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The Fourth National Report of the Russian Federation THE FOURTH NATIONAL REPORT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT Prepared for the fifth Review Meeting in frames of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management Moscow 2014 The fourth National Report of the Russian Federation has been drafted in accordance with Article 32 of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Report describes in detail the obligations arising from the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and compli- ance with them by the Russian Federation. The Report has been prepared by the State Atomic Energy Corporation «Rosatom» and the Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service with the involvement of: ● Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IBRAE RAN); ● Federal Budgetary Institution «Scientific and Engineering Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety» (FBI «SEC NRS»). The Fourth National Report of the Russian Federation on Compliance with the Obligations of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management Table of Contents List of abbreviations ...............................................................................................................5 Section A. Introduction ...........................................................................................................7 А.1. Purpose of the report.................................................................................................7 A.2. Structure of the report................................................................................................7 A.3. Conclusions drawn from the discussion of the third National Report of the Russian Federation presented at the fourth Review Meeting...................................................8 А.4. The main topics of the report and near-term Initiatives for the safety of SNF and RW management .............................................................................................................9 Section В. Policies and practices (Article 32) .......................................................................16 В.1. Policy in the field of SNF management....................................................................16 В.2. Practices of SNF management................................................................................16 В.3. Policy in the field of radioactive waste management................................................18 В.4. Practices of radioactive waste management............................................................19 В.5. Criteria used for definition and classification of radioactive wastes ..........................21 Section C. Scope of application (Article 3)............................................................................24 Section D. Inventories and lists (Article 32) ..........................................................................25 D.1. SNF management facilities (Article 32 (i))................................................................25 D.2. SNF inventories (Article 32 (ii))................................................................................26 D.3. RW management facilities (Article 32 (iii)) ...............................................................26 D.4. RW inventories (Article 32 (iv)) ................................................................................28 D.5. Decommissioning of nuclear facilities (Article 32 (v)) ...............................................31 Section E. Legislative and regulatory System.......................................................................32 E.1. Implementing measures (Article 18) ........................................................................32 E.2. Legislative and regulatory system (Article 19)..........................................................32 Е.3. State regulation of safety in the field of atomic energy use (Article 20) ....................56 Section F. Other general safety provisions...........................................................................66 F.1. Responsibility of the license holder (Article 21)........................................................66 F.2. Human and financial resources (Article 22) .............................................................68 F.3. Quality assurance (Article 23)..................................................................................73 F.4. Operational radiation protection (Article 24).............................................................75 F.5. Emergency preparedness (Article 25) .....................................................................79 F.6. Decommissioning (Article 26) ..................................................................................82 Section G. Safety of spent fuel management .......................................................................85 G.1. General safety requirements (Article 4) ...................................................................85 3 The Fourth National Report of the Russian Federation on Compliance with the Obligations of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management G.2. Existing facilities (Article 5)......................................................................................93 G.3. Siting of proposed facilities (Article 6)......................................................................95 G.4. Design and construction of facilities (Article 7).........................................................98 G.5. Assessment of safety of facilities (Article 8).............................................................99 G.6. Operation of facilities (Article 9).............................................................................101 G.7. Disposal of spent fuel (Article 10) ..........................................................................105 Section H. Safety of radioactive waste management..........................................................106 H.1. General safety requirements (Article 11) ...............................................................106 Н.2. Existing facilities (Article 12) ..................................................................................112 Н.3. Siting of proposed facilities (Article 13)..................................................................114 Н.4. Design and construction of facilities (Article 14).....................................................115 Н.5. Assessment of safety of facilities (Article 15).........................................................117 Н.6. Operation of facilities (Article 16)...........................................................................118 Н.7. Institutional measures after closure (Article 17) .....................................................122 Section I. Transboundary movement (Article 27)................................................................125 Section J. Disused sealed sources (Article 28)...................................................................131 Section K. Planned activities to improve safety ..................................................................133 Section L. Annexes ............................................................................................................135 Annex B1. SNF management ........................................................................................135 Annex B2. RW generation .............................................................................................136 Annex E. Framework normative and legal acts..............................................................137 4 The Fourth National Report of the Russian Federation on Compliance with the Obligations of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management List of abbreviations AMB — Atomic Peaceful Large (abbreviation for water-cooled graphite-moderated channel-type thermal neutron reactor) ASA — acceptable specific activity BN — fast breeder reactor CMP — open-type joint stock company «Chemical and Metallurgical Plant» (JSC «CMP») DWIF — deep-well injection facility for liquid radioactive waste EGP — loop-type graphite power reactor EIA — environmental impact assessment FA — fuel assembly FMB — floating maintenance base FMBA — Federal Medical and Biological Agency FR — fuel rod FSUE — federal state unitary enterprise FTP — federal target program FZ — federal law GD — guideline document GRW — gaseous radioactive waste GSP NFCF — General Safety Provisions for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities HLW — high-level waste IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency ICRP — International Commission on Radiological Protection ILW — intermediate-level waste IPPE — Federal state unitary enterprise «State Scientific Centre of the Russian Federation —Institute of Physics and Power Engineering Named after A.I. Leipunsky» (FSUE «SRC IPPE») IRS — ionizing radiation source LLW — low-level waste LRW — liquid radioactive waste MCC — Federal state unitary enterprise «Mining and Chemical Combine» (FSUE «MCC») EMERCOM — Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of the Consequence of Natural Disasters MSSA — minimum significant specific activity NF — nuclear facility
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