Utopia, Empire, and Harmony in 21St-Century International Theory

Remembering the Future — Utopia, Empire, and Harmony in 21st-Century International Theory

WILLIAM A. CALLAHAN University of Durham

Using a comparative approach to international relations theory, this article examines how ancient ideas are being recycled to describe world order in the 21st century. In particular, it provides a thick description of three models of utopia in global politics — Great Harmony and Harmony- with-difference from China, and Empire from Hardt and Negri. Using an unexplored set of Chinese-language texts, the article ﬁrst excavates how Communist Party intellectuals in China have been writing about the ancient Confucian ideal of Great Harmony as a way of promoting the People’s Republic of China’s role as a Great Power in the 21st century. Second, it uses Hardt and Negri’s deterritorialized concept of Empire to criticize Great Harmony discourse as a transcendent and state-centric model of world order. Hardt and Negri’s notion of immanent utopia is elaborated in the third section using another set of Chinese texts that describe the ﬂexible methodology of ‘Harmony-with-difference’. The article concludes that Harmony-with-difference provides a practical logic for achieving Hardt and Negri’s immanent utopia. The article contributes two things to international relations theory — (1) using Chinese- language texts, it broadens the reach of comparative international relations theory and (2) it uses the concept of Empire to challenge Chinese concepts of harmony, while using Chinese theory to elaborate on Hardt and Negri’s utopia. In this way, the article shows how key texts have productively recycled the classical concepts of utopia, empire, and harmony as a way of remembering the future for the 21st century.

KEY WORDS ♦ China ♦ empire ♦ harmony ♦ international relations theory ♦ utopia

Hegemony in the world system is not just a product of material power, either in terms of military strength or economic prosperity. World leadership

European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 2004 SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research, Vol. 10(4): 569–601 [DOI: 10.1177/1354066104047849] European Journal of International Relations 10(4) demands an ideology to order the globe symbolically, according to many normative international relations (IR) theorists. Pax Britannica was ordered by the concepts of ‘civilization’ and ‘free trade’, and the current Pax Americana by the big ideas of ‘democratic peace’ and ‘globalization’. Each hegemon aims to put its stamp on the world, seeking to universalize its particular national culture. Hardt and Negri’s Empire (2000) also talks of world order, but offers a detailed critique of such state-driven utopias, arguing that in the shift from imperialism to Empire there is a shift from a centralized world order to the decentralized logic of postmodern sovereignty. Hence universal Empire is not transcendent, but immanent — a utopia continually produced in the here and now by the multitude, rather than being imposed from above. This utopia, they argue, is the constitution of an unbounded network that does not divide and conquer; it works to incorporate, differentiate, and manage multiple singularities. While these two models of utopia are both Euro-American, now China is getting into the act to propose its own version of a moral world order. As a result of its dramatic economic growth since 1978, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a new confidence in international affairs. China is not merely trying to use its new economic power to transform its political status from that of a third world country to that of a Great Power. In addition to catching up to the West economically, China now aims to narrow the ‘normative gap’ in international relations theory (Deng and Gray, 2001: 6–7; Geeraerts and Men, 2001: 271–2). Criticizing globalization as Eurocentric, Liu Kang (1998: 164) asks — ‘As the last remaining socialist country, with perhaps the fastest economic growth in the world today, China presents a challenge to critical thinking about globalization . . . Will China offer an alternative?’ Many Chinese intellectuals believe that China can offer an alternative, and have been doing ideological work to develop an authentic Chinese model of world order for the 21st century. As an emerging Great Power, they feel it is only right and proper for China to contribute to IR theory (see Song, 2001; Geeraerts and Men, 2001; Liu, 1992: 226). Beijing’s foreign policy elite, for example, now calls on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to solve the South China Sea disputes in an ‘Oriental way’. As we will see, this Oriental way is not just for the East — it is presented as an alternative, universalizable ‘world order’ by scholars and policy-makers in China. As Harvard philosopher Tu Weiming (1990: 60) wrote in a Chinese journal: It is true that Cultural China reflects the implications of territory, nationality, race and language, but its essential defining characteristic is that it exceeds the particularities of territory, nationality, race and language. What it signifies is the construction of universal values of global significance.

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Likewise, a key European IR theorist feels that Chinese civilization can provide an alternative model for global politics — ‘The most obvious candidate for an independent IR tradition based on a unique philosophical tradition is China, though very little independent theorizing has taken place’ (Wæver, 1998: 696). The evolution of Zhang Yongjin’s (1991, 2001) arguments demonstrate this transition from understanding China as a victim (an outsider in a Eurocentric international society) to understanding China as the site of an alternative world order. In this way, the Chinese intellectual debate is moving beyond the issues of ‘narrow nationalism’ and ‘absolute sovereignty’ that characterized the 1990s to promote utopian Chinese views of world order for the 21st century (see Callahan, 2003a). In this article, I will compare three notions of utopia for the 21st Century (Chinese party intellectuals on Great Harmony, Hardt and Negri on Empire, and Chinese public intellectuals on Harmony-with-difference) as a way of examining how utopia works in world politics. In the first section, I will outline how the ancient idea of Great Harmony (Datong)1 is satisfying Chinese desires for a universal utopia — Great Harmony is the next big idea. Tradition is being recycled for the 21st century as the Chinese expression of Marxian utopia, most prominently by Communist Party intellectuals. I will examine whether this utopia is presented as unique to China (as a national Great Harmony society for the PRC) or whether it constitutes a model appropriate for world order (for a global Great Harmony). Second, I will ask if Great Harmony is a transcendent utopia based on idealist logic or scientific method, or whether it is an immanent utopia growing out of human history. This analysis will bring to light a set of Chinese-language texts that have yet to be analysed, and thus serves to broaden the reach of comparative international relations theory. The distinction between transcendent and immanent power will be developed in the second section, which uses Hardt and Negri’s Empire (2000) to deconstruct critically notions of world order. At first glance, pre- modern Chinese philosophy and postmodern Italian political thought constitute a very odd juxtaposition. But, as we will see, both are deployed in the service of reviving the ethico-politics of Marxist utopia. ‘Empire’ is a useful heuristic device for deconstructing the transcendent models of world order used by the Chinese texts. Moreover, Hardt and Negri push us to question utopias that are tied to a particular place. Rather than having to choose between an American-centric and a Sino-centric world order, they argue for a logic of liberation that works in decentralized and deterritorialized ways. Unfortunately, though their analysis of world politics is acute, Hardt and Negri fail convincingly to provide a way to work through the problems and possibilities of Empire to the promised liberation.

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In the last section, I will return to Chinese texts to argue that they provide the flexible methodology for liberation that is missing from Empire. Chinese philosophy also has been involved in a struggle between transcendent power and immanent power. While Great Harmony is a centralized ‘One- Worldism’ that seeks to abolish difference, another type of harmony (Harmony-with-difference) constitutes a flexible logic and methodology that allows for the immanent utopia proposed by Hardt and Negri. This will be shown through an analysis of Harmony-with-difference, first in classical Chinese philosophy, and then in contemporary Chinese texts. Indeed, while party intellectuals concentrate on the transcendent utopia of Great Har- mony, we will see how university-based philosophers and IR theorists are more interested in how Harmony-with-difference can be used as a problem- solving methodology. I will conclude that while normative IR theory calls for an internationalization of Chinese national values through Great Harmony, Harmony-with-difference constitutes a normative logic that is not limited to China, and works well with Hardt and Negri’s immanent utopia. In this way, a critical comparison of Great Harmony and Empire is useful for considering how Marxism is being revived in unexpected places for a new politics of utopia. Both discourses are themselves hybrids of Marxism and (1) pre-modern Chinese thought for Great Harmony and (2) postmodern sovereignty for Empire. Rather than synthetically resolving the contradictions of modernity, the logic of Harmony-with-difference will show how these texts can maintain the tension between Marxism, classical Chinese thought, and poststructuralism. In this way, they productively recycle the classical concepts of utopia, empire, and harmony as a way of remembering the future for the 21st century.

1. Great Harmony Recently, numerous articles which argue that China presents a peaceful alternative world order have been published in prominent English-language international relations journals (Zhang, 2001; Zhang, 2002: 73–80; Wang, 2001; Hua, 2001). In the past decade, many books and hundreds of articles on China’s peaceful nature also have been published in Chinese. For example, Liu Zhiguang published Oriental Paciﬁcism in 1992, while Li Shaojun’s An Introduction to International Politics (2002), a textbook published in China’s top IR book series, ends with a discussion of China’s model for a peaceful world order. These articles and books typically describe Great Harmony not just historically, but as a model of world order for the 21st century.

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‘Great Harmony’ refers to a famous passage in the ancient Chinese Book of Rites. It describes a utopian world: When the Great Way was in practice, then the world was held in common. They chose people of talent and ability whose words were sincere, and they cultivated harmony. Thus people did not only love their own parents, not only nurture their own children . . . In this way selfish schemes did not arise. Robbers, thieves, rebels, and traitors had no place, and thus outer doors were not closed. This is called the Great Harmony [Datong]. (Liji jijie, 1998: 581–3; De Bary, 1960: 176) Great Harmony thus refers not to international relations, but to an overarching world order, where things are held in common. If we cannot achieve this One-World society, the passage continues, we will have to settle for the selfish, bounded communities described as Xiaokang or Small Tranquillity: Now that the Great Way has fallen into disuse and obscurity, the Empire is like a family. Everyone exclusively loves their own parents and nurtures their own children . . . Walls and moats are built to make the city secure . . . [Rulers] recognize as an achievement only that which is to their own benefit. (De Bary, 1960: 176) Though many philosophers understand this passage in terms of a decay from the golden era of Great Harmony into Small Tranquillity, the classical Chinese grammar also allows us to read it with the opposite historical trajectory. Small Tranquillity is now seen by Chinese social commentators as a stage on the progressive road from Xiaokang society to the ultimate goal of a world of Great Harmony (Xiang, 2003). This short passage has inspired Chinese thinkers since the Han dynasty (206 BC–AD 220). In the early 20th century, Kang Youwei continued this tradition with his book Datong shu — The One-World Philosophy. This long book gives a detailed plan whereby all boundaries between nations, classes, races, genders, families, and species are progressively abolished. The era of Great Peace and Equality thus is created (K’ang, 1958). It is easy to see how the Great Harmony is a popular idea. It appeals to our utopian desires for an egalitarian society that is not only fair and just, but happy. Indeed, the Great Harmony passage is very vague, thus demands interpretation. Hence rather than this vagueness simply being a problem, it is also a sign of Great Harmony’s power — because Great Harmony is fruitfully ambiguous, each generation has to interpret it anew. Kang Youwei shows how this key passage has been flexibly adapted to answer the questions of different times over the past two millennia. Indeed, many of the current articles on Great Harmony are clearly written in the context of China’s international role in the post- Cold War period. For example, in 1999 the title of a prominent IR article

573 European Journal of International Relations 10(4) was ‘The Peaceful Orientation of Chinese Civilization’, while its subtitle was ‘A Response to “China Threat” Theory’ (Li Shaojun, 1999; Getz, 2000). What is curious, though, is Great Harmony’s popularity in China in the past decade, since the concept of harmony disputes the historical struggle that defines Marxist philosophy and socialist ideology in the PRC. Its popularity is a symptom of the switch from Deng Xiaoping’s economic pragmatism to Jiang Zemin’s patriotic nationalism. Certainly, Deng (1994: 72–5) spurred interest in things Chinese when he called for people to ‘build socialism with Chinese characteristics’ in 1984. But he was interested in building socialism in the context of the modern Chinese political economy, rather than ancient Chinese thought. Indeed, he felt ‘Chinese tradition’ was the product of feudal ideology, and thus a problem for socialist China. Jiang Zemin (1999), on the other hand, much more openly supported cultural nationalism through campaigns that promoted China’s ‘spiritual civilization’ and ‘patriotic education’ (see Callahan, 2003a: 489–91). The Great Harmony writings themselves tell the story — though there are numerous articles which connect Mao Zedong and Jiang Zemin with traditional Chinese culture, none look to Deng’s appreciation of traditional China (see Yuan, 2001; Zhu, 2002). What is most interesting about this new trend is not just what it describes (a Chinese utopia), but who is doing the talking — well-placed establishment intellectuals and officials. In this way, the debate is not just about Chinese utopia, but is part of intra-party struggles, first for the post-Deng Xiaoping leadership, and now for the post-Jiang Zemin leadership. In other words, Great Harmony discourse now defines the goals of not just the PRC, but the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin prominently employed Great Harmony imagery in his ‘Report to the 15th Party Conference’ — the goal of the public policy of economic reform is a ‘relatively well-off’ society, the latest translation of the phrase Xiaokang or Small Tranquillity.2 Xiaokang was even more central to Jiang’s ‘Report to the 16th Party Congress’ in 2002. Its title was ‘We Should Build a Well-Off (Xiaokang) Society in an All-Around Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism With Chinese Characteristics’, and it set 2020 as the deadline for China achieving such a Xiaokang society (Jiang, 2002b). This task was repeated in the People’s Liberation Army’s White Paper on China’s National Defence 2002, as well as in other key documents. Indeed, The Economist (2003) recently declared that ‘Xiaokang society’ was the ‘fashion- able new slogan in China’. ‘Relatively well-off society’ has now set the agenda for China’s new leader, Hu Jintao, as he interprets and implements the plans of the party (Economist, 2003). Thus with the end of the Jiang regime in 2002–3, the Chinese media also has been abuzz with commentary on Xiaokang and Great Harmony.

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The official Xinhua news agency even had to publish a special explanation of Xiaokang in November 2002, since both domestic and foreign journalists were not quite sure how to translate this idiosyncratic term (Xinhua, 2002; Renmin ribao, 2003; Shi and Shao, 2003; Economist, 2003). Against criticism from both the New Left and veteran party members, China’s ideologues thus have been using ancient Chinese philosophy as a way of pushing through the economic reform policy. The rise of nationalism and the resurgence of Confucian culture in China are not filling an ideological vacuum, as is often reported; rather than replacing Marxism, they are supporting the Chinese Communist Party. Evidence of this ideological struggle also can be found in a curious bunch of articles published in Chinese-language journals that show how Chinese party intellectuals are busy recycling the ancient idea of Great Harmony to satisfy Chinese desires for a universal utopia. Hence, Confucian tradition is being revived in the 21st century as the Chinese expression of Marxian utopia, often by Communist Party intellectuals in the service of certain factions within the party. But these writings not only tell us about intra-party struggles. They also give clues for how China’s establishment intellectuals and leaders see the PRC’s role as a Great Power in the 21st century. A recent article in the leading Communist Party theoretical journal puts it simply — ‘Hope to Great Harmony, Well-off Society Lies in Change of System’ (Zhao, 2003). Thus to understand the logic of the Chinese leadership’s goal of a well-off society, we also need to understand its relation to Great Harmony. Since the mid-1990s, more than 400 articles on Great Harmony have been published in Chinese-language academic journals in the PRC.3 Many of the articles are from the expected sources — philosophers, historians, and (a few) social scientists in universities. But a significant number of articles come from unexpected sources — China’s parallel academic structure of policy analysts in research institutes, the military, and especially in Commu- nist Party schools. Here I will examine the articles written by this second group, who could be called ‘scientific socialists’ rather than social scientists, especially when they are published in key party school and academic journals such as Qiushi, the theoretical journal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The analysis of these articles is not interested in their content, so much as in their discursive politics. Actually, like the classical Great Harmony passage quoted above, recent articles on the topic are generally very vague. Very few of the articles say much that is new. Most go over a well-trodden path of analysis, quoting the standard ancient texts and recalling the same tragic modern history of China. Few of the scientific socialists seem to be specialists in the classical texts they recall. Indeed, it is common for these

575 European Journal of International Relations 10(4) texts to share a cultural idealist view of China’s world order which is taken more from Western Sinology than critical Chinese studies (see Deng, 1999: 60; Johnston, 1995; Zhang, 2002; Wang, 2001). Though I learned little that was ‘new’ about the concept of Great Harmony from these articles, the discursive politics is quite interesting. It involves overlapping narratives whereby ideologues and strategists seek to relate Marxism with Chinese tradition. Simply put, the scores of articles can be organized according to two narrative themes — links and limits. Most explore links between modern China and ancient tradition. A few prominent articles argue that Great Harmony’s utility is limited by ideological problems — the contradiction between scientiﬁc socialism and utopian socialism. It is also limited by concerns over the proper space of Great Harmony — a national Great Harmony society for China or a global Great Harmony for the world. Hence, in the 1990s, while many in Europe and North America were arguing about the relation of Confucianism and democracy, in China’s party schools there has been a ﬁerce debate about the relation between Confucian social utopia and communist social utopia, which continues to this day.

Links — Tradition and Modernity, Confucianism and Communism Most of the articles go against Deng’s suspicion of tradition to draw ideological and normative links between ancient Confucian China and the communist PRC. Often this is done through comparison not just between tradition and modernity, but between East and West. On the one hand, Western tradition is defined in terms of dystopia according to the oppressive negatives of social Darwinism, slavery, Christian cultural imperialism, and predatory capitalism. On the other, the West is rehabilitated as the source of communist utopia, from Thomas More’s Utopia to Marxism itself (Zhou, 2002; Zheng, 1999; Sun, 2000; Zheng, 1994). The key theme in the ‘linkage’ narrative, though, is to join communist utopia with Chinese tradition. This makes Great Harmony patriotic, while at the same time reconfirming the nationalist authenticity and legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (Wu, 1997; Chen, 2002; Wang, 1998; Xia, 1999). Liu Yongguo’s (1994) ‘A Discussion of Ancient Great Harmony’s Essence and Influence’ is a good example of how links are made between (Chinese) tradition and (communist) modernity. The Great Harmony passage from the Book of Rites is quoted, and Confucian idealism is explored philosophically. More importantly, writers give us evidence of how this utopia inspired peasant uprisings throughout Chinese history, including Hong Xiuquan’s massive Taiping Rebellion in the 19th century. These articles tell us that from the time of the ancient sage kings to the present,

576 Callahan: Remembering the Future whenever people suffered oppression in China they looked to the egalitarian utopia of Great Harmony (Sun, 2000). The narrative recounts how the key reformist and revolutionary leaders in 20th-century China (Kang Youwei, Sun Yatsen, and Mao Zedong) also were influenced by Great Harmony (Ren, 1996; Li Huaxing, 2001; Wu, 1997; Li Gui, 2001; Xu, 1997). As Qian Gengsen (2000: 102) concludes: Confucian Great Harmony has had great utility and influence on the course of our history. Great Harmony was the ideal objective of all social reformers and revolutionaries, especially modern peasant revolutionary leaders like Hong Xiuquan, bourgeois reformers like Kang Youwei, and bourgeois revolutionary leaders like Sun Yatsen . . . Our struggle in the 21st century for the great tasks of peace and development takes energy and inspiration from Confucianism’s social ideal of Great Harmony. Others stress how Mao was strongly influenced in his youth by Confucian- ism and Great Harmony. Many point out how Mao’s utopian projects of the 1950s (especially the people’s communes) were not only inspired by Great Harmony, but explained using Great Harmony’s classical language (Chen and Zhuang, 2000: 47; Yu, 2002: 685). Great Harmony thus serves as an intellectual bridge between rebellious China and revolutionary Marxism — ‘Because the concept of Great Harmony provided the grounds, Marxism could be spread and developed in China.’ Song and Liu likewise conclude that ‘Confucianism’s Great Harmony helped the Chinese people choose the socialist path’ (Guan, 2002: 118; Song and Liu, 2000: 46). The history of the utopia of Great Harmony is not only linked to modern history and revolutionary history, but to party history. The legitimacy of communism is recovered from Chinese tradition rather than from Marxism, the history of other socialist states, world communism movements, or any of the other usual communist narratives. The communist revolution is thus naturalized as part of the evolutionary progress of Chinese history, rather than as the result of contradictions within global capitalism.

Limits — Scientiﬁc Socialism Versus Utopian Socialism Since stressing transcendent ‘harmony’ over class ‘struggle’ rides roughshod over Marxism’s historical materialism, Great Harmony is also of limited ideological value — according to a counter-narrative. Recall that Marx and Engels marketed their brand of socialism as scientiﬁc, as opposed to the mid- 19th-century utopian socialism of Saint-Simon, Robert Owen, and others. Marxian socialism was not a timeless ideal, but the product of class struggle in a materialist historiography which progressed according to clear stages — slave society, feudal society, bourgeois society, socialist society, and then

577 European Journal of International Relations 10(4) communism. Communism, in this schema, is a utopia that is achieved as the end product of a historical struggle among social forces. Great Harmony is criticized in the ‘limits’ narrative as a kind of utopian socialism that grew out of the agricultural society of the sage kings and Confucius (Sun, 2000: 18, 20). As Qian (2000: 102) writes, ‘now people look at [Great Harmony] and see that it does not reflect the laws of the objective development of society’. Indeed, because they did not follow Marxism’s historical prescriptions, the Great Harmony-inspired peasant revolts, which are praised in the ‘links’ narrative, usually failed. One author calls Great Harmony a ‘tragedy . . . Because “equality” and “Great Harmony” limited society’s division of labor, and held back the energy of the workers’ (Liu, 1994: 19). Great Harmony, they tell us, pushed Mao to skip historical stages and prematurely rush into communism. Likewise, Niu (2000: 39–40) argues that you cannot use Great Harmony’s ‘peaceful methods to transform society’. Indeed, if you promote it during the wrong historical stage, he explains, Great Harmony risks becoming neo-colonial, like the Soviet Union’s ‘social imperialism’ over Eastern Europe and China. Chen and Zhuang argue that Great Harmony likewise led to the dystopian debacles of the people’s communes and the Cultural Revolution. This is because Great Harmony’s ‘golden-age utopianism seriously impedes the development of productive forces, and leads to a complete retreat [from socialist revolution]’ (2000: 48). According to the narrative of limits, Great Harmony is either rejected outright as utopian socialism or it is put into a specific temporal context. Great Harmony thus does not overtake or displace Marxism, but becomes the final historical stage of communism in Marxist historiography (Zhang and Yu, 1997: 62). As Chen and Zhuang explain (2000: 48): In the final analysis, the conclusion of this essay is that the concept of Great Harmony entails naive rationalism. Historically it has sounded the revolutionary drum for struggle, and it has been useful for pushing historical progress. But Great Harmony is weak in its scientific analysis of the laws of development of human society. It is just an idealist description of a future model of society because it lacks scientific theory’s direction of how to implement it. Therefore, it necessarily has historical limitations. We must support the masses’ correct understanding of communism and do this by earnestly modernizing through building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Only then will we be truly able to realize the shared ideals of humanity. On one level, then, the debate about Great Harmony is highly theoretical and uses the specialized vocabulary and logic of Marxian polemic. The party intellectuals argue over questions such as ‘Is Great Harmony utopian socialism or scientific socialism?’ and ‘When is the proper historical stage for its implementation?’ But on a more instrumental level, these ideologues are

578 Callahan: Remembering the Future discussing how properly to build socialism with Chinese characteristics, with the pro-Great Harmony faction pushing for a faster implementation of the economic reform programme, while those who are sceptical of Great Harmony warn of its dangers.

National Security In addition to ‘Great Harmony’, Datong has been translated in many different ways — ‘Great Unity’, ‘Grand Union’, ‘Cosmopolitan Society’, ‘Great Commonwealth’, ‘the Great Similarity’, ‘Great Universality’, ‘Era of World Brotherhood’, ‘Great Communion’, ‘Great Similitude’, ‘Great Sim- ilarity’, ‘One-World Government’, and ‘Cosmopolitanism’ (see K’ang, 1958: 29–30). Most of these understandings of Datong look to the most common modern meaning of tong — ‘sameness’. At the turn of the 20th century, Kang Youwei wrote of Datong in terms of a great unity. His objective was a One-World government where all were equal in the sense that all distinctions were abolished. Like ancient egalitarianism, Kang saw equality arithmetically — the equality of sameness and unity in sameness (also see Xu, 1997). Writings about Great Harmony at the turn of the 21st century also look to unity as their objective, and are closely linked with the PRC’s domestic policy. Many of the articles use Great Harmony to address the sovereignty problems left over from the colonial era and the Cold War that still trouble China. Great Harmony, for example, is seen as the key for national unification with Han Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (Wan, 2000; Li Changdao, 1999). Likewise, Great Harmony addresses the problem of ethnic relations in the PRC — it is key to the multinational Zhonghua minzu (Chinese nationalism) that integrates the dominant Han Chinese nationality with the 55 official minority nationalities. Great Harmony is also used to buttress contradictory moves in domestic modernization policy, such as the ‘socialist market economy’ produced by economic reforms (Zhu, 2002; Gao, 2000; Yu, 2002: 685). As well as integrating and modernizing Chinese people, Great Harmony is deployed to exclude foreigners — it was anti-Soviet in the 1950s, and is anti- globalization now (Yu, 2002). Fei Xiaotong, China’s foremost social scientist, uses the Chinese notion of ethnic harmony to argue that the logic of harmony is also necessary in the era of globalization. Without ‘cultural awareness’ Chinese identity will be lost — just as national minority groups risk losing their identity when they migrate from their isolated homelands to the modern city (Fei, 2001: 16). Great Harmony thus is often deployed in these articles not for the benefit of the world, so much as for the survival of China as a nation-state in the international system.

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In the context of globalization, Great Harmony thus calls for tolerance between states — but not necessarily within them. Hence, even Niu (2000: 41), who ultimately argues against a universal Great Harmony, falls into line with the national limits when he tells us that the optimum world order is ‘peaceful coexistence’ between nation-states. Great Harmony’s universality is limited by Chinese nationalism; or to put it another way, its universality is expressed at and limited to the interstate level (Mao, 1998). Great Harmony is reframed from being a utopian ideal for the world to being a strategy in which national identity needs to be guarded in the name of ‘cultural security’ (Wen, 2002; Chen, 2002; Wang, 1998). In their examination of the limits of Great Harmony, the Chinese commentators missed perhaps the most pressing question — What is the relation of Great Harmony and its historical context in traditional Chinese imperialism? Indeed, Great Harmony was used in the governance of the empire — ‘Great Harmony of the Empire’ (Tianxia Datong) is written on the gate of China’s Confucian temple in Beijing where imperial China’s leaders were trained (Fei, 2001: 5). In their praise for the idealist workings of the Chinese world order, it is common for authors to overlook its traditional imperialist practice of conquering neighbouring polities and ‘civilizing the barbarians’. Zhang’s (2001) normative analysis of the Chinese world order, for example, is more interested in affirming the utility and morality of norms in general, rather than examining the specific ‘violences’ that these norms produced by excluding others (also see Zhang, 2002; Wang, 2001). Still, we should not exaggerate the importance of the influence of Chinese imperialism in the current debate about Great Harmony. Since the mid- 1990s, many Chinese scientific socialists have resurrected the concept of Xiaokang (Small Tranquillity) not just to promote a ‘well-off’ society, but to describe the international system of foreign relations between nation-states, with the goal of Great Harmony in the distant future (see Xiang, 2003; Tong, 2003). Great Harmony thus becomes peace between nation-states — ‘Once nation-states are established, we can pursue the Great Way of “the world of Great Harmony.” Then there will be a peaceful world.’ ‘Great Harmony is Confucian peace studies’ (Tian, 1998: 276, 294). More to the point, very few of the articles that discuss Great Harmony say much that is new; like the ancient writings on Great Harmony, they are both vague and ambiguous. Though these writings say little about the content of the Chinese big idea, their discursive politics is quite interesting. By and large, the writings on Great Harmony come from a certain section of the intelligentsia — the authors are scholars and officials in party schools and military institutes. Elite professors at universities and academies of social science do not write about

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Great Harmony (more below in Section 3). As a whole then, this group of articles tells us how establishment intellectuals are using socialism and tradition to understand their place in international politics as an emerging world power. Though party intellectuals do not carry much weight among elite IR theorists, they can be inﬂuential in framing both propaganda and policy in the PRC (Geeraerts and Men, 2001: 273). Curiously, these articles show how the debate combines the contradictory vocabularies and logics of Confucianism and Marxism. Thus, what we have is not the Confucian nationalism that was popular in the 1990s, so much as a global Confucian Marxist utopia for the 21st century.

2. Empire The logic of Great Harmony, in both the links and limits narratives, is transcendent; it looks to the grand outside of either utopian ideals or scientific rationalism to support its vision. Hardt and Negri’s Empire suggests a way out of the circular desire for imperialist order imposed from above, which they see as oppressive. Their mammoth book is rich with concepts and debates from fields as diverse as the history of political thought, international political economy, marketing, American history, and law. According to the New York Times, ‘Empire’ is the next big idea (Eakin, 2001). Certainly, Empire has also been criticized in various ways. Barkawi and Laffey (2002: 127) conclude that ‘Marxism, postmodernism and Italy notwithstanding, Empire is a deeply American book’ — and this is not meant as a compliment. Others take Hardt and Negri’s call for a deterritorialized understanding of global politics more seriously, but worry about whether they got Spinoza right since Empire’s understanding of its key concepts (Sovereignty and the Multitude) comes from this 17th-century philosopher (Bull, 2001: 6; Walker, 2002: 339). Kam Shapiro makes the most interesting criticism when he points out how even though Hardt and Negri’s argument seeks to get beyond the binary distinction of inside/ outside for an immanent notion of power, they still end up relying on Cartesian dualisms to script heroes and enemies — the Multitude versus Sovereignty (Shapiro, 2000). With these caveats in mind, though, I think that Empire’s discussion of utopian politics is useful for understanding Euro-American and Chinese dreams of a future world order. Like the Chinese scientific socialists, Hardt and Negri do not take Marxism as a master narrative; rather, they critically combine it with poststructuralism. In this section, I will develop their distinctions of imperialism/Empire and transcendent/immanent power. This will lay the basis for considering a similar debate in China between the transcendent sovereignty of Great Harmony and the immanent ordering of

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Harmony-with-difference in the next section. In this way, I will examine how both Empire and Chinese thought provide critical space for immanent utopia. This discussion also will address the ideological questions that Great Harmony provoked in the last section — but rather than questioning utopian socialism with scientiﬁc socialism, I will question whether the utopia is transcendent (as in both utopian and scientiﬁc socialism) or immanent.

Imperialism/Empire Hardt and Negri begin Empire by arguing against the prevailing left-wing understandings of globalization as a rearticulation of imperialism. Old imperialism (as in the British Empire) worked through a logic of sovereignty which produced borders of territory and civilization. This ‘global striation’ blocked certain flows of people and capital, while facilitating others (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 332). Imperialist sovereignty, then, relied on a logic which produced transcendental inside/outside distinctions (see Walker, 1993, 2002: 344). Liberation from imperialism, they argue, should not resurrect the nation-state as a shield against globalization, for state sovereignty also supports the exclusionary logic of national, colonial, and imperialist rule (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 43). Both imperialism and anti-imperialism are dated; they are dealing with the issues of the past world order. Hardt and Negri’s Empire, on the other hand, does not describe a place — it has no territorial centre of power, no fixed boundaries, but is a decentred and deterritorializing apparatus of rule (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xii). Rather than comparing a waning American empire with a waxing Chinese empire, Hardt and Negri see world order in terms of ‘a specific regime of global relations’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 46; also see Callahan, 2003a). The transition is not to a new territorially sovereign regime as the next (Chinese) superpower (Shambaugh, 1995), but to the regime of the non-place of the global market which is ordered according to bio-power and cultural governance — ‘The great industrial and financial powers thus produce not only commodities but also subjectivities’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 32). Rather than the heavily ordered territories of imperialist sovereignty, the world market ‘requires a smooth space of uncoded and deterritorialized flows’ which produce needs, social relations, bodies, and minds — they produce the producers (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 333). As they summarize — ‘Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xii). Utopia for Hardt and Negri turns from being a ‘good place’ into a ‘non-place’. Its goal is not a free territory, but a flexible logic of liberation. Following Marxian dialectics, Hardt and Negri argue that liberation from

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Empire does not entail destroying it. Just as capitalism liberated society from feudalism, Empire has liberated us from imperialist rule and nation-states. The objective, then, is to push through the contradictory logic of Empire for liberation on the other side where the Multitude calls Empire into being (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 43, 218). In this way, the Multitude can reappropriate knowledge and power in order to produce themselves in alternative subjectivities.

Transcendence/Immanence To lead the way to liberation, Hardt and Negri recall the history of sovereignty in European political thought. While Foucault (1986: 4) argues against the politics of utopia as a spectacular concern with an unreal space, Hardt and Negri change the subject to ask whether utopia is transcendent or immanent. Rather than being anti-utopia, they see transcendent sovereignty as the problem, and immanent utopia as the solution. Hardt and Negri make this point by arguing that the European Enlightenment has been misunder- stood by its critics. Rather than being a totalizing meta-narrative of the transcendent power of rationality, they tell the history of two Enlight- enments which were always in tension. Rather than limiting themselves to Descartes’s separation of mind and body and Hobbes’s alienation of power from the Multitude in the service of order, they look to Spinoza to tell the history of the ‘revolutionary plane of immanence’. The rise of immanence in the early modern period was more than a ‘secularizing process that denied divine and transcendent authority’. Hardt and Negri argue that this negative expression of power is ‘only a symptom of the primary event in modernity: the affirmation of the powers of this world . . . At the birth of European modernity, humanity discovered its power in the world and integrated this dignity into a new consciousness of reason and potentiality’ (2000: 71). The result was the ‘refoundation of authority on a human universal’ in radical renaissance humanism and republicanism (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 73). Immanence is revolutionary because it questions the inside/outside distinction that supports transcendent power. Power, knowledge, and truth are no longer separated from history and human creativity — ‘Immanence is defined as the absence of every external limit from the trajectories of the action of the multitude, and immanence is tied only, in its affirmations and destructions, to regimes of possibility that constitute its formation and development’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 373). Immanence takes us from the hierarchical discipline which comes from the outside to an internally generated self-discipline, self- organization, and self-liberation.

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The meta-narrative that we mistakenly call the Enlightenment, Hardt and Negri argue, was actually a response to the immanent revolution of renaissance republicanism. To recapture power in the counter-reformation, the ‘Transcendental apparatus’ deployed modern sovereignty. This intimate relation between politics and metaphysics enabled the recentralization of power in the hands of the elite. Hobbes used the threat of civil war to ‘transfer every autonomous power of the multitude to a sovereign power that stands above and rules it’. Modern sovereignty, like rationality, is thus defined by a transcendence which ‘alienates power from multitude’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 84). Modernity, then, is not a grand meta-narrative; it is in continual crisis as it addresses the tension between immanent and transcendent power, the Multitude and sovereignty. To summarize, neither the Enlightenment nor modernity is uniform or homogeneous. They are produced in the tension between two distinct and conflicting traditions. On the one hand, renaissance humanism was revolutionary in its discovery of the plane of immanence as the celebration of singularity and difference. On the other, ‘the Thermidor of the renaissance revolution seeks to control the utopian forces of humanism through the construction and mediation of dualisms, and arrives finally at the concept of modern sovereignty as a provisional solution’. Hardt and Negri explain that those who claim to be criticizing the Enlightenment, really are attacking only modern sovereignty. The problem with this strategy is that it silences the positive, productive, hopeful aspects of the Enlightenment found in renaissance humanism (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 140; also see Walker, 2002). This argument helps us to recognize the complexity of power in the present as well. While imperialist rule and sovereignty are transcendent, Hardt and Negri state that Empire and network capitalism are expressions of immanent power.

Constitutional Order Most radically for some, Hardt and Negri find Empire and immanent power in the USA. Indeed, the book has been criticized as ‘a breath-taking lapse into American exceptionalism’ (Barkawi and Laffey, 2002: 126). Yet as we have seen, such a geopolitical understanding misses the point. While recognizing the violence of African-American slavery and Amerindian genocide, Hardt and Negri find the logic of Empire exemplified in the constitutional regime of the USA. But immanent power is not found in the territorial body called the United States of America, but in the aesthetic order of its constitution: the idea of American Empire as the redemption of utopia is completely illusory. First of all, the coming Empire is not American and the United States

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is not at its center. The fundamental principle of Empire . . . is that its power has no actual and localizable terrain or center. Imperial power is distributed in networks, through mobile and articulated mechanisms of control. (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 384) Constitution thus is not just a noun as in the ‘19th Thai Constitution’, but a verb, as in the production power and identity. The US Constitution (and the constitution of the USA) is exemplary because it guides a ‘model of rearticulating an open space and reinventing incessantly diverse and singular relations in networks across an unbounded terrain’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 182). Like the constitution, Empire does not divide and conquer, but works to incorporate, differentiate, and manage — ‘Contingency, mobility, and flexibility are Empire’s real power’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 200). The purpose of liberation in this constitutional order switches from founding a new state to describing a new mode of bio-politics (see Foucault, 1991). This ‘leads the process of production in an effective social, political alternative, for a new constituent power’ which is ‘constructive and ethico- political’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 395). Rather than a search for equality, Hardt and Negri look to difference, nomadism, and miscegenation. How does this relate to Great Harmony? Hardt and Negri’s analysis of the USA as a utopia is not strange. Kang Youwei also looked to the USA as an example of utopia for his One-Worldism. Indeed, he largely wrote his utopian book, the Datong shu, while he was wandering in exile. Kang was particularly impressed with the US Constitution and its goal of equality. But the guiding themes of Hardt and Negri’s utopia of Empire go against standard utopian visions, including Great Harmony. Rather than appealing to One-Worldism, they look to otherness, specifically immigrants and diaspora. Rather than an arithmetic equality and homogenous happiness in a specific place, they see freedom in terms of the expression of various different singularities joined in a decentralized network. Unfortunately, Hardt and Negri’s argument, which relies on the creative power of the Multitude for liberation, lacks a way to get from here to there — ‘The call for an unmediated global uprising is a call to desire that must inevitably be frustrated’ (Shapiro, 2000). It is helpful to return to Chinese texts for a more useful immanent logic and flexible methodology for practical utopia.

3. Harmony-With-Difference — An Immanent Utopia In this section, rather than look to China or the USA as a utopian territory, I will explore harmony as an immanent logic for utopia. I will do this by relating two narratives of harmony in Chinese texts — in addition to Great Harmony there is also ‘Harmony-with-difference’ (he er butong). Fei Xiaotong equates Great Harmony and Harmony-with-difference. Stating

585 European Journal of International Relations 10(4) that Western academics have been unable to solve ethnic problems, he recalls (as noted above) that ‘Great Harmony of the Empire’ (Tianxia Datong) is written on the gate of China’s Confucian temple in Beijing. He argues that this is a theoretical basis for a multicultural world, and is a ‘reflection of Harmony-with-difference’. The world must take this road, Fei tells us, for globalization’s ‘Sameness-without-harmony’ will lead to global catastrophe (Fei, 2001: 5). Though Fei relates Great Harmony and Harmony-with-difference as equals, I think that they are actually quite different. Great Harmony is a place — a utopia which seeks to abolish difference for equality. In this way, Kang Youwei’s use of Great Harmony reflects the progressive approaches to injustice at the turn of the 20th century. The main problem for Kang is social inequality, and the solution is to abolish borders of both territory and identity. Using images from Buddhism and Christianity, Kang asserts that the solution is a universal equality in which difference is seen as a problem of hierarchy. Fei’s reading of Harmony-with-difference as ‘peaceful coexistence’ follows this quest for equality among nations and ethnic groups. Harmony-with-difference can be understood in a very different way. Rather than defining a territorial utopia, here Harmony-with-difference describes an immanent logic and flexible methodology. Certainly, Fei would agree that his notion of harmony (which equates Great Harmony and Harmony-with-difference) describes a general logic. Indeed, Fei argues that the world must learn from Chinese tradition in order to survive. Harmony- with-difference also overlaps with phrases that contain the keyword Great Harmony (Datong) — Datong youyi and Datong caiyi both mean ‘Great Harmony-with-difference’ (see Bao, 1998; Mao, 1998; Wan, 2000). But I think it is important to highlight the difference between Great Harmony and Harmony-with-difference. While Great Harmony has been used by emperors to unify a domain, and utopians for universal equality, Harmony- with-difference generates order not through unity and universality, but through an appeal to difference and ambiguity. Actually, Great Harmony is not prominent in the pre-Qin Confucian classics. But ‘he er butong’ is a key concept from the Confucian Analects. In the famous passage which gives us the phrase ‘Harmony-with-difference’, Confucius discusses the harmony/sameness (he/tong) distinction which is found throughout Chinese literature — ‘The exemplary person harmonizes with others, but does not necessarily agree with them [he er butong]; the small person agrees with others, but is not harmonious with them [tong er buhe]’ (Confucius, 1979: 13/23; Mei, 1996; Callahan, 2004b). Confucius tells us that agreeing with people means that you are the same with them, here uncritically the same — Sameness-without-harmony (tong er buhe).

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Harmony-with-difference, on the other hand, allows us to preserve difference in contingent self/other relations, each of which is singular. So rather than describing the same thing, Great Harmony and Harmony- with-difference describe very different notions of world order and social order. The interplay between them is quite like the transcendent versus immanent struggle in Europe and North America that Hardt and Negri describe — the sameness of the Great Harmony World versus the singularity of each Harmony-with-difference. Like transcendent sovereignty, Great Harmony is used by states in national, imperialist, and global space to (as Kang Youwei put it) ‘abolish’ difference. In Chinese thought, however, for historical reasons the relation of immanence and transcendence is different from that in Europe and North America. While transcendent sovereignty was presented as a provisional solution to the problems of pluralism and contradiction in early modern Europe, ‘one of the most striking features of Chinese intellectual culture . . . is the absence in any important sense of transcendence in the articulation of its spiritual, moral, and political sensibilities’ (Hall and Ames, 1998: 189). Hence rather than the plane of immanence being a revolutionary discovery as in renaissance Europe, in China immanent order is the norm; Chinese concepts of order are traditionally radically contingent because order is site and event speciﬁc. Even the concept of heaven (tian) is better understood as immanent than transcendent (Hall and Ames, 1998: 242).4 Heaven and the gods are not separate from us in a transcendent relation; through practices such as ancestor worship they are extensions of social life on earth (see Hall and Ames, 1998: 280). Transcendence historically emerged as a challenge to Chinese philosophy ﬁrst with Buddhism, and then with Euro-American modernity. While the ‘Transcendental apparatus’ was installed in counter-reformation Europe as a reaction to renaissance humanism, in China transcendental sovereignty was increasingly seen as the necessary solution to the disorder created by predatory European imperialism in the 19th century. To many Chinese intellectuals and activists, the only way to break out of the fragmentation and stagnation of the late imperial period was through transcendent ideals such as liberation via the keystones of modernity — Marxism, nationalism, and scientism (see Hua, 1995; Callahan, 2004). Indeed, this is how Great Harmony came to be interpreted as a transcendent ideal by Chinese intellectuals in the early 20th century (see Hall and Ames, 1998: 193). Now that people are questioning modernity both in China and in Europe and North America, it is helpful to explore the concept of Harmony-with- difference in terms of the notion of aesthetic order — an immanent order which constitutes difference. Drawing on A.N. Whitehead and the American pragmatists, Hall and Ames develop the distinction between rational order

587 European Journal of International Relations 10(4) and aesthetic order. While rational order ‘involves an act of closure; aesthetic order is grounded in disclosure’ (Hall and Ames, 1987: 16). Hence in a similar way to Hardt and Negri, Hall and Ames do not appeal to transcendent rational order which is guided by the external standards of science or theology. Rather than looking to external rational standards for reason, morality, truth, or identity, an aesthetic order is guided by context and contingency (Hall and Ames, 1987: 134–8). The concept of Harmony-with-difference is an exemplary case of the aesthetic order of Chinese social and political thought (Hall and Ames, 1987: 167, 158; 1998: 272). Indeed, the first definition of harmony [he] in the classical Chinese canon is ‘mutual responsiveness’ (Shuowen in Hall and Ames, 1998: 180). Harmony-with-difference thus does not fall from Heaven as a universal, but is produced in each context (see Qian, 1997). One of the favourite metaphors used to express Harmony-with-difference in classical Chinese texts involves the practical bio-politics of the everyday — food and cooking. Indeed, the culinary metaphor is expressed in the structure of the classical Chinese character for harmony [he] — it combines ‘grain’ and ‘mouth/eating’ (Hall and Ames, 1987: 166). Throughout classical Chinese texts, the preparation of food is used to explain Harmony- with-difference. Hall and Ames (1998: 181) thus argue that ‘Harmony is the art of combining and blending two or more foodstuffs so they come together with mutual benefit and enhancement without losing their separate and particular identities, and yet with the effect of constituting a frictionless whole.’ This culinary metaphor talks of the aesthetic order of cooking which does not rely on the scientific order of a recipe, but looks to the circumstances at hand to create and blend — it defers to the context of the cooking pot and its contents (see Lushi¨ chunqiu, 1996: 210; Callahan, 2003b). In this way, Harmony-with-difference has important parallels with Hardt and Negri’s concept of immanent utopia that looks to various different alternative subjectivities joined in a decentralized network, rather than transcendent utopia’s arithmetic equality and homogenous happiness (Great Harmony). Back in contemporary China, the phrase ‘Harmony-with-difference’ has been appearing in prominent places. Two weeks before he gave his ‘Xiaokang society’ speech at the 16th Party Conference, Jiang Zemin used Harmony-with-difference in a major foreign policy speech delivered in the USA. Jiang uses Harmony-with-difference to describe a future peaceful world order. After quoting the key ‘he er butong’ passage from the Confucian Analects (1979: 13/23), Jiang (2002a) goes on to explain: That is to say, harmony but not sameness; reserving differences without coming into conflict. Harmony promotes co-existence and co-prosperity, while difference fosters mutual complementarity and mutual support. Harmony-

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with-difference is an important principle in the development of all social relationships and in guiding people’s conduct and behavior. Indeed, it is the essential factor of the harmonious development of all civilizations. Jiang’s speech is still quite vague on just what Harmony-with-difference means for China’s foreign policy; but it promises to generate a reaction among IR scholars in China. Indeed, Chinese leaders and scholars explain the PRC’s new foreign policy of ‘peaceful rising’ with reference to Harmony-with-difference (see Xia Liping, 2004). Indeed, Chinese scholars in elite universities already have been mobilizing Harmony-with-difference not as an abstract utopia, but as a method for solving problems since the early 1990s (Zhang and Yu, 1997; Mei, 1996). This simple phrase has become very popular among philosophers and public intellectuals. Contemporary Chinese philosophers use the same classical sources to make similar arguments about the utility of Harmony-with- difference as China’s contribution to world order in the 21st century (Yue, 2001; Luo, 2001; Qian, 1997; Mei, 1996). Still, compared with the number of articles published on Great Harmony in the 21st century, the articles which apply Harmony-with-difference are few.5 Harmony-with-difference is also appearing in discussions of IR theory and China’s contributions to it that can be used to ﬂesh out the import of Jiang Zemin’s 2002 speech. Though they only mention Great Harmony in passing, a few university-based international relations scholars are appealing to Harmony-with-difference in order to relate ‘Traditional Chinese culture and the theory of foreign relations’ (Li Shaojun, 2002: 527; Liu, 1992: 234; Zhou, 2002). In Oriental Paciﬁcism, for example, Liu Zhiguang (1992: 227) follows this general philosophical line when he concludes — ‘There- fore, the fundamental principle of Harmony-with-difference should preserve both the unity and the difference of humanity.’ Liu argues that since post- Cold War international politics is characterized by a struggle among civilizations, China must promote its own ideas as part of the 21st century’s ‘cultural balance of power’ (Liu, 1992: 224 ff.; also see Chu, 2003; Li Shaojun, 2002). Hence we have a mixing of classical Chinese philosophy (Harmony-with-difference) and classical realism (balance of power). As Liu (1992: 226) explains:

Among the Chinese people’s cultural concepts there is one that can serve as such a principle: we must stress Harmony-with-difference in the 21st century. Preserving this spirit not only benefits the development of human culture. It also benefits harmonious relations among humanity in the world system. If Chinese culture took the lead [in the cultural balance of power], the principle would accord with Oriental Pacificism and would be Chinese culture’s contribution to the 21st century. In this harmony, diversity is preserved,

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because it does not seek to have one kind of culture dominate others, as was the case with Christianity. The end goal of this discussion of Harmony-with-difference is world peace, and especially China’s cultural contribution to it — ‘Our point is that the renaissance of Chinese culture will first benefit the values of peace . . . This is the global significance of Oriental Pacificism’ (Liu, 1992: 232). The reversion of Hong Kong in 1997 also provoked philosophers and social scientists to think about the relation of ancient Chinese thought and contemporary Chinese policy — especially the curious relation between ‘One Country, Two Systems’ and ‘Harmony-with-difference’. ‘One Coun- try, Two Systems’ is the formula used by Deng Xiaoping to allow Hong Kong to return to Chinese sovereignty, while still preserving the territory’s distinctive ‘way of life’. It is interesting because, on the one hand, ‘One Country, Two Systems’ is Beijing’s response to a diplomatic dispute with the United Kingdom, and on the other, it is a theoretical innovation that dramatically revises China’s longstanding doctrine of absolute sovereignty (see Callahan, 2004). In Chinese, the phrase ‘One Country, Two Systems’ has close grammat- ical and thematic parallels with ‘Harmony-with-difference’. Hence a number of elite scholars and public intellectuals both in mainland China and Hong Kong appeal to the notion of ‘Harmony-with-difference’ to explain ‘One Country, Two Systems’ (Xiang, 2003; Li Changdao, 1999; Luo, 1997; Tang, 1997; Li Tianchen, 1997; Tong, 1999). Their arguments differ from those cited above that use Great Harmony to stress the ethnic sameness of people in Hong Kong and mainland China, and thus the ‘national unification with Han compatriots’ (Wan, 2000). Rather than simply returning to China, they argue that Hong Kong can continue to follow its own way while being a part of China; Hong Kong can be both patriotic and Confucian in a socialist state. Tang, for example, argues that ‘One Country, Two Systems’ operates according to the grammar of yin and yang which are opposites, but not completely separate. They are complementary — in the midst of yin there is yang, and vice versa. Likewise, the socialist and capitalist systems of mainland China and Hong Kong were already related long before the handover — without reform and opening on the mainland, Hong Kong would not have prospered. Without Hong Kong’s investment and expertise, the mainland economy also would not have developed so quickly (Tang, 1997: 529; Zhang and Yu, 1997, 61–2). Hence Zhang and Yu conclude that ‘“One Country, Two Systems” embodies the spirit of “Harmony-with-difference”, combining principles and flexibility’ not just for Hong Kong and Macau, but for Taiwan too (1997: 62; also see Tian, 1998: 283).

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Thus these examples show how Harmony-with-difference has been deployed recently to explain not just the past, but also the present (in Hong Kong) and the future (for world peace). Certainly, these examples show that there is an urge to solve problems once and for all, in a transcendent way such as Great Harmony. Many of the articles thus speak of Harmony-with- difference as a ‘principle’. But I would argue that the passages cited above also demonstrate that the opposite urge is present — the need to preserve difference. Post-handover struggles over the governance of Hong Kong, for example, show how flexible both ‘One Country, Two Systems’ and ‘Harmony-with-difference’ can be. The formulas can be read in two ways — leaders in Beijing stress the ‘harmony’ of One Country, while Hong Kong people stress the ‘difference’ of Two Systems (see Callahan, 2004). Rather than Harmony-with-difference being a principle of rational ordering, it is a flexible methodology — an aesthetic ‘style’ which generates alternative subjectivities (see Luo, 2001). This is what is interesting about the discourse of Harmony-with- difference in both its classical and contemporary inscriptions — it maintains the productive tension between unity and difference, self and other. The logic of this harmony does not aim to solve the problem of contradictions, and thus deploy a new synthetic unity, like Great Harmony. Rather, it is a flexible methodology for solving problems ranging from world peace to Beijing–Hong Kong relations, to the political-economy of the family, to different modes of translating English terms into Chinese (see Zhang and Yu, 1997: 62; Bao, 1998). Harmony-with-difference thus becomes an immanent logic and flexible method for problem-solving. The goal of this problem-solving is not a stable order; like the immanent logic of the US Constitution, Harmony-with-difference generates a range of alternative subjectivities. When we treat Harmony-with-difference as a contingent logic rather than a transcendent principle or a place (i.e. Great Harmony), then it begins to describe a way to immanent utopia. Hardt and Negri stress how they are not providing the ‘schema of an ideal teleology’; rather, they propose two methodological approaches — critical and deconstructive, and constructive and ethico-political (2000: 47–8). The strength of Hardt and Negri’s Empire is in its critical and deconstructive analysis of European sovereignty and power. But as argued above, the book’s weakness is in the constructive and ethico-political methodology that would guide us towards liberation. As the analysis of Harmony-with-difference discourse shows, it has the opposite traits. The discourse is weak in its critical and deconstructive analysis of Chinese power and sovereignty (for obvious political reasons). But articles are quite useful because they propose Harmony-with-difference as a constructive and ethico-political methodology that can produce

591 European Journal of International Relations 10(4) alternative subjectivities. Together with Empire’s critical and deconstructive analysis, the ﬂexible methodology of Harmony-with-difference thus can provide a means by which we can work through the contradictions of Empire to liberation in line with Hardt and Negri’s immanent utopia. As Zhang and Yu (1997) suggest, we need to consider ‘The Contemporary Implications of Confucius’s Methodology of “Harmony-with-difference”’.

4. Conclusion This article has examined recent utopian writings first through the odd juxtaposition of Chinese communist notions of pre-modern Great Harmony and postmodern Italian-American notions of Empire. Thick descriptions of these strange concepts of utopia and world politics help us to do what Michael J. Shapiro calls a ‘reverse ethnology, which problematizes the present and the self’ (Shapiro, 1997: 35). While Hardt and Negri challenge us to question the ontological politics of transcendent power, the Chinese scientific socialists explore the intimate relation of theory and praxis through their policy-relevant dreams of Great Harmony. Both discourses involve a reinterpretation of Marxism — while Hardt and Negri engage in a poststructural rewriting of Marxist liberation, the Chinese party intellectuals use Marxism to reimagine a Chinese utopia. Instead of choosing between these two utopias, I looked to another Chinese discourse of harmony, Harmony-with-difference, to relate productively Empire and Great Harmony. Rather than seeing such hybrids as contradictions that need to be resolved, I appealed to the flexible methodology of Harmony-with-difference in an effort to maintain the tension between Marxism, classical Chinese thought, and poststructuralism in a way that enables both deconstruction and ethico-political action. By remembering the future in this way, Great Harmony, Empire, and Harmony-with- difference make us question new forms of oppression and liberation in the bio-politics of the everyday. This article has argued these points through the excavation of a body of Chinese-language texts from Communist Party schools and normative IR theorists that aim to provide a Chinese contribution to models of world order. It is common to hear that nationalism and Confucianism are filling a vacuum left by an exhausted socialist ideology in the PRC. But the first section showed how ideologues are using a curious combination of Marxism, nationalism, and Confucianism to promote the goals of the CCP and the Chinese state. Party intellectuals have been busy recycling the ancient idea of Great Harmony into the next big idea — for a number of reasons. First, it has been used as a utopian crutch to bolster the national legitimacy of communism and the party. Thus it is part of a semi-official

592 Callahan: Remembering the Future discourse of Confucian communism and Confucian nationalism. Part of this discourse involves a counter-narrative that points out the limits of Great Harmony in party history — Confucianism is useful for communism in China, but cannot replace it, we are told. Though it is common for elite university-based scholars in China to dismiss party school debates, we should recognize that they can be quite influential in the PRC’s propaganda and policy-making. Party schools are the sites for discussions of the broad questions of how China will reform and what China’s role in the world should be — and how the ruling party should pursue these objectives. Indeed, Great Harmony also is part of intra-party politics. The debate emerged during the transition from Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic regime of economic reform to Jiang Zemin’s more patriotic and nationalistic foreign policy. Great Harmony thus is used to smooth over the contradictions in Chinese domestic and international politics such as the ‘socialist market economy’ of economic reform and the return of Han compatriots in Hong Kong and Macau. The language and metaphors of Great Harmony continue to be used with the new Hu Jintao-led regime since the CCP’s goal is still defined in terms of China attaining a relatively well-off (Xiaokang) society by 2020 — which is on the road to Great Harmony. The main question here is whether we should take the Great Harmony debate seriously as Chinese futurology or limit our consideration to how it is being used as a weapon in the internal politics of the party. Thus, while many suggest that we look to ancient Chinese civilization for answers to contemporary Euro-American problems (Wæver, 1998), the analysis of Great Harmony discourse has shown how Chinese texts also can lead to state-centric and oppressive politics. The analysis of Empire in the second section showed how Great Harmony has limits in different ways from those presented by Chinese intellectuals, and contradictions in addition to those raised by intra-party struggles. Great Harmony is very much a transcendental world order, relying on either idealist models or scientific rationality for its legitimacy. Most of the recent Great Harmony articles appeal to these transcendent strategies in order to find a metaphysical foundation for their reformist regime that shows traces of the historical practices of Chinese empire. Rather than simply criticizing an American-centric or Sinocentric world order, in the last section I followed Hardt and Negri to argue for a logic of liberation which works in decentralized and deterritorialized ways. Contrary to Great Harmony’s centralized ‘One-Worldism’, I used classical Chinese texts and contemporary writings by elite intellectuals to elaborate on another type of harmony — Harmony-with-difference. Though some Chinese scholars equate Great Harmony and Harmony-with-difference, this article has argued that they have important differences — while Great Harmony is

593 European Journal of International Relations 10(4) a transcendent utopia, Harmony-with-difference is an immanent logic. Indeed, Harmony-with-difference has been used to explain a more open and productive notion of social order and world order. Rather than Great Harmony’s smoothing of contradictions, Harmony-with-difference is presented as a flexible problem-solving methodology that encourages otherness and difference in Beijing–Hong Kong relations, for example. I thus argued that Harmony-with-difference constitutes a flexible methodology for gen- erating alternative subjectivities in immanent utopia. Still, the logic of Harmony-with-difference runs into many of the same conceptual problems as Empire. Where is the potential for liberation? How can we reclaim control over our subjectivity, and change from being merely products of modernity to producers of immanent power and alternative subjectivities? Many commentators state that it is not sovereignty that is the problem, but the ‘state’ in state sovereignty (see Walker, 1993; Bartelson, 1995). But that argument misses the point. The state constitutes only one arena of politics and sovereignty. If we take Foucault’s (1991) arguments about governmentality seriously, we need to account for and contest power in all arenas of bio-politics. Hence it is not enough to unhinge the state-based Great Harmony from Harmony-with-difference. Like Hardt and Negri’s liberation, Harmony- with-difference needs to describe a dynamic method rather than a universal principle or an achieved state. Thus we also have to treat Harmony-with- difference as a flexible methodology for solving the problems of bio-politics in global and local space. In this way, we can use Harmony-with-difference to push beyond (Kang Youwei’s) critique of state sovereignty and (Fei Xiaotong’s) concern with the homogenizing tendencies of globalization, to see how the immanent logic of Harmony-with-difference works to liberate the bio-politics of the everyday. Both Empire and Harmony-with-difference show that utopia is not a political or philosophical problem for a new vision of world order; rather, politics is constituted in the struggle between transcendent and immanent power. The goal of both Empire and Harmony-with-difference is not a free territory, but a flexible logic of liberation.

Notes This research was conducted as part of a British Academy fellowship at Harvard University, 2002–03. It beneﬁted from presentations at the University of Oregon, the Association for Asian Studies, Harvard University, Fudan University (Shanghai), and Renmin University (Beijing). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. I especially would like to thank Paul Cohen, Arif Dirlik, Merle Goldman, Ellen McGill, Marie Thorsten, Stephen E. Welch, Ming-bao Yue, and Zhang Xiaojin for their comments.

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1. As I note later in the article, tong in Datong can be read in many ways. Though in modern Chinese it usually means ‘agree’ or ‘same’, its meaning is more complex in classical Chinese, where it plays with the tension between ‘harmony’ and ‘sameness’. Indeed, the first Chinese–Chinese dictionary definition of tong in the Xinhua cidian is ‘the same-yiyang’, while the third definition is ‘harmony-he’. Most of the English-language abstracts to Chinese-language articles also translate Datong as ‘Great Harmony’. The Chinese official Xinhua news agency employed ‘Great Harmony’ in its official explanation of Xiaokang (Xinhua, 2002). Hence, I interpret Datong as ‘Great Harmony’. 2. According to Chinese sources, it was actually Deng Xiaoping who reintroduced the concept of Xiaokang into socialist China. In 1979, he described the goal of the economic reforms as reaching the Xiaokang ‘standard’ of a per capita GDP of USD 800 (Deng, 1994: 74; Shi and Shao, 2003: 56). Hence, even when he invoked the classical concept of Xiaokang, Deng was not interested in social ideals so much as political-economic measures. Under Deng, Xiaokang was mentioned in passing as a material ‘measure’; but with Jiang Zemin Xiaokang was elevated to describe the central theoretical goal of the whole ‘society’. 3. The web-based China Academic Journal database provides a broad view of recent Chinese scholarship. Starting with 1994, it has collected full-text versions of articles from more than 2200 Chinese-language social science and humanities publications from the PRC. A December 2002 key-word search for ‘Datong’ since 1994 yielded 829 articles, about 400 of which deal with Great Harmony. The other half of the batch addressed the industrial city of Datong in Shanxi province. Follow-up searches in July and November 2003 yielded about 30 more articles. 4. For a fascinating discussion of immanence versus transcendence in Chinese thought, see the debate provoked by Defoort’s review of Peerenboom’s Law and Morality in Ancient China (Defoort, 1994; also see Hall and Ames, 1998: 219 ff.). 5. A key-word search for he er butong on the China Academic Journal database between 1994 and 2003 yielded around 30 articles that deal with the contemporary relevance of Harmony-with-difference. In the analysis below, I also use other sources, including IR textbooks.

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