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Communist Bombardments of Quemoy Island. - Nationalist Air Attacks on Amoy

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Communist Bombardments of Quemoy Island. - Nationalist Air Attacks on Amoy Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume IX, September, 1954 China, Page 13785 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Communist Bombardments of Quemoy Island. - Nationalist Air Attacks on Amoy. - Mr. Chou En-lai's Demand for "Liberation" of Formosa. - U.S. Seventh Fleet to defend Formosa against Invasion. A heavy bombardment of the Nationalist-held island of Quemoy, lying in the Formosa Straits about four miles oil the port of Amoy, was opened on Sept. 8 by Communist batteries on the mainland, which fired some 5,000 shells during a five-hour bombardment. The ChineseNationalist authorities at Taipeh ( Formosa) described the attack as the heaviest since October1949, when a Communist attempt to seize the island had been repulsed. It was stated that the Quemoy garrison had suffered some casualties, and that two U.S. officers who were on the island at the time had been killed (the two officers were members of the U.S. military assistance advisory group accredited to the Chinese Nationalist Government). Quemoy, the nearest island to the Chinese mainland under Nationalist control, and over 100 miles from Formosa itself, has a garrison of about 35,000 men, and was reported to possess among its defence artillery a battery of heavy 155 mm. guns. Together with other Nationalist-controlled islands in the Formosa Straits, it had been used as a base for harassing attacks on Communist coastal shipping and the Chinese mainland. It was claimed by Peking radio onAug.27 that 11 members of the Quemoy garrison had killed or wounded in a Communist commando raid on the island. Further Communist bombardments of Quemoy on Sept. 4-5 were followed by a series of Nationalist air attacks on gun emplacements and other military targets in and around Amoy, and also on large concentrations of junks and other coastal craft which, according to ChineseNationalist sources, were concentrated at various points along the coast of Fuklen province. For five days and nights (Sept. 6-10) Nationalist fighters and fighter-bombers kept up a series of attacks on these targets, while Nationalist warships, under cover of darkness, bombarded Communist coastal batteries and other objectives. Communiqués issued in Taipeh claimed that over 100 junks had been destroyed in these attacks, that Communist gun emplacements had been put out of action, and that heavy damage had been done to Communist barracks and other military installations. On the Communist side it was announced that six Nationalist planes had been shot down and that the attacks had caused a number of civilian casualties. Further exchanges of fire between Quemoy and the mainland occurred at almost daily intervals betweenSept. 10 and Sept. 20, whilst on the latter date the Nationalist Air Force — which had also carried out daily attacks on the mainland — claimed to have sunk seven Communist junks off Amoy. The commander of the Quemoy garrison, General Liu Yu-cheng, said on Sept. 12 that the island had been reinforced by heavy artillery and other weapons, and expressed confidence that the garrison could beat off any Communist attempt to land. He also stated that 100,000 Communist troops, comprising four field armies, were stationed along the Fuklen coast within a 50-mile radius. The Premier and Foreign Minister of the Chinese People's Republic, Mr. Chou En-lai, presented a foreign policy report to his Government on Aug. 11 which called for "determined action" to "liberate" Formosa. This declaration, the text of which was broadcast by Peking radio, declaredinter alia that the "liberation" of Formosa was an affair that concerned the Chinese people only; that any attempt by "foreign aggressors" to prevent the "liberation" of the island would constitute "an infringement of China's sovereignty and an interference in her internal affairs"; and that "any treaties concluded between the U.S. Government and the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group entrenched on Taiwan ( Formosa)" would be "illegal and without validity." The following declaration on Formosa was issued in Peking on Aug. 22 in the name of "all democratic parties and people's organizations in China," following a two-day meeting of theChinese People's Political Consultative Conference: "We solemnly proclaim to the whole world that Formosa is Chinese territory; that the occupation of Formosa by the United States cannot be tolerated; and that it would also be intolerable to place Formosa under U.N. trusteeship. To liberate Formosa and to eliminate the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group are an exercise of China's sovereignty and China's own internal affair. We shall brook no interference from any foreign countries. If any foreign aggressors seek to prevent the Chinese people from liberating Formosa, they will thereby interfere in China's internal affair, infringe on China's sovereignty, and violate China's territorial integrity, and must therefore take upon themselves all the grave consequences of such aggressive action." Addressing itself directly to the Nationalists on Formosa, the declaration said; "The policy of our Government is lenient. With the single exception of Chiang Kai-shek himself, anyone may renounce the evil past, come over to the side of right, and return to the mainland to rejoin his family." At a press conference in Washington on Aug. 17, President Eisenhower recalled that the measures taken by President Truman in 1950 to "screen" Formosa were-still in force, and that any attempt to invade the island would have to reckon with the U.S. Seventh Fleet, Mr. Dulles, in a press statement on Aug. 24, also emphasized that the U.S. Seventh Fleet had "basic instructions" to protect Formosa against any attack from the Chinese mainland; he noted, however, that there were a number of other islands held by the Chinese Nationalists, the defence of which was "so intimately connected with the defence of Formosa" that, as part of their overall strategy, the U.S. military authorities would be justified in defending them. It was commented in the U.S. Press that the instructions to the Seventh Fleet to defend Formosa would apparently include the defence of the Pescadores, but might not necessarily commit theU.S.A. to defending Quemoy and other small islands lying close to the Chinese mainland. The Economist The U.S. National Security Council — including the President and Mr. Dulles — met on Sept. 12 at Denver, Colorado (where President Eisenhower was spending his summer holiday). In a subsequent press statement, the President told correspondents that no specific decision had been reached involving American forces in the defence of Quemoy Island, and reaffirmed theAmerican policy of defending "the vital interests of the U.S.A. wherever they may arise." At a press conference held on the same day Mr. Dulles made the following statement: "The question of the defence of the islands which are outlying around Formosa is in the first instance a matter for the military people to decide. They have the mandate to defend Formosa; what that requires is for them to recommend, and we will listen to their advice. The President will certainly be the one who makes the final decision, subject, of course, to the right of Congress within the area of its constitutional jurisdiction." While returning from the Manila conference to the U.S.A. via Japan, Mr. Dulles paid a brief visit on Sept. 9 to Taipeh, where he met Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. No official statement was issued on the discussion between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Nationalist leader. — (New York Times - New York Herald Tribune - Times - Manchester Guardian) (Prev. rep. Formosa, 12742 B; U.S. Policy, 12724 A.) Note, The islands off the Chinese coast under the control of the Nationalist Government comprise (1) Formosa, (2) the Pescadores, and (3) the Quemoy group, of which Quemoy Island is the largest. Formosa, 100 miles from the mainland, has 7,000,000 inhabitants, plus 1,000,000 refugees from the mainland and the Chinese Nationalist Army, which is believed to be about 1,000,000 strong — making a total population of about 9,000,000. The Nationalist naval and air forces are also based on Formosa, the former including seven destroyers and the latter a number of modern jet fighters. The Pescadores, a group of 48 small islands in the Formosa Straits (21 of which are inhabited), lie 30 miles west of Formosa, and are defended by about 50,000 Nationalist troops; they have a population of about 70,000. Quemoy, the largest of four islands in the Quemoy group (the others are Little Quemoy, Big Tan and Little Tan), is about 120 miles in circumference and 12 miles across; as stated above, it is only four miles from Amoy and is strongly garrisoned. The population of the Quemoy group is about 50,000. A few other small islands off the coast — e.g., Matsu, off Foochow — are also under Nationalist control. Formosa, after having been for centuries part of the Chinese Empire, was seized by Japan in1895 and remained a Japanese colony until the end of the Second World War. The Cairo Declaration of 1943 laid down that Formosa should be restored to Chinese sovereignty after the defeat of Japan, and in 1946 Generalissimo Chiang Kai- accordingly took de facio possession of the island pending the conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty. In 1949 the Nationalists were driven from the Chinese mainland by the Communist forces, but retained control of Formosa and the smaller islands mentioned above. On June 27, 1950, two days after the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman issued a declaration committing the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the defence of Formosa, and also calling upon the Nationalists not to launch any attacks on the Chinese mainland — a policy which, in effect, involved the "neutralization" of Formosa.
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