Future of Europe: Disruption Continuity and Change

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Future of Europe: Disruption Continuity and Change SCER Report The Future of Europe: Disruption, Continuity and Change Strategy report setting out the big future challenges for the EU – and Scotland’s contribution to that European future Kirsty Hughes Editor May 2019 The Future of Europe: Disruption, Continuity and Change The Scottish Centre on European Relations (SCER) is an independent EU think tank, based in Edinburgh, that informs, debates and provides up-to-the-minute, high-quality research and analysis of European Union developments and challenges, with a particular focus on Scotland’s EU interests and policies. Independent analysis. European perspective. Compilation © 2019 Scottish Centre on European Relations Chapters © 2019 The Respective Authors All Rights Reserved Scottish Centre on European Relations is the operating name of Centre on European Relations (Scotland) Company Registered in Scotland / Company No SC559785 Design and Typesetting by Anthony Salamone Set in Barlow under the SIL Open Font License Published in Edinburgh May 2019 scer.scot Foreword SCER’s wide-ranging survey of the principal challenges the EU faces, seen both in a Scottish and a broader perspective, is brilliantly timed for the European Parliament election campaign and the new five-year EU institutional cycle. Real issues tackled by real experts: it makes a refreshing change from the shallow slogans of the Westminster Brexit battle. I am sure that, at least in Scotland, Mr Gove was wrong: the country has not had enough of experts. If, as I hope, Westminster finally accepts that the people should have the final say on whether we should take back Mrs May’s Article 50 notification, these considered analyses will help them make a well-informed choice. Let’s hope they are widely read, on both sides of the Border, and more widely across the EU. John Kerr Advisory Board Member Scottish Centre on European Relations 3 Contents Foreword 3 Acknowledgements 6 Recommendations 7 EU Politics: Disruption, Continuity and Change 1. Europe’s Future in the Face of Systemic Challenges 14 Kirsty Hughes 2. The EU, Scotland and Human Rights 25 Maria Fletcher / Tobias Lock 3. Citizenship, Identity and the EU 34 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott 4. Small States and Regions: Evolving Strategies in EU Politics 42 Anthony Salamone 5. EU Politics, Populism and Democracy 51 Pontus Odmalm 6. Scotland in Europe: Future Prospects 58 Michael Keating Media, Youth and Culture 7. Youth, Scotland and the EU: Working with and for Young People 65 Paul Reddish 8. A Culture of Hostility: Is Britain ‘Open for Business’ but 70 Closed to Culture? Nick Barley 9. Changing EU Media and Communications Outlook 77 Alistair Burnett Sustainable Development: Challenges and Opportunities 10. Politics and Economics of Reform of the Eurozone 87 Anton Muscatelli 4 Contents 11. Tackling Inequality in Today’s EU 96 Craig Wilson 12. Industrial Policy in the EU and Scotland: Divergent 105 Pathways? Alison Hunter / Fabian Zuleeg 13. EU Action and Scottish Ambition on the Environment 113 Annalisa Savaresi / Miranda Geelhoed Global and Neighbourhood Questions for the EU 14. The EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policies in an 123 Unstable World Daniel Kenealy 15. The EU’s Irregular Migration Approach – Less Defensive, 129 More Strategic Andrew Sherriff 16. The EU’s International Development Strategy: Time 138 for Change? Cathy Ratcliff 17. Stopping the Protectionist Tsunami: EU Trade Strategy 147 under Water? David Gow About the Authors 155 Strategic Advisory Group 158 Funders 159 5 Acknowledgements The SCER team is grateful to all those who have made this report possible. Our Strategic Advisory Group for our future of Europe programme gave us insightful comment and advice from the start. All the expert authors in this volume have provided excellent in-depth analysis and been a pleasure to work with – not least in producing high-quality work in a short time frame. The SCER Advisory Board has also continued to support and encourage our work. We held two main events in connection with this programme of work – one in Edinburgh and one in London. Many thanks to all the speakers and participants, to our Edinburgh co-organiser, the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and to our London co-organiser, the Federal Trust, for excellent, wide-ranging inputs and ideas. The report has been designed in-house by Anthony Salamone. We are grateful to all our funders – not least to the 90 people who contributed to our crowdfunding for this project at the start of the year. We hope the ideas and analysis in this report will contribute to a broader and deeper debate on the future direction of the EU and Scotland’s contribution to that. And we very much hope to build on this programme of work in our future SCER activities. 6 Recommendations The EU still has a strong basis from which it can create a forward-looking, overarching strategy in these turbulent and disruptive times. The EU must regain its confidence that its values, interests and rights can go together rather than be in conflict, even at a time of disruption and change. This new report draws on a range of expert voices, from Scotland and the EU, to consider the EU’s future at this time of multiple challenges and systemic change. Across seventeen chapters, the report assesses current and future EU strategies, policies, pressures and needs and the extent of solidarity or divergence within the EU. Each author also considers Scotland’s interests, contribution and approach in their area of focus, and suggests where Scotland can best learn from the EU, and where too, in some areas, it can offer ideas, solutions and examples of a way ahead. The report makes 40 recommendations under five headings. These recommendations aim to contribute to an ambitious, strategic future of Europe – and to Scotland making a strong, creative contribution to that future. 1. The EU’s Strategic Future For the EU: The EU must show renewed and imaginative political leadership as it navigates a divided Union and disruption and change globally. Differentiated integration and flexibility can be part of the answer, as long as it creates a strategic path for the EU; as a pragmatic partial route ahead, it will not be enough. The EU must build on and strengthen its best strategies in key areas, including development, human rights and climate change, and continue to be a leading voice in promoting the benefits of multilateralism. It needs to urgently tackle its own divisions, and find a route to being a stronger global actor. A strong new overarching and inclusive strategy for sustainable development – a green new deal and a 21st century industrial strategy – can impact strongly and guide policy, and help overcome divisions (social, political and economic) at home and internationally. The EU must find new ways to work with citizens and civil society in building the future Europe. A set of European citizens’ assemblies advising on policy should be held as one major contribution to revitalising the role of the EU’s citizens in shaping future EU policy. For Scotland: The Scottish government should develop a clear, overarching European strategy and vision, taking as its starting point the current major issues, priorities and strategic debates within, and facing, the EU as it enters its new five-year institutional cycle. This should build on, but go beyond, its existing policies, networks and areas of leadership and be taken forward in alliance with partners within Scotland and at all levels across the EU. As part of this, the Scottish government needs to take a fresh look at its soft power/para- diplomacy and develop a strong and consistent strategic framework for its European and wider para-diplomacy. 7 Recommendations 2. EU Politics: Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights For the EU: The EU should act to strengthen economic, social, cultural and environmental rights. It must urgently consider how to strengthen its tools to tackle rule of law issues. The EU can learn from individual countries, including Scotland, which are moving forward in specific ways on protecting economic and social rights. The EU should accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. Brexit shows that it is premature to consider EU citizenship a fundamental right. If Brexit happens, the EU and UK should revisit the idea of associate citizenship for UK citizens who wish to retain their EU identity in some form. For Scotland: If Brexit goes ahead then, so far as within the competence of the Scottish parliament, Scotland should try to mirror human rights developments at the EU level. Scotland should promote, and continue to invest in, its goals of being at the forefront of economic, social and cultural rights. The Scottish government should institute a series of citizens’ dialogues on Europe to promote a genuine public discussion of the key European challenges and ways ahead for the EU. It should also consider launching a citizens’ assembly on the future of Europe and Scotland’s European strategy. The Scottish government should undertake a series of strategic audits of its EU bilateral relations, starting with its priority countries in the EU (and identifying those) – drawing on the example of Ireland’s bilateral audits. It should also look at how to integrate European opportunities and issues into its policy-making and analysis across the board. 3. Youth, Inequality, Media and Culture For the EU: The EU needs to reform and step up how it communicates, connects and engages with its young citizens. Policy is moving in the right direction, but across all relevant policy areas youth must be more engaged in shaping policy, not just in one-way communication about policy. In engaging youth, helping to create high-quality employment and tackling inequality, the EU must learn rapidly from successful and innovative youth and civil society programmes across the member states.
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