Jurnal JIPR Edisi 1 Desember Tahun 2020.Pdf

Indonesian Journal of Political Research (IJPR)

EDITORIAL COMMITTE Chairperson Prof. Dr. Firman Noor, M.A. Editor-in-Chief Dr. Rosita Dewi, M.A. Managing Editor Defbry Margiansyah, S.IP., M.A. Editors R.A. Rizka Fiani Prabaningtyas, S.IP, M.IntR(Adv) Faudzan Farhana, S.H., LL.M. Mouliza Kristhopher Donna Sweinstani, S.IP., M.IP.

Secretarial Dini Rahmiati, S.Sos., M.Si Eko Heryati Sutaningtyas, S.H

Layouter & IT Anggih Tangkas Wibowo, ST., MMSi Adiyatnika, S.Kom

Editorial Advisory Board Prof. Dr. Syamsuddin Haris (Research Center for Politics, Indonesian Institute of Sciences - LIPI) Prof. Dr. Hermawan Sulistyo, M.A. (Research Center for Politics, Indonesian Institute of Sciences - LIPI) Prof. Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, M.A. (Research Center for Politics, Indonesian Institute of Sciences - LIPI) Prof. Dr. R. Siti Zuhro, MA. (Research Center for Politics, Indonesian Institute of Sciences - LIPI) Prof. Dr. Asvi Warman Adam APU (Research Center for Politics, Indonesian Institute of Sciences - LIPI) Prof. Dr. Lili (Research Center for Politics, Indonesian Institute of Sciences - LIPI) Drs. M. Hamdan Basyar M.Si. (Research Center for Politics, Indonesian Institute of Sciences - LIPI) Associate Professor Dr. Greg Fealy (Australian National University) Dr. Nur Iman Subono, M.Hum (University of Indonesia) Dr. Kevin W. Fogg (University of North Carolina)

Profile Indonesian Journal of Political Research (IJPR) is a peer-reviewed academic journal organized by Research Center for Politics, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI). IJPR seeks to publish high-quality articles based on original research, review articles, research notes, and book reviews to promote the exchange of ideas and knowledge concerning political science and issues in Indonesia, regional, and global politics, including political economy, security and defense, foreign policy, diplomacy, development, democratization, democratic governance, elections, peace and conflict, social movements, gender, environment, religion, and other strategic issues.

Editorial Address Research Center for Politics - LIPI, Widya Graha LIPI Building, 3rd floor and 11th floor Jend. Gatot Subroto Street Kav 10 South Jakarta 12710 Website: www.politik.lipi.go.id

ISSN 2747-2590 (printed)

CONTENTS Indonesian Journal of Political Research Article Volume 1, December 2020

EDITORIAL NOTE The Future of Indonesian Democracy Rosita Dewi & Firman Noor 8

ARTICLES Faces of The ‘Konstituante’: Data on Some of the Political Elite of Early Independent Indonesia Syahrul Hidayat & Kevin W. Fogg 24

Accomodating Indonesia’s Islamist Fringe: The Case for a More Inclusive Electoral System Greg Fealy 42

Digital Activism & Democracy in Indonesia Learning from the Foregoing Research Issues (2014-2020) Caroline Paskarina 58

Democratic Regression & Authoritarian Practices in Indonesia Wijayanto 72

RESEARCH NOTE Malaysia’s Political Changes Amid Covid-19 Mohd Rizal Mohd Yaakop, Mohd Azmi Mohd Razif & Ahmad Redzuan Mohamad 82

BOOK REVIEW Menimbang Demokrasi Dua Dekade Reformasi (MEASURING DEMOCRACY IN TWO DECADES OF REFORMATION). Edited by Syamsuddin Haris. Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia. 2019. Softcover: 556pp + xxviii Lili Romli 86

Indonesian Journal of Political Research (IJPR) Volume 1, December 2020 ISSN 2747-2590 (Printed)

EDITORIAL NOTE The Future of Indonesian Democracy Rosita Dewi & Firman Noor

INTRODUCTION he regression over Indonesian democracy is still debatable among the scholars. After 20 years of reformasi, it is important to reflect on how the democratic institution functioning Tin Indonesia. Indonesia has held five times democratic and fair general elections and also four times direct presidential elections. This is a remarkable achievement after the long period of authoritarian regime under Suharto. It seems the transformation from authoritarian regime into democratic political regime reflected on the implementation of democratic principles in Indonesia. Will Indonesian democracy follows her fellow ASEAN neighbours’ plummeting trend? Or will it strive to show positive progress despites all the challenges?

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA The political configurations and democratic system of ASEAN members are vary. The experience of colonization resulted the different political system from monarchy until democratic system. One of the most significant problems that ash been faced by developing countries in Southeast Asia are the involvement of the military in civilian politics. In some cases, military involvement limited on influencing government. However, other cases indicated that military took control the government. Militaries were dominant in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Philippine, Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia, but it was not happened in Malaysia and Singapore. Some countries have been successful to transform into democratic countries. As a member of the The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) those countries promoted the democracy in Southeast Asia Region (Kingsbury, 2017; Wungaeo, Rehben & Wun’gaeo, 2020). ASEAN aims to provide regional order and a basis for economic and security cooperation. ASEAN member countries has been actively promoting democracy and human rights as a new objective of ASEAN since the establishment of ASEAN Community that consist of three pillars: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), ASEAN Security Community (ASC), which later changed into ASEAN Political and Security Community, and ASEAN Social and Cultural Community (ASCC). It promotes democracy and human rights as central of ASEAN order (Sukma, 2009; Poole, 2019; Wungaeo, Rehben & Wun’gaeo, 2020). Whereas, discussion about domestic governance and regime type in member states has never been discussed in the official ASEAN forum. There is no requirement to be democratic state to be the ASEAN member or punishment for member state that do not apply the democratic principles. The non-interference norms make the options of political system in ASEAN members out of official ASEAN discussion (Poole, 2019). This “freedom” made the democratic development of ASEAN members varied. Not all the ASEAN members democratic developments have kept pace with the ASEAN the spirit of democracy, however the number of ASEAN countries, which have transitioned to adopt democratic system,

© 2020 The Authors. Indonesian Journal of Political Research published by Research Center for Politics, Indonesian Institute of Sciences. All right reserved. Printed in Indonesia. 2 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

increased (see graph 1). According to Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) democracy index, Myanmar has transitioned from authoritarian regime into hybrid regime. The political system of Singapore has also changed from hybrid regime into flawed democracy. Moreover, Thailand has also transitioned from hybrid regime into flawed democracy, even though Thailand also faced the democratic regression from flawed democracy return into hybrid regime for a couple of time. Some countries, Laos and Vietnam, remains under the authoritarian regime. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippine are considered as frontier of democracy among the ASEAN members.

Graph 1. Political System Changing in Southeast Asian Countries

Countries Number 1

0 2007 2011 2015 2019

Year

Flawed Democracy Hybrid Regime Authoritarian Regime

Source: Data were collected from EIU 2007 until 2019

However, most ASEAN members democracy are still debatable. Moreover, the human rights records of the most ASEAN members have also questionable (Poole, 2019). Therefore, the democratic system which has been implemented in several ASEAN countries are still categorized as flawed democracy (EIU, 2007-2019) or gated democracy (Lidya et al., 2014). The EIU democracy index is based on five indicators. Those are electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberty. Those countries are “adopted” the principles of democracy and human right, but how the implementation of those principles are still questionable. Election, for example, the governments conducted the elections across the region because “the elections are still treated as the yardstick for democracy” (Simandjuntak, 19 October 2018). Money politics, military involvement, manipulation made the freedom and fairness of the election has been questioning. Clientelism, Elitist, oligarchy are also still clearly shown in the democratic system in Southeast Asian countries (Embong, 2016; Power, 2018; Timberman, 2019; Aspinall & Berenschoft, 2019). According, to the democracy index 2019 from EIU shows that the democracy in several ASEAN members are stagnant or even declining. Philippine, as the oldest of Southeast Asian Country that adopted democratic system, shows the regression of its democracy under the regime of Duterte in 2016. The Duterte government’s track record regarding human rights and democracy indicated the regression of democracy in Philippine. His war on drugs that caused extrajudicial killing caused human rights violations (Timberman, 2019; Teehanke & Calimbahin, 2019). Moreover, his approach to “solve” conflict in Mindanao, by extended the martial law in 2017 and finally lifted in February 2020, questioning the implementation of democracy and respect of human rights in Philippine (Black, 19 July 2017; Gomez, 10 December 2019; Shortridge, 5 February 2020). This situation is not only occurred in Philippine, but also in Myanmar. The victory of National League of Democracy (NLD) in 2015 election under Aung Sang Suu Kyi leadership, as peace noble Rosita Dewi & Firman Noor | The Future of Indonesian Democracy 3

Graph 2. Rank of Democracy in Southeast Asian Countries (2015) Graph 2. Rank of Democracy in Southeast Asian Countries 2015

Rank 155

114 128 155

113

Remark: There is no data of Brunei Darussalam (Data were collected from EIU Democracy Index 2015)

Graph 3. Rank of Democracy in Southeast Asian Countries (2019) Graph 3. Rank of Democracy Southeast Asian Countries 2019

Rank 155

122 136 155

68 124

Remark: There is no data of Brunei Darussalam (Data were collected from EIU Democracy Index 2019) prize winner, brought expectation of democracy in Myanmar. It marked the end of more than 50 years of military rule. This election also elected Htin Kyaw as the first civilian president of Myanmar and placed Aung San Suu Kyi as Myanmar Counselor State. The Myanmar constitution did not allow her from becoming president because her children holds foreign nationality, even though she is widely seen as de facto leader. After five years of civil government in Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi government cannot suddenly change Myanmar from authoritarian regime into democratic state, even though the transformation of political system occurred in Myanmar as indicated in graph 2 & 3 (Stoke & Aung, 2019). Her failure to deal with the human right issue of Rohingya, an ethnic genocide accusation, also indicates that Myanmar is still far from democracy, beside that the military role is also still significant. Aung San Suu Kyi also tried to protect the government reputation by refusing to permit the United Nations fact-finding mission to investigate the accusation of human right abuse to Rohingya ethnic group in Rakhine State. Moreover, Aung San Suu Kyi attended the International Court of Justice in the Hague to defend Myanmar and military against the genocide accusation over Rohingya ethnic group reaped many critics from human rights activists and disappointment of her Burmese supporters (Akins, 2018; Selth, 2019; Nitta, 6 November 2020). 4 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

Similar with other countries in Southeast Asia, many scholars argued that Indonesia democracy have ended up “getting stuck” or even regression during the second period of President Jokowi’s government (Power, 2018; Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019; Aspinall & Meitzner, 2019; Aspinall, et al., 2020; Power & Warburton, 2020). Indonesia occupied rank 49 out of 164 countries in the world in 2015. Indonesia gain this position following the first winning of President Jokowi in Presidential election against Prabowo Subianto who known as strong figure of military general retirement. Jokowi’s winning in 2014 presidential election believed the survival of democracy in Indonesia. However, after his second period of government, the Indonesia rank of democracy fell 15 places in the 2019 index. This situation positioned Indonesia under Malaysia (43) and Philipine (54) as indicated in graph 3. This condition is a challenge for Indonesian democracy after more than 20 years of reformasi.

THE CHALLENGES OF INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY Indonesia is on continuing democracy and still has a hope to carry out democratic systems and values. Political problems in Indonesia are complex and are caused by factors, including income inequality, low commitment to democracy, unstable political institution and the emergence of new problems caused by political actor's maneuvers to name a few. Also new social-cultural development emerges, which is public tendency to display religious values. In this context, Indonesia is becoming recognized as Muslim moderate country, which appears more religious than before. This situation also to some extent provides a significant impact for the future of Indonesian politics. In the current situation it is fair to say that Indonesian democracy is in the crossroad. On the one side, democracy allows regular peaceful leadership change for more than 20 years and delivers a high opportunity to replace government both in national and local level. Also, many people today have many options in politics, with there is no ruling political parties and has given a greater freedom of expression to oppose the government. Moreover, democracy has given people the freedom of speech, including to criticize government. It also brings opportunities to marginal people to have chance in political activities, and clearly increased Non Government Organizations (NGOs) and political parties’ participation. Most Indonesian people believe that democracy is the best political system, that should be the only game in town. Latest LIPI’s survey for instance indicates that around 74% people believe that democracy is the most suitable system for Indonesia. With this situation, Indonesia is assessed by some observers as favorable country with consolidated democracy (Macintyre and Ramage, 2008; Diamond 2010) On the other side, there is a problem which contraproductive to the democracy. For instance, some politicians are using demagoguery and scaremongering tactics by instigating primordialism for their exclusive interests. This has created a bad impact for a fair competition and thus, endangering democracy. Democracy is also being threatened by oligarchy, who exists because of huge wealth abundance and utilizing it to take control political activities and policy formulation. High cost politics make them to be “political sponsors”. Hence, election becomes an arena to strengthen the oligarchs’ interest, so that a new term "Democracy for Sale" (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2019) emerges. Procedural democracy is being held hostage by elite interests and not giving benefits to people as whole. In addition, democracy is emanating oligarchy, anti-democratic appeal and corruption. Democracy today, whether at national or local level, has brought a dark era for neutrality and professionality of bureaucracy. They are being exploited as “election machine” and vote getter. Furthermore, the media situation is not satisfying. There are journalists and media who uphold journalistic ethics and keep themselves independent and objective. But, some prefer to be government's Rosita Dewi & Firman Noor | The Future of Indonesian Democracy 5 stooges. They are not giving any proportional space to opposition narratives and therefore lose their credibility to people. Also in the current situation, the government tends to be more oppressive to every critic from student activists, or social and political activists. Some of them are arrested due to their anti government position. Those conditions indicate the continuation which have been described by scholars as the flaw of Indonesia democracy with the tendency to be oligarch (Robison and Hadiz, 2004; Slater, 2004; Weber, 2006; Davidson, 2009; Bunte & Ufen, 2009; Klinken, 2009; Aspinall & Mietzner, 2010; Winters, 2011; Robison & Hadiz, 2014: Winters, 2014: Ford & Pepinsky, 2014; Rahmawati, 2018; Hidayat, 2019; Power & Warburton 2019). Many observers characterize Indonesian democracy, hence, as flawed, illusive, delegative or unconsolidated. Also, Indonesian democracy score is not satisfactory, it can be seen, from the result published by some institutions, for instance Economist Intelligence Unit (flawed democracy), and Freedom House (partly free). In general, these qualities are caused by weakening of democratic institutions and civil societies, emergence of opportunistic politicians, economic inequality, and less education on politics that strengthens democratic values. Democracy in Indonesia in general is still operating peacefully. The hope of the people for democracy is still high, even for among the developing countries. However, a threat form oligarch, poverty, unneutral bureaucracy, pers, police, weak civil society, partial rules of law, politization of identity makes Indonesia democracy seems not totally developed yet. In fact, the potential to be trapped in democracy regression quite open. What happen today indicates that even though Indonesia has successfully undergone the democratic transitions, the result has not met yet the ideal type of democracy. For this reason, the main task to do for Indonesian is to reinforce democratic values. Also, to strengthen democracy institutions and environment to support the development of democracy. The style of leadership would also provide a significant impact for that development.

REFERENCES Akins, H. (2018). The Two Faces of Democratization in Myanmar: A Case Study of the Rohingya and Burmese Nationalism. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs.38 (2): 229-245. Aspinal, E. et al. (2020). Elites, Masses, and Democratic Decline in Indonesia. Journal Democratization. 27 (4): 505-526. Aspinall, E., and Berenschot, W. (2019). Democracy for Sale: Election, Clientelism, and the State Indonesia. London: Cornell University Press. Aspinall, E., and Meitzner, M. (2019). Indonesia’s Democratic Paradox: Competitive Elections Amidst Rising Illiberalism. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. 55 (3): 295-317. Aspinall, E., and Mietzner, M. (2010). Problems of Democratization in Indonesia: An Overview, in Mietzner, M and Aspinall, E, (eds.). Problems of Democratization in Indonesia, Elections, Institutions and Society. Singapore: ISEAS. pp. 1-20. Black, E. (19 July 2017). Duterte Says Martial Law must be Extended to Ensure Public Safety. Retrieved November 20, 2020 from https://southeastasiaglobe.com/duterte-says-martial-law-must-extended- ensure-public-safety. Bunte, M and Ufen, A. (2009). The New Order and Its Legacy: Reflections on Democratization in Indonesia, in Bunte, M and Ufen, A, (eds.) Democratization on Post-Suharto Indonesia. London: Routledge. pp. 1-28. Davidson, J.S (2015). Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia. The Pacific Review. 22 (3). 293- 310. Diamond, L. (2010). Indonesia’s Place in Global Democracy, in Mietzner, M and Aspinall, E, (eds.). Problems of Democratization in Indonesia, Elections, Institutions and Society. Singapore: ISEAS. pp. 21-52. 6 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

EIU. (2012). Democracy Index 2011: Democracy under Stress. EIU. (2016). Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in an Age of Anxiety. EIU. EIU. (2017). Democracy Index 2016: Revenge of the deplorables. EIU EIU. (2018). Democracy Index 2017: Free Speech under Attack. EIU. EIU. (2019). Democracy Index 2018: ME Too? Political Participation, Protest, and Democracy. EIU. EIU. (2020). Democracy Index 2019: A Year of Democratic Setbacks and Popular Protest. EIU. Embong, A. R. (2016). The Noisy Right and the Not-So-Silent Moderates: Democracy and All That in Malaysia, in Wungaeo, C. B., Rehbein, B. and Wungaeo, S. (eds). Globalization and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Challenges, Responses, and Alternative Futures. London: Palgrave Mcmilan. Pp. 45-62. Ford, M and Pepinsky, T B, (eds). (2014). Beyond Oligarchy. Wealth, Power and Contemporary Indonesian Politics. Cornell: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications. Gomes, J. (10 December 2019). Duterte to End Martial Law in Philippine South after 2 Years. Retrieved November 20, 2020 from https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/duterte-end-martial-law- philippine-south-years-67619714. Hidayat, S. (11 October 2019). Urgensi Penguatan Kapasitas Lembaga Perwakilan. Media Indonesia. Kekic, L. (2007). The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy. EIU. Kingsbury, D. (2019). Politics in Contemporary Southeast Asia: Authority, Democracy, and Political Change. New York: Routledge. Klinken, G van. (2009). Patronage Democracy in Provincial Indonesia, in Törnquist, Olle; Webster, Neil; Stokke, Kristian (eds), Rethinking Popular Representation, London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 141-159. McIntyre, A, and Ramage, D. (2008). Seeing Indonesia as A Normal Country: Implications for Australia. Canberra: Australia Strategic Policy Institute. Nitta, Y. (6 November 2020). Myanmar Election Tested Democracy under Suu Kyi: 5 Things to Know. Nikkei Asia. Retrieved November 20, 2020 from https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Myanmar-election/ Myanmar-election-tested-democracy-under-Suu-Kyi-5-things-to-know. Poole, A. (2019). Democracy, Rights and Rhetoric in Southeast Asia. Switzerland: Palgrave Mcmilan. Power, T. (2018). Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. 54 (3): 307-338. Power, T. and Waburton, E. (2020). Democracy in Indonesia: From Stagnation to Regression. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute. Rahmawati, D. (2018). Demokrasi dalam Genggaman Para Pemburu Rente. Yogyakarta: Departemen Politik dan Pemerintahan, UGM. Robison, R. and Hadiz, V. R. (2004). Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets. London: Rouledge Curzon. Selth, A. (2018). All Going According To Plan? The Armed Forces and Government in Myanmar. Contemporary Southeast Asia. 40 (1): 1-26. Shortridge, T. (5 February 2020). Martial Law Lifted in Mindanao. Retrieved November 20, 2020 from https://theowp.org/martial-law-lifted-in-mindanao. Simandjuntak, D. (19 October 2018). The State of Democracy in Southeast Asia. Retrieved November 15, 2020 from https://th.boell.org/en/2018/10/19/state-democracy-southeast-asia. Slater, D. (2004). Indonesia’s Accountability Trap; Party Cartels and Presidential Power After Democratic Transition. Indonesia: 61-92. Rosita Dewi & Firman Noor | The Future of Indonesian Democracy 7

Stoke, K., & Aung, S. M. (2019). Transition to Democracy or Hybrid Regime? The Dynamics and Outcomes of Democratization in Myanmar. The European Journal of Development Research. 32: 274-293. Sukma, R. (2009). Democracy Building in South East Asia: The Asean Security Community and Options for the European Union. Stockholm: IDEA. Teehanke, J. C. and Calimbahin, C. A. A. (2019). Mapping the Philippines’ Defective Democracy. Asian Affairs: An American Review.0 : 1-29 Timberman. D. G. (10 January 2019). Philippine Politics under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment. Retrieved November 20, 2020 from https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/10/philippine-politics-under- duterte-midterm-assessment-pub-78091. Weber, D. (2006). A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Soeharto Era. Journal of Democratization. 13: 396-420. Winters, J. A. (2004). Oligarchy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Winters, J. A. (2014). Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia in Ford, Michele and Pepinsky, Thomas B. Beyond Oligarchy. Wealth, Power and Contemporary Indonesian Politics. Cornell: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications. pp. 11-34. Wungaeo, C. B., Rehbein, B. and Wungaeo, S. (eds). (2016). Globalization and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Challenges, Responses, and Alternative Futures. London: Palgrave Mcmilan. 8 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020 Indonesian Journal of Political Research (IJPR) Volume 1, December 2020 ISSN 2747-2590 (Printed)

Faces of The ‘Konstituante’: Data on Some of the Political Elite of Early Independent Indonesia

Syahrul Hidayat Universitas Indonesia, Indonesia

Kevin W. Fogg University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States

Abstract

This article analyses a large dataset of some of the political elite in Indonesia shortly after independence: the members of the Konstituante (Constitutional Assembly) in the 1950s. The CVs of over 600 members were collected, digitized, and made available online in 2018. In this article, the creators of that database analyze the backgrounds and demographic profiles of these members for insights into the political elite and propose further avenues for research using a quantitative analysis of the characteristics of Indonesia’s political elite. While some features of the Indonesian leaders in the 1950s were not surprising (for example, the group included more with the feudal title ‘Raden’ than women), others upend longstanding understandings of Indonesia’s political elite (for example, members of the political elite were 1.5 times more likely to have studied in Mecca rather than the Netherlands). Keywords: Indonesia, Konstituante, elite, prosopography, education, gender

INTRODUCTION lthough Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world today and the third- largest democracy, it is famously understudied, both on its own terms and in comparison, Awith other countries (Künkler and Stepan, 2013; contrast Pepinsky, 2014). One of the major hindrances to comparing Indonesian politics and history with other cases is the lack of easily accessible datasets on which to conduct comparisons. This article introduces a dataset that has been compiled and digitized by the authors: the CVs of all members of the Indonesian Constitutional Assembly, called the Konstituante, in the 1950s. Because that body was twice as large as the Indonesian parliament at the time, this is the largest set available for the Indonesian national political elite in the two decades after Indonesian independence. Therefore, on its own, it provides a broader representation of the early Indonesian elite in a single body. This article outlines preliminary conclusions based on the analysis of this dataset in both qualitativeand (especally) quantitative ways. By looking at these individuals collectively, a practice known in historical studies as prosopography, the nature of Indonesia’s political elite shortly after independence becomes clear. This is an innovation in the study of Indonesian politics, where the classic studies of this period (Kahin, 1952; Feith, 1962; Lev, 1966) were narrative rather than quantitative. In studies of more recent decades, there have been some attempts verging on prosopography with much smaller datasets (e.g., Buehler, 2007), but nothing like this on a national scale.

DATA SOURCE The data for this project was collected from the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia, file #10 of the Konstituante Collection. This file consists of three large, bound registers of CVs (Riwajat Hidup) handwritten onto printed forms, seemingly filled in by functionaries of the Konstituante after the institution was dissolved. The collection has 607 forms, comprising 603 individuals, including replacement members.1 All individuals have been included for the purposes of this analysis as members of the early Indonesian political elite, but the individual’s status is preserved in the digital database. The forms include lines for name, membership number, party affiliation, date and place of birth, residence, education, and (on some but not all forms) religion. It also includes a place for a photograph of the member, and a page-and-a-half for filling in work or organizational experience. Although all forms include the member’sname (usually with itles), party affiliation, membership number, and residence, many forms omit education and include only their membership in the Konstituante for work and organizational experience. This is true even for prominent members with impressive personal histories, for example, Mr. Wilopo, the former Prime Minister who was chosen as head of the Konstituante. For the purposes of this analysis, no attempt has been made to supplement the information provided on the forms.2 A team of Indonesian research assistants entered the data from these forms into a digital database, which forms the basis of this analysis. These entries were then checked for accuracy, completeness, and consistency by the authors. All of the data is currently available on a public website in both English and Indonesian, at http://www.konstituante.net.

MEMBERSHIP TYPES The vast majority of members (511 individuals, or about 84.7%) were chosen in an election held in December 1955—separate from the parliamentary election earlier that year, with slightly higher turnout.3 In the elections of 1955, voters could vote either for a party (in which case the party leadership would allocate the vote to a specific candidate) or for an individual (as an independent or— more often—listed under a party ticket). This means that the political elite chosen in this category was a combination of the party leaders’ preferences and the public’s direct preferences, since jumping the order of the party preferences was possible in this election system, although it seemed to be rare. A minority (63 individuals, or about 10.4%) were replacement members, identified by their parties as appropriate stewards of seats that had to be vacated because of death or political fallout. These individuals must be seen as entirely the preferences of party elites. The replacements began as early as 23 January 1957 (with Raden Soekarno Djojonagoro of the Persatuan Pegawai Polisi Republik Indonesia)—just two months into the Konstituante’s work—and started as late as 21 May 1959 (Achmad Bachtiar of Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia)—only six weeks before the body was unilaterally disbanded by Sukarno with his Dekrit ’59 (see Nasution, 1992, pp. 315-19). This does suggest that the supposed ‘failure’ of the Konstituante and its dissolution were not foregone conclusions, since the body was still taking the time to swear in new members until the very end. A small minority of members (29 individuals, or about 4.8%) were appointed members. They were chosen to represent communities that could not vote in the 1955 elections: the still-Dutch- controlled West Papua (5 individuals) or foreign’ ethnic minorities (Chinese heritage: 12 individuals, European heritage: 12 individuals).4 These individuals were inducted into the Konstituante much later than most members—only in 1958. Once sworn in, 13 of them joined existing parties or factions (Parkindo, PNI, Partai Katholik, Baperki, PSII, Masjumi, and IPKI), and the remaining 16 formed new factions (Daerah Irian Barat, Lima Orang, Wakil Golongan Keturunan Eropah, and Kesatuan). XƺȖȠƺǩFƺșǩȅǿƺǹ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশXF2ষॸ ࢲࢵࢱ

EƺșǴȣǾǩॸॴ ࢲࢳࢺ

FƺǦǏǹƺȠȣǹhǹƺǾƺশFhষॸॴ ࢺࢸ

XƺȖȠƺǩ?ȅǾȣǿǩș2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশX?2ষॸ ࢷࢹ

[ǓȒȣǈǹǩǷXȖȅǷǹƺǾƺșǩॸࢷ ࢳࢳ

XƺȖȠƺǩ?ȖǩșȠǓǿ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশXƺȖǷǩǿǏȅষॸ੼ ࢲࢺ

XƺȖȠƺǩ^ƺȖǓǷƺȠ2șǹƺǾ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশX^22ষॸॴ ࢲࢹ

XƺȖȠƺǩ?ƺȠǦȅǹǩǷॸ੼ ࢲࢴ

XƺȖȠƺǩ^ȅșǩƺǹǩș2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশX^2ষॸ ࢲࢲ

2ǷƺȠƺǿXǓǿǏȣǷȣǿǠ?ǓǾǓȖǏǓǷƺƺǿ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺ ࢲࢱ শ2X?2ষॸ

XǓȖǠǓȖƺǷƺǿeƺȖǈǩΡƺǦ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশXǓȖȠǩষॸॴ ࢹ

ƺǓȖƺǦ2ȖǩƺǿƺȖƺȠॸ ࢶ

(ǓȖƺǷƺǿXǓǾǈǓǹƺXƺǿȠǴƺ^ǩǹƺশ(XX^ষॸ ࢶ

@ǩǾƺKȖƺǿǠॸ ࢶ Syahrul Hidayat & Kevin W. Fogg | Faces of The ‘Konstituante’... EȣȖǈƺXǓǾǈǓǹƺXƺǿǉƺșǩǹƺॸ ࢶ 11

XƺȖȠƺǩȣȖȣǦॸ ࢶ

PARTY DISTRIBUTION ƺǏƺǿXǓȖǾȣșǴƺΛƺȖƺȠƺǿ?ǓΛƺȖǠƺǿǓǠƺȖƺƺǿ ࢵ The party distribution within the Konstituante mirrored2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশƺȒǓȖǷǩষॸ the parliament elected in 1955 and is thus generally well known in its broad outlines (Feith, 1957;XǓȖșƺȠȣƺǿXǓǠƺΛƺǩXȅǹǩșǩ[ǓȒȣǈǹǩǷ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺ Alfian, 1971). Notably, the sample for ࢵthis analysis is not a perfect reflection of the party breakdownsশXXX[2ষॸ in the representative body, because of the addition of replacement members, who are counted fully in the sample on top of the members they replaced. Thus, it is important to layout the sample usedXǓȖșƺȠȣƺǿƺΡƺॸ in this analysis by party or faction.5 Partiesࢵ or factions based on Islam are identified with an asteriskvƺǷǩǹ(ȅǹȅǿǠƺǿ?ǓȠȣȖȣǿƺǿȖȅȒƺǦॸ (*), while those based on Christianityࢵ are identified with a cross +( ). Independents who were elected under their own names are marked with a tilde (~). (ȖǩǿǏȅॸ ࢴ Table 1. Konstituante MembersXƺȖȠƺǩ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺ[ƺΡƺশX2[ষ by Party েvȅǿǠșȅǿǓǠȅȖȅॸ ࢴ

XƺȖȠƺǩFƺșǩȅǿƺǹ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশXF2ষॸ ࢲࢵࢱ XƺȖȠƺǩ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺ[ƺΡƺশX2[ষে/ƺΦƺǩȖǩǿॸ ࢴ

EƺșǴȣǾǩॸॴ ࢲࢳࢺ ?ǓșƺȠȣƺǿॸ ࢳ

FƺǦǏǹƺȠȣǹhǹƺǾƺশFhষॸॴ ࢺࢸ XƺȖȠƺǩXǓȖșƺȠȣƺǿeǦƺȖǩǷƺǦ2șǹƺǾশXXe2ষॸॴ ࢳ

XƺȖȠƺǩ?ȅǾȣǿǩș2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশX?2ষॸ ࢷࢹ XƺȖȠƺǩ[ǓȒȣǈǹǩǷ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺEǓȖǏǓǷƺশX[2Eষॸ ࢳ XƺȖȠƺǩ[ƺǷǴƺȠ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺॸ ࢳ [ǓȒȣǈǹǩǷXȖȅǷǹƺǾƺșǩॸࢷ ࢳࢳ XǓȖșƺȠȣƺǿ[ƺǷǴƺȠEƺȖǦƺǩǿ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশXǓȖǾƺǩষॸ ࢳ XƺȖȠƺǩ?ȖǩșȠǓǿ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশXƺȖǷǩǿǏȅষॸ੼ ࢲࢺ XƺȖȠƺǩ[ƺǷǴƺȠFƺșǩȅǿƺǹশX[Fষॸ ࢳ XƺȖȠƺǩ^ƺȖǓǷƺȠ2șǹƺǾ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশX^22ষॸॴ ࢲࢹ ǿǠǷƺȠƺǿ?ǓǾǓǿƺǿǠƺǿhǾƺȠ2șǹƺǾশ?h2ষॸॴ ࢲ XƺȖȠƺǩ?ƺȠǦȅǹǩǷॸ੼ ࢲࢴ (ǓȖƺǷƺǿƺǿȠǓǿǠ[ǓȒȣǈǹǩǷ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺ ࢲ XƺȖȠƺǩ^ȅșǩƺǹǩș2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশX^2ষॸ ࢲࢲ শ([2ষॸ

2ǷƺȠƺǿXǓǿǏȣǷȣǿǠ?ǓǾǓȖǏǓǷƺƺǿ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺ ࢲࢱ (ǓȖƺǷƺǿXǩǹǩǦƺǿ^ȣǿǏƺॸ ࢲ শ2X?2ষॸ ?ঀFȅȒǓॸઈ ࢲ XǓȖǠǓȖƺǷƺǿeƺȖǈǩΡƺǦ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশXǓȖȠǩষॸॴ ࢹ XƺȖȠƺǩeƺǿǩ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺॸ ࢲ ƺǓȖƺǦ2ȖǩƺǿƺȖƺȠॸ ࢶ XǓǷǓȖǏǴƺॸ ࢲ (ǓȖƺǷƺǿXǓǾǈǓǹƺXƺǿȠǴƺ^ǩǹƺশ(XX^ষॸ ࢶ XǓǿǴƺǹȣȖƺǿॸ ࢲ @ǩǾƺKȖƺǿǠॸ ࢶ XǓȖșƺȠȣƺǿ[ƺǷǴƺȠǓșƺॸ ࢲ EȣȖǈƺXǓǾǈǓǹƺXƺǿǉƺșǩǹƺॸ ࢶ [ঀ^ȅǓǏǴȅǿȅXȖƺΛǩȖȅșȅǓǏƺȖǏȅॸઈ ࢲ

XƺȖȠƺǩȣȖȣǦॸ ࢶ [ƺǏǴƺ?ǓȒȖƺǈȅǿƺǿॸઈ ࢲ

ƺǏƺǿXǓȖǾȣșǴƺΛƺȖƺȠƺǿ?ǓΛƺȖǠƺǿǓǠƺȖƺƺǿ ࢵ Source: Data compiled from www.konstituante.net 2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺশƺȒǓȖǷǩষॸ

XǓȖșƺȠȣƺǿXǓǠƺΛƺǩXȅǹǩșǩ[ǓȒȣǈǹǩǷ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺ ࢵ শXXX[2ষॸ

XǓȖșƺȠȣƺǿƺΡƺॸ ࢵ

vƺǷǩǹ(ȅǹȅǿǠƺǿ?ǓȠȣȖȣǿƺǿȖȅȒƺǦॸ ࢵ

(ȖǩǿǏȅॸ ࢴ

XƺȖȠƺǩ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺ[ƺΡƺশX2[ষেvȅǿǠșȅǿǓǠȅȖȅॸ ࢴ

XƺȖȠƺǩ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺ[ƺΡƺশX2[ষে/ƺΦƺǩȖǩǿॸ ࢴ

?ǓșƺȠȣƺǿॸ ࢳ

XƺȖȠƺǩXǓȖșƺȠȣƺǿeǦƺȖǩǷƺǦ2șǹƺǾশXXe2ষॸॴ ࢳ

XƺȖȠƺǩ[ǓȒȣǈǹǩǷ2ǿǏȅǿǓșǩƺEǓȖǏǓǷƺশX[2Eষॸ ࢳ 12 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

REGIONAL REPRESENTATION The data from members of the Konstituante is helpful to identify regional dynamics—always important in this archipelagic country with such a wide geographic spread—of early Indonesian elites, by looking at their place of birth lined up against current domicile. To some extent, the data on regional representation is less precise because of migration, i.e., the number who had moved from their place of birth to the national capital or Bandung. This means data on place of birth represents regional power blocs more closely than the latest domicile. In the simplest categories of Java and non-Java, most members of the Konstituante were born on Java (65%). The concentration of the population on Java is the main reason for the domination of Java-born members. The trend is consistent for members from the big four parties; 68% of their members were born on the island, and they were evenly distributed from the center to the eastern parts of the island, with significant numbers from the western part. If using today’s provincial boundaries, this would translate into the domination of three major provinces (West, Central, and East Java) for the big parties and for the institution as a whole. In total, these three provinces had 57.1% of all representatives in the Konstituante. However, Central and East were clearly more dominant with 121 members each compared to 67 born in West Java and Banten toConcerning Java-born members, there were different patterns that could be seen from the big four parties of PNI, Masjumi, NU, and PKI. Three of them—PNI, NU, and PKI—had relatively similar patterns, with a relatively high percentage of Java-born members: 79%, 78%, and 75%, respectively. Clearly, these parties are more Javanese than Masjumi. Although the majority of Masjumi members were also born in Java, the percentage was much lower, at 58%. This figure was a confirmation of how Masjumi was known for representing the aspirations of people on the outer islands (Samson, 1968, p. 1002). But, the reverse tendency of having more members toward the western part of Java compared to NU and PKI is a clear indication of its weaker attachment to ethnic Javanese cultural aspirations. According to the data provided by the members, 161 members (26.5%) listed addresses in Jakarta. As there were only 40 members born in Jakarta, there were 121 members who migrated from their hometown to the capital. This indicates quite a substantial number of migrations, showing the mobility of early independent elites and the capital as the epicenter of Indonesian politics, economy and education. In fact, several big cities had become destinations for migration, such as Surabaya (44 who had moved there from their birthplace), Bandung (36), Yogyakarta (35), Semarang (25), Makassar (21), Medan (12), and Palembang (11). In contrast, many regencies and smaller towns stood out as important places of origin, such as Agam (18 who were born there), Kebumen (11), Jombang (11), Purworejo (9), Bukittinggi, Tuban, and Garut (tied at 7). Although the data cannot confirm the details of members’ relocations before the latest listed address, it is still useful to indicate their mobility. From the four main parties, the data shows that NU was the party with the least mobility, as indicated by the difference between their birthplaces and their latest addresses. 57.3% of NU members (51 out of 89) lived in the same cities or regencies as their birthplace. The minimal mobility of NU members was also indicated by minimal interisland migration. Only 18 of them (20%) were born outside Java and among them, only two traelled outside their island (from Kalimantan to Java). However, there were two members who were born abroad, namely Nj. Ratu Fatmah Chatib and K.R.H. As’ad. It is likely that they were born while their parents were in the Middle East, as NU had a strong tradition of visiting Mecca or Cairo either for study or pilgrimage. There were no other parties with records similar to NU. For Masjumi, it is quite surprising to see that 44.1% (56 out of 127) of its members stayed in their hometowns. The party had a strong tradition of migration, with the most members of any party who moved between islands. 19.7% of them (25 out of 127) left their Syahrul Hidayat & Kevin W. Fogg | Faces of The ‘Konstituante’... 13 hometowns to settle on different islands. Other parties only had a handful of members who migrated across islands (13 for PNI, 8 for PKI, and 2 for NU). Meanwhile, PKI and PNI were relatively dominant in terms of mobility across provinces within an island. 38.9% of PKI members (35 out of 90) moved across provincial boundaries but still on the same major island. Most of them migrated to big cities in Java, mainly to Jakarta, Semarang, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya. With an additional of 28.9% of its members (26 out of 90) that migrating within a province, this indicates that PKI had a strong network on Java. PNI had a relatively similar pattern with PKI by having members who migrated within one major island (mostly Java). PNI had 37.5% members (51 out of 136) who migrated within an island, with only 24.3% staying in their home district. The data also shows that Masjumi had a wider geographic diversity in the birthplace of its members. Using today’s provincial boundaries, the party could claim broader coverage of Indonesia than others, with members born in 25 different provinces (out of 34 in 2020). Amid this wide distribution, outer island birthplaces were concentrated in the western and northern parts of Sumatra a insouthern Sulawesi, with 44 out of 129 total members (or 54.7% of the non-Java-born members). PNI had the second-broadest array of birthplaces, with members born in 19 modern-day provinces. NU and PKI depended more on members who had connections with Java; their members were born in 15 and 14 provinces, respectfully. Although NU and PKI were similarly based on Java, NU was the more localized, as the party supporters were mainly from East Java and the concentration was also localized to where Islamic boarding schools existed in the area known more recently as ‘Tapal Kuda’ (the districts east of Mt. Bromo). Throughout the different measures of regional representation, Masjumi stands out for its broader geographic base. This is also in line with the electoral returns: only this Islamic party could penetrate the 16 electoral districts roughly equally, or in other words, it had relatively ‘even support’ across the archipelago. This analysis of the birthplaces and migration of members supports Mestenhauser’s label (1960, p. 324) that Masjumi was ‘the national party’. The three other big parties (PNI, NU, and PKI) had more members with backgrounds in Java, had less interisland migration, and had less migration overall.

EDUCATION The average educational level of Konstituante members was well above the average Indonesian at the time, but members’ educational backgrounds were also highly variable. Remembering that as of the 1955 elections, some 70% of Indonesians were estimated to be illiterate (Hosmer, 1961, p. 78, n. 1), the educational levels of Konstituante members can be seen as remarkably high indeed. Although 66 members (10.6%) did not report any educational data on their forms, the majority of this is likely due to incomplete forms rather than a complete lack of formal education. For all 603 members analyzed in this study, the highest level of educational attainment can be found in Figure 1. The 35.3% who had achieved a level of tertiary education is especially impressive. Adding the additional 46% of members with a secondary school in their profiles, approximately 81% of the Konstituante members, who reported education on their forms, had experienced at least upper secondary school. Considering that the number of government upper secondary schools at the end of Dutch rule was only 30 (Neff, 1963, p. 7), education certainly played an important role in the making of the Indonesian elite. However, government schools were far from the only schools they attended, as a significant number of members claimed other education at equivalent levels. 14 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

Figure 1. Highest Level of Educational Attainment for Members of the Konstituante

No listing Primary Lower secondary Upper secondary Undergraduate Master's Source:Doctoral Data compiled from www.konstituante.net

In total, 174 members attended Islamic education at some level. Some only experienced Islamic types of education and others had a combination of Islamic and secular education. For NU, the majority of its members (at least 83 members out of 90, or 92.2%) had attended Islamic education, mainly pesantren. The small Islamic party Perti also had a high percentage of Islamic educational backgrounds, at 75% or 6 of 8 members, who listed their education. The largest Islamic party in Konstituante, Masjumi, recorded 70 out of 107 members or 65.4% who listed Islamic education at least once, while PSII only had 7 out of 17 or 41.2% and thus was the Islamic party with the smallest percentage in this category. It is clear that NU and Perti had more connections with Islamic education, as both were established based on networks of Islamic schools, and the parties’ elites mainly graduated from their education network. The only clear connection of NU’s members with non-religious schools was Sekolah Rakyat (primary schools), which were provided by either the Dutch colonial government or private organizations. Nevertheless, the percentage is also relatively small compared to those who attended pesantren: only a third. By contrast, Masjumi and PSII had stronger connections with non-religious education. 65 Masjumi members (60.1%) listed non-religious education, and PSII recorded 10 out of 17 members (58.8%) with some non-religious education. For PNI and PKI, it is clear that members of both parties were less connected with religious education. PNI only recorded 4 members who attended Islamic education at any level. Strikingly, more members from PKI and Republik Proklamasi attended Islamic education than from PNI. From 85 members with information on their education, 8 had some Islamic educational background. The data shows that both PKI and PNI were significantly more connected with secular education than Masjumi and NU. Perhaps the unique feature about PKI and Republik Proklamasi members was the high percentage of members with primary school as their final education or even without formal education. There were at least 8 members in this category (9% of PKI/RP) who listed their education only up to primary school. This percentage is relatively small compared to those with a higher level of education. But, looking at PNI (3%), Masjumi (2.8%), and NU (5.6%), the percentage is relatively high. Only PSII was comparable, with 3 members of 17 (17.7%) holding elementary degrees as their terminal education. The international education listed on the CVs also provides interesting data. At least 74 members studied outside of Indonesia, mainly pursuing higher education. Almost all parties had members with international educational experience. Among the ten largest parties, only IPKI had no members Syahrul Hidayat & Kevin W. Fogg | Faces of The ‘Konstituante’... 15 with international experience. Unexpectedly, Masjumi and NU recorded the most members with international educations, with 25 (out of 107) and 21 (out of 90) respectively. Trailing far behind in this category were PNI with only 9 (out of 121 members who filled out their forms) followed by PKI/ Republik Proklamasi and Parkindo with 5 members each. Although Parkindo only had 5 members who studied outside Indonesia, coming from only 17 members this meant the highest proportion, at 29%, reflecting greater educational mobility for the Protestant minority in the colonial era. For Masjumi and NU, the most common places of study for internationally educated members were in the Middle East. Mecca was the most popular place of study with 36 members as alumni and Cairo (al-Azhar University and Darul Ulum) producing 13 alumni as members of Konstituante. NU members had the strongest links with Mecca, as 20 out of the 21 with international educations had been in Mecca to study. For Masjumi, the picture was more complex. Only 12 of 25 members went to Mecca. This is still more than those who studied in Cairo, but the percentage of Cairo backgrounds was significantly higher than NU, with at least 9 having a bachelor’s degree from al-Azhar or Darul Ulum. Adding to its mix of profiles, 4 studied at Leiden, in the Netherlands. One of them, J.L.W.R. Rhemrev, joined Masjumi after being appointed as a member to represent those of European descent, and he, together with La Ode Manarfa, held doctorates from the latter university. A few studied at Islamic centers in South Asia. For both NU and Masjumi, one school in Mecca produced a disproportionately high number of graduates as members of the Konstituante: Madrasah al-Sawlatiyah. There were 8 members who attended the school (5 Masjumi and 3 NU). This suggests that the educational networks of Islamic parties were thoroughly intertwined at the international level, and there was not much difference in the background among the Islamically-highest-educated members. Besides the Middle East, Konstituante members studied in many other places. In total, there are 22 different places of study covering four different continents: Asia, Africa, America, and Europe. Mecca was the most popular destination for study with 36 members, however, Europe also became a destination for at least 25 members. The Netherlands was the most popular, especially Leiden, with 22 members, but Belgium and Czechia were also mentioned by 2 members. It is also important to mention that there was also a connection with East Asia (China and Hongkong) and the United States, reflecting the global links of Indonesian elites. This data on educational background challenges the traditional idea of the early Indonesian political elite, which emphasizes secular Western education and networking during studies in the colonial metropole (e.g., Feith, 1962, pp. 100-144; Mrázek, 1994, pp. 56-81). Although that may have been true of the very smallest circle of the president, vice-president, and prime ministers, it was not true of the political elite generally at the national level. By contrast (although in keeping with more recent historical research, e.g., Laffan, 2003), Islamic education and experiences in the Middle East were just as formative for the political elite of this period and must be taken into account when considering the roots of independent Indonesia.

WORK AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXPERIENCE Although the space for recording work and organizational experience (Riwajat Hidup categorized into Pekerdjaan and Pergerakan) is the overwhelming majority of the forms, there are two major limitations in analyzing this data. The first is the challenge of categorizing and quantifying this type of qualitative data for collective analysis. The second is the fact that 48 forms (out of 607) have only one entry in these categories, as provided by the Konstituante functionaries: Member of the Konstituante of the Republic of Indonesia (Anggota Konstituante Republik Indonesia).7 16 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

Within these limitations, however, several interesting conclusions can still be drawn. In order to perform this analysis, the project cataloged every word that appeared in the work and organizational experience columns (over 4,300 different words, if one includes variations in spelling and abbreviation). A closer analysis of the top 200 most frequent words, those that appeared more than 20 times across all profiles, draws out some trends that speak to the general background of the political elite in the 1950s.8 Unsurprisingly, four of the six most common words were those that appeared in every single entry: ‘member’, ‘Konstituante,’ ‘Republic’, and ‘Indonesia’. The third most common word was ‘head’ (ketua), speaking to the leadership experience these elite members brought to this assembly. The sixth most common word was even more telling: ‘teacher’ (guru), was tied with Republic in frequency. Unlike Indonesian political elites today, working in primary and secondary education was a common path into activism for leaders of the 1950s. Notably, the word ‘school’ (sekolah) and various words for ‘student’ (siswa, mahasiswa, and peladjar) also made it into the top 200 words, showing how formative education was as a hotbed of political activity. Another common trope of nationalist resistance in colonial Indonesia was the role of medical doctors, and the word ‘doctor’ (dokter) came up 95 times across all profiles. Another striking, although unsurprising, trend was the frequency of terms associated with religion. ‘Religion’ (agama) itself was the tenth most common word, with ‘Islam’ at number 12. Six other words associated with Islam appeared in the top 200 most frequent (madrasah, Muhammadijah, Islamijah, Muslimat, pesantren, and ulama), but only one associated with Christianity (‘Christian’, Kristen) appeared more than 20 times—and only barely (21 instances). The word ‘church’ (geredja) appeared only 17 times across all profiles, despite the presence of 32 members of explicitly Christian parties and many other Christians in secular parties. This suggests that Christian religious organizations were not a path towards politics in the same way that Islamic organizations were in this period—a distinct disparity in religious associational life. The low frequency of words associated with military struggle is also noteworthy. Although ‘struggle’ (perdjuangan), ‘militia’ (lasjkar), and ‘soldier’ (tentara) all enter the top 200 words, it is only barely, with a mere 22 mentions apiece. Given the centrality of the Indonesian Revolution as a touchstone of Indonesian lives in this period, and the dominance of the military in later Indonesian representative bodies, this relative dearth of individuals in the Konstituante who rose to prominence from military action speaks volumes about the paths to power in this period. Clearly, the party system was dominant and did not value service on the battlefield most highly. Finally, a few old party names that reached the top 200 words are noteworthy for what they say about the influence of colonial politics on postcolonial elites.9 The Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (by its abbreviation ‘PSII’) was the 87th most common word found in profiles, with 54 mentions—far more than the mere 18 members it had in the Konstituante. This suggests that many members serving in the Konstituante for other parties had backgrounds in PSII, which is natural given its influential position in politics during the 1930s. Similarly, the term ‘Parindra’ came up 27 times, referring to the political bloc that dominated among Indonesian representatives in the proto-parliament set up in the waning years of Dutch colonialism. Most of the other terms that appeared most frequently among member profiles were terms for various positions held (e.g., kepala, dewan, pengurus, pemimpin), organizational terms (e.g., tjabang, partai, pusat), or geographic terms (e.g, Djakarta, Djogjakarta, daerah). To provide some visual overview, the figure below presents the words that appeared over 100 times across all profiles, with size in proportion to their frequency. Syahrul Hidayat & Kevin W. Fogg | Faces of The ‘Konstituante’... 17

Figure 2. Words that Appeared over 100 times in Members’ Organisational and Work Experience

Source: Data compiled from www.konstituante.net

RELIGION Although religious questions in the Konstituante, and particularly the famous issue of Islam as the foundation of the state, are paramount in the institution’s historiography (Kementerian Penerangan, 1958), the data available from the collected CVs is disappointing and does not have the potential to shed new light on the identity of political elites. There were two different forms used in the collection of CVs, with only one difference: on a minority of forms, there was a line for ‘Religion’, while on the majority of forms no such line was included. Because of this, the dataset is missing religious identifications for 481 members (or 79.8%). Only 122 members (20.2%) provided information on their religious identity. The largest number of responses were members who identified their religion as Islam: 103 individuals. Most of these were from religiously-based political parties (57 from Masjumi, 17 from NU, 13 from PSII, 2 from Perti, 1 from PPTI), although there were also some individuals from secular parties (4 from IPKI, 3 from PSI, 2 from PPPRI, 2 from Buruh, 1 from PIR-Hazairin, and even 1 from PKI). The fact that representatives of non-religious parties and even the Communist party would list their religion as Islam when provided the opportunity shows that having a religious affiliation was already normative in Indonesia in the 1950s, even before such identification was mandated on national identity cards. No forms that had the line for ‘Religion’ left it blank. An additional 19 members identified themselves as Christians. Most of these put down simply ‘Kristen’ on their forms (8 from Parkindo, 4 from Partai Katholik, and 3 from Persatuan Daya), but 4 Parkindo members put down the more specific ‘Kristen – Protestan’ (Christian - Protestant). Again, the presence among these numbers of an ostensibly secular party (Persatuan Daya, representing ethnic Dayak people of Kalimantan) demonstrates how religious affiliation was normative at this time. Beyond the forms that listed religion, the religion of members of religious parties was oe that tThe majority of Masjumi members, NU members, and members of many other Islamic parties did not have the option to write ‘Islam’ on their forms—although they surely woud have!) Other, indirect data is available on the religious affiliation of members from their education backgrounds (in which some members listed religious, especially Islamic, education), from their work and organizational background, or from titles like Haji. Take, for example, Iskandar Wahono, a replacement member representing PNI. He noted the following under the category ‘movement’ (pergerakan): ‘before the World War, active in the Muhammadiyah youth movement’. Thus, it is clear that he was a Muslim, although no other mention is made on his form of religion, neither in his educational background nor his other organizational and work experience, and it is unclear whether he was still religiously active 18 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

at the time of appointment to the Konstituante. Overall, though, the education data (see above) is perhaps the best proxy for religious (especially Muslim) identity in this dataset.

TITLES Members also provided their own titles for the forms, reflecting their educational, social, or traditional credentials. This provides insight into the types of authority that carried the most weight in Indonesian society of the 1950s, but also about the differences in authority between the different parties. Of 603 individuals in the sample, 277 (45.9%) did not use any title, while the remaining 326 members had 427 titles between them, showing that many members employed more than one title. The longest string was Prof. Mr. Dr. Raden Mas Soeripto of the PNI; his honorifics reflect professional status (Prof.), educational status (Mr. and Dr.), and traditional feudal status (Raden Mas). Even more daunting were the two members of the Konstituante who put only their titles (and no personal names) on their membership forms. These were two royals from Java: K.G.P.A.A. Paku Alam VIII (of Yogyakarta, a representative of IPKI) and Radja Keprabonan (of Cirebon, who ran as an unaffiliated individual). Among the twenty-nine different types of titles listed (excluding the two special royal titles above),10 by far the most common title listed was Haji, with 115 entries. This spanned the Islamic parties (NU had the most with 53, or 54.6% of its members, followed by Masjumi with 45 or 34.9% of its membership; Perti had 5, PSII had 4, and PPTI had 1), and secular parties (PNI with 5 Hajis, IPKI and Gerakan Pembela Pantja Sila each with one). Notably, the PKI and affiliated leftist factions had no members who listed the title Haji, despite the great pains the party had taken in the campaigns of 1955 to express sympathy towards Islam (Hosmer, 1961; Woolgar, 2020, ch. 2). The second most common title was Raden (a Javanese feudal title), with 77 members claiming this honorific in some form. Notably, this means that there were almost twice as many Raden in the Konstituante as there were female members! Unlike today, feudal titles were still highly prized in the 1950s as a source of authority. Looking from the perspective of parties, PNI is rather notable for its heavy frequency of feudal titles, with 31 iterations of Raden, 2 Lalu (a Sasak feudal title), 2 forms of Mas (also a Javanese feudal title), and 1 Daeng (a Buginese feudal title), totaling 36 or 25.7% of its members. (Although this was the highest percentage among the top four factions, IPKI actually had a higher percentage of its 10 members: 40% with Javanese feudal titles.) The PNI also had a very high percentage of lawyers, as signified by the title Mr. (short for Meester in de Rechten, or holding a Dutch law degree): 14 members or 10% of the PNI delegation held this title, showing the high stock PNI put on a law background for the task of crafting a new constitution. PNI also had a comparatively high number claiming the title Dr.: 10 members or 7.14%. Masjumi, despite its comparatively high levels of educational attainment, still had far more usage of religious titles. 46 individuals (35.7%) used a religious title (H., K., or Sjech) compared to 17 (13.2%) who used educational titles (Dr., Drs., Mr., or Prof.) and 25 (19.4%) who used feudal titles (Andi, Daeng, Lalu, Sutan, or Teuku) and 46 (35.7%) who used no title at all.11 Even more extreme, in NU 58 (59.8%) individuals used a religious title, 1 (1%) an educational title, 14 (14.4%) feudal titles, and 23 (23.7%) no titles at all. This shows how religious achievement, either through pilgrimage or status as a teacher in the community, was the most important measure of authority for these major Islamic parties, and more so for NU than Masjumi. Smaller Islamic parties placed a similar emphasis on religious credentials: in PSII 5 of 18 had religious titles and in Perti 6 of 8. Syahrul Hidayat & Kevin W. Fogg | Faces of The ‘Konstituante’... 19

By contrast, the Christian parties had notably high usage of educational titles: 13 individuals with educational titles between Parkindo (7 out of 19) and Partai Katholik (6 out of 13), or 40.6% of all Christian party members. This may reflect the high value placed on educational attainment in the Christian electorate, but probably also the increased availability of higher education for Christian populations in the Dutch colonial era. Only three Parkindo representatives had a religious title (Ds., a term of address for pastors), and 3 Katholik representatives had Javanese feudal titles. PKI and Republik Proklamasi were notable for their lack of listed titles; for PKI 55 members (80.9%) and for Republik Proklamasi 13 members (59.1%) did not use any title or honorific. Among the titles that were used, most were educational (11, or 12.2%), followed by feudal (7, or 7.78%). This general lack of titles reflects PKI’s desire to avoid traditional categories of authority and the party’s struggle to represent the ‘common man’. Women were almost always identified with a specific title in front of their profiles. The vast majority (37) was listed as Nj. (for Njonja, there is no evidence to suggest that this was used to signify Njai), while two listed themselves as Nona (signifying unmarried women), and two as R.A. (Raden Adjeng or Raden Aju). Only two women did not use any title in front of their names: Suwati Bintang Suradi, who led the PKI list, and Kasijati of PNI. The use of female titles might have been implemented to help differentiate between members, as there were a number of women who were not only the wives of male members or politicians but also used their husbands’ names in their own names (see below in Gender). Among the women, 8 had additional titles besides the gender identifier: 2 used Mr., 1 used Dr., 2 used R.A., and 3 used Hj. All three women who used educational titles were from Parkindo, representing a greater opportunity in the mid-20th century for Protestant women to pursue higher education.

GENDER The Konstituante was dominated by male members. The data show that members of Konstituante were 93% men, leaving the women with only 7% percent or 42 members.12 The tendency of male domination was relatively similar in all parties including the four big parties (PNI, Masjumi, NU, and PKI). Among the big four, Masjumi and PNI had the highest number of women representatives, both at 11. However, as Masjumi had fewer total members than PNI, the percentage for Masjumi was slightly higher than PNI, 8.5% against 7.9%. The figures for the PKI can be interpreted more positively or more negatively. With 6 female members in the party delegation of 68, the formal PKI faction was 8.8% women. However, if Republik Proklamasi is combined with PKI as one bloc (having been elected on the same line in 1955), the percentage goes down to 6.6%, as the Republik Proklamasi faction included no women at all.

Figure 3. Number of Women Members in the Konstituante by Party

12 10 8 6 4 2 0

Source: Data compiled from www.konstituante.net 20 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

Obviously, these percentages do not actually represent the demographic profile of the Indonesian population in 1955, and women with slightly more than 50% of the overall population were severely underrepresented. Masjumi and NU also relied on their women’s wings to give them access to political participation. Thanks to Muhammadiyah and its Aisiyah auxiliary for women, Masjumi had activists that could be chosen as candidates for the Konstituante. Among 11 female members of Masjumi, 6 (55%) mentioned Aisiyah activities at the local or national level. For NU, the connection of its female members with its women’s wing was even greater; 5 of 6 female members of NU (83%) were linked with Muslimat. However, unlike Masjumi which had older female members on average (39.5 years old), NU’s women members were relatively young, with 35 as their average age. Thus, the presence of 42 female members in the Konstituante was perhaps more symbolic to give the notion of political equality, rather than actual equality (cf. Robinson, 2008, p. 59). This complex picture of female roles in politics is also problematized by the fact that a number of them have strong connections with male politicians and leading figures in each party. Several female members had close links with male members from several of the main Islamic parties, mainly as wives of the party’s leadership (Fogg, 2012, p. 105). These included Zahra Hafni Abuhanifah Thaib the wife of Abu Hanifah (Masjumi), Nadimah Tanjung the wife of M. Yunan Nasution (Masjumi), Solichah Saifuddin Zuhri the wife of Saifuddin Zuhri (NU), and Aisjah Dachlan the wife of KH Mochammad Dachlan (NU). However, this does not mean that all the female members entered politics, or the Konstituante in particular, due to their relationship with political men. There were many who stood out as prominent figures in their own right. Supeni from PNI, for example, was a well-known politician who had built her reputation from the grassroots level. Sjamsijah Abbas from Perti also had a similar reputation in her effort to educate people in villages, although she was also the daughter of the group’s founder. Julia Sarumpaet was a well-known seminarist and women’s advocate in North Sumatra who helped Parkindo win votes in the province, while Sophia Kruyt was a doctor who helped to build hospitals in Bandung and Surabaya. The latter’s status as an unmarried woman is an affirmation of individual achievement and reputation rather than dependency on others. Other female members who stand out as outstanding individuals include Masjumi members Ratna Sari—a prominent leader in West Sumatra; president of Permi for a brief period and the first Indonesian female in the position (White, 2013, p. 111)—and Siti Ramlah Aziez who was the leader of Aisyiyah in South Sulawesi. However, the proportion in small parties is different. Parkindo, IPKI, Perti, and PRIM, for example, had higher percentages of female members compared to the biggest parties. Parkindo had the highest percentage with nearly 16%, followed by Perti and IPKI with 12.5 and 10% respectively. However, the relatively small number of members from these last two parties made their women’s percentages look quite high even though there was only one female member. Parkindo is the best example of this. Having 4 female members from a total of 19 means the percentage is high compared to others, but to say that they had more commitment to women’s participation needs further investigation. By the religious basis of the parties, there was a higher percentage of female members in all Christian parties combined (12.5%) than all Islamic parties combined (7.5%), but still a higher percentage in the Islamic parties than in all non-religious parties combined (6%). This challenges traditional ideas about the androcentrism of Islamic politics in Indonesia, and it suggests that Islamic groups were an important avenue for female advancement in early politics. Syahrul Hidayat & Kevin W. Fogg | Faces of The ‘Konstituante’... 21

Figure 4. Percentage of Women Members by the Religious or Non-Religious Basis of Party Blocs

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 All Islamic All Christian Non-Religious Parties Parties Parties

Source: Data compiled from www.konstituante.net

CONCLUSION AND POTENTIAL AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH This dataset has tremendous potential for future research—a small portion of which the authors hope to undertake themselves, some amount of which will be incorporated into future projects, and the bulk of which is open to other researchers based on the data which has already been made available. Working from the current dataset, there are many questions that can be answered about the nature of the political elite and the political system in the 1950s. With the careful categorization of the work and organizational experience, for example, researchers could learn the path of government experience that led elite into legislative service, the most common ways that the political elite spent the Revolution, the level of collaboration that the post-colonial elite had with the colonial state, the mobility of political elite in more detail, the detailed profiles of female members, and other questions, including comparison with members of parliament elected two months earlier. In this article, the authors have not gone into correlations across categories that could also yield interesting data on the legislators, for example: were younger members more likely to have experienced educational mobility? Were younger members more or less likely to use feudal titles, or to list specific types of work experience? In addition to the synchronic analysis available about the 1950s based on this database, it is the hope of the authors that this large set of profiles for some of the national elite in the 1950s can be utilized in a comparative, diachronic way in the future against datasets compiled for other national legislatures since independence. This would provide an idea of how educational profiles changed over time, how work backgrounds changed, the ebb and flow of female membership in the national elite, etc. There are other areas where the data for the Konstituante is incomplete, but comparison with other sources or with more recent data may provide interesting connections. Most notably, none of these forms mention family relations (parents, spouses, children), which are included in forms for later legislatures; this kind of data is also crucial in understanding the formation of the national political elite and the establishment of political dynasties in Indonesia. Clearly, this project is just the beginning of a field with tremendous potential for better understanding Indonesia’s political leaders. 22 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

ENDNOTES 1 Four individuals have duplicate forms because they changed party affiliation during the course of the assembly: Suradi Sosrohardjana (#20, from Republik Proklamasi to PKI), Anwar Nasution (#292, from PNI to Gerakan Pembela Pantja Sila), Mudhono Budiwardojo (#413, from Republik Proklamasi to PKI), and Srikanah Koempoel (#423, from PNI to Gerakan Pembela Pantja Sila). It is also possible that the collection is a slightly incomplete profile of the members of the Konstituante; two member numbers (397 and 483) are missing, and it is impossible to know if other replacement members’ forms are missing. Throughout this article, unless another reference is provided, the historical data presented is from the dataset now provided online at www.konstituante.net. 2 Although this limits the exhaustive authority of the dataset, it accurately reflects the historical record and avoids arbitrary inclusion of additional known information on some members but not others. The researchers feared that any attempt to complete, correct, or expand the CVs provided would be subject to serious selection bias by the researchers as to what deserved inclusion. 3 In the elections of 1955, the seminal work remains Feith, 1957; see also Roem, 1988; Hosmer, 1961; Alfian, 1971. 4 Unlike previous bodies in Indonesia that had appointed members also to represent Indonesians of Arab heritage, the Konstituante did not have appointed members for the Arab community. 5 In this table, the four members who had duplicate forms are counted twice, once in each of the parties for which they have a form. However, in later statistical analysis looking at percentages of the total membership of the Konstituante (the overall percentage of women, for example), they are counted only once. 6 Republik Proklamasi was listed as a separate faction in the Konstituante, but in practice, it functioned as part of the PKI. It was elected on the same line as PKI in the December 1955 polls, and several in the Republik Proklamasi bloc noted their activism in the PKI or in its auxiliary organizations such as SOBSI and BTI. For the remainder of this article, the statistical profiles group PKI and Republik Proklamasi together. 7 Because all of these entries were dated with the date of the dissolution of the Konstituante, it is clear they were provided ex post facto by staff. The forms that only provide this one line of work or organizational experience correlate very closely with those who did not provide any educational history. 8 For this analysis, any one-, two-, and three-letter entries were removed, as were prepositions and words that did not directly indicate positions, locations, or organizations (e.g., ‘mendjadi, dalam, sebagai, idem, merangkap’, etc.). Abbreviations were combined with fully-spelled-out words (in favor of the latter) within the top 200 words. 9 Because two- and three-letter entries were excluded from the sample, the same analysis cannot be run for most parties in the Konstituante, such as the NU, PKI, and PNI. The term ‘Masjumi’ did appear 116 times. 10 These twenty-nine titles were, in order of frequency, Haji (115), Raden (65), Kiai (47), Mr. (43), Nj. (37), Dr. (32), Prof. (12), Drs. (9), Sutan (9), Ir. (8), Daeng (7), Mas (4), R.M. (4), Sjech (4), Dominus (3), Lalu (3), Sajid (3), K.R.T. (2), Mas Ngabei (2), Nona (2), R.A. (2), Teuku (2), Kiagus (1), Raden Muchamad (1), Raden Pandji (1), Raden Ngabei (1), Tjenteng (1). 11 Obviously, this represents some overlap, as individuals like Mr. R. H. Kasman Singodimedjo used a combination of educational, feudal, and religious titles. Additionally, all 11 women used the title Nj., while one of those was Nj. Hj. Women carrying the sole title Nj. will be omitted from the subsequent calculation of title types. The title Sajid—of which there was one in Masjumi—is ambiguous between being a religious title or a feudal title (as it claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, and thus cannot be earned through religious effort, but does connote religious prominence). Thus, it has been omitted from this tabulation. 12 Note that one female member has two forms: Srikanah Koempoel who moved from PNI to GPPS. Syahrul Hidayat & Kevin W. Fogg | Faces of The ‘Konstituante’... 23

REFERENCES Alfian. (1971).Hasil pemilihan umum 1955 untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat (D.P.R.). LEKNAS. Buehler, M. (2007). Local elite reconfiguration in post-New Order Indonesia: The 2005 election of district government heads in South Sulawesi. Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, 41(1), 119–47. Feith, H. (1962). The decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia. Cornell University Press. Feith, H. (1957). The Indonesian Elections of 1955. Cornell Modern Indonesian Project. Fogg, K.W. (2012). The Fate of Muslim Nationalism in Independent Indonesia [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Yale University. Gosnell, H.F. (1958). Indonesians go to the polls: The parties and their stand on constitutional issues. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2(2), 179-190. DOI: 10.2307/2108855. Hosmer, S.T. (1961). The 1955 Indonesian general elections in Java [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Yale University. Kahin, G.McT. (1952). Nationalism and revolution in Indonesia. Cornell University Press. Kementerian Penerangan. (1958). Tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante (Vols. 1-3). Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia. Künkler, M., and Stepan, A. (2013). Indonesian democratization in theoretical perspective. In M. Künkler and A. Stepan (Eds.), Democracy and Islam in Indonesia (pp. 3-23). Columbia University Press. Laffan, M.F. (2003).Islamic nationhood and colonial Indonesia: The umma below the winds. Routledge. Neff, K.L. (1963).Selected bibliography on education in Southeast Asia. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education. Lev, D.S. (1966). The transition to guided democracy: Indonesian politics, 1957-1959. Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. Mestenhauser, J.A. (1960). Ideologies in Conflict in Indonesia, 1945-1955 [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Minnesota. Mrázek, R. (1994). Sjahrir: Politics and exile in Indonesia. Cornell University Southeast Asia Program. Nasution, A.B. (1992). The aspiration for constitutional government in Indonesia: A socio-legal study of the Indonesian Konstituante, 1956-1959. Pustaka Sinar Harapan. Pepinsky, T.B. (2014). Introduction: State of Indonesian political studies. In E. Tagliacozzo (Ed.), Producing Indonesia: The state of the field of Indonesian studies (pp. 233-236). Cornell University Press. Ricklefs, M.C. (2012). Islamisation and its opponents in Java: A political, social, cultural, and religious history, c. 1930 to the present. NUS Press. Rocamora, J.E. (1975). Nationalism in search of ideology: The Indonesian Nationalist Party, 1946-1965. Philippine Centre for Asian Studies, University of the Philippines. Robinson, K. (2008). Gender, Islam, and democracy in Indonesia (Vol. 6). Routledge. Roem, M. (1988). Tinjauan Pemilihan Umum I dan II dari Sudut Hukum. In Bunga Rampai dari Sejarah (volume IV, pp. 99-122). Bulan Bintang. Samson, A.A. (1968). Islam in Indonesian politics. Asian Survey, 8(12), 1001-1017. DOI: 10.2307/2642153. White, S. (2013). Rasuna Said: Lioness of the Indonesian independence movement. In S. Blackburn and H. Ting (Eds.), Women in Southeast Asian nationalist movements (pp. 98-113). NUS Press. Woolar, M.G.B. (20210). Communism in Context: The Indonesian Communist Party in West Java, 1945-68 [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Oxford University. 24 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Syahrul Hidayat is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Universita Ind iwas currently a research fellow in the University of Exeter Unitedngdom. after He completed his PhD with final thesg the Impact of Moderation: The AKP in Turkey and the PKS in Indonesa” at the sersity of Exeterin 2012. He has broad research experience in Indonesian politics and stand BBC London. Kevin W. Fogg is the Associate Director of the Carolina Asia Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. With degrees from Duke and Yale, he previously taught for seven years at Oxford University and has been a visiting researcher at State Islamic Universities across Indonesia. As a historian, his work focuses on Islamic communities in Indonesia after independence. Corresponding author email: [email protected].

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors wish to express our gratitude to M. Putra Syah, Teuku Harza Mauludi, and Muhammad Imam who worked as the assistants on this project, and Seth Agung Setiadha who designed the digital database, assisted in assembling data subsets, and created the public website. This project was conducted with funding from the British Academy Small Grant project, ‘Understanding Indonesia’s Early Legislature,’ administered through the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, and with support of sabbatical leave from the latter.

Accommodating Indonesia’s Islamist Fringe: The Case for a More Inclusive Electoral System

Greg Fealy Australian National University, Australia

Abstract

The trend in Indonesia’s five post-Soeharto elections has been to make it progressively more difficult to register smaller parties and win parliamentary seats. The requirements to register parties have become more onerous and the threshold for gaining legislative representation has risen with almost each election and currently sits at 4%. This has meant fewer parties are able to contest elections, particularly if they lack wealthy supporters. One section of the community which has been affected by these restrictions has been the Islamists, those Muslims who want to bring Islamic principles and law into public life. Of the four Islamic parties that now hold seats in parliament, none claims to be Islamist, though arguably at least two – the Prosperous Justice Party and the United Development Party – have Islamist tendencies. There is no voice for more doctrinaire Islamists in parliament due to the small party restrictions. This article examines these electoral restrictions and Indonesia’s spectrum of Islamist parties and movements. It makes the case for lowering the registration requirements and legislative thresholds for small parties so that Islamists and other minority communities can gain better representation. The article places this discussion in the context of the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis. Keywords: Indonesian Politics, Democracy, Political Islam, Islamist Parties, Electoral system

ndonesia’s election laws over the past two decades have become increasingly restrictive, with the primary intention of limiting the number of small parties. These restrictions have taken the form Iof imposing ever more demanding requirements upon new parties that seek registration to contest elections as well as higher thresholds to gain parliamentary seats. These measures have succeeded in their purpose and the number of new parties competing in elections and winning seats has fallen significantly since the first election of the Reformasi period in 1999. The main argument justifying these restrictions is that they help to create a more orderly political system, which the country needs if it is to develop economically and consolidate politically. In effect, democratic participation is reduced in the name of stability. As some observers have noted, political order is by no means the only or even the major reason behind this growing electoral restrictiveness. The self-interest of major parties that dominate legislative processes is a major factor, as also is a desire to limit fringe groups that many in the political elite regard as problematic. One of the minority communities that leading parties are keen to exclude are the Islamists. This is because they regard Islamists as not only political foes but also an existential threat to Indonesia’s current constitution and tradition of religious tolerance. While Indonesia does have a small number of Islamist parties, their orientation is towards the middle of the political spectrum where greater numbers of votes are to be found, rather than in pursuing emphatically ideological Islamist agendas. As a result, many sections of the Islamist community feel lukewarm towards these parties, often with the result that they vote for them grudgingly, lacking a better choice, or they abstain from voting altogether. These more doctrinaire

‘fringe’ Islamist groups do have substantial support bases and an ability to mobilize large numbers of people on particular issues, and thus can be seen as representing an important minority within the electorate. Present election rules make it near impossible for these Islamist groups to participate, but if the system were more open, they would have good prospects of forming parties that might win a small to modest number of parliamentary seats. In this article, I will be arguing the case for making Indonesia’s election system more inclusive, so that it is able to become more broadly participatory and representative than it currently is. I contend that some increase in the number of smaller parties poses little risk of destabilizing the political system, and even more so, greater Islamist inclusion does not pose a threat to the religiously neutral and pluralist nature of the country. Indeed, allowing Islamist views and aspirations to voice in election campaigns and parliament is not endangering democracy, but in fact, strengthening it at a time when the broader trend has been democratic regression. I will consider the issue of Islamist accommodation in the context of the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis, which has aroused sharpening debate among scholars of political Islam in recent years over whether incorporating ‘radical’ groups into democracies has a moderating effect upon their thinking and behavior. The article is divided into six sections. In the first, I will discuss definitions of Islamism and look at the history of political Islam in Indonesia. Next, the increasingly restrictive nature of Indonesian electoral laws will be examined before describing the parameters of the debate over the Inclusion- Moderation Thesis and how applicable this might be to Indonesia. The fourth section looks at democracy and electoral restrictions across the Muslim world, followed by a survey of how successful Islamist parties have been in Muslim-majority democracies. Last of all, I turn back to Indonesia to consider which Islamist civil society groups might potentially become parties if election laws were liberalized.

INDONESIA’S ISLAMIST SPECTRUM The term Islamist is widely used both in scholarly and popular discourses. It often is used with a negative, and even pejorative, connotation in Western media but many who are directly involved in Islamic politics, particularly of a conservative nature, take no objection to it and some use Islamist proudly as a self-ascription. It is one of the very many terms popularised outside the Muslim world but which has become common usage within it. There are a great many definitions for Islamism in the vast literature on political Islam, but a core element is that Islamists are those within the Muslim community who seek to bring Islamic values and particularly Islamic law into the public domain. The most obvious forms that this can take are the support for Islamisation of the state and the comprehensive implementation of sharia law, but Islamist agendas can also run to Islamising the economy and cultural activities as well as ensuring that such things as social interactions, clothing, and education strictly accord with precepts of the faith. Usually, Islamists tend to promote conservative, literalist, and exclusivist understandings of Islamic law, in contrast to progressive Muslims who have more pluralistic and inclusive views, and who focus more on personal piety and freedom rather than publicly imposed religious strictures. For Islamists, it is the formal application of Islamic teachings in national life, usually via the state, that separates them from other sections of Muslim society and politics. A related term which has relevance for this discussion is that of post-Islamism. This refers to a trend in political Islam in numerous parts in the Muslim world where erstwhile Islamist parties and groups soften their ideologies and adopt more inclusive and pro-democratic positions. Post- Islamists, while personally remaining religiously conservative, nonetheless drop their insistence on sharia-isation, are willing to work within secular and democratic systems and to form alliances with non-Islamist and non-Muslim parties and organizations. This is a category that has found favor Greg Fealy | Accommodating Indonesia’s Islamist Fringe ... 27 with parties that once would have been cast as Islamist. Many of the parties discussed in this article, in fact, deny that they are Islamist, with some describing themselves as post-Islamist or nationalist- religious or simply nationalist. Two prominent examples of this are the Ennahda party in Tunisia and Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP). As will be discussed below, one of Indonesia’s main Islamist parties portrays itself in a similar way. There is much debate among scholars as to whether these parties are really post-Islamist, rather than just Islamist, and indeed, the entire concept the post-Islamism has been subject to growing criticism in recent years by some scholars of political Islam (Shadi Hamid 2018). Regardless of whether parties see themselves as post-Islamist or are described that way by observers, they are nonetheless near to, if not within, the category of Islamist. In an Indonesian context, the key criteria for classifying a group as Islamist or not is its desire for a more comprehensive or systematic application of sharia law and public morality based on Islamic values. Very few Indonesian Islamist groups advocate replacing the present religiously neutral 1945 Constitution and national ideology of Pancasila with an Islam-based state, and those that do so risk sanction from the state. But there are many groups in Indonesia that do campaign vigorously for Indonesia to be more Islamic than they currently perceive it to be and who regard Islamic values as being of higher importance than secular or other religious principles. Islamist activism can take a great many forms, not all of which are directly political, but most of which have political implications. Some Islamist groups support the amendment of the constitution to insert a clause that would oblige all Muslims to uphold sharia law, though they would argue this is a modification of the existing politico-legal framework, not a repudiation or replacement of it. Muslim parliamentarians strive for ‘morality’ laws, such as criminalizing homosexuality or extra- marital sex, and support for Islamically inspired local government bylaws, for example, to enforce modest Muslim dress codes, or prescribe minimum Qur’anic literacy requirements or to ban alcohol sales and prostitution. Other Islamist civil society groups, such as the Family Love Alliance (Aliansi Cinta Keluarga, AILA) have brought cases to the Constitutional court seek, in effect, to outlawing of adultery and gay and lesbian relationships (this was narrowly defeated). Yet others, like the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) undertake vigilante actions against perceived ‘un- Islamic’ or ‘immoral’ activities in their communities, including gambling, non-Muslim missionizing in Muslim districts, and behavior deemed blasphemous or heretical. Many of these groups work separately but are capable when conditions are conducive, of united and concerted action. The most significant recent incidence of this was the so-called 212 Movement, which was formed in late 2016 to campaign against the Chinese Christian governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnomo (Ahok), who was accused of blasphemy. The largest of the 212 rallies took place in December 2016 drawing at least half a million Muslims on to Jakarta’s streets, the largest demonstration in living memory. Most Islamist groups either formally or tacitly gave their support to the demonstrations. They were successful in pressuring the government to charge Ahok, leading to his conviction for insulting religion and jailing for two years. This was arguably the most potent display of Islamist mobilizing power in Indonesia’s history. In the political sphere, the usual criteria for regarding a party as Islamist is whether they have Islam as their ideological basis. Currently, three parties meet this criterion: the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), and the Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB). Since 2008, PKS has declared itself to be no longer an Islamist party and it prefers the ‘religious nationalist’ descriptor. But notably, its formal ideological basis remains Islam, not Pancasila, and its parliamentary representatives continue to favor sharia-based legislation, even if they avoid referring to it as such. PKS, PPP, and PBB have contested all five post-Soeharto elections. Another ten Islamist parties have run in one ormore elections since 1999 – none of which have cleared the parliamentary threshold to gain seats. 28 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

A glance at Indonesia’s electoral history shows that Islamist parties have not been particularly successful during the past twenty years of democratization. Their highest vote was in 2004, when five parties gain 21.3% of the vote. This vote fell in the following three elections. There were six Islamist parties in 2009 and they received 16.6%; the three Islamist parties contesting in 2014 got 14.8%, and the same three Islamist parties received just 13.5% in 2019. If one compares this to Indonesia’s first free and fair democratic election in 1955, when six parties could be classed as Islamist as they all supported sharia-isation of the constitution, the vote was 43.4% A distinction also needs to be drawn here between Islamist parties and non-Islamist Islamic parties, or what might better be called ‘pluralist Islamic parties’ (Fealy, 2001: 122-124). These parties have the religiously neutral state ideology of Pancasila as their ideological basis, not Islam, but they are nonetheless Islamic in the sense that they are firmly entrenched in particular Muslim constituencies, nearly all of their leadership comes from those support bases, and Islamic symbols and teachings undergird their identity and platforms. The essential difference is that they do not seek the Islamization of the state nor the expansion of sharia law. Indeed, they usually decry conservative sharia-ization agendas as dangerous to minority rights and national cohesion, and instead support inclusive, non-sectarian policies. They are wary of the state being involved in governing a wide array of religious matters and are more inclined to see pietism as a private matter rather than the realm of public regulation. During the Reformasi period, there have been two main non-Islamist Islamic parties: the more pluralist of the two is the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), which is the main political representative of the vast Nahdlatul Ulama community, and the second is the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), based in the membership of the second-largest Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah. There have also been eight other, much smaller pluralist Islamic parties since 1999, none of which have won seats. The total vote for pluralist Islamic parties was at its highest in 1999 when they gained 22.2%. This fell to 17% in 2004, to 11.3% in 2009, but rose to 16.6% in 2014 and 16.5% in 2019. Hence the pluralist Islamic vote exceeded the Islamist party vote in three of the five post-Soeharto elections (ie., 2004 and 2009). This divide between Islamist and pluralist Islamic parties and organizations is not always clear cut or immutable. Both types of groups have a diversity of members. Islamist sympathizers can be found in pluralist Islamic groups and there are some relatively progressive figures present in Islamist groups. For example, PAN has some outspoken and highly conservative leaders and politicians whose stances on Islamic issues are little different from those of ardent Islamist organizations, and PKS has allowed non-Muslims into the party (but not into high leadership positions) and has been mildly supportive of some interfaith issues. Similarly, within NU, an organization often praised as a bastion of ‘moderate’ or ‘progressive’ Islam, a significant minority of members and Islamic scholars, espouse sectarian views and find common cause with Islamists on many morality issues. Nonetheless, in general, there is a broad cleavage existing between conservative Islamist groups and pluralist Islamic forces which is important to our discussion on the representation of Islamism within the Indonesian political system. As will be elaborated upon further below, there are good reasons for believing that the percentage of Islamist voters is a good deal higher than the recent election results for Islamist parties suggest, and that many voters of a conservative disposition have tended either to abstain from voting or have given their votes to parties which they feel to not properly represent their Islamic values and agenda.

INDONESIA’S ELECTORAL RESTRICTIONS AND THEIR RATIONALE Indonesia’s current electoral laws make it difficult for Islamist leaders and parties to contest elections, as indeed, they do for all smaller constituencies within Indonesian society. There are two elements to this: first, the requirements to register a party as an electoral contestant are onerous; and second, the threshold for entering parliament is high. Greg Fealy | Accommodating Indonesia’s Islamist Fringe ... 29

The 2017 Election Law (UU no 7, 2017) sets out conditions under which a party would be eligible to contest the 2019 election. Among other things, it specifies that a party must have: legal status as a registered organization with the Ministry of Law and Human Rights; executive boards in all of Indonesia’s 34 provinces, as well as in 75% of the nation’s 514 regencies and 50% of its 7094 districts; permanent offices in Jakarta and provincial and regency-level cities; 30% female membership of its central board; and proof of membership of at least 1000 citizens (UU No. 7, 2017: 121-125). The Election Commission vets all parties seeking to contest elections to ensure that they meet these criteria. By far the most onerous of these stipulations is the requirement for boards across Indonesia down to the district level. At a minimum, this means that an aspiring party needs to have almost 3969 boards: that is, one national, 34 provincial, 387 regency/municipality, and 3547 districts. Having permanent offices in 422 cities is a similarly heavy burden, requiring a party to have substantial physical assets and financial resources. In practice, the Election Law means that setting up electorally eligible new parties is largely the preserve of those with wealth and, to a lesser extent, strong existing networks (but such networks can be purchased if a party grandee has enough money to dispense). Most of the new parties in the past two general elections have had rich founders or principle supporters who have expended millions of dollars to fulfill the registration requirements. Examples of this include: the Greater Indonesia Party (Gerindra), founded by Prabowo Subianto and extensively funded by his multi-millionaire brother Hashim Djojohadikusumo; the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) which had drawn significant support from wealthy progressive businesspeople such as Jefri Geovanni; and the Indonesian Unity Party (Perindo), which was launched and bank-rolled by billionaire magnate Hary Tanoesoedibjo. The difficulty of meeting the Election Law requirements is evident from the fact that for the 2019 general election, 73 new parties applied for verification but only four were approved (KPU, 2019); (Kompas, 2019). Election Commission staff acknowledged that the most common reason for rejecting new parties was that they failed to meet the board, office, or membership requirements at the regency and district level (Tirto.id, 2018). For Islamist organizations and communities, the Election Law stipulations are almost impossible to meet. There are two reasons for this. First, there are few millionaire Islamists and certainly none in the mogul category like Hashim Djojohadikusumo or Hary Tanosoedibjo. The Islamist community is diverse but it is, for the most part, not well to do. As will be discussed later, there are growing sections of the Muslim middle classes in big cities who have Islamist sympathies or orientations, but they have not, at least until now, been significant political donors. They are active on social media in promoting Islamist values and they do spend substantial sums in pursuing Islamic lifestyles, but, in general, they have not committed large sums to political organizations. Second, Islamist groups, in contrast to mainstream Islamic organizations, tend not to have strong, nation-wide networks. The majority of Islamist groups have localized support bases, often with a tightly knit core membership, but relatively few have dispersed, well-organized communities, let alone, significant financial resources spread across all provinces and most regencies. In this regard, the often-inflated figures that Islamist leaders trumpet regarding their membership and support base are usually wildly inflated and the truth is that even very active Islamist groups like FPI do not have strong administrative capacity or an extensive array of routine activities. Thus, to meet the minimum board and permanent office criteria required by the Election Law is an almost insurmountable hurdle for most, if not all, Islamist organizations. Even if Indonesia’s small parties, including fringe Islamist parties, could run in general elections, they face the hurdle of rising thresholds to gain seats in national and local parliaments. At the first post-Soeharto election in 1999, the parliamentary threshold was set at 2%, but this rose to 3% in 2004, fell to 2.5% in 2009, was elevated again to 3.5% in 2014 and has reached a new high point of 4% in 2019. The impact of this was evident in the election result. Only nine of the 16 national parties cleared the threshold and gained parliamentary seats. This led to 13,594,842 votes being ‘wasted’ – 30 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

9.7% of the total 139,971,260 votes cast – because they went to parties that fell short of the 4% cut-off (Titi Anggaraini, 2019). By comparison, at the 1999 election, when the threshold was just 2%, 21 parties out of the 48 contestants succeeded in gaining seats. The primary reason given by parliament for rising requirements for party registration and legislative thresholds is that Indonesian politics will be more orderly and stable if the number of parties in elections and legislatures is limited. But undoubtedly, the self-interest of parties already in parliament, and especially the larger parties, is a key factor. Parties such as the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, PDI-P) and Golkar have consistently sought to reduce the number of new and small parties and to tailor electoral laws that privileged established parties. The fewer the number of parties, the less need for wider coalitions and the greater possibility for political elites to dominate legislative processes. But these same large parties also have a dislike for Islamists, particularly the more doctrinaire fringe groups, whom they see as a disruptive influence to religious and ethnic harmony in Indonesia as well as a danger to the nation’s constitutionally prescribed religious neutrality. Such sentiment is especially prevalent in PDI-P, which draws on a strong secular-nationalist tradition and concern for minority religious rights. Anti-Islamist hostility has deepened in parties such as PDI-P, Golkar, and the pluralist Islamic PKB over the past half-decade as Islamists have mobilized against those they have identified as enemies by using sectarian, and on occasion, racist language. In the 2014 presidential election, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) came under sustained attack by Islamist groups who accused him of being: a closet Christian (he is in fact an observant Muslim); of Chinese birth; and a lackey of anti-Muslim interests, both foreign and domestic. Although Jokowi won the election, the Islamist campaign succeeded in tarnishing his Islamic credibility and in making the result far closer than it might otherwise have been. Two years later, Islamist groups were pivotal in the mobilization against Ahok in Jakarta. The sheer size of the anti-Ahok demonstrations and the space that they provided for Islamists to promote their broader agendas, shocked pluralist politicians and led many to push for state responses to limit Islamism’s impact. Given this political environment, there are few in the current government who are well disposed to arguments for having a more open electoral system, one that might give greater opportunity for Islamist involvement. Nonetheless, there are arguments for why consideration should be given to allowing a more inclusive political system, especially if there are concerns for Islamist radicalization.

INCLUSION-MODERATION THESIS In political science, and especially the study of Islamic politics, one of the major sites of theoretical debate in the past decade has been about the merits of the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis. The thesis posits that participation in competitive electoral politics can transform those who have previously held extreme or radical ideas into moderate democratic actors. According to this view, including groups within the democratic system provides incentives to negotiate and compromise with other groups holding different views or agendas, thereby encouraging them to modify their rigidpre- existing ideology and strategies in order to increase their electoral prospects and chances of gaining a share of power. For proponents of the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis, incorporating Islamists into democratic processes is an important means of broadening and strengthening commitment to civil and plural politics while at the same time undermining the propensity to use violence or unswerving sectarian agendas. Among the scholars who embraced the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis are Sultan Tepe (2005), in his study of conservative religious parties in Turkey and Israel, Vali Nasr (1995) analysis of Jamiati-i-Islami in Pakistan, and Carrie Wickham’s consideration of the Wasat Party in Egypt (2004). Greg Fealy | Accommodating Indonesia’s Islamist Fringe ... 31

But the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis has also had its detractors and they have grown in number in recent years. A major criticism is that many of the studies that use the thesis lack sufficient empirical detail to be persuasive. Many aspects of the moderation process are inadequately understood and it is possible that factors other than electoral inclusion are responsible for growing openness or tolerance on the part of erstwhile radical groups. Particular attention focuses upon whether moderating processes hinge on party elites rather than changes of attitude within the broader mass of members, in which case moderation may not sustainable in the long-term. Some scholars also distinguish between behavioral moderation, in which political leaders adapt their strategies to exigencies of democratic competition, and ideological moderation, where parties may significantly accept ideas that are compatible with democratic values. If moderation is only behavioral and lacks underlying ideological rethinking, then the risk is that such parties may easily return to their radical roots when political conditions are conducive. As Sultan Tepe observes in a recent critical essay on the Inclusion- Moderation Thesis, the theory is not a one-size-fits-all and that the nuances of different kinds of case study need to be explored before generalizing that inclusion will, of itself, produce moderation (Tepe, 2019). A number of scholars have used Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in an Indonesian context. Perhaps the best-known work is Michael Buehler’s study of PKS, in which he found considerable evidence that democratic involvement had led to the modification of the party’s outlook and behavior (Beuhler, 2015). Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi have written in somewhat more skeptical terms about the usefulness of the thesis in their analysis of the anti-Ahok mobilization in 2016-2017. There is not space in this article to enter more deeply into this debate about Inclusion- Moderation Thesis but several observations of trends in Indonesian Islamist politics are called for. First, Indonesia’s main Islamist parties can be seen as evidence in support of the Thesis. Although PKS and PPP retain their Islamic ideological basis, both parties consistently pitch their electoral strategies towards the center of the political spectrum where the great bulk of votes are to be found, rather than appealing only to their Islamist support bases. These strategic decisions are based on the realization that genuinely ideological Islamism is appealing to only a small minority of the electorate – according to polling data less than 15% of voters. The only hope for PKS or PPP to reach double figures in their vote is to attract Muslim voters who are drawn to non-ideological elements of their campaigning, be it promises of better welfare measures, greater equality in the distribution of wealth, or fighting corruption and immorality. So, in this regard, democratic participation has moderated the behavior, if not the internal ideological thinking, of Islamist parties. Second, the centrist tendencies of PKS and PPP have meant a widening gulf between the political agendas of the main Islamist parties and the preoccupations of many Islamist social movements. Many ideologically committed Islamists would like to see far more concerted advocacy of sharia-based policies than is pursued by PKS and PPP. They would also like to see more emphatic policies to redistribute wealth from Indonesia’s largely non-Muslim, Chinese economic elites towards the predominantly Muslim masses. Thus, this bifurcation between parties and civil society groups supports the critics of the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis that democratic involvement may bring moderation among the professional political classes but not necessarily among the masses. The question that Indonesia’s legislators should be asking is, if they want to undermine trenchant Islamism, does the available evidence suggest that democratic inclusion will be effective in achieving this? The PKS and PPP cases suggest that this is so, but the problem is the lack of variety in Islamist electoral options because of the restrictions set out in the current Election Law. Even if new Islamist parties might not embark on the pragmatic course taken by PKS and PPP, the fact that they have been allowed participation in the system would itself lessen perceptions that the state is hostile to them. In this context, it is useful to look at other parts of the Muslim world to see what electoral restrictions apply and how successful Islamist parties have been. 32 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL RESTRICTIONS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD The Muslim world is currently not a redoubt for democracy. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2018 Democracy Index, no Muslim majority nation was fully democratic (that is, scoring 8-10 on a 10-point scale), but three countries – Indonesia, Senegal, and Tunisia – were at the higher end of the ‘flawed democracy’ category (i.e., 6-7 on the scale). The EIU defines flawed democracies as systems where there are reasonably free and fair elections as well as substantial uphold of human rights, but major faults are present in the political culture, standard of governance, and public participation. Eight Muslim nations fall within the next category, hybrid, meaning that elections are not free and fair, there is poor rule of law, critics and opponents of the government are subject to harassment and repression, and corruption is widespread. Albania, Mali, Bangladesh, and Kyrgyzstan have somewhat more democracy in this hybrid category (5-6), and another four – Turkey, Morocco, Iraq, and Pakistan – are at the lower level (4-5). All other Muslim-majority countries are consigned to the ‘authoritarian’ category (0-4), with many states such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan located at the lowest ranking (EIU Democracy Index, 2019). A similar picture is painted by the US-based Freedom House, which like EIU, also does annual assessments of each nation’s levels of freedom and democracy. Freedom House uses a simpler classification than EIU, categorizing nations as ‘free’ (democratic), ‘partly free’ (semi-democratic) or ‘not free’ (undemocratic). In its 2019 report, Freedom House ranked only two Muslim-majority nations as free: Senegal and Tunisia. Indonesia was ranked free between 2006 and 2013 but since then it has joined other Muslim countries Pakistan, Bangladesh, Guinea, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Burkina Faso, Jordan, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Maldives, and Kyrgyzstan as being partly free. The remaining thirty-two Muslim-majority nations are in the not free category (Freedom House, 2019). The vast majority of democratic and semi-democratic states in the Muslim world restrict smaller parties, which often includes Islamist parties. The most common way of doing this is through parliamentary thresholds. Turkey currently has the world’s highest threshold of 10%; Kazakhstan at 7% is second. Most of the 16 Muslim nations classed by Freedom House as partly free impose thresholds of between 2-5%, not inconsistent with patterns across the broader world. It is notable to consider the cases of the two Muslim-majority countries ranked by both EIU and Freedom House as fully democratic. Tunisia currently has no threshold for obtaining parliamentary seats. In the October 2019 general election, 20 parties won seats in the national legislature, 13 of which had 4 seats or less in the 217-seat parliament (IFES, 2019). In the case of Senegal, due to the nature of its electoral system, no threshold is set, but the 2017 general election saw 11 parties get three seats or less in a parliament of 165 members. The point to make here is that both Senegal and Tunisia are examples of well-functioning democracies that impose no limits on the participation of small parties, including Islamist parties. In Tunisia, almost 220 parties competed in the 2019 parliamentary elections. More specifically, the Tunisian authorities have made a deliberate decision to accommodate Salafist parties, such as Jabhat al-Islah, the Justice and Development Party, as well as Hizb ut-Tahrir, in order to counter jihadist recruitment and the reduce the risk of young conservative Muslims being drawn towards violence rather than peaceful politics. More than 6000 Tunisians are estimated to have joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other jihadist groups in the Middle East and other parts of North and West Africa, and occasional jihadist attacks within Tunisia continue to cause political and social tensions (Nada 2017; Yehia, 2014). Senegal represents a different kind of dynamic. As in many Muslim-majority West African nations, Islamism is weak in Senegal, due predominantly to the enduring strength of Sufi movements and a politically entrenched tradition of secularism. The country’s election laws ban explicit Greg Fealy | Accommodating Indonesia’s Islamist Fringe ... 33 religious bases for political parties but Islamists have been able to skirt around this by giving their parties secular titles, such as the Party for Truth and Development (PVD) and the Party for Unity and Togetherness (PUR). Leaders of both parties have cautiously advocated Islamising agendas. At the 2017 parliamentary elections PUR won three seats in the national parliament and PVD one (Hamid and Lebovich, 2017; The American Foreign Policy Council World Almanac of Islamism, 2013; Dieye, 2009).

GLOBAL TRENDS IN ISLAMIST ELECTORAL POLITICS In general, Islamist parties tend to have limited electoral support in most Muslim nations and there are no instances of Islamist parties winning outright majorities in any democratic election. But there are a small number of instances when Islamists have won large pluralities in national voting and been able to form the government or dominate coalition governments. The three countries in question are Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia. By far the most successful Islamist party has been Turkey’s AKP. It was founded in 2001 by former Istanbul mayor, Recep Tayyip Erdogan based on an alliance of Islamist parties, particularly the recently banned Virtue Party, and socially conservative parties such as True Path and Motherland. The party has contested four general elections to date – 2002, 2007, 2015, and 2018 – and two direct presidential elections: 2014 and 2018. In 2002 it won 34.4% of the national vote but secured 363 (66%) of the 550 parliamentary seats. Its two-thirds majority enabled it to form government in its own right with Abdullah Gul, a former Virtue Party leader, as prime minister, who was replaced the following year by Erdogan. AKP received its highest vote ever in 2007 with 46.6%, but its parliamentary majority fell slightly to 341 (62%), still enabling it to continue as the governing party. Following this election, AKP succeeded in having its candidate, Gul, voted in as president by parliament. The 2014 election saw AKP’s vote fall to 40.8% and it gained only 258 seats (47%), thereby losing, for the first time in thirteen years, its parliamentary majority and the ability to form a single-party government. It went on to join with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to create the People’s Alliance to obtain a governing majority. At the 2018 general election, the AKP vote strengthened slightly to 42.6%, giving it 295 (49%) of 600 parliamentary seats, but the People’s Alliance won a majority with 53.7% of the vote and 344 seats (57.3%), allowing it to remain in government. The AKP has been more successful in Turkey’s two direct presidential elections, winning clear victories on both occasions with Erdogan as its candidate. In 2014, Erdogan won 51.8% and in 2018 52.5%. Egypt provides a contrasting case to Turkey of Islamist party fortunes. After Egypt’s post-Arab Spring democratization in early 2011, multiple Islamist parties were formed, the most important of which were Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Salafist al-Nour Party. The Brotherhood had long been active politically but subject to heavy restriction by the Sadat and Mubarak regimes. With the sweeping away of the Mubarak regime in January and February 2011, the Brotherhood quickly formed FJP as its sole endorsed electoral vehicle under the leadership Mohamad Morsi. Al-Nour was established at roughly the same time by the more conservative Salafist Call Society, one of the largest Salafist organizations in Egypt. Initially, al-Nour joined the FJP-led Democratic Alliance for Egypt but in the run-up to the election it withdrew and formed its own Islamist Bloc. At the general election, which was held in three stages between November 2011 and January 2012, FJP emerged as the largest single party, winning 213 (41%) of the 508 lower house seats. In total, the 11 Democratic Alliance parties gained 235 seats (46%), making it by far the biggest grouping in parliament. Al-Nour won 107 seats (21%) and its Islamic Bloc emerged as the second- largest coalition with 123 seats (24%). The crowning achievement for the Brotherhood came in the direct presidential elections in mid-2012, at which Morsi obtained 51.7% in the final round and was installed as president on 30 June. Morsi remained in office for just over one year and was removed 34 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

from office by the military in July 2013 after massive public protests. Al-Nour, though initially supportive of the FJP government, joined the opposition to it from early 2013 and backed the coup against Morsi. The FJP and the Brotherhood were banned after Morsi’s removal but al-Nour remains an active party, despite several legal cases calling for its disbandment. It won 11 parliamentary seats at the 2015 general election, making it the seventh-largest party in parliament. The last case of a successful Islamist party is Ennahda in Tunisia. Founded as the Movement of Islamic Tendency in 1981 and drawing inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood and Abul a’la Maududi, Ennahda became a party shortly after the 2011 Tunisian Revolution that sparked the broader Arab Spring. It contested the Constituent Assembly elections later that year, emerging as by far the largest single party with 37% of the vote and 89 of the available 217 legislative seats. Lacking a majority in its own right, Ennahda formed a governing coalition with two center-left parties, CPR and Ettakol. Ennahda’s secretary-general, Hamadi Jebali became prime minister and the party held 40% of cabinet seats. Mounting security, economic and political problems led to the resignation of Jebali in early 2013, with Ennahda relinquishing key ministries to technocrats and allowing the CPR to lead the government. Early the following year, Ennahda, along with its two coalition partners agreed to hand over power to a technocrat-led government. At the parliamentary elections held later in 2014, Ennahda’s vote dropped by a third compared to 2011, gaining 27.8% and 69 of 217 seats, the second biggest party in the legislature. At the 2019 elections, its vote fell again, to 19.6%, though it recaptured the position of the biggest party holding a quarter of parliamentary seats (Sadiki, 2019; Tharoor, 5 Nov 2019). Ennahda’s long-serving leader, Rached Ghannouchi, has now become a parliamentary speaker and at the time of writing, the party’s nominee for the prime ministership, Habib Jemli, is striving to form a government amid a highly fragmented political landscape (Aljazeera, 16 Nov 2019). To summarise the cases of these three Islamist parties, only the AKP can be regarded as having sustained and durable success. It has held the government as a single party for thirteen years and has been the dominant ruling coalition party for another five years. It has also held the presidency either through indirect or direct election for the past fourteen years. No other Islamist party in history comes near to achieving this consistency and longevity in government. The Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP in Egypt has had an ephemeral life in political terms. Within two years of its formation, it had won a plurality in parliament and narrowly won a presidential election, before being swept away on a wave of unpopularity and military aggression. Egypt’s other Islamist party, al-Nour has been a secondary player. And Tunisia’s Ennahda, despite winning international praise for its willingness to compromise with other parties and surrender power in the face of political tumult, has had, at best, a chequered history in government. Having gained a plurality on two occasions, it has proved incapable of providing effective leadership, and its vote has fallen by almost half over eight years. While it has shown itself to be more united and resilient than most other Tunisian parties, its prospect of longer- term political entrenchment is far from certain. It is also interesting to ask how Islamist parties in Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia might be seen in the context of Inclusion-Moderation Thesis. In its early years, the AKP was often held up as an example of political inclusion leading to moderation. Until the late 2000s, the party drew support from a broad cross-section of Turkish society, including Christian and Jewish minorities, who were attracted by its economically expansive policies, as well as its softer stance on Islamisation issues than many of the Islamist parties that had preceded it. AKP’s attitudes hardened in the mid-2010s, as Erdogan increasingly resorted to Islamist appeals to mobilize his supporters and buttress his position (Bubalo, Fealy & Mason, 2008; Cagaptay, 2017). As a result, present-day AKP is seen as contradicting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis. The FJP in Egypt is one of the most frequently cited cases of an Islamist party which did not conform to the Thesis. Although Mursi and Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarians had a good track record of cooperating with non-Islamist parties prior to the Greg Fealy | Accommodating Indonesia’s Islamist Fringe ... 35

Arab Spring, once in power the FJP quickly alienated many of its former allies and concentrated power in hands of the Brotherhood (Hamid, 2014). Ennahda is the only major Islamist party which has behaved in a way that is consistent with the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis. It has cooperated in government with a range of other parties and has been prepared to compromise on Islamically based policies for the sake of coalition cohesion. Perhaps most importantly, Ennahda was willing to surrender leadership of the government to non-Islamists when it lost public support. It has remained committed to democratic principles and to working cooperatively with other parties (Esposito, Sonn, and Voll, 2016). Aside from these three countries, the record of Islamist parties around the world is poor to middling. Perhaps the most comprehensive comparative study of Islamist party electoral performance is that done by Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Navqi. They surveyed 86 election results across 20 Muslim nations between 1968 and 2002, and found that Islamic parties averaged 8.9% of the national vote and gained 8.1% of legislative seats. Among their other findings that are of relevance to this discussion are that: (1) the fairer the electoral system, the worse Islamist parties tended to fare; (2) the longer Islamist parties were engaged in democratic contestation the less they emphasized sharia-related issues and the more they concentrated on rights and equality; and (3) the presence of conflict and terrorism tended to increase Islamist participation in electoral politics, not reduce it (Kurzman and Navqi, 2009). Kurzman and Navqi’s results are usually cited in support of the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis. The pattern identified by Kurzman and Navqi is broadly consistent with Indonesia in the Reformasi period. The most successful Islamist parties are PKS and PPP, both of which average votes of 6.3% and 7% respectively. PKS’ highest vote was 8.2% in 2019 and its lowest was 1.4% in 1999; PPP’s is the reverse with a peak of 10.7% in 1999, falling to 4.5% in 2019. No Islamist party has ever made it into the top-four parties and thus their influence has been modest at best.

THE CASE FOR LOWER ELECTORAL REQUIREMENTS AND GREATER ISLAMIST REPRESENTATION In this final section, I would like to outline why Indonesia should reduce its electoral barriers to smaller parties and encourage Islamist groups and other small minority sections within society to form parties and strive to win legislative seats, at both the national and local levels. The standard argument among both political scientists and Indonesia’s political elite for high thresholds is that it brings stability and order. Low thresholds mean higher numbers of parties competing in elections and potentially more fragmented legislative processes. If there are a large number of parties with a few members of parliament, forming ruling coalitions will be more difficult and unpredictable, as also will be the job of managing the parliamentary business. Members of Indonesia’s larger parties often refer back to the 1999 election, when electoral restrictions were minimal and 48 parties competed. Twenty-one parties won seats, ten of which had only a single seat. By contrast, the five biggest parties gained 90% of elected parliamentary seats (38 seats in the 500-seat legislature were allocated to the military). They argued that such a profusion of party representatives led to an unsettled, at times ill- disciplined, parliament, and that having somewhere between 8-12 parties in parliament is ideal as it balances the need for representation with that of maintaining a settled, workable system. However, there are at least two arguments against this. The first is that the higher the registration requirements and legislative threshold, the more ‘wastage’ there will be of votes. The second is that representation of community diversity, including that of Islamist groups, is severely compromised. There are particular reasons why Islamists should be accommodated within the political system. To begin with, this is a community of assertive views and often a strong sense of grievance. Many Islamists believe that the Indonesian state has been, for most of its history, ill-disposed 36 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

towards Islam, and particularly to Islamist groups. They trace this back to the negotiations over the founding constitution in 1945, where clauses that would have given legal recognition to sharia and also required the president to be a Muslim were removed after strong objections from religious minorities. Throughout Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (1959-1966) and especially during Suharto’s New Order regime, Islamists were systematically marginalized and repressed. For some Islamist groups, the current high thresholds are further evidence of the state’s determination to deny them a political space. A second reason is that the Islamist community is vulnerable to radicalization, which can, in its extreme forms, lead to a rejection of democracy and a resort to violence, such as through jihadism. The percentage of Islamists who become extremists is very small, but nonetheless the security implications for Indonesia are considerable and successive governments over the past two decades have invested heavily in various counter-radicalization measures. Greater attention should be paid to potential benefits of including a greater range of Islamists into formal politics. The parliamentary threshold should be returned to no more than 2%, as was the case in the 1999 election, but a case can be made for removing it altogether, as in 1955. Similarly, easing party registration requirements so that only provincial board representation and office distribution is needed would make it easier for minority groups to meet the minimum conditions. The question then is which Islamist organizations that are not currently active in politics might potentially consider becoming electoral contestants. The most obvious candidate is FPI. FPI claims to have seven million members and branches in every province and a majority of districts of Indonesia. Survey data has consistently shown relatively high public ‘awareness’ of the organization. Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi cite polling data showing that FPI’s public recognition in 2004 was 40% and this rose to 60% in 2016. Moreover, the percentage of people who said they supported FPI’s activities and agenda rose from 14 to 16 in that same period. Mietzner and Muhtadi observe that FPI has become ‘the most popular representative of militant ideas’ among conservative Muslims (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018: 9). Perhaps more importantly, exit polling shows 13.4% of voters at the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election said they would vote for FPI if it became a party. In Banten, the figure was 22.1%, in Medan 15.9%, and in East Kalimantan, 9.3% (Mietzner and Muhtadi, 2018: 9). Such data suggest FPI would have strong prospects of winning parliamentary seats. Since at least 2008, various FPI leaders have publicly discussed the possibility of converting their organization into a party, though the Front’s ‘commander’, Habib Rizieq Shihab, has always been wary (PinterPolitik, 2017). At the 2019 election, FPI did allow some 10-15 members to stand as legislative candidates for PBB, openly using their FPI affiliation, but most resigned when the party threw its support behind President Joko Widodo, who many Islamists see as an enemy of the faith (Republika Online, 2019; (Tempo.co, 2019). Although FPI’s popularity has fallen since the high- point of the anti-Ahok rallies in 2016-2017, and the fleeing of Rizieq to Saudi Arabia to escape charges of disseminating pornographic material, the organization still has the potential to be an effective party. In late 2019, when encountering problems renewing its registration with the Ministry for Justice and Human Rights, governing coalition members that it should just transform itself into a party (Warta Ekonomi, 2019). Another Islamist organization which might potentially consider direct political involvement in the future is Wahdah Islamiyah, the largest and probably best organized Salafist movement in Indonesia. It claims to have a membership exceeding one million, and it has a presence in most provinces. Moreover, it has a large network of well run educational, charitable, commercial, and predication-related media operations. In recent years, it has been repositioning itself from the right of the spectrum to the mainstream, becoming more pragmatic and somewhat less doctrinaire. It is now running public service religious training programs and its leaders are involved in advisory boards for national and local governments and semi-government institutions. It accepts Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as final. A growing number of its members have Indonesianised their Greg Fealy | Accommodating Indonesia’s Islamist Fringe ... 37 garb, and now often wear batik shirts rather than the traditional Salafi white shirts, and gowns. It has a very active women’s wing and has shown a willingness to compromise on issues such as gender empowerment (though not gender equality or feminism). Wahdah Islamiyah’s national profile rose considerably with its involvement in the 212 Movement. It was one of the four founding organizations in the National Movement to Guard the MUI Fatwa (Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa-MUI, GNPF-MUI) which served as the initiator of the 212 Movement. Wahdah’s chairman, Zaitun Rasmin, was a spokesman for GNPF-MUI and often appeared in the media in late 2016 and early 2017, as well as taking a prominent role in the various rallies. He is probably the first Wahdah leader to become well known outside Islamist circles. Although Wahdah Islamiyah has not publicly discussed the issue of becoming a political party, the trajectory of the organization towards the mainstream with a much large membership base, raises the possibility of direct political involvement. Most Salafi organizations eschew politics, believing that it is more important to Islamise society than to engage in matters of state. But a growing sub- stream within global Salafism, usually referred to haraki Salafism, is politically active. Al-Nour party in Egypt is one of the best known, but other Salafist parties include the al-Islah party in Yemen and the Dignity Party in Egypt.1 A third Islamist organization also warrants discussion as a possible party, even if it is now proscribed in Indonesia. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, Party of Liberation), from 2000 till mid- 2017, was one of the best-organized and most disciplined Islamist movements. It was probably also one of the largest. HTI kept is membership figures secret but research by Nawab Osman found that it had around 30,000 fully inducted members but a much larger community of trainee members and sympathizers that probably numbered several hundred thousand. Some of its larger events drew more than 60,000 people in Jakarta. It also enjoyed a good deal of success at attracting support from a diverse array of Muslim leaders, politicians, and retired military officers, who would regularly attend HTI functions as speakers or honored guests. By the mid-2000s, the Indonesian chapter of Hizbut Tahrir was generally reckoned to be the largest in the world (Osman, 2012; Fealy, 2007). HTI’s rapid expansion was notable because its ideology made it markedly different from virtually all other Islamist groups. Its core agenda was the restoration of a transnational caliphate that had been abolished by the Turkish government in 1924 (it did not recognize the Islamic State caliphate established by al-Baghdadi in 2014), something that sat awkwardly Indonesia’s long insistence that organizations declare primary loyalty to the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and to no other entity. Despite calling itself a party, HTI repudiated democracy as a godless, secular system and inherently un-Islamic. Nonetheless, the party did permit members to vote in the 2004 and 2009 elections, but only for candidates who supported pro-sharia policies, and in 2007, the HTI spokesman, Ismail Yusanto, was reported in the media as countenancing the possibility of his organization contesting an election (Detik.com, 2007). (Hizb ut-Tahrir in several Middle Eastern nations had contested elections in the 1950s and 1960s.) In early 2017, the Jokowi government accused HTI of seditious activity and of breaching laws regarding the registration of mass organizations. It subsequently dissolved HTI in July of that year. Despite is proscription, former HTI members remain active and some of its high-profile preachers continue to quietly recruit for the organization without making direct reference to it by name. Had it not been banned, HTI could well have been a serious electoral participant. There are potentially many other Islamist groups who might consider contesting future elections either on their own or in alliance with others if the regulations were more favorable. We have seen with the 212 Movement how it is possible to form, at short notice, for quite large Islamist coalitions to come together at short notice and the same could happen in politics as well.

1 I am grateful to Dr Chris Chaplin for some of the information upon which this discussion of Wahdah Islamiyah is based. Additional information has come from a confidential source who has done research into the organisation. 38 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

CONCLUSION One of the tasks facing the new Indonesian parliament is the revision of the 2017 election law for the 2024 elections. On present indications, it is unlikely that substantial changes will be made to the minimum requirements for political parties to contest the election or the current 4% threshold to gain legislative seats, for reasons already discussed above. Despite the dim prospects for change, this article has argued that the fear of Islamist participation is overblown and that there are benefits for Indonesia’s democracy and national security in having more significant Islamist involvement. If we look across the Muslim world, there are very few instances of successful Islamist parties. Success in this context is measured by their ability to win a major share, if not a plurality, of the national vote. As we have seen, no Islamist party anywhere has won an outright majority of the popular vote, though in the case of AKP in Turkey, due the nature of the electoral system, it has been able to secure for multiple terms handsome legislative majorities. The global average for Islamist parties is between five to eight percent. In Indonesia, history suggests that the appeal of Islamist parties is limited. In the five elections of the ‘Reformasi’ period, the total average vote for Islamist parties has been 16.5% and the only two significant Islamist parties – PKS and PPP – have averaged between them 6.7% between 1999 and 2019. These middling returns were delivered in free and fair elections where there have been no restrictions on Islamists in competing with other parties. Whatever might be said of Indonesia’s democracy, it has provided a reasonably level playing field for parties. Hence there are no grounds for expecting that Islamist parties might suddenly surge into the top three or even five parties in the next 10 to 15 years. But what is clear is that the current array of Islamist parties fails to galvanize many in the more conservative sections of the Islamic community, chiefly because they have moved towards the centre of the spectrum in an attempt to garner more votes. In doing so, they have downplayed the sharia- oriented policies (though these are still pursued in a more selective and understated way) and sought to cast themselves as non-Islamist. For many of their core supporters, this is an understandable strategy, but for more doctrinaire Islamist voters, these parties are seen as pale or diluted forms of proper Islamism. The earlier discussion of the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis raises precisely this point as to whether involvement in competitive politics has a moderating effect on Islamist parties. The evidence from PKS and PPP suggests that this is the case, as both have become far more pragmatic in their stances over the past 15 years. But in doing so, they have left behind sections of the electorate that want more emphatic championing of Islamist agendas, not toned-down ones. Critics of the Inclusion- Moderation Thesis rightly point out that too much attention is given to party leaders rather than rank-and-file members or broader support bases that might be much less convinced about the merits of compromise. In the Indonesian case, the limits of Inclusion-Moderation thinking are evident. Not only scholars, but also governments and state authorities should be wary of denying political space to fringe sections of society who hold fervent, but not necessarily militant views. Making it easier for Islamists to form new parties is one way in which Indonesia’s democracy could become more representative and reduce alienation among communities that believe the state is hostile or dismissive towards them. For these reasons, a strong argument can be made for reducing the parliamentary threshold to one percent or at the most two percent and eliminating many of the requirements for district-level representation which currently excludes most Islamist groups from seeking to register parties. At a time when many scholars believe that Indonesian democracy is backsliding on multiple fronts, opening up the system to a wider range of participants might restore some health to the country’s political reputation. Greg Fealy | Accommodating Indonesia’s Islamist Fringe ... 39

REFERENCES Aljazeera. (2019, November 16. Accessed 15 December 2019). Tunisia: Habib Jemli tasked with forming a new government. Retrieved from Aljazeera.com: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/tunisia-habib- jemli-tasked-forming-government-191116072758961.html. American Foreign Policy Council. (2013, July 11. Accessed 20 October 2019.). World Almanac of Islamism, ‘Senegal’. Retrieved from afpc.org: http://almanac.afpc.org/senegal. Anggaraini, T. (2019, June 25-26). An Agenda for Electoral Reform, presentation to the ANU-CSIS Conference on Electoral Reform. Jakarta. Bubalo, A., Fealy, G., & Mason, W. (2008). Zealous Democrats: Islamism and Democracy in Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy. Buehler, M. (2012) Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the context of decentralized institutions: The behavior of Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party in national and local elections. Party Politics, vol. 19 (2), pp. 210-229. Cagaptay, S. (2017). The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey. London and New York: I.B Taurus & Co. Detik.com. (2007, August 12). Dirikan Parpol, FPI tirukan Gerakan Hizbut Tahrir Dunia. Retrieved from Detik.com:Detik.com. Dieye, A. (2009, March. Accessed on 20 October 2019). “Secularism in Senegal: Withstanding the Challenge of Local Realities”, Institute of Islamic Thought in Africa Working Paper Series, Buffett Center, Northwestern University. Retrieved October 20, 2019, from buffett.northwestern.edu: https://buffett. northwestern.edu/documents/working-papers/ISITA_09-006_Dieye.pdf. Economist Intelligence Unit. (Accessed 2019, November 30). Democracy Indec 2018. Retrieved from www. eiu.com: https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index. Esposito, J., Sonn, T., Voll, J.O. (2016). Islam and Democracy After the Arab Spring. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Fealey, G. (2001). Islamic Politics: A rising or declining force. In D. Kingsbury, & A. Budiman, Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition (pp. 119-136). Adelaide: Crawford House. Fealey, G. (2007). Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia: Seeking a “Total” Muslim Identity. In S. Akbarzadeh, & F. Mansouri, Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West (pp. 151-64). London and New York: IB Tauris. Freedom house. (Accessed on 2019, November 30). Democracy in Retreat: Freedom in the World, 2019. Retrieved from freedomhouse.org: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-word/freedom- world-2019. Gerses, M. (2014). Islamist democracy and Turkey: A test of the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis. Party Politics, vol.20 (4), 646-653. Hamid, S. (2014). Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East. Oxford and New York: Oxford Univerity Press. Hamid, S., & Lebovich, A. (2017, April 20. Accessed on 14 November 2019). Why are there so few Islamists in West Africa? A Dialogue. Retrieved from Brookings Institution: https://www.brookings.edu/on-the- record/why-are-there-so-few-islamists-in-west-africa-a-dialogue-between-shadi-hamid-and-andrew- lebovich. IFES. (Accessed on 2019, November 28). Elections in Tunisia: 2019 Parliamentary Elections, p 1. Retrieved from ifest.org: https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/ifes_faqs_elections_in_tunisia_2019_parlia mentary_elections_september_2019.pdf. 40 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

Komisi Pemilihan Umum. (2019). ‘Partai Politik Peserta Pemilu. Retrieved from kpu.go.id: https://jdih.kpu. go.id/parpol. Kompas. (2019, February 18). ‘Menanti Gebrakan Empat Partai Baru Peserta Pemilu’. Retrieved from nasional.kompas.com: https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/02/18/09021091/menanti-gebrakan- empat-partai-baru-peserta-pemilu-2019?page=all. Kurzman, C., & Navqi, I. (2009, January 15). Islamic Political Parties and Parliamentary Elections. United State Institute of Peace Working Paper, 42 pages. Mietzner, M., & Muhtadi, B. (2018, July 09). Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilization in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation. Asian Studies Review, 1-20. Nada, G. (2017, August 7. Accessed on 15 November 2019). Nada, Garrett, ‘The Islamist Spectrum: Tunisia – From Democrats to Jihadis’, The Wilson Center, 7 August 2017,. Retrieved from wilsoncenter.org: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-islamist-spectrum-tunisia-democrats-to-jihadis. Nasr, S. (1995). Democracy and Islamic Revivalism. Political Science Quarterly,, pp. 110, 261-285. Osman, M. (2012). The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Identity, Ideology and Religious Mobilization. PhD Thesis, The Australian National University. Plus-Minus FPI Jadi Parpol. (2017, November 24). Retrieved from PinterPolitik.com: https://www. pinterpolitik.com/plus-minus-fpi-jadi-parpol. Republika Online. (2019, January 30). ‘Ini Jumlah Kader FPI yang Jadi Caleg Lewat PBB’. Retrieved from republika.co.id: https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/19/01/30/pm4mgk354-ini- jumlah-kader-fpi-yang-jadi-caleg-lewat-pbb. Rumah Pemilu. (Accessed on 2019, December 2). Republik Indonesia, Undang-Undang no. 7 Tentang Pemilu, 2017. Retrieved from rumahpemilu.org.: https://rumahpemilu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/ UU-No.7-Tahun-2017-tentang-Pemilu.pdf. Sadiki, L., & Aljazeera Center for Studies. (2019, October 29. Accessed on December 10, 2019). Tunisia’s Sustainable Democracy: Between New and Anti-Politics in the Presidential Election. Retrieved from studies.aljazeera.net: http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2019/10/tunisias-sustainable- democratization-anti-politics-2019-presedential-election-191021120857585.html. Tempo.co. (2019, February 1). Caleg Simpatisan FPI Mundur, Sekjen: Kekuatan PBB Ada di Yusril’. Retrieved from pemilu.tempo.co: https://pemilu.tempo.co/read/1171174/caleg-simpatisan-fpi-mundur-sekjen- kekuatan-pbb-ada-di-yusril/full&view=ok . Tepe, S. (2005). Religious Parties and Democracy: A Comparative Assessment of Turkey and Israel, Democratization, vol. 12, 283-307. Tepe, S. (September 2019). The Inclusion-Moderation Thesis: An Overview. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Tharoor, I. (2019, November 5. Accessed on December 2, 2019). In a World of Crisis, Tunisia’s Democracy Marches On. Retrieved from washingtonpost.com. Tirto.id. (2018, February 17). KPU: 14 Partai Jadi Peserta Pemilu. Retrieved from tirto.id: https://tirto.id/ kpu-14-partai-politik-jadi-peserta-pemilu-2019-cEWj. Warta Ekonomi. (2019, December 1). Usul FPI Jadi Parpol, Gerindra: Habib Rizieq Punya Kans Buat Nyapres. Retrieved from wartaekonomi.co.id: https://www.wartaekonomi.co.id/read259245/usul-fpi- jadi-parpol-gerindra-habib-rizieq-punya-kans-buat-nyapres.html. Wickham, C. (2004). The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party. Comparative Politics, vol. 36, 205-228. Yehia, K. (2014, October 19. Accessed December 1, 2019). Salafists Under Spotlight Ahead of Tunisia Poll. Retrieved from Ahram Online: http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/113446.aspx. Greg Fealy | Accommodating Indonesia’s Islamist Fringe ... 41

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Greg Fealy is Associate Professor of Indonesian Politics in the Department of Political and Social Change, at The Australian National University, Canberra. He specialises in Islamic politics and has published extensively on Nahdlatul Ulama and Indonesian Islamism. For correspondence, his email address is: [email protected]. 42 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

Digital Activism and Democracy in Indonesia Learning from the Foregoing Research Issues (2014-2020)

Caroline Paskarina Universitas Padjadjaran, Indonesia

Abstract

This article discusses digital activism and democracy in Indonesia, which is analyzed from several research articles published in the journal publications from 2014 to 2020. The objective of this research is to explore the various meanings of digital activism in Indonesia. The assumption is that digital activism is not a universal practice and the use of digital technology can be determined by the context and goals that are to be achieved from such activism. This article uses the scoping study method by exploring journal articles in the international publication database. The results of this research found that six themes portray the practice of digital activism in Indonesia, which are digital activism as (1) a strategy to mobilize support or to initiate social or political movement; (2) an arena to discuss marginalized issues; (3) critique and control of the government; (4) ‘hoaxtivism’ and counter-hoaxtivism; (5) hacktivism; and (6) identity building process. These various meanings show how digital activism became a potential strategy for pro-democracy agents to transform the inherent power nature of the internet. Such provides conditions for further research on digital activism and the strengthening of democracy in Indonesia. Keywords: Digital activism, techno-politic, democratization, scoping study, internet

INTRODUCTION ince its inception, democracy has always upheld the notion of freedom as a basic value that enables every citizen to actively participate in controlling decisions that are made in administrating Spublic interest. This notion of freedom has inspired the birth of various arena, media strategy, and even actors that colored the dynamics of power relations throughout the ages. The practice of democracy is inseparable from technological development both of them influence each other. Some have high hopes that technological advances will change power relations to become more democratic, but not a few are skeptical. This discussion of the relationship between power and technology shows that technology, in terms of all of the modern practical artifacts, is neither an independent entity nor a neutral entity. Technology can be a technical arrangement to form an order, such as mechanization that is applied to form certain more productive ways of working (Winner, 2017). On the other hand, there is also technology that is ‘inherently politics’, so the adoption of a given technical system unavoidably brings with it conditions for human relationships that have a distinctive political or recast for centralized or decentralized, example, egalitarian inegalitarian, or like that impressive liberating (Winner, 2017). From this viewpoint, technology itself is a political entity, so that its existence is not sufficient to be assessed only from its impact on social, political, and economic dynamics. Technology itself already contains power inherently, which has implications for two things, namely, first, the adoption of a given technical system requires the creation and maintenance of a particular set of social conditions as

the operating environment of that system. Second, a given kind of technology is strongly compatible with but does not strictly require, social and political relationships of a particular stripe. These two implications explained by Winner (2017) illustrate how the practice of power takes place through and by technology. Technology in this conception is more than just a tool, but as in Giddens’ (1984) conception, it becomes a structure that has a role to enable and limit social, political, and cultural practices, and also allows agents to construct the structure vice versa. Similar to what Boczkowski (2004) calls a process of mutual shaping to explain the symbiotic interaction of technologies and societies This article will discuss in more depth how the technology performs such a role, especially in the context of democratization in Indonesia. The technology discussed here is specifically digital media transmitted over the internet. Digital media includes digitized content, in the form of text, audio, video, and graphics, resulting from translating analog data to digital. The internet began to grow when the text was put onto the internet instead of stored on papers as it was previously. Soon after the text was put onto computer images followed, then came audio and video onto the Internet. Digital media has come a long way in the few short years to become as we know it today and it continues to grow. The rapid development of the internet in the late 20th century offered broader access to obtain real-time information from all over the world, especially after the World Wide Web developed as a way of exchanging information over the internet (Steve, 2016). Nowadays, the internet and the web have been used for various activities, not only for accessing information, but also for various other interactive activities, such as e-commerce, crowdfunding, and even participating politically through online petitions and e-voting. Activities that take place via the web also have unique dynamics because of the web’s characteristic as multi-layer space, which is usually categorized as the surface web, deep web, and dark web (Steve, 2016). The surface web consists of all web-based content that can be found in search engines. The surface web is open and easily accessible to the public. The deep web is anything a search engine cannot find and index. The dark web is content not found in search engines that can only be accessed anonymously using special anonymizing software networks. The dark web is usually used to carry out illegal activities, such as cybercrime, hoax dispersion, pornography, trafficking, narcotics dealing, terrorism, etcetera. The deep web and dark web require additional services to access. Many of these sites can only be viewed via TOR, which anonymizes the identity of the user - making it more difficult for law enforcement to hold those using these services to account (Acin, 2019). A multi-layer web with different arrangements shows how the web itself has politics to determine who can access the available information and what forms of interaction are formed between the people who access the web. Although the internet is a technology that can expand the arena of participation for the public, the arrangements in the technology also limit who the connected actors are and what forms of activity take place in it. On the dark web, even these restrictions are deliberately made to hide illegal activities from law enforcement, something that is a problem for democracy. The discussion in this article will focus on the dynamics that take place on the web, which are marked by the utilization of the web for political campaigns, elections, election result calculation, online petitions, and even protests and social movement mobilization. These activities as a whole represent digital activism that shows how the internet in general and the web specifically became a crucial instrument for democratization. The contestation between narratives in the web, such as the spreading of hoax, hate speech, the politicization of identity versus pro-democratic narratives on digital literacy, tolerance, multiculturalism, and equality, transformed the web into an arena of discourse competition that in- turn opens a space to deliberate issues that have insofar been ignored, taboo, marginalized, or seen as Caroline Paskarina | Digital Activism and Democracy ... 45 given, such as religion, ethnicity, gender, ideology, and others. In the political sphere, several studies have historically mapped the development of digital activism. Karatzogianni (2015) classified the development of activism into four periods, starting from 1994 with the anti-globalization movement which was initiated by Zapatista in Mexico, and the rise of alternative media such as Indymedia. The second period, from 2001 to 2007 was marked by digital activism as a form of protest against the Iraq war. In the third period after 2007, digital activism spread to countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and other countries outside of Europe and the United States. In the fourth period, from 2010 to 2013, digital activism moved towards the discourse on mass digital surveillance that is done by the state, which was compounded by the appearance of Wikileaks and Snowden. Gerbaudo (2017) described the prevalence of digital activism into two phases of development, based on the assumption that ideology is the contextual factors behind the emergence of digital activism. The first phase appeared in the 1990s, in concurrence with the popularity of the internet, while the second phase appeared along with social media such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, which facilitated interaction through online social networks. Digital activism in the first phase, was marked with the appearance of independent news websites, mailing lists, and hacker activists (hacktivists) that brought the issue of struggle against power domination of formal or non- conventional institutions, such as the state or corporations. In the second phase, digital activism became freer through social media networks to mobilize an even broader audience. Despite these studies showed the rapid development of digital activism, they tend to describe digital activism as a consequence of technological and communications development, even though we cannot ignore other factors apart from technology that also takes part in constructing contents in digital activism, such as ideology, power construct, social consciousness, economy, and culture (Gerbaudo, 2017; Kaun & Uldam, 2018). This shows that digital activism not only reflects how internet technology and its dimensions change political practice but also how power takes part in creating meaning towards technologies, who have access to technologies, how that access is managed, the objectives to be achieved with such technologies, etcetera. Internet technology itself is not a monolithic concept, for it consists of many dimensions, such as interface technology, algorithm technology, infrastructural technology, that all are shaping socio-cultural and political practices differently. Studies on digital activism that have developed until now provided a significant contribution to building knowledge on the interrelation between technology and politics. But, the tendency to focus on digital or technology per se, causes the findings from such studies to be trapped within universality in explaining digital activism. This is as if the variety of present technology is utilized in the same way and provided the same results as well. Other critics also questioned the convergence between what happens in the digital world and the ‘real’ world (Chan, 2014; Kaun & Uldam, 2018), also technological affordance as an issue which addresses the functional and relational aspects of a technology that do not determine, but rather frame the possibilities for action (Hicks, 2017; Hutchby, 2001; Joyce, 2010). The contextualization of digital political practice became one of the crucial issues that are discussed in works of literature on digital activism, especially to understand the plural forms that residential sociality can take is needed to move beyond existing binaries such as network sociality versus community sociality, as the internet is gradually becoming more local (Davies & Crabtree, 2004; Postill, 2008; Schneider & Goto-Jones, 2015). Following such an assumption, this article attempts to map the development of digital activism in the Indonesian political context. In Indonesia, the internet and democracy are intertwined, even from before the reformation. The development of the internet in Indonesia began in 1986 as part 46 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

of science and technology development strategy, and then rapidly developed as an alternative media that were utilized by activists who were critical of the New Order to communicate and publicize critical thoughts that were difficult to publish through mainstream media which were under repressive control of the regime (Hill & Sen, 2000). The appearance of the ‘Indonesia-L’ mailing list or ‘apakabar’, ‘Kabar dari PIJAR (Pusat Informasi dan Jaringan Aksi untuk Reformasi)’, ‘SiaR-list’, became a trace of the history of digital activism in Indonesia. These are the artifacts of a political sphere where pro-democracy activists deliberated the idea of people’s power - which originated in the Philippines – to fight the regime’s domination (Hill & Sen, 2000). In the era of post-reformation, the development of the internet showed a tendency to continue, and the number of its users kept on increasing. The results of a study conducted by We Are Social Hootsuite found that in 2019, the number of internet users and social media in Indonesia rose dramatically to reach 56% of the Indonesian population (Kemp, 2019). The increase in internet and social media users were followed by the intensity of social media usage. From 2015 to 2019, social media usage duration rose from 2 hours 52 minutes per capita in 2015 to 3 hours 26 minutes in 2019 2019 (Kemp, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). Such an increase in intensity as a result of an increasing variety of features in social media, that the internet can be used for various purposes, such as accessing actual information, entertainment, and even online transactions and trade. Activities in social media also showed a 92% increase in 2019 (Kemp, 2019). This shows that an individual would almost certainly access social media daily for a variety of needs, from entertainment streaming, information search, to communicating through various messaging applications. This condition yields sizeable potential, be that to strengthen the institutionalization of democracy or vice versa, towards practices that weaken democracy. The prevalence of internet usage in politics is primarily felt in elections, be that at national or local levels. This dynamic was seen since the 2014 elections, which was distinct from prior elections which primarily utilized television media as campaign platforms. In the following years, the competitive atmosphere was felt more in social media. Easy internet access through mobile communication devices such as phones, started to shift campaign media from television to social media. People access information easier through social media than through television. The digital activism phenomenon was geared toward the main goal of disseminating ideas, agitation, advocation, and protest notes in the digital medium (Arianto, 2017). This means digital activism has provided much space to increase public activity so that they could participate in political and governance issues. As a new public sphere, the internet and various digital media do not only appear during elections. Their existence in various dimensions of social life became an alternative for the people to voice their aspirations and expression on various public issues. By observing the dynamics in digital media, we can see how digital media became an arena in daily political life. This article attempts to map the practice of democracy in Indonesia which increasingly exists in the internet media. The map was compiled through research that was done to show democratic practices in Indonesia that are increasingly digitalized. Data was collected from the period of 2014 until May 2020, since this era is when digital media boomed as an arena for political discussion. The first period was also marked by the prevalence of hoax and hate speech, which showed the vulnerability of digital media in the development of democracy. This article focuses on describing the landscapes of digital activism in Indonesia during 2014-2020 and their implications towards democracy in Indonesia. This is hoped to provide a picture of the Indonesian reality construct to build knowledge on the practice of democracy in the digital era. How to develop the existing potential and vice versa, minimizing the negative effects of the practice of democracy in such a digital era. Caroline Paskarina | Digital Activism and Democracy ... 47

LITERATURE REVIEW Digital activism is generally understood as all activities that utilize digital technology to perform social change (George & Leidner, 2019). Joyce (2010) defines in more detail that such activities engage in both fixed and mobile devices with access to the internet such as different forms of hacktivism, denial of services attacks, hashtag activism, and open source advocacy. From such understanding, digital technology became a media that is assumed as neutral or detached from the interests of its users, and tend to focus on varieties of activities that arise parallel to the development of digital technology. The concept of digital refers to a group of connected devices that use digital code to transmit information (Joyce, 2010). Despite so, the focus does not lie on the digital aspect, but the transmitted information through such code. The term digital activism also refers to a certain type of technological infrastructure, be that in the form of hardware or software, such as when cyberactivism is primarily aimed at the internet in which such activism was done. Social media refers to the various social media software for social change, while e-activism refers to electronic devices (Joyce, 2010). This techno-deterministic perspective dominates the breadth of literature on digital activism, such as on the studies of the effects of media affordances on digital activity (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Castells, 2003; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Juris, 2008). Digital media became a set of tools that allow for participation with affordable cost, thus facilitating a new form of interaction which was not possible before. This logic is supported by ‘virality’, which is the ability to spread information and opinion rapidly through corporate social network sites such as Facebook and Twitter, which would ultimately be translated physically into movement. This perspective gave birth to conceptualization on the various forms of digital activism that mimic political participation in general, but through the use of digital technology or the internet as a media. The study by George & Leidner (2019) shows the wide scope of digital activism, from the easiest form through the use of affordable technology, to activities that require high-level digital skills and give widespread effects on policy changes. Based on such categorization, there are at least 10 forms of digital activism, that are from its lowest form, clicktivism, ‘metavoicing’, assertion, e-funding, political consumerism, digital petitions, ‘botivism’, data activism, exposure, and hacktivism as a form of activism that give the most effective to policy changes. Karatzogianni (2015) defined digital activism as political participation and protest organization in digital networks, beyond representational politics. Digital activism became a form of alternative political participation when formal representation channels are not effective to articulate interests or certain issues. This concept is a little different than George & Leidner (2019) who placed digital activism as a form of political participation, without connecting it to the existence of formal representative channels. As an alternative form, digital activism is directed towards reform or revolution that is initiated by non-state actors and new social-political formation, such as social movements, mass protests, as well as civil society organization that exists outside of the state or corporate institution (Anduiza et al., 2014; Karatzogianni, 2015; Theocharis et al., 2015). The techno-determinism perspective describes the practical advantage of digital technology for activists but ignores the symbolic and cultural dimension of digital activism, which has formed the contents that are channeled through this technology from the beginning. Gerbaudo (2017) criticized such perspective by placing politics and technology as two entities that affect each other in digital activism. In their view, through techno-politics, technology is not the only driving factor of the development of digital activism. In contrast, changes in power and ideology also affected how technology is used. Digital activism is activities to communicate messages, ideas, certain impressions, and as such are not only linked to the technological dimension but also the political dimension. This article uses the techno-politics conceptual framework from Gerbaudo (2017) to understand the various practices of digital activism and why they change from time to time. In line with such 48 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

opinion, Joyce (2010) also stated that digital technology infrastructure such as code, application, and devices which are the physical infrastructure of digital activism is just the starting point and not the endpoint of digital activism. The differences in economic, social, and political aspects will determine how the activists utilize such technologies.

RESEARCH METHODS This research uses the scoping study literature study method to map relevant works of literature in identifying the tendency of digital activism study in Indonesia and to analyze its research potential in the future. This technique is further elaborated by following 5 steps, that are: research question identification; relevant studies identification; collected data analysis; data presentation; and mapping conclusion (Arksey & O’Malley, 2005).

Framework Stage 1: Identifying the Research Question The research question to be discussed in this article is how is the tendency of digital activism study and citizen engagement in Indonesia? The concept of digital activism and citizen engagement covers a wide range of definitions, especially when only viewed from the use of the internet or social media as a characteristic of said activity. As such, in this study, digital activism is limited in the context of the relation between citizens and the state, which is a form of political participation to deliver aspirations and critiques to the government. Next, such limitation is tied to the democratization framework, that digital activism is a form of effort that is done to promote voluntary citizen consciousness for them to participate in public affairs. As such, digital activism is not one-way activism, but an interactive one marked by citizen engagement as a response for such activism.

Framework Stage 2: Identifying Relevant Studies The literature used as the unit of analysis is done through online exploration from the indexed institution database, which is Scopus (www.scopus.com), Science Direct (www.sciencedirect.com), Emerald Insight (www.emerald.com), and Google Scholar (www.scholar.google.com). The literature exploration used the keyword ‘digital activism’ and ‘Indonesia’, with limitations on the period of 2014 until 2020 for kinds of literature written in both Indonesia or English. The choice of language was done to expand the research which analyses the issue of digital activism and citizen engagement in Indonesia. The starting period of 2014 was chosen since it marks the mass usage of social media in political contestation in Indonesia, especially in the dynamics of the 2014 Presidential Election. This phenomenon re-surfaced and was even strengthened in the following years, especially in political contestations such as Gubernatorial Elections and the 2019 Presidential Election, and other political moments aside from general elections, such as in Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission or Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), Papua, and Covid-19 issues. With the aforementioned limitations, data collection was aimed to be more focused. On the other hand, the researcher could miss several types of research that may be relevant to the research.

Framework Stage 3: Study Selection Based on an online literature review, 421 articles were attained, which were then selected to sort duplicate articles (found in more than 1 database) or articles that do not contain digital activism in Indonesia (only including them as references or case illustration). Caroline Paskarina | Digital Activism and Democracy ... 49

Both exclusion criteria were then used as a guide when reading every article that was obtained from online literature exploration. This selection process yielded 26 articles that were further processed to find specific themes using Nvivo Pro version 12.

Framework Stage 4: Charting the Data ‘Charting’ describes a technique for synthesizing and interpreting qualitative data by sifting, charting, and sorting material according to key issues and themes (Ritchie & Spencer, 2010). Literature that became the unit of analysis is first processed in the form of a table that contains categories: publication year, title, source, the main issue, research method, and findings. The main issues and findings were then analyzed through creating categorization based on keywords from its main issues and findings from each literature. Every category was then analyzed by using Nvivo Pro 12 software to find a theme from the tendency of research done.

Framework Stage 5: Collating, Summarizing, and Reporting the Results Having ‘charted’ information from studies, we were able to present our narrative account of findings in two ways. First, attention was given to the basic numerical analysis of the extent, nature, and distribution of the studies included in the review. We produced tables and charts mapping to shed light on the dominant areas of research. Second, the literature was organized thematically according to the categorization of digital activism’s type.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION The results of data processing showed that several studies which discussed on digital activism in Indonesia during 2014-2020 showed that the majority of issues discussed are beyond the practices of electoral democratic practices.

Figure 1. Scope of Digital Activism

Source: Research Results, 2020

The above data showed that digital activism does not only appear in conventional political participation in the context of general elections or local elections. In everyday political life, digital activism appeared more. This became an opportunity to open for a wider room for daily public issue discussions. Digital activism not only discussed issues that are directly related to relations between states and their citizens, but also on issues related to relations among citizens, and even on the digital activism itself in conceptual or methodological forms. 50 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

Figure 2. Issues in Digital Activism

Source: Research Results, 2020 The variety of issues that are discussed in digital activisms in Indonesia showed a deviation when compared to other studies in other countries. In Indonesia, digital activism is mostly attributed to discussions that promote public engagement in a wide array of issues, such as in the general elections, becoming a political volunteer (Arianto, 2017), and even using social media as a space to participate in campaign activities (Purwanto et al., 2020; Rojabiaturrohmah et al., 2020). On the other hand, digital activism also made room to voice critics against the government and public policies, including to exercise control over the government, as seen in the digital activism movement to support the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Suwana, 2019). In the data presented in Figure 2, other issues that became contents for digital activism are contemporary political issues such as gender equality issues (Maryani, Janitra, et al., 2018; Maryani & Karimah, 2019; Parahita, 2019), movements against violence against women (Maryani, Astari, et al., 2018), abortion (Yulfianto & Jumaynah, 2016), child protection (Eriyanto, 2020), as well as religious issues in the context of identity politics (Fauzi & Ayub, 2019; Postill & Epafras, 2018). This marks that digital media became an alternative space that offers freedom in discussing marginalized issues in the formal spheres, such as in government institutions or political representative institutions. Digital activism also became a strategic choice to voice marginal issues that are often seen as sensitive or taboo issues in the formal sphere. As a political strategy, digital activism is used to reach various goals, especially to mobilize support and initiate movements to support or vice versa, rejecting an issue or policy. The following figure shows the mapping of digital activism in the effort of achieving certain interests. Caroline Paskarina | Digital Activism and Democracy ... 51

Figure 3. Functions of Digital Activism

Source: Research Results, 2020

The mapping above shows that digital activism as a strategy to mobilize support or initiate social or political movement still dominates the breadth of digital activism studies in Indonesia. This function is done in the context of general elections, such as in the study of the political volunteer in a general election cycle (Arianto, 2017), increasing public participation in voicing their concerns (Purwanto et al., 2020; Rojabiaturrohmah et al., 2020), or outside the context of general elections, such as in the form of hashtag movements to support the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Suwana, 2019), or to fight for gender equality (Maryani, Janitra, et al., 2018; Maryani & Karimah, 2019; Parahita, 2019). A sizeable portion in the use of digital activism is also used to build citizens’ consciousness on public issues, such as in the study on hashtag wars between groups that supported Komisi Perlindungan Anak Indonesia and those who demanded the dissolution of that institution (Eriyanto, 2020), the movements to reject land reclamation in Jakarta (Anam et al., 2020), corruption issues (Suwana, 2019), and disasters in Jakarta (Chandler, 2017). Digital activism is also used to build counter-discourse against prevailing social construct which insofar regarded as given. A study by Yulfianto & Jumaynah (2016) for example, discussed the movement of Abortion is not a Crime that attempts to build a counter-discourse against the hegemony of negative stigma that insofar attributed to abortion. Another study by Postill & Epafras (2018) also described how the new and old media interact with each other to be a sphere to represent how religious behavior is imagined in the contemporary context. These studies showed that digital activism does not move in a dichotomy relation, but also acts as an arena to bring up more various contestations, and thus give a picture of the reality of social and political complexity in the practice of power. Such is seen in the studies that specifically discussed digital activism in itself, especially from the conceptual and methodological perspective to expand the praxis of digital activism itself. 52 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

The results of research by Kristiyono & Ida (2019) and Rahmawan, et al. (2020) specifically discussed the probability of the use of research methods and several other prerequisites to increase the effectiveness of digital activism strategy. Overall, the articles that became the date for this research used the mixed method. This shows the varying perspectives and the wide reach of the data that can be used to describe, explain, measure, and even criticize the practices of digital activism in Indonesia. The trend of using mixed methods in studies also shows the focus of analysis that is not limited to the dimensions of digital technology, but also on the social, political, and cultural dimensions that shape the practice of digital activism. The studies used as data in the writing of this article reveal more of this contextual dimension and place digital technology as a tool or media. However, the use of this tool also shapes activists’ strategic choices, for example in developing networks through social media groups, encouraging policy change through hacktivism, or criticizing the government through hashtags. The results from data processing were then grouped to identify the themes that often appear in digital activism narratives that were exposed in the aforementioned research articles. These themes paint a tendency of the research of digital activism in Indonesia in the span of the last 5 years. The theme that first discussed digital activism in electoral democracy, such as the one done through the digital campaign, political volunteerism, and social media to mobilize support. In that context, digital activism was seen as if it became a substitute for conventional campaign platforms, including mass media such as newspapers and television. Social media is seen to be more adept to attract voter engagement since it enables real-time and direct interaction (Arianto, 2017; Lee, 2017; Lestari, 2018; Purwanto et al., 2020; Rojabiaturrohmah et al., 2020; Samadhi, 2008). The second theme showed the development of digital activism as a sphere for discussions on marginalized issues, such as gender, environmental destruction, abortion, and violence. Sensitive issues such as religiosity (Beta, 2020), ethnic identity, and post-conflict reconciliation are even discussed openly (Rohman, 2019). The discussions on marginal or sensitive issues are more open in digital rooms since interpersonal relations enable for formal barriers to be minimized, which then created self-efficacy from netizen to discuss such issues (Lestari, 2018). Self-efficacy and political participation also play as the foundation for the third theme that arose as a tendency of discussions of digital activism in Indonesia, which are activism in forms of critics and control over the government, such as in the issue of corruption (Jha & Sarangi, 2017; Suwana, 2019), government institution performance (Eriyanto, 2020), and policy implementation (Anam et al., 2020; Nurlatifah, 2020). From the experience of democratic transition in Indonesia and also in several other countries in Asia, corruption is a phenomenon that is attributed to the ruling regime. But, the authoritarian character of such regime made the issue of corruption to not be able to be discussed by the public, so that activists used digital media to voice their critics since the ruling regimes have limited ability to intervene in the sphere (Hill & Sen, 2000). After the reformation, digital media still retain the position of an effective platform to build pinion as a form of control over the government, especially in issues that invite public debate (Jha & Sarangi, 2017; Lee, 2017). On the other hand, vast experience in a democratic climate, coupled with speedy access to information through digital media also brings out the tendency of information overload as well as a hoax (Salam, 2018). This became one of the popular themes that are discussed in the context of digital activism that is linked to hoaxtivism, and counter hoaxtivism (Epafras et al., 2019). Reports from Freedom House mentioned that disinformation, including the spread of hoax, happens in general elections and presidential elections in 17 countries (Freedom House, 2017). The same phenomena also happened in Indonesia, especially after the 2012 DKI Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, the 2014 Presidential Election, 2016 DKI Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, and the 2019 Presidential Election. Caroline Paskarina | Digital Activism and Democracy ... 53

The prevalence of hoax does not only happen in the general election cycle but also in various controversial issues in the society. The problem lies not only because of the low literacy rates (Epafras et al., 2019), but also because people tend to receive information that is aligned with their preferences, interests, or positions (Salam, 2018). Digital activism pictures hoax on two sides, the mass production of hoax and the strategy to counter hoax from various sides. The production of hoax became another side of digital activism since hoax became a political commodity, in which truth and consequently hoax is perspectival, interest- based, and mobilized upon the instrument that exploits access, efficiency, and maximum performance (Nunes, 2012). Hoax and hoaxtivism tell us more than just the negative effect of human interaction, it disclosed to us the nature of the human condition, social interaction, and communication (Epafras et al., 2019). Another side to this is that digital activism also includes efforts to counter-hoax that are initiated by various sides. Here, digital activism related to counter-hoax gives birth to various movements, such as anti-hoax movements and literacy movements to provide education to the public so that they can differentiate valid information from the less-credible ones (Rojabiaturrohmah et al., 2020). The next theme that appeared in the digital activism narrative in Indonesia is hacktivism. From the literature data that was processed in this article, hacktivism as a theme appeared not from a negative practice to destroy the system, but as a distinct policy methodology or approach, sensitive to contexts and inter-relationships and critical of traditional or modernist approaches to security (Chandler, 2017), and as a transnational social movement to fight terror networks (Anshori, 2019). This showed another side of hacktivism, not only as a negative practice or technical practice, but carries specific ethics and aesthetics, aspects which are influenced by but cannot be reduced to technology. This is seen in the way in which hacker groups construct their language and symbology (Coleman, 2013). The appearance of this theme in digital activism in Indonesia became an interesting object since discussing hacktivism from differing standpoints and indicating digital activism practice in Indonesia is not all about the use of technology, but also in increasing creativity to bridge the limitations from the available technology. There is a new meaning that is constructed by hacktivism as evolving and adaptive life hacks (Chandler, 2017). The sixth theme found in article publications on digital activism in Indonesia is that digital activism a process of identity building. Technology is not just a material apparatus, a technical or instrumental structure possessing certain properties, but also a symbolic object to which some meanings and cultural uses are attached. This is an aspect that has been widely documented in the article on the ‘Fiqih Informasi’ (Fauzi & Ayub, 2019) and the dynamics of identity’s construction of the Muslimah Dawa activists (Beta, 2020). This indicates that technologies can be associated with very different meanings depending on the different social and cultural contexts in which they are deployed and the values and beliefs of the groups that utilize them (Gerbaudo, 2017). This aspect highlights the need to appreciate the embeddedness of technology in different cultural communities and how technology use depends on the customs, values, and norms adopted by these communities. The results of data processing and findings from such themes showed that the use of the internet and various social media in Indonesia underwent a shift from the beginning of its existence as an alternative sphere for activists to perform a resistance against the authoritarian regime to a potential sphere to build consciousness on public issues. This opportunity is needed to strengthen democracy. Digital activism in today’s age shows a tendency to be populist since the internet is used as an arena to mobilize support from autonomous individuals, separated, but can be united through ideas, issues, or shared interests (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Gerbaudo, 2012). Various research themes that arose from the study of digital activism in Indonesia showed a wide range of paradigmatic studies to instrumentalist on a variety of forms, strategies, and digital 54 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

activism performance. Various research methods were also used in the study of digital activism studies, which showed that the phenomena occurred in two dimensions that are interconnected, that are the community and network sociality. Therefore this finding justified the need to think beyond the dichotomy of community/network paradigm (Postill, 2008). Variations in the utilization of digital media emphasize the assumption by Gerbaudo (2017), that the relative autonomy of political and cultural processes from technology, that is how culture and politics are influenced by but not reducible to technology. Technology does not single-handedly define activism, rather activism is always informed by the cultural contents it channels, by the ideas, images, views that it puts forward. The character and form of media technologies are shaped by social, political, and economic needs and practices, while they in turn shape the very possibilities for self- expression, political participation, and activism (Joerges, 1999; Williams and Edge, 1996; Winner, 1980). The overlap between technology and social, political, as well as cultural context provides for a wide landscape to develop digital activism that is relevant to the strengthening of democracy in Indonesia.

CONCLUSION The analysis of publications in form of journal articles that discuss digital activism in Indonesia from 2014 to 2020 shows that this activism is not a recently performed action, but is rooted in history that can be traced back to the era of the New Order. This article has a limitation in that it is focused on literature scoping in the form of journal articles, so that other studies with the theme of digital activism that is published in other forms such as books, book chapter, reports, or policy briefs, were not mapped. This article focuses on describing the landscapes of digital activism in Indonesia during 2014- 2020 and their implications towards democracy in Indonesia. The results of this research found that six themes portray the practice of digital activism in Indonesia, which are digital activism as (1) a strategy to mobilize support or to initiate social or political movement; (2) an arena to discuss marginalized issues; (3) critique and control of the government; (4) hoaxtivism and counter- hoaxtivism; (5) hacktivism; and (6) identity building process. These various meanings show how digital activism became a dynamic process to contextualize the use of digital technology, placing the internet as a tool and an arena for democratic contestations. The six digital activism themes identified from this research became a reflection ofhow technology and context each shape the variations of activism, reaffirmed the assumptions of techno- politics perspective in explaining digital activism in Indonesia. This also suggests that the character and form of media technologies are shaped by social, political, and economic needs and practices, while they in turn shape the very possibilities for activism. The ideological dimensions of the internet and digital technology have not been developed much to understand digital activism in Indonesia. In fact, since its inception, the motivation to reform the power relations has been a very strong underpinning digital activism in Indonesia. This tendency to focus on the technocratic dimension has resulted in the internet becoming elitist. The study and practice of digital activism should be oriented to identify the functional and relational aspects of technology and society that have been framing various possible actions. This identification is needed to formulate relevant strategies to drive changes to the inherent power nature of the internet and digital technology. In this way, digital activism is also a strategy for pro-democracy agents to transform the internet as a structure of power. There is plenty of opportunity for further research on this topic, which could include digital activism as an arena for political contestation, a research field, a research tool with context-sensitive methodology, and a material product that describes the development of democracy in the digital era. Caroline Paskarina | Digital Activism and Democracy ... 55

REFERENCES Anam, K., Kolopaking, L., & Kinseng, R. (2020). The Effectiveness of Social Media Usage within Social Movement to Reject the Reclamation of the Jakarta Bay, Indonesia. Sodality: Jurnal Sosiologi Pedesaan, 8(1), 64–81. https://doi.org/10.22500/8202028955. Anduiza, E., Cristancho, C., & Sabucedo, J. M. (2014). Mobilization through online social networks: the political protest of the Indignados in Spain. Information Communication and Society, 17(6), 750–764. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2013.808360. Anshori, M. F. (2019). Hacktivist pada Pergerakan Sosial Transnasional : Kampanye Anonymous melawan Jaringan Teroris Transnasional 2015-2016. Andalas Journal of International Studies, VIII(2), 167–187. https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.8.2.165-185.2019. Arianto, B. (2017). Menakar Peran Relawan Politik Pasca Kontestasi Presidensial 2014. Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, 20(1), 50. https://doi.org/10.22146/jsp.18000. Arksey, H., & O’Malley, L. (2005). Scoping studies: Towards a methodological framework. International Journal of Social Research Methodology: Theory and Practice, 8(1), 19–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/1 364557032000119616. Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2012). The logic of connective action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics. Information Communication and Society, 15(5), 739–768. https://doi.org/10. 1080/1369118X.2012.670661. Beta, A. R. (2020). The Muslimah Intimate Public: Re-Considering Contemporary Dawa Activists in Indonesia. Asiascape: Digital Asia. https://doi.org/10.1163/22142312-BJA10002. Castells, M. (2003). The Network Society. Research Policy, 32, 1141–1145. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048- 7333(02)00118-X. Chan, A. (2014). Networking Peripheries: Technological Futures and the Myth of Digital Universalism. MIT Press. Chandler, D. (2017). Securing the Anthropocene? International policy experiments in digital hacktivism: A case study of Jakarta. Security Dialogue, 48(2), 113–130. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010616677714. Coleman, E. G. (2013). Coding Freedom: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Hacking. Princeton University Press. Earl, J., & Kimport, K. (2011). Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in the Internet Age. MIT Press. Epafras, L. C., Djalong, F. A., & Kaunang, H. P. (2019). Beyond Signal and Noise: Academics Goes Hoax and Hoaxtivism. Jurnal Kawistara, 8(3), 247. https://doi.org/10.22146/kawistara.34646. Eriyanto. (2020). Hashtags and Digital Movement of Opinion Mobilization: A Social Network Analysis/ SNA Study on #BubarkanKPAI vs #KamiBersamaKPAI Hashtags. Jurnal Komunikasi Indonesia, 8(3). https://doi.org/10.7454/jki.v8i3.11591. Fauzi, N. A. F., & Ayub. (2019). Fikih informasi: Muhammadiyah’s perspective on guidance in using social media1. Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, 9(2), 267–293. https://doi.org/10.18326/ ijims.v9i2.267-293. Freedom House. (2017). Freedom on the Net 2017: Manipulating Social Media to Undermine Democracy. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2017/manipulating-social-media- undermine-democracy. George, J. J., & Leidner, D. E. (2019). From clicktivism to hacktivism: Understanding digital activism. Information and Organization, 293), 100249. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2019.04.001. Gerbaudo, P. (2012). Tweets and the Streets Social Media and Contemporary Activism. Pluto Press. Gerbaudo, P. (2017). From cyber-autonomism to cyber-populism: An ideological history of digital activism. TripleC, 15(2), 477–489. https://doi.org/10.31269/TRIPLEC.V15I2.773. 56 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

Hicks, J. (2017). Digital Disruption in Asia. Asiascape: Digital Asia, 4(1–2), 5–12. https://doi. org/10.1163/22142312-12340065. Hill, D. T., & Sen, K. (2000). The Internet in Indonesia’s new democracy. Democratization, 7(1), 119–136. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340008403648. Jha, C. K., & Sarangi, S. (2017). Does social media reduce corruption? Information Economics and Policy, 39, 60–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2017.04.001. Joyce, M. (2010). Digital Activism Decoded: The New Mechanics of Change. New York & Amsterdam: International Debate Education Association. Juris, J. S. (2008). Networking Futures: The Movements Against Corporate Globalization. Durham, NC USA: Duke University Press. Karatzogianni, A. (2015). Firebrand Waves of Digital Activism 1994–2014: The Rise and Spread of Hacktivism and Cyberconflict. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137317933. Kaun, A., & Uldam, J. (2018). Digital activism: After the hype. New Media and Society, 20(6), 2099–2106. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444817731924. Kemp, S. (2016). Digital 2016- Indonesia: All the Data and Trends You Need to Understand Internat, Social Media, Mobile, and e-Commerce Behaviours in 2016. Retrieved from https:// datareportal.com/ reports/digital-2016- indonesia. Kemp, S. (2017). Digital 2017- Indonesia: All the Data and Trends You Need to Understand Internat, Social Media, Mobile, and e-Commerce Behaviours in 2017. Retrieved from https:// datareportal.com/ reports/digital-2017- indonesia. Kemp, S. (2018). Digital 2018- Indonesia: All the Data and Trends You Need to Understand Internat, Social Media, Mobile, and e-Commerce Behaviours in 2018. Retrieved from https:// doi.org/10.1016/j. solener.2006.08.015. Kemp, S. (2019). Digital 2019- Indonesia: All the Data and Trends You Need to Understand Internat, Social Media, Mobile, and e-Commerce Behaviours in 2019. Retrieved from https:// datareportal.com/ reports/digital-2019- indonesia. Kristiyono, J., & Ida, R. (2019). Digital Etnometodologi: Studi Media dan Budaya pada Masyarakat Informasi di Era Digital. ETTISAL : Journal of Communication, 4(2), 109. https://doi.org/10.21111/ejoc. v4i2.3590. Lee, S. H. (2017). Digital democracy in Asia: The impact of the Asian internet on political participation. Journal of Information Technology and Politics, 14(1), 62–82. https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.201 6.1214095. Lestari, Y. (2018). Civic Engagement Menggunakan Media Online di Kalangan Anak Muda Kota Padang. JIKE : Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi Efek, 1(1), 49–58. https://doi.org/10.32534/jike.v1i1.45. Maryani, E., Astari, S., & Padjadjaran, U. (2018). Selebriti dalam Digital Activism Tentang Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan di YouTube Celebrity in Digital Activism about Violence toward Woman in YouTube. 3(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.24198/jmk.v3i1.20656. Maryani, E., Janitra, P. A., & Rahmawan, D. (2018). “Aliansi Laki-Laki Baru”: The Role of Social Media in Promoting Gender Equality in Indonesia. Salasika: Indonesian Journal of Gender, Women, Child, and Social Inclusion’s Studies, 1(2). https://doi.org/10.36625/sj.v1i2.19. Maryani, E., & Karimah, E. (2019). Challenges and Opportunities: The Use of Digital Media By Woman in Jatinangor. Avant Garde: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi, 07(02), 171–186. Nunes, M. (2012). Abusing the Media Viral Validity in a Republic of Spam. In T. Gournelos & D. J. Gunkel (Eds.), Transgression 2.0: Media, Culture, and the Politics of a Digital Age (pp. 154–168). Continuum. Nurlatifah, M. (2020). Digital di Indonesia The Intersection of Freedom of Expression and Social Responsibility on Indonesian Digital Journalism Regulation. IPTEK-KOM, 22(1), 77–93. Caroline Paskarina | Digital Activism and Democracy ... 57

Parahita, G. D. (2019). The Rise of Indonesian Feminist Activism on Social Media. Jurnal Komunikasi Ikatan Sarjana Komunikasi Indonesia, 4(2), 104–115. https://doi.org/10.25008/jkiski.v4i2.331. Postill, J. (2008). Localizing the internet beyond communities and networks. New Media and Society. https:// doi.org/10.1177/1461444808089416. Postill, J., & Epafras, L. C. (2018). Indonesian Religion as a Hybrid Media Space: Social Dramas in a Contested Realm. Asiascape: Digital Asia, 5(1–2), 100–123. https://doi.org/10.1163/22142312-12340086. Purwanto, A., Zuiderwijk, A., & Janssen, M. (2020). Citizen engagement with open government data: Lessons learned from Indonesia’s presidential election. Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy, 14(1), 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1108/TG-06-2019-0051. Rahmawan, D., Mahameruaji, J. N., & Janitra, P. A. (2020). Strategi aktivisme digital di Indonesia: aksesibilitas, visibilitas, popularitas dan ekosistem aktivisme. Jurnal Manajemen Komunikasi, 4(2), 123. https://doi. org/10.24198/jmk.v4i2.26522. Ritchie, J., & Spencer, L. (2010). Qualitative data analysis for applied policy research. In Analyzing qualitative data (pp. 173–194). Taylor & Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203413081_chapter_9. Rohman, A. (2019). Persistent connection and participation: New media use in post-peace movement Ambon, Indonesia. New Media and Society, 21(8), 1787–1803. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444819831973. Rojabiaturrohmah, E. & Pujianti, L.S.P. (2020). Keterlibatan Media Sosial sebagai Media Informasi menjelang Pemilu 2019. JPPHK (Jurnal Pendidikan Politik, Hukum dan Kewarganegaraan), 10(1). Salam, A. (2018). The Hoax Phenomenon in Indonesian Society: Observing Anti-Diversity Memes since 2014. Jurnal Humaniora, 30(3), 315. https://doi.org/10.22146/jh.v30i3.38891. Samadhi, W. P. (2008). An Empirical Analysis of the Quality of Democracy in Asia: An Indonesian Case. International Symposium by Democracy and Social Movements. Schneider, F., & Goto-Jones, C. (2015). Where is Digital Asia? Asiascape: Digital Asia, 2(1–2), 5–10. Suwana, F. (2019). What motivates digital activism? The case of the Save KPK movement in Indonesia. Information Communication and Society, 14(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1563205. Theocharis, Y., Lowe, W., van Deth, J. W., & García-Albacete, G. (2015). Using Twitter to mobilize protest action: Online mobilization patterns and action repertoires in the Occupy Wall Street, Indignados, and Aganaktismenoi movements. Information Communication and Society, 18(2), 202–220. https://doi.or g/10.1080/1369118X.2014.948035. Yulfianto, A., & Jumaynah, F. (2016). Melawan Kredo Aborsi: “Gerakan Abortion Is Not A Crime Sebagai Sebuah Wacana Tandingan.” Jurnal Pemikiran Sosiologi, 3(2), 59. https://doi.org/10.22146/jps. v3i2.23536. 58 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Caroline Paskarina, is a senior researcher at Centre of Decentralization and Participatory Development Research and associate professor at Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Padjadjaran. Her area of research is citizenship, digital activism, political discourse, and populism. Previous publications include: “Konstruksi Kewargaan dalam Perbincangan di Twitter” (published by Unpad Press, 2020); “The Citizen in Electoral Discourse: A Preliminary Study” (EUDL EAI, 2019); “Surviving Election: Corruption and Transformation of Clientelism” (Power, Conflict, and Democracy Journal, 2017); “Bandung, West Java: Silaturahmi, Personalist Networks and Patronage Politics” (book chapter in Money Politics in Indonesia: Patronage and Clientelism in Legislative Election 2014, published by National University of Singapore, 2016); and other publications. Corresponding author Email: [email protected].

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This article is part of research funded by the Ministry of Research and Technology/National Research and Innovation Agency, the Republic of Indonesia through the scheme of Competitive Basic Higher Education Research Scheme (2019-2020). The author would like to thank the Ministry for providing the grant and to the Centre for Decentralization and Participatory Development Research Universitas Padjadjaran for supporting this research. Indonesian Journal of Political Research (IJPR) Volume 1, December 2020 ISSN 2747-2590 (Printed)

Democratic Regression and Authoritarian Practices in Indonesia

Wijayanto Universitas Diponegoro, Indonesia

Abstract

Large number of literatures on the current state of democracy in Indonesia argue that democracy in one of the largest democracies in the world is experiencing a decline. The view is shared not only by researchers from abroad but also from within Indonesia itself. However, among the researchers, there are differences of opinion about the extent as well as the indicators of the democratic decline. Each of the scholars appear to emphasize one aspect while ignoring other aspects. This paper intends to join in to enliven the debate by arguing that the decline of democracy in Indonesia has led to a reversal towards authoritarianism. Referring to a study conducted by Levittsky and Ziblat (2018), we argue that this authoritarian turn can be seen from the authoritarian practices carried out by the Joko Widodo administration which takes the form of, among others: first, rejection (or weak commitment) over the democratic rules; second, refusal of the legitimacy of the political opponents; third, tolerance or encouragement of violence; and fourth, willingness to limit civil liberties against political opponents including the media. Keywords: democratic decline, authoritarian practices, Jokowi’s administration, Indonesia

INTRODUCTION n early 2020, the Economies Intelligence Unit (EIU) made an interesting discovery. In the 73- page document, they report the situation of democracy in countries around the world which Ithey generally describe as experiencing setbacks, including Indonesia. In the findings of the Economist, during the last five years, Indonesia’s highest score for democracy occurred in 2015 where the score was 7.2, but after that our score continued to decline or at least stagnate. In 2016, our score decreased slightly to 6.97 then, but the decline continued to be 6.39 in 2017 and remained at the same figure in 2018. Even though in 2019 our score seemed to have improved slightly, namely 6.48 but in general the trend is downward. Even if we compare it to our score in the last 10 years since 2010, then the score in the last three years is the worst. This is because since 2010, our score has never been lower than 6.53. It is noteworthy that there are five indicators of democracy seen by the EIU, namely the election process and pluralism, government functions, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. Apart from the overall score, the most striking thing that should be noted from the EIU’s findings on the 2019 democracy index is the aspect of our civil liberties that has the worst contribution. In this case, the EIU places Indonesia’s civil liberties score as one of the worst in ASEAN, namely 5.63, lower than the Philippines (7.06), Malaysia (5.88), Thailand (6.47), and even Singapore (7.06). Likewise, IDEA also found the same findings. they call it democratic erosion (backsliding) and it is common all over the world. Asia and the Pacific is one of the regions most

affected by democratic erosion, with more than half of its democracies suffering from it. India is currently experiencing democratic backsliding and has the highest number of democratic declines since 2013. The Philippines, also a democratically backsliding country, follows India in the number of democratic declines. Older democracies such as Australia, Japan, and New Zealand have suffered some erosion, as has Indonesia. The same finding regarding the poor situation of civil liberties was also revealed by IDEA, which found the deterioration of our civil space. In this case, IDEA states that Indonesia is one of the countries experiencing moderate democratic backsliding (2020: 193). The findings of the two international institutions above were not surprising. At least one dozen recent studies were conducted by various political science scholars from inside and outside Indonesia that revealed similar findings. However, among the researchers, there was disagreement about when and to what extent the decline took place. This difference results in different formulations of democratic regression from one another. In this regard, the situation of democratic regression is formulated in various ways, including: ‘defective democracy’ (Mietzner, 2016, p. 228), ‘democratic setbacks’ (Hadiz, 2017, p. 261), ‘democratic regression’ (Aspinall & Warburton, 2018), ‘democratic deconsolidation’ (Mietzner, 2016, p. 279), ‘democratic decline’ (Power, 2018), ‘authoritarian turn’ (Power, 2018), “democratic backsliding” (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019a; Mietzner, 2020); ’democratic recession’ (Aspinal and Mietzner, 2019a); ‘Illiberal democracy’ (Warburton & Aspinall, 2019), ‘nondemocratic pluralism’ (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019b), ‘recession of democracy’ (Aminuddin, 2020), ‘neo authoritarianism’ (Wiratraman, 2018) ‘authoritarian innovation’ (Mietzner , 2019), and ‘authoritarian turn’ (Wijayanto, 2019). More than that, the most obvious debate lies in what are the indicators for the decline of democracy. Each of the scholars appears to emphasize one aspect while ignoring other aspects. With reference to the study conducted by Ziblat and (2018) this paper intends to enliven the debate by arguing that the backwardness of democracy in Indonesia has led to a reversal towards authoritarianism which can be seen from the authoritarian practices carried out by the Joko Widodo administration. This paper will be narrated in the following order. The first part will discuss debates among experts about what, when, to what extent, and how the democratic decline occurred in Indonesia. The second part will present the findings and analysis on when and to what extent the decline of democracy took place in Indonesia by referring to the Ziblat as well as formulating indicators of ongoing democratic decline. The last part of the paper will conclude how the situation of democracy in Indonesia is.

INDONESIA’S DEMOCRATIC REGRESSION: WHAT, WHEN, TO WHAT EXTENT AND HOW? Despite that, there are many scholars who have argued that democracy in Indonesia is declining by using various terms, not so many of them give a clear definition as to what they mean by democratic decline. Fortunately, there are some scholars who did suggest a definition. One of them is Mietzner (2016) who uses the term ‘democratic deconsolidation’ which he defines as “a process in which democracies gradually lose their quality over time, and which may or may not lead to a full democratic reversal” (279). In his later work with Aspinall, he further emphasizes his argument by suggesting that democratic decline is synonymous with terms such as backsliding, recession, or deconsolidation which refers to a situation where the quality of democracy quality has declined (or is declining) from a previously achieved level (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2019a: 301). The definition also proposed by Warburton and Power (2019) who theorize democratic decline as a process that progresses slowly which is characterized by a situation where political actors are slowly turning away from democratic values and institutions. This will not necessarily lead to authoritarianism. However, democratic regression is slowly giving birth to other types of political regimes that are not fully democratic but Wijayanto | Democratic Regression and Authoritarian ... 61 are also not fully dictatorial, such as illiberal democracy, competitive authoritarian systems, mixed regimes, and so on. Meanwhile, Warburton & Aspinal (2019) coined the term illiberal democracy which they define as “a regime in which free and fair elections persist alongside denial of substantive political rights, such as freedom of speech or freedom to choose and practice one’s religion” (p. 280). As well as differences in terms and definitions, differences also occur about when Indonesia began to experience a democratic decline. Marcus Mietzner theorizes that for him it started in 2016 when Jokowi intervened in the internal affairs of opposition political parties to seduce or force them to declare support for him (Mietzner, 2016). In parallel with that article, in another article Mietzner reiterates 2016 as a regression to democracy and this time making the mobilization of Islamic groups as signs that he labelled as populism. This populism is unfortunately faced in the wrong way by Jokowi, namely by using repression to suppress those who are a hallmark of authoritarian rule. Sometimes, other responses are no less bad than letting populism host Jokowi’s government by accommodating them in Indonesian politics. It does not stop there, Warburton (2016) also highlighted Jokowi when he felt that he had succeeded in stabilizing his coalition and had the need to enlarge development projects, at this point, there was a tendency for regression to emerge in Indonesian democracy. Furthermore, the basis for carrying out infrastructure development is accompanied by a tendency to ignore existing regulations for the sake of development itself. Thus, issues such as human rights become minor there. In contrast to Mietzner (2016) and Warburton (2016), Hadiz (2017) revealed that Indonesia has started experiencing distinctive democratic setbacks in 2017. Since then, democratic decline has been growing, especially stimulated by the strengthening of conservative Islamic groups and hyper- nationalist groups. . This point is important to note, especially regarding the confusion in public perceptions of nationalism. If, for example, in European countries patriotism is a positive concept, nationalism is a matter of concern because it is accompanied by a desire to occupy other countries - in the European context. In this country, the people are always given an understanding of the urgency of the interests of nationalism, not patriotism. The above studies also show differences in the extent to which democracy has experienced setbacks. Most scholars seem to agree that what has happened is ‘only’ a decline and has not led to authoritarianism. This is seen in terms such as: ‘defective democracy’ (Mietzner, 2016, p. 228), ‘democratic setbacks’ (Hadiz, 2017, p. 261) ), ‘democratic regression’ (Aspinall & Warburton, 2018), ‘democratic deconsolidation’ (Mietzner, 2016, p. 279), ‘democratic decline’ (Power, 2018), ‘authoritarian turn’ (Power, 2018), “democratic backsliding “(Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019a; Mietzner, 2020); ‘democratic recession’ (Aspinal and Mietzner, 2019a); ‘Illiberal democracy’ (Warburton & Aspinall, 2019), ‘nondemocratic pluralism’ (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019b), ‘recession of democracy’ (Aminuddin, 2020). However, some scholars have theorized that democracy has turned back towards authoritarianism using terms such as: ‘neo authoritarianism’ (Wiratraman, 2018) ‘authoritarian innovation’ (Mietzner, 2019), and ‘authoritarian turn’ (Wijayanto et al, 2019). Meanwhile, with regard to the sign of regression, scholars also have different opinions giving emphasis on certain aspects of the decline. The first group of scholar emphasizes the eradication of opposition both by hegemony and coercion as the sign of regression (Mietzner, 2016; Power, 2018; Mietzner, 2019; Aminudin, 2020; Aspinall, E., & Warburton, E. 2018). Mitzner (2016) for example states that president Joko Widodo has chosen a more coercive approach by using tools not used since the days of Suharto’s autocracy by intervening in the internal affairs of at least two opposition parties and eventually forced them to declare their support for his administration which are Partai Persatuan Pembangunan and Golkar party. In line with it, Power (2018) argues that at the end of his first terms, Jokowi increasingly practices more open repression and disempowerment of political opposition. He went further by arguing that these trends have served to unbalance the democratic playing field, limit democratic choice, and reduce government accountability. In line with is, Aminudin (2020) 62 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

suggested that the existence of political co-optation used by the President and the oligarchs who are allied with him against political rivals through repressive actions and hegemonic of power. Meanwhile, the second group of scholars emphasizes the use of illegal or illiberal means by criminalizing Islamic hardliners (Mietzner, 2018; power, 2018; Aspinal and Mietzner, 2019a; Warburton & Aspinall, 2019; Diprose et al, 2019; Aspinal et al; 2020). This has been made obvious by criminalizing some key leaders of the populist Islamist opposition as well as those oppositional figures who are critical to the Jokowi government (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019, p. 302). The treatment is given to HTI which was banned by the government as well as Habib Rizieq which was attacked through a charge of pornography has been seen as another example of this illiberal means (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019, p. 311). In line with it, in his other work, Mietzner (2018) also re-emphasized the criminalization of Islamic leaders of the opposition. Providing space for Islamic populism that endangers democracy to survive and giving them a role inside the power structure is another emphasis put forward by the third group of scholars (Bourchier, 2019; Aspinal & Warburton, 2018; Hadiz, 2017; Mietzner, 2019, Hamayotsu, 2013). Hadiz (2017) highlights the emerging discourse on conservative ideas such sharia law that increasingly become mainstream in Indonesian politics. He also argued that the jailing of Ahok, the Christian governor, following his statement commenting on the Qur’an as a reflection of the accommodation of Islamic conservative ideas by the judicial apparatus. The tolerance to the people protests on the street which led to the jailing was also the reflection of the same phenomena. In line with it, Mietzner (2019) highlights the use of identity politics during the election and evoking anti-minority sentiments to win the vote of the majority is a dangerous threat to democracy. In line with it, From the above description, it appears that with regard to democratic regression each scholar only focuses on three specific aspects which can be detailed as follows: first, suppressing opposition parties through hegemony or force; second, using non-legal/ non-liberal/criminalization methods to suppress populist Islamic groups and third giving space to anti-democratic ideologies/groups: conservative Islamic groups. In this case, there has not been a single scholar that has systematically formulated comprehensive indicators for the decline of democracy.

FOUR INDICATORS OF AUTHORITARIAN PRACTICES IN INDONESIA One way to define authoritarianism is to see it as a practice/behavior. Looking at the case in America, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) reveal four indicators of authoritarian behavior carried out by President Trump in America. The four indicators include: first, rejection (or weak commitment) to democratic rules of the game. Second, consolidation of the oligarchy and weakening of political opponents. Third, tolerance or encouragement of violence. Fourth, willingness to limit civil liberties against opponents, including the media. In this case, the authors argue that the four indicators can be used to analyze the situation in Indonesia and further argue that the four have occurred in Indonesia during the time of President Jokowi. This section will present the evidence and describe the analysis to support this argument.

Rejection (or Weak Commitment) to the Democratic Rule of the Game There are many cases that indicate signs of weakening the democratic rule of the game in Indonesian political history. At least, in the last five years, there are six that will be in the spotlight. First, in 2015, there was a Supreme Court decision that gave recognition to a group in Golkar, but the government through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights gave recognition to other officials. Of course, this is not just an inaccuracy, but if we compare it to the government, it has other purposes. Wijayanto | Democratic Regression and Authoritarian ... 63

Then with PPP, it is exactly the same, in our report, we even mention a complete report that we will share later so that actions weaken the possibility of this opposition through acts against the law or the verdict of the Supreme Court. So, it’s not just giving priority to one administrator, it’s not like that, but those who were chosen were those that were not won by the award. That, right, was very strange. Why? Well, that’s called an act against the law. Because the Supreme Court ruling said A, then the government did B. Second, the president allowed his ministers to disobey the constitutional decision. What we mean here is a ministerial regulation of the LHK NO. 83 of 2016 concerning Social Forestry. So there is the Constitutional Court decision No. 35 of 2012 which confirms customary forest is the forest located in the territory of indigenous people and is no longer a state forest. But this candy returns again. Indeed, in article 1 point (12), the definition of customary forest is still “Customary forest is the forest that is within the territory of customary law communities”, but by including customary forest as part of social forestry, it automatically equates it with village forest, community forest, forest community crops, and forestry partnerships. In other words, customary forests also remain state forests. And this is one of those things whose purpose or motivation is economic business. A year before the 2019 Election, there were signs of a repeat of the pre-reform era by hijacking state institutions for political interests, in this case, the Police and the TNI. The first happened to suppress the spread of hoax news related to the government that revolves around Jokowi and the PKI. This tendency is contained in his statement which is as follows: An example that came straight to me, ‘President Jokowi is the PKI’. There is even a picture on social media, me near Aidit. So, Aidit my speech under it. Aidit spoke in 1965. I was born in 1961, but some believe it. PKI was dissolved in 1965, I was born in 1961, I was only 4 years old. Some people believe in images like this (https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4139226/jokowi-minta-babinsa-tangkal- hoax-di-masyarakat). At the same time, Jokowi even blatantly asserts that fake news about him is a dirty political movement and at the same time mobilizes Babinsa to prevent this issue from developing more widely. Not only that, the second time, Jokowi even assigned TNI and Polri officers to disseminate the government’s achievements in order to succeed in his development agenda. “I entrust all officers to also socialize, to be conveyed at the right moments to convey that,” added Jokowi when delivering a speech in front of 243 TNI Staff at the State Palace (Hakim, 2020). Lately, Jokowi also instructed TNI and Polri to handle the coronavirus pandemic as if signaling that he intended to bring back the double function (dwi fungsi) of TNI/POLRI as practiced during the authoritarian New Order period (Ihsanuddin, 2019b). Later on, Jokowi used the help of Budi Gunawan, the head of the State Intelligence Board (Badan Intelijen Negara/BIN) for helping him to build a coalition with his rival: Prabowo Subianto following his victory in the 2019 election (CNN Indonesia, 2020). This has proven to be a great success as not only his fierce rivalries with Prabowo has ended but Prabowo has joined him to be part of his cabinet as minister of defense. This has triggered criticism that BIN has involved too far as intervening in the formation of Jokowi’s cabinet. Lately, BIN has even declared itself as having its own armies namely Pasukan Rajawali (CNN Indonesia, 2020). It has triggered a prolonged debate as this board should not have its own armies. Getting closer to the 2019 elections, Jokowi instructed soldiers at the village level to campaign for his policies and fight fake news about him. The campaign for him to be re-elected involved government officials, governors, regional heads, and even village heads who lined up to support him and, allegedly, also by force. The combination of the mobilization of civilian officials and military or law enforcement officials is a violation of the rules of the democratic game, considering that both the bureaucracy and the military apparatus are supposed to be neutral in elections. 64 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

The support of the regional head for Jokowi was conveyed explicitly by Governor Ganjar along with 31 other regional heads in Central Java as expressed in the following quote: “Yes, now I am with the regional heads of regents/deputy regents and mayors/deputy mayors throughout Central Java who support Pak Jokowi-Amin Ma’ruf, today we agree to support Pak Jokowi-Amin Ma’ruf (Ihsanuddin, 2019a).”

In this case, Bawaslu Indonesia as the institution legally appointed by the constitution to oversee the election proceedings stated that Ganjar and other regional heads had violated the principle of neutrality as regional heads. More precisely, based on the Bawaslu report, the Governor of Central Java has violated Article 1 number (3) and Article 61 paragraph (2) of Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning the Regional Government. Even though Ganjar had explained that his party made a personal declaration, Bawaslu denied this because there was a mention of a leadership position in the declaration. This Bawaslu report was then submitted to the Minister of Home Affairs, which unfortunately ended up being stopped there. The Minister of Home Affairs who is a PDIP cadre stated that the actions of punishments and friends were fine. To be precise, when interviewed at the Presidential Palace regarding this matter, Tjahjo Kumolo explained: “All have followed the licensing process to the local election supervisory committee. Also applying for leave permission, not using local facilities or finances. By law, by the process, by procedure everything is clear (Ristianto, 2019).”

Unfortunately, the weakening of democratic rules of the game does not stop there. In the final quarter of 2019, the public was again nervous about the plan to amend the Constitution. Starting from an agreement on October 13, 2019, in drafting a plan to extend the maximum term of office for the president to three terms. The planning involves at least the following three things (Rizky, 2019): 1. Improving the image of political parties by placing national interests above all other interests, 2. Do everything that is deemed necessary to prevent and fight all acts of radicalism, 3. Amendments to the 1945 Constitution should be comprehensive in nature concerning the need for state governance in relation to current challenges and a better future for national life.

Obviously, this decision is a form of denial of the constitution. The last time the constitution was amended, this was done in the spirit of limiting the power of the president. However, if it is changed into three periods, it means that there is a tendency to strengthen authoritarianism. Even though it is only a discourse, there are signs. If there is no strong protest from the community, it could be legalized.

Weakening or Suppressing the Opposition The president intervened in the election of chairman of the parties and succeeded in forcing some of them to leave their positions in the opposition. In our politics, this last happened during the New Order era. In two parties experiencing internal conflicts, Jokowi used his authority to win over the factions that supported him (Mietzner, 2018; Slater, 2018). In 2014 Golkar supported Prabowo as a presidential candidate under chairman Aburizal Bakrie. In November 2014, Bakrie won the Golkar party’s internal congress in Bali and was re-elected as chairman. However, factions within the Golkar party are the strongholds of Jokowi’s supporters. They maneuvered by forming a counter board under Agung Laksono. The counter board was formed through the counter congress in Jakarta in December 2014. This party’s internal conflict was not created by the government because factionalism in our political parties occurs very often, especially in the Golkar party. However, this internal conflict gave Jokowi an opportunity to step in Wijayanto | Democratic Regression and Authoritarian ... 65 and intervene. Through the Menkumham, Jokowi issued an official government decision that won the Agung Laksono camp in early March 2015. Along with political pressure that gave support to the Agung camp, Jokowi also put economic pressure on Aburizal. The Jokowi government no longer grants Bakrie the privilege of access to government projects. Jokowi through Luhut Panjaitan forced Bakrie to quit politics if the government wanted his business to be saved. The government required Bakrie not to continue in his position as chairman of the Golkar party and to hold another congress that brought together the two warring factions: Bakrie and Agung. In line with Bakrie’s obedience, Jokowi then also revoked the Ministerial Decree supporting Agung Laksono. On the other hand, Bakrie did sue AK and won the Supreme Court decision in the same year which also decided that the Ministerial Decree was invalid. Furthermore, Jokowi forced Bakrie to no longer run as a candidate for chairman and support other candidates that Jokowi approved. The candidate is Setya Novanto, a Golkar cadre with a bad reputation who was deliberately selected so that he is easy to control and does not have the popularity that endangers Jokowi. Jokowi did something similar with PPP. The party also experienced internal conflicts that occurred before the 2014 elections. This conflict was related to support for the presidential candidate in which Romahurmziy, the party’s general secretary, supported Jokowi while the chairman, Suryadharma Ali, supported Prabowo as a presidential candidate. Once Prabowo lost, Romi’s camp felt a sense of favor and organized a congress in Surabaya on 15-17 October 2014 which elected him as the new party chairman. At the end of October 2014, as was the case with Golkar, the government through the Minister of Law and Human Rights issued a Ministerial Decree supporting Romi. Suryadharma’s camp certainly cannot accept this. They then held a congress that won Djan Faridz in early November 2014. As happened in the Golkar party, the two camps then continued to fight in court. In October 2015 the constitutional court won Djan’s camp and annulled the Decree of the Minister of Law and Human Rights. Even so, the government still does not recognize this Constitutional Court decision and instead issues a decree which returns the management to Suryadharma as it was before the congress. In this case, at the same time, there was a legal process that placed Suryadharma as a suspect in a corruption case. Before finally going to prison, he wanted to issue a decision to organize another congress. At this congress, held on the 24th and 25th of February 2016, Romahurmuziy was unanimously elected as a new PPP chairman. Jokowi opened the congress, while Kalla closed it - sending an unequivocal signal that the government acknowledged only the pro-Jokowi faction as legal. Djan’s protests against the congress were ignored. The government’s confidence had already occurred when Luhut managed to approach Maimun Zubair, a charismatic PPP figure in early February 2016 who gave legitimacy to the government and the head of the ruling party: Romahurmuziy. The Democrat Party, PAN, and PKS became lenient with the government because they were worried that the same intervention would also happen to them. With the entry of the Gerindra Party into the incumbent camp, the condition of the Indonesian legislature has less opposition. All DPR leaders and only two out of ten MPR leaders are outside the incumbent coalition. With such a composition, of course, it will be easier for the government to manipulate regulations. After the 2019 election, Jokowi weakened the only remained opposition which is GERINDRA party through another strategy: hegemony. This is done by giving two of GERINDRA’s elites a position as ministers in Jokowi’s cabinet. It is reasonable to suspect that because Gerindra is considered too strong to be threatened in a similar way with the aforementioned parties. In this regard, Jokowi gave the party 2 strategic ministerial positions, Prabowo Subianto as Minister of Defense and Edhy Prabowo as Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. In Javanese political perspectives, this was seen as a strategy to calm the opponent namely ‘dipangku’ or to put someone on your lap. With the entry of the Gerindra Party into the incumbent camp, the condition of the Indonesian legislature has 66 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

less opposition. All of the parties are in the cabinet except the Democrat Party, PAN, and PKS which makes insignificant opposition compared to those under Jokowi’s coalition.

Tolerance or Omission for Committing Violence The third sign of authoritarian practices can be seen in the tolerance and omission for committing violence. The shooting and killing of the students who were protesting the change of KPK law in September 2019 were one of them. Among those who died, was Randi (21), a student at the Faculty of Fisheries and Marine Affairs, University of Halu Oleo (UHO), declared dead due to gunshot wounds in the right chest Thursday (26/9). Muhammad Yusuf Kardawi, died of a blow to the head. In response to this, Jokowi expressed his condolences and ordered National Police Chief General Tito Karnavian to investigate the cause of the death of the two students. “I also order to investigate all staff,” he said (Sani, 2019). However, there was no seriousness to take action against the suspects accordingly. How could he not, the punishment received by the six policemen who were found guilty was a verbal reprimand, one year delay in promotion, and only 21 days in prison. Head of Public Relations Division of the National Police, Kombes Pol Asep Adi Saputra, in the Sudirman area, Central Jakarta, Monday (28/10/2019), explained: When it was decided, the six members were found guilty of violating disciplinary rules. Overall, they are given a disciplinary sentence (Briantika, 2019).

Even before that, there was also a shooting tragedy by the Armed Criminal Group to spread terror to the Papuan people. One of them happened on December 2, 2018, in Kali Yigi, Nduga Regency, which was aimed at the Istaka Karya project workers. After three days, on December 5, the spokesman for the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) -Sebby Sambom, stated that the individual responsible for the incident was the Commander of the Military Area Markodap III Ndugama TPNPB Egianus Kogoya (CNN Indonesia, 2018). The suppression of tragedy is a cause for concern, but it is not only that. Human rights observers found that this happened because no serious efforts were made to guarantee human rights in Papua. The government, which has failed to open an effective dialogue forum with the Papuan people, has allowed this shooting to occur without a serious resolution to the actors (Pramana, 2020). Tolerance or omission of other violence occurs in cyber terror cases that occur against activists who are critical of the government. The first and most massive wave of terror occurred against activists who rejected the revision of the anti-corruption law in September 2019. Those who were members of the anti-corruption academic alliance organized themselves through the WhatsApp group. But then one by one the members of the WhatsApp group received terror in the form of continuous telephone calls from foreign numbers from outside Indonesia. There are dozens of WhatsApp group members who experienced this and caused panic among them. The group coordinator named Rimawan, academics from Gajah Mada University even received the terror of hacking to his WhatsApp number. The number was taken over by an unknown person then spreads a personal message to each group member to support the revision of the Law on Commission on Corruption Eradication (KPK). Hacking which was followed by the use of hacked numbers to spread fake news was also experienced by student activists who were involved in rejecting the revision of the Law. This was experienced by Lutfi, a student who was surprised to find a number that was no longer under his control to spread hate speech in the form of death threats to the police chief. The next terror that has also caught the attention of the public is that of activist Ravio Patra in April 2020. He is an activist who works as Indonesia’s representative in the Steering Committee of the Open Government Partnership (SC OGP), a transcontinental initiative fighting for transparency in government. His commitment to transparency is reflected in the views he shards on social media. Wijayanto | Democratic Regression and Authoritarian ... 67

The hacking occurred after Ravio on Twitter criticized the President’s Special Staff, Billy Mambrasar, who in his opinion was involved in a conflict of interest in government projects in Papua (Setyowati, 2020) and also wrote an opinion column criticizing the government treatment towards Covid19 pandemic in an online media, Tirto.id, in 23rd April 2020 (Patra, 2020). After these two activities, he found his WhatsApp account hacked and spread hate speech which incited the public to carry out arson and looting (Ibrahim, 2020). Tragically, because of this provocation, the police arrested Ravio at his place of residence and conducted an examination on him. Ravio was able to be free with the help of a network of activists who advocated for him. They were SafeNet which helped Ravio proving that his WhatsApp was hacked, then a combination of 11 civil society organizations calling themselves the Coalition Against Criminalization, including: SAFEnet, YLBHI, LBH Jakarta, LBH Pers, KontraS, AMAR, ICW, Lokataru, AJAR, Amnesty International Indonesia, and ICJR. These eleven CSOs have a wide network and reputation at the national and international levels. They issued press statements denouncing and demanding Ravio’s release. Ironically, this terror didn’t stop here. Cyberteror was also experienced by students in Gajah Mada University (UGM) who planned discussions related to legal governance in Indonesia regarding the law on the impeachment of the president in June 2020 (Syambudi, 2020). Those who wanted to hold discussions received death threats via telephone messages and even came directly to their homes with threats of verbal violence. Worse, when the chief editor of Tempo newspaper interviewed UGM activists regarding this threat, he was also hacked into his Instagram account (Adyatama, 2020). On August 20, this hacking was also experienced by the online website of the Tempo newspaper itself (Thomas, 2020). On August 22, the Twitter account of epidemiologists critical of the COVID19 policy by unknown parties (CNN Indonesia, 2020). Hacking was also experienced by online media Tirto.id with the loss of five articles in August (Antara, 2020). Of all the hacking cases, there is not one case that has been followed up by the police to reveal who the perpetrator is, starting from Lutfi’s case rejecting the revision of the KPK Law, Ravio Patra, UGM students to Tempo and Tirto.id. The slow pace of the police in following up on this case reflects the country’s tolerance for terror. In one interview, President Jokowi did not condemn hacking but instead casually replied that the perpetrators were young Indonesians who were very smart (Aji, 2020).

Threats to Civil Liberties, Including the Media Through the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Wiranto, the government has indeed officially restricted access to the use of social media. WhatsApp: 124 million, Instagram: 120 million ( 80%), Twitter: 78 million (52%), Facebook: 121 million users (81%), and Line: 88 million users (59%) for the time being starting from May 22, 2019, which took effect until the next three days. Although he had argued that this was for the benefit of the wider community, Wiranto clearly stated that this policy was taken to suppress the spread of hoax news by opponents. The government can be clearly observed from the following statement: “There are scenarios to create chaos, attack the security apparatus and create antipathy to the legitimate government (Yusuf, 2019).” The next point is related to Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) No.2 of 2017 or which is very familiar with Perppu Ormas (mass organization) which can dissolve community organizations without trial. This law has at least 4 articles that threaten freedom of association, namely articles 60, 61, 62, and 82A. If we look at the government’s arguments in the media, this is used to ban Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, an Islamic hardliner organization. But there is logical talk because the Perppu Ormas is still reverting the blasphemy article and even adding it to five to twenty years, to be precise in Article 82A paragraph (2). Whereas the articles of blasphemy have always been addressed to religious minorities and not the dominant group. In fact, the groups that the government accuses or 68 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

wants to target in a formal government statement so far also advocate for blasphemy. The limitation of civil liberties was also reflected in law number 5 of 2018 concerning the Amendment of the Terrorism Law. This law is intended to protect the people from terrorism. However, if we look at what is contained in this law on mass organizations, it involves the TNI to become one of the parties that can handle it. The task of the TNI in overcoming such terrorism, article 43 stated that it is part of the role of the military besides war. This is very basic in a democratic country because there are no more boundaries between defense and security. The limitation of civil liberty can also be seen from the plans to issue a research Certificate in 2008. The problem is, this Permendagri does not explain clearly the indicators of the negative impact of research (Nadlir, 2018) so that it can be an opening to curb the nation’s researchers. Even though due to the protest from the civil society this Permendagri article was not enforced, the fact that it was once released reflected a certain belief that thoughts can be controlled. Controlling what people may or may noy not think about is surely seriously limiting civil liberties. The other signs of the civil liberty’s repression can be seen in between 2018 to 2019 in which there were threats to people who did not vote, namely being snared by the terrorism law and the ITE law. This can be considered serious as the one who delivered this suggestion was the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Human Rights. In this regards we can consider that the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs is the most authoritative person after the President in this country to declare something according to the law or not. When the minister said that this is terrorism, this could be ensnared by the ITE law and others - and, of course, the policy will follow that. Even though no one is really charged with the terrorism law, again in a country that claims to be a state of law and democracy, statements like this from officials at that level might have a serious threat to democracy.

CONCLUSION Indonesian democracy is under a steady decline since 2016 and the situation gets even worse after the 2019 election. In this regard, there is a debate among political scholars on how far and how fast it’s declining as well as the sign of regression as each scholar emphasizes on some certain signs and give less attention to other signs. This paper enlivens the debate about democratic backsliding in Indonesia by investigating the extent of the decline and arguing that the decline has occurred at a level leading to authoritarianism. Unlike other scholars who pay attention to only one or two aspects of the ongoing democratic decline, this paper proposes the authoritarian practices of the Jokowi administration as the indicators of the regression. This authoritarian practices can be seen from four indicators of authoritarian behaviors, namely: first, rejection (or weak commitment) to the democratic rule; second, denying the legitimacy of political opponents; third, tolerance or encouragement of violence and fourth, willingness to limit civil liberties against opponents, including the media. These four indicators occurred during the reign of President Jokowi, both in his first term as president during his early term in office in the second term at the end of 2019. If we look at the tidal trend of democracy in Indonesia after the reformation, the democratic situation in Indonesia has experienced a nadir just recently. What Levittsky and Ziblatt (2018) wrote to explain how democracy died in America during Trump’s time can actually be used to analyze the situation that is currently happening in Indonesia. The author realizes that in addition to the four criteria above, there are other signs of democratic decline mentioned by literature, however the four signs that refer to Levittsky and Ziblatt (2018) above that clearly occur in Indonesia can be additional features of democratic decline. Wijayanto | Democratic Regression and Authoritarian ... 69

REFERENCES Adyatama, E. (2020, October 27). Kasad Andika Perkasa Ajak Tukang Bangunan Disabilitas Makan Bakso Bareng. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from Tempo.co: https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1399810/kasad- andika-perkasa-ajak-tukang-bangunan-disabilitas-makan-bakso-bareng. Aji, M. R. (2020, September 5). Begini Reaksi Presiden Jokowi terhadap Peretasan Media Massa. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from nasional.tempo.co: https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1382918/begini-reaksi- presiden-jokowi-terhadap-peretasan-media-massa/full&view=ok. Aminuddin, M F. (2020). Populist Promises, Democratic Fissures: Indonesia and the Philippines. Global Asia. 15(1). (https://www.globalasia.org/v15no1/cover/populist-promises-democratic-fissures-indonesia- and-the-philippines_m-faishal-aminuddin). Antara. (2020, October 29). Polisi Periksa CCTV di Lokasi Begal Sepeda Terhadap Seorang Kolonel Marinir. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from metro.tempo.co: https://metro.tempo.co/read/1400349/polisi- periksa-cctv-di-lokasi-begal-sepeda-terhadap-seorang-kolonel-marinir. Aspinall, E., & Mietzner, M. (2019a). Indonesia’s Democratic Paradox: Competitive Elections amidst Rising Illiberalism. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 55(3), 295–317. https://doi.org/10.1080/00074 918.2019.1690412. Aspinall, E., & Mietzner, M. (2019b). Southeast Asia’s Troubling Elections: Non-democratic Pluralism in Indonesia. Journal of Democracy, 30(4), 104–118. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0055. Aspinall, E., & Warburton, E. (2018). Indonesia: The Dangers of Democratic Regression. 129(Icsps 2017), 1–4. https://doi.org/10.2991/icsps-17.2018.1. Briantika, A. (2019, October 30). Vonis Ringan Polisi Kendari, Keluarga Randi: “Keadilan Sudah Mati”. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from tirto.id: https://tirto.id/vonis-ringan-polisi-kendari-keluarga- randi-keadilan-sudah-mati-ekBv. Bourchier, D. M. (2019). Two Decades of Ideological Contestation in Indonesia: From Democratic Cosmopolitanism to Religious Nationalism. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 49(5), 713–733. https:// doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1590620. CNN Indonesia. (2020, August 23). Akun Epidemiolog Pandu Riono Diretas, Dunia Akademis Terancam. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from cnnindonesia.com: https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional /20200822183537-20-538156/akun-epidemiolog-pandu-riono-diretas-dunia-akademis-terancam. CNN Indonesia. (2020, September 12). BIN Punya Pasukan Khusus Rajawali, Bersenjata Laras Panjang. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from CNN Indonesia: https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional /20200912110218-20-545608/bin-punya-pasukan-khusus-rajawali-bersenjata-laras-panjang. Hadiz, V. R. (2017). Indonesia’s year of democratic setbacks: towards a new phase of deepening illiberalism? Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 53(3), 261–278. https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2017.14 10311. Hakim, R. N. (2020, July 14). Jokowi Minta Perwira Remaja TNI-Polri Bantu Tangani Covid-19. Retrieved September 2020, 2020, from Kompas.com: https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/07/14/13085651/ jokowi-minta-perwira-remaja-tni-polri-bantu-tangani-covid-19. Hamayotsu, K. (2013). The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 43(4), 658–677. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2013 .780471. Ibrahim, R. (2020, April 23). Kronologi Peretasan WhatsApp & Penangkapan Ravio Patra. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from asumsi.co: https://asumsi.co/post/kronologi-peretasan-whatsapp- penangkapan-ravio-patra. Ihsanuddin. (2019, July 13). Kepala BIN Budi Gunawan Ikut Jembatani Pertemuan Jokowi dan Prabowo. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from Kompas.com: https://nasional.kompas.com/ 70 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

read/2019/07/13/13094171/kepala-bin-budi-gunawan-ikut-jembatani-pertemuan-jokowi-dan- prabowo?page=all. Ihsanuddin. (2019, February 26). Mendagri Pastikan Tak Akan Tindak Lanjuti Putusan Bawaslu atas Ganjar dkk. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from Kompas.com: https://nasional.kompas.com/ read/2019/02/26/12374611/mendagri-pastikan-tak-akan-tindak-lanjuti-putusan-bawaslu-atas-ganjar- dkk?page=all#page2. Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. New York: Crown. Mietzner, M. (2016). Coercing loyalty: Coalitional presidentialism and party politics in jokowi’s Indonesia. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 38(2), 209–232. https://doi.org/10.1355/cs38-2b. Mietzner, M. (2018). Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia. Pacific Affairs, 91(June), 261–282. https://doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2012.754486. Mietzner, M. (2019). Authoritarian innovations in Indonesia: electoral narrowing, identity politics and executive illiberalism. Democratization, 0(0), 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1704266. Mietzner, M. (2020). Populist Anti-Scientism, Religious Polarisation, and Institutionalised Corruption: How Indonesia’s Democratic Decline Shaped its COVID-19 Response. (Kipgen), 1–22. Nadlir, M. (2018, February 6). Ini Isi Permendagri Soal Aturan Penelitian yang Tuai Kritik Publik. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from Kompas.com: https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/02/06/22302571/ ini-isi-permendagri-soal-aturan-penelitian-yang-tuai-kritik-publik?page=all. Patra, R. (2020, April 23). Kenapa Penyajian Data Rasio Kematian COVID-19 dari BNPB Menyesatkan. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from tirto.id: https://tirto.id/kenapa-penyajian-data-rasio-kematian- covid-19-dari-bnpb-menyesatkan-eP1kPower, T. P. (2018). Jokowi’s authoritarian turn and Indonesia’s democratic decline. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 54(3), 307–338. https://doi.org/10.1080 /00074918.2018.1549918. Pramana, R. A. (2020, March 10). Upaya Menyelesaikan Masalah Kekerasan di Papua. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from voi.id: https://voi.id/berita/3522/upaya-menyelesaikan-masalah-kekerasan-di-papua. Ristianto, C. (2019, February 26). Mendagri Tak Lanjuti Putusan Bawaslu soal Ganjar dkk, Ini Respons Kubu Prabowo. Retrieved September 21, 2020, from Kompas.com: https://nasional.kompas.com/ read/2019/02/26/18443051/mendagri-tak-lanjuti-putusan-bawaslu-soal-ganjar-dkk-ini-respons- kubu. Rizky, F. (2019, October 13). Prabowo-Surya Paloh Sepakat Amandemen UUD 1945 Dilakukan Menyeluruh. Retrieved September 11, 2020, from okezone.com: https://nasional.okezone.com/ read/2019/10/13/337/2116435/prabowo-surya-paloh-sepakat-amandemen-uud-1945-dilakukan- menyeluruh. Setyowati, D. (2020, April 23). Kritik Stafsus Jokowi, WhatsApp Aktivis Diretas Lalu Ditangkap Polisi. Retrieved September 11, 2020, from Katadata.co.id: https://katadata.co.id/desysetyowati/ berita/5ea1337090dc3/kritik-stafsus-jokowi-whatsapp-aktivis-diretas-lalu-ditangkap-polisi. Slater, D. (2018). PARTY CARTELIZATION, Indonesian-STYLE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER-SHARING, and the CONTINGENCY of DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION. Journal of East Asian Studies, 18(1), 23–46. https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2017.26. Syambudi, I. (2020, June 4). Kasus Peretasan & Teror Diskusi CLS UGM: Polisi Lambat Bertindak. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from tirto.id: https://tirto.id/kasus-peretasan-teror-diskusi-cls-ugm-polisi- lambat-bertindak-fECn. Thomas, V. F. (2020, August 21). Kronologi Peretasan Tempo.co & Pembungkaman Pekerjaan Jurnalistik. Retrieved September 21, 2020, from tirto.id: https://tirto.id/kronologi-peretasan-tempoco- pembungkaman-pekerjaan-jurnalistik-fZml. Wijayanto | Democratic Regression and Authoritarian ... 71

Warburton, E. (2016). Jokowi and the New Developmentalism. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 52(3), 297–320. https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2016.1249262. Warburton, E., & Aspinall, E. (2019). Explaining Indonesia’s democratic regression: Structure, agency, and popular opinion. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 41(2), 255–285. https://doi.org/10.1355/cs41-2k. Wijayanto, Rachbini, D.J., Ruslan, M., & Bakarudin F.N. (2019). Menyelamatkan Demokrasi: Outlook Demokrasi LP3ES. Jakarta: LP3ES. Wiratraman, H. P. (2018). Pemilu dan neo-otoritarianisme. Konferensi Nasional Hukum Tata Negara (KNHTN), (November), 9–12. Yusuf, O. (2019, May 22). Wiranto: Pemerintah Sengaja Batasi Media Sosial Hari Ini. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from Kompas.com: https://tekno.kompas.com/read/2019/05/22/14291067/wiranto- pemerintah-sengaja-batasi-media-sosial-hari-ini.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Wijayanto is the director of the Center for Media and Democracy, LP3ES and a lecturer in Media and Democracy at the Government Science Study Program, Diponegoro University. For the last twelve years he has been working on issues related to journalism, media freedom, corruption, social movements and democracy in Indonesia. After completing his doctoral study with a dissertation on the biography of Harian Kompas at Leiden University in 2019, he developed his research interest in digital politics and its influence on democracy in the era of disruption. Recently, he won a research grant from KNAW Netherlands for the 2020-2021 research period with a proposal entitled “Cyber Troops and Public Opinion Manipulation: A Mixed-Method Study of Social Media Propaganda in Indonesia”. Corresponding author email: [email protected]. 72 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020 Indonesian Journal of Political Research (IJPR) Volume 1, December 2020 ISSN 2747-2590 (Printed)

RESEARCH NOTE Malaysia’s Political Changes Amid Covid-19

Mohd Rizal Mohd Yaakop Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Malaysia.

Mohd Azmi Mohd Razif University of Malaysia, Malaysia.

Ahmad Redzuan Mohamad Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Malaysia.

Abstract

The objective of this study is to examine Malaysian’s perspective on political changes in Malaysia during the Covid-19 pandemic. Not only did the 2018 election return Mahathir to power, but it also ended the six-decades-long one-party hegemony of Barisan Nasional (BN). Yet Mahathir’s return to power is not only potentially transformative for Malaysian domestic politics. It also has far-reaching strategic implications. Similar to previous elections, the battle lines of GE14 will be drawn mainly on domestic issues rather than foreign affairs. Domestically, the victory of Pakatan Harapan (PH) to win the 2018’s National Election had paved a way for several changes in the nation. However, after 22 months the PH government collapsed amidst a dramatic series of events in February 2020; with major issues of failure in fulfilling their manifesto. A new government overthrew the PH ruling side when one of the parties withdrew from the PH coalition, forming a new government consisting of Muhyiddin’s new Perikatan Nasional (PN). Ironically, this new government is argued to survive the immense internal and external challenges it faces in the coming months due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Fundamental policies in managing the pandemic bring crucial accountability that highlighted their governance credibility. This study focuses on the perception of the Malaysian community amidst the changes towards this political scene. To understand this, interviews and questionnaires were adopted online which involved 950 respondents randomly selected. The data was then analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software application. The results show that the respondents are well informed, knowledgeable, and aware of political change issues as the pattern is fairly consistent by sex, age, and ethnic grouping. Findings from this study provide insight into the importance of awareness in generating political awareness and public response towards policy and practices related to the government. Furthermore, the study captures what it means by political change for the respondents. It is important for future analyses to investigate this question and to enhance more study related to the understanding of Malaysian politics. Keywords: Political Change, Awareness, Health Security, Covid-19

INTRODUCTION fter winning the 2018 General Election, the winning coalition Pakatan Harapan consisted of PKR (Parti Keadilan Rakyat), DAP (Democratic Action Party), National Trust Party, and ABERSATU party. The victory plummeted to 22 months of governing power, leading to its failure to endure what was more to come. The failure of the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition party to survive Malaysian politics is very much due to its fiasco in fulfilling the 100 Manifestos before the election to win the mind and heart of the voters. Some of the manifestos were promised by themselves to the voters, set to be fulfilled before 100 days of the Pakatan administration. Furthermore, before the change of power, Mahathir, the newly reintroduced prime minister has opted to restructure not only the Cabinets but national policy in favor of justice and transparency. On the other hand, the then opposing parties UMNO and PAS was in favor of Malay-Muslim hegemony over multiracial. 1MDB scandal has always been portrayed as a core issue involving the previous Prime Minister Najib and had acted as the main factor that changes the electoral result. Malaysia under Mahathir may quickly implement anticorruption reforms. Internationally, Malaysia shall impact ASEAN in many ways especially to prove its transparency and democratic stand. Yet ASEAN-Malaysia relations are not merely a domestic political controversy, as it has strategic implications for Southeast Asia as well. Regionally, much to be talked about the side effect of this change to neighboring ASEAN countries mainly Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Cambodia. Clearly, the water did not stop at the water gate and it flows to the neighboring region politically, economically, and socially. The question of how political change in Malaysia affects Indonesia cannot be answered due to a new operational environment facing ASEAN Countries which is COVID-19. If Prime Minister Muhyiddin’s new coalition favors specifically Malay hegemony, then it is clearly affecting relation ties with Indonesia due to the Malay Nusantara concept which was once championed by Sukarno. Muhyiddin is the president of the Malaysian United Indigenous Party (BERSATU), now is leading a new governing coalition namely the Perikatan Nasional (PN), comprising of the Malaysian United Indigenous Party, Malaysian Islamic Party, and Gabungan Bersatu Sabah. The United Malay National Organization (UMNO) reaffirmed in July 2020 that it would not join but would carry on lending its support for the coalition and remain a part of the PN federal government. This coalition thus replaced the previous 22-month governing coalition Pakatan Harapan (PH). PN consist of the Malaysian United Indigenous Party (PPBM), Barisan Nasional United Malay National Organization (UMNO, Malaysian Chinese Party, Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), and Gabungan Party Sarawak (GPS). The fall started on 23 February 2020, when BERSATU and a PKR splinter led by Azmin Ali resolve to leave the governing PH coalition and started negotiating with parties such as UMNO and PAS to form an alternative government. A day after, Mahathir resigned as prime minister, leaving the King to only appoint him as an interim prime minister, before any firm decision to be made. Between February 25 and 28, the king then had conducted interviews with all the members of Parliament to determine who might command the majority. Later Mahathir said he had the majority, but the king decided to appoint Muhyiddin believing he has the parliament’s confidence. After a week of uncertainty and to the surprise of many, it was not in fact, Mahathir but PH defector Muhyiddin Yassin who was asked by the country’s King to form a government, in the process of becoming Malaysia’s eighth prime minister. Muhyiddin was sworn in on 1 March, with the cabinet formed and sworn on 10 March. He has tried to please his new partner through his cabinet appointment but those appointments do not reflect the relative strength of PN parties in Parliament. The government now consists of 109 members where 42 is BN, 31 is PPBM, 18 PAS, 18 GPS, and two independents. On the other hand, the opposition consists of 108 members.92 PH and Mahathir supporters from PPBM 16. Mohd Rizal Mohd Yaakop | Malaysia’s Political Changes Amid Covid-19 75

It is important to note that the crisis has revealed several factors that affect Malaysian politics over the medium to long-term. First, PH’s (Pakatan Harapan) electoral viability has diminished and will likely remain poor for the foreseeable future, given their history of failing to fulfill their manifesto. Second, while the ruling government PN may be electorally viable for the time being, it will face fundamental difficulties governing, as its essentially Malay-unity composition is highly vulnerable to legitimacy issues and internal strife. There is, in short, a deep impasse in Malaysian politics in which neither side of the country’s de facto two-coalition system appears viable as an effective governing entity in its current state. This suggests ongoing political instability, as well as inaction on several of Malaysia’s pressing economic and social issues. This perspective begins with a brief review of how Malaysia arrived at this impasse, after which the focus turns to the current state of the two dominant coalitions and what may lie ahead. A ban on mass gatherings, due to concerns over the spread of COVID-19, will limit anti- government protests by PH supporters. Second, the consequences of the new government are UMNO and PAS will pressure Muhyiddin to allow them greater say over government policy, emphasizing Malay-Muslim causes. Thirdly, if UMNO and PAS leave the PN coalition, the king may have to call for a snap General Election.

THE SILVER LINING PANDEMIC THAT HELPED MUHYIDDIN’S ACCOUNTABILITY The world is facing a global pandemic of Coronavirus Disease 19 (COVID-19) like never before. It is part of health security defined as the activities required to minimize the danger and impact of acute public health events that could endanger the collective health of populations living across geographical regions and international boundaries. Health security is a concept or framework for public health issues which includes the protection of national populations from external health threats such as pandemics (Aldis, 2008: 369-375). The impact at the global level is very severe with now 783,360 confirmed cases, 37,203 confirmed deaths in 206 countries (including areas and territories). COVID-19 is an infectious disease caused by the new coronavirus. Most people who were infected with this disease had experienced difficulties in breathing. Those vulnerable to this disease are older people with underlying medical problems such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes, severe respiratory disease, and cancer. WHO is trying some treatments for covid-19 due to no specific vaccines or treatments. COVID-19 is not the only pandemic but tragic. In any crisis, leaders have two equally important responsibilities: solve the immediate problem and keep it from happening again. The Covid-19 pandemic is a case in point. We need to save lives while also improving the way we respond to outbreaks in general. The first point is more pressing, but the second has crucial long-term consequences. This is no exception to the Muhyiddin government. Awareness of health issues especially on COVID-19 is a global phenomenon. As of April 2020, globally 823 626 confirmed (72 736) 40 598 deaths (4193) (MOH, 2020). After series of new cluster cases of the pandemic, people began to understand this contagion and its role in the state’s economic and social degradation whilst affecting various policies and pressures that have been taken during the course of this pandemic. The spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS- CoV-2) has already taken on pandemic proportions, affecting over 100 countries in a matter of weeks. A global response to prepare health systems worldwide is imperative. These factors might be one of the pushes that gave birth to the dramatic political change led by Muhyiddin, the current Prime Minister of Malaysia. This change occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, with the pursuit to address public health and attention had deliberately transcended political cleavages in order to produce widely shared pro-social health statements. The pandemic might help keep Malaysia’s Muhyiddin in power. 76 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

Governments will not be able to minimize both deaths from coronavirus disease and the economic impact of viral spread. Keeping mortality as low as possible will be the highest priority for individuals; hence governments must put in place measures to ameliorate the inevitable economic downturn. A key issue for epidemiologists is helping policymakers decide the main objectives of mitigation—e.g., minimizing morbidity and associated mortality, avoiding an epidemic peak that overwhelms health-care services, keeping the effects on the economy within manageable levels, and flattening the epidemic curve to wait for vaccine development and manufacture on a scale and antiviral drug therapies. Such mitigation objectives are difficult to achieve by the same interventions, so choices must be made about priorities (Anderson, 2020). For COVID-19, the potential economic impact of self-isolation or mandated quarantine could be substantial, as occurred in China. This includes global health problems such as SARs, MERs, and COVID-19. As a result, various international health conventions led by WHO appeared in the 21st Century. The health agenda has expanded to include global concerns: human population growth, atomic weapons, recycling, fossil medical dependency, biodiversity, etc. Public health and social measures are measures or actions by individuals, institutions, communities, local and national governments, and international bodies to slow or stop the spread of COVID-19. These measures to reduce transmission of COVID-19 include individual and environmental measures, detecting and isolating cases, contact tracing, and quarantine, social and physical distancing measures including for mass gatherings, international travel measures, and vaccines and treatments. While vaccines and specific medications are not yet available for COVID-19, other public health and social measures play an essential role in reducing the number of infections and saving lives (WHO, 2020). WHO has described four levels of COVID-19 transmission. These are countries or local areas with: (1) No cases were reported, (2) Sporadic cases, (3) Clusters of cases (grouped in place and time), or (4) Community transmission. Countries are putting in place a range of public health and social measures in different combinations and at varying times in the local evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Malaysian government is in line with WHO focuses that: States must prevent stigmatization and discrimination of refugees and migrants due to measures implemented during COVID-19 response operations. States must provide refugees and migrants, irrespective of their legal status, access to health care, other services, and culturally and linguistically sensitive information on how to prevent being infected and infecting others, and must consider social determinants such as discrimination and criminalization in their response operations. Refugees and migrants must be involved in the design of readiness and response plans, policies, and strategies, and be given the necessary assurances to be able to fully participate in public health measures. “Effective communication to counter misperceptions about the role of refugees and migrants is vital in the COVID-19 pandemic,” said Dr. Severoni. Dr. Santino Severoni, Special Adviser on Health and Migration and Director ad interim of the Division of Health Systems and Public Health at WHO/Europe (WHO, 2020). Malaysia has taken preventive action through Movement Control Order (MCO) on 18 March 2020 through the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988 and the Police Act 1967. Malaysia used to enforce this law in 2010 to prevent the malaria disease. The main objective of the MCO is to isolate the source of the coronavirus pandemic. The methods of prevention or isolating the source of coronavirus pandemic include the prohibition of movement and mass assembly nationwide, including all religious, sports, social, and cultural activities; suspension of all religious activities in mosques including Friday prayers; prohibition of leaving the country while restrictions placed on the entry of non-Malaysians into Malaysia; the closure of all premises and buildings except for infrastructure services and supermarkets, wet market, grocery stores and multi-functional stores selling daily necessities; the closure of all nurseries, government and private schools, including boarding schools, international schools, tahfiz centers as well as primary, secondary and pre-university Mohd Rizal Mohd Yaakop | Malaysia’s Political Changes Amid Covid-19 77 education institutions; as well as public, private universities and vocational training. Based on the Ministry of Health Malaysia situation report on 31 March 2020, there have been a total of 2,788 cases, with 140 new cases on 31 March 2020, 2,186 cases under treatment, and 537 cases have been discharged (MOH, 2020). Sadly, death cases have reached 43. Four in terms of test or screening on COVID-19, the Ministry had conducted screening on 40,483 individuals with 29,498 are negative (means no COVID-19), but have been advised to self-isolate from the public. 2,766 cases are confirmed positive under the treatment at various health facilities. This study aims at analyzing political change during the pandemic. It starts with a premise that COVID-19 is not simply a concern for the lockdown, social distance, restoration, or improvement of the health condition under the natural environment. It is about attitude, awareness, and understanding of a health situation and acceptance order from that government and providing the government with the legitimacy of power. It tries to see a bigger picture beyond the details of one’s own life. From a movement point of view, the government uses the power of state laws to regulate individual social and economic choices to the diminishment of human values and life or a political movement that uses the state as its primary means of action. Health security as any security issue must have a political outcome (Marsh, 2002).

METHODOLOGY Questionnaires This study used a questionnaire as an instrument for obtaining data. The questionnaire consisted of two sections: Part A: Personal information of respondents. This part contains the personal information that aims to help researchers find and understand the background of research subjects. This section contains seven items intended to obtain information relating to gender, nationality, age, occupation, income, tenure, and ethnicity. Section B: Understanding of health security issues. This part consists of 10 items to assess aspects of understanding on environmental security issues namely (1) health threat is a serious problem in Malaysia. (2) The health threat is also a global problem (3) Problems such as flood was burdening the community (4) The problem of COVID-19 is due to uncontrolled virus (5) Health problems COVID-19 cannot be avoided (6) Problems arise because of human weaknesses itself (7) This problem arises because of a lifestyle such food and beverage taken. Part C is about trusting the government’s action in dealing with the problem. (8) The problem arises because there is no cooperation in addressing health issues (9) Problems arise due to economic development (10) Problems arise because of different beliefs in addressing health issues. All respondents were provided with five options based on the following Likert scale: 1. Strongly Disagree. 2. Disagree. 3. Not Sure. 4. Agree. 5. Strongly Agree

Population and Sample The study population is of Malaysian students of high education. In order to represent the entire Malaysian students, the study involved only near to a thousand respondents in seeking views on aspects of awareness and political cooperation in addressing health issues. The study involved 950 respondents randomly selected from Malaysian Universities. The samples were made up of all walks of life that represent the population. By disregarding data that cannot be analyzed, then the sample was about 950. Due to Movement Movement Control Order (MCO) or Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan (PKP), this study only focuses on University Kebangsaan Malaysia in the state of Selangor. 78 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

Limitation The sample from university students cannot be taken as a generalization of the overall Malaysian public. In this pandemic due to restrictions, we can only manage the student. However, as the nature of university students, as they were kept in the campus parameter, their perceptions are due to their actions and limitations.

Data Analysis The data obtained from questionnaires were processed using Statistical Packages for The Social Science (SPSS) software. Descriptive statistics were used for percentages and frequencies. Descriptive analysis is a comprehensive technical description of the status of the survey which aims to provide an initial overview of the demographic profile. In analyzing the data, researchers are concerned with the complete answers of the respondents. Thus, incomplete questionnaires would be misleading and will be deducted from the analysis.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Awareness of Covid-19 Issues A total of 57.3 % of respondents felt that the latest information on health security threats such as Covid-19 was well received and meet their expectations. Further, only about 25.2 % are not satisfied and find the latest information on health threats such as Covid-19 is not acceptable, as expected. 16.5 % of respondents are very satisfied and felt the information received is exceeding their expectations. The majority of respondents or 94.84 % stated that problems such as flu and cough are burdening themselves and their families. Meanwhile, the rest said it is not a burden. A total of 385 or 50.3 % of respondents said that the best way to manage the health problem of covid-19 is through the restoration of orders. This is because if the order such as the social distance is clogged, it will cause flash disorder, particularly in urban areas. Therefore, some respondents suggested that the quality of the system can be improved and enhanced. Apart from this, a total of 18.14 % of respondents believe that the way out is to avoid the rampant disease is to tackle the problem of spreading. A total of 10.32 % of respondents suggested that the government should monitor the development of COVID19. This is because development contributed to a variety of symptoms and health crises, such as lack of sanitizer, short of ventilators, and hospital beds. Furthermore, there are 9.14 % of respondents said that awareness campaigns and education are also able to overcome the problem of contagion as it can enlighten the public about the importance of good health care and stewardship. This study found that the majority of respondents tends to agree that COVID-19 problems are due to human rather than an ecological factor. While the opinion is almost equally divided on whether the problems are due to ecological factors such as virus, more tend to agree with human factors such as lack of medical awareness, low political cooperation, economic development and difference in believes on how to handle the problem. It was found that a total of 26.2 % or 248 respondents did not agree that Covid-19 cannot be avoided. This is followed by 25.4 % or 241 respondents agreed with this statement. Meanwhile, a total of 17.9 % or 170 respondents said strongly agree. Next, a total of 16 % and 14 % respectively said not sure and was not successful. Therefore, opinion on whether Covid-19 is avoidable is almost equally divided into two. It is obvious that the majority of respondents agreed that COVID-19 is due to the human factor. The data shows that 59.7 % or 566 respondents strongly agree that the problem arises because of the man himself. This is followed by 32.6 % of respondents agreed with this statement. Meanwhile, a total of 4.5 % or 43 respondents said that not sure. Next, a total of 1.3 % and 1.5 % respectively disagree and strongly disagree. Mohd Rizal Mohd Yaakop | Malaysia’s Political Changes Amid Covid-19 79

On a statement that COVID-19 is due to lifestyle, more respondents tend not to agree. A total of 186 (19.6 %) of respondents strongly do not agree with this statement. 209 (22.0 %) respondents said not agree. Meanwhile, 19 % or 180 respondents said that they agree and 177 respondents (18.6 %) said strongly agree. Next, a total of 22 % and 12.3 % respectively saying do not agree and strongly agree. While, a large number of respondents, 26.6 % or 252 respondents did not sure about the fact that these problems arise because of food and beverage. With regard to government actions to address Covid-19 problems, it was found that a total of 37.7 % or 357 respondents agreed with the statement that the problem was mitigated because there is political cooperation in addressing health issues. This was followed by a total of 30.6 of the respondents strongly agree with this statement. Meanwhile, a total of 23 % or 218 respondents said that not sure. Next, a total of 6.5 % and 1.7 % respectively disagree and say was not successful. In addition, a total of 41.8 % or 396 respondents that problems arise because the problem arises of economic development. This was followed by a total of 37.4 % or 355 respondents strongly agree with this statement. Meanwhile, a total of 11.5 % or 109 respondents said that not sure. Next, a total of 6.8 % and 2 % respectively saying do not agree and strongly agree. Finally, it was also noted that a total of 37 % or 351 respondents agreed with the statement that the problem arises because of different understanding and belief in dealing with health issues. This was followed by a total of 24.5 % of respondents strongly agree with this statement. Meanwhile, a total of 24.2 % or 229 respondents said not sure. Next, a total of 9.5 % and 4.2 % respectively saying do not agree and very strongly agree. Based on the result of this study, it can be summarised that the human factor is equally or probably more dominant in determining COVID-19 problems. Despite health-based disasters such as SARS, MERS, and COVID-19 towards health problems is more important in order to determine whether the notion of COVID-19 is more prone to crisis or not. Thus, rather than looking at the causal linkage between health problems and crisis, analysts are primarily concerned with the health problems themselves. Virus rise, social distancing, and other predicted consequences of COVID-19 are considered threats. The sources of these threats are multidimensional and existential. They are indiscrete, long-term, and very difficult to combat. They are difficult to combat because they have economic, political, and social implications (WHO, 2020). It is important to note that awareness of COVID-19 problem such as social and political change is now worldwide. This change has global effects and it can only be tackled effectively through national and international agreements. Other issues have more local effects in the first instance and they can be dealt with at the national level. However, because of their cumulative impact around the world, they also require international action. Action is certainly required where international trade shifts impacts around the world (He, 2020). This research on political change and the COVID-19, while limited to how the respondents aware and understand the issue, has brought attention to the growing salience of non-conventional security threats. It has also stimulated discussion on issues of health and human security. It appears that this latter discussion may provide a useful framework within which to address development issues.

CONCLUSION COVID-19 is a new disease that brings overwhelmingly unprecedented situations. Unlike the previous pandemic and epidemic, they were under control. The unprecedented situation requires unprecedented measures to deal with the situation. Malaysia has taken necessary action to prevent the pandemic for the safety of the people. 80 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020

The analysis shows that the respondents are knowledgeable and aware of the health security issues. Most of them are aware of the threat of COVID-19 as well as its political consequences. In addition, the knowledge on health security has more influence by the idea that it is human nurture rather than nature as the main cause of the problem. Their understanding only reflects the idea of health security as the preservation of the environment. In sum, Malaysians are aware of the health problems, with more actions and improvements could be taken to secure the health and government effectively. Knowledge and awareness and the importance to preserve the health condition will lead to movements and reactions. Muhyiddin’s government will still be supported as long as the public is aware of the issue and they continue to obey the government. It is important for future analyses to examine more on the issue of awareness based on health security issues.

REFERENCES Aldis, W. (2008). Health security as a public health concept: a critical analysis. Health Policy and Planning, 23(6), 369–375. https://doi.org/10.1093/heapol/czn030. MOH. (2020). Case Definition. http://moh.gov.my/moh/resources/Penerbitan/Garis%20Panduan/ COVID19/Annex_1_case_defin ition_COVID_22032020.pdf. Anderson, R. M., Heesterbeek, H., Klinkenberg, D., & Hollingsworth, T. D. (2020). How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic? In The Lancet. https://doi. org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30567-5. WHO. (2020). Coronavirus disease (COVID-2019) situation reports. World Health Organisation. WHO. (2020). Measures against COVID-19 need to include refugees and migrants. WHO. Retrieved from https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid-19/news/ news/2020/3/measures-against-covid-19-need-to-include-refugees-and-migrants. MOH. (2020). Updates on the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation in Malaysia as of 31st March 2020. Ministry of Health Malaysia. Marsh, G. P. (2002). Man and Nature. Organization & Environment. https://doi. org/10.1177/10826602015002004. WHO. (2020). WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the mission briefing on COVID-19. [Online]. Retrieved on 1st March 2020 from https://www.who.int/dg/ speeches/detail/who-director-general-s- opening-remarksat-the-mission- briefing-on-covid-19. He, H., & Harris, L. (2020). The impact of Covid-19 pandemic on corporate social responsibility and marketing philosophy. Journal of business research, 116, 176–182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.05.030. Mohd Rizal Mohd Yaakop | Malaysia’s Political Changes Amid Covid-19 81

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mohd Rizal Mohd Yaakop, School of History, Politics and Strategic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Malaysia. e-mail: [email protected]. Mohd Azmi Mohd Razif, Malay Civilization, Islamic Science Institute, Islamic Science University of Malaysia, Malaysia. e-mail: [email protected]. Ahmad Redzuan Mohamad, School of History, Politics and Strategic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Malaysia. e-mail: [email protected].

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thanks the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia for a research grant that enabled this study (Research Project - OUP - 35/176/2008). 82 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020 Indonesian Journal of Political Research (IJPR) Volume 1, December 2020 ISSN 2747-2590 (Printed)

Lili Romli Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Indonesia

n commemoration of the anniversary of the reform era, researchers from The Center for Political Studies Indonesian Institute of Sciences has published a book with the title: “Menimbang IDemokrasi Dua Dekade Reformasi”. This book was written by fifteen researchers with subjects divided into four major themes, namely: Reform towards a democratic system; Representative Election and Party System Reform; Security Sector Reform; and Reform of Central-Regional Relations, Decentralization, and Local Politics. The editor, Syamsuddin Haris, is a senior researcher at The Center for Political Research Indonesian Institute of Sciences, who is currently a member of the Supervisory Board of the Corruption Eradication Commission. As we know, 20 years ago, to be precise on May 21, 1998, The New Order ruler, Suharto, who was in power for more than 30 years, was overthrown by the student movement. With the fall of this authoritarian regime, a new era called the Reform Era emerged. This era is a new chapter for the journey of democracy in Indonesia, which in the previous period (the era of parliamentary democracy) was ended by Soekarno with Guided Democracy and continued by Soeharto through the New Order regime. The birth of reform caused several changes to be made. The 1945 Constitution has changed through amendments. In this constitutional amendment, there are several fundamental changes, for example, the purification of the presidential system, which not only limits the power of the President but also requires the President to be directly elected by the people. Moreover, the amendment also mandates the formation of the Regional Representative Council (DPD), the Constitutional Court (MK), the Judicial Commission (KY), and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to support the creation of a better balance of power compared to the previous regime. The reform era also brings forth several policies that led to democratization, such as freedom to establish political parties, the freedom of the press, the prohibition of military involvement in practical politics, and the separation between the Indonesian National Army (TNI) and the Indonesian Police (Polri). Furthermore, general elections must be held in a free and democratic manner with an independent election organizer. Bureaucratic reform was also launched to ensure that the bureaucracy was neutral and could not be involved in practical politics. At the local level, the government issued decentralization policies and regional autonomy. The centralization of central and regional relations implemented by the New Order was abolished by the issuance of Law No. 22 of 1999 on Regional Government. In other developments, two provinces, namely Aceh and Papua, were granted special autonomy. There was a wave of democratization at the local level, which was not only due to the granting of regional autonomy but in the development of regional heads who were originally elected by the Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD) to be directly elected by the people.

For minority groups, especially among the Chinese ethnic, whose political rights were initially revoked, were also restored during the Reformation period. The government revoked several policies that restricted the freedom of expression of the Chinese people. The government also issued Presidential Instruction No. 26 of 1998 which eliminates the use of the term ‘pribumi’. Furthermore, several policies that were discriminatory for minorities were also eliminated. The question that arises is: how is the progress of reform in Indonesia now after two decades of being implemented? This book shows that the journey of democracy in the reform era has experienced distortions that have resulted in democracy stagnation. This is caused by at least two things: First, democratic practices tend to be procedural and experience silting, and second, political elites tend to be pragmatic, personalistic, and experience a moral crisis. Democracy is hijacked by a few people as a political vehicle so that oligarchic power is built. In the regions, predatory political dynasties or kinship politics emerged. The reform era was also marked by the strengthening of identity politics, intolerance, radicalism, and fundamentalism. Ironically, the birth of the reform era was initially intended to eliminate the practice of Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism (KKN). Instead of disappearing, corrupt practices have even flourished. Those caught in corruption cases and found guilty come from bureaucrats and politicians (legislative members, ministers, and district heads). Corruption in Indonesia is considered chronic. The rampant corruption cannot be separated from the political-cultural legacy of patrimonialism, which was rooted during the New Order. This culture was not lost in this reform era. Amid the rampant corruption, the enactment of Law no. 19 of 2019 is suspected of tending to weaken the KPK in eradicating corruption. Elections in the reform era can be held regularly. Elections went safely, peacefully, and democratically. However, the problems that arise, and described in this book are elections tend to be procedural, resulting in various violations such as rampant money politics and unresolved voter data issues. Above all, the election results, which were expected to simplify the party system to make it compatible with the presidential system, have not been achieved. This is due to the absence of a strong political will and commitment from the electoral law drafters. The small number of Parliamentary threshold (PT) and the large electoral areas are suspected to be the causes. Political parties that are the backbone of democracy are also not free from problems. The party system is fragmented and the weak institutionalization of political parties becomes a factor. The political party’s ideology is only a showcase, not formulated in the form of concrete party platforms and programs. There is personalism within the party that fosters oligarchy and clarity, creating internal conflicts, and eliminates internal democracy within the party. Political parties have become less entrenched in society. They have a bad image and raised the attitude of distrust from the community towards the ongoing democracy. Furthermore, the nascence of reform demanded that the military do not involve themselves in politics. The military must return to the barracks, not be involved in politics. Civil supremacy must be upheld. A separation between the TNI and POLRI was needed. Not only that, the two institutions carried out reforms. However, in its implementation, these demands face obstacles, both due to external and internal factors. In external factors, civilian elites are still drawing the military in politics. The aspiration to create a professional TNI and POLRI is still hindered by many things. The writing in this book shows that there were political compromises, both during the time of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and also the time of President Jokowi related to this effort. Internal reforms within the TNI are constrained by the fact that DPR political control is still weak. Meanwhile, the internal reforms in POLRI are experiencing structural and cultural constraints. Lili Romli | Evaluation of Two Decades Journey 85

According to this book, there has been a stagnation of democracy in this reform era. The reason is due to the absence of ideology, moral and leadership crisis, piracy by oligarchs, inconsistency, and ambivalence of the state in law enforcement. However, there is still a chance to realize a democracy that is substantial and inclusive. Commitment to Indonesia based on pluralism will defeat the sentiment of identity politics, a level of trust in the democratic system as the best system, and the support of a relatively autonomous civil society for the state. In that context, there needs to be a joint commitment from all elements of power in the state to strengthen democracy by upholding the rule of law, cooperation between elements of civil society power to keep democracy to be inclusive, and consolidated. In addition, the development and formation of a democratic culture must be encouraged. This book should be reading by observers, academics, and political practitioners in Indonesia because it describes well not only the current political context, the problems at hand, but also future recommendations which are expected if implemented can be a way of strengthening. Indonesian democracy going forward.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lili Romli, The Center for Political Studies Indonesian Institute of Sciences. e-mail: liliromli.lipi @gmail.com. 86 IJPR Volume 1, December 2020