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Romanian Intelligence Studies Review RRSI, no. 14/2015 1 ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES REVIEW No. 14 December 2015 Journal with scientific prestige acknowledged by the National Council for the Validation of University Titles, Diplomas and Certificates (CNADTCU), indexed in the international databases CEEOL and EBSCO Bucharest - 2015 - RRSI, no. 14/2015 2 Senior Editors Eduard HELLVIG – director of the Romanian Intelligence Service George Cristian MAIOR – professor, PhD, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy and The National School of Political and Administrative Studies Christopher DONNELLY – senior fellow Defence Academy United Kingdom, director of the Institute for Statecraft and Governance, Oxford, Great Britain Mark PHYTHIAN - professor, University of Leicester, Great Britain Ioan Mirce – professor, PhD, The National School of Political and Administrative Studies Vasile DÂNCU – $#11-0Q&Q,'4#01'27-$3!&0#12Q #-Bolyai University Michael ANDREGG – professor, PhD, St. Thomas University, USA Elaine PRESSMAN – senior fellow, Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Canada Jan GOLDMAN – professor, Tiffin University, USA Gheorghe TOMA – professor, PhD, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy Sergiu MEDAR – professor, PhD, “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu Niculae IANCU – senior lecturer, PhD, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy Cristiana MATEI – Lecturer, Center for Civil-Military Relations din Monterey, SUA Iulian CHIFU – senior lecturer, PhD, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration Iulian FOTA – senior lecturer, PhD, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy Marian SEBE – professor, PhD, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy Irena CHIRU – professor, PhD, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy Valentin FILIP – PhD, „Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy Board of Editors Editor in Chief: PhD Valentin NICULA Editors: PhD Mihaela TEODOR PhD Irena CHIRU PhD 0', PhD Cristina IVAN PhD Aitana BOGDAN PhD 0'12', PhD Codru LUCINESCU PhD Valentin STOIAN Teodora DOBRE Cover: *#,2',-,3 RRSI, no. 14/2015 3 CONTENT INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ……...………………....................…....………..….….. 5 Michael ANDREGG THE DEVELOPING GLOBAL CRISIS AND THE CURRENT WAVE OF MIGRANT/REFUGEES HEADING FOR EUROPE ………………………..............…………….......…... 7 '!& WOJNOWSKI TERRORISM SERVING GEOPOLITICS. THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALEKSANDR DUGIN’S GEOPOLITICAL DOCTRINE AND EVGENY MESSNER’S CONCEPT OF “REBEL WAR” …........................................ 15 SECURITY PARADIGMS IN THE 21ST CENTURY ……...................…………...…………………..….. 61 Raisa Gabriela ZAMFIRESCU THE INFORMATION SECURITY ENVIRONMENT:CYBER-ATTACK AS THE MODERN 21ST CENTURY THREAT …………………….......…………………....................................................…………………. 63 Teodora DOBRE, Virginia ANDREI THE WORLD AS SEEN BY VLADIMIR PUTIN .......................................................................................... 77 SECURITY STRATEGIES AND POLICIES …………………….......................……………………………… 89 Elaine PRESSMAN RISK ASSESSMENT FOR INSIDER THREAT: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, MILITARY and INTELLIGENCE APPLICATIONS ……………………….…..........................................…………………. 91 SECURITY CULTURE AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY …………....................…………......……....….…… 117 Iulian DICULESCU PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND INTELLIGENCE – A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO A SENSITIVE INTERCROSSING ………………………....……………………….....……...........................................…….……… 119 INTELLIGENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY ………………………………..........................………...………. 129 Florian COLDEA NEW CHALLENGES ON THE INTELLIGENCE FRONTLINE – A PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE ………………………………………......……………….........................................................……… 131 Loredana IVAN FRENCH ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM …………………....................…...………………………. 141 INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS ………………………………………......…....................……………..……………. 153 0'12', THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INTELLIGENCE: KNOWLEDGE DRIVERS ………...................……. 155 Mircea MOCANU INTELLIGENCE CYCLE MODEL DILEMMAS AND SOLUTIONS ……………......................………… 165 RRSI, no. 14/2015 4 OSINT .......................................................................………………………………......………......…..............……… 179 0# -Adrian RAICU THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA INTELLIGENCE …………..................…..……………………. 181 HISTORY AND MEMORY IN INTELLIGENCE ……………....................…………………...…………….. 197 -,-"03Q"*,2', REASONS FOR DEFECTION. HISTORICAL CASES ANALYZED THROUGH CONTEMPORARY MODELS …………………...................………………......…………………………………… 199 REVIEWS AND NOTES ……………………….....................................……………………………………..…….. 217 ROMANIAN PUBLICATIONS ON BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE - LITERATURE REVIEW BY OANA PUIE (ANIMV) – ……………………………..………………..............................................…….………… 219 "#$% &$*+% $+#Q TRSUQ INTELLIGENCE ELSEWHERE: SPIES AND ESPIONAGE OUTSIDE THE ANGLOSPHERE,GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESS, WASHINGTON D.C. REVIEW BY COSMINA-ELENA EPURE ……......…... 222 ACADEMIC FOCUS ……....................…………………………….............………………………………...……….. 225 TWELTH ANNUAL IAFIE CONFERENCE AND FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF IAFIE’S EUROPEAN CHAPTER IN BREDA, THE NETHERLANDS, JUNE 22-TVQTRSX ............................ 227 „SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION. SHARED CHALLENGES, SUSTAINABLE FUTURE” (SBSR) THIRD EDITION, BUCHAREST-Q[7UR– \#VQTRSX ..................... 229 INTELLIGENCE IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY THE 22nd EDITION, BUCHAREST, OCTOBER 13-SVQTRSX …………...................................................................................................……………. 231 CITYCOP CITIZEN INTERACTION TECHNOLOGIES YIELD COMMUNITY POLICING, June TRSW- [7TRSZ ................................................................................................................................................. 233 CARISMAND CULTURE AND RISKMANAGEMENT IN MAN-MADE AND NATURAL DISASTERS+!2- #0TRSW- + #0TRSZ ........................................................................................ 235 SAFFRON SEMANTIC ANALYSIS AGAINST FOREIGNFIGHTERS RECRUITMENT ONLINE NETWORKS, TRSW-TRSZ .................................................................................................................................. 237 REACT PN-II-RU-TE-TRSV-4-1669 - SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES IN RISK PREVENTION. A NATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE, October TRSW- .2#+ #0TRSY ................................................................................................................................... 238 C*+####,-TSW TRSX ……………………………....................…………………..............… 24R RISR, no. 14/2015 5 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT RISR, no. 14/2015 6 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT RISR, no. 14/2015 7 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT THE DEVELOPING GLOBAL CRISIS AND THE CURRENT WAVE OF MIGRANT/REFUGEES HEADING FOR EUROPE Michael ANDREGG* Abstract A “Developing Global Crisis” is unfolding today that reflects synergistic interactions among demographic pressures, authoritarian politics, militant religion, corruptions of governance and other factors worldwide. All of these four and several other relevant factors are complex, and many interact synergistically (e.g. non-linear interactions) so they will be illustrated by the case of Syria here. Keywords: global crisis, migrant, Syria, demographic pressure. Introduction A “Developing Global Crisis” is unfolding today that reflects synergistic interactions among demographic pressures, authoritarian politics, militant religion, corruptions of governance and other factors worldwide. All of these four and several other relevant factors are complex, and many interact synergistically (e.g. non-linear interactions) so they will be illustrated by the case of Syria here. Much commentary on that crisis focuses on the personalities of Bashar al-Assad and Vladimir Putin of Russia. Other observers focus on emergent forces of evil like the death cult ISIS (ISIL, Daesh or Islamic State – the name does not matter here) – or their leaders. These are all relevant to many questions, but they can obscure ultimate causes of war like the demographic pressures that generate so many global problems today, and pervasive corruptions of governance that prevent solution of them. For example, before the current crisis, the population growth rate in Syria was about 2.4% per year which yields a doubling time of less than 30 years (CIA World FactBook, 2010). That puts enormous pressure on natural resources like farmland and water. Climate change is a derivative factor caused by population growth and industrial development. Syria endured its worst drought in 150 years (recorded history of rainfall there) for four years before the conflict began. The World Bank reports that at least 1.5 million people (8% of Syria’s population) left unproductive rural areas for cities that were already overburdened with millions of unemployed youth (Liverani, 2015). Sources on * Michael Andregg teacher in the Justice and Peace Studies Department at the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, USA. RISR, no. 14/2015 8 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT the ground have claimed even more to me. These internal migrants poured into cities bereft of opportunity for already large teenaged populations. Another effect of high birth rates is pyramidal age distributions with many youth compared to elders. Assad reserved the best opportunities for his Alawite prime constituency and
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