49

Alone in virtue The “New Turkish” ideology in Turkey’s foreign policy

Szymon Ananicz NUMBER 49 WARSAW APRIL 2015

Alone in virtue The “New Turkish” ideology in Turkey’s foreign policy

Szymon Ananicz © Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies

Content editors Adam Eberhardt, Krzysztof Strachota

Editor Anna Łabuszewska

Co-operation Halina Kowalczyk, Katarzyna Kazimierska

Translation OSW

Co-operation Timothy Harrell

Graphic design PARA-BUCH

DTP GroupMedia

Photograph on cover Shutterstock

Publisher Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00 Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40 osw.waw.pl

ISBN 978-83-62936-56-4 Contents

Executive summary /5

Introduction /7

I. The “New Turkey’s” ideological origins /9

1. AKP – the ideological successor of Millî Görüş /10 2. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s concept /14

II. The New Turkish ideology in practice /19

1. Circumstances /19 2. The “New Turkey” and the Middle East /24 3. Revising the alliance with the West /30 4. Towards global power status /34

III. The New Turkish ideology and Turkey’s international standing /38

IV. Conclusions and prospects /42 4. 3. 2. 1. Ex the country ever more fully subordinating its foreign policy foreign its policy subordinating ever more fully country the Turkey’s isolation aconsequence of is international growing years. previous in Africa North and East Middle the in built had influence it lost much of the has followed, which ments Ankara develop regional the and Spring Arab of the aftermath the in power. of aglobal Nonetheless, status country’s the to the rise of a fulfilment Turkey’sof and a missionprerequisite historic economy, or the of security as amatter viewed but as been also not only leader. has aspiration aregional This as itself tablish to es efforts consistent making been has Ankara East. dle Mid the in politically alienated Turkey increasingly also is conflict. problem Russian-Ukrainian or the State Islamic the Syria, in war the as such challenges current sides’ two divergent the on positions and relations mutual in crises and everUSA, misunderstandings more frequent the and EU the with ties of political its weakening clear the in seen be West, away can the which from Turkey drifting is it be. to as used values, and norms opment on European based devel civilizational to by aspirations no longer underpinned It also of is interests. community shaky and a cherry-picked rather, values; it now is NATOon merely shared in based as Union membership and European the with alliance the views The recent years. Turkish in no leadership longeratic partner West’sOnce the ally, Turkey ever more problem an been has stage. international on the alienated increasingly coming be is country the and ambitions, its to inversely proportional decades.However,previous of Turkey’s results the are policy Turkish the in Republic policies that pursued the erably from consid it practices, differs actual and derlying assumptions of un its terms In ambitious. and active been has (AKP) Party Turkey’s Development and Justice the under foreign policy e cutiv e summary ------

5 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 6 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 6. 5.

phrase “alone virtue”.phrase in the in attitude this up summed has figures, leading AKP’s one of Kalın, Ibrahim alienation. international its and term of Turkey’seven failures despite the short the in foreign policy solutions, tactical suggestand objectives strategic the define ideology. of lens AKP ideology the will This through situation Turkey international continuedeep instability, seethe to will slips into state years) coming or the the in happen to likely Turkey of in leadership achange is (which there Unless un is end. this achieving for supposed crucial be to are will”) “national so-called the ing Turkey public make to the to powerambition (boost aglobal an injecting Turkish and in changes society identity tiating Ini power, traditions. its global in rooted a modern although Turkey foreign its policy, and making to aview state the with ofideology society, envisages a comprehensive reconstruction The relations. evolution the and international mission, of the Turkey’s world, the place its in historical its situation, internal about of dogmas At Davutoğlu. core asystem its is Ahmet ister min prime the especially politicians, veloped AKP by leading concepts movement de the and Görüş Millî of the traditions anti-Western conservative, the in roots its ideology has AKP dynamics. international current to adjusting andcapable ideology less less is in flexible rooted policy of eign Moreover, expectations. afor partners’ its incompatible with The objectives itfor sets Turkish partners. are foreign policy of Turkey’s diagnoses the with ideology does not square that AKP. The world ideologyruling of offered vision the to by ------outlines the origins and the main currents of that ideology. of that The currents main the and origins the outlines ideology. of precepts AKP part the to The first subordinated been Turkey’s which way in paper looks into the This has foreign policy principle of Turkish guiding policy. main the remain likely Thus, New years. Turkish coming the power the ideology in will monopoly AKP’s the on could challenge or that community) ty power (par political any there is Neither orherence universality. New Turkish the match ideology’s co attractiveness, popularity, could Turkey –that horizon in on the jects emerging any – nor are politico-ideological pro no alternative are momentAt the there ideology”. Turkish “New implemented, it the being which is itunder termed be could slogan ideology. the AKP’s the to with line In subordinated being country’s a consequence of the are policy – they have roots deeper Turkey’sable in situation The question processes in surroundings. unfavour or atemporarily of Ankara part on the errors of tactical result stage. not It the merely was international on the alienation Turkey in country’s the growing and of authoritarianism arise to policies, its leading ably on revised power and consolidated grip its consider has AKP the period, this During recent years. in mation a“New Turkey” of Turkey’s slogan Building the been has transfor ened. Turkey with issues strength be could onoperation international co- and alliance the United States hope to that the and EU led the West the activity. were appreciated in and Those changes tional Turkey,in unprecedented interna and rapid economic growth scene political of down the acalming state, of the democratisation ment (2002–2011) brought and about considerable modernisation govern AKP the of twoterms The politics. first and society state, Turkish of the on reconstruction athorough embarked (AKP) ty Development and Justice Par the powerto 2002, When it in came I ntroduction ------

7 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 8 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 Turkey’s standing. international on had ideology has political AKP the pursuing consequences that the upon areflection is part West, globally.the but also The third and East Middle the foreignits towards policy, in ogy especially Turkey’s discusses second part ideolimplementto this efforts - 1 2013) December since cemaat the especially moment movement Gülen (and that since the and and leadership However,el. the broke out aconflict between late 2011 in Turkish Isra with co-operation United States and the with alliance a close advocated of which Turkey’s AKP’s ally EU, the with integration cemaat movement socio-religious Gülen (the called so lah thethe ideology by of influenced Fethul to some extent was ship powerin leader (2002–2011),AKP twoterms the first its During Davutoğlu. developed by Ahmet order dynamics global and foreign policy Secondly, careers. concepts of on it the based political is their started they which in community Görüş tive, anti-Western Millî conserva tookthe from politicians AKP leading the which ideas foreignits policy, Firstly, sources. it two on from draws the stems influences ideology, political AKP’s of directly the which That part I analysed here. analysed therefore loston policy.not influence be its foreign and ised will It policy is negligible today. negligible is policy on influence their and Turkey’s foreign fectively marginalised have leadership ef been Turkish party ideology by imposed the New of the interpretation the who not with did agree istration admin the and more homogenous. party of Those the members much became also diplomatic service the and team AKP of the profile ideological the term, government’s AKP third the During

. research_papers/2014_RP02_srt.pdf January 2014, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ Paper, Research Player, SWP International and aNational as Community Religious ATurkish Itself? Overstretching Movement Gülen Fethullah the Is Seufert, Günter see: movement Gülen the about For information more T h e “ Ne 1

w T urk e y’s” id y’s” eological origins has become marginal has ), an ------

9 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 10 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 Europe. Relations with the Middle East were very limited, usually usually limited, were very East Middle the with Relations Europe. Western with integrate to NATO in aspirations and membership ittice Turkey’s meant Washington), to as well as subordination (in prac threat Soviet the from protection and ofantee security aguar as United States, regarded the with alliance on an based key’s World since foreign policy been had That line War policy II. of Tur line established the been what had rejected Görüş Millî engineering. social Kemalist of the aresult as life of political margins kept whopeople on been the had of Anatolia, of the traditions the Turkey’s especially and religion, and culture in rooted strongly be time But same new technologies. atand the democracy, as Western industrialisation achievements on such would draw movement order that sought propose to anew social The values. Empire’s Islamic and ment Ottoman of traditions the of Turkey’sroots abandon and Westernisation problems were the at the members, Görüş Millî to According form of Kemalism. the successors in continued his under and Atatürk Kemal Mustafa of reforms the with started that modernisation cultural and cial Turkey’s to aresponse as 1969 in Erbakan forced so Necmettin (or Vision) Görüş National movement founded by was The Millî AKP. founded the before they careers belonged had political active for they ment which to mostof their move Görüş ideology Millî worldview of the the in rooted was Their pursue. should Ankara that foreign policy of vision the tinct about Turkey’sexpectations adis order and global the place in Turkey’s world clear for visions, They very life years. had political in participated had minister) prime deputy and speaker liament par (future president) Bülent and Arınç and ter, foreign minister minis prime (the future president), Gül subsequently Abdullah and (who Erdoğan Tayyip wouldminister become later prime one year. However, Recep leaders, including foundersand its for over just it to power existed 2002 in had came AKP When the 1. AKP – the ideological Görüş –the successor ofAKP Millî ------pire’s collapse. movement’sbut, the from point of view, Em contributed the to aboutry, Western supposed bring to modernisation was which 3 2 19 the in period peoples reform before the subordinated Empire did Ottoman new order, the that ing as just Turkey role creat in supposed playintegrating to was aleading, United States. by would the not dominated be order that global world of creation for a just Islamic and the the with relations er development for the of representatives called clos Görüş Millî West’s the policies. roleing creating in destructive Jews played the which to according alead theories on conspiracy based was overtones and anti-Israeli anti-Semitic, sion strong had vi That Islam. to threat exploitationand a imperialism, with fied opposed to Turkey’s identi West, they the which with integration today, AKP in were who are those including members, Görüş Millî United States’ Cold the to War strategy. subordinated and frigid Shia-dominated Iran. Shia-dominated revolution apositive Islamic in movementof view the the take to permitted or Sufi), Shia, attitude divisions. This above political (Sunni, Islam of currents different the to adherence tive of their irrespec Muslims all together bringing of tenet its acommunity and idea of the pan-Islamism it Brotherhood, cherished the Like Brotherhood. Muslim the with relations personal and tutional

ried Ibrahim El-Zayat, the chief of the Brotherhood’s German branch. For branch. German Brotherhood’s of the chief the El-Zayat, Ibrahim ried mar niece Erbakan’s Brotherhood: the and Görüş Millî between tablished - es also were links Personal West. for the contempt and ogy, anti-Semitism theol its including ideology, Brotherhood’s the by influenced strongly was Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 212. 2003, Press, University Oxford Turkey, in Identity Political Islamic Yavuz, Hakan M. own. on its important became nostalgia Ottoman Turkey. however, the time, Over re-Islamise to aspirations “cover” for their as traditions Ottoman promoted community Görüş Millî why the is This involved. those against repression imposed and order constitutional the to athreat as Islam promoting treated ment establish of Turkey. TheKemalist for are-Islamisation of advocacy form a veiled effect in was Empire’s tradition Ottoman the to for areturn The call ment during the period when Erbakan was an an was Erbakan when period the during ment develop institutional of its peak the reached former the where Germany in relations close established first Brotherhood Muslim the and Görüş Millî 2 Millî Görüş maintained close ideological, insti ideological, close maintained Görüş Millî 3 émigré in Germany. Erbakan Erbakan Germany. in vis-à-vis th centu the the ------11 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 12 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 a view to creating a counterbalance to the G7. the to acounterbalance creating to a view with D8 organisation the oning Erbakan’s established initiative, terrorism. fight the against on in co-operation Tripoli with agreement ed an conclud end this to and for terrorism, sanctions under then Libya, It West even Israel. the sought and with rapprochement towards attitude ahostile sharing all Brotherhood, Muslim the and Hamas Iran, with relations close establish to strove Ankara period that 1996–1997. years In the in minister prime was whenicy Erbakan The inmovement’s reflection Turkey’s found vision fullest its pol 6 5 4 pragmatic reasons – he feared the political consequences). political the –he feared reasons pragmatic for enough (and not for also strong was that coalition ruling the in position his because promises deliver notto ondid these manage United Nations. He the quit and Israel with alliance informal the from Turkish-EU withdraw NATO, the union, customs dismantle pledged power, with ties loosen to the Erbakan taking On state. not Western did asingle include and destinations Muslim with exclusively almost up filled was of foreign visits list minister’s

erhood.pdf http://www.jcpa.org/text/Turkey_Muslim_Broth 2011. Affairs, for Public Center Jerusalem Flotilla, Gaza the and Brotherhood Muslim key, Global, the G.Merley, Steven see: Tur other, on the Brotherhood Muslim the and hand, one on the AKP the and Görüş Millî between links on the information more ment/1268/vielhaber.pdf ogy, Vol. 13, https://hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attach 2012, Vielhaber David see: Görüş Millî and Erbakan on Necmettin For information more pdf. http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/20130415155719_15_2_2013_dalay. Turkey, Policy, Islam’s Foreign Insight Vol. 2013. No. Political of Turkish 2, 15, Evolution the and Party TheAK Friedman, Dalay, Dov Galip Vol. No. and 1, 4, 1997, March Quarterly, East Middle Erbakan, with deal How to Makovsky, Alan see: policy foreign government’s Erbakan on the For information more sue the idea of a Muslim coalition. of aMuslim idea the sue pur and Libya with co-operate to wanted Erbakan that, Despite time. that Turkey at with of war astate in was which (PKK), Workers’ Party Kurdistan terrorist the backed Gaddafi Muammar Erbakan, with conference press at ajoint Speaking here. important particularly were reasons Ideological Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria and Pakistan. Pakistan. and Nigeria Malaysia, Iran, Indonesia, Egypt, Turkey, from aside Bangladesh, were members, The D8 4 , In that period the most populous Muslim states, act states, Muslim most populous the period that In The Milli Görüs of Germany, Current Trends in Islamist Ideol Islamist in Trends Current of Germany, Görüs The Milli 5 The Turkish prime 6 ------nation at the time. atnation the determi and commitment ideological shows their which cution, policies of of face Erbakan’s the perse menting the even party, in involved were actively developing Arınç, imple in and Gül Erdoğan, leaders, including AKP who became later The politicians Turkey. in munities com conservative the against aKemalist-Westernisted alliance ex there conviction that the United strengthened States, which approved were often of by Görüş the Millî against crackdowns 8 7 anyabsencethe of of effect the of asubject debate: turn the also is are recent years in Turkey’s EU away the from turning gradual have behind been that policy. politicians The of motivations AKP politics), from economy the foreign and military the eliminating and electorate potential the (expanding politics ofposes internal pur the intended to serve manoeuvre choice, or a tactical tional “pro-Western” civiliza and agenuine geopolitical was this turn whether question open It an is Israel. towards were not hostile done, had and Erbakan as of Islam importance on the much focus EU, not did the put in as membership to would aspire they clared anti-Western the from rhetoric, themselves de distanced they movement’s the continuing been policy. AKP, the When founding However,havethey that say oversimplificationto it would an be military. the from pressure forced under ment resign to was govern 1997his in and Erbakan’s were banned successive parties repressive of measures, the part As state. of the nature secular the order and constitutional to the a threat as Görüş viewed Millî military, the especially and establishment, Kemalist the because force Turkey in in paradigm policy internal foreign and the ing repression faced for repeatedly aides undermin his and Erbakan

down and subsequently imprisoned for publicly reciting an Islamic poem. Islamic an reciting for publicly imprisoned subsequently and down step to forced also was slate, its from of mayor Istanbul the elected been had and time at that party of Erbakan’s amember who was Erdoğan, Tayyip Recep dent designated by the AKP, was Erbakan’s chief foreign policy advisor. policy foreign chief Erbakan’s AKP, was the by designated dent presi and minister foreign minister, prime became who later Gül, Abdullah 8 7 The The ------13 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 14 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 party is strongly rooted in that tradition. that in rooted strongly is party the proves that Görüş old of precepts the Millî ly keeping with in increasing been power has in term third AKP’s the during policy attitudes towards scepticism? towards attitudes pro-European from evolutionan Turkish the in leaders’ thinking: genuine worldview AKP’s of the preferences? maybe Or it reflects EU, amanifestation or the rather with integrate to possibility real 10 9 of Turkey However, minister 2014. since prime beforethe starting (2009–2013), been ofhas foreign affairs and minister the as served then Erdoğan, and Gül ministers prime the to advisor policy eign forTurkey’s main the been Davutoğlu has more detail. in policy of underpinnings theoretical and ideological policy, the to explain of Turkey’s architect main Davutoğlu, the works foreign of Ahmet academic AKP. of ofview the the However, analysis an it takes worldthe intogeneral insight an ideology offers Görüş The Millî 2. the distrust towards the West displayed by AKP politicians today. politicians West the displayed by AKP towards distrust the reinforces Görüş Millî against repressions its in Turkish military United the States supported the conviction that the Furthermore, for Turkeyaspirations world. Islamic leader of become to the the and Empire Ottoman for West, the the aversion nostalgia Israel, to towards scepticism its worldview,and explain partly at least and party’s mentality the element in important an do constitute they movement’s the from ideals, guidance political direct not take

Ahmet Davutoğlu’sAhmet concept Policy in the Middle East, Bipartisan Policy Centre, December 2013, p. 25. p. 25. 2013, December Centre, Policy Bipartisan East, Middle the in Policy Evolution of Turkish the Understanding Conduct: of Turkish vsky, TheRoots Mako Michael Lobel, Aaron Cornell, E. Svante Edelman, S. Eric EU). See the from opposition (including obstacles objective encountered they once views original their to reverted easily quite they that shallow so was mind of change the point, at some EU the with Turkey’s wanted integration cians politi AKP the if even that suggest Makovsky and Lobel Cornell, Edelman, minister). prime the to advisor and leaders of one AKP (currently Kurtulmuş Numan particular in and party), HAS the (and party Saadet of the members cluding in party, last of Erbakan’s successors direct the AKP the into incorporate to attempts the in visible also was tradition Görüş Millî the to The attachment 9 In any case, the fact that Turkey’s that fact the case, any In 10 Even if the AKP does AKP Even the if ------dia, some European powers and others. powers and some European dia, In China, powers along with ancient countedpire, is among the Turkey, depth. Em historical sess successor Ottoman of the the “ancient younger pos entities, the powers”, state unlike which, of number for asmall reserved is power Thements. status global ele these all use power, of aglobal skilfully to needs astate status the ordergain to In economic prowess potential. or demographic might, location, military geographical of as power such hallmarks play arole traditional depth”, alongside the will “historical calls heritage, i.e. what Davutoğlu historical and culture traditions, 12 11 tions. recommenda practical specific and foundations theoretical both anew for formulated vision and Turkey’s foreign policy, including concept policy he developedity acomprehensive international capac that In academician. an Davutoğlu career, was political his end. now an to is coming that period anomaly, atransitory a historical United States’ hegemony the and followedsystem, which it, were Davutoğlu’s to According bipolar concepts, Cold the War world party. positionthe for in not he along did established have time an that implement ideas,fact despite and ladder the his political the up fast so progress to him enabled has This president Erdoğan. by trusted is and authority leadership. Davutoğlu enjoys special AKP the concepts to appealed how his demonstrates This politics.

would be more difficult for the author to pursue his foreign policy. his foreign pursue to the author for difficult more be would it published, were they if and readers for external controversial too be could book the in presented claims the that fears author the other, the to According research. in language English of the dominance the against protest in it was one, to According English. into translated be book the let never has Davutoğlu of why theories Turkey. two in are There popular are book the in presented concepts the that and significant be it to considers still author the that shows Turkey, in editions which 40 than more had has book the then, Since 2001. in yuzyillik-parantezi-kapatacagiz-494795 kapatacağız, parantezi Yüzyıllık Davutoğlu, Ahmet with interview of the Transcript tled “Strategic depth” ( depth” “Strategic tled ti is concepts his explained Davutoğlu Ahmet which work in The principal 12 The international system is now entering a phase in which which in aphase now is entering system The international 11 It was because of his research that he was invited to join to invited he was that research of because It his was Yeni Şafak Yeni , 1.03.2013, http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/yazidizileri/ 1.03.2013, , Stratejik Derinlik Stratejik ) and its first edition was published published was edition first its ) and ------15 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 16 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 it that served their particular interests. particular their served it that on system international an imposed had actors external that fact the in roots had its This neighbours. with conflicts and divisions problems or on internal its focused state introverted an became theEmpire, to in contrast and, heritage Ottoman from off its self cut it Republic Turkey Davutoğlu, to the According artificially 16 15 14 13 20 of the Westthe history due geographic the its to location and with Davutoğlu’sIn deep links Turkey interpretation, maintains Turkey make to ambition power. aglobal assured i.e. will”, aself- “national of the awakening an urges and politics in mentality” “peripheral the forto end an calls Davutoğlu therefore century alliance, but remains insurmountably separate from the the from separate insurmountably but remains alliance, century ferent nations and the Islamic world. Islamic the and ferent nations dif uniting and attracting of peacefully nature, universalist its to thanks potential, the heritage, has which Ottoman ondraw the economy army. arobust population, astrong it Finally, and can theentire fluenceand dynamic large a “Afro-Eurasia”.has also It in it which to can thanks regions, of many intersection tion at the geographic loca astrategic including it takes, that Turkey all has i.e. integration with the EU. the i.e. with integration results, expected nor the key’s region, achieved the in interests West Tur served the neither with alliance its to East Middle the with relations world. Muslim Subordinating the and Asia with links its from stemming advantage of potential its take to failed Union, it European the with much on too integration focusing subsequently,War and hegemony. of policy global pursuit its By US Cold of the purposes the United States, of serving the hands the in instrument an merely was and of own, its no strategy had

Stambuł: Küre Yayınları 2009, p. 558. 2009, Yayınları Küre Stambuł: Konumu Uluslararası Türkiye’nin Derinlik: Stratejik Davutoğlu, Ahmet Ibidem Ibidem Ibidem , p. 262. , p. 262. , p. 41-44, 90-93. , p. 41-44, , p. 32-33. 14 16 13 Ankara in that period period that in Ankara 15 In his view, his In th - - - - - ,

mented on. later imple and diplomatic career his by Davutoğlu before he started supposedis involveto application the of five principles formulated level, implementing Turkey’s tactical At the power strategy global velopment potential and has “said everything it say”. to had “said everything has and velopment potential of de its limits the reached already has Western civilisation the 19 18 17 an and Muslim civilisations. Europe of the origins the to sides, back date two which the tween be differences Western world. fundamental of That because the is organisations. Finally, it should pursue a “rhythmic diplomacy”, a“rhythmic it Finally, pursue should organisations. and states other with alliances and relations complementary by developing actor sive international dependence on single any ly, policy, i.e. amultidimensional it avoid pursue should exces relations. Fourth and developcultural economicand conflicts in involved actors regional amediator between as itend, act should world. of the To parts this other and regions neighbouring with develop should etc.). co-operation closer Syria, Thirdly, Ankara with relations hostile Armenia, with relations frozen the tion, ques unresolved Cyprus the concerns (this standing ternational Turkey’s undercut which neighbours with relations its in lems in neighbours”,with of “zero i.e.solve rule conflicts the prob the cy, Turkey Secondly, state. ademocratic be must it apply should

saw2013/Ahmet%20Davutoğlu.pdf Foreign Policy, http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/war Turkey’s Shaping Scholar Islamic an Role as Davutoğlu: Ahmet Gözaydın, İştar 2013; see in Warsaw in conference Association Studies International European for the prepared article the Cf. civilisations. two the in explicable in and untranslatable mutually are or parliament state religion, as notions such Davutoğlu, to According world. the in God to ascribed role the and ity real understanding ways of their concern differences those particular, In view.org/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=223051 Review Turkish minister, foreign Turkish the with talk ascholarly depth: Philosophical Balcı, Kerim civilisations. Islamic and Western between discrepancies fundamental the and lisation civi of Western condition on the Davutoğlu Ahmet with interview the See Insight Turkey,Insight Vol. http://arsiv.setav.org/ups/dosya/9595.pdf 10/No. 2008. 1, of 2007, Assessment An Turkey’s Vision: Policy Davutoğlu, Foreign Ahmet 19 Firstly, in order to gain international legitima international Firstly, order to gain in 17 Moreover, Davutoğlu, to according , 1.10.2010, http://www.turkishre 18

------17 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 18 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 outlined above, even if it appears to fail in the short term. short the in above, fail to it evenoutlined if appears may power, become principles aglobal the to long it as as adheres Turkey that faith unfaltering of source his of the is history. This laws moment, very or even the historical current of the dynamics essence of the uncovered the he has adeep conviction that reveal of Davutoğlu’s Many correct. are views statements his that vinced at attempt self-reflection, an ends he up even more con takes order.about global Turkish Whenever the he and under policy observations original by his stands consistently minister prime broke Turkish before up. Iraq the and Nevertheless, started Syria in war before the disintegrated, neighbourhood Eastern Middle reality, i.e. before geopolitical adifferent in career, litical Turkey’s Most of Davutoğlu’s po his before he began works were written position. image and international its build consistently and laboriously on long-term and focus to measures of Turkish aim diplomacy the is respect, this In it as can. forums involved be international and many as in foreign partners with as-frequent-as-possible and contacts active, regular i.e. maintain 20

lished-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-pub in Davutoğlu with interview the Cf. Cairo Review , 12.03.2012, available at: at: available , 12.03.2012, 20 - - - - 21 use. provisional for formulated hostages more or slogans to less became thereby leaders the aresult, as and, leaders of authority their the trust to tends ly accepted among public traditionally opinion,which willing and apparatus, bureaucratic the and media obliging an up by taken are leaders AKP by the raised slogans process: the aself-propelled been It has gestures. and slogans anti-Israeli anti-Western and Islamist, nationalist, populist, to resorted ten Turkish of the has popularity, its leadership boost to Seeking profile. ideological its reflects mostfully that apolicy pursue to freedom leadership ish the offered has Turk this All minimised. been has course, policy pro-Western the and foreign state’s of the secularity guardians were the traditionally which old establishment, the and tary mili the The party. influence of ruling the to challenge a serious mount cannot and fragmented AKP. weak, are Opposition groups Turkey’s by become the dominated scene has political domestic Turkey inside situation of the internationally. and turn afavourable to thanks recent years in momentum gained It has of Turkey’shensive transformation identity, politics. and society leadership’s AKP the for plan with acompre wider cably linked New Turkish the inextri to been come ideology has subordinated The process whereby Turkey’s be gradually has foreign policy 1. II

. Circumstances term=0_28264b27a0-9b6dff3b23-100877877. term=0_28264b27a0-9b6dff3b23-100877877. campaign=9b6dff3b23-October_30_2014&utm_medium=email&utm_ membership.html?utm_source=Al-Monitor+Newsletter+[English]&utm_ www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/10/turkey-nato-polarized- http:// State. Islamic the counter to on how aposition agree to tried they when on stumbled USA Turkey the and that problems the NATO and in membership on Turkey’s media Turkish the by comments critical unprecedentedly the Cf. T h e Ne w T 21 urkish id urkish eology practic in e ------19 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 20 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 media which dominate in the Turkish space, the in information dominate which media government-controlled help of the the With (or self-controlling) the New the of lens through ideology. Turkish affairs international and situation internal the views and self-confidence unshakeable president, who an displays current and long-time minister prime the Erdoğan, around consolidating been power party, has ruling the role Within here. played important has an factor The human 23 22 public life and international affairs. private and concerning issues ideological and onments moral judge making includes also state, thebut to effectively governing nation’s the as image mentor of himself whose role not is limited an creating been has Erdoğan apparatus, state by aided the also experienced under the AKP government. Dependent on Inter- AKP the under experienced that the impressive Turkey without growth economic difficult power of would much more be global pursuit on the Embarking Davutoğlu. and ideology of and Erdoğan acters char by the informed increasingly and diplomaticof services, the typical cautiontheand pragmatism by less lessdefined been and Turkey’s aresult As diminished. has foreign policy has services role professional ofdiplomatic the the that means minister prime the presidentalesser to extent, of and, the hands the power in concentration of This scale. on amuch smaller Davutoğlu, albeit minister prime around built been has authority intellectual and

house.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Report%20-%202-3-14.pdf Turkey, https://freedom Powerin and 2014, Media, Corruption, Crisis: in Democracy House, Freedom by Report Special the see For information, more media outlets are are outlets media Most limitations. considerable to Turkey in subject is media of the freedom reality but in developed, well seems scene media Turkish the surface, the On self-esteem_364672.html, com/national_Erdogan-disbelief-in-muslim-discovery-of-america-lack-of- http://www.todayszaman. from: taken were Thequotes organisations). cial finan lobby” (international “interest the and media Western West, the Israel, include Theconspirators rule. AKP’s the undermining in “forces” external of involvement the concerns speeches Erdoğan’s in motif selves”. A recurrent for them respect no “had that believe not who did anyone and Columbus fore be America discovered had Muslims that argued once Erdoğan For example, controlled by the AKP or apply self-censorship. or apply self-censorship. AKP the by controlled facto de http://www.ntv.com.tr/arsiv/id/25450624/ 23 A similar image of amoral Asimilar 22 and and ------a real possibility. a real of Turkey admission still the was process if EU into the that ing harm would risk that views such express policies and such sue Turkish to pur the free states, government member was EU the process of Turkey’sOnce the by halted was accession EU the to for development the New of Turkish the ideology.circumstances favourable created also has situation The evolving international Africa. and East Middle the Caucasus, the Balkans, vis-à-vis state ing rapidly of develop amodel amodern, as present itself and policy foreign active an pursue to Ankara enabled economic success has 26 25 24 consolidated country of that unravelling subsequent the and Iraq process. Theoccupation of invasion and contributed this to also Turkey and East Middle has the The United States’ towards policy agenerous development and creditor donor. aid IMF an aG20 member, of living, standards rapidly growing and situation macroeconomic astable economic leadercome with aregional ago, adecade just loans Turkey Fund be Monetary has national and use rhetoric with clear Islamist overtones. Islamist clear rhetoric use with and West the criticise to line, EU independent policy, the against often on Turkey’s limitations the an pursue to lifted ability partly thus

international-humanitarian-aid www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/12/09/report-turkey-ranks-first-in- http:// aid. on development 4.3 billion US$ than 2013 Turkeymore In spent For example, when the EU criticised the detention of the Zaman of the detention the criticised EU the when For example, to the EU is an important reason behind the impasse. impasse. the behind reason important an is EU the to Turkey admitting in interested not are states member EU that fact ever, the How chapters. negotiation certain blocking by responded states member EU the which to union, customs Turkish-EU of the a member as Cyprus nise recog to Turkey’s concerned refusal reason Theformal 2005. in launched de facto was process The accession EU”, the from advice [...] take not democracy. in Turkey you alesson give will Turkey can that so here, come to Turkey. trouble to lesson the racy Take ademoc give […] will they say They business. own their mind should] EU “[The saying: by responded Erdoğan 2014, December in per’s journalists mocracy-lesson http://www.afp.com/en/news/erdogan-says-eu-cant-give-turkey-de the stagnating or crisis-affected countries in the in countries or crisis-affected stagnating the 25 The stalemate in the accession the negotiations in The stalemate suspended immediately after it was it was after immediately suspended 26 newspa 24 This This ------­ 21 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 22 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 posed to offer answers to these questions. these to answers offer to posed The region. New Turkish the in sup countries ideology was other Turkey’s in and East Middle the in role with ofthe Islam relations region’s about or the models questions societies, political preferred scope of Turkey’s the as and states for Eastern Middle responsibility such issues identity brought forefrontSpring and ideological the to etc.). promotion relations, of tourism, visa The advent Arab of the exchange, trade (such as dimension ideological astrong without on areas mainly were focused a new relations level. Before, those elevated Turkey’s Spring The world Arab Arab to the with relations Turkey, now (in is which tem eroding. marginalised) too, been had sys international existing the that proved claim its Syria in Assad revolt against popular the and Egypt Tunisia,and in Libya regimes collapse of authoritarian the that tor. believed leadership The AKP fac important aparticularly was Spring Arab The of the outbreak interests.their with line in region players order, the other shape ern or letting East Middle of vision the own its projecting choice between the leaving Turkey actors, among regional with relations the in shifts for aspace opened has vacuum This East. Middle the in vacuum ageopolitical created following years the in region the in interest Washington’s and 2011 in of Iraq from of lack US troops drawal impact on the region. on the impact Turkey’s adestabilising having was Washington conviction that 28 27

the AKP government, its representatives would also deny any claims about about claims any deny also would representatives its government, AKP the of terms two first the During Europe. with values Turkey’s of shared sense showing statements were frequent more much rare; very was rhetoric, ern anti-West certainly and overtones, Islamist with Rhetoric world. Muslim the in lead to or aspirations ambitions power global than rather companies, developing Turkish rapidly for markets new find to effort an as explained was East Middle the in involvement Greater reasons. practical with tions ac its justify to tried power,in it years first its from team AKP of the tions assump political the were these policy. though Even Ankara’s in discourse Turkish New of the role growing the explain here mentioned The factors it free rein to apply repressions against the Palestinians. Palestinians. the against apply to repressions rein it free gives and Ankara to favours according Tel Aviv which conflict, Palestinian Israeli- the towards policy Washington’s by reinforced is conviction This 27 From Ankara’s point From of view, with the 28 ------29 West. the exploited,munity, as represented by or is even which persecuted com the Muslim and East Middle the of self-identificationas part ago,years but have of now given way Turkey’s clearly they signs to acouple just were frequent of civilisation European to belonging it). about Turkey behind values Declarations the and integration European in faith asincere from stemmed opposition, and the neutralise to designed manoeuvre not atactical just was policy pro-Western initial the that powerin (assuming years first its ing dur it was West about the now is than much more sceptical AKP West have to the evolved seems towards the The most: attitude party’s worldview the undergone in change. elements has ological ide specific of significance the rule, AKP’s of the years 12 the Over of a global power.of aglobal status the gain to efforts West, the (3) the and with relations vise (1) Turkey’s (2) re to East, aspiration its Middle the towards policy on: impact Ankara’sgreatest policy. the has The factor ideological determining factors one mostimportant is of the beliefs and tions worldview, leaders’ specific The AKP of framework the convic require. so circumstances the if nated subordi are elements other party’s ideology, the the all which to worldview. AKP’s of the element in trait stant overarching It an is mostcon the be to leader seems aregional power and aglobal be

sId=365530&columnistId=0 man.com/newsDetail.action;jsessionid=AJRdD--ItTTzDZj+GMLRah5Y?new us.” http://www.todaysza like not do they me, Believe of Islam. lands the of disputes and conflicts workforce, cheap gold, diamonds, oil, the like only world] Muslim [the outside from who come “Those Conference: Islamic the of Organisation of the forum at the Erdoğan by statement following the E.g. com/diplomacy_i-am-not-a-neo-ottoman-davutoglu-says_193944.html says”, Davutoğlu man, aneo-Otto not am “I for instance: See, past. Ottoman for the nostalgia their 29 On the other hand, the belief in Turkey’s in belief the hand, to other the On potential Today’s Zaman , 25.11.2009, http://www.todayszaman. ------23 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 24 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 of of reduced be solely pursuit cannot the to region the towards titude economy, mission. ahistorical but also or the of security not is amatter only world, Muslim this entire Empire’s more broadly, and, Ottoman former territories the the Thus, region. Turkey as of entire patron to becomethe the seeks of traditions religious and suppressed historical hitherto the also of not nation’s asingle only emanation butgovernment an is will, whose state democratic powerful amodern, time same at the and Empire Turkey’s successor Ottoman of the the as mission special in higher. belief The by Turkish astrong guided is leadership are East Middle the Ankara’sin pointFrom of view, stakes the new markets. solely policy about seeking this is Neither region. unstable an from coming threats the minimise position and cal grant Turkey the status of a global power. Turkeyof aglobal grant status the would patron its as itself order. global Thereforethe establishing for Turkish of the to is ing region keyimportance leadership, the Accord years. 12 last for pursued the consistently itwhich has of Ankara’s policy, priority the been has region up that power in Building Africa. North and East Middle the especially countries, Muslim AKP’stowards policy the in embodiment fullest the find world Islamic for role the aleading in nostalgia its and of Asia Turkey’s self-identification its poweras part aspirations, global 2. 30

The “New East Middle the Turkey” and realpolitik interests and the interests of the West. of the interests the and interests own of their pursuit on the focused and traditions local from disconnected regimes of authoritarian hands the in vested was states those in power tion, Islamisa their to lead inevitably would states Muslim the in mocratisation de that feared which West, the by pursued policy of the a result As states. of new, artificial formation the to led which Empire, Ottoman of the fall the after powers external between rivalry of constant arena an it became that region’s of importance the because “Afro-Eurasia”. It was entire of the security the to key the provides which location, geographic its and wealth, resource natural its relies, trade global on which straits of its because world for the importance of crucial a region is East Middle the Davutoğlu, to According 4. No.II, 1998 Volume 1997-February December Affairs, al of Internation Journal Perceptions, of Interests: Clash Davutoğlu, Ahmet , i.e. a calculated effort to optimise its own own geopoliti its to optimise effort , i.e. acalculated 30 However, Turkey’s at ------31 of policy “zero neighbours”. the problems in with itself ifested powerin when man term it first AKP’s the readyduring visible al was tendency This East. Middle the as developed intensely as been of has foreign policy direction no other rule, AKP Under the in 2010, or between Somaliland and the government of Somalia government of the Somalia and 2010,in Somaliland or between Iraq in Sunni the and Shia the between 2008, in Israel and Syria between 2008, and 2006 years the in Israel and Hamas tween be Palestine, in and Fatah Hamas (e.g.between conflict the in up influence honest prestigeits to build and broker an and as ablebe in to order to act conflicts regional in neutral mained It states. re Gulf the and Libya, Kurdistan, Iraqi Iran, Syria, including region, the major in actors the nearly all with tions rela political good maintain and soughtit efforts, to establish diplomatic intense ways. Firstly, through three leader in gional Turkey are Spring, as Arab itself sought the Before establish to development. under- socio-economicas as well conflicts, religious and political region’sthe antidoteto an supposed offer to therefore problems: Turcica (e.g. EU). the The new with pax integration of modernity demands the heritage with Ottoman the and values traditional reconciles which model, cultural and social political, Turkish of the but appeal even more also, the importantly, from states), neighbouring the to economy comparison in (especially of its strength rapidly growing not the from only power stems Turkey’s From ambitions. expansion power and point of view, its to project own its which in aspace as them seeing key started Now Tur were threats. perceived as countries neighbouring the which in paradigm original counter the to ran Its assumptions

December 2013. 2013. December Centre, Policy Bipartisan East, Middle the in Evolution Policy of Turkish the Understanding Conduct: of Turkish TheRoots Makovsky, Michael on Lobel, Aar Cornell, E. Svante Edelman, S. Eric see: states, Eastern Middle selected towards policy government’s AKP the about information For useful Ankara. for important more far was policy of that dimension Eastern Middle the that but it appears Armenia, and Cyprus states, Balkan the with relations its en or strength repair to tried policy, Turkey problems” also “zero of the part As formula was was formula 31 ------

25 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 26 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 brotherhood, whereby Turkey is usually represented as the “older whereby the brotherhood, Turkey as represented usually is to history, and shared of religion, acommunity to references made Turkish consistently the region, government of has the societies and states the development with and contacts In model. culture Turkish of the universality the in belief and of superiority sense its from stemming style by apatronising marked been has East Turkey’s Middle of the societies and states the diplomacy towards at risk. security own its placing and cost a huge social and power, from political him incurring removing to aview with measures oppositiontook anti-Assad other and the support to actively started it failed, efforts when those and forms, implement to al-Assad re democratic Bashar persuade to tried in Syria, Turkey started first When protests challenge. greatest the outbe to turned conflict The Syrian Libya. in initially and Tunisia, in new governments Egypt the supported subsequently and regimes crumbling the advocate against “Arab of the street” the as influence.acted It intoreal made hitherto had it efforts the transform to opportunity an as uprisings popular the order and erosion old saw of the the Spring. adventAnkara the Arab of the of Turkey’sThe peak with came involvement East Middle the in 2012. and 2002 9% 27 to %between Turkey’s in East’s from Middle share increased exchange trade the that fact the by as demonstrated economic sified contacts, Thirdly, (orinten it regimes. eased effectively visa abolished) Turkish Turkey in soap promoted operas), tourism also and and broadcasting and channels television Arab-language launching countries, of Muslim Turkish in foundations and universities opening programmes, (e.g.lifestyle grant student by large-scale and it end, Turkish promoted To the ed countries. culture this Islam-dominat in modernisation of amodel successful and state 2010).since Secondly, it abrotherly sought image its as build to 32

ekonomi.gov.tr Economy. of http://www. Ministry the of Turkish figures to According 32 - - - of Bagdad offers the most glaring example of this practice, this example of ofglaring the Bagdadmost offers exclusion the to Iraq Region in Kurdistan the with contacts tense the development sidestepping in governments: official while of actors social and political selected with relations of establishing Turkey’s broke out). Syria explains in protests also This practice the after or Assad Square, Tahrir in protests the during Egypt in 34 33 brother”. It limits the Turkish the leadership’sIt to adjust to policy limits willingness The ideologization of Turkey’s it made less flexible. also has policy region. the in mostgovernments against itself positions which organisation an Brotherhood, Muslim the with relations Fatah), close or the than (rather Hamas with contacts the include about the internal situation of those countries ( countries of situation those internal about the judgements Turkey that meant make to authorised which was peoples traditions, and local the from West disconnected the and by imposed cases many in regimes were governed by authoritarian states Arab the Spring Arab of the outbreak the and Empire toman Ot of the Ankara’s point From of view, fall the between partners. Eastern of Middle its sovereignty key’s the relativize to tendency

media/events/2010/11/29-turkey/20101129_turkey.pdf http://www.brookings.edu/~/ Institution. at Brookings Davutoğlu’s speech Cf. region. the in of countries of nationals diasporas large to home it is because affect Turkey equally (“brothers”) partners of the problems litical po and social the that implying by for instance Empire, Ottoman former of the countries of other societies the and society Turkish between ties mutual the emphasises Turkey also Iran-is-Erdogan-s-second-home.html. alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/02/02/Turkey-s-rival- are-attacks-against-all-muslims-turkish-president-says, http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/11/20/attacks-against-al-aqsa- Quotes: Turkey Algeria. and against attack an to tantamount was Jerusalem Temple in Mount the in operation Israeli the –that Algeria to avisit during and home, second his was Teheran that Iran to visit his during who said Erdoğan, e.g. officials, Turkish by statements numerous in visible also is attitude This visit. they states Muslim the in believers ordinary and officials with prayers joint in part take often Davutoğlu and Erdoğan For example, federal government and Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurdistan. Iraqi and government federal the between of dispute subject the is of Kirkuk Thestatus consent. Bagdad’s for asking without Kirkuk visited Davutoğlu Ahmet case, notable one In 33 This “seniority” manifests itself for instance in Tur in for instance itself “seniority” This manifests vis-à-vis http://english. Mubarak Mubarak 34 others others - - - - 27 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 28 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 marginalised within the ranks of the anti-Assad opposition. anti-Assad of the ranks the within marginalised became it even though Brotherhood, immediately favoured the opposition also where it the Syrian to relation in policy inflexible cent years. cent re in rise on been the has that atendency situation, current the 37 36 35 East, have been frozen since. have frozen been East, Middle the in partner important apotentially Cairo, with tions rela its Brotherhood: aprice the forpaid support to continuing Turkey because over pragmatism, has prevailed reasons logical ideo case, that In Egypt. in life political from eliminated fact in was Brotherhood the and ousted government was that after also but of Morsi, government it Mohamed ership of formed the Egypt, lead not the Brotherhood when, only under Muslim by the stood when Turkey Spring, Arab the after visible particularly became preference This Fatah. more more influential moderateof and the instead Palestine, in partner main its as decision opt to for Hamas Turkey’s determined choice This has recent years. in East Middle Turkey’s been the in has cousin, ideological its be to partner main considers AKP the ble which Brotherhood, The benefits. Muslim of absence tangi any and costs political high despite the partners for support those steadfast its in and East Middle the in partners

weaker than in the SNC. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and Qatar became the the became Qatar and Arabia Moreover, Saudi SNC. the in than weaker much was position Brotherhood’s the organisation, new the In Forces. tion Opposi and Revolutionary for Syrian Coalition National abroader joined SNC the when 2012, November player, until a dominant was Brotherhood Muslim the (SNC), which in Council National Syrian the Turkey backed Conduct... Turkish of Roots See: intensively. it co-operated which with regimes Arab of the legitimacy of social lack and corruption the to it object did Neither Khartoum. with co-operation veloped it de as Sudan in war civil the by bothered not was (2009), and elections tial presiden the after Iran in demonstrated people when way other the looked It of protests. outbreak the since opposed principally been it has which to phenomena political and social Turkey tolerated Spring, Arab the Before rary Security Council member in the UN in 2014. 2014. in UN the in member Council Security rary tempo of status the toobtain blocked Turkey’sefforts effectively Arabia, Saudi with Turkey, together against and, aimed clearly was which Greece, and of Cyprus Republic the with co-operation energy started has ably. Cairo consider increased Gulf, Persian the to route transport important tory, an terri Egyptian via goods Turkish of transporting cost the time: at that hood Brother Muslim the for supporting price adear paid already Turkey has 35 It is visible in the way Turkey the its It in visible choosing is been has 36 Ankara has pursued a similarly asimilarly pursued has Ankara 37 This This ------40 39 38 to Turkey, threat State a direct poses Islamic that observer external to any it clear is While 2014. in Iraq and United Syria ated States in by the initi operation anti-terror the in not did participate and region the in state other any itfollows than amore towards lenient policy it time but same at the organisation, State aterror be to Islamic ers consid Ankara level of At the declarations, 2014. in Iraq and Syria in State (ISIS), considerable made gains Islamic has which wards in reflected The “New ideology Turkish” also Turkey’s is to policy rebels. the towards policy and pragmatic flexible if only it followed conflict, a more Syrian of issue the crucial the Turkey which with on co-operate could Saudi Arabia, especially and States, the Gulf with relations adverselyits but affected also Turkey’snot undermined only opposition the Syrian on influence operating with other actors, or even by acting against them. against or actors, even by other acting with operating co- without on own, its East Middle problems the in dangerous most even the capable is of tackling country the that believes Turkey adjustments. tactical hoc ad make to outlook, unwilling of how Turkey’s illustration other on along-term based is policy problem.an is This State asecondary be to considersIslamic and regime Assad of the continued existence the in East Middle the

State, State, Islamic against war for Turkey the in Tough decisions Ananicz, Szymon position. position. op Syrian the among partners political important any have not does kara An that fact the change not does This territory. Turkish in presence their tolerates and Syria in groups militant and opposition various with lations re working informal, Turkey maintains that indications many are There be in the times of the SNC. SNC. of the times the in be to it used as stage international on the opposition Syrian the to committed Turkey it, longer to no as is support logistical providing been has and tion forma new the backed Ankara While opposition. Syrian the over sway its of Turkey much lost of which aresult as grouping, new of the patrons main with Jihadi militants, with casualties on the Turkish side). Turkish on the casualties with militants, Jihadi with clashes armed involved in been have forces police Turkish and Mosul, in late consu the of Turkish staff the kidnapped have militants Jihadi For instance, yses/2014-10-15/tough-decisions-turkey-war-against-islamic-state OSW Analyses OSW 39 Ankara invariably locates the sources of instability in in of sources instability locates the invariably Ankara , 15.10.2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/anal 38 40 ------

29 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 30 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 obstructionism of Cyprus, France and Germany, it seems that if if Germany, that it and seems France of Cyprus, obstructionism the away with this explains Ankara While authoritarianism. in arise even towards and EU-modelled reforms, of down ing the considerable negotiations slow and stagnating deep scepticism, towards membership, gain to efforts active and enthusiasm initial evolved has integration one from of European towards attitude Turkey’s rule, of AKP years 12 clear. the Over very is areas three these in had NATO. new in ideologyship has the The that impact member its United States and the with sion alliance process, the core ofAt Turkey’s the acces EU West the the are with relations affairs. regional and tions rela mutual in West interests its the respect to it expects theless, West’s of independently the elsewhere, and Never preferences. East Middle the in actors other with relations its shape to wants policies. It internal foreign its and independentin be to now seeks Turkey Instead governments. previous the under case the be to world, supposed was Arab as the in instability and ic radicalism policy, Islam Eastern or against apassive Middle its bulwark in Turkey want do they Neither United States’ bridgehead the be to exclusive club. join to an aspired advancement and civilizational lower of ladder was on the one EU’s that of partner, the weaker tus “oldthe sta the Turkey”, with itself satisfied view their in which However, no leaders longer of policy continue to the want AKP the modernisation. (although no longer of internal terms a model) in apoint of as reference serves still and for Ankara partner security economic and important an The Westpower eroding. is remains pole strongest but politics of the its global United States, still the is Turkish ideology. Turkey West, especially the and that believes ofexample how Turkey’s New the to subordinated is foreign policy West the another is with alliance its revise to Ankara’s ambition 3. radicalwards Islam. Turkey’s it demonstrates time, to same At the attitude liberal Revising the alliance with the West the with alliance Revising the ------41 aversion Muslims. towards Europe’s emphasising all Syria, in catastrophe humanitarian the facethe of in of indifference EU Islamophobia and the accusing and economic EU’s and model the into question political calling been judgements of state Turkish aboutto make the democracy. It has Union’s European the authority challenging vocally and quently ever been more fre has Ankara Brussels, with relations its In public Turkey. in the anegative West image of the among perpetuating and creating to contribute actively themselves team AKP EU,about the the since sceptical of increasingly public is opinion,which expectations the Turkey’s to not is aresponse EU merely away the from turning power.in two terms first AKP’s during case the was as battles, accession of political the process in argument does not need the stage and political on the rivals no serious has currently The party AKP. of the hands consolidation of the power the in with incided of Turkey’s weakening the that co fact has the pro-EU aspirations into account more plausible the one if takes all seem suspicions Such ends. accession the internal process its to using strumentally in been has and Europe notis convinced with about integration that may it efforts, appear of absence such Turkey the In rations. about Turkey’s sceptical are which states member aspi European EU of those arguments the development, would undermine and economic and political social, objectives concerning declared its way, accession of this the process. In tus it would implementing be sta actual of the regardless reforms wouldinternal continue the EU, it the with Turkey integration to were more committed itself or alliances with the government’s Turkey inside the with rivals (including or alliances campaigns) media hostile (plots, actions direct through such, as Turkey therefore government, and AKP the tent on undermining more Union broadly, and, European West, in conspirators the as image of an the have building been particular, in dent Erdoğan http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/gundem/Erdogandan-islam-dunyasina-ca gri-2031418 41 The Turkish leadership, presi and ------31 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 32 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 ing it a substantial degree of control infrastructure). degree over the iting asubstantial grant supplies diversification andof security, ensuring energy improving (by its beneficiary main the as well as market EU the to supplies of gas playerTurkey terms in position main of the the in puts (and Baku) by Ankara through pushed been has project that However, Europe. and region TANAP Caspian the the between corridor atransit providing to limited be to project was that in role of the Turkey plans, EU’s the to According original ple of this. exam clear project corridor offers a very transit gas southern the place. The evolution have taken of shifts value where important Turkey’s in The economy area EU another is the with relations of Turkey. Islamisation the against abulwark as them viewing governments, Kemalist the West supporting the was and Görüş of Millî members were leaders still AKP when the time the to back to Turkey, relation in intentions real its and Europe dates which of genuine mistrust politicians’ AKP of expression leading an are key’s 2013), problems in (e.g. over Park Gezi crisis internal the but for responsibility Tur an at attempt deflecting are not just efforts the PKK or the Fethullah Gülen movement). Gülen Fethullah or the PKK the 44 43 42 tween the EU and Russia (the sanctions). Russia and EU the tween place be economic taking and confrontation political despite the on-going are which Stream, South the to border, alternative an as Turkey’s across pipeline of anew gas EU struction the to territory con about the Russia with Ankara’s talks behind logicis A similar

line-russia-has-halted-construction-south-stream www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-12-03/unwanted-gas-pipe Analyses OSW Stream, of South construction the halted has Russia pipeline: gas The unwanted Kardaś, Szymon See: 2014. December tovisit in Putin’s Turkey Vladimir during opened officially were The talks the Southern Corridor, Corridor, Southern the in the West by left being gap the Turkey filling is Jarosiewicz, Aleksandra ranking officials in December 2013. 2013. December in officials ranking high- involving scandal corruption the of 2013 and summer Turkey the in in protests of social outbreak the interpreted authorities the how was This southern-corridor en/publikacje/analyses/2014-06-04/turkey-filling-gap-being-left-west- OSW Analyses,OSW 4.06.2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/ 4.06.2014, 44 Ankara has also been been also has Ankara 42 It seems that those those It that seems , 3.12.2014, http:// , 3.12.2014, 43 ------

48 47 46 45 policy, anti-Israeli an pursued 2006, in (considered West organisation) mas by the aterror be to Ha with in 2005), diplomatic relations established Hariri Rafik minister prime Lebanese of the assassination the after (especially it supported politically and Syria with relations friendly tained invasion of main Iraq, the in United territory its States use to the allow to refused when Ankara sides: two forthe instance between differences significant revealed which situations many have been there hand, other the On NATO other USA allies. and Turkey’s which in of the years those with line were in interests recent in few have situations very been there Africa, North and East Middle the to regard with of Especially co-operation. terms the revise and amore independentstatus gain to aspires clearly United NATO States, Turkey the and with relations its In also states. EU themember benefits view, mainly its in Turkish-EU which, of provisions the union, the ing customs question been has and relations trade in assertive increasingly tions with Teheran on the Iranian nuclear programme, nuclear Iranian onTeheran the with tions after the war in Georgia, in war the after Caucasus South the in situation play independently ed to the

ever, those negotiations have been stalled. stalled. been have negotiations ever, those How relations. of bilateral normalisation about talks to way paved the This killings. for the apologised 2013 Israel In killed. were nationals 9 Turkish which in 2010, in Gaza to assistance humanitarian carrying on aship dos comman of Israeli attack the after frozen were countries two the between Relations Peres. Shimon president Israeli the and Erdoğan minister prime between place took arow Davos where in conference 2009 the with came sis cri Another ahumiliation. as of notice absence the perceived and time that at Syria and Israel between mediations involved in was Ankara move. of the Turkey advance in notifying without 2008–2009, in Strip Gaza the in ation oper Lead Cast the launched latter the after of Israel critical Turkey became After the war in Georgia in 2008, Turkey came up with a proposal addressed addressed a proposal up with Turkey 2008, came in Georgia in war the After http://www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/2012-1-HayatiYazici.pdf taxes: and economy for the minister Turkish former the by article the See Turkish-Brazilian initiative was ultimately rejected by the United States. States. United the by rejected ultimately was initiative Turkish-Brazilian However, West. the the by established format negotiation the bypassed way, they this In programme. of Iran’s problem nuclear solve to the posed sup was that agreement an negotiated Iran Turkey, 2010 May and In Brazil 48 initially objected to the intervention intervention objected the to initially 46 tried to bypass the West’s the bypass to negotia tried 45 47 attempt ------33 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 34 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 even at the expense of major tensions in relations with allies. with of relations major in tensions expense even at the thefrom independent be and defence of West, terms in sufficient become to self- relatively seeks way, army.for the this In Ankara equipment military and of arms new purchases in fence industry of domesticde its Turkey’s share with the maximise to ambition line in was and system production of the the in participate to ties itdecision because would offer opportuni domestic companies its point.Turkey in acase NATOis took systems, with that integrated would not be system the that protests their and NATOfrom allies despite opposition strong taken defence system, air of an purchase the concerning China 2013decision in negotiations with open to Turkey’s purchases. arms concerning Ankara’s decisions in visible clearly that is ambition policy, an of security terms in self-sufficient Turkey’sIt also is objective to become ever more independent and passive vis-à-vis remained and Syria, and Iraq in operation anti-terrorist the in part take to refused Syria, in operations were expanding groups Jihadi other and way when other looked Al-Qaeda the Libya, in 50 49 are a say onthat having stage issues and political global ofing the shap the in participation Ankara’s to active extend butregion also The “New Turkey’s” neighbouring the to not limited are ambitions 4.

Towards global power status analyses/2014-03-05/turkey-russian-military-intervention-crimea Crimea, in intervention military Russian Turkey on the Ananicz, Szymon See: posed to participate in the new organisation. new the in participate to posed sup not West was the plans, Ankara’s to According Co-operation. and bility of Sta Platform aCaucasus create to states Caucasus South the and Russia to Andrzej Wilk, Friction between Turkey NATO?, and O between Friction Wilk, Andrzej Ananicz, Szymon See: awarded. be will contract the if decided be yet to It has force. air the and army navy, the for the implementing been has key that Tur programmes arms of in a number reflected are objectives Those turkey- www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-10-02/friction-between- ­and-nato OSW Analyses OSW the Russia annexation of Crimea. annexation Russia the , 5.03.2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ 5.03.2014, , SW Analyses SW 49 , http:// 50 ------this end. this to diplomaticcampaign offensiveand a large-scale promotional (without 2014 in success) Council by organising Security on the seat its renew to It tried itself. to concern of issues direct on local less focus putting while terrorism, fight the against in operation co- international the and ic Republic Congo, of the Afghanistan Democrat the Korea, problems of the North as such issues curity Turkey period se that on 2009–2010.In global focused years the in Council US Security of the member of atemporary status the diplomatic to efforts, earned Turkey Thanks aspirations. those 52 51 spected. re are societies of Muslim rights the that sure making in ested inter especially and civilisations between foster to dialogue ing world’s on the problems, co-deciding workstate mostimportant aconstructive as image of an itself build to Turkey trying been has Turks. for the importance or concern of limited of no immediate a Turk, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, appointed as the Organisation’s appointed the as a Turk, İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin Conference, where ithave to managed Islamic of the Organisation the within up stepped activity its also has Ankara rule, Under AKP Syria. in war of face the the in UN lysed the para has which China, and of Russia obstructionism the against objected ever more strongly also it recent has years In or India. zil Turkey, as powers such of absence emerging the and Council Bra West Security of overrepresentation the the in the questioning advocates United ofmost vocal Nations. of been It areform the has one been of the has Ankara cultures. and religions between logue objective overcome to is ofthe promote which prejudice and dia United Nations, the within initiative of“Alliance Civilisations”

ophobia-isil.aspx?pageID=238&nid=74945 ophobia-isil.aspx?pageID=238&nid=74945 visit-pope-hopes-turkey-can-be-great-peacemaker-Erdogan-slams-islam Islamophobia in Europe. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/in-historic- vis-à-vis world lamic - Is entire of the arepresentative as act to tried Erdoğan president occasion –on that example an as serve may Turkey to 2014 in Francis of Pope The visit ber: http://www.turkey4unsc.org/ mem Council Security Turkey a UN promote to as website dedicated the See 51 52 Ankara’s policy towards the United Nations illustrates United Nations illustrates the towards Ankara’s policy Together with Spain, Turkey Spain, Together with promote to managed the the head of the Catholic Church and called for an end to to end for an called and Church Catholic of the head the ------35 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 36 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 amples which illustrate this. illustrate which amples some ex of the are or Afghanistan of Bangladesh armies for the programmes training military or large-scale its Somaliland ratist sepa the and government of Somalia federal the between ations on Turkey’s bearing not have direct any Ankara’s medi interests. do issues such even issues, if security and political concern also –they economic contacts not is strengthen to only contacts those of The purpose importance. of regional states smaller as well as or Brazil, Africa Nigeria, South Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, na, Chi as powers regional such with contacts intensified itend, has To this America. or Latin Asia Southeast Africa, Sub-Saharan as such regions in influence working build to been has and states more distant with relations closer seeking Turkey been also has Nations (ASEAN). Asian Southeast of Association the (CARICOM) and Community Caribbean the (MERCOSUR), Common Market Southern the with partnerships informal established has and League, Arab of the meetings in part Union, takes African the within status observer gained has it that fact G7. the in the Theto of visible is ambition its breadth alternative an as D8 organisation to reinvigorate the tried also has Ankara i.e. total. in for for years terms, ten general two secretary 55 54 53 2013 US$ 4.3 in billion more than ment (in total, aid on develop spending been it has amounts Theed. substantial that diplomacyhad previously neglect areas in Turkish influence its expand to efforts generously been funding has Ankara Finally,

implications_for_the_EU_PP_A_Balcer.pdf 2012, http://www.demosservices.home.pl/www/files/Turkey_goes_global_ Europa, Demos Global, Turkey Balcer, Goes Adam see: For information more Development Co-operation Report 2014, p. 386. p. 386. 2014, Report Co-operation Development OECD see: information, more For first-in-international-humanitarian-aid. See: http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/12/09/report-turkey-ranks- a programme to train 15000 Afghan police officers. officers. police Afghan 15000 train to a programme Turkey launched 2011, In centres. army’s Turkish training the in training undergone have troops Afghan 3300 around 2001, since and 2004, since key inTur trained been have Bangladesh army of the of officers 3000 than More 54 53 55 ) have been an ) have an been ------countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, Afghanistan or Kyrgyzstan. Afghanistan Somalia, Pakistan, as such countries refugees), Syrian more to the to distant but also directed marily (where have states pri been they recently neighbouring to only not directed are The funds respect. this in instrument important - 37 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 38 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 (Syria, Iran, Libya), relations with Turkey Libya), with relations Iran, were away (Syria, mitigate to West the were frigid For icwith whose contacts. relations those econom their expand to opportunity an as them with relations welcomed region of the Turkey’sCountries closer to build efforts East. Middle apositive the had reception in also The policy AKP’s affairs. on international ferent perspective dif Turkey no that concern therefore adopt could afundamentally of Turkey’s There was status. economic political burgeoning and consequence ideology, a product ofas political a natural but rather key’s policy. The country’s were not power seen ambitions global it held someEU, gave that sway over Union which Tur asense the the with integration pursue to determined was Ankara tion that convic by the were reinforced Those expectations East. Middle the developmentin model andsecular promote modern, conflicts ease and check, in region Sea Black the in power ambitions global Russia’s keep Caucasus, Policythe Neighbourhood in European the through more effectively interests Turkey, its sue i.e.strengthen to hope could able be to EU pur to the rising, surroundings national Turkey’sinter in its geographic Ankara’s influence position. With given less welcome, understandable was as but treated Iran it was and Syria The with rapprochement Armenia. with relations ise and normal issue resolveto the Cyprus itan opportunity offered positive a very reception as had “zero neighbours” problems with thepolicy of In particular, region. surrounding the on effect ing astabilis had transformation, democratic economy internal and developing by adynamically buttressed time, of policy that eign Western point stage. of the From view,al Turkey’s new, for active Turkey internation position its on the considerably strengthened when atime was and Spring Arab of the outbreak powerto the to rise AKP’s the from spanned position.one The first international implementation New of Turkish on the Turkey’s had ideology has the that impact the analysing in Two distinguished be can periods III .

T int h e Ne e rnational standing standing rnational w T urkish id urkish eology T and urk e y’s ------ern states. The regional actors saw actors no need accept to Turkey’s The states. regional ern emergedEast Middle between also the and Differences Turkey Western its key from partners. Tur contributed alienating to anti-Western further rhetoric. This often and conservative-religious accompanied by the itarianism, Turkey of in author rise the and standards ofgression democratic are coincided United with situation States. This Union the and European of the opportunism duplicity and the of and policy its superiority Turkey because moral the ther emphasised strongly West of positions of the Turkey the and gap between fur widened The for Israel. of security Brotherhood),Muslim guarantees and the (including Islamists the to alternative forces an as of secular borders), unchanged (with rule states the Eastern Middle of the ante quo status ofa restoration the the State, sought West Islamic the with conflicts in entangled ing or Brotherhood becom Muslim the by backing fortions, instance fac and groups individual between got involved rivalry the in and Turkey conflicts While sirable. local play actively to the tried unde highly Westbut as region the developments saw the the in power, aregional position its as reclaim and mission historical its for acue Turkey were primarily accomplish to East Middle the in it triggered transformations the and Spring Arab the For Ankara, rapidly. soured relations their aresult, as and partners, its and Turkey order between international of the understanding the in differences were widening there that clear it became time At that Spring. Arab of the outbreak the with The started second period systems. political own order or their to al not die region see Turkey countries to the East Middle a threat as The Israel. with rivalry states’ Eastern Middle the in anew ally as Tel and Aviv broke Turkey down, Ankara seen between tions was when Finally, rela 2008. in Israel and Syria a mediator between 2010 government in as Iraqi or not acted boycott to the Sunnis or e.g. domestictensions, the when regional iteasing persuaded in helpful also was isolation. Ankara of international impact the , i.e. first and foremost, stability stability and foremost, , i.e. first ------39 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 40 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 its assessment of the situation. The statement by Ibrahim Kalın, Kalın, The by Ibrahim statement situation. of assessment its the point of for reference the developments, is power that or current tics tac and to adjust strategy foreignits policy less willing therefore is of success. Ankara prospect aguaranteed yetlong with term, objectives the in reach to but rather results, produce immediate Turkish not that is foreign policy intended to means history. This of dynamics the understand correctly they that belief by astrong buttressed founded and on deeply assumptions held ideological is foreign Their policy diagnosis. this does notleadership share isolation. However, risky position as AKP the international its and observer, Turkey’sTo external an afiasco, like seem could policy crises. and wars by ruptured region in a thesituation change significantly cannot force, use to therefore not and is prepared Ankara that and standards “soft” Eastern by Middle are which actions to limited is Turkey’s Turkey’s patronage, that either. aware They are backing accept to Kurds) Army,have Iraqi not willing too been the Syrian players whom Free Turkey the Brotherhood, (the Muslim supports legitimacy. The political internal their and interests regional own perceive which Turkey’s Egypt, their to and athreat as activities Iran Saudi to Arabia, refers this particular, in deteriorated: also involved countries region’sern the in conflicts, Turkey’simage East Middle other In Iraq. in regime Al-Maliki’s against minority Sunni the Region and Kurdistan the sided with and dictatorship, military the power against gain to strove they as Egypt erhood in Broth the supported Kurds, Syrian the and Assad against Syria in Brotherhood the Muslim i.e. backed ofsides conflicts, aseries in chose it unequivocally order after for a new regional proposals honest broker an who acceptableas comebroadly could up with lost credibility its Ankara region. for the programme tive political attrac heritage or an spiritual auniversal than rather tionalism, of expression Turkey’s an na as merely years, previous particular in been had were no longer which they veiled as past, as Ottoman shared the to Ankara’s references leadership. They interpreted ad hoc ad , because it is ideology, and not the current balance of it, because ideology, balance is current not the and - - - - - 56 of history. nature of the standing under atrue choice and moral acorrect from itbecause stems but acommendable stance is term short the in may impractical be alone morebeing flexibly: act policies and adjust to their ingness ( tue” Turkey’s “alone being stage vir as in positioninternational on the ideologues who and described politicians AKP leading one the

isil-coalition-to-be-part-of-a-single-package-turkish-fm.html See: http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/177195/incirlik-airbase-for-anti- regime. Egyptian the with co-operation to of solitude kind this preferred but he Nations, United entire the by isolated been it had because alone was Turkey that said he others, among Arabia, Saudi and Egypt from jections of ob aresult as Council Security UN on the seat temporary the obtain to on Turkey’sfailure commenting When affairs. of foreign minister current Turkey’s by embraced been also has virtue” in “alone of being The concept değerli yalnızlık ), Turkish up the leadership’s sums unwill 56 - - - - 41 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 42 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 Turkey has been drifting away from the West is also driven by driven West away the also from is Turkey drifting been has Russia). and The East process whereby Middle the context of both the in sides’ of themselves two views NATOthe (which manifest in differences deepening also Union. There are European the with Turkey continue integration that to seek will ever less realistic It separateness. seems of civilizational a sense and of interests ty communi way to a shaky giving been has years sides previous in ofprofessed two values by the community the and widening, been twothe sides’ world the of perceptions has between difference West Turkey. the and between for relations a major challenge The The implementation New of Turkish the created ideology has date). to case the rhetoriclesser been its activity, (as or change has or of greater enter periods adjustments, some tactical it may make although years, coming volition of foreignits policy own its the in of directions objectives and the change will country the that likely policy. Giveninternal Turkey’s un setup, it also is political current in foreign policy, ashift without foreign policy or alter changing without policy Turkey internal its that revise would thoroughly unlikely It therefore is build. to trying been government has AKP New element of Turkey the inherent an is the policies and which Turkey’s country’s the internal with linked closely is foreign policy the New by defined vision valid. is ideology strategic Turkish the conviction that the However, do not undermine corrections such (which Turkeyor limitations nonetheless). transitory, as views Turkey’sopments in country’s or failures the own surroundings devel international significant of and sudden aresult as usually it is gets corrected, of policy. its line policy that If underpinnings ideological the to faithful The Turkish remained has leadership world. the in and region role the in important increasingly an play to ambition the as developments, well as international est, inter country’s of assessment the national strategic its in sistent Turkey’s con very been has years 12 last over foreign policy the . IV

C onclusions and prosp and onclusions e cts - - - - - ture of Turkey’sture foreign linked policy. inextricably That is policy fu the determine ultimately developments will political Internal power. aregional as self it principle, establish to ambition i.e. the give up guiding its will Turkey’s Ankara However, region. that the in it unlikely tactics is caution predicting in warrants This course. its to sticking it was believing time the Spring), all while Arab of the outbreak the ter af before and regime Assad or the Kurds Iraqi the to relation in (e.g. policy Eastern Middle its in turns radical make to ability its Turkey it noted be should time, that demonstrated same At has the over Turkey to spilling itself. instability Eastern of Middle risk They the include gains. the exceed likely will policy come ever more policies. its of isolated The in this costs be East, problems Middle of the the in entangled become further Turkey likely that means will turn, in This, years. coming the in expected be should policy in its shift no significant results, visible of absence despite the East Middle the in assumptions ideological Turkey which followingits been with Given has persistence the proposed by Turkey. solutions the to crises to scribe do not and sub situation regional of the diagnoses its not share Ankara’s patronage, accepting do in not interested are partners West. it the to Eastern The as is Middle East Middle players the in West. the The New Turkish with ties foreign most to ideology as is have not compensated for Turkey’s partners Eastern weakened Middle the with government, relations AKP forforeign policy the of direction mostimportant the been has East Middle the While co-operation. strategic of development the positive create notimpulses for will and differences, gate the miti merely EU. However, the will factor with co-operation this Turkey because element, to economic no alternative has linking Turkey.dencies in important an Economic remain should ties ten authoritarian rising developments, the including internal ------43 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 44 POINT OF VIEW 04/2015 ternal political or economic destabilisation. or economic destabilisation. political ternal event of the in amajor in ambitions its have curb to will Ankara present its policy.continue with However, that happen it may also thelikely that conclusionDavutoğlu), will justifies Turkey which context of foreign policy, the (and in to Erdoğan also and AKP the to alternative Today Turkey in no be to realistic seems there Davutoğlu). and Erdoğan (especially leaders its and AKP the with Szymon A nanicz -