, 1985).

2 O abade Augustin Diamacoune Senghor foi o primeiro líder deste movimento, que organizou em colaboração com outros casamanceses uma manifestação em Ziguinchor, em dezembro de 1982, para reivindicar a independência da região de Casamansa. Os manifestantes tiraram a bandeira oficial do Estado e içaram a bandeira do Movimento das Forças Democráticas de Casamansa. O governo senegalês respondeu a este ato através das forças de gendarmaria, houve confrontos que resultaram em vários mortos e feridos de ambos os lados, dando início ao conflito armado. Em 1990, o MFDC fundou o seu braço armado designado Atika, que em jola significa combatente, flecha (cf. Tomàs, 2010). Como muitos conflitos armados em África, o conflito de Casamansa é de secessão. Com a independência dos países africanos a partir de 1960, surgiram conflitos intraestatais e internacionais com base em contestações das fronteiras coloniais herdadas, fronteiras essas artificiais, que criaram algumas “linhas da frente” ou “guerra” (Sall, 1992). Para conter essas tensões relativas às contestações das fronteiras coloniais e revisões territoriais que punham em causa a paz no continente africano, a Organização da União Africana (OUA), atualmente designada União Africana (UA), aprovou em 1964 uma Resolução adotando o princípio da intangibilidade das fronteiras coloniais: “The borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constituent a tangible reality”1. Mediante este princípio as fronteiras coloniais herdadas devem ser respeitadas pelos Estados pós-coloniais, para evitar conflitos derivados de alterações de traçados das fronteiras.

3 Porém, a adoção do princípio da intangibilidade das fronteiras não impediu o surgimento de movimentos secessionistas com fundamentos na contestação ou manutenção de fronteiras coloniais. Por exemplo, a Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) é um movimento de secessão que desde a independência de Angola (1975) reivindica a independência do enclave de Cabinda, argumentando que foi protetorado português ilegalmente incorporado ao território angolano no momento da independência. Na República Democrática do Congo (antigo Congo Belga), logo após a sua independência em 1960, surgiram forças internas centrífugas reivindicando a independência da região de Katanga, rica em minérios, numa guerra de secessão (1960-1963) (Badi & Tshibambe, 2010). O fundamento último da secessão era o acesso ao recurso petrolífero.

4 Já a Frente Polisário, em nome do povo saarauí, reivindica a soberania do Sara Ocidental, antigo Sahara Espanhol, desde 1976, e opõe-se à anexação pelo Marrocos. Contrariamente a muitos conflitos em África, este não é de contestação, mas de manutenção da fronteira colonial (Badie, 1995, p. 89).

Localização e população de Casamansa

5 A região de Casamansa, cuja capital é Ziguinchor, fica localizada no sul do Senegal, fazendo fronteira com o norte da Guiné-Bissau e o sul da Gâmbia (Figura 1).

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Figura 1: Mapa do Senegal

Image 102ED108000024500000191A62EA77C1EEF441AA.emf

Fonte: http://www.google.pt./search?q=mapa+de+casamansa

6 Esta região de Casamansa pertencia o domínio colonial português, desde a implantação portuguesa nos anos de 1645, e por quase dois séculos e meio, tendo como principal atividade o comércio, que compreendia escravos, marfim, couro, álcool, tecidos e armas de fogo (Boulègue,1989, pp. 16-17).

7 Com o acordo de delimitação das fronteiras entre Portugal e França, em 1886, Casamansa passou para o domínio colonial francês. Em contrapartida, Portugal ficou com o rio Cacine e o direito de pescas na Terra Nova2 (cf. Esteves, 1988; Gautron, 1982; Mota, 1946).

8 Desde então, a região de Casamansa passou a ter um estatuto administrativo especial, diretamente subordinada à administração do governador da África Ocidental Francesa, em Saint-Louis, no Senegal. Com a independência do Senegal em 1960, a região de Casamansa foi incorporada como distrito do Senegal (Foucher, 2009, p. 100). Paradoxalmente, desde 2008 a esta parte, Casamansa não consta no elenco das regiões administrativas do Senegal. O governo senegalês fez desaparecer do mapa o nome “Casamansa”, através da reforma administrativa e territorial pela Lei nº 14/2008 de 18 de março, que dividiu Casamansa em três regiões: Ziguinchor, Kolda e Sédhiou (Figura 2), contando com 1.592.392 habitantes, de acordo com o censo de 2002.

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Figura 2: Divisão administrativa e territorial do Senegal

Image 10156D84000029F700001ACA1C4FE69252256440.emf

Fonte: www.afrique-planete.com/senegal/carte_regions_senegal.php

9 A região de Casamansa é caracterizada por uma grande diversidade étnica como é o Senegal, com mais de 10 grupos étnicos, onde o grupo Jola destaca-se como maioritário. Por isso, a reforma administrativa territorial é vista como uma forma de acabar com o regionalismo e o etnicismo defendidos pela etnia Jola, que também é considerada etnia maioritária no Movimento das Forças Democráticas de Casamansa.

10 Em paralelo à diversidade étnica existe a diversidade religiosa, em que os cristãos, estimados em 30% da população, coabitam com os muçulmanos, animistas e todas as crenças jola. O tecido sociocultural de Casamansa destaca-se por esta diversidade étnica e religiosa. Porém, os Jolasão regionalistas, diferente dos Wolof que são centristas.

11 Não obstante a medida política concebida em reforma administrativa e territorial que extinguiu formalmente a denominação Casamansa, o espaço geográfico natural tradicionalmente designado Casamansa continua sendo assim denominado, tanto pela população como pelos investigadores, escritores e analistas políticos. O governo senegalês não alcançou os fins políticos preconizados com essa reforma administrativa e territorial.

12 Casamansa significa, na linguagem local, rei do rio dos Cassangas (Gonçalves, 2006, pp. 42-43). Esta região era o reino de Kasa, mansa significa rei em mandinga e Kasa era a sub-região ao sul do rio Casamansa dominada pelo grupo étnico Banhun. O reino de Kasa mansa deu nome à região que é conhecida como Casamansa.

13 O conflito de secessão em Casamansa está associado à contestação da fronteira colonial e o acesso aos recursos; e os argumentos do MFDC são os seguintes:

14 Que a região de Casamansa enquanto possessão colonial não estava integrada na colónia francesa do Senegal e foi, por conseguinte, indevidamente anexada no momento da independência do Senegal, conforme o abade Augustin Diamacoune Senghor: “Casamance never formed part of the French colony of Senegal and was therefore improperly annexed at the time of Senegal’s independence”3 (Beck & Foucher, 2009, p. 100; Marut, 2001, p. 8).

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15 As populações de Casamansa não foram consultadas, nem pelo poder colonial, nem pelo governo senegalês, para escolher entre as três soluções possíveis: integração territorial ao Senegal, Federação ou Confederação, ou independência. Nestas condições, Casamansa deve tomar sua independência após 20 anos de experiência unitária, em que o balanço tem sido desastroso (Diouf, 1994, p. 152).

16 A Administração central senegalesa tem marginalizado Casamansa dos benefícios económicos e sociais em benefício de Dakar, pois algumas infraestruturas da região eram desviadas para o centro do Senegal (Beck, 2008; Darbon, 1985). Os senegaleses do norte eram maiores beneficiários dos postos da Administração, da alienação dos terrenos sem títulos e do direito de pescas, em detrimento dos senegaleses (casamanceses) do sul (Gomes, 2016).

17 Destes argumentos apresentados pelo MFDC como fundamentos do conflito armado de secessão, destacam-se essencialmente duas razões: política e económica. Relativamente à razão política, segundo a qual a região de Casamansa não estava integrada à colónia francesa do Senegal e foi ilegalmente anexada por Senegal no momento de sua independência sem que a população fosse consultada, o MFDC tentou provar este facto, mas o resultado foi adverso. Por solicitação do movimento, o Estado senegalês pediu parecer da França, com o fim de clarificar às partes se a região de Casamansa foi administrada de forma independente ou não do território do Senegal, então colónia francesa. Em 1993, a França enviou para o Senegal o consultor Jacques Charpy, que tomou parte na reunião, em Ziguinchor, entre o MFDC e o governo senegalês, estando presentes os representantes do Estado da Guiné-Bissau, para o fim de clarificar esta situação. Jacques Charpy apresentou um relatório sobre a Administração colonial francesa de Casamansa e concluiu que a região de Casamansa nunca foi administrada de forma independente, mas integrada ao território do Senegal colónia francesa (Marut, 1994, pp. 213-231). Porém, o então líder Augustin Diamacoune Senghor discordou do relatório apresentado e decidiu continuar a luta armada para a independência.

18 Analisando os factos empíricos da história da colonização francesa do Senegal, não existem dados probatórios de que a região de Casamansanão integrava a área de soberania territorial do Estado senegalês. Se isso fosse comprovado, isto é, que a região de Casamansa foi administrada independente do Senegal, não subsistiriam dúvidas sobre a legitimidade do argumento político de secessão.

19 O artigo III, nº 3 da Carta da OUA, atual União Africana (UA), consagra o princípio da intangibilidade das fronteiras coloniais ou artificiais ao referir-se àsoberania e integridade territorial dos Estados e os seus direitos inalienáveis de existência independente. Com fundamento neste princípio, uma região pode pretender separação ou independência, desde que os pretendentes consigam provar que durante determinado período colonial foi administrada pela Metrópole independente do resto dos territórios. Se assim não for, qualquer pretensão secessionista carece de bases legais para ser acolhida, permanecendo a fronteira colonial herdada. Tendo em conta os factos não provados, o MFDC viu reduzida a força de sua reivindicação separatista, contudo se recusou a aceitar esta realidade e continuou a rebelião, que também se fundamenta sobre a base económica.

20 A par do argumento económico de falta de acesso aos recursos está subjacente a questão étnica e regionalista Jola do sul, versus Wolof do norte do Senegal, o que leva alguns investigadores a darem uma certa ênfase à etnicidade do conflito. Porém, esta

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questão merece uma abordagem mais profunda para situá-la no contexto de um conjunto de elementos e demais motivações do conflito.

Recursos económico-sociais de Casamansa

21 Casamansa é uma região com muitos recursos naturais, considerada “um celeiro do Senegal”, em que pesam a agricultura (arroz, amendoim, caju, manga), a pesca e o turismo. A produção do arroz em Casamansa corresponde a 50% de toda a produção do arroz do Senegal, embora atualmente esta produção se verifique insuficiente para a subsistência dos casamanceses, por razões de explosão demográfica, que fez aumentar a procura e que obrigou ao consumo do arroz importado. A recente exploração da castanha de caju para exportação soma-se ao amendoim proveniente do norte e é comercializada em todo o Senegal. O algodão produzido na Alta Casamansa corresponde a dois terços da produção nacional. Mas existe um défice de unidades de produção e meios de transporte que dificulta a evacuação de mercadorias para o norte do Senegal (Diouf, 1994). A pesca de uma maneira geral é centrada sobretudo em peixes, camarões, crustáceos e outros moluscos, mas a pesca artesanal é amplamente desenvolvida pelos casamanceses. O turismo éuma das principais fontes de receita, considerado estratégico para o desenvolvimento económico do Senegal, sendo que as infraestruturas estão concentradas no litoral de Casamansa, onde existem redes de hotéis e praias.

22 Relativamente aos recursos minerais, o “ouro cinzento” é explorado em regime de monopólio pelos ganeses que se encontram no estuário de Casamansa, em Elinkine e Diogué. Em Falémé existe um jazigo de produção de ferro e um outro de ouro em Sabodala, na região de Kédougou, cuja exploração teve início em 20094. Ao largo da costa de Casamansa existem reservas petrolíferas offshore calculadas em centenas de milhões de toneladas, mas não foi iniciada a exploração devido ao elevado custo do barril (70 dólares), o que reduz a sua rentabilidade (Marut, 2010). Mas a quantidade de petróleo existente, caso seja explorado a custos moderados será uma grande fonte de receitas para o Senegal. Portanto, o acesso aos recursos é um dos argumentos utilizados para a rebelião, em que o MFDC reclama que os casamanceses, na sua maioria Jola, estão afastados dos benefícios desses recursos, que são desviados pelo Governo para o centro e o norte do Senegal, maioritariamente Wolof e muçulmano. Na verdade, os recursos de Casamansa contrastam com a pobreza de sua população, comparativamente ao centro e ao norte do Senegal, onde os marabouts (muçulmanos) detêm mais poder económico que os do sul. A precariedade das infraestruturas rodoviárias em Casamansa dificulta as ligações com Dakar, o que impõe a necessidade de restauração das ruas e estradas, construção de pontes e de um aeroporto internacional, porque a linha aérea Dakar- Ziguinchor e vice-versa, inaugurada em 2011, minimizou apenas as dificuldades de ligação mas não as colmatou.

23 Paradoxalmente à pobreza e a precariedade infraestrutural, no domínio da educação, a região de Casamansa (Ziguinchor) possui a taxa de escolarização mais elevada do Senegal (100%), muito superior à de Dakar, que é de 57%, e que noutras regiões varia entre 33% e 17%. O serviço de saúde de Ziguinchor também está qualificado entre os três primeiros do Senegal: Dakar, Thiès e Ziguinchor (Diouf, 1994).

24 Relativamente à sustentação do conflito, os combatentes do MFDC asseguram a sua autossubsistência (alimentos e medicamentos) através da exploração dos recursos da região. Em Balantacounda, a castanha de caju é a principal fonte de subsistência; em

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Bignona, a colheita de castanha de caju tem sido dominada pelos combatentes em prejuízo da população local; e em muitas vilas tem-se registado incidentes entre os guerrilheiros e os militares para o controlo da colheita da castanha de caju. A exploração e o contrabando da madeira e de canábis também são outras fontes de rendimento (Marut, 2010, p. 52). Mas as drogas (canábis) já eram produzidas em Bignona antes do início da rebelião, porque em 1980 as forças da ordem já haviam apreendido algumas toneladas de canábis e em 1996 apreenderam em Diouloulou 300 toneladas5. Além do contrabando de mercadorias, o roubo de bois e mercadorias às populações assumiu grandes proporções na zona fronteiriça entre Salquenhé, Balantacounda e Ziguinchor. Portanto, o prolongamento do conflito é assegurado por estes tráficos promovidos pelos atores internos do movimento, que segundo Marut (2001) têm contribuído para a compra de armas de baixo custo nesta região da África Ocidental e sua proliferação (p. 15) e para o contrabando de produtos locais e animais para a Gâmbia e a Guiné-Bissau. Outras fontes de financiamento têm sido ajudas da comunidade jola e donativos dos membros do Movimento das Forças Democráticas de Casamansa.

25 A questão da independência é a principal causa do conflito que divide o MFDC em diferentes fações, em que César Atoute Badiate lidera a fação considerada moderada, localizada em Cassolol, perto de Farim, na região norte da Guiné-Bissau e Salif Sadio lidera a fação considerada dura, perto da fronteira da Gâmbia em Brikama. Este conflito é considerado de baixa intensidade, porque os confrontos armados entre as Forças Armadas senegalesas e os combatentes do MFDC acontecem de forma esporádica e com longos períodos de acalmia.

Capacidade bélica e zonas de conflito

26 No início do conflito, na década de 1980, o Movimento das Forças Democráticas de Casamansa possuía uma capacidade bélica rudimentar: arcos, flechas, catanas e contava com uma média de 2.000 homens sem experiência de guerrilha, ocupando as zonas florestais de difícil acesso e próximas às fronteiras, bem como os subúrbios de Ziguinchor (Marut, 2010). Quando o governo senegalês enviou militares das Forças Armadas para Casamansa, os atos de violência passaram a centrar-se nas emboscadas e ataques contra os veículos das Forças Armadas. Os confrontos armados que ocorreram entre os guerrilheiros do MFDC e os militares das Forças Armadas sempre resultaram em várias dezenas de vítimas (Beck & Foucher, 2009, p. 107). Nas operações de guerra as minas antipessoais e anticarros têm sido utilizadas pelas duas partes em conflito e até esta data fizeram mais de 800 vítimas entre mortos e feridos6.

27 As principais zonas onde estão os militares são: Baixa Casamansa, Média e Alta Casamansa, porque as Forças Armadas senegalesas dividiram-se em duas regiões militares: Ziguinchor e Kolda; uma parte para a Baixa Casamansa está estacionada em Ziguinchor, Bignona e Elinkine e outra parte para a Média e a Alta Casamansa, em Kolda (Marut, 2010, pp. 163-164). Durante o evoluir do conflito foram criados muitos aquartelamentos militares à volta de Ziguinchor, uns próximos à fronteira com a Guiné- Bissau em Santhiaba (M’Pack, Youtou e Manjaco) e em direção à Oussouye e Cap Skirring; e outros próximos à fronteira com a Gâmbia (Bignona e Banjul). Os aquartelamentos estão próximos às bases dos rebeldes constituindo uma espécie de cerco, com exceção das zonas florestais onde não foram criados por causa das minas.

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28 O número de guerrilheiros do MFDC foi progressivamente aumentando com a adesão dos jovens ao movimento e atualmente o MFDC conta com cerca de 4.000 a 5.000 guerrilheiros, com experiências de guerrilha adquiridas ao longo de mais de 35 anos de conflito.

29 As Forças Armadas senegalesas têm cerca de 14.000 homens; em Casamansa estão entre 5.000 e 8.000 homens que fazem parte da Gendarmerie, que integra grupos móveis de intervenção (GMI), um número duas vezes superior ao dos guerrilheiros do MFDC (Marut, 2010). Mas apesar da supremacia numérica, profissionalismo, formação e experiência, as Forças Armadas senegalesas não representam uma ameaça séria contra os guerrilheiros do MFDC e vice-versa.

As relações de poder na Senegâmbia: Senegal, Guiné- Bissau e Gâmbia

30 As relações de poder na Senegâmbia (Senegal, Gâmbia e Guiné-Bissau) associadas à questão de a etnia Jola (Felupe) pertencer aos três países e integrar o MFDC, têm influenciado os posicionamentos da Guiné-Bissau e da Gâmbiarelativamente ao conflito de Casamansa.

31 Em 1981, antes do início do conflito armado de Casamansa, houve uma tentativa de golpe de Estado na Gâmbia, para derrubar o regime do então presidente Dawda Jawara, mas falhou pela intervenção do Senegal, que enviou suas tropas para apoiar o Presidente e o Governo. Por consequência, o então líder militar protagonista do golpe, Kukoi Samba Sanyang, acompanhado de suas tropas munidas de armas provenientes da Líbia (Allen Yero Embaló, comunicação pessoal, Bissau, 20 de junho de 2011), pediu asilo político à Guiné-Bissau, onde foi acolhido. Na época, o então presidente da Guiné-Bissau era João Bernardo Vieira (Nino), que também assumiu o poder pelo golpe de Estado em 1980, derrubando o primeiro presidente da República da Guiné-Bissau, Luís de Almeida Cabral. Um militar que assumiu o poder através de um golpe de Estado dificilmente poderia negar asilo a um outro que tentou assumir o poder pela mesma via mas falhou. As posições ambivalentes da Guiné-Bissau e do Senegal relativamente ao golpe de Estado na Gâmbia foram influenciadas pelo ambiente político que se vivia nos dois países. Contudo, esses posicionamentos contribuíram para a quebra de confiança nas relações entre estes Estados, sendo que o Senegal foi considerado Estado oponente ao golpe de Estado na Gâmbia, pela ajuda que o então presidente Abdou Diouf prestou ao seu homólogo, enquanto o Estado da Guiné-Bissau foi considerado apoiante do golpe, por ter dado asilo ao líder golpista e seu grupo.

32 O contexto geopolítico da Senegâmbia determinado pela situação geográfica de proximidade dos países, associado às políticas destes, no âmbito sub-regional é fortemente influenciado pelo ambiente interno de cada um dos países. Aqui, há uma correlação entre o espaço geográficoexterno e a política interna com objetivos estratégicos estabelecidos. Como afirma Almeida (1990), “A geopolítica é a ciência que estuda os fundamentos geográficos dos acontecimentos políticos” (p. 121). Esta ciência estuda a relação entre o homem político e o espaço territorial, analisa a influência das questões espaciais nas opções políticas, bem como o impacto destas na organização do espaço. Foi nesse ambiente de quebra das relações de confiança entre os países da

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Senegâmbia que ressurgiu em 1982 o MFDC como rebelião armada independentista, contra o Estado senegalês.

33 No início da década de 1990, as tensões entre o Senegal e os seus vizinhos (Guiné-Bissau, Gâmbia e Mauritânia) e o ambiente de conflitualidade regional com as guerras civis da Libéria (1989-1997) e Serra Leoa (1997-2000) são geralmente apontados como fatores que contribuíram para a entrada de armas na região de Casamansa através de tráfico e contrabando, dificultando a resolução do conflito por meios alternativos pacíficos.

34 A esta situação acrescenta-se o conflito político-militar na Guiné-Bissau em 1998/99, entre as Forças Armadas guineenses e o então presidente da República, Nino Vieira, cuja razão principal foi o tráfico de armas da Guiné-Bissau para Casamansa. Daí resultou a construção de alianças: o Senegal aliou-se ao então presidente da República e Governo da Guiné-Bissau, enviando tropas senegalesas a Bissau, e os elementos do MFDC da ala de Salif Sadio aliaram-se à Junta Militar chefiada pelo entãochefe de Estado-Maior General das Forças Armadas guineenses, brigadeiro Ansumane Mané. Porém, a Gâmbia manteve-se equidistante do conflito e teve uma intervenção diplomática que conduziu o Presidente Nino Vieira ao exílio em Portugal, passando pela Gâmbia, após ter renunciado ao seu cargo de Presidente da República, em virtude da derrota pela Junta Militar.

35 Em 2000, os presidentes eleitos da Guiné-Bissau, Kumba Ialá e do Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, tiveram como missão principal o reforço das relações de cooperação entre a Guiné-Bissau e o Senegal, abaladas pelo conflito. O presidente da República da Guiné- Bissau posicionou-se claramente contra o conflito de Casamansa e a utilização do território guineense como base de retaguarda pelos guerrilheiros do MFDC. O presidente Abdoulaye Wade condenou a aliança entre Ansumane Mané e Salif Sadio durante o conflito, manifestando solidariedade ao novo poder eleito, em particular ao seu homólogo Kumba Ialá, a quem ele chamava mon fils (meu filho) e que poderia contar com o seu apoio na eventualidade de uma rebelião interna protagonizada por Ansumane Mané e seus aliados.

36 No plano externo e ao nível sub-regional, impunha-se à Guiné-Bissaunão só o reforço das relações de cooperação com o Senegal, mas com a República da Guiné, que também foi interveniente no conflito político-militar, em 1998/99, na Guiné-Bissau.

37 A aproximação entre as novas autoridades guineenses e senegalesas abriu portas para negociações e acordos e o reforço da cooperação no domínio da Defesa e igualmente no domínio económico, que permitiu a revisão ao acordo de pescas entre os dois países. Em agosto de 2000, durante uma visita oficial do presidente Kumba Ialá ao Senegal, os dois chefes de Estado acordaram assinar um protocolo adicional ao acordo de partilha dos recursos petrolíferos e haliêuticos, em que a Guiné-Bissau passaria a beneficiar de 20% da exploração dos recursos petrolíferos, ao invés dos 15% anteriormente acordados entre os presidentes Abdou Diouf e João Bernardo Vieira7. Mas foi um mero ato político assumido apenas pelos dois presidentes, Abdoulaye Wade e Kumba Ialá, sem consequências de ratificação pelos parlamentos e engajamento dos respetivos governos. Portanto, prevalece o acordo anterior que concede 15% de recursos petrolíferos à Guiné-Bissau e 85% ao Senegal e a instituição da agência de exploração conjunta sediada em Dakar, desde 1996. Contudo, após 20 anos desta experiência, a Guiné-Bissau requereu ao Senegal a renegociação para assinatura de um novo acordo. Paralelamente à diplomacia económica e política, as autoridades políticas guineenses, com fundamento na destruição do material bélico decorrente do conflito armado em

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Bissau, não hesitaram em comprar material militar da China e da Ucrânia para rearmamento das Forças Armadas. O Presidente senegalês Abdoulaye Wade, por sua vez, viajou a Paris solicitando o apoio do governo francês em material bélico8. O recurso à compra de material bélico pelos dois países espelhava um clima de desconfiança que se supôs ter derivado do aumento de incidentes e da insegurança das pessoas nas zonas fronteiriças. Havia informações dos serviços de Segurança do Estado de que a fação do MFDC liderada por Salif Sadio estabelecera sua base no norte da Guiné-Bissau, mas a reação do governo guineense não se fez esperar – foi expulso do território.

38 Após o derrube de Kumba Ialá por um golpe de Estado em 2003, o presidente de transição, Henrique Pereira Rosa, durante o seu mandato (2003-2005) procurou manter boas relações com o Senegal e não tomou qualquer posicionamento político que merecesse destaque relativo ao conflito de Casamansa ou sobre o processo de paz.

39 Foi nesse contexto que em 2005, a fação do MFDC liderada por Salif Sadio, após ter recusado assinar o acordo de paz com o governo senegalês em 2004, foi instalar-se na Barraca Mandioca9, no norte da Guiné-Bissau. Foi expulso pelas Forças Armadas guineenses, em 2006, numa operação militar designada “Limpeza”, que foi organizada pelo então chefe de Estado-Maior General das Forças Armadas, Tagme Na Waie, sob o comando operacional do então coronel António Indjai, na qual participaram 600 militares guineenses e uma centena de guerrilheiros da fação de César Atoute Badiate e de Magne Diémé10 (Marut, 2010, pp. 292-293). A operação contou com o apoio político do então presidente da República, Nino Vieira, que reassumiu o poder após ter vencido as eleições presidenciais em 2005. No seu regresso ao poder, Nino Vieira passou a apoiar os separatistas do MFDC adversários de Salif Sadio e reforçou a cooperação militar com o Senegal.

40 Após o assassinato do presidente Nino Vieira em 2009, Malam Bacai Sanhá, candidato do Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), foi vencedor das eleições presidenciais. Na presidência de Malam Bacai Sanhá (2009-2012), este privilegiou as relações político-diplomáticas com o Senegal e assumiu uma posição de neutralidade relativa ao conflito de Casamansa. A mesma estratégia política foi adotada pelo então governo liderado por Carlos Gomes Júnior e os governos que lhe sucederam. Portanto, neste contexto de análise do comportamento das autoridades guineenses face ao conflito de Casamansa, convém destacar que o presidente Kumba Ialá foi o único que assumiu sem ambiguidade uma posição de clara condenação do conflito quer pelos seus discursos, quer pelaação do Governo.

As relações do Senegal com a Gâmbia

41 As relações do Senegal com a Gâmbia nunca foram amistosas, salvo no período da Confederação da Senegâmbia (Senegal e Gâmbia), criada em 1982 como espaço político e militar. O Senegal passou a ter influência política sobre a Gâmbia, assumindo o compromisso político-militar de garantir a proteção do então presidente Dawda Jawara contra uma eventual rebelião militar interna. Como contrapartida económica, controlava a evasão das divisas do contrabando dos produtos da zona11. Por consequência desta influência, a Confederação durou apenas sete anos e foi dissolvida, porque já não agradava àGâmbia, que precisava ter mais autonomia político-militar e controlo interno do seu fluxo monetário.

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42 O presidente Dawda Jawara foi destituído do poder em 1994, por um golpe de Estado liderado por Yahya Jammeh, que assumiu o poder e implantou o regime militar. Em 1996, Yahya Jammeh foi eleito presidente da República da Gâmbia, em eleições presidenciais livres e democráticas. Para os senegaleses, com a ascensão ao poder do presidente Yahya Jammeh, da etnia Jola, a mesma dos separatistas de Casamansa, a Gâmbia era um parceiro necessário, todavia inconfortável para a resolução do conflito de Casamansa, pois tanto poderia intervir como terceira parte na negociação ou para apoiar os rebeldes do Movimento das Forças Democráticas de Casamansa. Houve desconfiança de uma das partes protagonistas do conflito, o Estado senegalês, sobre a neutralidade da Gâmbia, condição necessária da terceira parte interveniente (Jabri, 1990).

43 O presidente Yahya Jammeh foi sistematicamente acusado de apoiar os rebeldes e consta que alguns elementos de sua guarda presidencial faziam parte do movimento separatista, “mas sempre recusou sua ligação com os rebeldes” (Marut, 2010, p. 133). Apesar disso, o Senegal não prescindiu claramente da sua intervenção na resolução do conflito. Em 2005, as relações entre a Gâmbia e o Senegal tornaram-se tensas, porque o governo da Gâmbia aumentou o preço da travessia do barco que garante a ligação deste país com o Senegal. A Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO) designou o então chefe de Estado nigeriano e presidente em exercício da União Africana, Olusegun Obasanjo, para utilizar os seus bons ofícios para a normalização das relações entre os dois países12. Para suprir as ligações precárias entre os dois países, o Senegal avançou com a proposta de construção da ponte que liga os dois países, mas a Gâmbia recusou e as ligações terrestres entre Banjul e Ziguinchor continuaram sendo realizadas normalmente através de viaturas ligeiras até 2018. Para os senegaleses a razão dessa recusa era derivada da antipatia dos gambianos pelos francófonos de uma maneira geral e pelos senegaleses de um modo particular. Mas esta questão já foi ultrapassada, porque o atual presidente da Gâmbia, Adama Barrow, mantém boas relações com o presidente do Senegal, Macky Sall, e a ponte de Farafenni, também denominada Senegambia Bridge, foi construída e inaugurada este ano (BBC, 2019). Esta ponte irá facilitar a mobilidade dos habitantes do norte do Senegal para a região de Casamansa no sul e vice-versa e o desenvolvimento do comércio. Existem estreitas relações económicas entre a Gâmbia e o Senegal do ponto de vista informal, sustentadas por trocas comerciais e circulação de vendedores ambulantes.

44 A Gâmbia é um pequeno país com 11.000 km2, encravado no Senegal, com exceção de sua fachada marítima, razão pela qual todas as suas trocas comerciais terrestres com os países vizinhos passam necessariamente pelo território senegalês. Não possui recursos minerais como petróleo ou urânio, sua economia depende essencialmente da agricultura e do turismo internacional, mas possui influência natural no conflito de Casamansa devido à sua localização geográfica e à etnia Jola. Salif Sadio, após ter sido expulso da Guiné-Bissau, foi fixar a sua base perto da fronteira da Gâmbia e muitos casamanceses encontram-se como refugiados neste país.

45 Em 21 de outubro de 2010, a polícia nigeriana interveio no porto de Lagos, por causa do carregamento de 13 contentores de armas sofisticadas provenientes do Irão com destino à Gâmbia. Segundo informações das fontes oficiais iranianas, essas armas destinavam-se a apoiar o MFDC13. Isso fez aumentar o clima de desconfiança entre as autoridades gambianas e senegalesas, não obstante o desmentido da Gâmbia sobre o destino das armas14. Outras informações davam conta que o MFDC recebeu armas

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provenientes do contrabando da Líbia, Iraque e Burquina Faso, que transitaram por Mauritânia, Gâmbia e Guiné-Bissau. As Forças Armadas senegalesas responderam de forma incisiva a estas informações e os confrontos armados intensificaram-se no norte de Casamansa. A violência de um conflito pode não ser imputável à técnica dos combatentes ou àspaixões dos beligerantes, mas à geometria dos relatórios de forças (Aron, 1962, p. 161).

46 Apesar das suspeitas de envolvimento da Gâmbia no apoio ao MFDC, as relações entre o Senegal e a Gâmbia não estiveram em causa. Os dois países reforçaram a cooperação em matéria de segurança, a 24 de fevereiro de 2011, com a assinatura do acordo de patrulhamento conjunto na linha da fronteira entre Casamansa e Gâmbia.

47 Senegal cortou as relações diplomáticas com Irão em 23 de fevereiro de 2011, porque não admitiu qualquer desculpa de Teerão sobre as armas iranianas utilizadas pelo Movimento das Forças Democráticas de Casamansa.

48 Alguns incidentes ocorridos posteriormente deterioraram as relações entre o Senegal e a Gâmbia, por exemplo, a execução de dois senegaleses entre os nove condenados à morte em agosto de 2012. O governo senegalês disse que a Gâmbia deveria informar ao Senegal por via diplomática, sobre a condenação à morte de dois cidadãos senegaleses antes de os executar, o que não aconteceu. O presidente do Senegal, Macky Sall, condenou duramente a execução e afirmou ser “uma violação flagrante da Convenção de Viena de 1963, sobre os assuntos consulares e das relações de boa vizinhança entre Senegal e Gâmbia” (Juillet, 2012). Exigiu que fossem aplicadas sanções contra a Gâmbia pelo ato que ele qualificou de desprezo do presidente gambiano pela vida humana.

49 O presidente Yahya Jammeh afirmou que as relações entre o Senegal e a Gâmbia não eram boas, porque o Senegal acolheu e deu asilo aos seus opositores e aos implicados na tentativa de golpe de Estado na Gâmbia (ANGOP, 2013). Estes episódios demonstram que o conflito de Casamansa influencia o contexto geopolítico da Senegâmbia, porque interfere nas relações do Senegal com os seus vizinhos Guiné-Bissau e Gâmbia, devido ao triângulo fronteiriço e étnico entre os três países. O Senegal tem investido em influências diplomáticas e políticas para ter os seus vizinhos como parceiros e incentivá-los a não permitirem que seus territórios sejam utilizados pelos rebeldes de Casamansa como bases de guerrilha.

50 Neste sentido, convém ao Senegal ver no poder, tanto na Guiné-Bissau como na Gâmbia, governantes que lhe inspirem confiança.

51 O presidente da Gâmbia, Yahya Jammeh,não inspirava confiança ao poder de Dakar por ser ele da etnia Jola e suspeito de ser apoiante da ala de Salif Sadio, pelo que sua derrota presidencial era desejável pelas autoridades políticas senegalesas.

52 Em 2016, Adama Barrow, o adversário do Presidente Yahya Jammeh às eleições presidenciais na Gâmbia, venceu com 43% dos votos. Numa primeira posição, Jammeh parecia ter reconhecido a derrota, mas depois fez uma reviravolta e recusou reconhecer os resultados eleitorais definitivos, alegando irregularidades. Disse que iria interpor recurso no Tribunal e só aceitaria os resultados após a apreciação e decisão do Tribunal. O proclamado vencedor, Adama Barrow, recusou aceitar a intenç ão de Yahya Jammeh e instaurou-seo clima de conflitualidade. Por consequência, Yahya Jammeh decretou o estado de emergência, impedindo a realização da cerimónia de tomada de posse do presidente eleito Adama Barrow, que foi refugiar-se em Dakar por questões de segurança.

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53 A Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO) declarou-se disposta a intervir na Gâmbia, através de sua força militar ECOMOG, que é Grupo de Monitoramento ou Brigada de Supervisão de cessar-fogo, para obrigar o então presidente Yahya Jammeh a reconhecer a sua derrota eleitoral e abandonar o poder. A intervenção seria a partir de Dakar, e Nigéria e Gana declararam-se prontos a enviar militares. Paralelamente à tomada de decisão da CEDEAO, Adama Barrow, alegando “circunstâncias excecionais”, tomou posse como presidente da Gâmbia, na Embaixada da Gâmbia no Senegal. Por consequência, a CEDEAO encetou negociações diplomáticas com o presidente Yahya Jammeh e este aceitou abandonar o poder e foi para o exílio na República da Guiné, sem que houvesse a programada intervenção militar.

54 No quadro da CEDEAO, a Nigéria e o Senegal têm peso económico e influência político- diplomática significativa; associados ao Gana, o peso triplicou. Portanto, era quase segura a intervenção militar da CEDEAO, caso o então presidente Yahya Jammeh não abandonassepacificamente o poder. O apoio imediato do Senegal a Adama Barrow e o seu empreendimento político-militar para a saída do poder de Yahya Jammeh foram sem dúvida motivados pelas relações precárias e de desconfiança política entre as autoridades de Dakar e de Banjul, devido ao conflito de Casamansa. É neste sentido que Paul Claval afirma: “o poder se traduz, nas relações, pelo aparecimento de assime trias e desequilíbrios” (1979, p. 7), que se constatam nas relações sociais, e no caso concreto, nas relações entre os Estados.

55 Para as autoridades senegalesas saiu do poder um presidente “jola” do país vizinho suspeito de apoiar os elementos do Movimento das Forças Democráticas de Casamansa. A saída de Yahya Jammeh do poder na Gâmbia representa uma nova fase nas relações de cooperação entre Senegal e Gâmbia, porque o novo Presidente, Adama Barrow, à partida tem a confiança das autoridades do Senegal, sendo mais próximo do presidente do Senegal, Macky Sall.

56 Para Salif Sadio, líder da fação radical do Movimento das Forças Democráticas de Casamansa, a saída do poder de Yahya Jammeh na Gâmbia não deverá influenciar o curso do conflito, porque “embora mantinham ligações”, este apoiava mais as posições do governo senegalês15. Pois a sua luta é para a independência de Casamansa e afasta a hipótese eventual de autonomia. Nas suas declarações Salif Sadio defendeu a independência com o argumento de que “Casamansa foi colónia portuguesa e foi anexada ilegalmente por Senegal”. Esta é a razão fundamental do prolongamento do conflito, uma posição defendida pelo então sacerdote Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, que foi líder espiritual do Movimento das Forças Democráticas de Casamansa.

Considerações finais

57 As relações de poder entre os Estados se construíram e se constroem em função de interesses comuns ou particulares de cada um deles. Com relação ao conflito de Casamansa, a estratégia geopolítica dos Estados da Senegâmbia conduziu algumas vezes posições equidistantes e outras vezes alianças bilaterais entre Senegal e Guiné-Bissau ou entre Senegal e Gâmbia. Foi neste contexto de alianças bilaterais que se realizaram operações de patrulhamento conjunto entre o Senegal e a Guin é-Bissau, decorrentes da assinatura do Protocolo Adicional ao Acordo de Cooperação em Matéria de Segurança e Defesa, em 1992, para garantir a segurança das populações

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das zonas fronteiriças e mais tarde entre o Senegal e a Gâmbia.O Senegal sempre duvidou da neutralidade do então presidente da Gâmbia, Yahya Jammeh, em relação ao conflito, porque havia uma desconfiança de que ele apoiava a ala de Salif Sadio. Porém, Salif Sadio esclareceu que não recebia nenhum apoio material de Yahya Jammeh – embora esse esclarecimento podenão ter convencido o Senegal.

58 Não obstante o firme propósito do Senegal em influenciar posições políticas da Guiné- Bissau, sobretudo durante a presidência de Abdoulaye Wade (2000-2013),não conseguiu envolver as autoridades guineenses de então na gestão do conflito de Casamansa. O poder do Senegal de influenciar os seus vizinhos é relativo e assimétrico.

BIBLIOGRAFIA

Almeida, P. V. (1990). Do poder do pequeno Estado: Enquadramento geopolítico da hierarquia das potências. Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas.

ANGOP (Agência Angola Press). (2013, 5 de julho). Presidente Jammeh acusa Senegal. www.portalangop.co.ao

Aron, R. (1962). Paix et guerre entre les nations. Calmann-Lévy.

Badie, B. (1995). La fin des territoires: Essai sur le désordre international et sur l’utilité sociale du respect. Fayard.

Badi, M. K., & Tshibambe, G. N. (2010). La secesión del Katanga revisitada o las incertidumbres de la creación del Estado-nación en el África postcolonial. In J. Tomàs (Ed.), Secesionismo en África (pp. 329-365). Bellaterra.

BBC. (2019, 24 de janeiro). Le pont Farafenni, relance économique entre le Sénégal et la Gambie ouvert. https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-46985009 (Acedido a 7 de março de 2019).

Beck, L. (2008). Limited brokers: Casamançais “sons of the soil” in southern Senegal. In L. Beck, Brokering democracy in Africa: The rise of clientelist democracy in Senegal (pp. 153-195). Palgrave Macmillan.

Beck, L. J., & Foucher, V. (2009). (Re)creando la comunidad. El uso de la autoridad consuetudinaria para resolver el conflicto de Casamance en Senegal. Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals. Procesos de Reconciliación Posbélica en África Subsahariana, 87, pp. 95-121.

Boulègue, J. (1989). Les Luso-Africains de Sénégambie – XVIe - XIXe siècles. Ministério da Educação – Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical& Université de Paris I, Centre de Recherches Africaines.

Claval, P. (1979). Espaço e poder. Zahar.

Darbon, D. (1985). La voix de la Casamance. Politique africaine, 18, pp. 127-140.

Diouf, M. (1994). Sénégal: Les ethnies et la nation. L’Harmattan.

Esteves, M. L. (1988). A questão do Casamansa e a delimitação das fronteiras da Guiné. Centro de Estudos de História e Cartografia Antiga.

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Foucher, V. (2009). “La guerre par d’autres moyens”? La société civile dans le processus de paix en Casamance. Raisons politiques, 35, pp. 143-166.

Gautron, J.-C. (1982). La Confédération de la Sénégambie: Entre l’union et le protectorat. L’année africaine, pp. 239-272.

Gomes, A. R. (2016). A Guiné-Bissau no processo de resolução do conflito de Casamansa. Tese de doutoramento não publicada, ISCTE - Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal.

Gonçalves, A. (2006). Casamança, um grito de liberdade sufocado. Revista Fórum, 39, pp. 42-43.

Jabri, V. (1990). Mediating conflict: Decision-making and Western intervention in Namibia. Manchester University Press.

Juillet, C. (2012, 31 de agosto). Sénégal: Macky Sall exige des sanctions contre la Gambie. Afrik.com. www.afrik.com/article26849.html (Acedido em 12 de novembro de 2012).

Marut, J.-C. (1994). Guerre et paix en Casamance. Repères pour un conflit, 1990-1993. In F.-G. Barbier-Wiesser (dir.), Comprendre la Casamance: Chronique d’une intégration contrastée (pp. 213-231). Karthala.

Marut, J.-C. (2001). Guinea-Bissau and Casamance: Instability and stabilization. Rapport WRITENET, 15/2000, pp. 1-25.

Marut, J.-C. (2010). Le conflit de Casamance: Ce que disent les armes. Karthala.

Mota, A. T. da. (1946). A descoberta da Guiné. Boletim Cultural da Guiné Portuguesa, 1(1), 11-68.

Sall, E. (1992). Sénégambie: Territoires, frontières, espaces et réseaux sociaux. Travaux et Documents, 36, pp. 1-28.

Seck, A. (2005). Sénégal, émergence d’une démocratiemoderne (1945-2005): Un itinéraire politique. Karthala.

Tomàs, J. (2010). Casamance: El particularismo inquietante. In J. Tomàs (Ed.), Secesionismo en África (pp. 129-166). Bellaterra.

NOTAS

1. “As fronteiras dos Estados africanos, na data de suas independências, constituem uma realidade concreta” (Tradução da autora). 2. É o direito à pesca do bacalhau na Terra Nova, região que está situada no pequeno território francês de Saint-Pierre e Miquelon, junto ao sul do Canadá. 3. “Casamansa nunca fez parte da colónia francesa do Senegal e foi por conseguinte indevidamente anexada no momento da independência do Senegal” (Tradução da autora). 4. Kédougou é a antiga região de Tambacounda que o MFDC considera localidade pertencente à Casamansa. 5. Dados do Observatório Geopolítico das Drogas do Senegal. 6. Denúncias das ONG que atuam no domínio da paz, como por exemplo a Associação dos Jovens para a Promoção da Paz e a Cooperação Transfronteiriça e a Associação Nacional para o Desenvolvimento Local Urbano. 7. A autora, enquanto ministra da Justiça e membro do Governo, integrou a delegação presidencial de visita oficial a Dakar. 8. Notícia avançada pela Agence France Presse (2000).

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9. Barraca Mandioca está situada a leste de M’Pack, linha de fronteira que divide o território da Guiné-Bissau do Senegal. 10. Magne Diémé liderava uma fação que se subordinava às ordens de César Atoute Badiate e deixou de existir após a sua prisão e morte em 2007. 11. www.portalsaofrancisco.com.br/alfa/gambia/gambia.php 12. www.panapress.com/Presidente-nigeriano-medeia-diferendo-entre- senegalegambia (Acedido a 20 de setembro de 2013). 13. Os contentores tinham granadas, obuses, morteiros, etc. Consultar: www.voaportugues.com/content/article-02-23-2011-ivory-coast-iran- weapons-116752259/1259614.html 14. O chefe de Estado-Maior General das Forças Armadas do Senegal apresentou o relatório sobre a utilização de armas do Irão pelo MFDC. 15. Entrevista de Salif Sadio concedida à jornalista da RTP África, Indira Baldé, em Casamansa, a 24 de maio de 2016.

RESUMOS

O conflito de Casamansa é um conflito armado de secessão no sul do Senegal, com início em 1982, quando o Movimento das Forças Democráticas de Casamansa (MFDC) se opôs ao governo senegalês, reivindicando a independência da região de Casamansa. Este conflito tem efeitos transfronteiriços para os países vizinhos do Senegal, que são a Guiné-Bissau e a Gâmbia, que têm em comum alguns grupos étnicos, como o Jola, maioritário em Casamansa, que também faz parte do Movimento das Forças Democráticas de Casamansa. A proximidade das fronteiras e as ligações interétnicas têm influenciado o conflito e as relações de poder entre os três países. Embora a Guiné-Bissau e a Gâmbia tenham adotado posição oficial de neutralidade, o governo senegalês não tem demonstrado total confiança nessa posição.

The conflict of Casamance is an armed conflict of secession in southern Senegal, beginning in 1982, when the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) opposes the Senegalese government, claiming the independence of the Casamance region. This conflict has transboundary effects for the neighbouring countries of Senegal, which are Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia, which have in common some ethnic groups, such as Jola, majority in Casamance, which is also part of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance. The proximity of borders and interethnic links have influenced conflict and power relations between the three countries. Although Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia have adopted an official neutrality position, the Senegalese state has not demonstrated full confidence in that position.

ÍNDICE

Keywords: Casamance conflict, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia Palavras-chave: conflito de Casamansa, Senegal, Guiné-Bissau, Gâmbia

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AUTOR

ANTONIETA ROSA GOMES Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL) Centro de Estudos Internacionais (CEI-IUL) Av. das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, Portugal [email protected]

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25 Anos de Política Nacional de Saúde na República da Guiné-Bissau: Memórias do seu Planeamento Estratégico em Saúde 25 Years of national health policy in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau: Memories of its strategic health planning

Cátia Sá Guerreiro, Zulmira Hartz, Paulo Ferrinho e Philip J. Havik

NOTA DO EDITOR

Recebido: 20 de setembro de 2018 Aceite: 04 de novembro de 2019

República da Guiné-Bissau, um Estado frágil e o planeamento estratégico em saúde

1 Ocupando a 178ª posição no total de 188 países classificados para o Índice de Desenvolvimento Humano (UNDP, 2016), a República da Guiné-Bissau (RGB), com cerca de 1,7 milhões de habitantes, trinta etnias (Fula, Balanta, Mandinga, Manjaco e Pepel representam mais de 85% da população) e diferentes credos religiosos (islamizados, católicos, protestantes e animistas), situa-se na África Ocidental, distribuindo-se por uma faixa continental e 88 ilhas correspondentes a 22% do território nacional (Instituto Nacional de Estatística da RGB & Ministério da Economia e Finanças da RGB, 2018; MINSAP, 2017).

2 Um Estado independente desde 1974, depois de um conflito armado (1963-1974) que opôs o Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) à administração portuguesa, a situação política na Guiné-Bissau tem sido instável,

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marcada por repetidos golpes de Estado e conflitos armados desde 1980. Apesar de uma transição pacífica para eleições multipartidárias em 1994, o percurso político do país tem sido muito acidentado (Forrest, 2003; Sangreman, 2016). Três momentos de particular tensão podem ser destacados na história do país: o conflito político-militar de junho de 1998 a maio de 1999, o golpe de Estado de 2012 e a queda do Governo em 2015. Esta instabilidade apresenta particular impacto ao nível da economia nacional, com francos efeitos na degradação de infraestruturas e no tecido social.

3 O PIB per capita pouco se distancia dos 500 USD, valor atingido apenas depois de 2007 (Ministério da Economia, do Plano e da Integração Regional da RGB, 2011). Em termos dos níveis de pobreza, 70% da população vive com menos de 2 USD/dia (Cardoso & Dubbeldam, 2018).

4 Caracterizada por fracos recursos internos, o sector primário tem sido o maior contribuinte do PIB (Escritório Regional Africano da OMS, 2008). As infraestruturas de apoio às atividades económicas (rede rodoviária, portos marítimos, telecomunicações, e abastecimento de água potável e eletricidade) são deficientes (MINSAP, 2017).

5 Segundo o Índice dos Estados Frágeis (Fragile States Index – FSI; Fund for Peace, 2018) a RGB é considerada o 16º país mais frágilnum universo de 178 países (Messner et al., 2018). Não existindo uma definição internacionalmente acordada de Estado Frágil (EF) (Fund for Peace, 2018), segundo a OCDE (2008), os dois critérios apontados para a caracterização destes Estados são a falta de legitimidade, ou seja, vontade do Governo e capacidade e eficácia para prestar serviços básicos e segurança (Newbrander et al., 2011).

6 Marcada por uma forte dependência da comunidade internacional nos sectores da economia, saúde e educação (Dussault & Fronteira, 2010; Guerreiro et al., 2017; Sangreman, 2016; The World Bank, 2018), que foi reforçada pelos Programas de Ajustamento Estrutural (PAE, 1987-1998) (Alves, 2002; Lopes da Cruz, 2007), os sete maiores parceiros de desenvolvimento da RGB têm sido a União Europeia (UE), o sistema das Nações Unidas, o Banco Mundial, o Fundo Global, o Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento (BAD), Portugal e Espanha. Dos multilaterais realçam-se ainda a Comunidade Económica de Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO), a União Económica Monetária da África Ocidental (UEMOA) e o Banco de Desenvolvimento da África Ocidental (BDAO). Dos bilaterais realçam-se também Dinamarca, França, Brasil e, mais recentemente, China, Marrocos, Índia, Irão e Nigéria (MINSAP, 2017).

7 Importa sublinhar que, para além da Ajuda Pública aoDesenvolvimento, prestada no quadro das relações intergovernamentais diretamente ou por mediação de organizações multilaterais, deve considerar-se ainda a ajuda privada – prestada ou por agentes económicos (empresas ou bancos), geralmente destinada a atividades produtivas (agrícolas e industriais) e que pode revestir a forma de créditos à exportação, investimentos diretos, reinvestimentos de lucros, entre outras; ou por atores da sociedade civil, geralmente mediada por organizações não governamentais (ONG) (Lopes, 2003).

8 Apesar de progressos significativos na redução da mortalidade neonatal, infantil e da criança, relativamente a países comparáveis da África Ocidental, África subsaariana ou países de baixa renda, a RGB tem um desempenho desfavorável na maioria dos indicadores de saúde (MINSAP, 2017), espelhando também as fraquezas do seu Sistema Nacional de Saúde (SNS). Este apresenta três níveis de funcionamento – local, regional e central – que teoricamente correspondem a prestações de serviços de nível primário,

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secundário e terciário, mas sem ter capacidade de resposta às necessidades de saúde do país.

9 Diversos fatores originam esta realidade, entre eles a baixa densidade de recursos humanos da saúde (RHS), infraestruturas em avançado estado de degradação, serviços de diagnóstico complementar praticamente inexistentes, deficiente funcionamento do sistema de referência e contrarreferência (MINSAP, 2007). (Ilustração 1). Regista-se ainda a frequente rutura de stocks de medicamentos/materiais e a falta de cadeia de frio, dificultando a instituição de tratamentos médico-cirúrgicos e a sustentação de serviços de vacinação.

Ilustração 1: Exterior de um hospital regional

(Fotografia deCátia SáGuerreiro)

10 Estão identificados importantes determinantes da realidade sanitária do país (MINSAP, 2017), sendo de destacar: a deficiente capacidade de governação do sistema de saúde, com graves deficiências em funções como as de definição de políticas e estratégias, mobilização de recursos, inspeção, regulação, coordenação entre ministérios e os níveis central e regional e articulação com os parceiros e as organizações da sociedade civil; a débil capacidade de gestão em termos de planificação, implementação, supervisão, manutenção de equipamentos, monitorização e avaliação; a insuficiência de financiamento para o sector da saúde e fraqueza do sistema de proteção social, manifestadas tanto na excessiva dependência de pagamentos diretos pelas famílias, como na excessiva dependência dos apoios externos para o funcionamento de rotina (MINSAP, 2017).

11 De 2012 a esta parte, o investimento do Estado na saúde flutua significativamente de ano para ano, nunca ultrapassando os 9% do Orçamento Geral de Estado (OGE), muito aquém do acordo de 15% (Gebregziabher & Hansen, 2018; MINSAP, 2017) assumido no âmbito do compromisso de Abuja (WHO, 2001).

12 Os gastos do Governo com saúde representam apenas 1,9% do PIB, o que é significativamente inferior ao de alguns dos seus pares regionais. Esta situação mantém-se em 2018. Em 2016, os gastos em saúde pública representaram apenas 31,3% do total de gastos em saúde, menos que o Burundi (38,8%) e a Gâmbia (46,6%), mas superior aos da Serra Leoa (9,0 %) e dos Camarões (13,4 %). Os gastos do Governo com a

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saúde não só são baixos, como são feitos quase exclusivamente (cerca de 90%) com RHS. Daí resulta a necessidade de as famílias investirem em média 15% de seus gastos não alimentares em saúde (Gebregziabher & Hansen, 2018).

13 Apesar destes indicadores, é de sublinhar que: os esforços das autoridades, com o apoio da comunidade internacional, contribuíram para melhorar as condições de vida da população em geral: foram realizados alguns progressos encorajadores, especialmente nas áreas de educação primária, acesso a água potável, saneamentobásico e saúde, combate aoHIV/SIDA e malária, respeito pelos direitos da criança e questões de género e saúde reprodutiva e da mulher. (Africa MDG Progress Reports, n.d., p. 4)

14 Importa salientar que no quadro da implementação do primeiro Documento de Estratégia Nacional de Redução da Pobreza (DENARP I, 2004-2007), a Guiné-Bissau realizou progressos significativos na estabilização da gestão macroeconómica, na reforma da administração pública e na melhoria da oferta dos serviços públicos, nomeadamente nos domínios da educação e saúde. Porém, devido à conjugação de vários fatores, dos quais se salientam a instabilidade política e institucional, a penúria das infraestruturas de base, o impacto das crises petrolífera e económica internacional, e o contraste entre as metas estabelecidas e a realidade do país, estes resultados ficaram muito aquém dos objetivos inicialmente fixados. Por exemplo, o crescimento económico foi, em média, de 3,1% entre 2007 e 2009, opondo-se a um objetivo inicial de 5%. Consequentemente, o nível da pobreza manteve-se elevado (69,3% em 2010, vs. uma estimativa de 64,7% para 2002), o que contribuiu para a redução das oportunidades do país em alcançar os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio (ODM) no horizonte 2015 (Ministério da Economia, do Plano e da Integração Regional da RGB, 2011).

15 Com base nas lições aprendidas desta experiência, foi elaborado o segundo DENARP, com horizonte temporal 2011-2015, que reconhece o impacto negativo da fragilidade do Estado e da instabilidade política (Ministério da Economia, do Plano e da Integração Regional da RGB, 2011). Findo o período de implementação deste documento, assiste-se à sua substituição pelo Plano Estratégico e Operacional do Governo Terra Ranka 2015-2025 (República da Guiné-Bissau, 2015).

16 Numa continuidade de definição estratégica de luta contra a pobreza que se insere numa tentativa de ajustar os planos às condições locais (Sangreman, 2016), este plano foi desenhado por guineenses e para guineenses com o intuito de, até 2020, reconstruir o país, consolidar as instituições democráticas e lançar as fundações para a estabilidade e desenvolvimento socioeconómico sustentável, em que o sector da saúde surge como uma das prioridades, com forte ênfase no melhoramento das infraestruturas e da governação do sistema de saúde.

17 Sendo um dos países mais pobres do mundo, a RGB tem investido no planeamento estratégico para o sector da saúde )PES( (Guerreiro et al., 2017).

18 A gestão estratégica do sector da saúde da Guiné-Bissau foi, até março de 2017, orientada pela Política Nacional de Saúde (PNS) adotada e aprovada em 1993. Esta enquadrou, ao longo dos tempos, diversas políticas temáticas e orientou a elaboração de três Planos Nacionais de Desenvolvimento Sanitário (PNDS) (Guerreiro et al., 2017). O PNDS pretende ser o documento que define a estratégia nacional de saúde do país (Cardoso & Dubbeldam, 2018). Ao PNDS I (1998-2002, revisto para 2003-2007) sucedeu o PNDS II (2008-2017) e em 2017 completou-se um novo processo de planeamento – PNDS III. A extensão do primeiro PNDS foi enquadrada pelo DENARP I e o segundo PNDS pelo

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DENARP II. A elaboração do terceiro PNDS foi orientada pela PNS adotada em março de 2017, pelo Plano Estratégico e Operacional do Governo Terra Ranka 2015-2025 e pelas recomendações que emergiram da 1ª Conferência Nacional de Saúde em outubro de 2014 (Guerreiro et al., 2017).

19 Vale a pena fazer memória deste exercício com um duplo propósito: por um lado, partindo das memórias dos atores-chave e do conteúdo dos documentos oficiais de PES existentes na RGB, analisar os processos de PES na RGB, enquadrando-os no descrito pela literatura e contextualizando-os na especificidade vivida por EF nesta matéria; e, por outro, guardar memória destes processos, como trilhos de um passado que nos ajudam a escolher caminhos.

20 Com este duplo intuito, o presente trabalho foi realizado com recurso ao método histórico pelo qual é possível investigar acontecimentos, processos e instituições do passado para verificar a sua influência na sociedade atual, partindo do princípio de que as atuais formas de vida social, as instituições e os costumes têm origem no passado, sendo importante pesquisar as suas raízes para compreender a sua natureza e função (Marconi & Lakatos, 2007). Recorreu-se a análise de conteúdo (Bardin, 2008) dos PNDS I, II e III, dos documentos resultantes da avaliação da implementação dos PNDS I e II (Ferrinho, 2015a; Fronteira et al., 2007) e de treze entrevistas semiestruturadas (Flick, 2005) realizadas entre fevereiro de 2016 e agosto de 2017 a avaliadores e atores-chave em PES na RGB.

21 Os treze entrevistados fizeram memória dos processos de PES em que estiveram envolvidos, tendo sido selecionados pelo investigador por se reconhecer serem detentores de informações pretendidas para o estudo, constituindo assim uma amostra não probabilística intencional (Marconi & Lakatos, 2007).

22 Dois deles são avaliadores portugueses, um envolvido na avaliação do PNDS I e o outro nos processos de avaliação da implementação do PNDS I e do PNDS II, bem como na redação dos PNDS II e III. Ambos foram entrevistados em Lisboa.

23 Os restantes onze entrevistados são guineenses, estão ou estiveram diretamente implicados nos processos de PES, desde a elaboração do PNDS I até ao atual processo de redação e implementação do PNDS III. Ocupam ou ocuparam cargos de governação do sector a nível nacional, dois deles amplamente relacionados com programas específicos (Luta contra a Tuberculose e Lepra e Saúde Materno-Infantil) e dois dos entrevistados ocupam atualmente cargos em organizações internacionais.

24 Oito destas onze entrevistas foram realizadas em Bissau em fevereiro de 2016. Uma outra foi realizada por videoconferência, estando o ator-chave em Bissau e o entrevistador em Lisboa, em julho de 2017. As entrevistas aos atores-chave que ocupam cargos em organizações internacionais decorreram igualmente por videoconferência, com o entrevistador em Lisboa, em março e julho de 2017 e os entrevistados no país de missão.

25 As entrevistas foram gravadas, com o devido consentimento dos entrevistados sob garantia de anonimato.

26 Com base na literatura consultada foi elaborado um mapa metodológico que permitiu analisar os processos de PES na RGB, descrito na Figura 1.

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Figura 1: Ciclo de planeamento estratégico em Saúde

Image 101FE340000028F900001A4B5F031CBA02AD36A1.emf

(Adaptado de Chatora & Tumusiime, 2004, p. 21; State of Queensland, 2015, p. 15)

Figura 2: Planeamento Estratégico em Saúde na República da Guiné-Bissau de 1974 a 2018

Image 107944300000371000004BB2982372AF86697B27.emf

27 Os autores consultados definem vários passos no processo de planeamento em saúde, os quais formam um ciclo contínuo integrando uma fase de diagnóstico seguida de definição de objetivos e prioridades. Destes decorrem a definição estratégica e a determinação de recursos necessários para a sua implementação. A monitoria e avaliação são transversais a todo o processo, sobretudo no momento da implementação,

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permitindo fazer dele um ciclo. Este é o enquadramento que está na origem da construção do presente mapa metodológico.

28 A evolução do PES na RGB está descrita, numa perspetiva de guardar memória dos processos desenvolvidos (Guerreiro et al., 2017), sendo sintetizada na Figura 2.

29 Propomos uma viagem pelas memórias daqueles que viveram a realidade de 25 anos de Política Nacional de Saúde num Estado que apesar de frágil tem claramente definidas uma visão da saúde – “um sistema de saúde cada vez mais eficiente, eficaz e financeiramente sustentável, com um crescente envolvimento de diferentes sectores e responsabilização pelo Governo, profissionais e cidadãos” – e a missão do sistema de saúde para concretizar essa visão: “Contribuir de uma forma decisiva para o bem-estar físico, mental e social da população, seguindo os preceitos de acesso universal aos programas e serviços de saúde considerados prioritários pelo Governo, de forma acessível, equitativa e de qualidade para todos” (MINSAP, 2017).

Memórias e reflexões de 25 anos de Política Nacional de Saúde

30 Após a independência do país em 1974, o primeiro grande projeto em saúde foi implementado nas regiões de Cacheu e Tombali a partir de 1976, versando o desenvolvimento comunitário. Financiado pela Cooperação Holandesa e com o apoio da Organização Mundial da Saúde (OMS), a “Reforma da Intenção Primária” lançava o desafio de trazer a saúde às comunidades, envolvendo profissionais de saúde, concretamente enfermeiros que haviam sobrevivido à guerra da independência, e cidadãos, capacitando as comunidades para intervirem na sua própria saúde. O processo de avaliação destes projetos-piloto pode ter contribuído para o desenho de uma estratégia nacional de saúde, cuja definição demorou, provavelmente devido a mudanças políticas após o golpe de Estado de 1980. O Projeto de Saúde de Base apresentado em 1978, elaborado com base numa operacionalização das orientações da Declaração de Alma-Ata, destacou a necessidade de um plano nacional, a regionalização da gestão dos serviços de saúde, uma distribuição mais equilibrada dos RHS e a criação de uma rede de serviços primários em zonas rurais e urbanas. “Foi a génese da PNS e assim nasceu a pirâmide sanitária que ainda hoje é conhecida”, refere um dos entrevistados.

31 Em 1993, a meio da segunda fase da política de ajustamento estrutural que se iniciou em 1987, foi aprovada a PNS, a qual priorizou a saúde materno-infantil e o planeamento familiar, o melhoramento dos sistemas de saneamento e a prevenção e controlo de doenças, elaborando programas para cada área. Os alicerces do Plano Estratégico para o Sector da Saúde consistiram em descentralizar os serviços, melhorar o acesso e a distribuição dos recursos, aumentar a sua qualidade, desenvolver um programa de formação e reciclagem de quadros, reforçar a coordenação intersectorial e criar um sistema nacional de informação sanitária (MINSAP, 1997, 2017). Como principal instrumento da PNS (MINSAP, 1997), foi realizado o primeiro exercício de PES, sendo o seu resultado apresentado na mesa-redonda sectorial de 1997. Nasceu assim o PNDS I (Ilustração 2).

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Ilustração 2: Capa do documento Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento Sanitário I

Image 101448F00000218900002F865A17DED2CD6A6F9D.emf

32 São gratas as memórias do exercício de PES que resultou na redação do PNDS I, cuja implementação acabou por ser adiada devido à guerra de 1998-1999.

33 Este exercício, na opinião de grande parte dos entrevistados, passou pelas diversas fases do ciclo de planeamento definidas no mapa metodológico utilizado no presente trabalho.

34 Com início em 1995, logo após as primeiras eleições multipartidárias no país em 1994, foi feito “um exaustivo e útil trabalho de diagnóstico”, analisando a situação vivida então na RGB em termos de saúde e suas necessidades, contextualizando os dados encontrados na realidade histórica, política e social do país. Foram definidas prioridades e estratégias, envolvendo os diferentes parceiros incluindo os financiadores.

35 Com base nesta realidade, foram definidas quatro áreas prioritárias de intervenção: qualidade dos cuidados de saúde e acessibilidade; reforço institucional e gestão de recursos; desenvolvimento dos recursos humanos; promoção da saúde e colaboração intersectorial (MINSAP, 1997).

36 Um estudo preliminar do sistema de saúde nos meados dos anos 90, antes da introdução do PNDS I, concluiu que a degradação das infraestruturas, a falta de pessoal qualificado e de investimento, e o deficiente sistema de planificação, também associados aos PAE, formaram “obstáculos ao desenvolvimento dos serviços de saúde” (Paulo & Jao, 1996). A equipa do MINSAP estava consciente dos desafios que a implementação do Plano iria colocar devido à fraca supervisão central do sistema, à falta de integração dos programas verticais e de uma política coordenada de formação de quadros, bem como à fraca coordenação entre os diferentes níveis dos cuidados. Os efeitos do PAE criaram barreiras para a intervenção, devido à deterioração das infraestruturas sanitárias e até

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à redução destas, com o desaparecimento de mais de uma dezena de centros de saúde no interior. Ao mesmo tempo surgiu um sector privado, sobretudo na capital, para utentes mais abastados, recrutando RHS do SNS. Sendo a capacidade de gestão identificada como um dos principais entraves, foi criado o Programa de Reforço da Gestão Sanitária (PRGS) através de um projeto-piloto com equipas regionais polivalentes em Biombo, Bafatá e Oio. Para este fim foram administrados cursos de planificação a quadros regionais, para elaborar e implementar planos regionais, identificar problemas-chave e aplicar soluções em consonância com os recursos disponíveis e os problemas locais (Paulo & Jao, 1996). Este programa lançou as bases para criar o perfil sanitário que foi definido imediatamente antes e no período de redação do PNDS I. Fez-se a divisão sanitária em 11 regiões e não 8 como as administrativas, uma vez que as limitações de acessibilidade foram tidas em conta. De facto, “a regionalização que acompanhou a redação do PNDS I foi uma etapa marcante”. “O PNDS I está muito bem desenhado!” é a exclamação de um dos entrevistados, espelhada na forma saudosa que àquele se referem muitos dos que participaram neste trabalho. “Os trabalhos decorriam com ânimo. Cada região fazia o seu trabalho. Tínhamos indicadores e analisávamos as falhas. Foi assim que desenhámos o mapa sanitário.”

37 Ainda hoje “o PNDS I continua a ser uma referência”. Um dos entrevistados refere que: o PNDS I conseguiu ser um documento federador de todos os parceiros que estavam na RGB, foi de facto uma experiência espetacular ver a implicação de diferentes pessoas de diferentes governos e nacionalidades. Desde holandeses a suecos, americanos, entidades como o BM, a OMS, todos se envolveram no processo. Foi um trabalho formidável e participativo.

38 Outro aspeto realçado deste documento é o facto de apresentar uma “reflexão sobre a futura implementação, fundamental para a sua apropriação aos mais diversos níveis”. Porém, “o PNDS I foi lançado em março de 1998 e dois meses depois teve início a guerra civil”.

39 Segundo os entrevistados “a guerra de 98 foi muito dura, mais que a da independência, mais agressiva e levando por um lado a uma ampla fuga de quadros e por outro à destruição de infraestruturas essenciais ao funcionamento do SNS”.

40 A vivência da Guiné-Bissau retrata a relação entre a fuga de quadros e a instabilidade política e económica descrita na literatura. Países como Angola, Congo, Libéria, Moçambique, Ruanda e Serra Leoa viveram guerras civis na década de 90 e perderam mais de 40% dos seus médicos até ao ano 2000 (Clemens & Pettersson, 2008). Dados de 2000 indicam que 7 em 10 médicos guineenses estariam em exercício profissional fora do país, sendo que nesse ano exerciam medicina em Portugal 160 médicos guineenses de um total de 251 que haviam fugido do país, permanecendo na Guiné-Bissau um total de 103 médicos (Clemens & Pettersson, 2008). Embora inferior à fuga de médicos, segundo a mesma fonte, a fuga de quadros de enfermagem registou em 2000 um total de 25%.

41 A situação político-militar de 1998 comprometeu a execução do PNDS I, tendo este sido em 2002 revisto para o horizonte temporal de 2003-2007, com o objetivo de implementar as atividades inicialmente programadas (Fronteira et al., 2007; MINSAP, 2007).

42 Em finais de 2007, resultando de uma consultoria solicitada pela Célula de Gestão do PNDS do Ministério da Saúde Pública (MINSAP) da RGB, foi efetuada a avaliação da

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execução do PNDS I, sendo entregue em dezembro do referido ano o respetivo relatório, o qual foi validado pelo MINSAP (Fronteira et al., 2007). Esta avaliação teve por objetivo relatar e analisar as informações disponíveis sobre a implementação e execução do PNDS I e o impacto que este teve na melhoria da saúde da população e nas taxas de cobertura dos indicadores-chave da saúde pública (Fronteira et al., 2007).

43 Segundo os avaliadores, “o PNDS estava muito bem feito e por isso foi simples desenhar em termos teóricos a avaliação”. Os avaliadores tentaram ir para além dos indicadores descritos no Plano e foi estabelecida a relação com os ODM, tornando o trabalho útil e apreciado, com impacto na posterior redação do PNDS II.

44 Porém, implementar a avaliação que havia sido desenhada foi “um processo duro, um confronto com uma realidade difícil de enfrentar. A avaliação foi feita num contexto e o Plano havia sido redigido noutro”. O Plano, que tinha estado adequado, deixou de o estar no pós-guerra. Os avaliadores referem, sem esconder as marcas que esta avaliação lhes deixou: “levávamos uma estrutura de avaliação e ao chegar ao terreno os dados para calcular os indicadores definidos tinham desaparecido. Aqueles objetivos tinham deixado de fazer sentido. Houve um retrocesso, faltava tudo. Faltavam os RH, os recursos farmacológicos, as infraestruturas”. “Tivemos de adaptar a estrutura da avaliação àquele novo contexto. O grande desafio foi transformar situações avaliadas não desejáveis em contributos para o crescimento daquele país”, sublinham. Assim, as sugestões efetuadas no final do documento de avaliação pretenderam contribuir para a alteração de uma visão negativa da avaliação, que vem da ideia de que se avalia para punir, para um sentido positivo do ato de avaliar – sabe-se que o plano não foi cumprido em muitos dos objetivos e intervenções mas há a possibilidade de continuar a progredir.

45 Em continuidade do caminho percorrido com a implementação do PNDS I, ambicionando um projeto de desenvolvimento socioeconómico para assegurar a obtenção de “Ganhos em Saúde” de 2008 a 2017 (MINSAP, 2017) e na expetativa de dar resposta aos objetivos traçados no quadro do DENARP, foi elaborado o PNDS II com o horizonte temporal de 2008-2017 (MINSAP, 2007).

46 Como se pode ler na contextualização deste documento, ele não apenas pretende ser o contributo do sector da saúde para a redução da pobreza e promoção do desenvolvimento socioeconómico sustentável à luz da Mesa-Redonda de Genebra de 2006 (evento que reuniu em Genebra os doadores com o objetivo de angariar ajudas para o financiamento de ações constantes no DENARP, OGE 2006/2007 assim como para o Programa de Reforma das Forças de Defesa e Segurança da RGB), como leva também em conta os compromissos do Governo da RGB relativamente à prossecução dos ODM, da Declaração de Abuja sobre a meta de 15% doOGEdestinado à saúde (WHO, 2001), entre outros compromissos assumidos no domínio da saúde e do desenvolvimento. A sua concretização passa necessariamente pela implementação gradual de todos os programas nacionais de prevenção e combate às doenças transmissíveis e não transmissíveis, promoção da saúde e outros (MINSAP, 2007).

47 Em 2011 é adotado o DENARP II (Ministério da Economia, do Plano e da Integração Regional da República da Guiné-Bissau, 2011), promovendo o enquadramento do PNDS II (Cardoso & Dubbeldam, 2018), numa perspetiva de promoção do Estado de direito e do desenvolvimento económico e do capital humano, aspetos em que se centraram os pilares da então definida estratégia nacional de luta contra a pobreza (MINSAP, 2017).

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48 Porém, “enquanto todos conheciam o PNDS I, o mesmo não sucedeu com o PNDS II”, refere um dos entrevistados. O PNDS II nunca foi formalmente assumido, o conjunto de indicadores e métricas nunca foi finalizado porque o processo foi interrompido pelo golpe de Estado de 2012. Comparativamente ao PNDS I, é menos rico em termos de indicadores que permitam monitorizar a implementação, é um plano mais orientador para o desenvolvimento do trabalho de implementação de uma estratégia. Infelizmente não se conseguiu trazer para o PNDS II a métrica que existe no PNDS I.

49 O PNDS II apresenta-se como “um documento ambicioso e didático, pouco operacional”, sendo, porém, de referência, “usado por alguns parceiros como orientação para a elaboração dos seus projetos”. Faltou ao PNDS II a vertente da implementação. Um dos entrevistados, questionado sobre a importância da existência de um plano como este, na consciência da sua fraca utilização, referiu ser “fundamental que este tipo de documentos de orientação estratégica incluam uma reflexão profunda sobre a sua implementação, caso contrário tornam-se em exercícios sem utilização”.

50 A execução do PNDS II foi comprometida pela situação político-militar então vivida. A grande consequência do golpe de Estado de 2012 foi “a saída da maior parte dos parceiros que existiam nessa época”, inviabilizando a implementação estratégica prevista. Muitas das estratégias de gestão perderam a sua força e simplesmente deixaram de existir. “Antes do golpe de Estado havia um forte dispositivo de controlo de gestão, por exemplo ao nível dos medicamentos. Neste momento nada disso existe, não há preocupação com stocks”. Este entrevistado, com olhar entristecido, lamenta que “hoje nada funciona”.

51 Em agosto de 2015, e num momento em que a instabilidade política parecia ultrapassada, foi realizada uma revisão do PNDS II, com recurso a consultoria externa, com o objetivo de contribuir com subsídios a serem considerados pelo MINSAP na avaliação da implementação do Plano, de forma a permitir que as atividades inicialmente programadas pudessem ser adequadas ao então momento presente, sugerindo-se o prolongamento do horizonte temporal até 2020 (Ferrinho, 2015b). O relatório final da consultoria foi entregue e validado pelo MINSAP.

52 Analisando o ciclo de planeamento e implementação na RGB, verifica-se que nos exercícios de PES que ocorreram depois da redação do PNDS I, concretamente a já descrita revisão do horizonte temporal do PNDS I e a redação do PNDS II, os processos decorreram de forma diferente do que acontecera nos anos 90 do século XX, não se aplicando o ciclo de processo em análise: o PES surge como resposta à exigência dos financiadores e não como resposta a necessidades e prioridades definidas pelo contexto guineense.

53 Segundo grande parte dos entrevistados, “teoricamente deveria ser o governo da RGB a solicitar apoio para as suas necessidades em saúde”. Porém o que se verifica, e segundo opinião unânime dos entrevistados, é que a ajuda se obtém “de acordo com a agenda dos financiadores”. As fragilidades de governação, marcadas pela instabilidade gerada pela rotatividade e pela ausência parcial ou total de vontade política, bem como a perda de eficácia das instituições, contribuem para que cada parceiro/financiador adote a sua própria agenda sem ter por base as prioridades nacionais. Não reconhecendo a liderança política, as entidades externas tendem a definir os seus objetivos e implementam os seus projetos ou programas, reforçando a sua verticalização, e também a fragmentação.

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54 Como consequência, assiste-se a uma falta de coordenação entre doadores, conduzindo a duplicação de ação, desfasamento de objetivos com a realidade local e até a baixa sustentabilidade das iniciativas. Assiste-se por exemplo à presença de vários atores numa mesma região sanitária, enquanto outras regiões permanecem com parco investimento. É o caso do desfasamento de intervenção entre o sul e o leste da RGB. Por outro lado,há alguns programas com vários doadores como financiadores e outros sem financiamento.

55 Há ainda a referir que muitas vezes o trabalho no terreno depende de acordos feitos entre governantes e entidades financiadoras, sendo que nem sempre estes acordos refletem as reais necessidades da população. Exemplo disto é o acordo para construção de grandes infraestruturas como o Palácio do Governo quando as estradas de ligação entre regiões sanitárias permanecem carentes de intervenção. Porém pode existir por parte dos financiadores a tentativa de apostar em pontos de convergência nas intervenções, sendo que, segundo os entrevistados, “cada um não abdica dos seus objetivos institucionais”. Segundo as palavras de um dos entrevistados, as quais sintetizam o dizer de outros, “os doadores não se articulam entre si e não há coordenação por parte dos governantes, nem vontade para tal”.

56 De facto, na RGB “os governantes parecem preferir operar a nível bilateral que em concertação, obtendo assim maiores benefícios diretos”, promovendo a duplicação das ações, o desfasamento dos objetivos e ainda a fraca sustentabilidade das iniciativas. Assiste-se assim a uma “tensão permanente entre os programas verticais e a tentativa de ter uma estratégia nacional, sendo que esta tensão resulta da política de financiamento. […] A verticalização no sector da saúde da RGB é uma luta constante”.

57 De facto múltiplos parceiros nacionais, internacionais, multilaterais, bilaterais, ONG, entre outros, têm apoiado o sector da saúde da RGB de forma pouco articulada entre si e com o MINSAP (Ferrinho, 2015b). À margem doPES, asONG intervêm – sobretudo ao nível da educação e da saúde – nas comunidades, quer implementando os seus próprios projetos quer os de grandes entidades financiadoras (Silva, 2016). Em 2008 existiam 16 ONG com projetos na saúde, sobretudo nas zonas mais periféricas do país, atuando com base em protocolos e parcerias com o MINSAP (MINSAP, 2007). Num inquérito feito recentemente, identificaram-se dezenas de organizações ativas no país com um forte empenho na área de saúde comunitária e saneamento básico (Costantini et al., 2018).

O Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento Sanitário na estratégia de saúde do país – Reflexões rumo à atualidade

58 Aprofundando estes dados, podemos questionar-nos sobre qual o lugar do PNDS na estratégia de saúde do país. “A base de todo o planeamento em saúde deveria ser o PNDS. Daí deveriam sair os planos regionais e os programas nacionais aí deveriam assentar. A articulação entre todos deveria ser uma realidade que não existe por falta de coordenação.” Esta afirmação, pronunciada por um dos entrevistados, sugere a coordenação e liderança como grandes temas que têm de ser abordados ao falar de PES na RGB. Porém, a montante, importa ter presente que na origem do planeamento está a resposta a necessidades e esta na RGB só ocorre com recurso a financiamento externo.

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Assim, “para falar de PES na RGB temos sempre de referir o grande tema da relação com financiadores”.

59 Embora haja esforços para aumentar a coordenação entre os parceiros de desenvolvimento no sector da saúde – Banco Mundial, Fundo Global, UE, Aliança Global para Vacinas e Imunização (GAVI), OMS, UNICEF (Fundo das Nações Unidas para a Infância), Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD) e outros –, a presença de vários atores criou duplicação de prestação de serviços e programas verticais (como Malária, VIH e Tuberculose). Desde 2016, o Banco Mundial, o PNUD, o UNICEF e a UE lideram esforços para estabelecer um mecanismo de coordenação do sector da saúde para reduzir a fragmentação do sector (Araujo, 2018; The World Bank, 2018).

60 Apesar dos gastos limitados em saúde pública, o Ministério da Saúde Pública (MINSAP) não tem sido capaz de executar inteiramente o seu orçamento, tendo esta execução sido de aproximadamente 50% em 2014, diminuindo para 42% em 2015 (Araujo, 2018; MINSAP, 2017; The World Bank, 2018). As baixas taxas de execução indicam a capacidade limitada do Governo para planificar estrategicamente e implementar ações de políticas de saúde, sublinham as mesmas fontes.

61 De referir ainda a ausência de um mecanismo legal e institucional de integração e coordenação do sector privado e de medicina tradicional, verificando-se uma ausência de registos da sua atividade e financiamento (MINSAP, 2017).

62 De facto, os PNDS evidenciaram algumas lacunas em termos de uma visão mais abrangente do sistema de saúde, concentrando-se principalmente no SNS, com referências limitadas ao sector privado, às ONG e as organizações cívicas. Em 1990 as matrizes do PAE levaram o Governo a abrir as portas à iniciativa privada, ao autorizar o estabelecimento de consultórios e postos de enfermagem particulares, e farmácias privadas. Contudo a proliferação de estabelecimentos não foi acompanhada pela regulação, regulamentação e monitorização das suas atividades, e a sua contribuição para a saúde das populações (MINSAP, 2007). O mesmo se pode dizer das atividades das ONG que, apesar da sua notável proximidade às comunidades mais vulneráveis, estão bastante fragmentadas e dispersas.

63 Importa referir que “se se pretende que os líderes guineenses tenham capacidade para operacionalizar estratégias, temos de garantir que estes tenham acesso ao financiamento”. O que tem vindo a ocorrer é que os doadores financiam diretamente os seus projetos através de ONG, sem passar pelo MINSAP. “No momento em que o financiamento ultrapassa por completo o orçamento de Estado, as estruturas estatais perdem a capacidade de governação e liderança”, refere um dos entrevistados. Este financiamento direto provavelmente surgiu pelo não reconhecimento, por parte dos doadores, de autoridade dos governantes guineenses.

64 Porém esta metodologia em nada abona a uma mudança, a um progresso em termos de governação e liderança. “Existem casos que espelham descrédito pelas instituições estatais, criando-se processos de resposta a necessidades completamente paralelos às possíveis respostas do Estado”, sublinha um dos entrevistados. Porém, verifica-se o colapso destas soluções quando os projetos terminam e as ONG ou os financiadores abandonam o terreno. “Acaba o financiamento, as ONG vão embora e colapsa tudo”, refere o mesmo entrevistado. Os entrevistados são unânimes ao referir que, caso o

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investimento seja feito nas estruturas estatais, mesmo que haja colapso, permanece pelo menos o capital social que não se perde.

65 O povo “adapta-se às propostas dos financiadores e doadores pois não é detentor nem de vontade nem de consciência para não o fazer”. Existe um “inconsciente coletivo pati, pati, pati…”, refere um dos entrevistados, salientando o pedir constante como uma forma de vida, recorrendo à expressão das línguas locais que significa pedir, mendigar. A alfabetização da população manifesta ser ainda insuficiente, influenciando este processo de adaptação aos projetos tantas vezes díspares de que são alvo as comunidades. Exemplo disto são por exemplo a falha na implementação da Iniciativa de Bamako (Ridde, 2004) por incapacidade dos agentes locais, bem como a aceitação de projetos distintos que cobrem a mesma necessidade numa mesma localidade.

66 Estas características que dizem respeito à capacidade de adaptação da população guineense vão ao encontro da descrição feita por Forrest (2003) da sociedade multiétnica da RGB, a qual é caracterizada por estruturas e formações sociais que desde os tempos coloniais constituem o que o autor chama de “alternativas populares às autoridades governativas”. Estas exercem a nível local uma mais forte influência sobre as comunidades que a dos órgãos governativos propriamente ditos, baseando-se em mecanismos de cooperação interétnica e intercomunitária. Estes permitem definir processos de autonomia social assentes no conhecimento e na capacidade de resposta a necessidades por parte de indivíduos e grupos sociais, por exemplo a questões da saúde e bem-estar das populações.

67 Exemplo disto é o caso dos agentes de saúde comunitária (ASC) e das parteiras tradicionais, que no PNDS II são considerados parte integrante da organização do SNS enquanto recursos de apoio às Unidades de Saúde de Base (USB), estruturas reconhecidas como sendo de iniciativa comunitária, constituindo então o maior número de estruturas de prestação de cuidados de saúde (MINSAP, 2007). Também no PNDS III é referido que ao nível da comunidade, o sistema de saúde se tem apoiado nos ASC sem que estejam definidas orientações sobre o futuro destes recursos no sistema de saúde guineense (MINSAP, 2017). Os ASC e as USB podem ser encarados como uma resposta comunitária a necessidades de cuidados primários de saúde não satisfeitas, exemplificando uma alternativa popular às autoridades governativas.

68 Voltando à história nacional, salienta-se em outubro de 2014 a realização da 1ª Conferência Nacional de Saúde, presidida pelo então primeiro-ministro, tendo sido redigido um documento de recomendações “Ao Governo através do MINSAP”. Importa ainda referir que o horizonte temporal do DENARP II era 2015, não tendo sido adotado um novo DENARP. Este foi substituído pelo Plano Estratégico e Operacional do Governo Terra Ranka (2015-2025) (República da Guiné-Bissau, 2015).

69 Em abril de 2017 validou-se uma nova PNS, substituindo a de 1993, depois de um processo que se arrastava desde 2009 (MINSAP, 2017). Iniciou-se assim um novo processo de planeamento do qual resultou a redação do PNDS III, tendo-se optado por não prolongar o horizonte temporal de implementação do PNDS II. O terceiro PNDS é então orientado pela nova PNS, pelo Plano Estratégico e Operacional do Governo Terra Ranka 2015-2025 (República da Guiné-Bissau, 2015) e pelas recomendações que emergiram da 1ª Conferência Nacional de Saúde de outubro de 2014. Estando em vigor, e sendo já “um documento de referência sobretudo para os financiadores”, à data de redação do presente artigo aguarda ainda a validação por parte do Conselho de Ministros.

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70 No que se refere ao processo de elaboração do PNDS III, os entrevistados referiram que “o documento foi pensado para produzir uma nova estratégia nacional no sector da saúde”, tendo a sua redação sido assente em dados de avaliação da implementação do PNDS anterior e em dados de contextualização/análise da situação atual em saúde vivida no país, reportando a uma primeira parte do mapa metodológico definido para o presente trabalho. Porém as fases seguintes não são aplicadas – este documento estratégico tem uma forte componente política “pois o Governo tem de liderar todo o processo”, refere um dos entrevistados, sendo que o novo plano espelha um alinhamento com as diretrizes internacionais para a saúde e com as estratégias dos parceiros financiadores.

71 Os programas verticais estão incluídos assim como todos os programas prioritários. Segundo os entrevistados, “os financiadores destes programas vão encontrar no PNDS razão para a sua cooperação pois trouxeram-se os programas para dentro do PNDS”. A UE, o BM e outros financiadores têm participado no processo de planeamento e na tomada de decisão, e houve uma tentativa de ajuste das agendas dos financiadores e do Governo. “As agendas não estavam alinhadas e tenta-se fazê-lo neste PNDS.”

72 Se o PNDS pretende nortear a intervenção em saúde na RGB, torna-se ainda relevante referir que documentos estratégicos em nutrição, água/higiene e saneamento reafirmam o compromisso político da RGB para com a saúde das populações. Este compromisso pauta-se também por uma dimensão além-fronteiras, estendendo-se a abordagem estratégica aos objetivos regionais definidos, espelhados também em documentos orientadores. (MINSAP, 2012). Exemplo desse compromisso são a CARMMA – “Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality in Africa” e o POPEN – “Plan opérationnel de passage à l’échelle nationale des interventions à haut impact (IHI) - Stratégies pour l’accélération de la réduction des mortalités maternelles, néonatales et infanto-juvénile en Guinée-Bissau”, entre outros.

73 Para a implementação e execução destes planos e estratégias entram em cena variados atores internacionais, dos quais se salientam a UE, o BM, diversas delegações das Nações Unidas como OMS, UNAIDS, FNUAP, UNICEF, UN Women, bem como agências de cooperação bilateral das quais se salientam Portugal, Espanha e França por exemplo.

Lendo as memórias à luz do contexto global

74 O PES emergiu na década de 1990, fortemente impulsionado pela Global Strategy for Health for All by the Year 2000 (WHO, 1981) e, mais recentemente, pela Health 21 – Health for All in the 21st Century (Ferrinho et al., 2015).

75 O planeamento em saúde em Africa tem evoluído ao longo das décadas, impulsionado por diversas motivações. A história mostra evolução de acordo com o paradigma de gestão em saúde prevalecente a cada momento, constituindo os processos de planeamento em saúde uma parte integrante do esforço para fortalecer a governação em saúde (Delanyo et al., 2017). É de salientar a Conferência Internacional sobre Cuidados de Saúde Primários e Sistemas de Saúde em África, realizada em Ouagadougou, no Burkina Faso, em 2008, onde os esforços para melhorar o planeamento em saúde foram impulsionados, na expectativa de promover a boa governança (WHO, 2008). Cinco anos após a conferência, 19 de 46 países da região da

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África haviam desenvolvido políticas de saúde e 22 tinham estratégias nacionais de saúde (Delanyo et al., 2017).

76 O PES na RGB tem acompanhado a tendência global deste procedimento, o qual desde a década de 90 se assume como orientação incontornável para legitimar uma visão estratégica para a definição de áreas prioritárias de intervenção no sector da saúde. No entanto, e de acordo com os entrevistados, o PES materializado em políticas e nos vários PNDS, os quais deveriam orientar todos os atores e sectores que influenciam a saúde para as prioridades nacionais da população e reforçar a liderança do Estado guineense nos processos da sua implementação, encontra-se desvirtuado numa amálgama de interesses dos diferentes intervenientes.

77 Os resultados obtidos, muito marcados por histórias e reflexões vividas e feitas na primeira pessoa, reportam para uma ausência de processo de PES conforme o mapa metodológico definido, motivado este facto por fatores contextuais relacionados com a fragilidade do Estado da RGB e com a forma como é dada resposta a esta fragilidade.

78 A RGB é um EF, apresentando esta condição um impacto determinante num SNS incapaz de responder às necessidades deste sector no país, o que parece influenciar a postura dos financiadores no ciclo de PES. Na opinião unânime dos entrevistados, o PES surge como resposta à exigência dos diferentes financiadores, afastando-se não raras vezes do PNDS, divergindo os planos regionais e os programas nacionais deste documento que determina as prioridades nacionais em matéria de saúde e que teoricamente deveria legitimar o governo da RGB para orientar os seus parceiros na ação e no financiamento deste sector. A literatura refere que o financiamento externo baseado no desempenho, realizado por parceiros bilaterais, multilaterais e globais, nos países de média e baixa renda, e particularmente no contexto de EF, é frequente, não estando os seus efeitos nos sistemas de saúde estudados(Bertone et al., 2018). No entanto, os mesmos autores referem que os atores externos e financiadores assumem um papel de grande destaque nestes contextos e que a fraca confiança entre estes, o sistema público e os governos levam à adoção de programas baseados em abordagens contratuais em detrimento de um alinhamento com as políticas dos países.

79 A OMS alerta para o facto de o planeamento e a formulação de políticas em contextos frágeis imporem desafios complexos que exigem abordagens inovadoras. O subfinanciamento e a má gestão do sector da saúde caracterizam os ambientes frágeis, prejudicando a duração e a intensidade das crises no sistema de saúde, nomeadamente a legitimidade e a capacidade da liderança governamental (WHO, 2018).

80 As memórias dos entrevistados revelam o impacto da instabilidade política, a qual adensou a fragilidade do Estado e das instituições e a sua capacidade de elaboração e implementação da política de saúde. As diferenças consideráveis por eles assinaladas entre os processos que resultaram no PNDS I e II são bastante esclarecedoras a este respeito. Esta situação de fragilidade foi identificada como um dos fatores decisivos na maior influência e dependência de países doadores e da expertise externa sobre as políticas de saúde nacionais. Num país frágil como a Guiné-Bissau, apesar da sua grande dependência de financiamento e expertise externo, uma maior capacidade de investigação pode contribuir para adequar melhor os apoios internacionais às necessidades locais (Kok et al., 2012).

81 Vimos que na opinião dos entrevistados, existe na RGB uma noção de resiliência, reforçada pelo esforço de planeamento, a qual contraria os efeitos subjacentes da fragilidade das instituições e a sua capacidade de implementação de estratégias de

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saúde ao nível nacional. Os entrevistados reconhecem a existência de processos que promovem os já referidos efeitos de duplicação das ações, desfasamento dos objetivos e fraca sustentabilidade das iniciativas. A literatura sustenta a perceção dos entrevistados de que, em contextos onde a incerteza é generalizada, impera uma multiplicidade de atores, a fraqueza do Estado, a coexistência de necessidades humanitárias e de desenvolvimento (WHO, 2018).

82 Considerando ainda o binómio planeamento/implementação, o qual, conforme descrito, tem vindo a estar comprometido ao longo da história do PES na RGB, a literatura sublinha a importância da relação entre planeamento e implementação, salientando porém que alguns planos quase não se referem à implementação – algo que se verifica, por exemplo, no PNDS II. Muitas vezes quem planeia e quem implementa são grupos distintos de pessoas, sendo que segundo os autores consultados, planear conjuntamente é um importante prelúdio para um bom trabalho conjunto de implementação, estando o planeamento no seu pior quando trata de forma inadequada a implementação (Crisp, 2017).

Considerações finais

83 A realidade encontrada na RGB em matéria de PES vai ao encontro do que a literatura refere como os desafios dos processos de planeamento em países africanos (Delanyo et al., 2017). O escritório regional africano da OMS propõe atualmente um quadro de planeamento para responder a esses desafios e alinhar o processo de planeamento (Delanyo et al., 2017).

84 Com o processo acima descrito criou-se no MINSAP uma cultura de planificação. Porém, embora o PES na RGB seja uma realidade, este encontra-se desprovido dos princípios que o devem nortear tendo em conta o contexto de EF e de instabilidade política prolongada ao longo dos anos. A RGB terá ainda que inovar os seus processos de PES, para que este responda às reais necessidades de saúde da população. Ciclos mais curtos de PE e a descentralização bem monitorizada do mesmo poderão fazer emergir uma melhor coordenação e liderança por parte do Governo, mesmo perante a forte dependência externa, bem como potenciar estratégias que respondam mais adequadamente às necessidades de saúde do país.

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Araujo, E. C. (2018). Project information document/integrate safeguard data sheet – Guinea-Bissau strengthening maternal and child health service delivery – P163954 – Sequence No: 01. The World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/967021519215311151/Project-Information- Document-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet.docx

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Ferrinho, P. (2015b). Subsídios para a revisão do Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento Sanitário 2008-2017 até 2020 – Apreciação da sua implementação em Agosto de 2015 e contribuição para um roteiro para a sua revisão.

Ferrinho, P., Guerreiro, C. S., & Portugal, R. (2015). Estudo comparativo de estratégias/PNS de países europeus membros da OCDE. Anais do IHMT, 14, 71-84.

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Fronteira, I., Ferrinho, F., Dussault, G., & Ferrinho, P. (2007). Relatório de avaliação final da execução do Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento Sanitário 2003-2007 da República da Guiné-Bissau. Associação para o Desenvolvimento e Cooperação Garcia de Orta.

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Guerreiro, C. S., Silva, A. P., Cá, T., & Ferrinho, P. (2017). Planeamento estratégico no sector da saúde da Guiné-Bissau: Evolução, influências e processos. Anais do Instituto de Higiene e Medicina Tropical, 16(Supl.1), 55-68.

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RESUMOS

A República da Guiné-Bissau (RGB), um Estado frágil marcado por um contexto de instabilidade política e institucional, tem feito desde 1993 o exercício do Planeamento Estratégico para o Sector da Saúde (PES). Os documentos estratégicos sectoriais – Planos Nacionais de Desenvolvimento Sanitário (PNDS) – demonstram capacidade de resistir às adversidades governativas. Esta revisão longitudinal das políticas pretende fazer memória deste exercício com duplo propósito: analisar os processos de PES e destes guardar memória, como trilhos de um passado que permitem entender e contextualizar caminhos percorridos. Constata-se que o PES ocorreu sobretudo respondendo às exigências dos financiadores, nem sempre sendo implementado. Com a implementação do PNDS III (2018-2022), ambiciona-se reverter esta situação com uma estratégia integradora dos diferentes atores em saúde.

The Republic of Guinea-Bissau (RGB), a fragile state marked by a context of political and institutional instability, has since 1993 carried out the Strategic Planning for the Health Sector (SPHS). Sectoral strategic documents – National Plans of Sanitary Development (NPSD) – demonstrate a capacity for resistance to governmental adversities. This longitudinal policy review has a double purpose, namely to analyse the SPHS processes and to guard these memories to allow an understanding of the trajectories in question. This paper concludes that the SPHS mainly responded to the requirements of funding institutions, and it has not always been implemented. The NPSD III (2018-2022) aims to reverse this situation by implementing a strategy which aims to integrate the different health actors.

ÍNDICE

Keywords: health policy, strategic health planning, National Health Development Plan, Republic of Guinea-Bissau Palavras-chave: política de saúde, planeamento estratégico em saúde, Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento Sanitário, República da Guiné-Bissau

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AUTORES

CÁTIA SÁ GUERREIRO WHO Collaborating Centre on Workforce Policy and Planning GHTM - Global Health and Tropical Medicine Instituto de Higiene e Medicina Tropical, Universidade Nova de Lisboa Rua da Junqueira, 100 1349-008 Lisboa, Portugal [email protected]

ZULMIRA HARTZ WHO Collaborating Centre on Workforce Policy and Planning GHTM - Global Health and Tropical Medicine Instituto de Higiene e Medicina Tropical, Universidade Nova de Lisboa Rua da Junqueira, 100 1349-008 Lisboa, Portugal [email protected]

PAULO FERRINHO WHO Collaborating Centre on Workforce Policy and Planning GHTM - Global Health and Tropical Medicine Instituto de Higiene e Medicina Tropical, Universidade Nova de Lisboa Rua da Junqueira, 100 1349-008 Lisboa, Portugal [email protected]

PHILIP J. HAVIK GHTM - Global Health and Tropical Medicine Instituto de Higiene e Medicina Tropical, Universidade Nova de Lisboa Rua da Junqueira, 100 1349-008 Lisboa, Portugal [email protected]

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Book review Recensão

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Takuo Iwata (Ed.). New Asian Approaches to Africa: Rivalries and Collaborations. Delaware: Vernon Press. 2020. 296 pp. ISBN 978-1-62273-809-0

Clara Carvalho

REFERÊNCIA

Takuo Iwata (Ed.). New Asian Approaches to Africa: Rivalries and Collaborations. Delaware: Vernon Press. 2020. 296 pp. ISBN 978-1-62273-809-0.

1 New Asian Approaches to Africa é uma obra que se impunha para o conhecimento das relações preferenciais entre diferentes países asiáticos e o continente africano. Organizado por Takuo Iwata, professor de Relações Internacionais no College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University no Japão, o livro reúne as comunicações ao seminário homónimo realizado na Universidade de Quioto, Japão, em novembro de 2018 e analisa as relações com África dos países asiáticos com programas de parceria e cooperação no continente (Japão, China, Coreia do Sul, Índia).

2 O livro é enriquecido pela introdução de Takuo Iwata, um cientista político que se dedica à questão das relações entre os países asiáticos e africanos. O organizador começa por delinear a história e a estratégia dos diferentes países asiáticos em África, contextualizando as relações de cooperação e os diferentes atores, as suas prioridades e múltiplas facetas. A cooperação dos países asiáticos em África adquire novos contornos que não estavam presentes na arquitetura da cooperação internacional liderada pela OCDE e dominada pelos países ocidentais. Desde logo, uma abertura à colaboração estreita entre cooperação e negócios e economia. São abandonadas as condicionantes exigidas pela cooperação ocidental, nomeadamente no que toca às questões de

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democracia e reforma neo-liberal. Esta relação entre os países asiáticos e africanos tem por marco, no período contemporâneo, a Conferência de Bandung em 1955, dominada pelas questões das independências e do posicionamento face aos dois blocos dominantes (ocidental e socialista). Seis décadas depois, os interesses de uns e outros foi alterado. Do lado asiático as principais economias com investimento em África são, por ordem de entrada no mercado africano atual: o Japão, o primeiro Estado asiático a integrar a OCDE (1964); a China, o país com mais interesses e maiores investimentos em África, através de múltiplas parcerias; a Índia, que mantém relações históricas com os países da África Oriental; e a Coreia do Sul, que passou de recetor a membro da OCDE em 1996 e iniciou os trâmites para integrar o Comité de Assistência ao Desenvolvimento uma década depois. Estes quatro países mantêm cimeiras e fóruns reguladores da sua cooperação seja em termos bilaterais ou com a União Africana, começando com o Japão, que lançou o TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development) em 1993, seguido pela China em 2000 (Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, FOCAC), pela Índia (India- Africa Forum Summit, IAFS) e Coreia do Sul (Korea–Africa Forum, KOAF) imediatamente depois. Neste novo processo de cooperação há ainda espaço para projetos comuns, como o Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) liderado pelos governos do Japão e da Índia.

3 Esta obra, que recobre temas diversos como cooperação internacional, soft power, relações comerciais e o papel da sociedade civil, encontra-se dividida em três partes, a saber: Fóruns Asiáticos sobre Desenvolvimento em Africa, Soft Power Asiático em África, Novas Fases das Aproximações Asiáticas em África. A primeira parte relega o leitor para os fóruns de acordos de cooperação entre países asiáticos e africanos, além dos programas de relevo lançados, considerando o seu contexto histórico e desafios atuais. Integra artigos sobre as relações intergovernamentais de cooperação entre a China e a União Africana (“The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) – A Co-constituted Relationship”) por Yu-Shan Wu, University of Witwatersrand, África do Sul; as cimeiras Índia-África (“Evolution of India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) Since Its Inception in 2008”) por Aparajita Biswas, Centre for African Studies, University of Mumbai, Índia; as relações com a Coreia do Sul, país que desde 2011 integra o Comité de Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento da OCDE (“Korea-Africa Forum (KOAF) – South Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy and Its Limitations”) por Hyo-Sook Kim, Kansai Gaidai University, Japão; e o TICAD (“TICADs under the Changing Global Landscape — Japan’s Role in African Development Reconsidered”) por Motoki Takahashi, Kyoto University, Japão.

4 A segunda parte do livro incide sobre o softpower de alguns destes países, focando diferentes exemplos e estudos de caso, nomeadamente a Coreia do Sul (“Asia–Africa Relations – The Way Korean and African Cultures Encounter”), por Yongkyu Chang (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, República da Coreia), a China na perspetiva do turismo chinês (“A New Approach to Cooperation with Africa from the Rise of Chinese Tourism in the 21st Century”), por Huaqiong Pan (Peking University, China) e o Japão (“Turning Point in Japan’s Soft Power Strategy in Africa”), por Takuo Iwata (Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japão).

5 Finalmente, a terceira parte analisa projetos e estudos de caso reveladores das novas políticas de cooperação, incluindo os artigos de Pedro Miguel Amakasu Raposo de Medeiros Carvalho, Kansai University, intitulado “Small Farmers – The Missing Link in the ProSavana Triangle”; o artigo “Japanese Firms and Their Internationalization in Africa”, por Scarlett Cornelissen, Stellenbosch University, África do Sul; e o artigo “Changing Aid

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Architecture in Africa Through the Encounter Between OECD Countries and Non-OECD Countries ” assinado por Masumi Owa, Chukyo University, Japão.

6 Os exemplos concretos que aborda são reveladores das políticas de aproximação ao continente africano, não só no quadro das estratégias de cooperação entre países asiáticos e africanos como no contexto de outras cooperações. É exemplificativo o estudo de Pedro Amakasu Carvalho sobre a cooperação triangular Sul-Sul no quadro do programa ProSAVANA, um empreendimento situado no Corredor de Nacala que envolve os governos de Moçambique, do Japão e do Brasil. Inicialmente foi apresentado como um caso de sucesso e considerado exemplar da cooperação com países do Sul com experiência em agricultura tropical, como é o caso do Brasil. Contudo, tem vindo a ser contestado tanto ao nível nacional como internacional, por atentar contra os interesses dos pequenos agricultores e limitar o seu acesso à terra.

7 Saliento igualmente o artigo de Masumi Owa, uma antiga colaboradora da embaixada da China no Uganda. A autora começa por comparar a cooperação “tradicional” iniciada pelo CAD-OCDE e a sua política de ajuda condicional com novos atores como a China que investem apenas no desenvolvimento económico e de infraestruturas. O Uganda, país onde residiu durante um período prolongado, é o melhor exemplo do que o ECDPM (um think tank) descreve como uma imposição dos Direitos Humanos que é vista como uma interferência na soberania nacional por alguns países africanos. Neste contexto, a opção pela cooperação com a China é, não apenas interessante em termos económicos, como preferencial para um governo agastado pelas interpretações nos media ocidentais sobre a sua política interna.

8 Esta é uma obra que se impunha tanto pela sua abrangência como pelo foco transdisciplinar. As relações internacionais são analisadas com base em exemplos pertinentes e trazem um novo olhar para as múltiplas facetas de uma cooperação que tem provocado mudanças estruturais em diversos Estados africanos. O livro oferece uma visão ampla sobre as relações entre os principais países asiáticos e África, uma perspetiva rara na literatura recente que tem privilegiado o emergir da China como principal parceiro bilateral de muitos dos países africanos. O investimento da China em África aumentou de 10,5 mil milhões em 2000 para 220 mil milhões em 2014 (Anshan 2016, p. 48), e foi acompanhado de uma longa lista de pesquisas focando questões de relações internacionais, diplomacia, relações económicas e mesmo migrações, tanto do lado da academia chinesa como ocidental (Anshan, 2016). As relações China-África têm sido alvo de um escrutínio detalhado desde os trabalhos pioneiros de Chris Alden, Fantu Cheru (comparando os investimentos da China e da Índia em África), Ian Taylor ou Li Anschan. Estes autores analisaram os interesses económicos e diplomáticos desta relação, não só pela necessidade de matérias-primas e fontes de energia para a indústria expansionista chinesa, como pela necessidade de apoio dos países africanos às suas posições nas Nações Unidades e à sua entrada como membro permanente do Conselho de Segurança. Mais recentemente, focam a colaboração nas políticas de paz e segurança do continente. Outro foco de interesse tem sido a inclusão dos países africanos na ambiciosa iniciativa Belt and Road (BRI): até setembro de 2019, um total de 40 países em Africa tinham assinado um acordo bilateral com a China relativo ao BRI.

9 Face à abundante literatura sobre as relações China-África, este livro oferece a vantagem de situar esta cooperação no contexto mais amplo dos interesses de outros países da mesma região. Será interessante seguir esta pesquisa com a análise de outros países asiáticos, tais como a Indonésia, Malásia, Tailândia e Vietname, considerados a

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segunda geração das “economias emergentes”, cuja aproximação ao continente africano é expectável.

BIBLIOGRAFIA

Alden, C. (2007). China in Africa. Zed Books.

Anshan, L. (2005). African studies in China in the twentieth century: A historical survey. Brazilian Journal of African Studies, 1(2), pp. 48-88.

Cheru, F., & Obi, C. (Eds.) (2010). The Rise of China and India in Africa. Zed Books.

Development Reimagined. (2019). Countries along The Belt and Road- What does it all mean? https:// developmentreimagined.com/2019/09/26/countries-along-the-belt-and-road-what-does-it-all- mean/ (Acedido a 08 de dezembro de 2019)

ECDPM. (2014). Don’t ignore the elephants in the room – Will the Africa-EU Summit revitalise the partnership? Blog entry. https://ecdpm.org/talking-points/dont-ignore-elephants-room-will- africa-eu-summit-revitalise-partnership/. (Acedido a 08 de dezembro de 2019)

Taylor, I. (2009). China’s new role in Africa. Lynne Rienner.

AUTORES

CLARA CARVALHO Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL) Centro de Estudos Internacionais (CEI-IUL) Lisboa, Portugal [email protected]

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