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SOCIAL SCIENCES Institute University European Institute. Cadmus, on University EUI Working Paper SPS No. 94/7 Access European Open Robot Gilpin. The Realist Qwest fo r the Dynamics of Power Author(s). Available

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES Research Institute WP 3£0 EUR University European Institute. Cadmus, on University EUI Working Paper SPS No. 94/7 Access

Robert Gilpin. European Open The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power Author(s). Stefano Guzzini Available The 2020. © in Library EUI the by produced version BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI) Digitised All rights reserved. Repository. No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form without permission of the author. Research Institute University European Institute. Cadmus, on University Access European Open Author(s). Available The 2020. © in Library EUI the by

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St efa n o G u zzin i’ Institute

(Revised version of a paper presented at the inaugural conference of the Nordic International Studies Association, Oslo, 18-19 August 1993. To appear in: Iver B. Neumann & Ole Wæver (eds) Masters in the Making. University International Theorists Reassessed. London: Routledge, forthcoming) European Table of Contents Institute. 1. Assumptions: ontological ambiguities and methodological individualism 5 Cadmus, 1.1. Moral pessimism and the permanence of human nature (5) 1.2. The utility function of security, power and wealth (6) on 1.3. Individual or group permanence? (7) University Access 2. Realist IR as necessarily neomercantilist IPE ...... 8 2.1. The changed modern international political economy (9) European 2.2. Definition and ideologies of IPE (11) Open

3. Dynamising neomercantilism: three dialo g u es...... 14 Author(s). 3.1. State dynamics: the dialogue between Lenin and Clausewitz (14) Available 3.2. Socio-economic dynamics: the dialogue between Marx and Keynes (16) The 2020. ©

3.3. IPE dynamics: the dialogue between Lenin and Kautsky (18) in

4. International liberal order after the decline of the Pax Americana . . . 21 Library 5. The limits of neomercantilist IP E ...... 24 EUI

6. Conclusion ...... 28 the by

European University Institute (Via dei Roccettini, 9; I - 50016 San Domenico produced di Fiesole (FI); Fax: (39-55) 59.98.87; E-mail: [email protected]). 1 would like to thank Anna Leander, Iver B. Neumann, Heikki Patomaki, Michael Suhr and Ole Waever for comments on the previous draft of the paper. version Digitised © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository. Repository. Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power Research

Stefano Guzzini Institute

The crucial date in the recent International Political Economy must have been 15 August 1971, when the US administration decided to suspend University the Bretton-Woods monetary system. Not only did this unilateral deci­ sion change the way the international monetary system was to be run;

it was perceived that the US thereby officially declared its power posi­ European tion as challenged. After the 1973 crisis, the erosion of US power, the recession, and the rising protectionism came to be linked. US academics Institute.

started for the first time to apply analysis of the decline of powers to Cadmus,

their own country. The oil shock and the accrued influence of economic on

weapons moved economic issues to the level of ‘high politics’, i.e. to University questions of war and peace. One of those scholars who were caught relatively well-prepared to Access respond to these issues, was Robert Gilpin. The first reason is that he European had not specialised in the core of International Relations. His initial Open academic majors were in fact outside political science, narrowly con­ ceived. He took a B.A. in philosophy and a M.S. in rural sociology Author(s). before he wrote a PhD in political science. He specialised on the role Available of science and technology for domestic and foreign policies. At the time The 2020.

of the 1971 watershed, his most recent book was a detailed analysis of ©

the social and political responses of one former great power to the chal­ in lenges of the after-war period.1

When he presented some of the theses in an article, he concentrated Library on industrial and technology policies undertaken in different European countries to respond to the so-called ‘technology-gap’ which existed EUI between the US and European countries.2 Provoked by T. Levitt’s criti­ the

que that the ‘gap was not technological’, but managerial, Gilpin re­ by sponded that this was true, but beside the point. And here it is worth

1 France in the Age of the Scientific State (Princeton University Press, 1968). produced 2 ‘European disunion and the technology gap’, The Public Interest, no. 10 (Winter 1968), pp. 43-54. version

1 Digitised 2 Stefano Guzzini Repository. quoting at length, because the 1968 text alludes to Gilpin’s nearly entire research programme afterwards. Research The point is that the technology gap is much less an economic than a political problem. This is true in several senses. In the first place, what

is at issue for Europeans is their political position vis-à-vis the great Institute powers and their capacity for long-term national independence. Where­ as, beginning in the latter part of the nineteenth century, control over petroleum resources became essential once naval ships shifted from sail

to diesel, so today an independent aerospace and electronics industry, University along with the supporting sciences, is seen to be crucial for a nation to enjoy diplomatic and military freedom of action. Second, the intensity of the European reaction to the technology gap must be understood in

the context of the profound economic and political developments which European have engulfed western Europe since the end of World War II ... First,

there has been the trauma for France, Great Britain, and several other Institute. European countries of decolonization; seldom in history have proud and ruling peoples been reduced to second-class status so fast. Second, for Cadmus,

the first time in history the political and industrial leaders of western on

Europe have experienced and must come to terms with a full-employ­ University ment market economy.3 Access It is a research programme about the long-term shifts in ‘power’-factors European that give way to the rise and fall of ‘powers’. In short, it is about the Open dynamics of power. Its ingredients are: (1) the basic driving forces: on the level of the actor, the quest for Author(s). power and on the system level, market mechanisms and technological Available change. In the modern age, technology/efficiency and power have The

become inextricably linked. The result is a global, i.e. national and 2020. © transnational, ‘struggle for efficiency’; in (2) the domestic response to this struggle which has to accommodate an ever more complicating socio-economic consensus. Gilpin’s approach to the welfare state is torn between its positive capacity to stabilise Library democracies and its negative nationalistic impulses to export problems; EUI

(3) the international accommodation of power shifts, especially of great the

power decline, where competition risks to degenerate in technological by or other wars. When Gilpin recalls in 1987 his crucial turn in 1970 to what will 1* produced 1 ‘Of Course the Gap’s Not Really Technological’, The Public Interest, no. 12 (Summer 1968), pp. 125-26. version Digitised Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power 3 Repository. later be called the discipline of IPE, he refers to his experiences in France where the US multinational corporations would have been kick­ ed out, if Général de Gaulle had convinced the German government to Research follow suit. He analysed that the German refusal was linked to a wider bargain in which the US military guarantee to Germany was ‘traded off for the Multinationals: only the Pax Americana made transnationalism Institute of this kind and speed possible.

Although I did not fully appreciate it at the time, I had returned to a University realist conception of the relationship of economics and politics that had disappeared from postwar American writings, then almost completely devoted to more narrowly conceived security concerns.4 European This particular dynamising of the Realist vision produces several ap­ parent paradoxes for the easy categorisation to which IR/IPE scholars Institute. have been trained to. One the one hand, ever after he declared that Cadmus, Thucydides ‘would (following an appropriate course in geography, on economics, and modern technology) have little trouble in understanding University the power struggle of our age’5, he is considered as one of those most ahistorical Realists who believe in the Realist credo from a profoundly Access unchanged international system. Some of his own writings, especially European chapter 6 of his War and Change give credence to this belief. Yet, in Open the chapters preceding it, and in several other writings, Gilpin goes at length developing the changes that occurred in the international system Author(s). since the Peloponnesian War — with the coming of global capitalism, Available the rise of the nation-state and the welfare state. In the simplistic The

dichotomy between historical and scientific Realism, he represents a 2020. © curious mix of a scholar that derives the present system and its ordering in principles very much historically, but trying to systematise a theory of (hegemonic) action on the economic (ahistorical) level, coming close to general laws (for this specific historical period). Library

On the other hand, his approach might systematically relativize EUI

changes to which Neorealists would be pointing their interest. Whereas the

the end of the Cold War would prompt a Waltzian identification of by

4 The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. xii. produced 5 War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 211. version Digitised 4 Stefano G uzzini Repository. change in terms of shifts away from a bipolar system to an embedded unipolar or multipolar one (see also Hans Mouritzen in this volume),

Gilpin’s approach must stress the profound continuity of the interna­ Research tional political economy and the increasing difficulties to run an interna­ tional liberal order — which are partly independent from strategic bipolarity. Institute Finally, although he has been stressing many transnational aspects in the account of international change (demography, economics, busi­ ness), the view retained finally is a research programme around the im­ University pact of theses changes for state policies — as if they were still the major forces in international governance. In other words, whereas his initial definition of IPE around the ‘pursuit of power and wealth’ pro­ duces a horizontal image of the IPE governed by a net of actors-rela- European tions and institutions, the later focus on ‘states and markets’ valorises Institute. a vertical view of international authority around a hegemon.

The following discussion will introduce these problems in more Cadmus,

detail. Section I will analyze Gilpin’s underlying assumptions. Then, his on

academic project will be identified as a plea for a necessary updating University of Realist IR as Neomercantilist IPE. Section III presents Gilpin’s way to dynamize Realism around three basic tensions in the present IPE, as Access he conceives it. This is followed by a short discussion on his empirical European and normative interest in the present situation, lacking but requiring a Open hegemon. The final section will point to some limits of this Neomercan­ tilist approach. Author(s). The discussion is built around internal tensions in Gilpin’s thought. Available

Often, these are acknowledged. Gilpin’s work can be characterized by The 2020. an attempt to do justice to a wide variety of approaches. Sometimes, the © result is rather an accrued sense of undecision. When provoked to cha­ in racterise himself, Gilpin refers to himself as a ‘liberal in a realist world

and frequently also in a Marxist world of class struggle’.6 Rather than Library considering this as confusing, thus a major weakness of his work, it should rather be read as an indicator of academic transparency. There EUI is no effort to hide or cover uncertainties which are certainly not only the his. In times of hasty disciplinary closures as ours, his work stands for by an attempt to offer the possibility of mutual learning. produced 6 ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism', in Robert Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 304. version Digitised Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power 5 Repository.

1. Assumptions: ontological ambiguities and methodologi­ cal individualism Research As we will see, Gilpin proposes a particular Realist mix of (ontological and methodological) permanence at the individual or group level and

(historical) change at the international one. This has as an effect to Institute historically situate the present system and to systematically account for the way forces of change are translated into a theory of action. This section will deal with the latter aspect. University

1.1. Moral pessimism and the permanence of human nature Pressed to define what he understood as Realism, Gilpin refers to Rose- European crance’s description of political Realism not as a systematic theory, but

‘as an attitude regarding the human condition'. Gilpin bases political Institute. Realism on three assumptions: (1) the essentially conflictual nature of international affairs; (2) the essence of social reality being the group, Cadmus, which, in modern times, means the nation, and (3) the primacy in all on political life of power and security in human motivation. University

It is for this last item, the unchanging human motivation that Gilpin Access quoted Thucydides in approval. And indeed, at many points he refers European to a sceptic view of human nature as being the underlying criterion to Open distinguish Realism from both liberalism and Marxism; against the first, because it believes in the possible harmony of interests and against the latter for its belief that socialism would overcome confiictuality.* Author(s). Available Whereas the context might make conflicts less likely, human conflictual nature remains constant.*' The incessant attack on the Realist story as The 2020. ©

a never ending repetition and rehearsal on the stage of world politics in has its core here. But for Gilpin, there is even more to this. If one can perceive a permanent basic motivation of human beings, then this is also the privileged place to start theorising. Gilpin's turn to a utilitarian Library

or as he, following Brian Barry, calls it. an economic approach, is EUI inextricably linked to this Realist assumption. 78* the by

7 ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism', pp. 304-05. 8 To what extent it makes sense to present IR/IPE in three opposing schools will be treated later in section II. produced 7 So also for the advent of nuclear weapons; see ‘The Theory of Hegemonic War'. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. XVIII, no. 4 (Spring 1988). p. 613. version Digitised 6 Stefano Guzzini Repository.

1.2. The utility function of security, power and wealth The economic approach to Realism and IR is not exactly new. To re­ call, in microeconomic theory, agents try to maximise their utility Research functions. That is, for a particular set of resources at hand, agents will choose to allocate their resources in a way to maximise their return. Institute Optmality is achieved at that point where any other allocation of re­ sources would diminish the general welfare. Neo-classical economic theory does not exactly know what utility means for a particular agent. Yet, with the concept and fact of money at hand, it can reduce the University variety of aims on a measurable and commensurable scale. As applied to International Relations, utility is interchangeably

identified with ‘security’ or the ‘National Interest’. Once again, there is European no way to know exactly what this means for any international agent

(generally the state or government), but, so the story goes, there is a Institute. pendant to money in economic theory, namely power. Utility maximiz­ Cadmus, ing in IR means the maximization of power. on

This approach has been severely criticised by some other writers, University either because the power-money analogy does not exist at all10, or

because it is only of limited use, assuming what the literature calls a too Access high ‘fungibility’.11 Thereby is meant the incomplete transferability of European power resources from one issue area to another. As applied to IR: Open whereas you are able to ‘cash in’ your labour in money with which you can buy something else, in IR, you cannot necessarily ‘cash in’ atomic Author(s). weapons (strategic issue area) for lower tariffs (trade issue area). Available When Gilpin writes that power and security are the permanent moti­ The

vations of agents and tries to construct an economic theory of IR, he 2020. ©

keeps up with this already contested tradition. But within this thought, in he enlarges the economic picture, or more precise: he tries to render it more dynamic. In two ways. First, he is puzzled with the changing re­ sources or bases of power. Second, he translates shifting power equili­ Library

bria, as expressed in territorial or other expansions, onto the agent level EUI

in terms of marginal economics: expansion will happen as long as its the by

10 For this early and trenchant critique, see in particular Raymond Aron (1962) Paix et guerre entre les nations, 8th ed. (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1984). For a late and insufficient response to this critique, see Kenneth Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neo­ produced realist Theory\ Journal of International Affairs, vol. 44 (Summer 1990), pp. 21-38. 11 David Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). version Digitised Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power 7 Repository. marginal return is higher than the incurred costs. As we will see later, this approach will however not be applied to typical Realist strategic theory, but to the world political economy: from deterrence theory to Research the theory of hegemonic war. This is the logical consequence of his historical situating of today’s international political economy. For Gilpin, the international system has Institute profoundly been changed by the rise of the global market economy and the emergence of the nation-state — a mutually feeding dynamics, by the way. The result is a present system characterised either by anomy University or by a hegemonic (liberal) order. For Gilpin, being a Realist in the second half of the 20th century must mean to be a neomercantilist; to be a IR scholar requires to be an IPE scholar. European

1.3. Individual or group permanence? Institute.

One of the major difficulties of Realists who have strong assumptions Cadmus,

on the level of human nature is, of course, the translation onto the on

international level. Take as one example Morgenthau’s solution. University Morgenthau posits three basic drives of ‘all man’12 *: the drive to live, to propagate, and the drive to dominate. If one aggregates these Access different drives, then the result (in a world of scarce resources), must European be the struggle for power. From this foundation in human nature derives Open a specific view of politics at the domestic level, called national power. This specific view finds its origins in the frustrated power drives within Author(s). societies. The state of law is able to control the individual struggle for Available power, but not to eradicate it. It remains unsatisfied and will be project­ The 2020. ed unto the international scene (p. 74), i.e. what Morgenthau calls ©

‘nationalistic universalism’. He thereby means the universalization of in nationalist drives — as opposed to the primacy and isolation of foreign

policy form domestic affairs. Morgenthau sees a close relation between Library social disintegration, personal insecurity, and the ferocity of modern nationalistic power. This implies, as well, that one can start the analysis EUI of IR at the national level: the projection of individual power struggles the on the national level means that one can reapply the arguments derived by from human nature to a international system where exactly this control of the struggle for power cannot be checked by an overarching authority produced

12 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 17. version Digitised 8 Stefano Guzzini Repository. comparable to the (national) state. Now, Gilpin does not follow those who have tried to rescue Realism

from such dark assumptions and to derive conflictuality not (just) by Research human nature but by the security dilemma and the third image. For him, it does not derive from international anarchy, but from the permanent

feature of intergroup conflict. Institute

The building blocks and ultimate units of social and political life are not the individuals of liberal thought nor the classes of Marxism ...

Realism, as I interpret it, holds that the foundation of political life is University what Ralf Dahrendorf has called ‘conflict groups’... This is another way of saying that in a world of scarce resources, human beings confront one another ultimately as members of groups, and not as isolated

individuals ... True, the name, size, and organization of the competing European groups into which our species subdivides itself to alter over time—tribes, city-states, kingdoms, empires, and nation-states—due to Institute. economic, demographic, and technological changes. Regrettably, how­ Cadmus, ever, the essential nature of intergroup conflict does not.13 on

Of course, the recourse to the state-level is necessary for a neomercant­ University ilist approach. Yet, Gilpin leaves unanswered how exactly the link has Access to be thought between the individual level and the national one. If

human nature and motivation is the permanent factor (as he says in the European Open last of three characteristics of Political Realism), and intergroup conflict a permanent (or even ‘essential’) feature, then this aggregation should be spelled out. This is an old problem. It seems that Gilpin presupposes Author(s). that since everyone shares the same motivation, the group in which they Available

are embedded will just do the same. But this leaves open the question, The 2020. to which we will return later, if there is something like a unified © National Interest. The economic model Gilpin uses must actually as­ in sume such a thing, although he himself gives quotes to question it. Library

2. Realist IR as necessarily neomercantilist IPE EUI

On the basis of these assumptions, Gilpin proposes an academic project the which tries to redefine the disciplinary borders of international politics. by Particularly important is his sensitivity to the changing forms of inter­ group conflicts according to the evolution of the group’s internal 15 produced

15 ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, p. 305. version Digitised Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power 9 Repository. organization. For Gilpin, the advent of the nation state and market econ­ omy require a necessarily neomercantilist conception of Realism. The welfare state in the 20th century leads him to plead for a study of IPE Research around themes that synthesize neomercantilist and Marxist concerns.

2.1. The changed modern international political economy Institute It is here where his initial studies on technology and industrial policy play a major role. Gilpin believes that since the rise of the nation-state and the market economy, power cannot be understood independently University from the economic base. This basic insight of mercantilists and Marxists alike, is the driving force of his theorising: wealth and power, and the

actor’s pursuit of these universal means are inextricably linked. Thus, European Gilpin provides a historical picture of today’s IPE.

Gilpin believes that the rise of an international market economy had Institute. a major impact on states’ security, because it constituted a more or less Cadmus, autonomous sphere within and across borders, due to its independent on dynamic and its separate aims from the state or society at large.14 15 This University extraordinary development was possible for three reasons: (1) the invention of a monetarised economy; (2) the rise of a merchant middle Access class, and (3) the avoidance (or postponement) of a unifying Empire in European Europe. The European balance of power allowed the merchant class to Open develop its strength in an environment where competition for wealth and power was pushing societies to adopt the modern state organisation. Author(s). Since the modern nation-state had an unchallenged fiscal and war­ Available making capability, it became from then one the major group organiz­ The

ation whose expansion lasts until today.15 2020. ©

From the advent of the European state system (city-states) until the in Pax Britannica, this is the phase of mercantilism, the first attempt of the modern world to organize a world market economy on a global scale. Once again, technological and organizational innovation in war­ Library fare bolstered the rise of mercantilism — as a form of political econ­ EUI

omy and concomitantly as a theory. For both gunpowder and the rise the

of professional armies needed the recourse to the merchant trading by

14 For this and the following, see 'Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective’, in Klaus Knorr & Frank N. Trager (eds), Economic produced Issues and National Security (Kansas: Regents Press, 1977), pp. 21 ft. 15 War and Change in World Politics, p. 123. version Digitised 10 Stefano Guzzini Repository. system (to assure the provision of powder) and wealth (to pay the armies). In return, the Sovereign assured property rights.

But only with Britain’s victory in the Napoleonic wars, the industrial Research revolution, and new means of communication, were the conditions uni­ fied to create an interdependent world. The 19th century balance of power (balance for the continent and power for Britain) allowed the Institute competitive leader to manage financially and commercially the interna­ tional economy. It would be a ‘liberal’ one, because Britain’s compara­ tive advantage and national security interest would lay in as open University markets as possible. In short, the Pax Britannica provided the political framework for the emergence of a liberal international economy and concomitantly for (economic) liberalism as a doctrine.

This spurred, in turn, the critique of economic nationalists like European Hamilton or List who argued for a dynamic theory of comparative ad­ vantage where endowments might be created by conscious policies and Institute. must be protected in their infant phase. It finally prompted the critique Cadmus, of socialists and Lenin’s theory of imperialism. on

For Gilpin, World War I was the test for the effective power shift University that has occurred with Britain’s decline and the rise of Germany and the US. The absence of strong leadership in the interwar period produces Access the breakdown of the system.16 Only with the Pax Americana after European 1945 could a new liberal international order be established. Open Gilpin will generalise from this historical account the factors that affect the incentive structure of actors and thus the stability of an Author(s). Available international system. In his utilitarian theory of war, instability arises whenever a state calculates that it will be rewarding. This calculus will The 2020. ©

be affected by changes in transport and communication, in military in technology, and by demographic and economic factors that distinguish this our period from the pre-mercantilist ones.17 Thus, although Neorealist theory might refer to the eternal return of power politics, the Library

‘necessary’ mercantilist approach introduces as endogenous factors EUI the by 16 Here, Gilpin follows the Kindleberger interpretation of the interwar period as a period where one leader was not strong enough and the other not willing to play the leader for the establishment of a liberal international order. See Charles P. Kindle­

berger (1973), The World in Depression 1929-1939,2nd ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin produced Books, 1987). 17 For this and the following, see War and Change in World Politics, pp. 55-84. version Digitised Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power II Repository. many otherwise neglected features. The result is a dynamic chain starting with (organisational and technical) technology and economic change, via power shifts and incentives for agents to change behaviour, Research to actual policy changes and finally their impact on the kind of international system (liberal or not). Finally, Gilpin places today’s IPE in the context of an international Institute system that exists since 1815, where liberal and non-liberal order change and where the liberal ones are linked to the existence of a state

politically hegemonic and economically efficient who is therefore inter­ University ested to impose it. ‘First in the European system and then on a global scale, successive political and economic hegemonies have supplanted the pattern of successive empires as the fundamental ordering principle of international relations.’'8 European

If Neorealism has been criticised for not being able to differentiate Institute. the change from the medieval to the modern system, Gilpin’s historic and more dynamic account cannot be attacked with this charge.18 19 A Cadmus, neomercantilist Realist finds in the hegemonic governance of an inter­ on national liberal order the major ordering principle of IR. University Access 2.2. Definition and ideologies of IPE European Out of the historical development of IPE in the last few centuries de­ Open rives also Gilpin’s view of the organizing approaches that provide the ideal types for the ruling of the international system: economic nation­ Author(s). alism (or neomercantilism), liberalism (following, but despite, Vernon Available called the ‘Sovereignty at bay’ model) and Neomarxism (or dependen­ The

cy).20 Later the same models have been expanded into three ideologies 2020. © of IPE in general.21 in Since he repeats this tryptic at a time when they have become com­ mon value also in IR, Gilpin gives the impression that he wants to con­ Library EUI

18 War and Change in World Politics (italics added), p. 144. the 19 For its classical statement, see John Gerard Ruggie (1983) ‘Continuity and by Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 131-157. For a discussion, see Ole Wsever in this volume. 20 ‘Three Models of the Future’, International Organization, vol. 29, no. 1 (Winter produced 1975), pp. 37-60. 21 The Political Economy of International Relations, chapter 2. version Digitised 12 Stefano G uzzini Repository. ceive IPE as a sister discipline in analogy with IR.22 Yet, as we will see, his view of IPE de facto attempts to overcome the limits of IR by

a wider approach based essentially on the integration of ideas derived Research from neomercantilism and neomarxism. If, for historical reasons, Neo­ realism must be mercantilist, IR as a discipline must become IPE.

Together with the threefold typology, Gilpin provides a rather Institute succinct focus of the subject-matter that IPE is supposed to cover (and that defines its scientific research programme). As such, his definition is often repeated in the standard literature23 University

political economy in this study means the reciprocal and dynamic inter­ action in international relations of the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit

of power. In the short run, the distribution of power and the nature of European the political system are major determinants of the framework within which wealth is produced and distributed. In the long run, however, Institute. shifts in economic efficiency and in the location of economic activity Cadmus, tend to undermine and transform the existing political system. This poli­ tical transformation in turn gives rise to changes in economic relations on that reflect the interests of the politically ascendent state in the University system.24 Access This definition claims to be broad enough to integrate the three ‘models European of the future’ into one discipline. This is also his attempt in the later Open textbook. Yet, the three ideologies seem not to be entirely satisfactorily integrated in that definition. The difficulty lies in the ‘liberal model’. Author(s). There is, at least, a tension in the solution, he provides us. Available In his book on Multinational Corporations, the liberal model was The 2020. © in 22 Just to cite some of the innumerable triads in IR, see K.J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline. Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985) and Michael Banks, ‘The Inter-Paradigm Debate’, in Margot Light & A.J.R. Library Groom (eds) International Relations. A Handbook in Current Theory (London: Pinter, EUI 1985), pp. 7-26. In IPE, see R.J. Barry Jones, ‘International Political Economy:

Problems and Issues-Part I’, Review of International Studies, vol. 7 (1981), pp. 245- the

60; Nazli Choucri, ‘International Political Economy: A Theoretical Perspective’, in by A.L. George, O.R. Holsti & R.M. Siverson (eds) Change in the International System (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 103-29; and finally Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy (New York et al. \ Harvester, 1988).

22 See as an example, already ten years later: Martin Staniland, What is Political produced Economy? (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985). 24 U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, p. 40. version Digitised Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power 13 Repository. subsumed to derive from the interdependence literature. Its essential claim was that increasing economic interdependence and technological advances in communication and transportation are making the nation Research state an anachronism and shifting the control of world affairs to transnational actors and structures (e.g. Eurodollar market). To this framework is added a world view of voluntary and cooperative relations Institute among interdependent economies, whose goal consists in accelerating economic growth and welfare of everyone through the MNC as trans­

mission belt of capital, ideas, and growth. University This presentation superposes insights from the interdependence lite­ rature with the liberal economists’ or neo-functionalist credo. By making the latter an intrinsic part of the liberal research project, Gilpin runs into a problem. For political economy, political or power-analysis European is an endogenous variable of the explanation. Liberal international Institute. economics, however, treats power as exogenous. By the force of his definition (where power and wealth are integrated), he would be pushed Cadmus, to exclude liberal international economics from the body of theory. on Maybe therefore, he accommodates the definition in the 1987 text­ University book to what seems to be the present orthodoxy for the definition of Access IPE, the ‘state-market nexus’: European Open The parallel existence and mutual interaction of ‘state’ and ‘market’ in the modern world create ‘political economy’... In the absence of the state, the price mechanism and market forces would determine the out­ Author(s). come of economic activities; this would be the pure world of the econ­ Available omist. In the absence of the market, the state... would allocate economic

resources; this would be the pure world of the political scientist (...) The 2020. For the state, territorial boundaries are a necessary basis of national © in autonomy and political unity. For the market, the elimination of all political and other obstacles to the operation of the price mechanism is

imperative. The tension between these two fundamentally different ways Library of ordering human relationships has profoundly shaped the course of

modern history and constitutes the crucial problem in the study of EUI

political economy.25 the by This definition allows to integrate liberal economic theory as the model for the study of markets - even if power is treated as exogenous varia­ ble. Nevertheless, he cannot but later admit that therefore ‘liberalism produced

25 The Political Economy of International Relations, pp. 8, 11. version Digitised 14 Stefano Guzzini Repository. lacks a true political economy’.26 This squaring of the circle (how to integrate the liberals, even if they are, as defined here, of no use) leaves one rather perplex. The stress on political economy (as in his first defin­ Research ition) was a reaction against the compartmentalization of the subject matter in two different disciplines which often treat the other as exo­ genous to the subject. Economics was considered insufficient, because Institute it did not integrate power analysis in its explanatory models and in its turn, political science often treated economics as exogenous or some­

times only dependent on the political setting: the autonomy of market University forces was missed. To alter the definition which stresses the ‘organiz­ ation’ of the pursuit of power and wealth, rather than the ‘objective’ of this activity27 is to fall back on a conceptual and disciplinary split, political economy was supposed to overcome. European Institute. 3. Dynamising neomercantilism: three dialogues Cadmus,

In coherence with his earlier view, Gilpin in fact tries to overcome this on split by elaborating an approach which is a mix of the two ‘real’ theor­ University ies of political economy: mercantilism and Marxism. They will be arti­ culated here in the form of three ‘dialogues’. Access European 3.1. State dynamics: the dialogue between Lenin and Clausewitz Open An economic approach whose basic unit is the state requires necessarily a ‘theory of the state’. Gilpin offers a theory of the state that can Author(s). accommodate both marxists and the elitist theorists of the state (thus, Available also Realists). The state is an ‘organization that provides protection and The 2020. [welfare] ... in return for revenue’.28 This corresponds to the above- © in mentioned historical bargain between the political system and the rising middle-class when the nation-state developed in concomitance with the

(global) market economy. Providing protection/security from foreign Library

threats and establishing property rights and the distribution of wealth EUI domestically are the states’ primary function. the Aware of the long-lasting problem of assuming a National Interest, by or a states’ utility function, he states that, of course, there does not exist

26 The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 45. produced 27 These are his terms. The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 11. 28 War and Change in World Politics, p. 15. version Digitised Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power 15 Repository. such a thing, and that strictly speaking only individuals have interests. This brings us back to the initial ontological question, if the ‘essential’ unit is the individual or the state. Gilpin does not really discuss it, but Research refers to the National Interest, in a manner not too unsimilar to elitist or radical theories of the state as determined ‘primarily by the interests of their dominant members or ruling coalitions’.29 Institute Yet, when he goes on discussing the so-called National or foreign policy interests, he falls back on a ‘universalist’ position, the interests

being security and welfare, that are the logical consequence of the per­ University manent motivation at the individual level. Thus, he remains undecided whom to give right in what Raymond Aron has called the ‘dialogue bet­ ween Clausewitz and Lenin’: European

Le premier ne mettait pas en doute la notion du bien de la communauté Institute. (ou de l’intérêt national, dans le vocabulaire d’aujourd’hui)... Lénine ré­

pliquait à Clausewitz qu’il admirait, que dans un État de classes, il ne Cadmus, pouvait y avoir de bien commun. L’action extérieure des États exprime­ on rait la volonté d’une classe ou d’une autre. Les événements, depuis la University révolution de 1917 réfutent simultanément, me semble-t-il, les théories extrêmes.30 Access

If for the external function and motivation there has not been much European change, at least on the domestic side, Gilpin sees in the type of ‘social Open formations’ (the concept is taken from Samir Amin) a major source of international change. Social formations determine how the economic Author(s). surplus is generated, transferred and distributed both within and among Available

societies. The change from one social formation to another determines The 2020. the change from one to another international system. © in

The distinguishing feature of premodern and modern international rela­ tions are in large measure due to significant differences in characteristic Library social formations. The displacement of empires and imperial-command

economies by nation-states and a world market economy as the princi­ EUI pal forms of political and economic organization can be understood only the as a development associated with the change from an agricultural form­ ation to industrial formation.31 by

29 ibid., p. 19. produced 30 Raymond Aron, Les dernières années du siècle (Paris: Julliard, 1984), p. 30. 31 War and Change in World Politics, p. 110. version Digitised 16 Stefano Guzzini Repository.

Important to note is here that for Gilpin the former socialist countries and the Western liberal countries have, of course, many differences, but share the fact that the economic surplus is generated by industrial Research production and this effects their foreign behaviour. It is, however, probably not only the similar industrial social formation, but its insertion into a common international market system that creates a Institute pressure for similar behaviour. If for a Waltzian Neorealist, states in a self-help system behave similarly, independent of their political system,

the neomercantilist extension of the National Interest as implying also University welfare, means to conform to a world market economy which is also a consequence of social formations.

3.2. Socio-economic dynamics: the dialogue between Marx and European Keynes Institute. More recently Gilpin has come to specify a change that might in fact Cadmus, correspond to another major historical shift, although he does not characterise it as such. When Gilpin describes the global political on University economy after 1945, it is identified by a hegemonic liberal international

order, the Pax Americana. Yet, this hegemony is different from the Access British one. The key to the difference lies exactly in the link between European the social formations and the international system they create. The Open change that has happened and that has been institutionalised after World War I, is the change to social formations whose legitimacy derive from their capacity to enrich their people and to do it more equally. The Pax Author(s). Available Americana is based on a special kind of the liberal state, the welfare state, which under US leadership, collaborates in an international system The 2020. ©

of ‘embedded liberalism’.32 in Gilpin analyses the Keynesian revolution as a response to the in­ herent problems of 19th century capitalism that Marx had more or less rightly recognised. Yet, capitalism is intrinsically expansionist. With the Library

end of the imperial division and thus the exportation of the problems, EUI the contradictions of capitalism ricochet back on the leading economies. the The world being finite since the end of the 19th century, capitalism by

12 The concept and the analysis to which Gilpin refers is from John Gerard

Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in produced the Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 379-415. See also the article on Ruggie in this volume. version Digitised Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power 17 Repository.

TABLE 1. Nullification of Marxist Laws b y Welfare States (The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 59). Research

Marxist Law Welfare State

(1) Law of Disproportionality Demand management through fiscal and Institute monetary policy (2) Law of Accumulation Income redistribution through progressive income tax and transfer payments Support for trade unions University Regional and small business policies (3) Law of the Falling Rate of Government support for education and Profit research to increase the efficiency of all European factors of production Institute. Cadmus, becomes inherently conflictual on the international level. Whereas on University capitalism can be supplemented by a welfare state to overcome its con­

tradictions on the domestic level, the question arises if it can work on Access the international level where no world welfare state exists. Gilpin European believes that Open

the logic of the market economy as an inherently expanding global system collides with the logic of the modern welfare state. While Author(s). solving the problem of a closed economy, the welfare state has only Available transferred the fundamental problem of the market economy and its The 2020.

survivability to the international level.33 © in The result is a system where states compete on the international divi­ sion of economic activities, by using and creating their comparative advantages, and by attracting production into their countries. The Library domestic welfare legitimacy makes states more nationalist than before. EUI

Only a hegemon can impose a liberal order in this competitive environ­ the

ment. Only the hegemon can provide the necessary public goods to by allow the ‘compromise of embedded liberalism’, i.e. to run a multilat­ eral system by allowing autonomous national economic policies. produced

.33 The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 63. version Digitised 18 Stefano Guzzini Repository. 3.3. IPE dynamics: the dialogue between Lenin and Kautsky If the present international system has been the second in a series of liberal hegemonies (and not just empires), then the dynamics of hege­ Research monies are the major research programmes at the international level. Again, sticking to an individualist approach, the dynamisation is Institute achieved via the impact of environmental changes on the cost/benefit calculus of the leading (and other) power. The approach is inscribed in what has come to be called ‘hegemonic stability theory.’ The latter can be characterised by three theses: University (1) The emergence of a hegemon is necessary for the provision of an international public good (Hegemony thesis).

(2) The necessary existence of free riders (and thus the unequal European distribution of costs) and/or a loss of legitimacy will undermine the

relative power position of the hegemon (Entropy thesis). Institute. (3) A declining hegemon presages a declining provision of an interna­ Cadmus, tional public good (Decline thesis). on Such a hegemon normally rises after a rearrangement of power shifts University which is most probable to be violent. The reason is that power (and

efficiency) shifts are quicker than the political reactions and produce Access thereby an incentive structure for the rising powers to go to war in European

order to change their status in the system.34 Open The particular public goods that Gilpin finds the hegemon providing are roughly the same, Kindleberger analysed to be lacking in the inter­ Author(s). war period: Available (1) the stabilisation of monetary and trade relations via - rediscount mechanisms for providing liquidity during international The 2020. ©

crises in - lender of last resort function - management of international monetary system (Kindleberger would add the maintenance of a structure of exchange rates and Library

coordination of macroeconomic policies) EUI

- openness of markets for distressed goods the by

34 The same logic applies to Krasner’s image of the ‘two tectonic plates’, which might produce an earthquake (major conflict), if the shifts in one (distribution of

power) are not reflected in the other (international regimes). See Stephen D. Krasner, produced ‘Regimes and the limits of realism: regimes as autonomous variables’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 498-500. version Digitised Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power 19 Repository. - a steady, if not countercyclical flow of capital; (2) redistribution of income through foreign aid; and

(3) regulation of abuses (sanction mechanisms).35 Research Thereby, Gilpin gives a two-sided account of hegemony in general and an international liberal order in particular.

On the one hand, he follows the typical Realist account that hege­ Institute mony breeds order in the sense of the limitation (and deterrence) of conflicts.36 He does not, or at least does not want, to subscribe to the idealist turn which speaks of the US ‘sacrifice’ for a liberal order.37 University Quite to the contrary, he follows Carr’ critique of the British ideology of a harmony of interests

Once industrial capitalism and the class system had become the European recognised structure of society, the doctrine of the harmony of interests acquired a new significance, and became...the ideology of a dominant Institute. group concerned to maintain its predominance by asserting the identity Cadmus, of interests with those of the community as a whole (...) No country but Great Britain had been commercially powerful enough to believe in the on international harmony of economic interests.38 University

He states explicitly that the hegemon must perceive it in the own (per­ Access haps long-term, or enlightened) interest to provide the public good. European Only, this is consistent with the underlying economic approach.39 Open On the other hand, he shifts from the focus on the utilitarian calcu­ lation to a kind of functionalist argument based on a domestic analogy: Author(s). the hegemon takes over the same functions that the government does in Available The 2020. © in 35 For the Kindleberger statement, see The World in Depression 1929-1939, in particular pp. 288-95, and in ‘Dominance and Leadership in the International Econ­ omy. Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides’, International Studies Quarterly, Library vol. 25, no. 2 (June 1981), p. 247. For Gilpin’s formulation, see The Political

Economy of International Relations, p. 368. EUI 36 For instance, Kenneth Waltz ‘International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power’, in James Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign the

Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 312, says: by ‘Extreme equality [among states] is associated with extreme instability.’ 17 For this unexpected idealism in a staunch Realist, see Charles P. Kindleberger, ‘International Public Goods Without International Government’, The American

Economic Review, vol. 76, no. I (1976), p. 10. produced 38 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, pp. 44, 46. w ‘The Richness of the Traditions of Political Realism’, pp. 311-12. version Digitised 20 Stefano Guzzini Repository. domestic society, namely providing the public goods of security and protection of property rights, which are exchanged for revenue.40 This is linked to the basic assumption of the ubiquitous nature of conflict in Research politics tout court. It is in this line, that he follows Keohane’s argument against HST which refuses the decline thesis, that regimes (Keohane’s public good) once established can take on a dynamic of their own and Institute subsist, although the hegemon that issued the system has declined in power.41

Yet, he believes that this definitely weakens the international liberal University order. This is due to the fact that it weakens one of the three political foundations of such an order: (1) a dominant liberal hegemonic power or powers able to manage and enforce the rules; (2) a set of common European economic, political, and security interests that binds them together; (3)

a shared ideological commitment to liberal values. Institute. In that respect, Gilpin translates into IPE the common norms that Realists have found necessary for the functioning of a (political) concert Cadmus, system. The concert has to be run not just by the major powers, but, in on order to allow a liberal order to function, by all the major liberal University

power, their common code integrating domestic political and interna­ Access tional economic issues.

It is here, that he refers to the classical socialist debate between European Open Lenin and Kautsky as one of the major contradictions or dynamics and policy issues.42 Lenin stipulated that the Taw of uneven development’, i.e. the necessarily differential growth of national capitalist economies, Author(s). will undermine any attempt to establish an international multilateral Available order. The expansionist drive of monopoly capitalism at the imperialist The 2020. stage will necessarily provoke wars. Kautsky, on the other hand, argued © in that the capitalist countries would not be so stupid to go permanently to war with each other if a collaboration in international exploitation would be more lucrative, i.e. his doctrine of ‘ultra-imperialism’. Library

Consequently, Gilpin’s empirical question has become the future of the EUI liberal order after the decline of the Pax Americana. the by

40 War and Change in World Politics, p. 145. 41 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). produced 42 For the following, see in particular The Political Economy of International Relations, pp. 38-40. version Digitised Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power 21 Repository. 4. International liberal order after the decline of the Pax Americana Research The crisis from 1971/73 has been furthered by recent developments. The first major change was, of course, when the strains on the US

capacity to handle both the international political economy and its own Institute society became visible. This is, so Gilpin, the consequence of a massive redistribution of world economic power away from the United States first toward Europe and then and to the Pacific around Japan and South­ east Asia. The US has become deeply endebted and needs foreign, in University particular Japanese, help to run international monetary relations. Furthermore, the monetary system’s change to a flexible system has taken the former discipline away and induced the phenomenon of global European inflation. This risk heavily constraints traditional Keynesian policies. The monetary system is by now nearly out of control by the revolution Institute.

in the financial sector. Firm’s management of industrial production has Cadmus,

become vertically integrated, and is now genuinely transnational. on

Finally, Gilpin speaks of a change to a third phase of the industrial University revolution, with the coming of knowledge-intensive industries, which has ‘undermined the basic assumption of the Bretton Woods trading Access system that comparative advantage was a “given” of nature and could European not be altered by the policies of corporations and/or governments’.43 Open Consequently, the present system is characterised by the concomitant transnationalisation and integration of markets and increasing national­ Author(s). istic impulses. In the same time, the ‘struggle for the world product’ (a Available Helmut Schmid quote, Gilpin likes to use) will be decided with the gain The 2020.

of one hegemon, because, for Gilpin, economic efficency and political © power have become inmcreasingly linked. Who will be this hegemon in will largely determine the outlook of the next international order. The pressure has already led to many adjustment programs, both Library domestically (education, industrial policies, and so on) amd externally

(protectionism in different forms, using political power for markets or EUI investments). The biggest of these adjustments is certainly the Soviet the one. Gilpin sees Gorbachov’s choice as induced from abroad mainly by from his growing awareness that the Soviet power was declining rapidly produced 43 The Transformation of the International Political Economy (Firenze: The European Policy Unit of the European University Institute, 1991), pp. 16-17. version Digitised 22 Stefano G uzzini Repository. if it was not catching up with the growing ‘technological gap’ as com­ pared to the G7. As in Europe and Japan during the US leadership, the

Soviet Union decided the most liberal reforms since the Bolshevik Research Revolution.44 But also in Japan, domestic restructuration took place. Europe took a new initiative to regain some macroeconomic instruments via a accelerated political and economic integration (Maastricht). The Institute Third World has given up its claims for a NIEO and competes for the attraction of FDIs (the worst is not being exploited, but being neglected

by the international division of production). Finally, even the US, seems University to reconsider its politices after years of ‘masking] the profound deve­ lopments that have occured and the challenges they have posed. The United States has lived on borrowed time — and borrowed money — for much of the last decade’.45 Many of Gilpin’s later writings are European filled with policy recommendations within which he also integrates his Institute. studies on technological policies.46 But the major risk of the system is not only the survival of the li­ Cadmus, beral order inside or outside the countries, but a reversal to a situation on where the very existence of this present international system is threaten­ University ed. This theme appears twice. On the one hand, the increasing trans­ Access nationalization of production exposes not only industries, but entire

social formations to competitive pressures from abroad, which can dis­ European Open rupt existing social consensus and, in turn, spill over conflict to the international level. This explains partly Gilpin’s repeated concern with Japan-US (or Western) relations. On the other hand, the decline of the Author(s). Pax Americana seems to be accompanied by a decline of the legitimacy Available

of the principles on which it was built. It is here where the topic of The 2020. ‘inter-civilizational conflict’ (his term) acquires all its importance. © Gilpin’s solutions correspond to a typically Realist solution, both in pragmatic and normative. He is rather critical about the attempts to Library EUI 44 In a sense, the technological competition inextricably linked to the power competition is the fundamental change in recent world politics, which provides the the background against which the end of the Cold War must be understood. by 45 ‘American Policy in the Post-Reagan Era’, Daedalus, vol. 116, no. 3 (Summer 1987), p. 33. 4<’ For an account on the most efficient technology policies, see ‘Trade, Invest­ ment, and Technology Policy’, in Herbert Giersch (ed.) Emerging Technologies. Con­ produced sequences for Economic Growth, Structural Change and Employment (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1982), pp. 381-409. version Digitised Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power 23 Repository. externally induce changes on the social structure of specific states, as visible in the ‘cultural’ turn US-Japanese mutual reproaches sometimes take. To save at least a partial version of embedded liberalism and re­ Research duce the impact of possible trade wars, Gilpin follows the general idea of a ‘benign mercantilism’ organized through the partition of the world in three hegemonic orders (US-Europe-Japan) with respective economic Institute spheres of influences.47 * With regard to other forms of inter-civilizational conflict, the answer

is again one of separation, this time between internal and external. University Gilpin discovers himself a Grotian Realist. States (should) understand that the best way to avoid major conflicts lies in the sharp division between domestic value systems and international politics and in the reciprocal acceptance and moderation of national interests: ‘in contrast European

to liberalism and Marxism, realism is a universal political theory which Institute. every society can understand.’41* Gilpin hereby in fact replays a theme of recent political liberalism. Here the claim to have a ‘higher order Cadmus, theory’ than all the other political theories rests upon a private (values) on / public (space of tolerance) distinction which allows a procedural University solution of social choices, in brief a system of justice. To state and Access hopefully reduce the confusion between the disciplines: Grotian Realism

in IR in many respects corresponds to recent procedural theories of European Open liberalism in political theory that take pluralism or the ‘plurality of incommensurable conceptions of the good’ seriously.49 It also shares the ambiguity of political liberal theories about how Author(s). to ‘convince’ an actor to endorse the universal morality, when the Available

underlying value-system cannot accept such a compromise. The ambi­ The 2020. guity is about violence. In IR, major conflicts must be avoided. But war © in in its limited form is an instrument of Realist politics. After so many Library 47 The Political Economy of International Relations, chapter 10.

411 ‘The Global Political System’, in J.D.B. Miller & John Vincent (eds), Order EUI and Violence. Hedley Bull and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 137. the 4<> The formulation refers to John Rawls. See in particular his turn of the 1980s by in: ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 14, no. 3 (1985), in particular pp. 248-49; and ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 7, no. 1 (1987), pp. 4 ff. The possible difference is that Realism says to accept any (national) value-system, whereas produced Rawlsian liberalism requires the necessary acceptance of principles of justice for a conception of the good to be admitted. version Digitised 24 Stefano Guzzini Repository. attempts to update Realism, we are back to the basic dilemmas as they are posed by Classical Realism. When neither human nature nor the conflictuality of the international system vary, neomercantilist IPE is Research certainly a valuable advance to better apprehend the dynamics of the system and the possible widening of the cracks in the wall of the existing order. When asked how to react, however, its instruments do Institute not leave Realist normative theory.

5. The limits of neomercantilist IPE University Gilpin’s initial interest is double: it concerns both the capacity of societies to react and adapt to a changing international environment and the possible spill-overs of societal dynamics on international order. It European is guided by a liberal concern for the welfare state and for a liberal international order, which is, as we will see, not always clearly defined. Institute.

Therefore, Gilpin cannot indulge into the purely structural move of Cadmus,

Neorealism, because this approach black boxes the societal level. As we on

have seen, Gilpin’s approach needs the latter to historize the interna­ University tional structure, as for instance the present link between the welfare state and the international liberal order. In fact, whereas Gilpin inte­ Access grates Waltz’s structure as one of the elements of the systemic level European into his model, Waltz does not integrate a theory of the unit-level, al­ Open though he admits that ‘international-political theory at times (sic!) needs a theory of the state’.50 Author(s). In a way, Gilpin’s attempt to dynamize Realism problematizes the Available co-determination of the two levels. It can be understood as a way to The

overcome two major problems in balance of power theories. First, a 2020. © focus on changing power bases and actor’s power dynamics should help in to prevent the risk of tautological reasoning where any outcome can be explained ex post by a reassessment of the initial distribution of power. Library To avoid tautology, balance of power theories in fact require an actor- based relational and not structural-positional power-approach.51 EUI

Second, this approach allows for competing unit and system-level expla­ the nations of international events (See also Hans Mouritzen in this by

50 ‘Reflections on Theory of International Politics. A Response to my Critics’, in

Robert O. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 331. produced 51 This point has been repeatedly advanced by David Baldwin. See his Paradoxes of Power. version Digitised Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power 25 Repository. volume). To give up the mechanical view of the balance of power has more implications than usually acknowledged. If international politics

articulates itself along unpredictable patterns of actor’s amity and Research enmity which define the system’s homogeneity or heterogeneity, then no extrapolation can be done from the distribution of power. Or the other way round: a structural analysis based on the anarchy assumption Institute might exclude security options that are nevertheless created by features of amity and homogeneity which at the actor level rule the relations between particular states or regional complexes.52 University As we have seen, Gilpin’s neomercantilist project is a somewhat ambiguous mix, or an ‘ambivalent juxtaposition’53 54 between a scientific (choice-)theoretical ideal, which is at the same time historically in­ formed — at first hand a puzzle for those used to classify him into the European scientific corner of Realism. It should rather be read the other way Institute. round. Gilpin is a historicist Realist who tries to be clear about its as­ sumptions, the same that underlie many of the traditional empiricist ac­ Cadmus, counts of international politics, namely utilitarian thinking and conse- on quentialist ethics. Unfortunately, the debate about these assumptions is University not opened for long, but immediately closed with the unique reference to an underdiscussed liberal political theory and to choice-theoretical Access approaches, both acceptable to the main canons of IR/IPE. His first re­ European action to meta-theoretical critiques is telling in this regard.34 Open This is also the general thrust of the following critique of this Neomercantilist project: in a sense the later writings of Gilpin restrict Author(s). Available the interdisciplinary exchange to which his own approach had contrib­ The 2020. © in 52 This argument about the indeterminacy of balance of power theories (even for the range of possible and reasonable actions) has been done already by Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics (Baltimore et Library al.: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), in particular p. 86. The distinction between

homogenous and heterogeneous international orders was elaborated by Raymond Aron, EUI Paix et guerre entre les nations, pp. 108-09. 52 For the critique of this Realist strategy to overcome its inherent tension between the structuralism and historicism in general, but applied to Gilpin, see R.B.J. Walker. by ‘Realism, Change, and International Political Theory’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 1 (March 1987), pp. 78-79. 54 ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Poiitica Realism’ is a response to Ashley’s critique of Neorealism in which Gilpin does not even mention the meta-theoretical produced level on which Ashley’s critique is pitched. See Richard Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and Its Critics, pp. 255-300. version Digitised 26 Stefano G uzzini Repository. uted. On the one hand his project consisted in a more general critique about how IR should be analyzed (namely as IPE), i.e. in an attempt to overcome Realism by integrating some of its insights. On the other Research hand, the turn to a more systemic hegemonic stability theory and the state/market nexus provide rather (just) an update of Realism. Being one of the forerunner of IPE as a redefinition of IR, he might have unwit­ Institute tingly ‘normalized’ it to an unchallenging subcategory of international and increasingly US politics.

By introducing the necessity of a theory of the state, he opens up University both to ‘comperative political economy’ and to historical sociology that have been increasingly isolated within IR. Both approaches would study the articulation of particular state-society nexus in the changing global political economy, either by in-depth studies of one case or by more European macro-level comparisons.55 By stressing both the transnationalization Institute. of production and adaptation processes at the societal level, Gilpin should be pushed to analyse transnational blocking groups and lobbies Cadmus, and integrate the study of domestic dynamics with transnational ones.56 on

In short, transnational actors and networks cannot be reduced to the University outside environment of state action, but should be taken to form a Access common realm of world politics.

Yet, Gilpin repeatedly shifts back to a policy-making level. Take as European an example his discussion of Third World development, where he right­ Open ly points to domestic reasons for underdevelopment, but in fact black­ boxes them. ‘Those less developed societies that have put their houses Author(s). in order and have created efficient domestic economies have succeeded Available

in achieving very rapid rates of economic growth.’57 This explanation The 2020. begs the question: how can a country with a specific social formation, © a particular positioning in the global political economy, and particular in transnational links put its house in order? What are the systematic and Library

55 Representative for others, see Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets. EUI Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985) and Theda Skocpol (ed.) Visions and Method in Historical Sociology (Cambridge, Mass.: the

Cambridge University Press, 1984). by 56 This is one of the tenets of more radical political economy, as for instance in Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order, Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)

57 ‘Development and Underdevelopment: Conflicting Perspectives on the Third produced World’, in S. Hook, W. L. O’Neill & R. O’Toole (eds) Philosophy, History and Social Action (Dordrecht el at.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), p. 205. version Digitised Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Powei 27 Repository. what the contingent constraints and opportunities? Despite his own analysis of the vertical integration via firms, of the

increasing globalisation of political economy, it is, as if politics were Research only done by states. This could be due to the central role of hegemons in the theory and thus the concentration on great power policies. Maybe it is because the role of the (Realist) writer to provide council to the Institute prince58 requires a state-policy oriented perspective. Yet, being taken back to a national (or state) perspective, has con­ sequences for the very identification of the problems of the present University global political economy. There is first of all a reduction of liberalism to a free-trade order.59 Protectionism represents therefore an evil to be avoided. This is much influenced by the historical lesson of the interwar period, where competitive ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies, or more ag- European ressive ways to export domestic adjustments abroad. In this reading, Keynesianism is as much a liberal domestic solution, as the welfare Institute. state an international problem. Gilpin is, however, well aware that Cadmus, today’s technological and economic change has brought about a system on of international production where international trade is decreasingly University important and the major flows are either goods exchanged within firms (also across different states) or are in the form of capital, know how or Access other forms of what is called the ‘New Foreign Direct Investments’ European (patents, licenses, domestic savings used for FDIs, and so on). In other Open words, the ‘health’ of the global market system can hardly be satisfac­ torily measured with the thermometer of its free trade conviction. Author(s). This signifies that the liberal international order has to cope with a Available

transnational agenda, where national reversals to more neoliberal poli­ The 2020. cies, which Gilpin at times notes with tentative approval, only increase © the fiscal crisis of the state level, not on the expenses, but on the in­ in come side. Far from preparing a return to a less national (because less

state-interventionist) order, neoliberal policies, in fact, correspond to a Library kind of nationalist competitive strategy in the new global competition for foreign investment and market shares. EUI Gilpin’s focus on trade might induce to think that if only multilateral the management of national trade policies would happen, the liberal order by can be saved. Yet, the novelty is not that much hegemonic decline and produced 58 ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, p. 320. 59 See for instance, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, pp. 31 If. version Digitised 28 S t e f a n o G u z z i n i Repository. rising protectionism, but the global stage of production. The difficulty is not the rising use of national economic policy means, i.e. an affirm­ ation of national sovereignty that could be negotiated with others, but Research the increasing powerlessness of these very means a the disposal of indi­ vidual states.60 Even if we had a hegemon, in today’s world, it could barely enforce a liberal order as before. Institute It is difficult not to have the impression, that Gilpin’s very legit­ imate interest in the adaptation of his own society eventually plays a

trick on his neomercantilist approach: it becomes increasingly not only University state, but US-centered. The link to social formations which has been ne­ glected otherwise reappears in the implicit (and sometimes explicit) US agenda. Having helped to open many new routes in the study of politics, widely conceived, this turn might have contributed to make out European of IPE just a particular subfield of the ‘American science’ IR. Institute.

6. Conclusion Cadmus, on

Gilpin has challenged established Realist IR and proposed its renewal University as neomercantilist IPE. The basic puzzles of his research are the dynamics of power and powers. Gilpin set out a research programme Access which can be formulated around three problématiques, namely the iden­ European tification of state dynamics, socio-economic dynamics and the tensions Open in global governance. This necessity to replace established IR was also historically derived. Maybe the development of the nation state and of Author(s). the last phase of global productive integration requires a further step Available outside the neomercantilist logic, for which Gilpin provides some clues, The

openly acknowledges theoretical and normative tensions and yet re­ 2020. © mains undecided. Besides his insights, it is this honesty which honours in his work and still provides needed thinking space for the discipline. Library EUI the by

“ The diffusion and ‘disappearance’ of authority is a theme Susan Strange is stressing in her later writings. See for instance: (1988) Stales and Markets. An

Introduction to International Political Economy, 2nd ed. (London: Pinter, 1994) and produced together with John Stopford (and John S. Henley), Rival States, Rival Firms. Com­ petition for World Market Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). version Digitised Robert Gilpin. The Realist Quest for the Dynamics of Power 29 Repository. Robert Gilpin’s cited work

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(Winter 1975), pp. 37-60. University U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation. The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975). ‘Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective’,

in Klaus Knorr & Frank N. Trager (eds), Economic Issues and National European Security (Kansas: Regents Press, 1977), pp. 19-66. (with Henry Bienen) ‘Economic Sanctions as a Response to Terrorism, The Institute.

Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (May 1980), pp. 89-98. Cadmus, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University on Press, 1981). University ‘Trade, Investment, and Technology Policy’, in Herbert Giersch (ed.),

Emerging Technologies: Consequences for Economic Growth, Structural Access Change, and Employment (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1982), pp. 381-409.

‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, in Robert O. Keohane European Open (ed.) Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) , pp. 301-21. (originally published in International Organization, vol. 38, no. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 287-304). Author(s). (with the assistance of Jean M. Gilpin) The Political Economy of International Available Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987). The

‘American Policy in the Post-Reagan Era’, Dxdalus, vol. 166, no. 3 (Summer 2020. ©

1987) , pp. 33-67. in ‘Development and Underdevelopment: Conflicting Perspectives on the Third World’, in Sidney Hook, William O’Neill & Roger O’Toole (eds), Philo­

sophy, History and Social Action. Essays in Honor of Lewis Feuer Library (Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), pp. 173-208. EUI ‘The Theory of Hegemonic War’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. XVIII, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 591-613. the

‘The Global Political System’, in J.D.B. Miller & John Vincent (eds) Order by and Violence. Hedley Bull and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 112-139. The Transformation of the International Political Economy. Jean Monnet Chair produced Papers (Firenze: The European Policy Unit at the European University Institute, 1991). version Digitised 30 S t e f a n o G u z /. in i Repository.

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